The Ghana Journal of Religion and Theology (GJRT), formerly Ghana Bulletin of Theology (GBT), is an interdisciplinary and ecumenical refereed journal that seeks to serve as a forum for religious studies and to promote the encounter between people of different faith commitments and different perspectives on religion. Articles in the GJRT represent neither the views of the editorial board nor the Department for the Study of Religions, the University of Ghana. No part of this written publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without written permission from the publisher.

Publisher: Department for the Study of Religions, University of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 66, Legon, Accra Ghana (gjrt@ug.edu.gh).

Profile: Scholarly articles  
Research Reports  
Reviews of current books

Issues: Twice a Year (July and December)

Editor: Dr. George Ossom-Batsa

Editorial Board:  Dr. Rabiatu Ammah  
Dr. Nicoletta Gatti  
Dr. Abamfo Atiemo  
Dr. Lawrence Boakye

International Advisory Board:  
Prof. Mercy Oduyoye (Ghana)  
Prof. Detlev Dormeyer (Germany)  
Prof. Andreas Heuser (Switzerland)  
Prof. PierLuigi Bossi (Madagascar/Italy)

Inland subscription: GhC 15.00  
Overseas Annual Subscription: US$18.00 (including postage)  
Single copy purchase: US$ 9.00 (including postage)
EDITOR’S NOTE

Welcome to the seventh edition of your preferred African Religious Studies journal. As always, the articles in this edition have been carefully selected to reflect our mission of presenting thought provoking discussions on aspects of the humanities.

In the first article, Dovlo discusses the issue of distinguishing between which race qualifies to be called God’s people. He shows how the Bible is sometimes deployed by some interpreters to perpetuate or construct negative identities about the African race. Through a comprehensive analysis, the writer reveals how African Christians in the Diaspora and Ghana reconstruct their identities as ‘people of God.’

Kissi, in his article describes the similarities in some of the strategies the author of the letter to the Hebrews and the Akans of Ghana adopt in redirecting the pain they feel in their suffering situation, to reflect positively energized perspectives. This provides a refreshing new way of viewing the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The next article by Quayesi-Amakye decodes the ethical issues embedded in the book of Esther. Often, the story is read uncritically so the social, political and ethical implications have not been applied for holistic benefit of the people of God. Attention is drawn to several ignored spots in the narrative that are necessary for sociopolitical considerations.

Amevenku and Boaheng in their article explore the superficial contradiction between the teachings of Paul and James on justification in Romans 3:28 and James 2:24. Whereas Paul believes that people are justified by faith apart from works of the law (Rom. 3:28), James is of the view that people are justified by their deeds and not by faith alone (Jas 2:24). This article analyses the Greek terminologies employed by James and Paul in communicating their views, and contends that the concept of justification expressed by the two authors are complementary rather than contradictory.

The fifth article discusses a different indicator for development as enshrined in the Populorum Progressio written by Pope Paul VI. Although much emphasis is placed on economic growth as an indicator for
development worldwide, Antwi argues that favourable economic indicators do not necessarily reflect the Christian vision of development which corresponds to the well-being of all aspects of every citizen’s life.

Adubofour and Nso-Yine’s article focuses on the establishment of mono-ethnic churches in southern Ghana for migrants from the north. The study portrays the principal role the Frafra Christian Fellowship played in the planting of Frafra churches by assisting the mainline churches. It also shed light on the cardinal importance of mother-tongue in indigenous mission work.

White investigates pastoral transfer in Classical Pentecostal Churches in Ghana and its implication on church life and the pastoral family. The author recommends that pastoral transfers should be carried out in an impartial manner, without compromising on the missional agenda of God and the holistic development of the pastoral family.

In the last article, Majeed examines Gyekye’s critique of selected authors; whilst revealing the flaws in Gyekye’s arguments. Based on recent scientific studies of genetic influences, Majeed argues that Gyekye’s interpretations of the related concepts of ntorɔ and sunsum are unclear. From Majeed’s analysis, it has become significant for philosophers to engage with the necessary resources in an effort to better understand and inform the masses on how, from the indigenous perspective, Akan thinkers construe human personality.

Evidently, the writers have challenged themselves with in-depth analysis of their selected topics and I dare say they have outdone themselves! May I take this opportunity to congratulate them and urge them on in their academic pursuit. It is equally appropriate to thank all our avid readers for joining us on this journey of producing quality research into contemporary religious issues which is practicalized in day-to-day life.

Thank you and enjoy this edition!

George Ossom-Batsa
INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

1. The language of publication is English and French
2. Scholarly articles are welcome on any subject within the scope of the Journal.
3. We only accept articles that have not been previously published, or submitted for publication elsewhere.
4. All rights of accepted contribution will be reserved to the Ghana Journal of Religion and Theology.
5. Author Identification: For purposes of blind reviews only the title should appear on the first page of each article. Submitted articles must come with a cover sheet which indicates the author’s name, institutional affiliation and current status (e.g. Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Professor, etc.)
6. An article should not exceed 25 pages (c. 5,000 words). Submit article in word windows format as an e-mail and sent to (gjrt@ug.edu.gh or gobatsa@ug.edu.gh). Quotations in excess of four lines must be indented.
7. Abstract: An abstract not exceeding 150 words should accompany each article.
This issue was produced with financial support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York through the University of Ghana Building the Next Generation of Academics in Africa (BANGA-Africa) Project.
AN ANALYSIS OF KWAME GYEKYE’S CONCEPTION OF ‘SUNSUM’ IN AKAN PHILOSOPHY

Hasskei M. Majeed

Abstract: The concept of sunsum has been a subject of disagreement among Akan philosophers. Gyekye criticizes the views of Akan writers such as Kofi Busia, Joseph Danquah and Kwasi Wiredu despite his acceptance of their position that sunsum is the basis of an individual’s personality. This paper examines Gyekye’s critique of these authors (especially Busia) and shows how Gyekye’s arguments are not only sometimes inaccurate, but also how they do generate a major problem of attribution that hampers a good understanding of his thesis.

Key Words: Sunsum; personality; personal identity; genetic influence; human behaviour.

Introduction

Sunsum is one of the entities postulated by Akan thinkers as a constituent of the human individual. Individual is to be understood, for the purpose of this paper, in the ontological sense of a person – that is, in the sense of an entity whose identity is either metaphysical or empirical, or both.

The existence of the human body is not denied in Akan philosophical conceptions of a person. However, in addition to the body (nipadua or honam), the sunsum is also postulated and, in some sense, separated from another entity called ↄkra. Although these two entities are often translated as ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ respectively, these translations are heavily contested in Akan thought. For instance, while Kwasi Wiredu and Safro Kwame disagree with Gyekye and postulate that the ↄkra is

1 The Akan is the dominant ethnic group in Ghana, West Africa.
quasi-physical. Martin Ajei and Hasskei Majeed affirm the metaphysical character of the $\kappa r a$. By the account of Gyekye, the $\kappa r a$ acquires a “substantive” identity, similar to the Platonic and Cartesian characterizations of the soul.

Akan thinkers such as Kwame Gyekye, Kofi Busia, Joseph Danquah and Kwasi Wiredu disagree over the rendering of sunsum as “spirit” because of (i) how the word sunsum is employed by the Akan people in their linguistic expressions, and (ii) the sort of activities that are attributed to the sunsum in Akan thought. In this paper, I analyze Gyekye’s conception of sunsum and how he interprets the views of the other thinkers. Gyekye’s conception of sunsum is built upon the views of writers whom he characterizes as anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers. Specifically, he groups for discussion the views of such anthropologists as R. S. Rattray, Peter Sarpong and Eva

---


Meyerowitz,\(^7\) that of a sociologist like Kofi Busia,\(^8\) as well as those of philosophers such as Joseph Danquah and Kwasi Wiredu.\(^9\)

In critiquing these authors, Gyekye states that the anthropological and sociological accounts entail “some conceptual blunders,”\(^10\) which are incapable of justifying the translation of *sunsum* into English as ‘spirit.’\(^11\) The blunders, as summarized by him are: “(1) that the *sunsum* derives from the father, (2) that it is not divine, and (3) that it perishes with the disintegration of the *honam*, that is, the material component of a person.”\(^12\) What Gyekye accepts, nonetheless, from the anthropologists and sociologists is their view that *sunsum* is the personality or the basis of the personality (or character) of the human being. He associates this view with Busia, Rattray and Meyerowitz.\(^13\)

In addition to these writers, the philosopher Danquah also identifies *sunsum* with personality,\(^14\) just like Wiredu. For Wiredu maintains that *sunsum* is that which “gives a person’s personality its force.”\(^15\)

Therefore, it may be said that the establishment of a link between personality and *sunsum* is a position which Gyekye accepts from all those he criticizes.

Gyekye comments widely on the views of Busia and suggests that both Busia and Danquah interpret *sunsum* in physical terms. And, that this is inconsistent with his (Gyekye’s) belief that the *sunsum* is a spiritual entity.\(^16\) On this background, the paper aims at showing: (i) where Busia is not accurately understood by Gyekye, and (ii) that

---

12 Gyekye, *Essay*, 89. In the next section of this paper, I will be guided by these blunders.
Gyekye’s supposedly correct conception of *sunsum* leads him inadvertently to the difficult situation of not knowing where to locate with certainty the source of personality traits. Thus, I show how Gyekye’s analysis leads one to a state of insoluble confusion.

In this paper, I discuss, first, Gyekye’s critique of the anthropologists and sociologists (that is, the three blunders identified by Gyekye), followed by an assessment of his views on the two philosophers (Danquah and Wiredu). Finally, I bring to fore the problem of attribution of qualities of personality that proceed from Gyekye’s argument.

**The Three Blunders: Gyekye’s Critique of the Anthropologists and Sociologists**

This section identifies the three main issues in the critique of Gyekye and examines each in its proper context.

1. Gyekye attributes to Busia and Sarpong the idea that the *sunsum* derives from the father. However, he denies the paternal origin of *sunsum* on the bases that all spirits, including this *sunsum*, derive from the Supreme Being, and that it is *ntorↄ* (responsible for genetic influences) which is acquired from the father. But to understand this debate properly, it is important to interrogate the position of the paternal arguers in some detail. I concentrate on Busia whom Gyekye also discusses at length. I intend to establish whether Busia’s reference to the father necessarily makes him deny the Supreme Being as the source of *sunsum* and whether he denies that *ntorↄ* is passed on from father to child. If my analysis yields positive findings on these, then, Gyekye’s assessment of Busia would not be correct.

Gyekye’s first reason for his attribution of a person’s *sunsum* to the Supreme Being – that is, his belief that all spirits come from the Supreme Being – is not strong enough to confute Busia’s argument. It can only be a straightforward rejection of the position that the father

---

19 Gyekye spells this word as *ntoro* while Busia spells it as *ntorↄ*. For the sake of consistency, I use the latter throughout this paper.
Kwame Gyekye’s Conception of ‘Sunsum’

is the source of *sunsum* only if Busia is not aware of or does not hold this view as well. For that would mean that all Busia knows and can attribute *sunsum* to is the father. But a closer examination of Busia’s text reveals that he holds this view too. He admits that all spirits and, indeed, “all spiritual power derive from the Supreme Being.” The challenge now is how to provide a comprehensive analysis of his position, and determine whether Gyekye is right in the way he criticizes him.

In the thinking of Busia, the English term ‘spirit’ is the proper designation for a complex Akan concept which envelopes both *sunsum* and *ntorɔ*. In this concept, *sunsum* is presented as a speck of the *ntorɔ*. In his words, the *sunsum* is “a child of the *Ntorɔ* and shares its nature.” By ‘nature’ he has in mind spiritual nature. This is the first point of disagreement between Gyekye and Busia. According to Gyekye, *sunsum* is spirit but *ntorɔ* is not. *Sunsum* is derived from the Supreme Being but *ntorɔ* is derived from the father’s semen; *ntorɔ* is a set of genetic factors or inherited characteristics received from the father. Busia, however, regards the *ntorɔ* to be spirit because each distinct *ntorɔ* is, in Akan thought, “under the aegis of a god (*bosom*)” and is thus, a spiritual child of that god or deity who, in turn, is a child of – or proceeds from – the Supreme Being. Indeed, Meyerowitz confirms this spiritual connection between the *sunsum* (an individual’s personality) and the *ntorɔ* deities.

But in what sense is *sunsum* spirit? In the first place, it could be maintained, as Gyekye notes, that *sunsum* is an Akan term used to refer to anything spiritual – either in the form of a spiritual action or entity. As an entity in the human being which bears his or her personality, Busia implies that there are major personality traits in the child which he or she acquires from the father. And if *sunsum* is or bears personality, then, a child’s personality traits most probably largely come from the father. In spite of the fact that in modern, scientific terms

---

these traits are significantly attributed to genetic factors, the indigenous beliefs of the Akan suggest that these genetic factors would be “spiritually” acquired from the father who is just the closest in spirit to the child. In other words, this spiritually transmitted personality traits trace back to the father’s ntorↄ, then to the ntorↄ deities, and finally to the Supreme Being. The father is only the immediate transmitter of personality. Busia reveals this multi-transitional character of the spirit (or sunsum) in his explanation of ntorↄ:

In the same way that these children of the Supreme Being [that is, Ntorↄ deities] share his spirit, so the Ntorↄ are children of the rivers [that is, river deities] from whom they derive their spirits; and in the same way that the Ntorↄ is a child of the river, so the sunsum of a man is a child of the Ntorↄ and shares its nature; thus again, all spiritual power derives from the Supreme Being … [T]he father … is the immediate transmitter of his son’s sunsum from the Ntorↄ …

From the foregoing, Busia’s position is that the sunsum comes from the Supreme Being although it passes through a chain of beings before one acquires it. It can be noted that, contrary to Gyekye’s thinking, his claim that the sunsum derives from the Supreme Being is not different from Busia’s view. Therefore, Gyekye does not succeed in showing that Busia does not conceive of the sunsum as divine. Secondly, Gyekye’s intervention that the ntorↄ is inherited from the father is a belief which is neither new to nor rejected by Busia. From some other activities attributed in Akan thought to sunsum – for instance, its ability to act in dreams – Gyekye is able to postulate, quite brilliantly though, that sunsum must be an entity capable of acting independently. However, his inability to interrogate deeply the implications of the characterization of sunsum as the basis of an individual’s personality gives rise to serious problems in his interpretation of sunsum – and I discuss this further in the last section of the paper.

2. Gyekye also raises a serious issue about the position of the anthropologists and sociologists in connection with the divinity of sunsum. According to Gyekye, this account does not regard sunsum as divine.

27 Busia, “The Ashanti,” 198; Square brackets are mine.
And here again, he cites Busia. Yet, there is ample evidence in the very work of Busia cited by Gyekye to the contrary. For instance, Busia writes: “... the Ashanti believes that every man receives a *sunsum* and also a *kra*. A man’s *sunsum* is his ego, his personality, his distinctive character. It is divine, but perishes with the man ...” Despite Busia’s unequivocal statement that *sunsum* is divine, it is quite difficult to understand why Gyekye would refer to the same page where Busia’s statement is and, perhaps, with some awareness of this same quotation, to impute non-divinity of *sunsum* to Busia. It is therefore relevant at this stage to understand Gyekye a bit more. Gyekye provides the reason for his position as follows:

Busia says that one part of a person is ‘the personality that comes indirectly from the Supreme Being’. By ‘personality’ Busia must, on his own showing, be referring to the *sunsum*, which must, according to my analysis, derive directly from the Supreme Being, and not from the father ... It must therefore be divine and immortal, contrary to what he and others thought.

In this quotation, Gyekye suggests that Busia only discusses the indirect origin of the *sunsum* – but not the question of the divinity of *sunsum*. Gyekye also gives the impression that the divinity of *sunsum* is guaranteed by his analysis alone. But these suggestions are incorrect. Moreover, he does not explain why in spite of Busia’s explicit affirmation of the divinity of *sunsum*, he would still insist that Busia does not argue for the divinity of *sunsum*. In the absence of this, Gyekye’s critique of Busia’s argument is not fully justified. But if I grant that he (Gyekye) is aware of Busia’s postulation of the divinity of *sunsum*, then, I can assert that he believes Busia cannot maintain that *sunsum* is divine and at the same time claim that *sunsum* comes ‘indirectly’ from the Supreme Being.

The suggestion here is that one can only claim that something comes from a being if that thing comes *directly* from the being. But this reasoning is problematic and unhelpful to the course of Gyekye. In the context which this debate is taking place, to be divine is, if properly

---

30 Busia, “The Ashanti,” 197. Ashantis are one of the Akan peoples who speak the *Twi* dialect. Not all Akans speak *Twi*.
understood, to emanate from the Supreme Being. In view of this, it seems to me, something received indirectly from the Supreme Being can be said to have *emanated* from the Supreme Being. This may be illustrated with the analogy where a posted parcel is said to emanate from its sender even if an agent of the postal service is the one who gives it directly to the receiver. This analogy commits Gyekye to the unintended position that the parcel did not emanate from the sender. But I need to caution that the process of acquiring divinity status as held by Busia, which I deem correct, does not prevent Gyekye from maintaining that *sunsum* emanates directly from God – that is a different issue altogether. In other words, a debate about what it means to be divine (that is, whether directness or indirectness of origin of something makes it divine) is different from one which is about whether or not something (like *sunsum*) actually has a direct or indirect trace to the Supreme Being.  

3. Gyekye also attributes to the anthropologists and sociologists the view that the *sunsum* perishes along with the body when a human being dies. I have stated above that Busia holds this position. Gyekye’s rebuttal that *sunsum* is not mortal makes sense to me because this attribute is rather applicable to the body. This notwithstanding, I reject aspects of Gyekye’s argument. Gyekye states in opposition to the perishability thesis that “… if the *sunsum* perishes along with the body, a physical object, then it follows that the *sunsum* is something physical or material”. This statement cannot fully apply to Busia because he holds that *sunsum* is spiritual, not physical or material. He notes, “A child receives two spiritual gifts, a *sunsum* and a *kra*. He implies therefore that the *sunsum* is spiritual, but it can perish. This means that Busia is right about the spirituality of *sunsum* but only wrong about its mortality. I therefore do not support Gyekye’s argument fully.

---

32 This does not mean that an Akan thinker cannot hold that *sunsum* is never derived at all from the Supreme Being but is derived just from the father. For example, Sarpong traces *sunsum* to the father and rather traces only *kra* (which he translates as soul) to the Supreme Being – (Sarpong, *Ghana*, 37). Wiredu however translates *kra* not as soul but as a life bearing quasi-physical entity - Wiredu, “The Akan Concept,” 121.
Gyekye on the Views of the Philosophers: Danquah and Wiredu

Danquah does not only consider *sunsum* to be that which provides an individual’s personality, but also suggests that it (*sunsum*) has material properties unlike the *кра* (soul). Danquah attempts to strengthen his argument for the materiality of *sunsum* by claiming also that *sunsum* is that part of the human being that undergoes “conscious experience.” Gyekye correctly rejects this claim with the analogy that “a purely material thing, such as wood or a dead body, cannot experience anything.” And for the same reason that I accepted Gyekye’s criticism of Busia’s claim above that *sunsum* “perishes with the man,” I think that Gyekye is right in denying Danquah’s assertion that *sunsum* has material properties.

Wiredu also supports the view that the *sunsum* is not spiritual. He observes that the *sunsum* “is believed by the Akans to perish at death whereas spiritual beings are supposed to be immortal by nature.” It is noteworthy that Wiredu’s position that the *sunsum* perishes at death is not based on any evidence from the Akan language or practice which he, as a native Akan, has observed. He mentions Busia as the source of that belief. But Busia himself does not support his claim with any evidence (in terms of Akan language or practice). He merely states it. Therefore, the view that the *sunsum* perishes at death is not an argued position. In any case, I have (in agreement with Gyekye) rejected this view.

Wiredu’s perspectives on the functions and the relationship between the *ntorɔ* and *sunsum* are also worthy of philosophical attention. According to him, the *ntorɔ* ‘is that which is responsible for the cast of his [that is, an individual’s] personality’ and is acquired from the father, while *sunsum* is “that which is responsible for the total effect

---

37 Danquah, *Akan*, 115-116. He writes *кра* as *окара*.
38 Danquah, *Akan*, 112.
43 Wiredu, “The Akan Concept,” 119; my square brackets. This is an adaptation of Busia’s analysis of the account given by his (Busia’s) informant. The informant first states: *sunsum*, transmitted by the father, is ‘the personal power, or cast of countenance, or personality of man’.
communicated by an individual’s personality.” It is difficult not to see the dovetailing of the two definitions into each other; “personality” being the unifier. Wiredu implies here that *ntor* casts personality but *sunsum* brings it into effect. This is particularly so if one also takes into account Wiredu’s earlier statement that *sunsum* is, “that which gives a person’s personality its force.” In terms of general outlook, Wiredu’s treatment of *ntor* and *sunsum* is similar to Busia’s since Busia has also technically sought to merge the two concepts. This shows Wiredu’s indebtedness to Busia as he further taps into Busia’s ideas in support of his treatment of the concepts: “According to some accounts, there is a close relation between ‘sunsum’ and ‘ntor’. (Thus, Busia says ‘A man’s *sunsum* is a child of his *ntor’).”

I make two observations about Wiredu: first, his claim that the *ntor* derives from the father cannot literally be attributed to Busia without qualification. For I have explained above that, the latter meant the father was just the immediate transmitter of *ntor* when he stated that it is derived from the father. However, it is quite possible that given Wiredu’s dependence on Busia for the development of his (Wiredu’s) argument, he understands the father factor in the Busian sense, yet there is no explicit evidence in his work that shows he does. Secondly, Wiredu does not only mention *ntor* and *mogya* (blood [believed to be inherited from the mother]), but he maintains, most importantly, that these are probably related to genetics – unlike *nipadua* (body), *кра* and *sunsum*. In this sense, he comes closer to Gyekye, despite

Although, the informant uses the word ‘sunsum’, Busia follows this sentence up with what appears to be a correction: “But most often the Ashanti will say that a man transmits his *Ntor* (spirit) to his child” (Busia, “The Ashanti,”197). By suggesting that *ntor* could replace *sunsum* here, Busia allows some role in the formation of personality to *ntor*; and this is exactly what Wiredu appears to have adapted in the development of his position. This interpretation of *ntor* is, nonetheless, rejected by Gyekye as discussed above.

43 Wiredu, “The Akan Concept,” 120.
the fact that the two of them do not necessarily share the same views on what kra and sunsum mean.\(^{47}\)

**The Problem with Gyekye’s Conception of ‘Sunsum’**

The inaccuracies or shortcomings in Gyekye’s arguments which I have identified and discussed above are those that relate to how he has interpreted and critiqued other scholars – especially Busia. What I seek to do in this section is to discuss the major problem which I find in his own exposition of the Akan concept of sunsum which is partly built – as one would expect – on the way he understands authors whom he has criticized. The problem results from the way he conceives of the relation between the sunsum and ntor\(^{\circ}\).

Having admitted, like all the other authors, that the sunsum of an individual is the basis of his or her personality, Gyekye nonetheless faces a great challenge of showing clearly the source or cause of personality traits in the individual. Gyekye identifies sunsum as an entity in the human being that can function on its own. According to him, an individual acquires his or her character or personality only through sunsum – an entity which he also regards as spiritual.\(^{48}\) He, then, advances that personality traits or “qualities” such as “courage, jealousy, gentleness, forcefulness, and dignity” are “spiritual” just like the nature of sunsum.\(^ {49}\) However, since he claims that these qualities come from the sunsum which in turn is given by the Supreme Being, a gentle individual (for example) would trace his or her gentleness to a God-given sunsum, but not, on Gyekye’s own presentation, to a father-given ntor\(^{\circ}\). Gyekye explains that ntor\(^{\circ}\) is/are genetic feature(s) thus, ntor\(^{\circ}\) would be “the basis of inherited characteristics and may therefore be translated as ‘sperm-transmitted characteristics’, even though spiritual as well as physiological qualities are attributed to it.”\(^{50}\)

Gyekye, however, does not pay much attention to the meaning he gives to ntor\(^{\circ}\) in the preceding paragraph, and this is exactly the origin

\(^{47}\) For instance, Gyekye does not regard kra as a quasi-physical entity, contrary to the position of Wiredu which I have stated above. Gyekye regards it as metaphysical (Gyekye, Essay, 85).

\(^{48}\) Gyekye, Essay, 90.

\(^{49}\) Gyekye, Essay, 90.

\(^{50}\) Gyekye, Essay, 94.
of the problem he faces. He does not, for instance, tell what the physiological and spiritual qualities attributed to the \( ntor\) are, except to assert that the “introduction of inherited characteristics into the constitution of a person” makes the Akan concept of a person “complex.”\(^5\) In the absence of specification, then, it is difficult to tell whether or not Gyekye would agree that “inherited characteristics”, for any individual, might include gentleness, courage and forcefulness which he conceives as personality (traits) and has attributed to the \( sunsum.\) But it seems that these qualities might indeed be inherited. The question then is, what really accounts for the personality of the individual? Is it \( sunsum\) or \( ntor,\) or both? Are there some qualities or personality traits that are obtained from the \( sunsum\) but not from \( ntor?\) Does the reverse hold? Gyekye does not provide his reader with any clear responses to these questions. Therefore, he would find it difficult to tell what, in Akan philosophy, would be the source of any trait at any point in time.

The question of the possibility of genetic influence on human personality needs to be taken more seriously, especially now that it appears to have gone beyond possibility to the level of scientific fact. For example, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has established that: “In view of existing evidence from studies of monozygotic (MZ) twins,” using genetic influence to predict behavioural traits “might be able to account for” up to 50% of the variance of those traits.\(^5\) The Council however cautions against the use of just one gene as a causal explanation for a specific trait, since a gene “will normally interact with many other genes and with many non-genetic factors” in accounting for behavior. It (the Council) also emphasizes that “the proteins that genes make and the way these affect our bodies and brains will be one part of an explanation of human behavior.”\(^5\)

Similarly, after Thomas Bouchard Jnr. conducted a research on the effects of genes on personality traits among some twins in affluent Western societies, he concluded that “Genetic influence is in the range

\(^{51}\) Gyekye, \textit{Essay}, 94.  
\(^{53}\) Nuffield, \textit{Genetics}, 36.
of 40 to 50%, and heritability is approximately the same for different traits”.\(^{54}\) He also suggested that genes indeed do influence personality traits, and that “molecular mechanisms” do shape behavior.\(^{55}\) Given these research findings, Gyekye needed to have accounted thoroughly for both \(ntor\) and \(sunsum\). This notwithstanding, \(sunsum\) is by no means an easy concept. It is clothed with technicalities and woven into several difficult concepts, one of which is \(ntor\). This observation is also made by Gyekye: “I must admit [that] the real nature of the \(sunsum\) presents perhaps the greatest difficulty in the Akan metaphysics of a person and has been a source of confusion for many.”\(^{56}\) He sets out to solve this difficulty—suggesting also that the difficulty “is not insoluble.”\(^{57}\) But as I have already shown, he has not been very successful in doing so.

**Conclusion**

Kwame Gyekye is renowned for producing original ideas in African philosophy, especially from within the Akan or Ghanaian context. His ideas on the Akan concept of the human being do not only challenge the views of previous thinkers but also offer great insights for anyone seeking a deeper knowledge of Akan thought. It is in this light that he examines the concept of \(sunsum\). In Akan thought, \(sunsum\) is one of the entities that the human person is composed of. He accepts the accounts given by Busia, Danquah and Wiredu that the \(sunsum\) is personality or determines an individual’s personality.

However, his arguments against these scholars, especially Busia, have sometimes been inaccurate. For instance, while his rejection of the mortality of \(sunsum\) is correct, I have shown that his attribution of the idea of the materiality of \(sunsum\) to Busia is incorrect. I have also

---

\(^{54}\) Thomas J. Bouchard, “Genetic Influence on Human Psychological Traits,” *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 13, no. 4 (2004), 149.

\(^{55}\) Bouchard, *Genetic Influence*, 151. He cites M. Ridley, *Nature via Nurture: Genes, Experience and what makes us Human* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003) and G. Marcus, *The Birth of the Mind: How a Tiny Number of Genes Creates the Complexities of Human Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 2004). I reckon that his studies took place in the West, but it is only a matter of time before similar findings are made on Africans, if they are not already being made.

\(^{56}\) Gyekye, *Essay*, 89.

\(^{57}\) Gyekye, *Essay*, 89.
argued that his interpretations of the related concepts of *nto*ɔ and *sun-sum* are unclear, and as a result, his position on the general debate on *sunsum* is cast into the sphere of insoluble difficulties. Given the importance in recent scientific studies of genetic influences on human personality, it becomes more pertinent that the difficulties in Gyekye’s thesis be pointed out in an effort to understand how, from the indigenous perspective, Akan thinkers construe what is now referred to by Wiredu as “rudimentary genetics” and human personality.

Dr. Hasskei M. Majeed

Department of Philosophy and Classics,
University of Ghana, Legon
(mmajeed50@yahoo.com)