James Sutterlin: Mr. Duelfer, first of all I want to thank you for agreeing to participate in this Oral History Project of Yale University. I would like to begin this conversation, which will be focused obviously on UNSCOM, in asking you to describe what your background was before you went into the position of Deputy to the Executive Chairman, and if you would, to describe how you perceived your job there.

Charles Duelfer: I was seconded from the State Department, where I was a Civil Service Officer, as distinct from a Foreign Service Officer. I was, I guess, considered an expert in political military affairs and I spent my time at State in the Political Military Bureau dealing with both regional security issues in Africa, Central America, and the Middle East, as well as with arms control issues. At the time, the early ’90s, I was head of something called the Center for Defense Trade, the Deputy Assistant Secretary under Richard Clarke on those types of matters; although during the Gulf War, the Under Secretary of State, Bob Kimmit, had asked me to run the State Department task force when the situation did turn to a war as opposed to just a crisis. I spent the period of the war running all the State Department operations center functions: counter-terrorism, and so on and so forth. After the war I was involved with some of the initiatives to control
conventional arms in the Middle East. There was something called ACME: Arms Control in the Middle East Process. But it was not until 1993, when Bob Gallucci had become the Assistant Secretary at State Department...

JS: In Political Military Affairs.

CD: ...in Political Military Affairs, then I went up to UNSCOM. The way that worked was that Bob Gallucci, then the Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs, had been in fact the first Deputy Chairman under Ekeus. He spent about six months there, and then there were two other people who temporarily filled the position for a period of months, Pierce Cordon and Ambassador Newlin, a former Ambassador to Algeria. But I was offered up to Rolf Ekeus along with a couple of other names, and interviewed with Rolf Ekeus, and he picked me. I don’t know if he’s lived to regret it or not, but in any case, I began my service there in October of ’93, and stayed there until the very end of UNSCOM and when Hans Blix began his chairmanship of UNMOVIC.

My role was to serve the Chairman, and of course the needs and the requirements of the Chairmen tended to change over time, but I think that in all cases I was seen as a link in many ways to the United States government, and I had deep knowledge of various elements in the US government, high levels to low levels. But also I served in other ways to facilitate UNSCOM things with other countries and in fact with the Iraqis as well. It was an evolving relationship. I’m not sure this gets to what you’re looking for.
JS: Your responsibilities essentially then were as a true Deputy, and they were in a sense the same as the Chairman.

CD: Ekéus in particular, to the extent that you could term his leadership as management, operated a bit on a hub and spoke system; the fact that I was the Deputy did not mean that everyone in the organization had to report through me to Ekéus. That was not the case at all. In fact, it was a very loose management structure, it was a very small organization, and Ekéus kept his hand in everything. There was no formal structure in particular, but I think Ekéus operated to the extent that he felt his staff knew what was going on and he trusted me. Again, the first day I pitched up, I was not a trusted member of the staff. I was a new person on the staff, and one had to demonstrate value-added, I think, and I believe I did that fairly quickly. One of the first things I could do was offer an easy connection for him to elements of the US government, and also a way of testing what those parts of the US government were saying, what they meant. If he was getting some kind of signal from some part of the US government, I could tell him, “Well, based on my experience, this is what these characters are reacting to, or what they really want.” But a Deputy as someone who acts for the Chairman, yes that did occur, but Ekéus was very cautious on that. I think he really ran things as really an extension of himself.

JS: But your American nationality then was an important factor in your job; your familiarity with the US government and, I presume, the trust the US government had in you.
CD: From the start, the position of Deputy was seen as an American position. Now over time, the role of the United States, and the role of the other Security Council members, and their criticism of this relationship grew. I think immediately after the war there was a strong consensus in the Council. The thesis that I have is that the Council was very strong in April 1991, and while not decaying in a straight line, it inevitably tended to come apart as Council members had different agendas and objectives. But certainly, from the start, there was recognition that the United States had a special role in winning the war, they had the most resources, they knew what was going on in Iraq more than anyone else did, and therefore it was logical that they had a strong position and role in UNSCOM. But in all the time, the reservation of the Deputy position for the United States began to be challenged, particularly in 1997, when the Iraqis were complaining about the preponderance of what they called the ‘Anglo-Saxons.’ In October of 1997, they of course began to refuse cooperation, they refused to have the U2 operate, and this became a crisis. At that point in time, the Russians, with the acquiescence of the Washington Administration, took a leading role in diffusing the crisis.

JS: You’re talking about the U2 crisis.

CD: The U2 and a prohibition against American inspectors. This was the first time that UNSCOM had withdrawn its people from Iraq. It was a decision taken by Richard Butler, who was the Chairman at that point in time.
But one of the elements of the package of steps the Council took was to have an emergency session of the commissioners, and Russia’s stepped up, and with a straight face in this emergency session, they proposed, through their commissioner—who at least nominally was supposed to be acting on his own behalf though he was clearly acting on instructions—he proposed that for the more efficient operation, more efficient and effective operation of UNSCOM, that there should be five Deputies, and that each of the Permanent Members of the Council should have a Deputy. This would be intended to make the Commission more effective and efficient. It was not agreed to, but it does indicate the fact that there was an American Deputy, and only an American Deputy was being challenged.

JS: To skip ahead, and since you have mentioned these particular incidents in which the Iraqis took a much stronger line against Americans and the U2, which they I think considered to be an American operation, do you have particular feelings to what the importance of the timing was? Why did the Iraqis move at that particular point? Did they already sense disunity?

CD: Their strategy, and I should say that I had very frank and close dialogue with the Iraqis, particularly the Deputy Ambassador, a guy named Saeed Hasan, who is in fact now the Ambassador up there.

JS: When you say “up there” you mean New York.
CD: New York, yes. I think I probably had a good sense through him, and probably Baghdad through me, of where things were headed. He would say, quite frankly, that when he felt they were making progress with the Council. But I think they did sense progress, but you've got to look at the entire course of time. There were a lot of things going on. Towards the end of 1993, Iraq finally acknowledged Resolution 715 on November 23, 1993. This was an enormous step forward, in the sense that they then accepted the legitimacy and the task of UNSCOM monitoring, not just saying that Iraq got rid of the weapons, but that there was a continual presence without end, in principle, of the UN to monitor their activities. Now throughout 1994, UNSCOM's almost entire activity was to put in place a monitoring system, and the investigation of previously constructed programs, they were called 'past programs,' was set aside. That went forward. The Iraqis were pressing very, very hard that we declare the system operational.

In October of 1994, there was to be an important report to the Council where the Iraqis were demanding in essence that we declare this system operational. In my view, it was far from being operational. We did not have the biological monitoring system in; we had the rudimentary part of the chemical system. We had conducted surveys throughout Iraq of various facilities that we had to make decisions on whether they should be monitored at all, and if so, how often, in designing what we call 'protocols.' The missile system, because it involved a relatively small number of sites, was the most mature for monitoring purposes. But there was a lot of tension, and Iraq, to increase the pressure on the Council, moved forces south, and this was seen correctly as a threat, and Iraq has an exquisite sense of the use of force, sometimes they go overboard, obviously, but they will mix dialogue with force. In the fall, they moved force; the Americans reacted by
responding with a redeployment of more force to the region which was very expensive. But this caused debate in the Council, and subsequently, the Iraqis moved back. But Iraq saw that, I think, as progress.

In 1995, UNSCOM was pressing to get the Iraqis to admit it had a weapons area that, frankly, UNSCOM had been overlooking, and that was the biological weapons program. In the course of putting in place the monitoring system for biology, we were caused to focus on biology and some of the disparities and illogical parts of what Iraq had been doing became evident. Moreover, this caused us to bring fulltime biologists on the staff. One of the things we didn’t do, which was our own fault, we didn’t have a full-time biologist on the staff until 1994. That was I think a big oversight; we tended to focus on missiles and chemical weapons, because it was obvious that Iraq had them.

Frankly, UNSCOM was a bit like a child’s soccer game, where you see this mass of kids all chasing the ball, and people don’t play position. We tended to do that a bit, frankly, but in any case, in the course of putting in place the monitoring system, we were looking at something called ‘growth media’ in particular. ‘Growth media’ is the material that you use to grow cultures, and for legitimate purposes in diagnostic and medical situations you buy this stuff by the kilogram. We came across data from suppliers, and in fact data in Iraq, that they acquired tons of this material. How do you reconcile this? We got the usual tales from Iraq; one which I called the ‘progressive idiot theory’ was that “You know, we are a very simple country, really, and our clerks are really uneducated, and you also have to realize that we had a lot of money at the time, and there weren’t resource constraints, so if a clerk is told to fill out a purchase order and he fills it out for a kilogram, he passes it to the supervisor, and the supervisor says ‘If one kilogram is good,
then ten kilograms must be better.’” And so on. So they wind up ordering a ton when they really only need a kilogram. This didn’t really hang together. In any case, we felt we had compelling evidence that Iraq had an offensive biological program. Certainly the United States assessed, before the war, that they had both Anthrax and Botulinum, otherwise they would not have inoculated troops.

JS: The US, you mean.

CD: The United States. But we at UNSCOM had not really been focusing a lot of energy on that. In the spring of ’95, there was basically a tacit, an explicit agreement, between Tariq Aziz and Rolf Ekeus. I had made a trip to Baghdad in May, and again had been pressing the point that they needed to come clean on biology. The Iraqis were pressing the point that, “You have to recognize that we’ve come far in chemical and missiles,” and subsequently they said to Ekeus, “You give us a clean bill of health in the June ’95 report,” (a regularly scheduled report to the Council), “and we will satisfy you on biology.” And Ekéus took that aboard; a sufficiently positive report was crafted, although it was over some objections of people in the Commission, myself included. But the words were agreed by all. It was sufficiently weasily worded that you could draw your own conclusions. But in any case, the Iraqis said it was sufficiently positive, that they agreed to invite Ekéus to Baghdad in July of 1995, and at that meeting they acknowledged an offensive biological weapons program. They said, “Well, we had this stuff, but of course we destroyed it all before the war, we never weaponized it. These points of their acknowledgement which were ludicrous.
A month later, Hussein Kamal defected, and put an end to all of this and many other fabrications. This was a major inflection point, both for UNSCOM and, I think, Rolf Ekéus, and also the Iraqis. With Hussein Kamal out—and he’d been responsible for directing the development of a lot of these programs—the Iraqis panicked, they did not know what he would say, they did not know how they would confront UNSCOM inspections after this, and how they would react. What we learned from Hussein Kamal and frankly, more importantly, what we then learned in the spasm of a response from Iraq afterwards, caused us to conclude a few things. One, that Iraq had continued its activities after 1991, that they retained materials, and they provided us with a lot of documentation at a ‘Chicken Farm’ which had belonged to Hussein Kamal. Iraq provided a lot of documents, but when we examined those documents, we found there were certain lacunae in those documents, which led us to conclude that they were still retaining materials. The third thing is that Iraq had a very sophisticated system for preventing us from getting to these materials— the so-called “concealment mechanism”. In the fall of 1995, Ekéus was galvanized. He didn’t want to be fooled again. I mean we made a mistake in reporting positively about Iraq in our June report, and I felt we were wrong at the time, but that goes back to [the fact that] we had also arranged our first interview with a defector, Wafiq al Samarra’i, and I can come back to that.

JS: When you say ‘we’ do you mean the Americans or UNSCOM?

CD: I had a divided mind on this. But it was an UNSCOM interview, conducted not just by myself, but with other experts. In any case, I’m still proceeding forward to your
original question, on November of ’97. What these events in ’95 did was, it bought us some time with the Security Council, and the Security Council’s consensus, patience, and ability to hang tough when Iraq had been eroding [unanimity in the Security Council] and pressure was being shifted from Iraq to UNSCOM. In March of ’95, I believe—check that—there was an initiative by the French to have Ekeus orally brief the Council monthly on progress, and while Ekeus agreed to this, and it gave Ekeus an opportunity to appear before the Council, which is usually good in reminding them you’re alive, it was also not a too subtle way of keeping the pressure on UNSCOM as well as Iraq. And so people were shifting the burden of proof from Iraq to UNSCOM in a subtle way. They were asking UNSCOM, “What’s left? What does Iraq have to do? You keep telling us they haven’t fulfilled their responsibilities, but we have to get on with this,” meaning things have to move forward.

The events of the summer of ’95, Hussein Kamal came forward, and it was revealed that Iraq had in fact been concealing things, allowed us some breathing room with the Council, caused us to be reinvigorated in terms of what we were going to do in terms of investigating past programs as opposed to just putting monitoring in place. It caused us to create a concealment investigation. So in end of ’95 and ’96, we started a series of some very intrusive inspections, which were very provocative for Iraq. We felt we had no choice, because on the one hand, we knew Iraq was still concealing material, we felt the Council needed to—they wanted to see this, so we were trying to get some tangible proof. From an Iraqi perspective, these guys were poking around in some very serious areas. I think Iraq didn’t know how to deal with this, and they kept coming back to some of the more friendly members of the Council—France, Russia, in particular—and
through 1997 I think they were detecting more support from them. I think they realized that we were obligated for operational reasons to limit the knowledge of some of these inspections, and the Russians and French I think felt threatened by that in some ways. There was concern on their parts about what these guys [UNSCOM inspectors] were really doing, and what can they find out about what we had done. When I say ‘we,’ I would include France, Russia, and China, with Iraq, because there are a lot of things they didn’t want to come out.

I think Iraq sensed that there was a growing division between what they called the Anglo-Saxons and other members of the Council. And they tried to work that wedge, partially successfully. One factor that they also had to contend with, and it’s a force which exists today, is that the French, Russians, and Chinese, and British as well, they need the Security Council to remain an important and effective body in the world, because that’s one of their last claims to fame these days. From their perspective, they need a way of containing the United States, and the Security Council’s a tool for that, it’s a vital tool for them, where their veto position is important. So tempering what the actions would be of some of these countries in support of Iraq is still, to me, that they need the United States to agree that this is a Council issue. There is a balance there, but Iraq has been very shrewd in the last two or three years of working with them.

JS: In this connection, what about sanctions? Did sanctions, the continuation of sanctions, play into this Iraqi strategy?
CD: The short answer is, of course, yes, but I want to make sure that we’re clear on language. Embargo is one thing, sanctions are another. The prohibition on buying Iraqi oil was of course put in place in August of 1990, and that was an immediate reaction of the Council to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Lifting the embargo was linked to Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and renouncing their annexation of Kuwait. They didn’t, the war ensued, and then the embargo in the new resolution, the cease-fire resolution, the embargo was tied to Iraq’s satisfying the WMD provisions, which in some ways you can see as a bait and switch for the Iraqis. But UNSCR 687 took the embargo and said, okay, Iraq, you’d better get rid of these weapons of mass destruction, and accept the other constraints, and that must happen before the embargo is lifted. Now some of the members of the Council had views more extensive, particularly the United States, where it was not only weapons of mass destruction provisions, but other elements had to be satisfied by Iraq as well before the United States would agree to implement this so-called ‘paragraph 22,’ and that became the short-hand for lifting the embargo.

The sanctions are of course a different restriction, and that was what you can provide to Iraq, sell to Iraq. One of the continuing issues between and within the United States government, the Council, and Iraq, is would the United States ever really agree to lift the embargo, even if Iraq complied. And there were various noises which came out of Washington on that. I remember a front page *Washington Post* article in early ’93, which said Saddam no longer has to leave before the embargo can be lifted. These issues tend to be cyclical, and you see various things at various times. But from the Iraqi perspective, that was always a real question. But from my dialogue with them, I think their view for many years was that eventually time would pass, the natural alignment
between the United States and Iraq would reemerge. Moreover, they had strong memories of the ‘80s (when the US dealt with Iraq), and expected eventually there would be some reconciliation.

They kept asking, “What do we have to do to talk to you? Let us just talk to you.” The United States view was, “We won’t even talk to Iraq.” So they saw me as a senior American that they could talk to regularly. Of course, I had no official role in terms of representing Washington views to them, but they saw me as someone who was at least an educated observer of Washington and the White House.

The other thing I [want to say], is that in terms of satisfying UNSCOM, they seemed to have the view that they had to get to a position where there is an “acceptable lie,” in a sense, where polite people will come to an “arrangement,” because they couldn’t possibly really want us to find all of this stuff. That seemed to be their attitude, and it took me a while to understand that was the case.

The other part of the dynamic was, and this is something which Rolf Ekéus played quite regularly, that when he went to the Iraqis and he was trying to encourage/seduce them into complying fully, he said, “If I report to the Security Council that you’ve done what is required, the United States will be in a very difficult position to not move forward on the sanctions and on the embargo.” He would raise this in his discussions with Washington as well, and he would talk to a National Security advisor, and then he would go back to the Iraqis and say, “Well, I’ve talked to the Americans, and it’s my sense”—sometimes he was even more explicit than that—saying, “the Americans will go ahead if you just do the right thing.” I don’t know if the Iraqis believed that or not. They certainly seemed to be toying with the bait for many years. In my view, in
August 1998, they took a firm decision and said, “Forget it.” Their decision matrix then was that they would evaluate alternative courses of action based on their judgments on how it would contribute to the erosion of sanctions. I’ve left off embargo there, because at that point in time, embargo was really irrelevant, that had been lifted.

JS: The Oil for Food.

CD: But I had conversations—these are confidential; I don’t want to be too explicit about those conversations—but it was clear to me at that point in time that Iraq had turned a corner and they just said, “Forget it. The United States is not going to move forward on this, and we’re just going to pursue the erosion of sanctions.” Before that, I think they were straddling two courses, I mean they would do what they could to encourage the erosion of sanctions, but they would also play the Council role, play along with these resolutions, and see if maybe after time they could get to a point where the Council would take a formal step in their direction. But not through August of ’98, no.

JS: Does that coincide with Butler’s advent?

CD: Butler had been around for a year at that point. August ’98 was the point where we had the last official meeting in Baghdad. That was, I mean Tariq Aziz—there was always a theatrical quality to these meetings in Baghdad. But he demanded of Butler, “You must declare us disarmed at this point; we have filled our obligations. Otherwise, you are being dishonest.” And Butler said he couldn’t do that, and the Iraqis at that point
took the decision that they would only permit monitoring activities by resident inspectors at declared facilities. When I say 'declared facilities' I mean ones which we had a practice of visiting because they had agreed dual-use capabilities. So there would not be the opportunity to go to new sites. In other words, if we hadn’t been visiting a site, we couldn’t go inspect it. This was of course a virtually useless activity, in my view, in terms of being able to tell anyone that Iraq has not reconstituted its weapons programs or retained weapons they already had. But they turned a corner at that point, and there were the subsequent crises—there was this rather feckless bombing activity.

JS: Yes, that’s a question I wanted to ask. What do you think was the effect of this, particularly the second US-UK bombing?

CD: You can’t look at these things in isolation—well, you can, but I think you have to look at other issues as well. The domestic Washington political scene was dominated by Monica Lewinsky, and that, I think, had its effect on decision-making. The decision-makers will swear up and down that it wasn’t an issue, but I think that other judgments can be made. There were scheduling issues that came up, and for one reason or another the United States had determined that military action would be limited in time, it would be limited in the nature of its attacks, they weren’t going to use a lot of manned aircraft. And I think the Iraqis learned from that a great deal, that that was the end of serious regime threatening military action. It was certainly the end of consensus in the Council. I think given the course of events leading up to it, some would argue that they had to bomb one way or the other. I think if you’re going to bomb, what’s the objective?
You’ve got to have [one]. If the objective is to modify Iraqi behavior, I think they succeeded in modifying Iraqi behavior in exactly the opposite way than they perhaps intended.

There’s a difference in mindsets here. I don’t think...one of the things I learned, or I think I learned about the way Iraqis view things is that there is less fear of military actions. The Americans target, they target based largely on imagery of buildings. You look at pictures, and you pick certain buildings to target based on film. Iraq has different mindset.

I remember an incident where in 1994, I was accompanying in Iraq some of our people who were putting in place a monitoring system, and they were putting in place some of these cameras. A lot these cameras were operated [with a] radio system, and a camera could only usefully transmit a signal along a cable of roughly one hundred and fifty feet, otherwise there would be attenuation of the signal. One of the places we wanted to view with a camera was the entrance to this particular facility so that we could see the traffic going and coming in. Unfortunately, the entrance was a long distance from the transmitter location in the facility. Our proposed solution was to put the camera out at the end of this line, and put a telephoto lens on it so it can look at the gate. The Iraqis came by and said, “No, if you do that, it will be seeing outside the facility.” One of the Iraqi principles was that we can monitor a facility, but shouldn’t monitor the outside of it. So here was a dilemma, how do we solve this problem? For me, it was a very difficult problem to solve, if we can’t extend the line. The Iraqis very simply said, “Oh, that’s easy, we’ll move the wall and the gate and everything else up to the camera.” I realized, in my thinking, the walls and other structures were not variables. But in Iraqi thinking it
was no great deal, they tear things down, they build them up again, and structures were like scotch tape to them. So, when the United States blows up buildings and bombs structures, this does not necessarily cause Iraqis a lot of pain. They build buildings and tear them down, move them around. They’re very good at that, it doesn’t cost them much, they’ve got a lot of manpower, they’re energetic, and the resources which are involved are not something they’re short of. The United States in December of 1998 had given Iraq plenty of warning, weeks of warning that they might be bombing. And so they can move the capability outside the buildings, and they did this during the Gulf War, and they’ve done it several times since then. They’re quite good at moving equipment, machinery, things which are not necessarily easily replaced, outside, into open areas that you can’t target. The bombing damage was thus minimized.

JS: You’re suggesting something that I wanted to ask about. The Iraqis during the course of the Iran-Iraq War were in fact quite subtle in their diplomacy, vis-à-vis the Security Council in particular. And if I understand you right, you’re suggesting that even after the defeat, and in the face of UNSCOM and so forth, that they retained a certain flexibility, a certain subtlety, skill in their diplomacy?

CD: I wouldn’t go that far, I think the Iraqis are a mixed bunch. On the one hand, they may have some people who are skilled and kind of understand the Western world; on the other hand, the people who make the ultimate decisions in Baghdad are not necessarily those people. They have been very clumsy. They have done some dumb things, which even their advocates in the Council get exasperated with. I don’t want to suggest that the
Iraqis are terribly skilled at manipulating the Council. I think they have a very good innate sense of the use of force, and they can smell weakness like a shark smells blood in the water—that they are very good at. I think they have a good sense of force. Not necessarily negotiation, but force, and they know when an opponent’s attention is divided, whether it’s the Council’s or whether it’s Washington’s.

I happened to be in Baghdad when Monica Lewinsky broke, and it was almost humiliating in a sense, because here I am, and they look at me as an American, the last superpower, and they’re trying to make heads or tails out of this Monica Lewinsky stuff. They frankly looked at me like I had two heads; they couldn’t work this out at all. But they do know that this means that Washington’s weak, I mean they were able to understand that much. They didn’t understand the flailing about in Congress. I didn’t understand that, so they certainly weren’t going to be able to. But they do smell weakness, and they make use of it. They were constantly testing; they would test the edges of the envelope. Sometimes they go too far, and they get trounced. But that’s kind of the way they operate. They operated that way with us. When we conducted intrusive inspections, they would block us and see what the action of the Council was, and they knew that if they blocked an inspection and preserved a shred of ambiguity about whether we they were doing something prohibitive or not, then it was easier for someone on the Council to believe that they were…
JS: I wanted to ask, in that connection, the Council repeatedly passed condemnatory resolutions, especially in the earlier years, and one of the threats that Ekéus made to the Iraqis frequently was that he was going to take this to the Council. Was Iraq responsive to these threats from the Council, and if so, why?

CD: Well they were. That was an important tool, and Ekéus was extremely attentive to keeping the Council together, and rightly so. When we were in Baghdad, there were some unique features of the way UNSCOM was organized. We were a sub-organ of the Council. To the extent that the Council supported us, that was our only authority in Iraq. You’re all by yourself. Who are you going to call? It was only the Council. So to the extent that the Council was united and strong, we had leverage. As I said earlier, there is a natural inclination, a natural progress, in that a unitary actor can outlast a coalition because as time goes on, people have other issues and agendas and so on and so forth. Ekéus spent a lot of time trying to keep the glue of the Council from dissolving. I think he kept it together longer than many other people would have. But we did use that tool.

There was language which was key in many of the statements by the Council, called ‘material breach.’ This became a code-word for impending use of force, because if the Council said that Iraq was in ‘material breach’ of its obligations under Resolution 687, that lifted the responsibility of the other party in this contract, if you can think of it that way. It lifted their obligations, and the obligation was a cease-fire. The cease-fire resolution wasn’t a treaty or a peace, and so if Iraq was found in ‘material breach’ of the resolution then that lifted the cease-fire obligation on the part of the coalition. It was an implicit threat that force could come afterwards. Now that language occurred, probably,
in Council statements on the order of six or seven times. ‘Force’ may have been used
two or three times. And over time, these statements by the Council lost their impact, to
the point where I think ultimately in ’97 and later—Iraqis treated these resolutions like
parking tickets in New York City. There was an inflection point, in my view, on this in
the summer of ’96, and here is a point where I would disagree with Rolf Ekéus in our
judgments on this. This has to do with the June period where we had some blockages
over some of the intrusive inspections, and Ekéus was asked by the Council to go out to
Baghdad, and he came back with a joint statement, a joint program of action, and
modalities for inspection of sensitive sites.

JS: Right.

CD: And my judgment on this may be colored by perhaps a deeper view into what was
going on in the United States in Washington, in the lead-up to these things, and of the
crisis surrounding it. I’ll give you my take on it. We had had an inspection called
UNSCOM 150, which was headed by Chief Inspector Nikita Smidovich, and this was the
second in our series of dedicated concealment mechanism inspections. We had had an
erlier one called UNSCOM 143 in March of 1996, also headed by Nikita Smidovich.
We had learned from that, and we had learned from available materials we had collected,
that security organizations, key ones in Iraq, had been involved in the movement of
proscribed materials. Some of these locations were around the Saddam International
Airport, which borders on presidential areas; it’s an area which is sensitive to the Iraqis,
and we had attempted to inspect some of these areas. There were blockages. In particular
we had standoffs at I believe three locations, special Republican Guard sites, special security organization sites, which went on for long periods of time. Rolf went into the Council to brief on these – that there were standoffs that ultimately the Iraqis did not relent. We withdrew our team, and this was a big issue with the Council. They issued a resolution, on 12 June, number 1060. The resolution condemned the Iraqis. There were also Security Council presidential statements condemning the Iraqis. We had a lot of problems in Iraq; they were forcing helicopters out of the area, which we had every right to observe, and we were trying to observe inside the locations from which we were blocked, and the Iraqis were forcing the helicopters away. They were manning anti-aircraft sites, pointing weapons at the helicopters.

It was a difficult, difficult time. The Council—and this is reflecting my window into what Washington was doing, Washington was spending a lot of time in capitol and in New York, bringing them together in a consensus, “Look, if the Iraqis don’t agree to this, we’re going to thump ‘em, and we want your support, and we’re going to thump ‘em seriously.” As part of that diplomatic activity, it was agreed, the Council said, “We’re going to give Iraqis one more chance. We’ll send Ekeus back out to Baghdad with instructions, and they’ve got to agree to provide immediate, unconditional, unrestricted access.” Rolf went out, and had discussions with Tariq Aziz. I wasn’t present. He came back with these three documents, one of which was a joint statement signed by himself and Tariq Aziz, which said the Iraqis were providing immediate and unconditional access. The second document, which was agreed, but not signed, was a joint program of action, which was a series of things that Iraqis and UNSCOM would work on to move the process forward. The third document, which initially was going to be kept confidential in
a sense, but certainly not from the Security Council, was a list of procedures that Ekéus
would instruct his inspectors to follow if Iraq declared any given site to be sensitive,
because there were the so-called ‘sensitive site modalities.’ This was in fact discussed
and negotiated with Tariq Aziz, and there were drafts that went back and forth. But it
was a unilateral instruction by Ekéus to his inspectors, and there were various aspects of
this. If Iraq declared a site sensitive, there were a limited number of inspectors who
could go in, there was not a limit on the amount of time they could spend there, but there
were a lot of…

JS: It provided for more advanced notice, didn’t it?

CD: It provided for a period of time where access would not be permitted while Iraq
brought a senior official to the site. So, in essence it wasn’t…we didn’t need to pre-
notify that we were going to a sensitive site, but there was a built-in period of time where
UNSCOM could provide perimeter security in a sense, perimeter observation, but we
couldn’t go in until a senior Iraqi arrived on the scene. Now in the Baghdad area, that
was understood to be about an hour and a half. If you were up near Tikrit, someplace
distant from Baghdad, it would be longer. This could be seen as a set of sites where
access was neither unrestricted nor immediate nor unconditional. So on the one hand,
you have a signed statement, which says one thing. On the other hand, you have a
procedure in which you’re in a fairly formal way giving up those rights. Ekéus came
back to New York, the Iraqis had leaked to the Russians and others in Baghdad this piece
of paper. So by the time Ekeus got to Bahrain, this was coming out, and it was an awkward circumstance.

In my view, that undermined, that was the last time there was going to be a consensus on the use of force against Iraq to enforce this, and I think to me it was an inflection point. Rolf would argue I think strongly the other way on this. But I think the Iraqis then saw that there were definitely going to be limits on what the Council would permit. I think as a matter of practice, the modalities did not allow the full type of inspections we needed, and they didn’t work, and I think in practice that was it. Rolf would argue, “Look, we live in a political world, this is the best we’re going to get, it’s better to have something than nothing.” Certainly he’s got a lot of points on his side on this. But I think in terms of what the Council was able to agree on, and I think, from my perspective, seeing the work that the National Security Council, the White House, and others had done to try to build a consensus on really holding Iraq’s feet to the fire, these set of documents pulled the rug out from under that. Ultimately, I don’t know if it would have made any difference to the final outcome, but that was what happened.

JS: Let me ask a related question. Somewhat later, when the Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to Baghdad, and reached an agreement with the Iraqis, as he was leaving, Tariq Aziz handed him a letter or a piece of paper of some kind. I think that Kofi Annan took the position that that piece of paper was not important in terms of the agreement he reached, it was something intended for UNSCOM. How did UNSCOM interpret this event?
CD: I think what you’re referring to is not a piece of paper Tariq Aziz handed to the Secretary-General, but a letter, which was sent to him he received the day he got back to New York.

JS: I thought he actually handed it to him at the airport, but maybe not.

CD: I wasn’t there, you may be right. But I know there was a letter, which arrived and appeared to be modifying the agreement which the Secretary-General had just made, his ‘triumph,’ and I say that facetiously. The Secretary-General said, “Look, I’ve come to my agreement, this doesn’t bear. Quick, try to bury this thing, and inform the Iraqis that they should forget they ever sent this letter.” But to the cynics of UNSCOM, this was no surprise to us that the Iraqis would try to weasel out of this as quickly as possible. My personal view of that whole episode was pretty negative.

JS: Could you elaborate on that? What was your perception of this episode of Kofi Annan’s effort?

CD: Well, one of the Iraqi objectives was to get around UNSCOM. So long as the Council said, “UNSCOM is our actor in this, then you, Iraq, are not going to come to us except via UNSCOM.” We had a lot of authority; but as Iraq became more and more successful in going around UNSCOM, going directly to Council members, and looking for second judgments, other judgments, they were making progress on that. They had
sought for quite some time to involve the Secretary-General as a way of, again, getting around UNSCOM.

UNSCOM and Iraq were not equal parties in the process initially set up in 1991. UNSCOM was superior to Iraq. What Iraq was successful in doing over time was maneuvering themselves into the position where Iraq and UNSCOM were equal parties at the bar, the bar being the Security Council, or perhaps the Secretary-General. And that was something that they were successful at. The Council allowed them to do that. The Secretary-General allowed them to do that. Whether we contributed to that by steps that we had taken, (by either chairmen), or whether, it was that the dynamic was changing, and when the Secretary-General agreed to step into this issue, that confirmed it. The previous Secretary-General wouldn’t touch Iraq with a ten-foot pole. That was a Council issue; he would go nowhere near it. That was to our benefit, frankly. But Kofi Annan, for whatever reasons, decided that this was an issue that he had an obligation to participate in. He had very little background in this; I think a matter of days of study of the issue.

The primary issue at the time was this debate over access to presidential sites, and all parties muddied this fundamental issue. The United States did a lot of damage itself in this because they were trying to build a momentum for possible military force. They wanted to build a public case for this. They made all kinds of ludicrous presentations to the press about, “Well, there could be five pounds of Anthrax in one of these presidential palaces that could kill a squillion people.” Absurd presentations, which muddied the real principle issue that UNSCOM was faced with, and that was we could not accept and perform the task given to us [with] a shift in the right of access, whether it be a
It was the principle of access that was vital to us. It’s not that we thought that inside these presidential areas we were going to find weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqis, of course, played this up. They said, “Oh, right, we have chemical weapons under Saddam’s bed, that’s where he hides these things.” And this was an issue which I think was a problem in Washington, particularly after a public debate or presentation, which Madeleine Albright and Samuel Berger had at Ohio State University, when they got shredded, they looked pathetic. And after that, I think they decided, and I have no particular knowledge of this, but it appeared that they were perhaps more interested in a resolution of this, and were perhaps more willing to accept—I say ‘they,’ and I think I’ll be careful here, because the cabinet officers had different views, so perhaps the ‘White House’s’—but they were more interested in a negotiated settlement perhaps, and perhaps more willing to have Kofi go out there. I don’t know what conversations took place between the President and Kofi. But the earlier reluctance on the part of the United States to have Kofi step into this, I think attenuated a bit after that.

In any case, he went out there with a set of guidelines; there were some guidelines which the Council had agreed to, there were a separate set of guidelines that the United States had provided to him. And he negotiated something with them, which deeply affected UNSCOM and the Council’s goals and objectives with Iraq. When he came back and briefed the Council, I was present, and I was just really shaken by him. He briefed the Council, it was a closed (so-called informal) meeting, but packed, and really, he briefed in a way that UNSCOM was the—he used the word ‘cowboys.’ I gave a lot of
thought to resigning at that point, had written a letter, ultimately did not [resign], some pressure was put on me, but there was a lot of dismay in UNSCOM.

JS: And UNSCOM had not had a role in briefing the Secretary-General or preparing him?

CD: We had a limited role, I mean he asked for Butler to come up and brief him about what exactly are these presidential areas, and what’s important about them. There was a lot of noise in the system. The Iraqis were saying that they were unclear what the presidential areas meant. We briefed the S-G and his staff on what we believed to be the issues, and we believed this by empirical experience, because we knew that we had been blocked, and so we indicated to him what our judgment was that they were concerned about. The Iraqis then came up with their own set of definitions.

The first step in fact that the Secretary-General took was to request a survey mission go out, that was unaffiliated with UNSCOM, and he asked the Austrian government to supply some people under the leadership of a fellow named Steffan de Mistura, who had served out in Baghdad, and who was a Swede who was known to the Secretary-General. He went out there with some of these surveyors. He took along a French member of UNSCOM who was a bit familiar with it because he served as one of our photo interpreters. But he [Steffan] was most definitely not an UNSCOM person, and was prohibited from talking to UNSCOM. They conducted a survey, and came up with a [survey]—it was very quickly done, but they did what they thought was
required—of presidential areas. This was the first step which the Secretary-General took, again moving UNSCOM out of the picture.

JS: I want to move back to something that you were talking about, and that is this so-called ‘mechanism.’ Scott Ritter, in his various writings or at least in interview, gives a lot of attention to this, and connects it to a certain extent with assistance that the Israelis provided because they were, in his words, very good at this type of identification of moving sites. What can you say about this mechanism? Did this really become a principal target for UNSCOM? And equally important, if this was the target, then the actual discovery of weapons, or weapons capacity, how was that related to discovering the mechanism?

CD: Let me address the second part first, which is sort of the principle of why this focus on concealment, and then I’ll return to the Israeli angle, because the Israeli angle proceeds from this. As I said, the summer of ’95 was really an inflection point for UNSCOM, and I think for Rolf Ekeus. Many of us had known that Iraq was cheating. I think all the experts knew. When I say ‘the experts,’ there was sort of a core—people floated in and out of UNSCOM, but there were some long-term recidivists in this endeavor. But when Hussein Kamal defected, and we analyzed the documents that were provided, we were embarrassed by what we had missed. We knew there were ongoing activities going on that we had not seen. Shortly afterward, in November of 1995, we became aware of, and the Jordanians intercepted, based on information we provided to them, an attempt to bring in long-range ballistic missile—submarine-launched ballistic
missile—guidance systems into Iraq. So this further galvanized the Commission that things are going on here. Ekeus agreed that we ought to have a dedicated effort to penetrate this concealment activity and mechanism. And the rationale for it was two-fold. One was to try to catch them. We said, well, if they’ve got a SCUD, let’s find it. But we weren’t that stupid to think that, if we actually get to a warehouse where there’s a SCUD inside, the Iraqis will say, “Oh, yeah you’re right, this is the warehouse, might as well come in and see it.” No, we would get blocked, so that Iraq could preserve this last shred of ambiguity. But we thought through some clever array of techniques and collection methods we might be able to catch them, and perhaps catch them in a way that we could demonstrate to the Council that they were retaining prohibited materials.

JS: In concealment, right?

CD: Yes. But here again, I want to return to the theme. We, the Commission, were feeling pressure from the Council to prove to them that Iraq wasn’t complying, and Ekeus was feeling that pressure. He would go back, and the French would say, “You should be briefing us regularly, we need to get on with business. These are big stakes here, these are contracts which are going by the wayside, there’s a lot of money on the line.”

JS: He was that direct.

CD: So the second rationale was that, “Well look, we recognize that the Iraqis may not let us in, but we’re going to make ourselves so annoying to them that they’ll stop. Make
them stop. And if we kept raising it...if they really want to get the oil embargo lifted, and sanctions relaxed or removed, they’ve got to stop this, and we’re just going to keep after them, which is causing so much pain, that they’ll just say, ‘Look, it’s not worth it. Let’s give it up.’ So we figured that there were these two rationales.

Now in a way, maybe we were falling into a trap in the sense that maybe we should have just told the Security Council and said, “Look, you set us up. We were created to verify Iraq’s declarations to us. The burden of proof was on Iraq. You’ve got to figure out how to get Iraq to do that. We’re sitting here, we’re telling you that what they’re telling us is wrong, it’s not verifiable, it’s wrong.” And maybe we were falling into a trap in the sense that we were letting the Security Council off the hook. There’s one thing the Council likes to do: they don’t want to be responsible for anything, they’ll maneuver and dodge and whatever. So, in retrospect, I think one could debate that question. But in any case, that’s what we decided to do, and we had a lot of creative and energetic people. We had gathered some information on what we believed the concealment practices were, and the center of this was Nikita Smidovich, initially. Scott Ritter has become famous for this in a way, but the real initiative early on was Smidovich. I strongly supported them in making this case to Rolf. But the thinking began, the initial steps were taken, in the fall of ’95. And the first inspection, which took place in March, UNSCOM 143, had in fact initially [been] planned for November of ’95, but some of the things which we had hoped to do, we were depending upon the United States to provide assistance on, and we felt that we were getting a bit of a rope-a-dope from the United States. They were saying they would do one thing, and they didn’t produce things. So we, over Thanksgiving weekend, had some conversations, I talked
with Rolf, I remember I was in Stratton skiing in Vermont, and said, “Look, these guys are diddling us. Let’s cancel it.” And Rolf was a little bit reluctant at that point, because he had been talking with Tony Lake and others. I said, “We’ve got to communicate to Washington here, and one way to communicate here is to just cancel.” And we did. That had a bit of a galvanizing effect on the supporting elements of the US government, and I can discuss that further, but you had also asked about the Israeli connection.

UNSCOM, we were carnivores when it came to information. Anything we could find out that would help us, we were interested in it, whether it was on the Internet, in newspaper articles, anywhere, we were interested. We would take information from anybody. It dawned on us that one actor in the region who might know something about Iraq would be the Israelis, and what could they tell us? There were early communications with them, I knew some of them, Tim Trevan, who was Ekeus’ Executive Assistant at the time, attended a meeting where there were Israelis present, and floated an idea, and there was some dialogue in various ways. But it ultimately came to pass that it was agreed that there would be a meeting in New York in March of ’94, an initial meeting at the Tudor Hotel, I remember. It’s now called the Crown Plaza, a small hotel near the UN on 42nd Street. And it was agreed that the Israelis had experts who had been following these matters in Iraq. They certainly had been analyzing the SCUD missile program because they received a few of these, and they could provide us with some information. So we agreed to a program of visits, where the Israelis’ experts would sit down with our experts and discuss a given topic. This was useful.

But it also became apparent that they had information about how the Iraqi government was structured in some ways that we [did not]. We had not, as an objective
at that time, been collecting information on how the security organs worked, what they
did, and who were the key figures and so forth. And that gave us a little bit of a start in
developing a model, a model which—Scott Ritter did some very creative and energetic
analysis on this—it was a model that we built a lot on, and I think ultimately we knew
much more than anybody else in the world, other than the Iraqis, about how they
operated. But our analytical approach was to build a hypothesis, built in – trying to
weave together – the facts that we had, connect the dots together in a way that we felt
reflected reality, and then test them through various inspections and so forth, and over
time we did pretty well. But this began in the fall of ’95 under the leadership of Nikita
Smidovich. It was a very closely held analytical and inspection activity. We worked that
right until we left Iraq, in various ways.

JS: What were the other most important sources of information or intelligence? The
United States presumably was the most important for the whole operation.

CD: Well, you’ve got to be careful on what you mean by most important. There was
information and there was material support. Frankly, the United States was vital at the
start. Rolf Ekéus gets called in Vienna and is asked, “I want you to head something that
we’ve called UNSCOM.” Well, good grief, no one knew what they were doing at that
point, and he started gluing this thing together. But what are you going to do? You’re
supposed to go into Iraq and make sure there aren’t any weapons. Well, I don’t think
Rolf knew a lot about Iraq. Staff show up, but didn’t even have maps. So the United
States was in a position where they provided maps, they provided some information,
briefings, they provided the U-2 and all these sorts of things, which were vital to begin with. But over time, you know, the United States wasn’t in Iraq. We were. And we gradually learned an awful lot more about what was going on in Iraq than the US knew. But they still provided a lot of support: technical support, imagery support. And that was very, very important. Setting up the monitoring system, the chemical labs, all this stuff. They were very, very helpful. In a way it was a bit contradictory, because you assume that they were not interested in UNSCOM reporting positively under Paragraph 22, i.e. that we had done what UNSCOM had to do, and now the Council could take the steps on lifting the oil embargo. One could look at what the United States was doing and say, “Well it’s kind of against their interests, why should they be so helpful?” And this was again, a point Rolf used in discussing with the Iraqis why they should cooperate, and in fact it was an issue in the Council, what the US was doing.

There was a gradual shift over time about what UNSCOM knew and what the United States knew and was able to tell UNSCOM. I would say by 1995, when we had come into possession of the “Chicken Farm” documents, that we were way ahead, way ahead of the United States and any other government, frankly, in overall knowledge of what was going on in Iraq. Now that’s not to say that countries wouldn’t receive pieces of information from various sources that we would be unaware of and would be useful to us. But the United States didn’t, for the most part, have a lot. There was always a suspicion by the Iraqis—the Iraqis were quite funny on this—that the United States knew much more, but was holding information back. This would explain to Iraq some behavior on UNSCOM’s part, e.g. we didn’t focus on some issues. The Iraqis had to be wondering in 1991 through 1993, “Why aren’t they asking us about biological weapons?” And the
assumption that the Iraqis had was that the United States was holding back on that because they wanted to prolong sanctions and the embargo as long as possible, and therefore they weren’t [talking about it]. There were these kinds of things.

But in 1995-96, we got limited information from the United States, we got useful information from Israel. We got some limited information from Russia, when we pressed them, and that was largely with respect to the SCUD missiles. They provided us good information on what they had shipped in the SCUD missile area to Iraq. Curiously, they also provided that to Iraqis. We had a period of time in fall and early winter of '96, when we were going to focus on getting to the bottom of the missile issue with Iraq, and this was an initiative that Ekeüs had with Tariq Aziz. The Russians were supporting us in this but we also found that the Russians had some of the key Iraqis informed—Amir Rashid, Hossam Amin, and others—and invited them to Moscow to discuss all the details of their accounting. We had asked the Russians, “Could you tell us what you told the Iraqis?” I’m trying to give the Russians some credit for helping us out, but they didn’t help in other areas.

We had chronic problems with some other suppliers, members of the Security Council. We kind of made it a point not to discuss publicly suppliers. I mentioned the matter of the Russians, that’s come out now, but there were some members of the Council who flat-out refused to ever answer any questions about what they had provided to Iraq, even though the Iraqis would tell us their version. But we were never quite sure that was all, and of course they would still complain to us in the Council meetings that we weren’t proceeding fast enough.
There are different kinds of information: there’s supplier information, there’s information that may come to some country’s attention about ongoing activities. It was a personal project of mine to develop access to Iraqis who had left Iraq. I tend to prefer not to use the word ‘defector’ because ‘defect’ means they’ve shifted loyalties to another country, but a lot of people were moving for various reasons. But in any case, there are a lot of Iraqis who’ve left. Oddly enough, many of them had a lot of knowledge, and the first time we were able to do this was when—it’s a known case now—Wafiq al Samarra’i, who had been head of military intelligence during the Iran-Iraq war, left. He went initially to northern Iraq. It had become known that he was out, and I explored, through Washington contacts, and said, “Look, I’d like to talk to this guy, I think UNSCOM should talk to him. We know things and we can ask questions that, second-hand, it just isn’t going to happen.” And after a lot of my haranguing, I got some support from the United States to get access to this guy. Myself, and Tim Trevan, and Nikita Smidovich, made our way to northern Iraq and spent some very, very productive hours with this guy. This was in February of 1995, and he told us some things about his direct and indirect knowledge of what Iraq retained. And this gave us reason to believe that there were many things that Iraq hadn’t told us, particularly on VX. Again, this goes back to some of my problems with UNSCOM giving Iraq a fairly positive report in June 1995 connected to the deal with Tariq Aziz on biological weapons. But General Sammarra’i said a fair amount about the chemical and biology and also the missile area. In a more important sense, it also gave us an idea of what documents would exist. He was not in a position to directly observe some things. But he was in a position to directly observe the types of documents which were created, particularly immediately after the
war, summarizing Iraq’s remaining holdings in various areas. This experience we found very useful, and caused me to try to look for other opportunities. Obviously, Hussein Kamal was one.

JS: Can I just interrupt there, what about Hussein Kamal? Was your access adequate?

[beginning of tape 2, side 3]

Whether UNSCOM had adequate access to Kamal and other defectors; whether you got notification always through another one of the Member States, or was UNSCOM able to, so to speak, find its own sources of information?

CD: The question of Hussein Kamal—when he left, it was obviously a very publicly known event. There were two sessions with him, both of which were led by Rolf Ekeus. The Jordanian government facilitated this. King Hussein himself, who had met with Ekeus on occasion, had made the arrangements. I think the short answer is that we had as much access to him as he was interested in providing. The dialogue and information, I think provided, was important, but I think more important was the reaction that the Iraqis had in terms of releasing information. I think the Iraqis recognized early on that he could tell us some things and then we would have to investigate. Even if he didn’t know the details, we would be investigating the details anyway, so all he had to do was say a few things, and that would be enough to provoke UNSCOM to look in the right directions. So I think the answer is yes, we had enough access, the Jordanian government was helpful in arranging that, because he was under their protection at the time at the Palace
in Amman. We’ve never really expressed in detail what he told us, but I think again, by comparison, the real, the most important effect was what it caused the Iraqis themselves to tell us and to provide us documentation.

The technique of going directly to sources was again, something that I had pursued early on, because we had been receiving reports from so-called supporting governments. And often these were based on human sources that they had, and what always struck me was that we could ask these people a lot better questions than you [supporting governments] could about our business. And since we were on the ground, we could very easily test their information and say, “Tell us, describe the factory you were in.” It was very easy to tell if these people were really credible, or if they were people sent out by Iraq. We became very attentive to this. We asked some governments, when we became aware that there was someone in their territory that we were possible interested in, we would ask and sometimes they would say yes, and sometimes they would say no, or sometimes they would say that the person wasn’t available for whatever the circumstances. I think I ultimately had roughly solid, very productive Iraqis that provided useful information. And it was not a rigid system for doing this, but it was obviously a sensitive activity. Often, I was able to arrange for an expert to provide the questions, if not even personally interact with an individual. But it was something that [was] kept compartmented within UNSCOM in a sense, because we knew we were being observed carefully. And there were a number of different ways we found out about and became interested in someone from journalists, in fact.

One important person in particular was highly informed, and someone no government had been involved with. And ultimately I developed a pattern (and this is
even after we were no longer in Iraq) of gathering information. A lot of Iraqis have left for a number of reasons, and go to a number of different countries; most countries have immigration services which are separate and distinct from their information services. If you try to connect these two, you can get some interesting results. And it got to the point where some Iraqis would be seeking asylum in a country, and claiming to have been involved in certain things, and countries would come to me saying, “Is this real, or is this guy making this up?” And that provided a useful mechanism for getting information.

JS: Was Ekeus aware of this, and did he welcome it?

CD: This evolved over time, and Ekeus certainly welcomed it (much took place after Ekeus left). After that first experience in February of ’95, I think he recognized that there was value in this. I think it was a little bit of a new idea, and we really had to press hard in that case to get support from Washington, and others were involved, but having done it once, it became a very useful tool. Ekeus himself was involved in it with Hussein Kamal. And at that point, we were realizing that we knew much more about Iraq than almost anybody else, and no one else was going to be able to ask the questions and be able to put them into context. No government could do that. If someone said that they were working at a certain factory, well we could say, “Alright, well, can you describe that factory to us?” And if they could describe correctly, we would know. Or we would ask, “Well, who else worked there?” And if they couldn’t name some people that we knew worked there, then we could tell whether this guy was telling the truth or not. It also provided a way of looking for things in imagery. So it was very interesting, it gave us a
lot of locations to inspect, but we still fundamentally had the problem that even if we had
great information, we couldn’t go to the Council and say we had proof. And that
ultimately was a huge problem for us because you can go into the Council with a whole
bunch of evidence, maybe, and maybe some of it is sensitive and you don’t want to use it,
but they were really looking for proof. You know, “Show us a SCUD.” And so if we go
to someplace where someone said they have moved this, or had documents on that, that’s
one thing. If it’s real, they’ll block you, say you can’t get in. Tantalizing in many ways,
but certainly not satisfying.

JS: What about Iraqi scientists in Iraq, who were still part of the regime? You had
access to them, as I understand it. Were they a useful source of information?

CD: The question of access again applies not just to physical locations, but also to
people and information. We discussed that seriously with the Iraqis largely in early 1996,
and we again had to evolve modalities, in a sense, because we identified a lot of people
by name that we wanted to talk to, and Iraq was recoiling from some of this. Not just the
scientists, but people in the security services. Recalling that a large part of the picture
presented by Iraq depended upon their claimed activities in 1991 of unilateral destruction.
They claimed that early on, they themselves destroyed a lot of the weapons that we were
looking for, and that accounted for a large portion of this material balance which we were
trying to achieve. So to attempt to verify, in the any absence of documents, we would say,
“Well, who was present when this happened? What did you do?” and try to get some
coherent and mutually reinforcing testimony. Testimony is the wrong word because it
implies a legal implication, but in a sense it conveys the process. Iraq was recoiling because they wanted to maintain control over the information flow to us. So we evolved a series of procedures where Iraq would be able to have someone present during the interview, and things could be taped or not taped. We gained access to many people to whom we sought access, but it was not often without preconditions, it was not often at the right time—by right time, I mean when we wanted. There would be delays, so-and-so had a traffic accident, he can’t show up this time, or his mother died. We would get a lot of stories which may or may not have been true, but it depended on the circumstances. It was also a very uncomfortable position for these individuals whom we were interviewing, because no matter how well they were coached, and they were all fundamentally coached by the Iraqis, they could slip up, and some of them would be extraordinarily nervous. I was present in many of these discussions, and you really have a cold heart to do this, because these guys’ lives were on the line in many ways. But you know, it was our task to get the information. It was a useful tool; it didn’t allow us to come to many firm conclusions, though, about Iraqi presentation. In many cases, it opened more issues.

JS: You said that in a lot of them you participated. I was wondering, how much of your time did you spend in Iraq or in Bahrain?

CD: I was not an inspector. I kind of in some ways straddled between the Chairman’s position and the expert’s position. I certainly enjoyed being in Iraq, getting as close to a hands-on look as possible, and in some cases I did participate in inspections. The first
concealment inspection I was not nominally part of the team, but I was in Baghdad at that
time recognizing that there were going to be potentially some political issues, and I was
involved in negotiations with Amir al-Saadi and company on access. I also led the
technical part of a presidential inspection. But I would also go with some of our teams
when they were present and try to work through some of the problems that they were
having with the Iraqis. The short answer is that I probably made about eighteen or
nineteen trips to Iraq, but none of them for long periods of time.

JS: You just mentioned the presidential sites inspection, that you led the technical
part. Was this the one where there were the various ambassadors that went along?

CD: Yes. We had a lot of snide names for that, ‘Dignity Battalions,’ and so on, but
this was the result of the Secretary-General’s agreement with Iraq, and there were
elaborate procedures put in place for UNSCOM, and I don’t use the word ‘inspection’
because the Iraqis refused to have that as a word. But whatever it was, we went to these
various palace areas. There was a group of diplomats under the leadership of the Under-
Secretary for Disarmament, Dhanapala. It was the inspectoral team that was under my
supervision, and it was a bit like one of these ‘Outward Bound’ experiences for these
diplomats. They didn’t know what they were signing up for, I don’t think, but they really
kind of enjoyed it. Much of what we do has a sort of military flavor to it—there are
helicopters operating, there are all these communications nets, and you get a line of
march vehicles going out, and there are these hordes of Iraqi minders and soldiers all over
the place, and it was a bit of a bizarre thing when we were going to these presidential areas. Of course, the Iraqis had weeks of time to prepare them, but it was interesting.

JS: Were there any results, really, from this operation?

CD: There were political results, of course, that the Iraqis were able to take credit for having opened up even Saddam’s bedroom, and there were several places which presumably were—they had one place and it had little slippers, and pajamas and such that were allegedly Saddam’s. Iraq was able to claim credit for having allowed these unwashed inspectors in, and that was that. So they had kept their end of the bargain, and they claimed nothing was found. So that put the lie to all these statements by Washington that had come out. I think in principle, it did demonstrate some aspect of access. But I had very firm conversations with Iraqis on this because it was my view that this exercise was in no way an inspection, because Iraq knew we were coming, they had ample time to prepare all this. But it did serve the purpose of being a baseline exercise, so we would understand and be able to better focus subsequent inspections. Of course, they hated that, because for them, and this was a very sensitive point with the Secretary-General, but from the Iraqi perspective, this was a one-of-a-kind deal. I knew this was an area of contention, and there was some suspicion that in the context of discussions between the Secretary-General and the Iraqis that there was somehow the understanding that it was in fact a one-time deal. At one point, I had to sign a joint statement, and I used this as an opportunity in a way to expose the Iraq position. It was a document that Amer Rasheed and I would sign, which would convey to the Council the new boundaries, the
reestablished boundaries of these presidential areas, and I put in it language indicating that these boundaries would serve as the baseline for subsequent inspection activities. Of course, Amer Rasheed couldn’t put his pen to that piece of paper. And not to let him off the hook easily, I had to say, “Why not?” He said, “You know why not, I cannot sign a piece of paper which says you’re coming back.” So ultimately we took it out, but I duly reported that experience to the Security Council, and that was an unwanted piece of information from many people’s perspectives, but it was in fact the case. It undermined the Secretary-General’s agreement. The Iraqis did not see this as being an activity which was going to be repeated. Incidentally, we at one point had planned another inspection, a very modest one in a presidential area, but it was in December 1998, the last inspection before what ultimately became Desert Fox, and as things were going badly already, we decided it would not be such a great idea to attempt another presidential site inspection. We therefore told the chief inspector not to proceed at the last minute.

JS: We’ve been talking about you gathering information, or UNSCOM gathering information from various sources. What about the Iraqis, to what extent were they able to penetrate UNSCOM or other sources to get information about what UNSCOM was doing?

CD: Some of the old hands of UNSCOM had a propensity to become paranoid, but the old saw is that just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re after you. People became very suspicious that the Iraqis always seemed to know where we were going before we got there. And in some cases, the minders—these are the Iraqis who would
accompany our inspections, and they were always present—if we had a new inspector and he was given a task to go to some location, and he got lost, the Iraqi would explain to him where to go, even though he was, in theory, not supposed to know what the object of the inspection was. There was a lot of evidence these guys had a good understanding of our practices and operations, and there are a lot of ways they can do it. The Baghdad monitoring center in Iraq was certainly a location that they understood. We had Iraqi staff.

In some ways, we tried to limit their access to sensitive parts of our operation. But even the foreign nationals that worked for us...in some cases the Iraqis would tell me they were quite pleased with the information they had received about us. In a way, they were bragging about it. They were proud of the information they would get on the discussions in the Security Council.

There were reports of people on our staff that were being paid by the Iraqis. One case was in fact highlighted when Hussein Kamal left. During the first visit between Ekéus and Hussein Kamal, Ekéus had arranged for an UNSCOM translator to be in Amman. This was someone who was brought from our operation in Baghdad. And when he entered the room where Hussein Kamal was to meet them, he asked who this gentleman was. He was introduced as our translator, and Hussein Kamal inquired where he was from, and the fellow said, “Syria.” Hussein Kamal became very agitated and said, “Get him out of here, get him out of here.” He subsequently explained that they had been paying an UNSCOM translator from Syria for some period of time.

I investigated this a fair amount, and I’m not sure that this particular individual was the one. There was another candidate. But in any case, here we had Hussein Kamal...
saying, “Yes, we were paying one of your translators.” Information subsequently came to light about another case where it was confirmed beyond all possible doubt to me that somebody else who had been on the UN payroll was also being paid by the Iraqis to provide information.

It was a problem for us, but not entirely insurmountable. It made life very difficult. Because we were not a nation state, where you can have laws on security and so forth, there weren’t any real penalties. Someone is not risking going to jail by being paid by the Iraqis. At the UN, as it turns out, you can’t even really fire somebody for it, because it’s an impossible thing to necessarily prove. If a person appeals in a personnel process, well, what are you going to say, “I’ve got this Iraqi defector in country X, who swears up and down that they were paying so-and-so.” Well, all the person has to do is deny it, and then in the personnel appeals process you’re stuck. So you can maneuver people out of the way of sensitive information, but it’s an art rather than any kind of a bureaucratic process.

Ultimately, I think we found that Iraq was very good at anticipating where we were going. A few times, maybe, we caught them surprised, but it was difficult.

JS: There’s one question in this field. Butler claims to have had reliable information that even Primakov was being paid by the Iraqis. Do you have any knowledge of that, or do you have any knowledge of where he would have gotten such information?
CD: That’s a tale that has been around, and there are a few sources to it. I know where he heard it, and I know that case, but it’s tough to prove. And it’s not really UNSCOM’s business.

JS: But you think he had a fairly sound basis then, at least, for making this accusation?

CD: I’m not sure that the basis that he makes it on is sound. I’m not saying it’s wrong, but it’s also not UNSCOM’s business.

JS: I want to go to another subject now, and that is the extent to which, if at all, Member States (to use UN jargon) exercised direct pressure on the Executive Chairman or on UNSCOM in general in other ways. Not through the Security Council, but I mean directly.

CD: Member States that were members in the Security Council?

JS: Not necessarily, no.

CD: Of course, the Security Council was our boss, and it’s a bit like—sometimes I make these analogies and they often don’t work with non-American audiences—I would sometimes say it’s like having Sybil for your boss, Sybil being this woman who became known because she had a multiple personality disorder, and I think there were fifteen or
sixteen distinct personalities. Working for the Security Council is a bit like that, because they all have distinct objectives and requirements and things that they think you should be doing. Members of the Security Council, particularly the P-5, they’ve got a view on what you’re doing, and they will happily express it to you. You have to take that into some consideration, because they are a part of your boss. The other Member States didn’t really have a lot of input into what we were doing, unless we asked them, and even then they might say yes, but they might say no. But they were not really pushing us in any particular direction. We really dealt mostly with Council members, and of course, the non-permanent members tended to rotate. We would keep interested countries informed, more so under Ekéus than Butler. I think Rolf Ekéus was much more attuned to keeping people on board, in a sense. He would brief non-aligned and he would have meetings with Gulf States, for example. But the Member States directly didn’t really explicitly push us. It was more the other way around, where if we had learned that material from a certain country had gone into Iraq and we wanted to know, “Could you tell us how much of this stuff you sent in, and to whom, so that we can confirm Iraq has done something with it?” Sometimes they were helpful often they were not.

JS: A related question. Through inspections and through analysis, you really became the best-informed agency on what was happening, or had happened, in Iraq. Now my question here is how much of this information, which you obtained, went back to governments through nationals working in UNSCOM?
CD: Frankly, a lot. Our staff was drawn from a wide range of countries. They tended to divide in a couple of ways. We would have long-term members on the staff in New York at the headquarters. We would also have staff, experts which would be brought in for temporary service on what we called non-resident inspections. In other words, if we wanted to explore a certain question with the Iraqis, or do a certain type of investigation, we would bring together experts for a period of a week or two to do this work in Iraq. And then they would disperse back to their home governments, their countries. The third type of personnel would be people that we brought in to keep in Iraq for some period of months to do the day-to-day monitoring activities. These people learned a lot, they were exposed to a lot of UNSCOM information, and they returned to their home governments.

Now when you serve with UNSCOM, you sign a contract, a special service agreement, and it says that a) you will not take instructions from any outside governments, and b) you will not share information that is inappropriate or has not been authorized by the leadership of UNSCOM. This is an imperfect system, and I have no doubt that a lot of people went back and shared information about their experiences in UNSCOM with their host governments. I don’t think that problem is unique to UNSCOM, and it’s not unique to people who are seconded to a UN operation versus those who were paid by the UN directly, although that charge has been made about UNSCOM. In many ways, I think it’s easier to deal with a question of someone sharing information inappropriately if they are seconded to UNSCOM, because you can just get rid of them. You can just call up the appropriate government and say, “Listen, we’ve got problems with this guy, thank you very much, he will be back in your capital in two days.” If you have someone you’ve hired, again, like the case where if Iraq is paying
someone, you can’t get rid of him or her. You can raise a question about his or her performance, but you know, to actually fire somebody is very difficult in the UN system.

So in some ways, contrary to what you might expect, the ability of the management to enforce some discipline on this matter is better if they’re loaned. The allegations are that the Americans in particular received a lot of information, and you know, we had. Some information was exchanged legitimately, because if you’re going to seek an evaluation, you’ve got to tell someone what you want him or her to evaluate. This was true not just for the United States, but for other countries as well, including Russia, for example. If you want the Russians to evaluate an Iraqi engine, they want to see the Iraqi engine. But the more serious question is are they using this information for non-UN related business? And that’s something which national governments will determine and use.

JS: There’s a related question. Some people, including Iraq, have made the accusation that spies were placed in UNSCOM by national governments, especially the United States. Was it your impression that in fact some people managed to be assigned there, on assignment really from national intelligence agencies?

CD: The flow is the other way. UNSCOM asked for individuals. Where we didn’t request specific individuals, we would ask for people with a certain set of skills. And these requests would go to governments. The process was that either the Chairman, or in his absence, I would sign a letter to a mission in New York and say, “We need either Mr. X or Dr. X or we need someone with the following skills.” And maybe they’re a
computer expert, maybe they’re someone who’s a good observer, or maybe they’re a chemical weapons expert. Now where those people came from within the host country, if we were asking for a generic set of skills. That was up to the host country. They were not inserting people into our staff. There were one or two exceptions late in the game, and I can return to that, but that was on a political sense rather than the other sense. But where they came from—did they come from intelligence organizations, did they come from the military, did they come from universities? We understood these people oftentimes would come from the national security establishments of the supporting countries. But what’s the surprise there? Where do you find ballistic missile experts? The Red Cross doesn’t have these things. People say you should ban people from intelligence organizations from serving. Well, I can understand why that would be said, and the IAEA claims, they think, to pursue such a process, but again, you hear the Iraqis still say they’ve had people from their intelligence operations operating or working for IAEA. It’s just not a simple question, although it may sound that way. But our view was simply: we took experts, and to the extent we could decide what they were doing and what information they would have access to, we tried to control that. But you know, no system is perfect.

JS: In that connection, in this allied office, this US-Australian-UK office, right, in Bahrain? As I understand it, briefings were given there in a secure room to team leaders, including imagery, before they went out on inspections. The question is, was debriefing done there also by the teams, or of the teams when they came back?
CD: This is Gateway.

JS: Yes.

CD: And the origin of Gateway is when we first began our work—again, we didn’t know what we were doing, where we were going, we just said “Let’s go into Iraq and quick, go find stuff.” Some of the supporting governments, led by the United States in this case, said, “We need to be able to figure out a way of providing you assistance before you go in countries.” Since our jumping off point was Bahrain, they began putting people in Bahrain that could provide cameras, that could provide maps, and so on and so forth to help these initial inspections. And as time went on, this became a systematic process that was joined in by the United States, Canada, the UK, and Australia. It was an arrangement set up and initiated by supporting governments. UNSCOM was not directing it; UNSCOM was not a direct part of it. But it became something which was valuable to inspectors, and they offered whatever assistance inspectors wanted, including secure meeting rooms, pizzas, you name it.

There was a serious problem that UNSCOM had in terms of conducting planning for surprise inspections in an area that was considered secure, and where there was some sense that information would not be passed back to the Iraqis, and that the Iraqis couldn’t listen in one way or the other. Bare in mind that there was a sizeable Iraqi mission in Bahrain, there were a couple dozen Iraqis running around there. Now UNSCOM inspectors were given a wide range of flexibility. It was individual decisions by individual chief inspectors, whether they were going to make use of anything which
Gateway had to offer or not, or whether inspectors stopped there or met with them for assistance, or talked to them afterwards. UNSCOM gave no direction on this. Now there was discussion a lot of times on the way out, but this is a murky area. In some ways you discuss an issue with somebody and you can’t help but convey some information. So I don’t doubt that these governments were in fact learning something by UNSCOM’s work in their interaction with UNSCOM. But it’s just a murky area. If you’re going to ask for assistance from a supporting government, you’ve got to deal with that.

JS: To what extent did you have secure communication facilities so that you could transmit, for example, imagery that might have been available in Gateway to the office in Baghdad or elsewhere?

CD: I have to dissect your question, because you’ve mentioned imagery that might have been available in Gateway.

JS: Which would have been satellite imagery.

CD: Satellite imagery was not given to UNSCOM. On occasion, satellite imagery or the information derived from satellite imagery, was shown to UNSCOM, but it was in no way something that we could then take away. U-2 imagery was not able to be transported by UNSCOM to Iraq. It was kept in New York. Now on occasion, for training teams purposes, we would ask the United States to make U-2 imagery available
out in Bahrain, so that our teams could use it for training purposes. But it could not be brought into Iraq.

JS: U-2 could not, either?

CD: No. The French imagery, which was brought in late in the game from a Mirage, they didn’t have those constraints on that. So that was in some ways an advantage on French imagery, but there were other drawbacks on that.

On your question of communications, early on there was recognition of the problem between getting questions from Washington to UNSCOM. And the United States offered to put in place a commercial secure phone between the State Department and UNSCOM. And so if there was information on, for example, the U-2, if we wanted to ask the Americans to image a certain location, this could be done over the phone quickly, and without the risk of that information being compromised.

JS: From where to where?

CD: From New York to Washington’s State Department.

JS: Did they have one from Bahrain?

CD: That was an early-on system. Subsequently, we needed secure communications between New York and our operations in Baghdad, as well as in Bahrain, and we were
provided these Motorola Sec-tels, which were a pretty sophisticated commercial encryption device. And those were used pretty regularly, and that also applied to faxes between New York and Baghdad and Bahrain. So we felt that we had a system that would be difficult electronically for the Iraqis to intercept, but that didn’t mean they couldn’t listen in through electronic means in the rooms at either end, it just means they couldn’t in the intervening space.

JS: With regard to the U-2, and also with regard to the helicopters, for that matter, I wanted to clarify something about payment. I understand, until now at least, that the United States was not compensated for the expense of the U-2.

CD: That’s correct.

JS: And not for the crews, or anything.

CD: Zero. We provided the crews a UN certificate, and it’s my understanding that it was about a seven million dollar a year expense for the Americans. But we didn’t pay for anything.

JS: And what about the Germans who provided planes and helicopters?

CD: Initially, we didn’t pay them. But then they were going to keep a record, and they kept, as you might imagine, exquisite records down to the last pfennig of what their costs
were. Of course when we began, we didn’t have real sources of revenue, but after
UNSCR 986 passed, and we became part of the revenue stream of Iraqi oil sales, the
Germans quickly came up with a bill, and they were paid a sizeable amount of money for
both their helicopter and transport aircraft operations.

JS: But in fact, that was Iraqi money, right?

CD: Yes, that’s correct.

JS: And is the same thing true of Chile?

CD: They provided helicopters to replace the German’s. The Germans had CH-53’s, a
couple of them. They took a decision, or their Defense Minister decided that he no
longer wanted to support this. I guess it was about three, three and a half years that
they’d been doing it. “Enough was enough.” The Chilean government offered us UH-
1H’s, a package of five. They were to be paid, and they began after 986, and so we paid
them. In fact, one of the things I had to do after we left Iraq was to come to an
arrangement with the Chileans on the helicopters, which were still there, and compensate
for them.

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[Beginning of tape 2, side 4]
JS: We talked about this a little bit off [the record] at lunch, but I wanted to ask again about UNSCOM’s contact with other UN agencies operating in Iraq, in particular, the humanitarian representatives. Did you come together at all, was there any sharing of information about what you had observed?

CD: Not much, no. The problem with relations between UNSCOM and the other UN organizations was a bit cultural, in a sense. We had very different missions, and we dealt with very different parts of the Iraqi government. We shared space with them, the so-called ‘Canal Hotel,’ which became the headquarters of UNSCOM, was identified, established, and converted for UN use in the process of UNSCOM setting up its monitoring system in early 1994. The Iraqis offered this to us, and it was a large facility which was given over to the UN. It was more space than we needed, and so when the humanitarian aid people came in, they began to share this space. But they were very different types of people. We were aggressive inspectors, in many ways, or scientists—people who basically joined to go penetrate the Iraqi walls of obfuscation on these weapons programs. And we were what stood between the lifting of the embargo and the sanctions. The other UN agencies were trying to help the average Iraqis in the street, who were victims of all these processes, and in some ways caught between us and the Iraqi government. So there were two very different types of personalities and objectives that were cohabitating, and there were some personality issues. Fundamentally, people kind of got along, but these two different objectives just cohabitating in the same office space....
JS: I want to go back to a topic we just touched on this morning, and that is monitoring, the building of the monitoring system. Of what was that intended to consist? It wasn’t completed, I know, but I mean what were the elements of this monitoring system?

CD: The simply stated task was to be able to provide assurances to the Council that Iraq wasn’t reconstituting its weapons program. How you do that? That’s a tough task when you consider that some of these activities are not easily observed. What we did was we designed a network of elements, not a single one of which was compelling in itself, but when you took them all together, and put them all in place, and you realize that time is on your side, you assume this is going to work in perpetuity, you do create two things that Iraq has to think about. One is deterrence. There are two elements of deterrence: what’s the probability of detection, and what’s the price if they get caught. We had control over one part of that, and that one part was the probability of detection. We felt that with this network, we could, over time—time being a long period of time—your odds would go up; again, also, commensurate with the size or scope of the violation. We had an export-import system that we designed and that was made a resolution by the Security Council, and that was one part of it. We had resident inspectors, who would visit not just declared sites, which is to say sites which have been identified and known to the Iraqis that we would be paying regular visits to because they had equipment capability or some capability that was of interest to us. But we also could inspect non-declared sites, and that was why the issue of access was so vital, that we did have the ability to go anyplace anytime, and in fact exercise that. And in my view, the credibility
of the system would be enormously diminished, and there’s a risk that you put in place a system which reports that nothing’s going on, and build a false sense of security when, in fact, it’s worse than nothing. But that’s not the question you asked.

We had a camera system which was useful in the sense that it deterred known facilities from being diverted to non-permitted purposes. It was sort of an area denial tool. Likewise, and this was something I was particularly proud of for the organization, was an air-sampling system for the chemical system. That allowed us to deny large areas to the Iraqis, because we deployed a bunch of these sensors, which would periodically take and record a sample of the air. We would bring these back to our laboratory in the Baghdad monitoring system center, and analyze them for any trace elements that would indicate any chemical weapons activity. They were very sensitive.

JS: Somebody had to personally carry those back?

CD: Of course. The way they operated was with little paper tubes in these machines that had to be checked monthly. But you go out monthly, you take the samples off, and you run through them. Frankly, sometimes it didn’t work, but the Iraqis didn’t know that, so it was still a deterrent. Had a bit of a spat with the Security Council on this, but that’s another story. They seemed to want to make sure that everyone—in a spasm of transparency—make sure that everybody knew everything about UNSCOM, what UNSCOM did. And it was a bit like if a policeman is supposed to be monitoring speed on a highway and he has a radar gun which only works on blue cars, do you want to print that in the paper? No, and it was a similar problem that we had. But in any case, this
chemical monitoring system was quite good, and that combines the episodic visit by
inspectors, and the potential that if Iraq was doing something untoward, some way it
might leak out or somebody might defect at some point. We had this whole array of
things that we did. Even in the biology area, it could provide some comfort to the
international community. Again, it was vital that we have extensive access without
conditions, and vital to be able to interview people, access to documents, and access to
computers, for example, biology, microbiology labs. They’re small; you can make small
quantities of some very pernicious agents in the university microbiology lab. But if you
check records, and you check computer [records], you shouldn’t be seeing
communications between that place and a security organization, for example. So all
these types of little tip-offs and indicators and stuff, if you accumulate them you felt that
you could provide reassurance to the international community.

JS: And the concept was that would be a continuing process?

CD: The idea was that it would be in perpetuity.

JS: In perpetuity, yes. The next question is, there is no more UNSCOM, and it’s not
very likely that the successor organization is going in. But IAEA can do inspections, as I
understand it. Is there any way that IAEA can continue this monitoring system, or not?

CD: IAEA has a bit of a different problem than UNSCOM did. In the first instance,
Iraq didn’t yet have completed nuclear weapons. UNSCOM, on the other hand, was
supposed to account for a whole bunch of things, which Iraq had created and in fact, had used. Also, the signature of nuclear activity is different, bigger. They [IAEA] would have to replicate a lot of what we had, and some of what we deployed in Iraq was done jointly. They were imbedded in our monitoring center, they shared communications with us. They would have to recreate their own camera system now, and I think a credible system could still be put in place if Iraq is willing to accept it. But they have the same principles involved in terms of access, and going to what we termed capable sites or new sites. In fact, the IAEA was pretty aggressive in some of that. Gary Dillon was one of the key proponents of this so-called ‘capable site’ system that we had for collecting information or identifying new locations in Iraq, which we didn’t understand their purpose, but from the information available could have dual use capabilities and therefore we would inspect them.

JS: In the nuclear field?

CD: In the nuclear field. So we would have joint inspections for nuclear and missiles, for example.

JS: But my question would lead to let’s say that IAEA continues to go into Iraq, periodically. Their monitoring would be exclusively for nuclear developments, or is it conceivable that they could cover a broader field?
CD: Be careful here, because the legal auspices under which Iraq permitted the IAEA to go in, where they prohibited us, was the NPT. It was not, and categorically not, with respect to the resolutions relayed at the end of the war, either 1284 or 687. They were not there to do that, so the activities that IAEA was permitted to conduct were those much lower standards associated with monitoring NPT obligations. Which is quite different from the IAEA and UNSCOM activities which were conducted to implement 687 or, now, if it should happen, the activities under 1284. Yes, last December, the Iraqis permitted IAEA in, but it was under their NPT obligations, it had nothing to do with...

JS: So, in fact, in your opinion there is really no possibility of continuing this monitoring system that was established, unless UNSCOM’s successor organization goes back in.

CD: Yes, and even then, they’re going to be operating under a very different set of circumstances. I’d be astonished frankly, if indeed Iraq permits them in. The will’s not there on the Council’s part.

JS: Do you have anything to say about the general relationship, as it developed over the years, between UNSCOM and IAEA, leaving aside the question of the personal relationship between Ekeus and Blix?

CD: I think there was a bit of healthy competition in many ways. We kind of fashioned ourselves in the early years as being more aggressive than IAEA, but you
know, I think the IAEA did do good work. They put together a lot of data on what Iraq was up to. They were similarly surprised when Hussein Kamal defected, and they learned a lot about what Iraq was doing that they hadn’t discovered, and we learned a lot of things that we had responsibility for that we didn’t know. I also tend to think that a little too much may have been made about this competition or conflict between Blix and Ekéus. I don’t think that—we were territorial in a sense, we preserved our prerogatives, and didn’t want IAEA doing things that we thought were really our business. One of the key provisions given to us and not the IAEA was the ability to designate new locations in Iraq for inspection, even for IAEA. There was a bit of healthy competition. In the early years, up until ’96 to ’97, UNSCOM had its own nuclear group. We would have two nuclear experts, one French, one American, of our staff who were conducting some investigation of nuclear things. This may have irritated IAEA, but I think ultimately the experts got along fairly well. We had a lot of joint work. The monitoring center was shared; when we had developed the export/import system, it was joint with the IAEA; notifications on the export/import system were made to a joint unit that was a shared responsibility of UNSCOM and IAEA. You know, as things go, I don’t think it was too bad.

JS: I have two final questions. One is, the point has been made by others that as long as the trained scientists remain in Iraq in these various fields—nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical—that Iraq will have a capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, and the only way to eliminate that is to eliminate the scientists. What is your view on that?
CD: Even if you eliminated the scientists, they’d grow back. The nuclear issue—it will quickly point to [the fact that] they have to have access to fissile material, and that’s either going to be readily observable if they try to do it themselves, or if they buy it, or steal, then you’ve got a problem. That’s true. You do the best you can. Any country can develop this stuff if it has the will, and people are willing to devote the resources. The problem with Iraq is it certainly demonstrated intention to obtain all these weapons, and that’s, I think, what causes the international community concern.

JS: And there are adequate scientists remaining there?

CD: Absolutely, clearly. Their work in the nuclear area was on the mark. It’s not just scientists, there’s a lot of engineering, too. You’ve got to be able to build some very specific parts, and have them fit together. It’s not just—it’s more than pure science, there’s a lot of sophisticated engineering, and it would take time to recreate that, but it can be done. All these triggers and shells and all that stuff, that’s not easy to do, but it can be done.

JS: My final question, it’s the hardest one, I guess, but you were in a senior position in UNSCOM for almost all of its existence. How do you assess its accomplishments? How important were they, how extensive were they, and what were the weaknesses?

CD: On a technical level, I think we accomplished a lot in the face of a very difficult opponent. Iraq, as it turns out, clearly wanted to retain some portion of its capabilities. If
you look at the record, UNSCOM caused Iraq to get rid of a lot of these weapons. Percentage-wise, we’ll never know if it was seventy percent, eighty percent, ninety percent, whatever. But we, I think, set a whole lot of technical precedents in terms of inspections, in terms of access, in terms of techniques, for some of which we were criticized, some of which people weren’t willing to—they would say that’s too much of an affront to sovereignty. I think on a technical, analytical side, we did an enormous amount. I think the seeds of failure were present from the beginning, though, because what we were doing was not arms control. This was not a process that Iraq entered into because it felt it was in its self-interest. Iraq lost a war, they were coerced into this, and this was coercive disarmament. We were trying to cause Iraq to get rid of something which they judged to be in their highest national interest to retain. And the dynamic there just doesn’t work over the long haul, so long as you have a continuous dedicated unitary actor on the one hand, Iraq, vis-à-vis a coalition with meandering objectives and attention, in a sense.

I think the Security Council maintained a consensus for a fairly lengthy period of time on this. There was a recognition that these weapons and the Iraqi track record were things that the international community had to be gravely worried about. I think the efforts of particularly, Ekéus, to kind of keep that consensus together sustained it for a while, but ultimately the laws of nature don’t favor this coalition. And UNSCOM, to the extent that its power existed in Iraq only through the backing of the Council, Tariq Aziz would look at you and say, “You want to go here? You and what army?” And then you look over your shoulder, and you find these people standing there whistling. There wasn’t any army after a while. And they knew that. So I would say we were on the
ground technically successful, I’d argue with an A-. I think with respect to the precedents that we tried, I would say a B.

I think some of the things we tried didn’t work, some of the things we tried worked, some of the things we tried made perfect sense, but were politically... the culture of the UN wasn’t prepared for it. In principle, the aerial imagery, the collection of information in the visual part of the spectrum was no different than the collection of information in the non-visual part of the spectrum. The same identical set of procedures were involved, but people considered one objectionable and inappropriate activity for an international organization. From our perspective, it was just another way of gathering data on what the Iraqis were trying to do. If we conducted an inspection, and we were able to arrange for the U-2 to fly over an area so we could see how the Iraqis reacted, and so we could see Iraqi convoys forming up to avoid UNSCOM inspectors, what’s wrong with trying to collect non-visual parts of the spectrum to do the same thing? And we did, but ultimately the Council didn’t want any part of this. I don’t know, it’s a mixed record, I guess.

JS: Is it replicable, ever, do you think?

CD: Well, you’ve got to have a country which loses a war, which has a lot of resources that attract a lot of attention. At the current pace, about once every ninety years you can do this. I think Napoleon created a disarmament process in the Treaty of Tilsit, for an example, like this. Also after World War I there was a case where you had a disarmament
provision with this forced disarmament theory, in 1920. I’d say about every eighty or ninety years, it appears to me, the international community will try something like this.

JS: Well, that’s ultimately optimistic—we’ll last that long!