UN INTERVIEW
Brian Urquart
June 1, 1984

Interviewer: Leon Gordenker

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GORDENKER: This is the second interview with Brian Urquhart. Today we are going to concentrate on the character of the Secretary-General. One of the ways to begin this is to think about those characteristics of an occupant of or a candidate for that office that are most relevant to his choice and working in that office. Would you like to talk a bit about that, Brian?

URQUHART: I think we should just take the general necessities in this office first, because it is an extremely difficult office to fill and I do not think that any of the incumbents so far has satisfied all the qualifications required, although some have had quite a high number of them.

I would say, in the first place, to be the Secretary-General of the United Nations one must have a sense of mission, because it is in some ways an extremely thankless job and one does not have the normal supports of power, influence and leverage that even the politicians in quite small States have. Also, he is compelled throughout to take a middle line, which normally ends with his not being particularly popular with anyone. So that the first characteristic of a Secretary-General, in my view, is a sense of mission, a sense of dedication, and a real conviction that what he is doing is actually worth doing.

Following on that I think one needs to have a very advanced political sense - a political sense in the true meaning of the term - of the motivations, the fears, the aspirations and the frustrations of the people with whom one is dealing and the ability to look at those factors in an objective way, because if one does not do that one almost instantly becomes involved in the problems one is trying to solve.

GORDENKER: Isn't there some contradiction between a sense of mission and the ability to maintain objectivity?

URQUHART: No, I don't think so. And, after all, objectivity and impartiality are prescribed in the Charter for the members of the Secretariat. It is important to remember that the Secretary-General, although the world's No. 1
civil servant and a very highly publicized personality, is in fact a member of the staff; he is a member of the Secrétariat, which he heads. I think that the qualities required of us are also required of him. Without them it would be very difficult for him to operate.

I think the experience and knowledge of politics and public life are important — and with the five incumbents so far that experience has varied very widely.

I think that a clear analytical capacity and, if possible, a high intellectual level are desirable — a capacity to analyse situations for what they are rather than for what the various protagonists in them or the press say they are; in other words, really to get to the root of problems and try to deal with those problems on that basis, rather than on ephemeral and superficial criteria which is always a temptation.

I think that a very high degree of moral courage is required: day to day the courage not to wish to be popular, not to wish to be liked and not to succumb to the temptation to tell everybody what they want to hear; and, possibly, in some situations, much more than that: the ability to take a stand in public which will be unpopular with a very wide circle of persons but which you are convinced is the right stand and therefore what you have to do. I am thinking, for example, of Hammarskjöld's conduct in the Congo which was extremely unpopular with practically everybody. That is but one example. Or, indeed, poor U Thant's experiences in 1967.

I think that as a factor of courage, daring maybe a good idea — though I am a little bit doubtful about that. I think that there are rare occasions when great courage is required to do what is necessary. But daring is something else: I think the quality required is the ability to judge the situations which require a daring approach, not do it as a matter of course.
Obviously, a public personality is very important for any public figure - I mentioned this in the first interview - and that is partly a matter of luck and what you were born with; you do not control it but it is an extremely important factor. I think it is probably even more important now that there is a whole industry of image-making related particularly to the television medium. I think to be able to resist that and have a real public personality which is genuine is something with which people are born and for which they are not necessarily responsible, but it certainly helps.

I would say that patience is an absolutely pre-eminent quality for the Secretary-General, because in that job you have to put up with an immense amount of frustration and an immense amount of harassment in one way or another. After all, everybody wants you to be on their side; everybody will blame you publicly if you are not; the press will very often get it wrong about what you are doing, and you are in effect the world's No. 1 scapegoat in certain international situations. To put up with all that, do something useful and stick to what you think is the correct course require great patience. That has been a very variable quality of our five incumbents, but it seems to me that in the long run it is an immensely important quality.

It is often forgotten nowadays that the Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer and has, apart from anything else, to run not only the United Nations bureaucracy but also theoretically to co-ordinate the whole United Nations system of autonomous specialized agencies - a task which itself is really doomed to failure by the system but which everybody persists in allotting to the Secretary-General because they can't do it themselves.
I think that in running the Secretariat it is very important to remember this is a new bureaucracy. It is less than 40 years old; it has gone through a series of basic changes in its constituency which has made it even more difficult to run than at the beginning. It is an international civil service which was initially based on Western ideas which aren't necessarily accepted in most of the rest of the world, and we have had, as a matter of practice, to modify the way we run the Secretariat to take account of the fact that the Western bureaucratic system isn't the only idea for running a public organization. And, of course, we also have the problem - which I regard basically as an asset - of having to put together a Secretariat composed of nationals ideally of all 159 Member States. In the long run, I think this will prove to be an advantage, not a disadvantage; but in the organizational phase it makes life very difficult.

I think that is enough for the time being on characteristics of the Secretary-General.

GORDENKER: May I, then, ask you to go on and talk about each of the individuals who have held the office. When you do so it might be an interesting point to bring up that each of these persons comes from a somewhat different culture. Although the Western European culture dominates with three candidates, it would be interesting to note as you go along whether that has made any difference in the world in which they functioned.

What about Trygve Lie? What sort of person was Trygve Lie? Which of the characteristics that you think are important did he display?

URQUHART: When Trygve was elected he was quoted as saying that he couldn't understand why this impossible job had fallen to a Norwegian labour lawyer. I think one has to start from that. The selection of Trygve Lie as Secretary-General was based on political necessities, not on any search for someone who had the ideal
qualifications for the job, and Trygve was very much aware of it. His background, as I said before, was in the labour movement in Norway: he had been the Minister of Justice in Norway, the Foreign Minister of Norway in the Government-in-exile in London during the war, and had had considerable political experience — but in a rather unusual and restricted atmosphere, partly due to the conditions of the war. I do not know whether that served him well or badly. He always referred to his "political nose" — by which he meant his instincts — rather than to perhaps the more difficult path of hard work and intellectual analysis. He had a considerable contempt for intellectuals and was very much a kind of non-intellectual type. He was a proud man.

He was also rather suspicious — with good reason, I think. After all, he had been dealing all during the war with the British, who are not always the most straightforward people to deal with. I think he was a rather suspicious man, anyway, and he was extremely conscious of the status of his position and extremely anxious not to have anyone fool around with it. I think he was right about that. He was very touchy, for example, about seating arrangements at formal lunches and dinners. People sometimes thought it was silly. I never did, because I think he was right. Symbolism is very important, especially in an office which was new and was being built up by him as the first incumbent.

GORDENKER: Do you think he did that quite deliberately, in a symbolic way. Was this a ____________________________ advantages?

URQUHART: I think it was partly both. I think Trygve was a rather vain man and he was a rather touchy man. But I think he also had a very serious understanding of the importance of his office, of the importance of the whole concept of the United Nations, and I give him full credit for that. We
sometimes made jokes about him, but one makes jokes about everybody so why not. However, it seems to me that basically he had a very serious idea of the job which he had been almost fortuitously selected to do, a job for which he was well aware that he did not have possibly all the ideal qualifications.

Trygve was a very subjective man, very easily personally put out; he had a very quick temper and used to fly easily into quite impressive rages which, I think, were partly put on and partly not. Personally, if one thinks about what he actually did he comes out a great deal better than people have given him credit for.

I think I said before that his great achievement was to get the Organization - the United Nations - started, and he hit the ground running. We had the whole thing going full blast on serious conflict and other cases before we had even got the room, set up and the chairs by the tables.

GORDENKER: I remember it well.

URQUHART: I think he really did extraordinarily well on that. He had quite a lot of good help, and he had had a good preparatory start from Gladwyn Jebb, who had been the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission, who had done a marvellous job in getting the rudiments of the Secretariat together, as well as getting things like rules, regulations and procedures more or less set. But even so, Trygve had the job of moving the whole thing to New York, finding a temporary headquarters in Hunter College, then another in Lake Success, then getting the Assembly set up in two places at once - because we had to have it in Flushing Meadows, we had the Military Staff Committee meeting in the Henry Hudson Hotel in New York. It was a very, very complicated period, and I think he pulled that together very well.

But, of course, his great achievement probably was that he managed to get the Headquarters site question settled. I think people have now forgotten what a
complex and controversial affair that was. There was a great deal of controversy in the United States, let alone elsewhere, about where the United Nations should be settled. There was — it seems unlikely now — in fact a cut-throat competition to get the United Nations to San Francisco, the Middle West, Westchester County or New York City —

GORDENKER: Or the Black Hills of South Dakota.

URQUHART: exactly, or the Black Hills of South Dakota. There were — I forget how many offers there were, but there was a great number — people actually sitting there lobbying, including the Mayor of San Francisco, Mayor Laguna). It as a very hot issue. Trygve, I think, decided very early on — and I think it was the best decision he had ever made — that New York City was by far the most sensible place to put the UN, from a long-term political, communications, vitality, point of view, and he set to achieving that and did it. He did that by cultivating excellent relations with Mayor O'Dwyer of New York; Bob Moses, the then City Co-ordinator of New York — an absolutely remarkable man; the Rockefeller family, especially Nelson, and so on; and latterly with Mr. Zeckendorf ( ), the real estate man who put the whole deal together. He got that through and really devoted a tremendous amount of time and energy and, I think, imagination to making it work. We owe him a great deal — if for nothing else — on that.

I do not think Trygve had great intellectual or analytical capacity. As I say, he more or less flew by the seat of his pants. He was always speaking of his "political nose".

GORDENKER: May I interrupt you here. Just on this very point. You spoke of the Headquarters as an illustration of his "political nose". Is this an illustration of the way his experience as a politician in a small country might have fitted well as a politician in a metropolitan area which was roughly the same size as a small country?
URQUHART: I think his excellent relationship with the New York City authorities was very much like that. He was a sort of one of the boys with the New York City group, and they were a pretty impressive people too. I think that was a very major factor. We had a hell of a lot of problems. For one man - if you come to think of it - to have settled this somewhat rumbustious international circus into the middle of one of the most populated and one of the most constricted cities on earth, and to have done it with apparent ease, is no mean achievement - especially by the New York City people and, I think, also by Lie. I think he cultivated extremely close relations with them, they liked him, and the sort of boon companion aspect of Trygve's character served the Organization extremely well.

When we got to big, major, world political problems maybe it didn't serve him so well. I do not know what else he could have done, but of course the Palestine problem was the pre-eminent one of his later years. How he could have done better on that I don't know. Anyone who had been Secretary-General would certainly have been accused by the Arabs of being pro-Israeli and by the Israelis as being pro-Arab - and, indeed, Trygve was mostly the former. He was served extremely well, first by Bernadotte and then by Ralph Bunche after Bernadotte was assassinated. I am not sure how happy he was with that. He really was rather a secondary influence in the later development of the Palestine problem.

And, of course, he finally got tripped up completely on Korea - through no fault of his own whatsoever. Nobody could have escaped it. Once the Security Council had decided on the unified command under the United Nations flag in Korea I don't think any Secretary-General would have had any option but to go along with it and support it. But in doing that he lost the Soviet Union.
GORDENKER: Was he able to intellectualize, verbalize, his situations in those conflicts that you mentioned? Was he able to formulate —

URQUHART: No, I don't think so. If you read his memoirs — which, of course, were written after he retired and with which he had a lot of help — there is a very good analysis of all these things. I think that probably in the back of his mind this was true, but I don't think he could do it a part of on the hoof, as it were. I dare say maybe it didn't matter very much. I don't think there was too much he could do about it. He was very impatient with intellectualizing or analysis. He wasn't very keen on it, believing that instinct was better. I think that he was rather easily made subjective about problems by the way people treated him, the sort of things they said, and so on; he was a touchy man. But that doesn't in any way detract from his basic dedication and the feelings he had about the Organization.

And I think one should remember that, though it turned out to be politically unfeasible, Trygve did make a number of proposals which were quite important in the political field. As I mentioned before, he proposed the United Nations Legion. The idea was a United Nations permanent peace-keeping force. Now that's a non-starter for all sorts of political reasons which we can go into later. But he did at least propose it strictly to do with the Palestine problem and the situation specifically in Jerusalem which was a disaster, both before and after the statehood of Israel for some time. He actually modified that idea into what became the United Nations Field Service, which in fact is an extremely valuable addition to the Secretariat. I think Trygve could claim a lot of the credit for having developed that really essential group, which has served us wonderfully well in the field ever since.
As I mentioned before, he was rather prone - but then everybody was in those days - to a sort-of 10-point, 20-year peace plan and things like that. That was fashionable in those days. Everybody did it. I don't know where that came from. I think perhaps from Roosevelt. That wasn't really very practical -

GORDENKER: Four freedoms?

URQUHART: For instance, we were dealing with - four freedoms - point 4, you know. There was a lot of that kind of thing going on then. And I don't think there was anything wrong with that, except that it turned out, in our case, not necessarily really ever to get into - you never get into a sort of gear out of neutral on these things.

GORDENKER: Do these represent any kind of originality or insight, or are these borrowed notions? What I am really asking is how -

URQUHART: I am not quite sure. I think Trygve was basically a rather pragmatic sort of person, and when he saw that there was no one who could police the Holy City of Jerusalem during an increasing onset of fighting, lawlessness, anarchy and so on he tried to put forward ways in which it might be done - and, of course, certain things did come out of that: the whole truce supervision business, which we have done in many parts of the world ever since; the seeds of the whole base of peace-keeping were in the Truce Supervision Organization originally in Jerusalem and then later expanded, and the Military Observer Group in Kashmir - which is still there - to police the cease-fire of 1948 in Kashmir. Those were actually developed in the field by others. Bunche, I think, should probably get the major credit for the way those things were set up and actually made to work. I think that was an enormous contribution by Bunche, but Bunche was working under Lie and to do these things needed Lie's agreement and co-operation at all times, and Lie freely gave it. Therefore he certainly deserves some of the credit for that.
He was a very, very impatient man - impatient with political problems, impatient with people and, latterly, very impatient with the staff. He did have a very bad time over that. The McCarthy period, the witch-hunt in the Secretariat and the persecution of many American members of the Secretariat, including some very senior ones, would have been a very severe trial for any Secretary-General, especially when it coincided with the Soviet boycott of the Secretary-General. In Trygve's case, I don't think he handled that particularly well, but then I don't know anybody who might have handled it better - except, of course, Hammarskjöld, who handled it brilliantly. On the basis of Lie's experience it was an excessively difficult period to operate in at all in any orderly fashion - because the plain fact of the matter was the American establishment was paralysed by the attacks of McCarthy and nobody would venture to do anything sensible or reasonable. Therefore, he got no support whatever and was, more or less, left alone to try to work things out and try to protect his staff and also make quite sure that relations with the host country did not become completely unmanageable.

**GORDENKER:** He had the insight to see the implications of that, did he?

**URQUHART:** Well, I am not sure. Of course the trouble was that the staff also got very angry with him, so he became very impatient with them as well. I think they also didn't show very much sense. There was an immense amount of It would have been much more helpful if Trygve had had the kind of personality to be able to get the staff into a coalition with them, then at least he would have had a solid front here. That sort of didn't happen, and by that time he was tired, exasperated and extremely angry, with the Soviet Union, with McCarthy, with the United States and with his own staff. That was a factor of impatience and a certain rather short fuse. And I suppose the mixture of the Soviet boycott and McCarthy was what led him to resign in November 1952.
I don't think Trygve had very much organizational talent, nor indeed had he ever done much organization so far as I know. But, again, that's a judgement that has to be qualified, because organizing the UN Secretariat in the middle of a very heated series of political situations is not like organizing a nice, neat national civil service—and it was a very difficult task—and anyone who criticizes his performance in that has got to see, first of all, that it is not just like organizing a national foreign office or something; and, in the second place, he had to organize while the thing was actually in full gear, which is a very difficult thing to do. There was no possibility of delaying important appointments to make sure you had the right person. You needed somebody immediately, and very often the wrong people were available.

I think he was very badly served by his senior staff, the eight Assistant Secretaries-General who, with a few notable exceptions, were extremely mediocre.

GORDEIKER: That's a point I would like to come back to later.

URQUHART: And we had better come back to that, because a lot of the troubles we have had since have been due to that.

He was very well served, I think, by Andy Cordier, who was a kind of all-purpose general factotum and who had a very disorderly mind which was the ideal for this rather fluid set-up, but also a very clear idea of what was important to get done. And I think that Andy did a remarkable job. I don't know anybody else who would have had quite the personality and the same stamina to do the kind of things that were done then.

He was not at all well served by his Chief of Administration. The first one was a joke: Jolly Jack Hudson, somebody who had been fired from the Department of Agriculture—he was called "potato Jack"—who was a complete farce.

GORDEIKER: He was an expert on tobacco, wasn't he?
URQUHART: He was an expert on tobacco; yes, that's right.

I don't think he was particularly well served by some of his other Assistant Secretaries-General.

GORDENKER: Let's get back into that in a later session or later in this session.

I would like to turn your attention to Dag Hammarskjöld. But before I do, let me put to you a very general question about Lie. Was he a man who grew up to his office? Was this a man who cut the potential of his office down to his size? Was this someone who in his improvizing matured a philosophy? Was this someone who in some sense went beyond daring the world to throw him out and built a real foundation of policy and not just happy improvization?

URQUHART: I think that Trygve did in one way grow up in the office. I think he really gave it his best, and in retrospect I think it was quite a considerable best too. But I don't think he ever developed a sort of coherent, overall concept of policy or anything like that. Nor am I quite sure how easy that would have been to do in that period. You have to remember in that period you had a really astonishing reversal of fortunes for the UN.

When we arrived in the United States we were thought to represent the coming of the Millenium and everything was going to be all right. But the cold war was already creeping in and completely destroying the basic concept of peace and security under the Charter – something that has never been reconstructed. The demise of the Military Staff Committee, which was the essence of this concept, and the turning down of the Baruch Plan on the international control of atomic energy were, in my view, the two major symptoms of a total reversal of the basic concepts of the Charter, that is, the unanimity of the great Powers in dealing with matters of international peace and security. Discouraged, also, was virtually abandoned.
Trygve had to come to terms with that as we went along, and I don't think at that stage anybody – except sort-of rather more academic people like me – had really asked themselves what the hell was happening. And he was quite impatient if one tried to explain that we were operating on a kind-of reverse situation to what was intended. So that I think to that extent he was not the kind of person who could conceptualize problems and then try to develop a practical policy out of them. Even if he had been, I very much doubt if anybody would have paid very much attention.

In those days it was fashionable to believe that the Secretary-General should be a very obscure person and should not take part in political matters. Later on, when the cold war froze the Security Council almost totally, it became fashionable to ask the Secretary-General to be a highly visible political entity – but it wasn't true in Trygve's time. And Trygve resented that; he was a politician basically, and he wanted to take a political role. Personally, I think he was right – and actually he was proved right by events after he left, because that is what happened to the Secretary-Generalship. But when he was there it was not fashionable, especially with the European Powers, and particularly the British who were always quoting Sir Eric Drummond. I think that was a very severe strain on him, and I am not quite sure he realized what the real basic nature of the strain was until it became abundantly clear when he had the painful experience – which others had later – of getting stuck on an issue where he had to go forward on a course prescribed which was literally certain to disaffect either the East or the West.

Trygve had come in strongly suspected of being very pro-Soviet. I think that was a gross misjudgement of him. I don't think he was either pro-Soviet or pro-Western. He was thought to be pro-Soviet because, when Minister of Justice in Norway, he had revoked the asylum of Leon Trotsky (??), as a result of which
Trotsky went to Mexico and got murdered. This was always held against him in right-wing circles, especially by people like Colonel McCormack of the Chicago Tribune and others like him; and he was very much written up in the sort of loony, right-wing press in the United States at that time as a real communist agent. He violently resented that. Of course, the ironical thing was that he got written up in Pravda and Izvestia as a quasi-imperialist, United States stooge, running dog and so on, in no uncertain terms. So that he really did have a very frustrating time.

But, basically, the thing that was true was that the Organization, instead of being the theatre of unanimity of the great Powers, had become the jousting ground for the two feudal barons carrying out their ideological war. It has been so ever since and is one of the reasons why it doesn't work very well - although I think we have to keep trying. None the less, right from the beginning it has been a basic impediment, and I don't think Trygve quite understood what had happened to it - until he finally got stuck with the Korean business.

GORDENKER: What do you think of his public image? You have made the point several times that it is important that the Secretary-General be able to represent a broader public than his own immediate entourage by what he is doing.

URQUHART: I don't think Trygve had a very. That was awkward for him. In the first place, he didn't speak very good English and he spoke no French. In the second place, he was a very large, beefy, rather sort of purplish kind of man and appeared to be very flustered a great deal of the time; he wasn't cool - I mean in any sense of the word - and I don't think that helped him. On the other hand, he had a good war record; he was extraordinarily, in one way, a very endearing and decent person - though tricky. I don't think he really had a public image - hardly at all - and in fact people weren't thinking very much about
public image of the Secretary-General in those days, because the UN started with such a dazzling public image — a great mistake in my view — that they weren't really thinking in terms of persons at that time; they were thinking about the collectivity of the Security Council and that kind of thing, and the halo over the whole Organization. That was rather quickly dispersed; but in Trygve's time that was the main thing.

You also have to remember that at that time there were some very striking public figures actually in the Organization. There were successive Secretaries of State of the United States who appeared a great deal here. There was Gromyko. There was Alexander Cadogan, who was a rather internationally known diplomat, the British Permanent Representative. There were some very spectacular — Paul Henri Spaak, who was President of the first session of the General Assembly, a very spectacular man, one of the great orators of the age. There were extraordinary figures: René Kassan, that amazing Leon, all these very spectacular public figures; Mrs. Roosevelt, who was an extremely important part of the set-up —

GORDENKER Krishna Menon.

URQUHART: Krishna Menon — there were many. One could go on talking. There were some extremely spectacular public figures intimately mixed up in all the dealings of the UN, and so the Secretary-General did not stand out above them in any sense. And, indeed, I don't think Trygve had that kind of personality, so it did not really come up so much then.

GORDENKER: In our last session, you said that at the end of Trygve Lie's tenure of office there was a considerable disarray in the Organization; that Hammarskjöld was brought into this quite without any anticipation on his part and had to cope with it. Suppose we talk a bit about Hammarskjöld's characteristics: what he brought to the office and, in particular, how he reacted to what he found here after he took over the thirty-eighth floor.
URQUHART: I should preface this by saying that, having written a very long book on Hammarskjöld, what I think about him is probably much better expressed in there than anything I'll manage to do now. But -

GORDENKER: That's an excellent book, but you might have reconsidered parts of it, it might look different in the light of -

URQUHART: No, no; I don't think so. The interesting thing about Hammarskjöld was that he was lucky, as I said before, to arrive at a period when the dawn was rather clearly visible in terms - temporarily, as it turned out - of the cold war and all that. You had a year of exceptional positive events of various kinds. In that respect he was lucky. I think he would have done very well anyway.

When he arrived, Hammarskjöld was, ostensibly, a very young, extremely diffident, very quiet, slightly mysterious figure - and he looked much younger than he was, which was 47. Most people really didn't know anything about him. I don't quite know why not. He was very well known in European circles, because he had been one of the great planners in the Marshall Plan - and that was where the British and French had come to admire him so much; he had been the President of the Bank of Sweden and Secretary of the Treasury in Stockholm at the age of 29 - which was quite remarkable; he had been the Minister of State in the Foreign Office for some time, but nobody knew much about him except in European circles. So he had a great advantage of starting rather inconspicuously.

The first thing he had to tackle was the mess in the Secretariat - which, by that time, was almost total: the place was in a state of uproar, very bad morale, total disorganization, extreme discontent. What he did was himself work out and analyse the basis of the problem and then tackle it at the root by two means: one was to revolutionize the way in which we dealt with the United States Government;
but more important, to look at the basis of the Secretariat, the Staff Rules and Regulations, the way the Secretariat operated, the relationship of persons in it to each other and fundamentally to try to get that into control and change it if necessary - and he did that.

GORDENKER: Would you characterize that as methodical?

URQUHART: It was better than methodical. One of the less read papers in the UN—and I have Hammarskjöld's administrative papers from that period; they are absolutely extraordinary, partly because they are very concise, partly because they are eminently readable—unlike almost all other papers of that kind that I have ever seen—and partly because they do what they do—which is Hammarskjöld's great strong suit—they enunciate principles and the practical means by which you put those principles into real effect. It was the real trick of the Administration—and Hammarskjöld was a very good administrator. The pity of it was in later years he never had time to do it.

He also did a complete reorganization of the Secretariat by dint of having meetings himself with every single major grouping in the Secretariat—something like 85 meetings all told—and as a result of that completely reorganized the Secretariat. He shifted people about. Without really ever firing anybody, he managed to reduce the number of officials in places where he thought they were excessive. He actually reduced the budget by about $2-$3 million which, in those days, was enormous, because the whole budget was, I think, somewhere in the order of $35 million. All that revolutionized the morale of the Secretariat, because you had the feeling that you were in the hands of somebody who knew what he was doing and, furthermore, in a quiet way had a very dominating personality.
GORDENKER: Would you talk more about that. How did he dominate?

URQUHART: It's rather hard to say. He had none of the qualities of a sort-of great leader that you can think of.

GORDENKER: Not charismatic?

URQUHART: Well, it was in the long run — of course it was charismatic. He was extremely firm. He was always slightly ahead of the game. He had a brilliant analytical mind and was able to think in advance of problems — something that almost nobody I know can do. He was extremely articulate and also capable of the most amazing obscurity when necessary — which lent a slight air of mystery to what he was doing, especially later on, on political matters — which, actually, is a very good trick because then you can spring new ideas on people at exactly the right moment when they might be wishing to grasp for them. That's what his great strength in negotiation was. He was a very, very imaginative, extremely knowledgeable man. He had an infinite capacity for absorbing basic facts on any subject. We were all much surprised later on, for example, when the Suez Canal got blocked in 1956 to find that Hammarskjöld was an expert on international insurance and toll rates; and he devised a brilliant scheme, which nobody ever noticed until it had actually worked, for financing the clearing of the Suez Canal by upping the Canal fees by 2 per cent which, in fact, paid off the entire debt literally on the day that he was killed — and nobody even noticed it. He was a very, very competent, remarkable man in these sorts of ways. That's why I said I think it was such a pity that he wasn't around for the great period when somebody with an over-all economic notion would have been very helpful, because that was really — he was an economist by training and background.
As far as the staff was concerned, I think people were very unfair to Trygve Lie - though it was tempting to be so. Everybody was so relieved to see a change that they were prepared to endow Hammarskjöld with all sorts of qualities which he perhaps didn't have. He was a very difficult man to know personally - in fact, almost impossible; I think he disliked the notion of intimacy to an enormous degree. Anyone who tried to trespass on his privacy was very brusquely rebuffed.

But he was very benevolent and minded very much about cases. For example, I had a great friend called Gustavo Duran -

GORDENKER: Yes, I knew him.

URQUHART: who was one of the main victims of McCarthy; he was a marvellous Spaniard. I said to Hammarskjöld: "You know, this is a really terrible case. This is a man with a heroic record, one of the more remarkable performers in the Spanish Republican Army in the civil war in Spain, he was a remarkably talented man and is being ruined." Hammarskjöld was horrified by this and really did a remarkable job, not only of solving the problem - which was ridiculous anyway with Gustavo; a non-existent loyalty problem - but also of recouping Gustavo's morale. So that, side by side with this rather rebuffing sort of reclusive character, he had a great warmth and compassion for actually doing something. I think that got across to the staff.

He was also quite tough with the staff - which was a very good idea. It wasn't a one-sided proposition, protecting the Secretariat; he also made it very clear that the Secretariat was very well going to be in a situation where it deserved protecting. That, I think, was quite a shock to some people, but he did it and people began to see the point of it. He was extremely intolerant of
mediocrity or mistakes and could be very, very tough if he was irritated by what he thought was a bad performance—which was rather new, actually. I was delighted to see that, because we hadn't seen much of that in the previous five years.

**GORDENKER:** Let's take this point of his intolerance about mediocre performance and put it into a somewhat different sphere. If he was intolerant of mediocrity around him, mediocre performance, or simply neglectful performance, how did he operate with the statesmen that he had to meet all the time, many of whom could be accused of this at any moment, or seemed to be acting so?

**URQUHART:** They weren't employees; he wasn't responsible, after all, for the statesmen. He was responsible—

**GORDENKER:** He had to talk with them.

**URQUHART:** In private, at any rate, he was extremely intolerant of a great number of them. This, I think, was quite a difficulty, because I think people realized he was not always exactly patient with what he regarded as poor performance or stupidity. And a lot of people certainly resented this—quite a lot of people. On the other hand, that was part of his character. There was no way you could do anything about it. Hammarskjöld believed that you did somebody no justice, or paid them no compliment, by tolerating the fact that they were stupid. One can carry that sort of thing too far, but it is not a bad idea, actually, and it certainly keeps people on their toes.

**GORDENKER:** In contrast to Trygve Lie, here you have an individual who has a very broad range of vision. You can never imagine him as one of the boys down at the precinct club-house on the East side in New York—

**URQUHART:** No—I am sorry—in no way.
GORDENKER: What about that? Was that a limitation or was it a
(inaudible)?

URQUHART: Hammarskjöld was regarded with great suspicion by a lot of
people on the outside at the beginning - for example, by Henry Cabot Lodge, by
Dulles, by Eisenhower even. He was regarded as a kind of rather innocent, priggish
Swede who really didn't have too much to do with anything and who was making
preposterous demands about the way the Americans in the Secretariat were being
treated - the McCarthy thing - and it was all very awkward, because McCarthy was a
difficult political issue in Washington, and they were really very snooty. And, then, they discovered - which everybody else has discovered with other
Secretaries-General - that every now and then even the United States had a problem
that it couldn't solve, and it came rather quickly with the Americans.

He got into terrible trouble with the Eisenhower régime over the Guatemala
coup of 1954 when the CIA overthrew the Government of Guatemala, and Hammarskjöld
not only denounced it to the United States but also made what he thought about it
quite clear in public and indeed proposed to take action on it - and they were
furious.

Then, of course, we got to the affair of the American airmen in China, where
the United States had got itself into a corner - because, on the one hand, they
refused to have anything to do with the communist Chinese Government in Peking and,
on the other, were demanding the release of American airmen who had come down in
China from an airspace in which they had no business. It was a rather tricky
situation; there were 17 of them. And - finally, like so many impossible situations, it
wound up first of all in the Security Council, then in the General Assembly and, in
the end, it was dumped in the lap of the Secretary-General - and everybody assumed
that that was the end of it. Hammarskjöld took that perfectly seriously and
proceeded to take it on as a job - which nobody thought was possible. To do that he went to Peking and conducted a most elaborate negotiation - not helped by the fact that right in the middle the CIA tried to shoot down Chou En-Lai's plane on the way to Bandung. None the less, he went ahead anyway and finally got those people out. It was then that Dulles suddenly realized - Dulles was very critical of Hammarskjöld's talking to the Chinese, making great friends with Chou En-Lai, being extremely rough on the United States when they made statements that he thought were unhelpful - that Hammarskjöld got results. I must say - greatly to everybody's credit - they then realized they were dealing with an absolutely major international figure of a very unusual kind. I think that was an extraordinary - that was his great breakthrough with the United States. And the British who had been somewhat hypercritical about him also realized he was something to reckon with.

Then, of course, they had their trouble with Hammarskjöld over the Suez, when Hammarskjöld, as usual, behaved in an extremely outspoken and straightforward manner - at one point even making a statement in the Council saying that the Secretary-General's function was based on the assumption of the co-operation of the members of the Council, in good faith, and if that co-operation was not forthcoming then he didn't quite see what the Secretary-General was supposed to be there for.

GORDENKER: Was that a pretty daring thing to do?

URQUHART: At that time, but it had a very chastening effect on both the British and the French, who did not want, on top of all the other trouble they had got into in the Suez, to end up in a sort of head-on collision with the Secretary-General, and again, greatly to everybody's credit, especially Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary throughout that crisis, ended up becoming a friend and admirer of Hammarskjöld, having gone through all those problems.
I think that's where Hammarskjöld was remarkable: he was of a stature that, no matter how much you might have disagreed with him on something, you came out at the end realizing you were dealing with a person who was not going to be pushed around, who was not going to be partisan, one side or the other, and who was a real force as an individual. That is something we had never had before or since in a Secretary-General, I must say. But that is a very unusual human quality.

GORDENKER: Let me ask you another kind of question about this human quality.

Hammarskjöld represents the glory of the Western European civilization - a trained intellectual, based in university, with a very wide range of factual knowledge, but really no experience of a revolutionary situation or the poverty and difficulty of the third world. How much could he empathize with the third world? To what degree was this a good point?

URQUHART: You have asked what, to me, is the most interesting and perhaps the most moving question about Hammarskjöld. As you can obviously see, I had a tremendous regard for him - though I didn't know him very well - and thought he was an absolutely marvellous man.

When he died - what was the name of that marvellous French Ambassador who was responsible for his appointment? I can't remember his name, but he was the French Permanent Representative here in 1953 - he paid a tribute to Hammarskjöld in which he said:

"Sweden, which in all the periods of European civilization has evaded the revolutions that have afflicted the rest of us and has therefore preserved in an uninterrupted stream the great spirit of the eighteenth-century enlightenment."

And it is perfectly true, actually. It is very interesting. If you go to the
Swedish Academy of which Hammarskjöld was a member you will see the eighteenth century in living form; it is absolutely extraordinary. It doesn't exist anywhere else. Hammarskjöld was very proud of that. But, of course, it did also mean he was rather naïve in some respects.

For example, he was deeply shocked—the thing that made him really angry at Suez was that the two pre-eminent European Powers, the people he most admired, the British and the French, could behave in this incredibly sort of dishonest, hypocritical way, saying they were doing one thing in public and doing exactly the opposite in private. He thought that was outrageous, particularly since and of course it was added to by the fact that he had just negotiated here in New York with the Egyptian, British and French Foreign Ministers what in fact was the solution of the Canal problem, and the British had to overthrow that agreement in order to invade. They did it, and I think that was one of the really major problems.

He was very free to admit that he came from an extremely privileged elite which it is really if you stop to think of it, and, of course, the great emotional experience of his later years here was started with his trip around Africa in early 1960. Again, he was rather naïve in some ways. He was rather naïve. Hammarskjöld had very little idea of what other people were like until he found out the hard way. He wasn't very experienced in judging people, I don't think—which was rather charming in way. That was something he did not have. He was not an acute judge of character. He was tremendously impressed by that trip and never stopped talking about it, and believed that now the colonial problem was out of the way the UN would bridge the relationship between the old colonial Powers and the newly independent ex-colonial Territories which needed each other but could not admit it owing to the political history of the immediate past.
That was, of course, the basis of his whole enthusiasm for the Congo operation and that was where he learnt it was not quite as simple as that, because the post-colonial world wasn't functioning in a kind of Garden of Eden, where good intentions were the only thing there. There was the East-West struggle and there was the whole problem in the new countries – which everybody else has – of politics growing up, and politicians, rivalries, corruption and all that kind of thing, and it wasn't quite the kind of Garden of Eden that he thought he had glimpsed. He had seen a spot where he could be of great help to those people. He really loved those people. He was devoted, for example, to Sekou Touré; and then he was deeply shocked when he discovered that beneath Sekou Touré's sort-of rive-gauche intellectualism there was a very tough African tribesman lurking who was perfectly prepared to clobber the opposition by all means. He was deeply shocked by this. I think to that extent he was a little slightly well, in a way, it was a naivety which was rather touching.

GORDENKER: It's a

URQUHART: He made the same mistake with de Gaulle. He believed that he could strike up a personal relationship with de Gaulle similar to the relationship he had struck up with Ben-Gurion in Israel or Fawzi, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, which was a fantastically important factor in Hammarskjöld's successes in the Middle East, because he really was a great personal friend of both and liked them. He thought he could do that with de Gaulle and Khrushchev. Anybody could have told him that was nonsense. It was only when he was much too far to get out that he discovered he was going to be struck down by both of them – and he was. He was a little bit naïve in that way, but I don't think there was anything terribly wrong with that. He was a rather pure-hearted man, really, and wasn't prepared to admit
that the world was a corrupt and evil place, he was just not prepared to admit that, so he got into lots of trouble. But I don't think that detracts from his character.

GORDENKER: I don't intend it to detract from it, but I do find it really interesting that here you have a person whose intellectual keenness had developed to a degree where he became a first-class international politician but in encountering a situation in which the daily stuff of life is far more important than grand politics he didn't know that he-

URQUHART: This is where I think he became unstuck. For example, he did very well in sophisticated parts of the world - the Middle East or even South-East Asia, where you have a very long sophisticated culture - where those very complicated nuanced plans which he used to work out, which were really amazing, did fine. For example, in Lebanon in 1958 he really did a remarkable job of solving what was in fact an extremely hairy problem. After all, there was a civil war in which the United States had suddenly landed with 14,000 marines - he has never got any credit for it, because nobody wants to admit it was a mistake - but the fact of the matter is it was Hammarskjöld who provided the basis upon which Eisenhower was able to withdraw the marines with honour - something we could have done with last year - and he did it in a fantastic personal negotiation with the Lebanese, all of them, with Nasser, with the Syrians, the Americans, the British, everybody. That was a huge personal diplomacy, and he could do that.

But, of course, when he got into the Congo - where nobody was playing by the Queensberry or any other rules, and indeed had never heard of them - when he was dealing with Lumumba, Gizenga or Tshombe he got into one hell of a mess, because he was in an area where there just weren't any rules - and people were scared, which also made it worse. And then he got into a terrible muddle, I think. We'll talk about that later.
I think what you say is correct: the formation of Hammarskjöld was this very intellectual, élite formation, which worked wonderfully well with very sophisticated people. But with people who weren't running on their mind it was a bit more difficult.

GORDENKER: I want to ask one more question along these lines. You described Hammarskjöld as a person who thought deeply about those events with which he came into contact and formulated, always, some kind of principled approach. He had notions about the edges of his schemes and where this would go and so forth. You also described him as a person who was quite masterful at certain kinds of personal relationships — with Ben-Gurion, with Fawzy, personal negotiation on the Lebanon and so forth.

URQUHART: Chou En-Lai was a very important element in that success.

GORDENKER: Chou En-Lai. Was there any conflict, do you feel, in this rather detached mode of analysis, on the one hand, and the necessary nuances of a personal relationship, on the other?

URQUHART: No, I don't think there was provided he'd picked the people right. I think where he got into trouble was with people whose culture he wasn't familiar with — for example, Nkrumah.

GORDENKER: Chou En-Lai?

URQUHART: Chou En-Lai, after all that's a highly — you know there was something very Mandarin about Hammarskjöld, actually. In fact, in one respect he was more oriental than U-Thant. We shall go into that also. What we haven't mentioned here is the amazing phenomenon of Hammarskjöld's personal —

GORDENKER: Mysticism?

URQUHART: interior life, which this book Markings is all about. I think it is a very interesting phenomenon, because as the pressures mounted on him and he had more and more difficulties — and he really did have some major ones, I must
say, partly due to his own fault - Hammarskjöld took refuge in a more and more mystical view of religion and in the end was much more a mystic than U Thant, who was a practising Buddhist. Hammarskjöld was the real thing, and I think for that reason it was perfectly easy for him to get on fine with - oh, I don't know - the King of Laos, Chou En-Lai or even Krishna Menon. But when you got to a sort-of different culture, Africa, in the first fine rapture of independence, Hammarskjöld was immensely enthusiastic about Nkrumah and Sekou Touré - and even at one point about Lumumba. But then suddenly discovered that these chaps were not at all on the wavelength that he was on and that caused some very considerable hitches. My goodness, we ended up in some really tremendous messes - and I don't think there is anything wrong with either of them. I don't think it was anybody's fault. It was just what you were saying - he was in the unknown there and wasn't really prepared for it.

GORDENKER: Was he ever in the unknown on technological matters?

URQUHART: No, he was very good on that, as a matter of fact. He had this extremely disciplined mind.

I organized the first International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which is arguably the greatest meeting we've ever had - and it was absolutely marvellous, I must say:

GORDENKER: We have managed to leave that out of the scheme; it's going back in.

URQUHART: It should be in, because it was an extremely important meeting, not only scientifically but also politically. He became passionately interested in that and really did master the kind of necessary general concepts of nuclear physics, reactor technology and so on, so that he could talk to the Advisory Committee. He loved it. He very much enjoyed intellectual problems; he liked to try and master some new field, could do it and was good at it.
GORDENKER: I'd like to use this to go back to Trygve Lie for just a moment. Lie began to see the dawn of the present era of technology, first with the Baruch Plan and then later on increasingly with telecommunications and with notions about economic development, including the transfer of technology - it was, after all, in Lie's time that the first technical assistance mission was sent out, to Haiti -

URQUHART: Is that right? I didn't know about that. I had forgotten.

GORDENKER: Yes, that's right, in '48.

URQUHART: Yes, that's right.

GORDENKER: So, therefore, you have someone who really was at the dawn of this new era too. To what extent did Lie understand this or react to this?

URQUHART: My guess would be scarcely at all.
URQUHART: Lie was very much strictly a political figure.

GORDENKER: There was a patching together of coalitions.

URQUHART: I don't think that Lie would have ever presumed to have been any kind of even amateur in economics or anything like that. It was out of his scope and he wasn't going to pretend it was in it, which I think was perfectly sensible. Hammarskjold was an economist by training and profession and a very remarkable one, and it was very much easier for him. Also Lie didn't have any intellectual curiosity. I don't think Lie ever read anything, certainly not to my knowledge, except for Zane Grey of all things. We had the complete works of Zane Grey in the Secretary-General's office in those days.

GORDENKER: Eisenhower also read things like that.

URQUHART: But Lie was absolutely open about it; he was not an intellectual and basically a political operator, and who can say that's a bad thing to be? It's all right. It's just a matter of a difference in interests and character really.

GORDENKER: How about you in all of this? We're going to stop pretty soon, but let me ask you just one question about yourself. We have gone through two periods of Secretaries-General. You are standing by, working very closely for one of them and increasingly closely with the second. What was your impression as a civil servant and as a person about working at this time? What sense of excitement and mystery, of failure, of success did you have? Give me your sort of personal views.

URQUHART: I don't want to go into personal things too much in this because I don't think they are of any very great interest. I joined the Secretariat in July 1945 after six years in the British army. I had never in my adult life had anything to do with civilians at all until that time, and I must say...
they were quite a shock to me. You have to remember that in those days we had all sorts of people running around. We had Alger Hiss, George Marshall, everybody. was a very big deal in those days. I was very much impressed by this and also astonished by the way civilians behaved. It was rather like being in a zoo with most of exotic animals. I was also very much astonished that, in July 1945, people genuinely believed that the Charter was absolutely the real thing, that we were going to have everybody sitting down, that the world was going to come to order, that things were going to work according to Chapter VI and Chapter VII, end that things were going great. The major fly in the ointment in those days, apart from the beginning of a very suspicious attitude by the Soviet Union, was the argument between the United States and the European colonial Powers on the urgency of decolonization, which you can imagine was a pretty hot subject with the Dutch, the British, the French and the Belgians. But it was very far off. It was thought that decolonization would take about a hundred years and would be an extremely gradual process. Then of course the British put tremendous impetus behind it with India in 1947. And after that the thing began to pick up steam, and I think one of the most important things the United Nations did was to provide not only the incentive but also the catalyst for this enormous historical process, and I still think it's tremendously important. And the person who did a great deal in that was, of course, Ralph Bunche; but we'll come to that later.

I was, like everybody else, delighted it was what I wanted to do anyway and it did seem this was the great hope; especially if you have been killing people for six years. It was jolly nice to stop doing it and do something else. It was really marvelous. It was like living in a marvelous new world, which one hadn't really thought was possible.
Then of course the frustration set in, because I was intolerable; I was the private secretary to Gladwyn Jebb and then what was then called the personal assistant to Lie, and was constantly making extraordinarily forward suggestions as to what we ought to do, mostly of a rather grandiose kind. I had no idea of the limits of reality or politics at all. Everybody was quite nice about it because I had a very good war record, so nobody wanted to be nasty. But the plain fact of the matter was that we were a great pain in the neck. And then of course, on top of that, when we got organized under Gladwyn Jebb in the Preparatory Commission it was a 24-hour-a-day free-for-all, totally improvised and it was marvelous. We had a very small number of people. Everybody did everything he had to do and it worked beautifully. It was when bureaucracy set in and we began to have tables of organization and departments and rules and all that that the trouble started.

GORDENKER: Which was not so different from your military experience.

URQUHART: No, not so different. But we also had to get everybody into all the slots and start working right away, as I said before. And this was a terrible hazard, and the most incredible people began to appear. So when we got here I became increasingly critical, I am sorry to say, of most of my colleagues, especially the senior ones. But of course it didn't help. I was also, probably very unfairly I think, extremely critical of Lie, who was having a very difficult time. He had all the responsibility and was torn in seven directions at once. He was quite out of his depth I think, in quite a lot of it and would say so. And after Gladwyn Jebb he was the opposite, an extremely cool, extremely funny professional who never, never showed the smallest sense of emotion in any situation
- and Lie was always getting these tremendous tempers and getting flustered and sweaty and so on, and it was, in contrast, I must say, I don't think we were very helpful, frankly. We were always proposing ideal solutions to what were political problems, which is a great propensity among precocious young people. When I look at my papers from that time I blush at the kind of things we expected people to do and then were furious when they didn't do them. But one began to learn.

I don't know what would have happened under a different person to the administrative set up. I think it was a mess and still is to some extent. For example, people did things that were ludicrous. They set up the Public Information Office as if it were the American Office of War Information, which was a propaganda agency. There was absolutely no way in which the United Nations could have—We are still suffering from that now. It was a complete misconception, and yet we had all these great experts - Eric Biddle and everybody—telling us that this was the right way to do administrative things. We had a lot of real administrative hotshots, and, boy, it wasn't the way to do it, and whether someone more perceptive than Lie would have made any difference I am not so sure. But anyhow that was one problem.

Politically it was distressing because the first fine careless rapture was very quickly disposed of in the very first cases in the Security Council—the Azerbaijan case and various things and the increasing rhetoric between Vishinsky and Molotov on the one side and Dulles, Adlai Stevenson, who was the American representative in the Preparatory Commission, and so on on the other. Then we had the beginnings of the Palestine problem, and of course none of us at that time realised that, curiously enough. Whatever one feels about the Palestine problem, that is the cross on which this Organization today to a great extent, in my view,
has been crucified, and I think it has served to divide and sort of split this Organization in a way that nothing except the East-West struggle has done. I think it has had an incalculable effect and I regret it. We were completely wrong. We all thought that that was a problem that would be solved in a few months, but of course it wasn't.

So one learned as one went along. I parted company with Lie in 1948 because I had made another juvenile error, which was to try to reform the administration and the *modus operandi* by getting in Sir Robert Jackson, then Commander Jackson, as kind of super chief of staff. He was an absolutely remarkable man with a fantastic organizational gift, but he was totally unsuited to the political atmosphere of the UN. It was a total disaster and at that point, since it was my idea, I was made the joint private secretary between Lie and Jackson, who absolutely hated each other. But they would never abuse each other to their own face. They would always abuse me and tell me to pass it on and then they would be sickeningly polite to each other when they met. And it wasn't helped either by the fact that Jackson insisted on addressing Lie all the time in cricket metaphors. He would say, "We're on a very sticky wicket today, Secretary-General. We should play back from the bowling and hit it to the leg", and Lie would say "Vot does he mean?". And of course it was impossible. So it was an unhappy period and finally, when I was away on leave, Lie fired Jackson. He was about the only one he ever fired. And this somewhat soured our relations.

And then I was very bothered about Lie's attitude towards Bunche, who was the Mediator in Palestine at that time and in grave danger. It was a very, very dangerous job and I felt that Lie was not supporting him and indeed was in some respects undermining him. I may have been wrong about this, but we had a big
row about that and finally we agreed it was not a very satisfactory relationship, and I was sort of discarded and went into the Co-ordination Section, which was as boring as hell.

But the first five years were a very disillusioning period and whether some of it could have been avoided I am not sure. We could not presumably have avoided some of the political disasters. The administrative side, I am not so sure about. But then of course that all pulminated in the McCarthy business, which was a major incredible setback to the whole idea of a corporate secretariat.

GORDENKER: We will spend some time on that. We should stop now because you have to get on with your work. I think that next time we will pick up with U Thant, if that's all right with you.

URQUHART: That will be fine. What I would like actually.... At what point are we going to get into actual situations rather than into personalities?

GORDENKER: Right after we get done with this.

URQUHART: All right, fine. That's good. I think we have done enough on Lie and Hammarskjold.

GORDENKER: I think we have. It was your choice to start on the Secretary-General, you recall, and I think it was a good choice because it gives us a certain amount of overview. We out into it a little bit and we tend to learn each other's style too.

URQUHART: I'm afraid I'm rambling a great deal, which is not a good idea.

GORDENKER: I don't think you're rambling at all. You take off "up the bayou" occasionally, but I think that's all right and, after all, you're not trying to state something here that is going to be published tomorrow.
ahead, some day, some how our dreams will come true. This is my impression.

Q: I hope we have not taken up too much of your time.
A: No, no. I apologize if I spoke too much.
Q: No, indeed. And we are going to take you up on your offer to look you up when we get to Gen
A: You will be most welcome. I will get my better half to meet you.
Q: I'd like that.
Q: ... you don't change your mind.
The members of the Syrian delegation were — and you will have to excuse my very poor pronunciation — but Farih Al-Khourì
A: Paris Al-Khourì died. He is dead.
Q: Nam Al-Anakri?
A: He is dead.
Q: All right. Nazam Al-Kudusi?
A: He is still alive. He was President of the Republic of Syria too.
Q: Do you know where he is now?
A: I don't know, but most probably he is in Paris.
A: He is dead.
Q: Do you know when he passed away?
A: About four years ago. (unintelligible)
Q: Then, Nurandin Khalala?
A: I don't know, but I think he is alive.
Q: Would he most likely be in...?
A: In Syria.
Q: And then the Secretary to your Prime Minister, Raja Horani?