AN ASSESSMENT OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING REFORMS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
ON PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

BY

MOSES KOFI ANNOR

(10404357)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY
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DECLARATION

I do hereby declare that apart from references to the works of other authors, which have been duly acknowledged, this dissertation is the result of my own research work carried under the supervision of Dr. Afua Boatemaa Yakohene. It has not been presented either in part or whole to any institution for the award of a degree anywhere.

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MOSES KOFI ANNOR DR. AFUA BOATEMAA YAKOHENE
(STUDENT) (SUPERVISOR)

........................................... ..............................................................
DATE DATE
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the almighty God, who has been my strength and my provider. It is also dedicated to my dearest mother, Mrs. Mercy Addison, for her constant prayers, love and support throughout my period of study.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all I will like to thank the almighty God for His grace, guidance and protection upon my life, and for successfully seeing me through the duration of my study at LECIAD.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISSON</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFSS</td>
<td>Global Field Support Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPTs</td>
<td>Joint Protection Teams</td>
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<td>LECIAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
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MISCA - African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic

MINUSCA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

MINUSMA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MNJTF - Multinational Joint Task Force

MONUC - United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

OAU - Organization of African Unity

ONUC - United Nations Operations in the Congo

PCCs - Police Contributing Countries

POC - Protection of Civilians

RCD - Rally for Congolese Democracy

RECs - Regional Economic Communities

SEA - Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

SOP - Standard Operating Procedures

SPM - Special Political Mission
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCCs</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
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ABSTRACT

As an influential international organization, the United Nations (UN) has the legal mandate to maintain international peace and security. It does this through various means including peace operations. The fluidity and exigencies of wars and violent conflicts; and the need for the use of appropriate strategies and fallouts of peace operations have led to various reforms. This dissertation examines the key factors and reports that necessitated UN’s peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century and its implications on the conduct of some peacekeeping operations particularly in Africa since 2000 till date. The study is hinge on the theory of collective security, which explains how UN peacekeeping operations evolved as a strategy for the maintenance of international peace and security. The study employs the qualitative method of research using semi-structured interviews to collect relevant primary data from the respondents who were selected through purposive sampling technique. The study revealed that, contemporary security challenges, coupled with changing prevailing security dynamics as well as experiences and difficulties faced by UN peacekeepers during peacekeeping missions are the major factors that necessitated UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century. The study also found out that, although the UN had instituted many reforms on peacekeeping operations in the 21st century, the Brahimi Report in 2000 and the HIPPO report in 2015 are the most prominent peacekeeping reforms. These two reforms are the landmark reforms and currently cover every aspect of the UN peacekeeping architecture. The study proved that current peacekeeping reforms has help put the protection of civilians at the forefront of current peace operation in Africa, and has ushered in more robust and multidimensional peacekeeping operations on the continent, while improving cooperation between the UN and AU in tackling Africa’s security challenges. The dissertation concludes by recommending that, the UN should clearly define its POC doctrine, and provide adequate resources for peace operations in Africa. Also, there is the need for more consultative and inclusive decision making between the UN and AU when drafting peacekeeping mandate.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction to the Research Problem

The primary purpose for the establishment of the United Nations (UN) was to maintain international peace and security in an effort to prevent another World War. Although peacekeeping emerged after the formation of the UN as a necessity but was never part of the original design of the UN, as there is no mention of it in the UN Charter.\(^1\) Originally, peacekeepers were only sent into a conflict environment where there was a “peace to keep”. Thus, they were only deployed after a ceasefire agreement had been reached among the warring parties, and they were there as military observers or a neutral party, in an effort to make sure all warring factions adhered to the peace agreement. Without an explicit definition, it makes it difficult to define the term peacekeeping without narrowing its scope and flexibility.\(^2\) The changing nature of the scope of peacekeeping over the years makes it difficult to have a universal definition for it. There are core principles of traditional peacekeeping operations namely consent, impartiality and minimum use of force.

Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld famously defined peacekeeping as belonging to “Chapter VI and a Half” of the UN Charter. He placed peacekeeping in between pacific settlement (Chapter VI) and military action (Chapter VII).\(^3\) *Agenda for Peace* by Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992, was the first attempt by the UN to define the term peacekeeping, it defined peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well”.\(^4\) Diehl also defines peacekeeping as “the prevention,
containment, moderation and termination of hostilities, through peaceful third-party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”

In 2008, the Capstone Doctrine also defined UN peacekeeping as;

“A technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements—military, police and civilian—working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”

All these varying definitions show how UN peacekeeping has evolved over the years, making it very difficult to have a universal definition for it. For the purpose of this paper, the term peacekeeping will be used interchangeably with peace support operations and peace operations as and when the term changes with subsequent reforms.

UN deployed its first peacekeeping mission in 1948, to oversee the Armistice Agreement between Israel and her Arab neighbours, since then there have been 71 peacekeeping missions, covering almost all the continents in the world. The UN has used peacekeeping “to provide security and political, and peace building support to help countries transition from conflict to peace, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support for organizing free and fair elections and the promotion and protection of human rights.”

Currently, the UN has 14 peacekeeping missions in four continents, with 124 contributing nations, and 104,043 personnel, which consist of 87,916 uniformed personnel, 12,830 civilian personnel and 1,308 U.N. Volunteers. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is the largest in the world with about 22,492
peacekeepers. The UN spends approximately $6.80 billion every year on peacekeeping missions around the world, with the bulk going to missions in Africa.\textsuperscript{10}

Post-Cold War upsurge in conflicts called for an unprecedented need for more peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers, but this time around with roles that are more complex. Thus, now peacekeepers moved away from being military observers to civilian protectors, election monitors and nation builders. Unfortunately, in many cases the organization failed to live up to these expectations, as UN military failures became common in the 1990s, with Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia serving as key reminders.

These peacekeeping reports seek to evaluate the whole UN peacekeeping architecture, which consist of several areas, but for the purpose of this research I will be assessing these impacts of the reports in only five key areas in UN peacekeeping, which are (i) Protection of Civilians (ii) Peacekeeping mandates (iii) Peacebuilding (iv) UN partnerships with other regional organizations and (v) Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). These five key areas give me enough information to assess these reports, and also seem to run through all the peacekeeping reports.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

As an influential international organization, the UN receives huge public attention, and because of the importance of its peacekeeping operations, used as a tool to maintain international peace and security, calls for reforms are very frequent. Since the end of the Cold War UN peacekeeping operations have move away from consensual truce monitoring to a more multidimensional nature, like humanitarian intervention and assistance, election monitoring, institutional transformation, nation-building(post-conflict reconstruction) and many more.\textsuperscript{11} The
key principles of traditional peacekeeping were impartiality, consent and minimum use of force, popularly known as the ‘holy trinity’. However over the last two decades, these principles have evolved, especially after the failures of some UN peacekeeping operations in the mid-1990s, in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda led to gross human suffering, and the frequent use of the phrase ‘never again’ by the UN and other world leaders.

The end of the Cold War saw a significant increase in the number of violent conflicts especially in Africa. The world was ravaged with intra-state civil wars, political instability, drought and famine, endemic diseases, extreme poverty and underdevelopment, gross human rights violations and refugee crisis. From 1948 to 1988, the UN deployed only 15 peacekeeping missions around the world. Surprisingly, the number of peacekeeping missions jumped to 31 between 1989 and 1999, with the majority of them in Africa. Thus, the UN had to restructure its peacekeeping architecture in order to deal with these dynamic conflicts.

This new era of peacekeeping required fundamental modifications in UN peacekeeping guidelines and practices as well as a myriad of administrative reforms during the last 20 years, to enable UN peacekeeping operations to evolve to those new conditions and demanding situations.. UN peacekeeping debacles in the 1990s in countries such as Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, led to a necessary re-evaluation of U.N. peacekeeping. Therefore, the UN started a systematic and in-depth assessment of its peacekeeping architecture with a view to strengthening its capabilities to conduct peace operations guided by some key reports such as the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) popularly referred to as “Brahimi Report” and the Report of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (2015), also known as “HIPPO Report”. The reforms have impacted some areas including the Protection of Civilians (POC), Mandates, Peacebuilding, UN
partnerships with other regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. The aim of this research therefore, is to assess how some of these reports have ushered in peacekeeping reforms of reforms and its implications on the conduct of some peace operations particularly in Africa since 2000.

1.2 Research Questions

1. What factors and reports necessitated UN’s peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century?
2. What are the consequent reforms and its implication on UN peace operations particularly in Africa?
3. What implementation challenges have these reforms faced and the way forward for the UN in the conduct of peace operations in Africa?
4. What is the way forward for UN in the conduct of peace operations in Africa?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1. To examine the factors and reports that necessitated UN’s peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century.
2. To identify the implications of the reforms on UN peace operations in Africa.
3. To discuss the challenges faced in the implementation of these reforms.
4. To identify the way forward for UN in the conduct of peace operations in Africa.

1.4 Scope of the Study

The study is limited to UN peacekeeping reforms initiated since 2000, and its implication on some
UN peace operations in Africa as guided by the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) popularly referred to as “Brahimi Report” and the Report of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations (2015), also known as “HIPPO Report”. For purposes of data analysis the implications of these reports on the conduct of UN peace operations in Africa will be assessed in five key areas namely:

(i) Protection of Civilians (POC)

(ii) Mandates (robust, clear, credible and achievable)

(iii) Peacebuilding (Human Rights, Rule of Law, Security Sector Reform, and transitional Justice)

(iv) UN partnerships with other regional organizations especially the AU, and

(v) Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).

1.5 Rationale of the Study

This study seeks to add to the existing literature on the subject, much research has been done on UN peacekeeping reforms but not much on its implications on peace operations, especially in Africa. This study seeks to add to the body of existing literature. Also, in the context of policy this study seeks influence existing UN peacekeeping policies, as it can be consulted by policy makers and peacekeeping practitioners, in order to make them more effective. This study seeks to serve as a basis for further studies on the implications of UN peacekeeping reforms on peace operations in Africa. With the HIPPO Report only in 3 years of use, this study is essential in boosting research and an in understanding of the Report, especially in the 5 areas under discussion.
1.6 **Hypothesis**

This research posits that, the introduction of UN peacekeeping reforms has improved the conduct of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

1.7 **Theoretical Framework**

This research employed the theory of collective security. Collective Security as defined by George Schwarzeberger is “a machinery of joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order”. This theory became very popular after the first decade of the 20th century, after the balance of power international system had failed to prevent World War 1, leading to the establishment of the League of Nations. The theory is associated with scholars such as; Kupchan and Kupchan, Snyder, Booth, McLean, Palmer, Perkings, and Papp. Onyemaechi also defines it as “an idealist mechanism used to prevent hostilities among states that rely on states forming military forces to deter aggression”. In this arrangement, war or aggression is seen as a threat to international peace and security. This theory rests on the principle of indivisibility of peace, often attributed to the 23rd President of the United States Woodrow Wilson, who defined it as “Every situation which is likely to affect the peace of the world is everybody’s business”. He believed war or aggression were a threat to international peace and security, so all countries had a moral obligation to stop aggression or war. The Collective Security concept is based on the assumption that with the anarchical nature of the international system, war and aggression are bound to happen. Thus, there is the need to put measure in place to prevent war or aggression from happening. Also, Collective Security system serves as a good mechanism to check countries with aggressive ambitions, as any attack on a state will bring the full force of the international community. This keeps countries in check and also serves an insurance policy for the victim. This renders aggression and war fruitless as it seeks to punish
offenders and prevent future wars.¹

The effects of World War 1 led to the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919, and it was the first modern organization to enhance the concept of collective security, as it sought to settle disputes and prevent war or aggression.²⁰ Article 10 of its Covenant “asks that member states must respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of all member states against any form of aggression.”²¹ Even though theoretically the League made provision for the use of military force to quell any form of aggression or war by any state, it did not have its own army and those members who went against the agreement could not be punished or stopped. For example, the League of Nation failed to prevent Italy for invading Ethiopia in 1935.²

After the League’s failure to prevent World War 2, the UN was created as a successor to the League, and was established as a Collective Security system, that sought to prevent another World War and maintain international peace and security. But the UN unlike the League of Nations had universal membership, with well-established institutions to tackle international security threats.²³ The preservation of international peace and security has been enshrined in the Charter of the UN as its core function. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter lays down the UN’s Collective Security function, as it reads “Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”²⁴ The UN Security Council has been entrusted with the responsibility to use Collective Security actions to deal with anything that threatens international peace and security. The first time the UN Collective Security was invoked in1950, during the Korean War, when North Korea attacked South Korea. The UN Security Council recognized North Korea as the aggressor and held that her attack on the South constituted a breach of international peace, and called for the immediate withdrawal of North Korean troops from the South. Led by the US, the UN also employed its collective security apparatus again in 1991 to drive away Iraqi forces that had occupied
Kuwait, after Sadam Hussein tried to annex Kuwait. The UN saw Iraq’s actions as a breach of international peace and security, so had to actively act to protect Kuwait.

The creation and development of the institution of peacekeeping under UN auspices represents a remarkable instance of the evolution of the UN Collective Security system. Unlike other tools of the system, at no point is ‘peacekeeping’ mentioned within the UN Charter. The concept of peacekeeping broadly represents an attempt by the UN to develop a mechanism through which it is able to support efforts aimed at the creation or maintenance of peace, or at the very least conflict avoidance, through the deployment of (traditionally) non-combatant forces on the ground to undertake a variety of functions.

Although, earlier operations were essentially deployed to keep parties in conflict apart, primarily through ceasefire patrolling tasks, as the UN’s conception of collective security increasingly came to embrace human security in peacekeeping. During the 1990s in particular, ambitious mandates conferred upon operations in very difficult circumstances led to debates on the very purpose of peacekeeping and the principles by which it should operate. With the surge in the number of intrastate conflicts at the end of the Cold War, the demand for UN peacekeeping operations also increased resulting in peacekeeping missions being given very ambitious mandates in challenging environments.

According to Palmer and Perkings as cited by Eke (2007), Collective Security has played a vital contribution to the evolutionary development of conditions of peace through the establishment of international organizations. Thus, they argue that the theory has provided a framework for keeping conflicts from becoming major threats to international peace and security because these international organizations.

Also, Kupchan and Kupchan argue that Collective Security has helped address realist concerns of an anarchic and self-help international system, where hostilities are rife. This is done by providing
a more effective mechanism for balancing against aggressors when they emerge, as well as making aggression less likely by creating institutions to check such aggressors, as it provides far more effective balancing against aggressors than balancing under anarchy.

Karl Mannheim uses the macro-sociology theory to criticize the Collective Security theory as being a “relative utopia”. Thus, he believes the theory is based upon certain idealistic assumptions that make its operationalization difficult. According to him, Collective Security has failed to find a compromise between national and world sovereignty, as sovereign states who are the major actors in the international system, will not be bound to fulfil such pledges should the need arise, and will only do so when it promotes their national interest. States will only act according to their interests and the UN’s actions do not supersede the politics among sovereign states, but only mirrors the current state of the international system.

Also, another criticism of the theory is the problem of subjectivity involved in determining the appropriate threat or aggression. Thus, there is no clear definition of what aggression entails, as what one might consider aggression can also be considered as self-defence by another state. This dilemma makes it difficult for some states to support the action of the UN Security Council even when there is a breach of international peace, as they might not see the actions of the offender as aggression but only self-defence.

Regardless of the criticisms levelled, against the Collective Security theory, it helps understand how UN peacekeeping operations evolved as a strategy for the maintenance of international peace and security. Also, the UN through the Security Council has employed peacekeeping as an effective tool in maintaining international peace and security, so the theory gives us an in depth understanding of peacekeeping and its importance to the UN collective security architecture.

1.8 Literature Review
The issue of UN peace keeping operations and its related activities has received a considerable scholarly attention, as many scholars have written extensively on the topic. According to scholars like Karen Karns, there is a considerable body of literature on the subject of the UN activities especially its peacekeeping operations. Some of these scholars do not only delve deep into the concept of peacekeeping as adopted by the United Nations, but have also looked at some of the diverse approaches to peacekeeping within the circles of the UN.

1.8.1 Understanding Peacekeeping

On the definition of the concept of peacekeeping, Kofi Annan the former UN Secretary General, defined it as “a United Nations’ presence in the field, with the consent of the parties, in order to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts and their resolution or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief”. Also, scholars such as, George Maritell, defines UN peacekeeping as: “Operations in which personnel owing allegiance to the UN are engaged in military or para-military duties and are carrying weapons for their own defence in pursuit of duties designated by the UN as necessary for the maintenance or restoration of peace”. This definition is regarded as a very technical one, since its seeks to properly define peacekeeping according to the Charter of the UN.

Other scholars, who try to define Peacekeeping operations, distinguished it from the concept of peacekeeping. According to FT Liu defined Peacekeeping Operations is “essentially a practical mechanism used by the UN to contain international conflicts and to facilitate their settlement by peaceful means.” Again, some other scholars, such as Lewis Coser, insist that, “the term UN peacekeeping cannot include UN observers”. It is therefore clear as indicated by scholars like Solomon Agada, “there is therefore, no single accepted definition of the term peacekeeping”. The above definitions and others may be allowed in order to realize their peculiar purposes or goals. In
this study however, peacekeeping refers to “a mechanism for conflict resolution covering a wide range of activities to include use of observers, troop’s deployment, disarmament, humanitarian and supply of relief materials, refugee resettlement and elections”. This study adopts this definition in line with Solomon Agada that explains, Peacekeeping should be “conceived as an inter-positional force placed between two or more contending and warring factions with opportunity to resolve the conflict either through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation and sometimes arbitration”.\textsuperscript{38} It is also in line with the UN own definition of peacekeeping, which portrays peacekeeping as "an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict."

1.8.2 Reforming United Nations Peacekeeping

Some literatures on peacekeeping operations of the UN is in the area of the challenges facing the UN in its bid to ensure that, it executes its core mandate. For example, Solomon Agada, wrote on “The Challenges of United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: Case Study of Somalia” and explored some of the monumental difficulties that the UN faces in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. One of the main challenges facing the UN, especially in its peace operations in Africa is the delay in deployment of troops or arm military personnel to war or conflicts areas in Africa. The causes of such delays according to Reddy, Shravanti, “have been identified to be procedural and excessive bureaucracy resulting in inefficiency and waste”.\textsuperscript{39} He explained that “during the 1990s the US, currently the largest contributor to the UN, gave inefficiency in the UN System as a reason for withholding her dues”. When the US agreed on the repayment of the dues, it was done on the condition of major reforms initiatives.

Again, scholars such as Usden and Juergenliemk, have attributed the reforms process embarked on by the UN in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century on peacekeeping operations to the realization of “the failures of UN
peacekeeping in places such as Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia, and therefore saw the need to put in efforts to reform the United Nations peacekeeping bureaucracy which have been ongoing since the mid-1990s”.40 Scholars such as Forman, Shepard and Andrew Grene, have underscored the point that “since the mid-2000s, the numbers of deployed personnel have been stagnant and are decreasing in the last years due to the Western engagement in Afghanistan”.41 They however, posited that “while peacekeeping will remain a key area for the United Nations to engage in, it is likely to be less personnel intensive in the coming years”.42 This means that, these scholars have predicted a situation in the future where many countries would be so willing to contribute troops towards UN peacekeeping operations.

Also, Jaïr van der Lijn, et al, have written on “Progress on UN peacekeeping reform: HIPPO and beyond”, where they pointed out the fact that “UN peace operations increasingly find themselves deployed in countries where there is no peace to keep, where insurgencies are ongoing, and where peacekeepers face asymmetric threats”.43 Acknowledging the efforts demonstrated by the United Nations to ensure peace and security, the four scholars bemoaned the fact that “in these environments, UN peace operations are asked to perform increasingly challenging tasks to assist governments and to stabilize countries”.44 This according to them, actually requires “adequate UN mandates, as well as appropriate military and civilian means”. There is also “a continuing urgent need to address the issues of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers”.

According to scholars such as Olonisakin, Funmi, “the end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in the UN and brought about multidimensional peacekeeping” as well as its accompanying approaches.45 He is of the view that “in a new spirit of cooperation, the Security Council established larger and more complex UN Peace Keeping Operations, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-state conflicts”.46 Rotberg Robert opined that, the
establishment of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations in the UN and its success which started from the “first of such missions which was a resounding success, was due to the full cooperation of the warring parties, the contributory support of the UN Security Council and the timely provision of the necessary financial resources, by the UN donor partners”. 47

Since then, the importance of UN peacekeeping has not been questioned or under any form of doubt. Samii Cyrus, observed that, the “United Nations peacekeeping stands out as one of the Organization’s most original and ambitious undertakings in its effort to control conflict and promote peace”. 48 Commenting on the need for the UN to continue its mandate, scholars such as Durch, Holt, Early and Shanahan, observed that “the Blue Helmets will continue to break new grounds as the UN is called upon not only to contain conflicts and alleviate the suffering they cause, but also to prevent the outbreak of war among nations and to build towards enduring peace”. 49 For the UN to continue its peacekeeping operations successfully, Festus Aboagye opined that the UN would need to enhance its “ability to promptly deploy troops for UN Peace Keeping Operations” and strive very hard to overcome the challenges that hamper its operations such as funding and bureaucracy. 50

From all the literature reviewed above, it is clear that, the literature has clearly defined the concept of peacekeeping and its related activities, differencing peacekeeping from peacekeeping operations. The literature has also established the need for the UN to continue its peacekeeping operations so as to be able to achieve its core objectives. It was also clear from the review of the available literature that, the changing nature of conflicts as well as the security dynamics demands that the UN put in places certain pragmatic measures that would adequate respond to the many challenges that confront peacekeeping in the 21st century. However, it was clear from the literature that, the literature gaps of specifically looking at UN peace keeping reforms in the 21st century, with the aim of identify key factors and reports that necessitated these reforms as well as their implications on peacekeeping
operations in Africa, has not been filled by the available literature. It is this literature gap that is left unfilled, by these literatures that, this study seeks to fill.

1.9 Operational Definitions

**Peacemaking**: Peacemaking is a process of “addressing conflicts in progress, in an attempt to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation.”

**Peacekeeping**: It is “primarily a military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.”

**Peace-building**: It defines “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”

1.10 Sources of Data

This research used both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources of data comprised of semi-structured interviews with some lecturers from Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), and lecturers from LECIAD. The secondary sources of data were sought from journal article, policy papers, published and unpublished report and Internet sources.

1.11 Research Methodology

The study used qualitative method of research design. Creswell defines it as “a type of educational research in which the researcher relies on the views of participants; asks broad, general questions;
collects data consisting largely of words (or text) from participants; describes and analyses these words for themes; and conducts the inquiry in a subjective, biased manner."54 This means that gives the researcher the ability to describe, interpret, verify and evaluate a phenomenon. It also makes use of strategies of inquiring such as case studies, grounded theory studies, ethnography, and narratives.55 Qualitative research also helps to uncover trends in thought and opinions, and dive deeper into the problem.

These reasons therefore influenced the choice of qualitative approach for this study. I therefore collected open-ended and emerging data through semi-structured interviews with the intent of developing themes from the data for qualitative analysis.

1.11.2 Sampling Size, Sampling Method and Target Population

The sampling method this study employed is the purposive sampling technique to collect data from respondents. Purposive sampling also known as judgment or subjective sampling is a non-probability sampling technique in which the researcher relies on his or her own judgment when choosing members of a population to participate in the study.56 The researcher decided to select specific research fellows from both LECIAD and KAIPTC because; he believes they have the needed expertise and in-depth knowledge on the research topic.

Purposive sampling is used because it is the most cost effective and time-effective sampling method available. Also, it is the only appropriate method of sampling due to the limited number of respondents available to be interviewed.

The population of the study is made up of 7 respondents namely;

-Professor Henrietta Mensah- Bonsu who is Professor and senior law lecturer at the University of Ghana School of Law, former director of the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy
(LECIAD), and a former Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Rule of Law (DSRSG) in UNMIL in 2007.

- Dr. Festus Aubyn and Dr. Fiifi Edu-Afful both Research Fellows for Peace Support Operations Programme at the Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).

- Dr. Emma Birikorang, Programme Head for the Peace Support Operations Programme at KAIPTC.

- Mrs. Joana Ama Osei-Tutu, Head of Women Peace and Security Institute (WPSI) at KAIPTC

- Mr. John Mark Pokoo, Head of Conflict Management Programme at KAIPTC and,

- Mr. Mustapha Abdullah, a Research Associate at KAIPTC respectively.

1.11.3 Data Collection

The relevant data was solicited using semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interview guides were used to obtain data concerning UN reforms instituted in the 21st century and its implication to peacekeeping operations in Africa. The interview guide is structured around the five key areas under review in both reports. Qualitative research is better preferred for this study because it provides depth and detail ensures openness, simulates people’s individual experiences and attempts to avoid pre-judgments. It also makes use of open-ended questions, here the respondents are free to respond in their own words, and these responses tend to be more than yes or no. This gives room for the researcher to probe the respondents for further information. Data collection was done depending of the availability and expertise of respondents. These interviews were recorded electronically, and the data was later transcribed verbatim.

1.11.4 Data Analysis
Content analysis was used to analyse the collected data. A content analysis is a “detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular material for identifying patterns or themes”. It helps make sense of the data collected and also highlights the important messages, features or findings.

Both reports covered the 5 key areas under study. Protection of Civilians (POC) was seen as the cornerstone of every UN peacekeeping operations and the use of force had become one way of achieving that goal. Both reports did not make mention of a POC or a stabilization concept to aid peacekeepers discharge their duties. Also, both reports called for more inclusive collaboration and cooperation between the UN and other regional organizations. Peacebuilding was now seen as a continuous process in helping achieve sustainable peace.

1.11.5 Ethical Considerations

The researcher obtained letters from LECIAD, which were distributed to the intended respondents. Respondents were informed of the intended interviews and dates were fixed for the interviews to take place. Interviews were later conducted on agreed dates with respondents, and in line with ethics of social research, the researcher gave the respondents the options to either remain anonymous or provide names and titles to be used for the purpose of analysis which they obliged to. Also the researcher sought the consent of the respondents before carrying out the audio recordings.

1.12 Limitations of the Study

The researcher encountered some few challenges in the process of conducting it. First, there was a shortage it number of respondents to be interviewed, this was due to their unavailability of some
respondents during the time of data collection. This in turn limited my use of more primary data, so I had to depend mostly on secondary sources of data.

1.13 Organization of Chapters

Chapter 1 constitutes the introduction of the research.

Chapter 2 analyses the UN reports that have influenced UN peacekeeping reforms and the consequent reforms thereof.

Chapter 3 assesses the implications of the UN peacekeeping reforms on peace operations in Africa, the implementation challenges reforms faced and the way forward for the UN.

Chapter 4 discusses the summary of research findings, conclusion and recommendations
ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW AND CONSEQUENCES OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING REFORMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of two UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century namely the Brahimi Report (2000) and the HIPPO Report (2015), with emphasis on some key recommendations from these reports, which are in line with the objectives of this research. It begins with an overview of UN peacekeeping operations since 1948 to provide insight into how peacekeeping operations were conducted before the 21st century UN peacekeeping reforms were introduced.

To be able to critically analyse UN peacekeeping operations, it is important to categorize their evolution according to periods and scope, as peacekeeping has evolved since 1948. However, for purpose of this research, UN peacekeeping will be divided into 3 main categories, namely; traditional or First Generation Peacekeeping, Second Generation Peacekeeping and Third Generation Peacekeeping. Generations are divided on the basis of three main factors: the level of force used by operations’ military pillar; the type and depth of tasks conducted by its civilian pillar; and in the case of the latest generation, increased UN load-sharing with regional organizations.

2.1 Traditional or First Generation Peacekeeping (1948-1988)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, peacekeeping was entrusted into the hands of the UN Security Council, which was mandated to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping
operations usually fell between Chapter VI (Pacific settlements of disputes) and Chapter VII (Use of enforcement actions to maintain international peace). This was because pacific settlements of disputes were ineffective in resolving inter-state conflicts, whereas due to Cold War politics the five permanent members of the Security Council could not agree on the use of enforcement actions to control and resolve conflicts. The Cold War politics placed some restriction on peacekeeping operations, especially the issue of state sovereignty, this led to the development of some principles of peacekeeping namely:

(a) “Consent of the parties: This was very important in order not to violate the territorial integrity of the host state. The Security Council could only deploy peacekeepers into any territory after the host state had consented to it.

(b) Impartiality: It meant that the peacekeepers could not force their will on the parties as that might affect the local balance of power. They were not to take sides among the parties, but to deal will all parties equally this was very important in an effort to gain the consent and cooperation of the parties.

(c) Non-use of force except in self-defense: Here UN peacekeepers could not use force to keep the peace, unless they were under attack. This was necessary as any form of enforcement action by the Security Council was seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the states.

The first peacekeeping operation during this period was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNSTO), which was a military observer mission authorized by the Security Council to oversee the Armistice Agreement between Israel and her Arab neighbours in 1948. Peacekeeping during this period was mainly characterized by unarmed military observers who were primarily monitoring ceasefires, they were to act as impartial observers mandated to keep the peace and contain the conflict until a political solution was found.
“The first time the UN used armed personnel was in 1956, when the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which was deployed to address the Suez Canal crisis, but they were not giving enforcement powers. UNEF was mandated to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt, patrol the border areas and prevent further military incursions, forming a buffer zone between Anglo-French-Israeli and Egyptian forces. It was also mandated to ensure that both Israel and Egypt respected the conditions of the 1949 Armistice Agreement."

The United Nations Operations in the Congo (UNOC) was the first large-scale mission with nearly 20,000 personnel who were mandated to halt the crisis in the Congo in 1960. There were a total number of 15 UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War period. Almost all peacekeeping operations deployed within this period had chapter VI mandates.

2.2 Second Generation Peacekeeping (1988-1999)

Originally, peacekeeping missions were deployed to prevent inter-state conflicts. However, by the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflicts had become more intra-state, and this called for a doctrinal and operational shift in peacekeeping. The core principles of traditional peacekeeping operations which are (consent, impartiality and minimum use of force) could not be applied to the current nature of conflicts, so there was a shift from traditional forms of peacekeeping to more multidimensional peacekeeping operations, as now peacekeepers were deployed to every volatile environments where there was little or no peace to keep. By the end of the Cold War, many of the smaller conflicts that the Cold War superpowers had held at bay were now free to explode unchecked. In the absence of Soviet or American patronage, many developing states around the globe began to fracture and spiral into chaos fuelled by resurgent nationalism, political instability,
and contested natural resources. The United Nations confronted an alarming proliferation of bloody and primal intrastate conflicts throughout much of the Global South.

Interstates conflicts meant that the UN got to play the neutral and third party in those kind of conflicts, so it was much more easier to seek the consent of one party to deploy UN troops within its boundaries, but unlike second generation peacekeeping where the warring factions were either government forces against rebels, or rebels against other rebel groups, What was relatively easy to do when implementing a solid peace agreement between two States that had an interest in keeping their word, had become much more difficult to achieve with a multitude of non-state actors to a conflict. Seeking consent before deployments was very difficult as most of the conflicts were not conventional warfare, where you could easily identify the warring parties.

Also, neutrality was still a key part of second generation peacekeeping, being neutral meant that they could not take sides with either parties of the conflict and this made the work of the peacekeepers very difficult as civilians were mostly the targets of these new conflicts, as they found it difficult to differentiate between civilians and belligerents. Most mandates during this era were very ambitious and vague, as it did not categorically state what UN peacekeepers should do when civilians came under attack. This form of neutrality led to them being unable to prevent mass atrocities committed against civilians (Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia).

Furthermore, minimum use of force by UN peacekeepers unless in self-defense was also very instrumental in second generation peacekeeping. Thus, second generation missions were almost always deployed under the auspices of Chapter VI, meaning no changes were made to their rules of engagement. However, unlike in first generation peacekeeping where peacekeepers were lightly armed, this time around UN peacekeepers were heavily armed due to the volatile nature of the conflict environment, but force was to be used only as a last resort. This made these types of
peacekeeping operations very reactionary, especially in situations where civilians were under attacks. Resulting in ineffective protection of civilians’ strategies, as POC was not at the centre of most mandates, and did not clearly spell out how peacekeepers were supposed to use force to protect civilians caught in armed conflicts, as their rules of engagement were poorly conceived.

For instance, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed in Bosnia to with the mandate to “safeguard civilian populations caught up in the increasingly bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia.” However, when the Dutch contingent of UN forces deployed in Srebrenica came under attack from pro Serbian Bosnian forces, they were unable to use all necessary force to protect themselves and the civilians under their control. This led to the massacre of about 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in July 1995.19

The UN operation that took place in former Yugoslavia was the first test of the new generation of peacekeeping in 1992. Peacekeepers were now responsible for ensuring the implementation of peace accords as well as laying the foundations for sustainable peace. Missions were now multidimensional in nature, as it now involved police and civilian contingents, even though military contingents remained the backbone of these missions. There was a surge in civilian engagement involved in assisting in political transitions from conflict, and humanitarian assistance, with limited mandate to use military force.20

In addition, troop contribution for UN peacekeeping had taken a drastic change. Thus, unlike traditional peacekeeping where most of the military contingents were from Western states, during second generation peacekeeping most Western countries were reluctant to contribute troops for UN peacekeeping operations, but now majority of peacekeepers were deployed from most developing countries in Asia and Africa. Now most Western countries were willing to provide the funds, while developing states provided the work force for UN peacekeeping operations.21
The scope of peacekeeping operations expanded, particularly after then UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali introduced *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, which was a landmark reform initiative, which sought to revise the UN peacekeeping architecture in order to be able to deal with post-Cold War conflicts. This reform initiative placed emphasis on preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was also created in 1992, prior to that the UN Office for Special Political Affairs was responsible for the management of UN peacekeeping operations and other UN Secretariat activities, which related to conflict prevention and management. The new DPKO in conjunction with the UN Secretary-General was responsible for the planning, management and direction of all UN peacekeeping operations. It was also mandated to provide “guidance and support on military, police, logistical and administrative issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions.”

This was also the period UN peace operations suffered its lowest moments, as the general success of earlier missions raised the expectation for UN peacekeeping operations beyond its capacity, and this led to the UN Security Council authorizing missions with very ambitious mandates and inadequate resources. “The “big three” failures of peacekeeping in the 1990s include the UN’s failure to prevent or limit the Rwandan Genocide in 1994; its inability in bringing about a political accord, coupled with relatively heavy military losses, in Somalia; and its failure to protect civilians and itself in Bosnia, leading to the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. These three missions came under great criticism for the UN’s failure protect civilians in armed conflict, as they resulted in the loss of many human lives, and the credibility and legitimacy of UN peacekeeping.”

After these setbacks the Security Council reduced the number of its peacekeeping missions and set upon a period of “reflection”, as the confidence in UN peacekeeping was at an all-time low, and sought to find solutions to avoid such atrocities from ever happening again.
2.3 Third Generation Peacekeeping (2000-present)

Lessons from failed second generation peacekeeping had a profound effect on the core principles of UN peacekeeping “Holy Trinity”. Which lead to the emergence of 3rd generation peacekeeping.29 By the turn of the 21st century the UN begun to increase its peacekeeping operations especially in Africa, where they were asked to perform even more complex and large peacekeeping operations in a number of African countries namely Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) and Sudan).30 These missions are typically dispatched under Chapter VII mandates. UN peace operations in the twenty first century changed in at least three important ways: they had become more focused on the protection of civilians, they had become more robust, and in some cases, they are starting to adopt stabilization as a mission goal.31

These missions were an upgrade on the second generation missions, as they were more multidimensional and integrated in nature, due to the broader range of objectives they were to undertake. The multiplicity of tasks now expanded to include security, humanitarian and political objectives. Environmental developmental and socio-economic objectives were appended as the need for even more comprehensive responses became increasingly evident. This broader range of objectives also demanded a new multidimensional approach that included civilians and police, as well as military components. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) defines integrated and multidimensional peacekeeping missions as:

“An instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis
Although the military remains the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now included administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, gender protection officers, de-miners and electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers and experts in communications and public information.

Furthermore, third generation UN peace operations often operate in high-risk environments where there in usually no peace to keep, in which they face complex and asymmetric security threats or violent extremists who target the missions. Despite limited capabilities, missions are being asked to protect civilians or stabilise the security situation within settings of ongoing violent conflict. They sometimes face ‘spoilers’, or are asked to proactively dissuade ‘spoilers. In such environments, they are confronted with, among other challenges: bomb or mortar attacks, ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and hostage situations.

These new missions were also robust in nature, and had the permission to use force at the tactical level to implement the mission’s mandates. Though they did not completely drift away from the core principles of traditional peacekeeping, now impartiality meant upholding the mission’s mandates and the principles of the UN Charter. The UN had learnt that in as much as impartiality was very important for peacekeeping, it was to be seen as rather impartiality to “execute the missions’ mandates, and not thinking about neutrality between warring parties.” The use of force moved away from only in instances of self-defence to protection of civilians and missions’ components. Missions were now being deployed under Chapter VII, and peacekeepers were mandated to use all necessary means within their capabilities to protect civilians under imminent threat.
In 2007, UN Secretary-General, Ban Kin-moon, divided the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) establishing the Department of Field Support (DFS) as a separate entity that was responsible for “the provision of support to international peace operations including UN peacekeeping, special political and other field missions.” This was done to reduce the burden on the DPKO and improve the quality of UN peace operations.

“During the end of the first decade UN peacekeeping had entered into an era of “consolidation”, as the number of peacekeeping operations had reduced, with most of the earlier missions having drawn down and troops reduced. Nonetheless, with an increase in violent conflicts especially in Africa (Mali, DRC, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic), the UN continues to face similar challenges as before, as now UN peace operations are multidimensional and robust in nature, and provides political solutions, civilian protection, assist in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, support electoral assistance, promoting and protecting human rights and restoring the rule of law."

2.4 The Brahimi Report and the Beginning of UN Peacekeeping Reforms

The first UN attempt to reform its peacekeeping apparatus was in 1992, when at the request of the Security Council, the then Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, introduced “An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peacekeeping” (popularly referred to as An Agenda for Peace). This report was the first comprehensive assessment of UN peace operations to be able to catch up with the new global security challenges the world was facing. More also, it was at a time when the UN was experiencing a crisis of confidence at the end of the 1990s, as the recommendations of the report failed to live up to its expectations. This was compounded by the
humanitarian crisis in Somalia, and the genocides in both Rwanda and Srebrenica, which had dramatically damaged the credibility of UN peace operations. In 2000 the UN produced a comprehensive review of peace operations, a landmark document that really changed the face of its peace operations, and sought to find solutions for the failures of UN peace operations in the 1990s.


The UN peacekeeping debacles in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica led to a crisis of confidence for UN peace operations, as its credibility and effectiveness was questioned. At the turn of the new century there was an increase in conflicts around the world, especially in Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC), and this called for more peace operations. However, in an effort not to repeat those failures again, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, mandated Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi and a group of high level of experts to reassess the UN peacekeeping architecture and make “frank and realistic” recommendations to make UN peacekeeping more effective.

The Panel came up with the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, popularly known as “Brahimi Report” named after the chairperson of the Panel, Lakhdar Brahimi. This report offered an “in-depth and frank” critique on UN peace operations. The Panel believed that until such radical changes were made, the UN was going to struggle to tackle the new peacekeeping and peacebuilding challenges of the new millennium.
2.4.2 Objectives of the Report

The Panel was mandated to identify and examine the weakness in UN peacekeeping operations, and offer realistic recommendations to solve those problems. The Secretary-General promised to implement the recommendations, and called for more support and commitment from member states in an effort to effectively implement the Report’s recommendations. 

Basically, the report is divided into six sections, with the first section introducing the report and the reasons for change. The next four gives an overview of the current challenges to UN peace operations and present fifty-seven specific recommendations for the UN to act on. The final section of the report deals with the challenges to the implementation of reforms. The report gives three key conditions for the success of future complex missions

a) Political support
b) Rapid deployment with robust force posture, and
c) A sound peacebuilding strategy.

The Panel argued that all these three conditions were what are needed for effective complex missions and all recommendations in the report are geared towards achieving all three conditions.

2.4.3 Key Recommendations in the Brahimi Report

In this section the study analyses some of the key issues addressed in the report and the given recommendations. They include; (a) The Need for Preventive Action (b) The need for a Peacebuilding Strategy (c) The Need For Robust Doctrine And Protection Of Civilians (d)The Need For Clear, Credible And Achievable Mandates.
2.4.5 The Need for a Peacebuilding Strategy

Peacebuilding was first introduced incorporated into UN peace operations by Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace in 1992. It defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” However, the Brahimi Report gave peacebuilding activities a much more critical role than Agenda for Peace, and this was as a result of UN peace operations becoming more multidimensional at the turn of the century. UN peacekeepers were supposed to create a stable and secure environment for peacebuilding activities to take place, peace builders were now responsible for supporting the political, social and economic changes that will help secure a safe environment that is “self-sustaining”. This was because keeping the peace alone was not an adequate strategy for long-term sustainable development, so there was the need for the UN continue to assist the countries from transitioning from war to peace.

The Report entreats the Executive Committee on Peace and Strategy (ECPS) to present to the Secretary-General a comprehensive plan to strengthen UN’s capacity to implement a permanent peacebuilding strategy, and implement programmes in support of those strategies. It also stresses on the doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and uphold the elements of rule of law and maintain law and order, as it is very important in such a fragile situations, as the least violence can lead to the recurrence of conflict. For effective peacebuilding strategy, there is the need engage the local people, and these engagements should be multidimensional in nature. In an effort to strengthen government institutions in conflict zones, the conduct of credible free and fair elections should be part of the broader peacebuilding strategy. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes must be transformed into quick-impact projects that will positively impact on the lives of the people in the mission area.
Summary of key recommendations on peacebuilding:

(a) “A small percentage of a mission's first year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team’s resident coordinator;

(b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments;

(c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict;

(d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.”

2.4.6 The Need for Robust Doctrine and Protection of Civilians

Calls for more robust peacekeeping operations began in the 1990s after the horrors of Rwanda and Srebrenica, and this lead to the search for a more comprehensive doctrine to protect civilians and prevent such atrocities. This was incorporated into the Report, as it urged UN peacekeepers to stop violence “in support of basic United Nations principles”. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was the first mission to be given a protection of civilian (POC) mandate in 1999. Post-Brahimi majority of mandates issued to UN missions have authorized peacekeepers to use “all necessary means to protect civilians when under imminent threat of physical violence”.

The Panel agreed that the core principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality and minimum use of force unless self-defence) should still be the bedrock of UN peace operations, but it still urged that the changing nature of conflicts being more intra-state and transnational, consent will be
difficult to seek. Here impartiality will only mean adherence to the principles of the Charter, because in a situations where only one party is ready to adhere to a peace agreement, while other parties are clearly intent on violating the agreement, peacekeepers cannot be impartial and continue to give equal treatment to both parties. These were the same situations the UN faced in Rwanda and Srebrenica, which resulted in extreme human suffering. Thus, the UN’s failure to distinguish between victim and aggressor was the major cause of failure of both missions, and this damaged the reputation and credibility of the organization.

The Report urged that, all peace operations must be able to effectively defend themselves, mission components and mission mandates, which included the protection of civilians at whatever cost. This called for robust rules of engagement and under no circumstance should “the peacekeepers cede their initiatives to their attackers”. For the effective robust engagements, mandates should specify clearly an operation’s authority to use force. This also means that there should be larger forces who are well equipped to effectively achieve the mission’s mandate. Now peacekeepers should be armed with the necessary capabilities needed to mount an effective defense against violent challenges. Now new peace operations should contain specific mandates to protect civilians in armed conflict and use the necessary force to achieve the objectives of the mission, if they come up against resistance. Mission components (military, police and civilian volunteers) have been entrusted with authority to use any means within their capabilities to protect civilians in armed conflict. Also, civilian protection mandates given to complex peace operations should also be provided with the necessary resources needed to carry out that mandate.

*Summary of key recommendation on The Need for Robust Doctrine And Protection Of Civilians:*
2.4.7 The Need for Clear, Credible and Achievable Mandates

One area of UN peace operations, which has been criticized the most, is the need for clear, credible and achievable mandates. Most critics of UN peacekeeping blamed a lack of clear mandates for its shortcoming in the 1990s. Mandates are legal instruments which provide purpose and direction for UN peace operations.59 They are crafted to reflect “the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents”.60 UN peacekeepers are supposed to act in accordance with the mission’s mandate, and so the quality of the mandate will definitely determine the success or failure of any peace operation. Power politics by five permanent members of the Security Council have been the cause of very ambitious or ambiguous mandates, and their political nature makes it very difficult to issue appropriate mandates that meet the challenges of the conflicts.61

To overcome this challenge the Brahimi report urged that Security Council should not draft template mandates for peace operations, but mandates should be drafted to reflect nature of the conflict on the ground, as no conflict is ever the same. The Brahimi Report urged the UN Secretariat “not to pull its punches when laying out requirements for an operation in a potentially dangerous environment, and to tell the Security Council when a possible operation exceeded its capacity, and should tell the Security Council what it needs to hear, not what it wants to hear.”62 This was very important as it was going to help the Security Council draft achievable mandates which would be
mission specific, according the availability of adequate resources, and the actual things happening on the ground. It also advised that Security Council mandates should be in draft form until the Secretary-General confirms that it has the necessary resources and commitments from member states to meet the requirement on the ground.\textsuperscript{63}

\textit{Summary of key recommendations on clear, credible and achievable mandates:}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{(a) “The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines;}
  \item \textit{(b) The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements, including peace-building elements, from Member States;}
  \item \textit{(c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;}
  \item \textit{(d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission’s use of force.”}\textsuperscript{64}
\end{itemize}

2.5.1 Background to the HIPPO Report

For seventy years peacekeeping has been the most effective tool used by the UN to maintain international peace and security. There are more peacekeepers on the ground and operating in very volatile environments than ever before. This has put a severe strain of the effectiveness of UN peace operations. Today, UN peacekeepers are being deployed into conflict situations where there is no “peace to keep” or conflicts are ongoing in countries such as; the Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, Mali and South Sudan.

To be able to match up to the current challenges’ peacekeeping was facing, there was a need to “take stock” of the evolving expectations of UN peacekeeping and re-assess the whole UN peacekeeping architecture fifteen years after issuing its most comprehensive peacekeeping reform initiative in 2000. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, appointed a high-level panel of experts led by Jose Ramos-Horta, the former President of Timor-Leste, to carry out the first “comprehensive” UN peacekeeping reform after the Brahimi Report in 2000.

After several months of consultation and deliberations, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation published its findings in June 2015 in its report “Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People.” The Report produced over 100 recommendations, calling for the drastic improvement in the execution of UN peace operation. Although the Report acknowledged the massive improvement in UN peace operations post-Brahimi, it still identified some chronic challenges that hinder the effectiveness of peace operation. In particular, it made mention of; the continuous use of template mandates, less attention on development of political strategies to complement military strategies, and the over reliance on military and technical strategies at the expense of mediation and prevention strategies.
Central to the thinking behind the HIPPO report was the need for the Security Council, Secretariat and Troops contributing countries (TCCs) and Police contributing countries (PCCs) consultation in the area mandate formation, in order to help eliminate some chronic capability and implementation-related challenges. It makes a strong statement describing UN peace operations as a political partnership requiring triangular cooperation from start to finish to ensure a shared understanding of the situation, the political goal and required resource.\textsuperscript{67} In September 2015, the Secretary-General also presented his report on the implementation of the HIPPO recommendations.

In 2015 almost the same time that the HIPPO Panel undertook their review of UN peace operations, a ten-year review of the UN peacebuilding architecture was taking place, as well as a review of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

For the success and effectiveness of current and future peace operations the report demands four major operational shifts, that is;

a) Primacy of politics: “Politics must drive the design and implementation of UN peace operations, with a focus on political solutions rather than military or technical ones. Member states should also help mobilize renewed political effort to keep peace processes on track when the momentum behind them falters”.\textsuperscript{68}

b) The need for the flexible use of the full spectrum of UN peace operations: “Missions should be well-tailored to the context with smoother transitions between phases rather than conforming to rigid peacekeeping versus special political mission templates. The UN should also strengthen analysis, strategy, and planning, and the Security Council should adopt sequenced and prioritized mandates to allow missions to develop over time”.\textsuperscript{69}
c) A stronger, more inclusive peace and security: “To respond to crises, such a partnership should be based on enhanced collaboration and consultation, as well as mutual respect and mutual responsibilities”.70

d) Emphasis of a more field-focused Secretariat and people-centred UN peace: “UN Head Quarters must improve upon its work by focusing more on improving on-field practices, and UN peacekeepers must serve and protect the people they have been sent to assist”.71

2.5.2 Key Recommendations in the HPPO Report

The HIPPO Report contains 125 separately listed recommendations, counting all sub-recommendations separately, but for the purpose of this study, I will only focus on 6 key the recommendations I see as essential to my work. These 6 recommendations include:

(a) Protection of Civilians (b) The use of force for peace and protection (c) Peacebuilding and Sustainable Peace (d) Achievable Mandates (e) Strengthening Global-Regional Partnerships (f) Addressing Abuse and enhancing Accountability.

2.5.3 Protection of Civilians

Even though since the last decade and a half, UN peace operations have been given explicit POC mandates, to protect civilians from conflict-related violence and abuses, yet UN peacekeepers have struggled to effectively execute these duties. The UN Security Council has made POC a core responsibility of every UN peace operation. These shortfalls by peacekeepers can be mainly attributed to they being deployed into very hostile conflict environments where no peace
agreement has been reached, and governments inability or unwillingness to protect their own civilians, as in most instances they are also responsible for the abuse.

Civilian protection is a core and moral duty of the UN, and nothing will damage the legitimacy and credibility of UN and its peace operations more than its failure to protect civilian caught in armed conflict. After its failures to protect civilians in both Rwanda and Srebrenica, the Brahimi Report recommended that protection of civilians should be a key objective of any UN peace operations, and should be done even with the use of force if necessary.\textsuperscript{72} In today’s conflicts where civilians are usually the targets of militia groups, it has become imperative of the UN more than ever to do anything possible to protect civilians in armed conflict. Today over 98% of UN uniformed personnel are deployed into conflict zones to protect civilians even if there is the need to use force.\textsuperscript{73}

For any UN peace operation to effectively protect civilians there is a need for the Secretariat to realistically assess protection of civilians needs during mission planning this can be done if it takes into consideration the resource capabilities of the mission, and should there even be unexpected changes in the conditions in the field it should inform the Security Council, TCCs and Police contributing countries so they can adjust their strategies to meet the current demands. There is also the need for the Secretariat to improve its information gathering and analysis capabilities, as there is the need for timely, actionable, and reliable information on threats to civilians, as this will help for proper planning for the missions.\textsuperscript{74} The Panel calls for the UN to use other unarmed strategies to lead the fight for civilian protection, which must mostly include political strategies, which can sometimes help bring an end to conflicts and work to advance the peace process.\textsuperscript{75} As the Panel stress that;
“It is an unfortunate reality that no amount of training and good leadership, or troops and helicopters, will ensure the protection of all civilians across the 11 million square kilometres that 106,000 uniformed UN peacekeepers are today asked to operate in.”

The ability of the UN to assess the threats to civilians will influence recruitment and planning strategies. Thus, it will inform the UN on the type of armed forces, forms of violence, types of threats, potential risk to civilians over time should be assessed effectively to shape the capabilities of the mission. Also all missions protection efforts should be tailor made to suite the kind of threats on the ground, but should not be a template or one size fits all type of mandate, as it has mostly proved ineffective.

For the proper implementation of mission mandates, member states must provide the mission with the necessary capabilities and with the support of the Security Council in obtaining them. There is also the need for the required equipment and financial and human resources, to be able to implement the mission’s mandate, and reinforcements should be supplied on time. Also, for effective implementation of POC mandates mission leadership should be willing to carry out such duties, and there should be a clear chain of command to avoid any unnecessary delay when carrying out their duties. Effective training is also very essential to the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. Thus, the ability of peacekeepers to help protect civilians during armed conflicts will always depend on their level of training received as it will guide them on the kind of strategy to employ, and under what conditions those strategies must be used to protect civilians.

Summary on Protection of Civilians.

(a) “To deliver on protection of civilians, the current gap in many missions between resources and mandates need to be addressed.
(b) Every peacekeeper – civilian, military, police – must do all they can when civilians are under imminent threat. Political leverage and influence can be more powerful than military response.

(c) In view of the positive contributions of unarmed civilian protection actors, missions should work more closely with local communities and national and international non-governmental organizations in building a protective environment.”

2.5.4 The Use of Force for Sustainable Peace and Protection

The Brahimi Report introduced the era of robust UN peacekeeping operations, as it called for peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians and the mission’s mandate. It also called for a more concise and robust peacekeeping doctrine. Now with peacekeepers operating in very volatile environment where there is little or no peace to keep, great military capability is need to prevent conflicts from escalating or protecting civilians and the mission’s mandate.

The Panel suggested that all peace operations should be prepared well to have all the necessary resources to improve upon its capabilities in order to effectively respond to threats and use force proactively in self-defence and protecting civilians, especially in volatile situations where there are spoilers of war. Also, the UN should coordinate with other regional actors and member states to develop suitable political solutions, especially in environments where there is little or no peace to keep. For the Security Council to mandate any peacekeeping force to engage in enforcement action, extreme caution should be taken, and also the core principles of peacekeeping should still continue to guide peace operations but should not be used as an excuse for inaction. Impartiality should not be seen as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases by peacekeepers when civilians are under attack, but impartiality must mean the adherence to the UN Charter and the
objectives of the mission.\textsuperscript{85} Also robust peace operations should have the necessary capabilities to engage in such missions, with greater clarity and consensus needed on what precisely robust peace operations entail.

With peacekeepers operating in very volatile environments and faced with asymmetric threats, the Report gives 3 categories of UN peace operations where and how force can be applied in such operations.

(a) Ceasefire Monitoring Mission: These types of missions were largely used during the Cold War, to maintain their presence where political solution had remained elusive. But today they have become the targets of violent extremist groups, so have to use the necessary force to protect the mission.\textsuperscript{86}

(b) Peace Implementation Mission: It is called multidimensional missions, and are deployed to support the peace process or political transition with the focus on maintaining the political process, protecting civilians and helping sustain the peace. With regards to the size of their tasks they require all the necessary capabilities to implement the mission’s mandate, and must be willing to use all necessary force to protect civilians and deter spoilers of the peace process.\textsuperscript{87}

(c) Conflict Management Missions: These missions are deployed in the absence of any available peace process, or where the peace process has broken down. Peacekeepers in such missions are mandated to protect civilians and prevent escalation of conflicts, or contain the conflict so that political solutions can be reached.\textsuperscript{88}

The HIPPO Report believes that UN peacekeepers do not have the requisite equipment, intelligence logistics, capabilities, and specialized military preparations to engage in counterterrorism operations, these operations must be carried out by host governments or a capable
regional force or an ad hoc coalition force authorized by the Security Council. However, any mission that find itself operating in such asymmetric environments should be provided with the necessary capabilities and training to tackle such threats.

Only the Security Council can authorize a UN peace operation to undertake enforcement action, and for such missions’ extreme caution should be taken and mandates should be time-bound. Also such missions must be carried out in support of a clear and achievable political process, and should conform to International Humanitarian Law standards. There is usually a gap between mandates and practice when it comes to the use of force in peace operations, and this is as a result of member states reluctance to support such operations, but to overcome such challenges, the should be continuous consultation between the Security Council, Secretariat, and Troops and Police contributing countries. Also, where the tasks exceeds the capacity of the UN, the Panel calls for UN to partner with other regional organizations to carry out such robust peacekeeping missions.

Summary on the Use of Force.

(a) “In the absence of a peace to keep, peacekeepers are increasingly asked to manage conflict. A rethink of capabilities and concepts is needed, to support these conflict management missions.

(b) The Panel argues that extreme caution must guide any call for a UN peacekeeping operation to undertake enforcement tasks. The UN should not engage in military counter-terrorism operations.

(c) The UN peacekeeping principles remain an essential guide for success; they must be interpreted flexibly in light of changed circumstances, and not be used as a shield for inaction
(d) When required, Member States should ensure that peace operations have available contingents with the necessary equipment, training and enabling capacities to respond to threats, and to sustain them in using force proactively in self-defence and to protect civilians and dissuade spoilers in line with their mandates.

(e) When UN peacekeeping operations are deployed absent a viable peace process, the Security Council, Secretariat, regional actors and all Member States should work proactively to advance a political process and support other conditions for success, and should review regularly the viability of the mission.”

2.5.5 Peacebuilding and Sustainable Peace

For a very successful and effect exit strategy for any peace operations, it must be able to build and consolidate peace in the conflict environment. Over the 20 years, UN peace operations have shifted from the military nature to include a wide range of peacebuilding strategies like; security sector reforms, election monitoring, building and strengthening key government institutions and many more.\(^ {93}\) Now Special Political Mission (SPM) work in tandem with military personnel to implement peacebuilding strategies on the ground by “working with national counterparts and international partners on articulating peacebuilding priorities and providing strategic guidance, assisting in establishing an enabling environment for the implementation of peacebuilding tasks, and by implementing peacebuilding tasks themselves.”\(^ {94}\)

The Panel incorporated some recommendations of the Advisory Group’s report calling for new approaches to achieving sustainable peace.\(^ {95}\) The Report further outlined 7 challenges that have hindered effective implementation of peacebuilding strategies over the years. These included: “insufficient consultation with national actors on peacebuilding priorities; a lack of inclusion of a
broad range of national actors in peacebuilding processes; disregard for national realities in reform
design and implementation; and a lack of strategic planning, coordination and integration of
international efforts, including on funding aspects”.96 However, the Panel stressed on the need for
national/local ownership of peacebuilding strategies. This meant that there was a need for more
emphasis on achieving effective political solutions. There is also the need for the involvement of
local stakeholders, especially in conflict situations where no comprehensive peace agreement
exists.97

*Summary on Peacebuilding and sustaining peace.*98

(a) “The Security Council and other international actors should remain politically vigilant
and provide sustained support to the country to prevent a relapse of conflict.

(b) Establish pooled country-level UN funds linked to a political roadmap and integrated
strategies, and provide missions with some resources to spend in-country.

(c) Review the current capacities of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to aid in
sustaining peace.”

### 2.5.6 Achievable Mandates

One of the themes emerging from both the Brahimi and HIPPO report is the need for clear and
achievable mandates. Both reports suggest producing mandates in two stages as a way to
accomplish this goal. However, the specific problem that each report attempts to address with these
recommendations is quite different. The Brahimi report suggests producing mandates in two stages
to give troop- and police-contributing countries greater opportunity to provide input on what
capacities could be feasibly generated, and therefore to try to ensure that the mandates matched
available resources. The HIPPO report’s recommendation to produce sequenced mandates in two stages primarily aims to mitigate the problem of template mandates that are simultaneously bloated with too many tasks and disconnected from the reality of conditions on the ground.

The HIPPO report’s recommendation on sequenced mandates is very important as, sequenced mandates have the potential to be a very helpful tool in promoting the effective protection of civilians and more effective peace operations generally. They can reduce the number of activities that place pressure on limited mission resources at the beginning of a mission, and can prevent the inclusion of activities that may undermine protection objectives if undertaken at the wrong time. Yet the concept of mandate sequencing has not been fully developed.

As the HIPPO report notes, the gap between expectations and the ability of missions to deliver on the ground is widening. This is in part due to the inclusion of too many tasks at the initial stage of mission mandates, raising hopes about what can be delivered rapidly on the ground. Sequencing mandates may assist in better managing these expectations. First, they could make mandates more limited and achievable, breaking away from the trend toward authorizing large, multidimensional missions with very wide-ranging mandates.

**Summary on achievable mandates.**

(a) “Achievable mandates must be based on a clear analysis of the conflict and a political strategy.

(b) Establish sequenced and prioritized mandates as regular practice, including a two-stage mandating process, to allow for realistic planning on the ground.
(c) Institutionalize Security Council and Secretariat consultations with troop and police contributing countries to forge a common purpose for missions from the outset.”

2.5.7 Strengthening Global-Regional Partnerships

One of the common themes that echoed throughout the report is that the UN cannot singlehandedly address the challenges associated with maintaining peace and security in the twenty first century, and partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations are crucial, in particular the African Union (AU). The African continent indeed remains the main focus for UN peace operations, with more than 100,000 of the 129,000 peacekeepers deployed currently. In the last ten years, the number of African personnel serving in African-mandated operations has grown from zero to 40,000, while the number of UN peacekeepers coming from Africa has increased from 10,000 to 30,000. African Union operations to date have, however, been largely reliant on bilateral and European Union support. This has made it difficult for the organization to sustain its peace operations, and it has led to premature transitions to the UN missions in Mali and the Central African Republic. With the challenge of rapid deployment continuing to plague UN peacekeeping missions, the AU has shown the ability to generate and deploy forces more quickly than the UN. Beyond deploying responsive peace enforcement operations, the AU also has an inherent incentive to respond to crises before they erupt on its continent and has a range of prevention instruments at its disposal that the UN does not have.

The report emphasized that the UN-AU partnership should be underpinned by several principles, which could also serve as a baseline for other future partnerships: “consultative decision making and common strategy; the division of labour based on respective comparative advantage; joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation; integrated response to the conflict cycle, including
prevention; transparency, accountability and respect for international standards.”

It also recommended that the “use of United Nations-assessed contributions be provided on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the African Union and/or African Member States.”

Summary Strengthening Global-Regional Partnerships.

(a) “The UN-AU strategic partnership should be underpinned by the following principles of cooperation, which might also serve as a baseline set of principles for UN engagements with other regional organizations in future: consultative decision making and common strategy; division of labour based on respective comparative advantage; joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation; integrated response to the conflict cycle, including prevention and transparency, accountability and respect for international standards.

(b) Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations should be supported, on a case by case basis, by United Nations-assessed contributions, and accountability and standards frameworks should be established for such operations.

(c) Strengthen UN liaison with other regional organizations.”

2.5.8 Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and enhancing Accountability

The sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of civilians by members of UN peace operations continues to be a major cause for concern. Acts of SEA constitute gross violations of human rights and the universal values that the UN represents. They also undermine the efforts of the UN peace operations to make, build and sustain peace, which require legitimacy and trust from the people they are supposed to protect. Recurring revelations of widespread SEA have caused great damage
to the reputation and credibility of the UN as a whole, and to UN peace operations. In 2003, then-
Secretary-General Kofi Annan articulated a zero-tolerance policy against SEA, including
transactional sex. Yet in 2015, HIPPO concluded that grave shortcomings persist with regards to
prevention, enforcement, accountability, and ensuring justice for victims.

In the same year, an External Independent Review Panel (hereafter External Panel) produced a
damning report on the UN’s response to allegations of grave acts of SEA by non-UN forces in the
Central African Republic (CAR). It found that the UN had focused on protocols rather than on
victims, and had perpetuated a culture of impunity by its passive, fragmented and bureaucratic
response. The HIPPO report described the issue of SEA as one of the key areas in which existing
policy must be put into practice in order to empower UN peace operations to deliver more
effectively in the field. Hence, most of its recommendations focused on the ‘urgent and robust’
implementation of measures that had already been introduced to enhance accountability and
strengthen the UN’s policy of zero tolerance for SEA.

Summary on Addressing Abuse and Enhancing Accountability

(a) “Immunity must not mean impunity. Immunity was never intended and does not apply to
provide immunity from prosecution to UN personnel alleged to have committed sexual
exploitation and abuse. The immunity privileges are functional only, i.e., related to the
exercise of his/her professional duty as a UN employee, not for private acts.

(b) Disclose information on disciplinary actions taken by contributing countries, including
information on non-reporting.

(c) Immediate and robust implementation of the Secretary-General’s proposed measures,
including establishment of immediate response teams and six-month deadlines to complete
investigations.
(d) Bar troops from countries listed in the Secretary-General’s annual reports on children and armed conflict and on conflict related sexual violence, until de-listed.

(e) Create an effective and adequately resourced victim assistance programme.”

2.5.9 Conclusion

Generally, there have been three generations of UN peacekeeping operations, with each occurring in different epochs of time. The constant evolution of threats to global peace has necessitated the change in approach to peacekeeping. Generally, there has been three major peacekeeping reforms since the end of the Cold War, which have all helped to shape and direct the course of UN peace operations. The Brahimi Report, there first UN peacekeeping reform in the 21st century brought much promise to peacekeeping especially to places like Africa, where there was an upsurge in conflicts. Protection of civilians, regional and global partnerships and robust peacekeeping was given much emphasis, and became the driving force of most UN peace operation, especially in Africa.

After more than a decade and a half of implementing some of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, the UN Secretary-General saw the need for new peacekeeping reforms. This resulted in the introduction of the HIPO Report, which sought to improve upon the Brahimi Report, as challenges confronting UN peace operations had drastically evolved. The report placed much emphasis on the need for more political solutions guiding UN peace operations in an effort to achieve sustainable peace, and the need for peace operations to be more people-centred. Sexual exploitation and abuse, which was not discussed in the Brahimi Report, was thoroughly discussed, as it had become a threat to the credibility and existence of UN peace operations.
END NOTES

2 Ibid
4 Ibid
6 Ibid
7 Ibid
8 Ibid
9 Ibid
10 Ibid (3)
11 Ibid (8)
15 Ibid
16 Ibid
17 Ibid (1)
18 Ibid (14)
19 Ibid
21 Cite op. 14
23 Ibid(6)
24 Ibid
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CHAPTER THREE

ASSESSING THE SELECTED UN PEACEKEEPING REFORMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

3.0 Introduction

This Chapter discusses the various factors and reports that necessitated the United Nations’ peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century. This section of the study identifies the key UN’s peacekeeping reforms that have occurred in the 21st century, as well as the implication of these reforms on peacekeeping operations in Africa. The chapter examines the challenges associated with the implementation of these reforms instituted by the United Nations as well as the way forward for the UN as far as the conduct of peacekeeping operations in Africa is concerned. It also presents the views of the interviewees that were gathered through the interviews conducted with research fellows from LECIAD and KAIPTC, and does this by corroborating these views and opinions with the views of key scholars on the subject matter, obtained from the literature. The chapter responds to the research objectives and finds answers to the research questions set out in the first chapter of this study.

3.1 Key Factors and Reports that necessitated UN’s Peacekeeping Reforms in the 21st Century

The United Nations, since its formation in 1945, following the devastating nature of the Cold War, has undertaken several commendable peacekeeping operations across the world especially in areas that are confronted with wars, conflicts and other disputes. Just like any other human institution, the operations of the UN have received numerous criticisms from the public across the globe. All
these criticisms, coupled with notable key factors and specific report findings have necessitated UN’s peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century. Some of these key factors and reports, which propel the need for the UN to institute certain key reforms in the 21st century, are discussed below:

One key factor that has necessitated UN’s peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century is the change in the nature of international conflicts and troubles. Katherine Zimmerman, observed that the types of conflicts that existed and necessitated the formation of the United Nations, in the 20th century, are non-existing in the 21st century.¹ It is therefore very imperative that the UN also adjusts its strategies and core functions so as to catch up with current types of conflicts in the 21st century. According to Zimmerman, the nature of the 21st century conflicts, “has resulted in a shift towards multidimensional peacekeeping operations that are often mandated to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement between parties to a civil war”.² This according to her, has in turn, “led to an expansion of the non-military component of peacekeeping operations whose success is increasingly dependent on the work of civilian experts in key areas such as the rule of law, human rights, gender, child protection, and elections”.³ Closely linked with this is the fact that the “difficult experiences of the mid-1990’s in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda prompted the UN to re-assess its approach to peacekeeping and try to reform most of its strategies of keeping peace.

Another key report that necessitated UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century is the “Brahimi Report” (A/55/305-S/2000/809). In March 2000, a Panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued a report that has come to be known as the “Brahimi Report”, named after the Panel’s chairperson - Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi. According to scholars like Jorge Battaglino and
Germán Lodola, “the Brahimi Report offered an in-depth critique of the conduct of UN peace operations and made specific recommendations for change”, propelling the UN to start instituting very important reforms towards its peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{4} The scholars added “the report also underlined consent by the warring parties, a clear and specific mandate and adequate resources as minimum requirements for a successful UN mission”.\textsuperscript{5} This does not only demonstrate how significant the Brahimi Report is, as far as the peacekeeping missions of the UN are concerned, but it also indicates the extent to which the report necessitated UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

A further initiative of key significance UN necessitating peacekeeping reforms was the publication in 2011 of a report on \textit{Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict}, by an independent group of senior advisers appointed by the Secretary-General. Scholars such as Rosan Smits, Floor Janssen and Ivan Briscoe, believed that this report on the civilian capacity “proposes practical measures to improve civilian support to conflict-affected countries, focusing on how to recruit and deploy the range of expertise required, as well as on how to transfer skills and knowledge to national actors”.\textsuperscript{6} According to them, this report has influence the United Nations significantly with regards to their reformation agenda.\textsuperscript{7} The 2011 report on civilian capacity therefore is part of the key factors and reports that necessitated UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

Again, another key report that necessitated UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is the HIPPO Report. Almost 15 years after the Brahimi Report, in October 2014, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to find answers to these challenges. Its findings were published in June 2015 in its report: \textit{Uniting
Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People. Mary Kaldor, observed that “although HIPPO recognized many improvements in the field of peace operations made in the preceding decade, it flagged a wide range of ‘significant chronic challenges’, which made it almost compulsory for the United Nations to reform many of its policies”. The (HIPPO) Report, did not only mention “increasing demands on operations in the absence of sufficient resources” and the issue of “insufficient unity of effort among the different parts of the UN system”, but it also indicates strongly the issue of “too much use of template answers and too little attention paid to tailoring solutions to support political processes and strategies”, as well as “too much focus on technical and military approaches over prevention and mediation”. This actually buttresses the point that, the HIPPO report is one of the key factors that necessitated UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century.

3.2 Key UN Peacekeeping Reforms in the 21st Century

The UN has undertaken reforms since its formation in the mid-1940s. It is therefore clear that the reforms do not only “aim to reinvigorate the partnership among all peacekeeping stakeholders, but also to build a common framework for strengthening peacekeeping to meet the requirements of the future”. There are obviously many reforms instituted by the UN since 2000, but a couple of the key UN peacekeeping reforms that have taken place in the 21st century, are discussed below:
3.2.2 Global Field Support Strategy

Another 21\textsuperscript{st} century reform is the adoption of the Global Field Support Strategy. In the year 2009, there was a package of very laudable proposals to “reform and strengthen peacekeeping that were launched as part of the initiated known as the ‘New Horizon’”. Fukuyama, observed keenly that, “this was done with a view to defining a policy agenda for peacekeeping that reflects the perspectives of the global peacekeeping partnership and that seeks to make peacekeeping operations faster, more capable and more effective”. According to Fukuyama, one very significant policy reform that emerged from the “New Horizon” initiative was “the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), which saw the approval of the General Assembly in 2010.\textsuperscript{12} The Global Field Support Strategy is “an integrated services delivery model adopted by the UN with the aim of enabling faster response times for mission start-up and improving support to mission operations.\textsuperscript{13} This reform, according to Dutch scholar, van der Lijn, has made sure the UN delivers very rapid responses to conflict-stricken areas, unlike previously where the UN was dull in reaction to conflicts.\textsuperscript{14} This strategy enables the UN to send its officers to the field across to quickly respond to civilians who are suffering. It is therefore obvious that, the Global Field Support Strategy represent a key reform of the UN in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, as far as peacekeeping operations are concerned.

3.2.3 Capstone Doctrine

Again, one key reform of the UN is Capstone Doctrine. In the year 2008, the “first comprehensive document on the planning and conduct of peacekeeping missions” was produced by the UN, known as the Capstone Doctrine. According to Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “The
Capstone Doctrine had a system-wide aim, targeting the full-spectrum of UN peacekeeping activities”. This reform document did not only “acknowledged that the UN had been without clear guidance on peacekeeping”, but it also demonstrated the fact that it was, “the first attempt in over a decade to codify the major lessons learned from the past six decades of United Nations peacekeeping experience”. Scholars like Ronald Hatto, have observed that “the reform document was intended to help practitioners better understand the basic principles and concepts underpinning the conduct of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations as well as their inherent strengths and limitations”. The Capstone Doctrine “outlined the core functions and overarching principles that guide the assessment, planning and implementation of UN peacekeeping missions”. In this reform document of the UN, “a lot of attention was paid to the coordination and integration of the different components of a UN mission, both horizontally and vertically”. The reform indicated an increasing recognition of both “the potential and the challenges that came with increasing coordination of peacekeeping activities”, making it one of the key reforms in terms of UN peacekeeping operations in the 21st century.

3.2.4 Policy on Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations

The other key reforms that are worthy of mentioning as far as UN peacekeeping operations are concerned are in the technical department as well as the department of peacekeeping operations. A typical example of such reforms includes “the 2008 Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”, which “provides guidance on command and authority throughout UN missions”. According to David Curran, “on the technical side, there has been a big increase in the number of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), documents that guide and instruct the UN Head Quarters and the peacekeeping missions on issues such as planning or
communication”. This is a big policy reform, which witnessed a shift from “having operated largely without any such guidance in the 1990s, to now a wide range of SOPs available for peacekeepers – and more are being developed”. There are also reforms that are focused on standards, with the Department of Peace Keeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, “working to improve common standards for the troop-contributing countries (TCCs)”. The most recent example of these reforms include development of standards for Infantry Battalions, staff officers and medical support by the Secretariat.

3.3 The Implications of UN Peacekeeping Reforms on Peace Operations in Africa

There is absolutely no denying the fact that the various UN peacekeeping reforms would have some implications on peacekeeping operations in Africa. Some of these implications are discussed below, using indicators such as, the protection of civilians, mandates, UN partnerships with other regional organizations, peace building and sexual exploitations and abuse:

3.3.1 The Protection of Civilians

Nothing better defines the success or failure of any peacekeeping mission than its ability to protect civilians who have been caught in armed conflict. After all it was the failure of the UN to protect civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica, which led to a loss of credibility of UN peace operations at the end of the Cold War. POC in armed conflict is very important not only to the UN peacekeeping, but the UN system in general, as it enhances the credibility and legitimacy of whole UN system.

Also, POC mandates are very important in achieving sustainable peace process, as any peace accord that does not help halt armed violence against civilians will make it difficult to have
legitimate government. According to the DPKPO and DFS POC is defined as; “All necessary means up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing and responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government”. 

In terms of the protection of African Civilians, UN peacekeeping reforms in 21st century would have many implications in peacekeeping operations in Africa. In an interview with Mr. Mustapha Abdallah from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC), he pointed out that, the reforms put in place by the UN in this century, would go a long way to impact peacekeeping operations in the African continent in the area of civilian protection. Mr. Mustapha Abdallah put it like this:

*The changing nature of conflicts call for the UN Peacekeepers to put in place reforms that would use every necessary means to protect civilians in armed conflict. Previously there were no rules of engagement by armed groups, who used guerilla tactics and this put civilians at risk. But due to the reforms, now core principles of traditional peacekeeping have changed, where now impartiality meant the protection of civilians and the mission mandate. 2001 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was developed and was seen as building on the recommendations of the Report, all in the hope of protecting civilians in armed conflicts. R2P was also recommended by the 2004 UN Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.*

The opinion of Mr. Mustapha is very well in line with aspect of the literature especially the views of scholars such as Jan Rood, who buttressed the point that, reforms in peacekeeping operations by the UN in the 21st century, would not only give civilians some comfort, but would also ensure that, many innocent lives would not be lost during instances of conflicts.

**UN Peace Operations in Africa with POC and Chapter VII Mandates in the 21st Century**
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
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<td>b. Monitoring the border with Chad and The CAR</td>
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<td>(6) United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the</td>
<td>The DRC</td>
<td>2010-present</td>
<td>UNSCR 1925 (July 2010) Chapter VII</td>
<td>a. POC,</td>
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| | | | a. POC,  
| | | | b. Monitoring the ‘flashpoint border’ between north and south |
| | | | a. Political process  
| | | | b. POC and security  
| | | | c. stabilization |
| | | | a. Transition process  
| | | | b. POC  
| | | | c. DDR |

**Source:** Annual Review of Peace Support Operations in Africa 2016 (KAIPTC)

Although since 2000 the UN has established eleven peacekeeping missions in Africa with explicit POC mandates, but the first UN mission with a POC mandate was the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999. The POC mandate has become increasingly important in recent years despite remaining a controversial issue, and achieved varying degrees of successes especially in peace operations in Africa. Some particular missions stand out in relation to how well they have
been able to implement POC mandates, some notable examples are UNAMID (Sudan), UNMISS (South Sudan), MONUSCO (DRC), MINUSMA (Mali), and MINUSCA (CAR). However, most respondents identified MONUSCO as the UN mission which has become the “laboratory” for POC practices, and, due to past failures that revealed gaps in the implementation of POC strategies in UN peacekeeping operations.

The current UN mission in the DRC which is known for its longevity and size has been operating since 1999 when it was deployed then as United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to oversee the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. recent UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo are notable for their size and longevity.\(^\text{24}\) MONUC was later transformed into the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010, and has become the largest UN mission with 22,498 peacekeepers, and also the most expensive peace operation with an annual budget of $1.2 billion.\(^\text{25}\) MONUSCO has become the UN’s flagship mission for the experimentation of POC strategies like the use of Joint Protection Taskforce (JPT) and community engagement networks. Also, robust peacekeeping strategies like the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to eliminate M23 rebel group that was systematically terrorizing civilians in the eastern part of the Congo.\(^\text{26}\)

**3.3.1.1 The POC Dilemma in the DRC: From MONUC to MONUSCO**

The UN has been ever-present in the DRC since 1999, but however despite the amount of time and resources in has spent there, it has woefully failed to end the conflict in the country, and protect civilians who have regularly come under attack from pro-government forces and other rebel groups. For instance in May 2002, despite the presence of roughly about 1000 MONUC peacekeepers in the city of Kisangani, it failed to stop the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD)
a rebel group who were sexually abusing civilians and looting. This was because it lacked the necessary military capabilities to protect civilians and restore order in the city.\textsuperscript{27}

Again in 2004, UN peacekeepers failed to protect civilians from reprisal attacks from RCD rebels who had committed widespread sexual violence in the city of Bukavu in south Kivu, even when it has a contingent of 700 troops nearby.\textsuperscript{28} Also, in 2008 MONUC forces were unable to prevent the massacre of about 150 civilians in the city of Kiwanja in northern Kivu, who came under attack from rebel groups.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{3.3.1.2 Challenges to POC Implementation in MONUSCO}

1. Mandate language is very ambitious and overloaded with numerous tasks for the peacekeepers. It difficult to place priority on POC as they lack the necessary logistics to carry out all those tasks.

2. Lack of clarity on how the mission is supposed to protect civilians when the government is unable or unwilling. MONUSCO has been frustrated by the Congolese government in its efforts to protect civilians as DRC troops have been regularly accused of gross human rights abuses against the civilians.

3. The vast and inaccessible terrain in a country as large as western Europe makes patrolling and reconnaissance survey very difficult, hence hindering UN peacekeeping presence in some parts of the country.

4. Inadequate resources to respond to force with force to protect civilians. The mission is ill-equipped with the necessary capabilities to use force to deter spoilers of peace and protect civilians.
3.3.2 Mandates (Robust, Clear, Credible and Achievable)

Closely related to civilian protection (POC), is the need for a robust shift in UN peace operations, as these two normally go hand in hand, this is because to be able to protect civilians from physical and imminent harm in armed conflict, a certain degree of force must be applied to achieve such a goal. However, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once said “it is not the wish of the UN to turn peacekeepers into war fighting machine” but they must operate with some degree of force to confront “the lingering forces of war and violence” which might derail the peace process.30

Again, in terms of Mandates (robust, clear, credible and achievable), the reforms at the technical department of the UN peace keeping and that of the DPKO has had huge impact on peace operations in Africa. This was confirmed in an interview with Fiifi Edu-Afful, from KAIPTC, who indicated that, the reforms are needed to clearly define the mandate of the United Nations in peacekeeping. According to him, the strengthening of the DPKO, post Brahimi and HIPPO goes a long way to determine the extent to which these reforms would impact peace operations in Africa. Fiifi Edu-Afful stated that:

Need for more robust peacekeeping (Chapter VII mandates): The POC mandate made it necessary UN peace operations to have robust nature (the use of force to protect civilians and the mission mandates). Post- Brahimi all UN peace operations had Chapter VII mandates (Liberia, Serra Leone, DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR) Robust mandates because peacekeepers are faced with more asymmetric threats, and the terrain had become very volatile. These mandates must be clear and show how the force should be used, how civilians are to be protected. Since 2004, the UN has moved towards a new type of peace operations especially in Africa-(Stabilization Missions, where force is used on the operational level unlike robust peacekeeping Now Stabilization missions are what the UN is deploying in Africa since 2010(DRC, CAR and Mali). 2013-UN used the Force Intervention Brigade(FIB) in DRC.31

This clearly does not only show how the reforms of the UN in the 21st century regarding peacekeeping operations, have implications on peace operations in Africa, but it also goes a long
way to demonstrate the fact that the United nations reforms on peacekeeping have multiple implications on peace operations in Africa. Over the years UN peacekeeping mandates have been accused of lacking country and context specificity. The list of mandated tasks is too extensive and formulated too broadly, mission mandates have lacked clear guidance on mission priorities, this has over the years affected peacekeepers ability to effectively protect civilians under imminent threats. They have also been criticized for lacking equal Security Council support for the political resolution of a crisis or conflict.

With POC now the cornerstone of every peacekeeping operation in Africa, and peacekeepers faced with the daunting task of keeping the peace in conflicts where there is no peace to keep, couple with facing numerous asymmetric threats in the form of terrorist networks and transnational organized crimes, the work of today’s peacekeepers has become ever challenging. These new reforms called for the highest form of clarity in mission mandates and availability of sufficient resources to equip peacekeepers to implement the missions’ mandates very effectively. To protect civilians and the missions’ mandates peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century has called for more robust peacekeeping operations, especially, in Africa where armed groups deliberately target civilians.

Majority of the respondents alluded to the fact that peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century has accounted for the robust turn of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Thus, from the table above it can be seen that with all the eleven peace operations deployed in Africa in the 21st century with POC mandates have all been accompanied by Chapter VII mandates (which calls for the use of enforcement action), but these have come with varying degrees of success. Over the last decade, UN peace operations have moved towards stabilization missions, where the use of military force is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of mission mandates, of the four stabilization
missions deployed by the UN since 2004, three of them can be found in Africa (MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA). This shows how these reforms initiatives have impacted UN peace operations in Africa, because these missions have moved away from being robust missions as recommended by the Brahimi Report to larger scale enforcement missions.

3.3.2.1 MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)

The use of the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC in 2013 under UN Security Council Resolution 2098 “to eliminate the M23 rebel group that had been systematically targeting civilians in the eastern part of the DRC, and committing serious human rights violations for years, shows how now peace operations in Africa are taking on a more proactive role in dealing with spoilers of peace and protecting civilians in armed conflicts in Africa.” The FIB was given a Chapter VII mandate (enforcement action) to neutralize targeted armed groups responsible for destabilizing the DRC.

The FIB has helped improve upon the security situation in the DRC, as it has carried out airstrikes along with the Congolese military forces. Their defeat of the M23 rebel group in the eastern parts of the country paved the way for diplomatic process, which led to the signing of the Nairobi Declaration in December 2013. This political process has aided in the implementation of some Security Sector Reforms (SSR), and Disarmament Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) strategies in some parts of the country.

The formation and use of the FIB has been a turning point in the robust use of force during UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, by deploying the FIB in the DRC it became a counter-insurgency
operation, and in that process moved UN peacekeeping towards a stabilization (peace enforcement operation), and making itself a party to the conflict in the DRC.\textsuperscript{34}

Though the FIB was successful in eliminating the M23 rebel group, this approach has received considerable criticism within academic circles for moving away from the core principles of UN peacekeeping and blurring the lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and in the long run making the peacekeepers prone to reprisal attacks from armed groups.\textsuperscript{35}

3.3.2.2 Robust Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Asymmetric Threats- MINUSMA

In April 2013 the UNSC through UNSCR 2100 established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to “support the political process, transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of a transitional roadmap”.\textsuperscript{36} MINUSMA’s mandate was renewed by the UNSC in 2014 under UNSCR 2164, mandating MINUSMA to “ensure security; stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and establishment of the state authority, and the protection and promotion of human rights in Mali.\textsuperscript{37}

The Mali mission is a clear example of third generation peacekeeping operations, which are robust and have greater willingness to use military force.\textsuperscript{38} It is also the first UN peace operation with an explicit mandate to counter asymmetric threats and help a state regain authority over areas contested by terrorist groups. MINUSMA has been working closely with EU to carry out airstrikes against terrorist groups operating in the vast deserts in northern Mali.

As of 2017 118 peacekeepers in Mali alone had lost their lives since 2013. They have continually been target by terrorists groups, and because these peacekeepers have no counterterrorism
capabilities they are finding it very difficult to stabilize the northern parts of the country or even protect civilians, which is a core duty of their mandate.\textsuperscript{39}

Even though in policy terms the UN peacekeepers have been mandated to used robust force to implements the missions mandate and protect civilians, they have generally suffered from certain challenges that have hindered the effective use of force in these missions. Some of these challenges include;

1. Differences among members of the Security Council on the use of force leading to ineffective robust peacekeeping mandates. There is a lack of consensus on the use of military force in UN peacekeeping operations between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

2. Differences among troop contributing countries (TCCs) on the use of force.

3. Translation of mandate into the concept of operations and the rules of engagement.

4. Lack of robust political solutions to accompany POC mandates and the use of robust force.

   MINUSMA and MONUSCO are clear examples that force alone cannot guarantee sustainable peace or protect civilians in armed conflicts

5. Difficulties in processing information, leading to failures in early warning.

6. Reluctance to engage government partners that are complicit in harming civilians

7. Poor understanding of the responsibility of UN missions to engage when host governments cannot or will not protect civilians, clear examples are UNMISS in South Sudan where the government forces have been accused of being deliberating targeting civilians.

8. A lack of UN peacekeeping doctrine for counterterrorism has made MINUSMA very ineffective as it is the only mission deployed to deter terrorist groups. Without a
counterterrorism doctrine they cannot operate in such an asymmetric environment without having the necessary capabilities to deal with such threats.

3.3.3 Peacebuilding (Human Rights, Rule of Law, Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice)

In terms of peacebuilding, the UN reforms in the 21st century such as the Brahimi, which recommended that the Executive Committee on Peace and Strategy (ECPS) to put in place a complete strategy to ensure that UN’s capacity is strengthened enough so that they would be able to enact and execute a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy as well as programs that would back these strategies. These reforms would also have very telling implications on peacekeeping operations in Africa in the sense that they ensure that the elements of rule of law as well as the maintenance law and order are upheld. The reforms in the security sector as well as transitional justice would have implications on effective peacebuilding in Africa, as far as peacekeeping operations are concerned. This would not only ensure that the local people enjoy their fundamental human rights, but are also able to access equal justice. It would also lead to the strengthening of many government institutions, especially those in conflict zones, and make sure that free and fair elections are conducted as part of the broader peacebuilding strategy.

As a very important component of contemporary UN peace operations, peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstructions is very key in achieving sustainable peace. These UN reforms have stressed on the need for effective peacebuilding strategies. UN peacebuilding has been very effective in most of the missions established in the first half of the 21st century. Notable mentions include UNMIL in Liberia and UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire. These aforementioned missions have been able to successfully draw down in 2017 and 2018 respectively, after completing its post
conflict reconstruction activities, after decades of bloody conflict which brought these states to the verge of collapse.

UNMIL has been touted as one of the UN’s most successful missions to date. This is because Liberia has not only witnessed a peaceful transfer of power from 2 different governments, but it has also been able to rebound from the brutal civil war that accounted for more than 250,000 deaths, and also an Ebola epidemic that affected its health systems. After 15 years of deployment, UNMIL has been able to assist Liberia emerge as a beacon of political stability with a developing economy that continues to rebuild core government functions and institutions and rebuild its destroyed infrastructure.

Security sector reforms (SSR) has been very important in achieving this success, as now the Liberian local security services have been trained to have the necessary capabilities to assume certain security responsibilities they did not have during the civil war. Also disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) has accounted for the successful drawdown of this mission. Effective DDRR strategies will go a long way to shape the lives of ex-combatants by being able to gain meaningful employment.43

Whereas UNAMSIL, UNOCI and UNMIL have been hailed as success stories, most of the remaining UN peace operations in Africa have failed to implement peacebuilding strategies. Current missions in the CAR, DRC, Mali, South Sudan, and Darfur, have not improved stability. “These missions have failed largely because they were deployed in a context of ongoing war where the belligerents themselves did not want to stop fighting or preying on civilians,” and with government control non-existent in very turbulent conditions in these countries, peacebuilding strategies failed. For example, the UN has been operating in the DRC for almost two decades now, but there are no signs of this mission drawing down any time soon, but only MONUSCO struggling
to keep the peace and implement peace agreement. Recent Peacebuilding reforms have advocated for the inclusion of the local people, but this has been difficult to achieve especially in missions where the belligerents have no interest in the peace process, and governments have lacked the political will to work in tandem with these missions to implement the mission’s mandate or attain sustainable peace.

3.3.3.1 Challenges to Effective Implementation of UN peacebuilding Strategies

1. Most political processes neglect the grievances of the local people
2. Governments are not inclusive enough
3. Mistrust by locals of the national government and missions themselves
4. Local ownership of peacebuilding strategies is still a setback to effective peacebuilding
5. Funding for the Peacebuilding Commission has been hard to access
6. Lack of robust political solutions to accompany military strategies

3.3.4 UN Partnerships with other Regional Bodies Especially the AU

Another implication of UN peacekeeping reforms on peace operations in Africa, as widely acknowledge by observers and scholars is the fact that, such reforms have taught Africa countries very good lessons with regards to their partnership and responsibilities with the United Nations. In an interview with Dr. Festus Aubyn, from the KAIPTC, he mentioned that reforms such as the Global Field Support Strategy have brought about burden sharing, as African countries would have to also brace themselves to support themselves in cases of disasters and conflicts. According to Aubyn:

*One noted implication is burden sharing. UN can’t do it alone and Chapter VIII of its Charter calls for the use of regional...*
organizations to assist the UN maintain international peace and security. Since the Rwandan genocide, African countries have called for African solutions to African problems. The UN would not intervene where there is no peace to keep: so now regional organizations usually have to take the first step in calming down the situation before the UN comes in. The 2004 UN Report of the High Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change reemphasized that point, recommended for a strategy for the UN to implement a 10-year plan with the AU to build the capacity of the UN. This was approved at the 2005 World Summit and Peace Operations. An example of such cooperation between the UN and AU is the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (Sudan), AU played key roles in both CAR and Mali (AFISMA was there before MINUMSA took over).

This position resonates well with the observations of scholars such as Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, who underscored the point that, the recent reforms in the UN peacekeeping operations ensures that the UN does not shoulder all the problems with regards to peace operations, but it ensures that it collaborates with other regional bodies such as the African Union in finding lasting solutions to conflicts in war stricken areas.

The UN has been a strategic partner of the OAU and other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) since the end of the Cold War, but this partnership has evolved since the OAU transformed into the AU in 2002. Since its creation in 2002, the AU has been able to showcase some of its comparative advantages in responding to new demands for peacekeepers, including in environments facing asymmetric threats. The increasing demand for organizations to step in can be seen by the wide range of peace operations mandated by the AU, as in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan (2004-2007), Somalia (2007-to date), or Mali (2013). In recent years, the AU has also authorized a range of more offensive types of operations led by countries in a specific region, often referred to as ad hoc security initiatives, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel Force.

UN-AU partnership occurs at three levels, namely strategic, institutional and operational or field levels. In relation to the cooperation at the strategic level, this involves the UNSC and the African
Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). They work together to provide high-level strategic direction and political guidance on issues of peace and security including peace operation. At a strategic level, the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) have increased their interaction, including through the hosting of joint bi-annual meetings.\textsuperscript{49}

Also at the institutional level the UN Secretariat works with the African Union Commission, this level of engagement helps provide political and strategic guidance to the UNSC and the AUPSC. They also work closely in the Joint Task Force by information sharing and improved coordination.

For instance the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel work closely with MINUSMA to assist in the mediation and peace process between the Malian government warring parties. The UN Secretariat also provides operational guidelines and policies and doctrines for the African Standby Force. Also The Joint UN-AU framework for enhancing the partnership on peace and security, launched in April 2017, is often seen as a culmination of efforts to boost coordination between the two organizations strategically and operationally.\textsuperscript{50}

Furthermore, at the operational or field level, the UN’s cooperation exist in three different forms, namely: integrated; coordinated; and sequential cooperation respectively. With an integrated type of field cooperation the UN and AU both work within a single chain of command or joint chain of command. A typical example of such cooperation can be seen in the establishment of the United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). This has been the flagship UN-AU peacekeeping operation on the continent, where both organizations work closely to avert the worst “humanitarian and political crisis” on the continent.

Coordinated operations also involves both organizations work under different chains of command, this can be seen in the UN’s continues engagement in Somalia, where it has no peace mission there but works closely to support the AU-led AMISOM mission technically and financially.\textsuperscript{51}
The third form of operational cooperation is sequential, with this type of engagement the UN either precedes or normally follows AU and other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) efforts to restore peace on the continent. An example of such cooperation can be seen in the UN establishing peacekeeping missions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone after ECOWAS has gone in to contain the civil wars on both countries in the 1990s. It was also recently experienced again when the UN took over the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to MINUSMA in 2013, and the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) to MINUSCA in 2014 respectively. These AU/RECs mission are supported or approved by the UN Security Council, and these missions are later rehatted into the larger UN peacekeeping missions.

3.3.4.1 Challenges to UN-AU Cooperation

The UN has played a very important role is dealing with some of the security challenges in Africa, but both the UN and AU lack a common understanding on the interpretation and implementation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter which calls for the use of enforcement action to deal with threats to international peace and security. This lack of consensus affects speed and seriousness attached to dealing with conflicts in Africa, because in a situation where the UNSC may deem it necessary for the use of Chapter VII action, the AU might prefer to use mediation and vice versa. Without a common understanding of when, where and how to apply Chapter VII actions it makes it very difficult for both organizations to effectively deal with conflict and other security challenges on the continent. This kind of misunderstanding is very evident in a situation where the UNSC only
gives orders for the use of Chapter VII, but the AU lacks the necessary resources (financial and logistics) to carry out such activities. For example, during the 2011 Libyan political crisis the UNSC was calling for humanitarian intervention, but the AU was in favour of political solutions (mediation). This kind of impasse led to the delay in dealing with the crisis effectively and on time.

Also, another challenge to the UN-UN cooperation is the lack of effective consultation between the UNSC, AU and TCCs when drafting peacekeeping mandates. This has led to a feeling of mistrust and disrespect of each other’s perspective on African security challenges. It has also led to the frequent use of templates mandates for most UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Without effective consultation between both organizations to understand the security dynamics of African conflicts, the UNSC will always tend to draft mandates that do not correspond with the nature of conflict at hand, leading to ineffective implementation of peacekeeping mandates. This form of mistrust does not promote effective cooperation if one party feels left out of the major decision making processes.

Again, the UN-AU cooperation sometimes lacks clear modalities on how to transfer AU-led peace operations into larger UN missions. With the AU having a comparative advantage of proximity to conflicts on the continent, they are usually the first respondents and are authorized by the UNSC to stabilize the conflict before they come in. However tensions usually arise when transferring such AU-led missions into UN missions, because operational control and appointment of senior mission leadership are sometimes disputed. For example, in 2013 the UN refused to accept Burundian President Pierre Buboya as the head of MINUSMA, even though he had served as the head of AFISMA. This created some form of tension between the two organizations.

Furthermore, there is a lack of guiding principles to the UN-AU cooperation leading to power imbalance and unnecessary competition and antagonism between both organizations. This leads
to a situation where the AU is frequently excluded in the strategic decision making process at the
mission headquarters, while the UN virtually controls the whole operation. This type of unequal
relationship breeds animosity instead of both organizations working to complement each other.

There is also the lack of clear modalities for funding AU-led peace operations on the continent from
the UNSC. Thus, the AU depends of the UN for financial and logistical support for its own peace
operation, but with unpredictable sources of funding it makes it very difficult for it to respond to
most of the security challenges on the continent.

3.3.5 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)

According to the UN, sexual exploitation is “Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of
vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including but not limited to, profiting
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another”, and sexual abuse as “the
actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or
coercive conditions”. The reforms adopted by the United Nations which are found in the 2003
United Nations Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,
where it is also clearly stated that “United Nations forces conducting operations under United
Nations command and control are prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation and sexual
abuse, and have a particular duty of care towards women and children”, would have very positive
implications for peacekeeping in Africa, since many of the vulnerable people such as women and
children in war torn areas in Africa would not be subjected to any form of sexual exploitation during
peacekeeping. According to Anna-Maria Wiker, measures such as “the U.N, the ten codes of
conduct, the zero-tolerance policy and the present three-pronged strategy in the reform program of
the UN, would go a long way to affect peacekeeping operations in Africa, since they represent
potential solutions for the unfortunate problem of sexual exploitation and abuse by
UN staff when they are on a peacekeeping mission in Africa.” In recent times the UN mission in the CAR has become a mission riddled by numerous SEA allegations, but the UN’s effort to address these allegations in MINUSCA has been slow and inconsistent.

Over the last decade the UN has been quick to announce new SEA policies, but has been slow to implement such policies in UN peace operations. This has been made difficult by member states inability to support such reforms, and especially for TCCs to investigate SEA allegations committed by their troops. In 2016, the UNSC adopted resolution 2272, which was the first UN resolution of SEA. This resolution urged member states, especially, TCCs to make conscious efforts to implement SEA policies by the UN Secretary-General in peace operations, and holding their troops accountable by improving the efforts in investigating and prosecuting offender. This resolution led to the Secretary-General sending home a whole contingent of DRC peacekeepers who were found guilty of SEA allegations in the CAR in 2016.

3.3.5.1 Challenges to SEA in UN Peace Operations

The UN lacks coercive mechanism for member states to investigate and prosecute their own troops. Thus, offenses committed by peacekeepers during UN peacekeeping operations fall directly under the jurisdiction of TCCs and this makes ensuring accountability very difficult. Currently the UN does not have any coercive strategy to force member states to investigate and prosecute their troops who engage in SEA during peacekeeping. This has led to high levels of impunity as most peacekeepers know they would not be punished for their actions by their governments, and this makes it very difficult for the UN to combat SEA which has become a menace to UN peacekeeping operations.
Also, lack of resources to support SEA victims makes it very difficult for the UN to tackle this menace. Since the UN started initiating policies to combat SEA, little attention has been paid to victim protection. This affects its ability to tackle the problem. Recent reforms have called for victim protection, but the UN lacks adequate resources to carry out such strategies. This lack of effective victim protection strategies makes it very difficult for victims to come out and report the offenders.

Furthermore, reporting and investigations are very slow, and bureaucratic hurdles contribute to this problem. Thus, bureaucratic hurdles delay the investigation process making it very difficult to hold perpetuators accountable. These bureaucratic hurdles frustrate the investigation process, as it takes more time than necessary to conclude investigations, and discourage victims from coming forward to report their case, as they feel nothing will be done about it.

### 3.4 Some Implementation Challenges of UN Peacekeeping Reforms

As already indicated earlier in this section of the study, the new and complex environment, together with the ambitious objectives of the United Nations and ever-growing pressure on scarce resources, has made it more imperative than ever to put in place more reforms regarding peacekeeping operations in order to meet the dynamics of conflicts in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. However, there are some noted impediments faced by the UN in its attempt to implement these needed reforms. Some of these implementation challenges as far as peacekeeping reforms are concerned, are discussed below.

In relation to the robust turn of UN peacekeeping operations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, one implementation challenge faced by the UN is the issue of conceptual disagreements. According to
Mats Berdal there is a serious conceptual debates with regards to what constitutes peacekeeping and enforcement and this makes it very difficult for the UN to properly implement. He argues, for example, that "the fundamental distinction between enforcement and peacekeeping should be made and maintained by the UN”, since it has the potential of preventing the UN from successfully implementing its reforms. The core argument of Mats Berdal is to the effect that “elevating peacekeeping to peace enforcement raises several issues and the chief among them is whether the UN is endowed with adequate resources to undertake certain enforcement mandates”. With the UN moving towards more stabilization (enforcement) missions (MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA) it is very important it develops a stabilization doctrine, because these new type of missions threatens the core principles of traditional peacekeeping which it has relied on over the last seven decades.

Without a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the UN runs the risk of losing more troop contribution countries who are reluctant to deploy their troops for such missions in very volatile environments. Another issue as raised by the scholar is whether the UN can develop a competent structure to undertake enforcement, including cases where the military risks are very high”. He further raised the issue of legitimacy, and “whether the impartiality that is the key to UN peacekeeping operations can be maintained”. All these are conceptual ambiguities that need further clarifications with regards to the core purposes and mandate of the UN before it can effectively implement peacekeeping reforms.

Another implementation challenge as espoused by scholars is the lack of enough resources for the UN to undertake proper reforms on peacekeeping operations. According to Michele Griffin, “the world community is unwilling to provide the UN with resources to undertake enforcement tasks”. He argues that previous experiences have shown that “without the political support of the five
permanent members of the security council and, in particular, the logistical, financial and political support of the United States, no peacekeeping operation has ever been completed successfully”. It is, therefore, clear that the mere passage of resolutions, coupled with the adoption of reforms and recommendations from reports, under UN Chapter VII without proper provision of adequate resources for the UN to effectively implement these reforms, is tantamount to nothing serious. It is clear that financial and other resources such as logistics support and human resources in the form of personnel are very crucial to the implementation of UN reforms on peacekeeping operations. For example UNMISS, MONUSCO, MINUSMA, MINUSCA have been accused of not doing enough to protect civilians under their control, but a major impediment to this situation is the lack of capabilities (funds, and equipment) to effectively arm these peacekeepers to protect civilians and tackle spoilers of peace. For example, the UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA has found it very difficult to even protect themselves from terrorist groups because they lack the requisite equipment to deal with asymmetric threats in Northern Mali.

Another serious implementation challenge as far as UN reforms on peacekeeping operations are concerned is the issue of structural limitations. According to Brian Urquhart, “structural limitations have hampered the effectiveness of certain missions” and the implementation of very key reforms on UN peacekeeping operations over the years. He argued further that “a lack of pre-deployment planning, mobility limitations, restrictions on the use of force, the sparse availability of military intelligence from member states, and, of course, a lack of funding”, have all bridled the capability of United Nations to effectively implement its much needed reforms. This clearly means that, structural limitations in the United Nations, makes it very difficult for the UN to fully implement some of the most pressing reforms that are needed to change the face of peacekeeping operations. There is therefore the need the leadership of the UN to rise above these challenges and put in place
measures that would afford it with the requisite opportunity and capacity to implement all the
needed reforms so as to make peacekeeping operations effectively efficient.

Also this structural limitation has made it impossible for the UN to implement most of SEA policies
it has initiated over the last decade for example the Zied Report. This was clearly identified in the
HIPPO Report that called for urgent and robust implementation of previous SEA policies in order
to ensure accountability and enhance the UN’s zero tolerance policy on SEA. For example, in 2015
the UN suspended whistleblower Andreas Kompass for leaking classified documents to the French
government over allegations of its troops sexually exploiting and abusing children in the CAR
between 2013 to 2014. These kind of bureaucratic limitations highlights why the UN, after numerous
policies of combating SEA in its peacekeeping missions, has failed to make any meaningful strides
in the last 15 years, even though SEA has become one of the major threats to the credibility of peace
operations.

Furthermore, in relation to robust peacekeeping and POC in UN peace operations in Africa, a lack
of robust political solutions to back these military strategies in UN peace operations has hindered
most missions’ ability to use robust means to protect civilians and the mission’s mandates. Even
though the robust turn of peacekeeping operations has really help UN protect civilians during armed
conflict, it has failed to accompany these strategies with political solutions. The HIPPO Report
sought to advocate for this cause of action for all UN peace operations, but three years after its
introduction it has not been overly successful. This is a mixture of the UN finding it difficult to
navigate the political terrain of these conflicts where state authority is close to non-existent (Mali,
CAR, South Sudan, DRC and Sudan), and warring factions reneging on peace deals on a regular
basis.
3.5 The Way Forward for UN Peace Operations in Africa

According to scholars like Furley, Oliver and May, the way forward for UN peacekeeping in Africa is the partnering of the UN with regional bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS. According to them, “the African organizations cast their role not as replacing UN actions but as supporting its multidimensional operations by leading immediate, if not long-term, peacekeeping missions and UN member states acknowledge the importance of these regional efforts, especially, in Africa, and praise the efforts of the AU and ECOWAS in Sudan and Burundi, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire”. According to Imobighe and Zabadi, despite the UN Security Council authorizing or welcoming African Union’s missions, “recognized the need to improve peace operations capacity in Africa, and called for UN initiatives to work together, the UN needs to go beyond this cooperative rhetoric, and try to overcome the hurdles it faces in collaborating effectively with African organizations on more than an ad hoc basis”. Again, the scholars added that, going forward, it is very fundamental that, “the UN needs a device to activate on the very support urged by its own reports to enable regional and sub-regional groups to lead and manage peace operations successfully. The Secretariat has established its working groups on African security, but they need a strategic vision and political support to set goals and priorities”.

Kente, Vanessa and Malan, argued that in discussing the way forward for UN peace operations in Africa, it is important that “the UN Security Council cite Chapter VIII authority more consistently and effectively with regards to missions led by regional and sub-regional organizations, employing it to trigger real assistance in knowledge and systems (e.g., planning and management), operational capacity (e.g., logistics support, identification of trained units), and funding (e.g.,
assessed or voluntary contributions)”. The three scholars added that in turn, “such collaboration could increase the ability of the United Nations to organize effective peace operations and smoother hand-offs from regional leadership, to access trained pools of peacekeepers (military and civilian police), and to have regional capacities co-listed within UN databases (e.g., UNSAS; on-call lists of personnel)”.

There is also the suggestion that, very “improved coordination of bilateral support offered by members could also help regional efforts complement, not compete with, UN goals”.

Again, Jude Cocodia, writing on “Peace Operations in the Central African Republic: Some Challenges and Ways Forward”, had cause to offer the following recommendations with regards to the way forward for UN peace operations in Africa:

- AU and UN-led peace support operation mandates should be flexible enough to respond adequately to the actual conditions as well as the local dynamics of a conflict.
- The AU should consider the local histories of mission areas and the sociocultural affiliations of peacekeeping contingents before, during, and after deployment.
- The AU and UN should improve peace support training and raise the awareness of peacekeepers with respect to the significance of local support for success.

All these recommendations are very crucial in strengthening the relationship between the AU and UN in terms of peacekeeping operations in Africa, going forward. It is therefore clear, that the way forward for peacekeeping operations in Africa, as far as sexual exploitation and abuse is concerned would be among other things the removal of political immunity from U.N staff, proper enforcement of U.N resolutions and the addition of more women to the peacekeeping personnel, especially to mission areas prone to these problems.
3.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, “several corrective measures have been suggested: improve communication between operations in the field and the New York headquarters, establish a central planning agency at the Secretariat, assign support regiments for UN duty, pre-stock general supplies at regional depots, arrange faster airlifts, improve early-warning capabilities and secure better military intelligence from member states”. Though there is no disputing the fact that the UN has undertaken several peacekeeping projects in Africa, however, “if peacekeeping is to continue serving as a tool for maintaining international peace and security, Member States will need to ensure that missions are given clear mandates and the necessary human and financial resources to implement them”. In order to deal effectively with the lingering forces of war and conflict, the UN, Member States and other key stakeholders must continue working together to develop the right tools to make peacekeeping work.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of all the findings of the study and the conclusion as well. It summarizes and concludes the study by stating the specific findings that were gathered throughout the entire research. The chapter also draws various deductions from all the literature and the information gathered on the subject matter under study in order to make a solid point. The chapter presents brief findings with regards to UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century. The chapter also summarizes briefly the findings of the study with regards to some of the key factors or reports that necessitated UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century. The chapter also makes clear the findings of the study with regards to some of the key reforms instituted by the United Nations in the 21st century, as far as peace operations in Africa is concerned.

This study hinges on the theory of collective security with the hypothesis that “introduction of UN peacekeeping reforms has improved the conduct of peacekeeping operations in Africa.” George Schwarzeberger defines collective security as “a machinery of joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order”. Collective Security theory is very relevant to this study because of its ability to help the study understand how UN peacekeeping operations evolved as a strategy for the maintenance of international peace and security.

4.1 Summary of Findings

As a guide to conducting this research, three main research objectives were set out in the beginning of this study, plus their corresponding research questions, which served as a guide to the researcher in bid to achieve all of the research objectives at the end of the study. The four research objectives
included the following: To examine the key factors and reports that necessitated UN’s peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century; To identify the consequent reforms and their implication on UN’s peace operations in Africa and to discuss the implementation challenges faced by these reforms and the way forward for UN peace operations in Africa. Specific findings were made with regards to all these research objectives which are summarized below:

With respect to the first objective, the study found out that, these factors are multifaceted in nature. The study revealed that, contemporary security challenges, coupled with changing prevailing security dynamics as well as experiences and difficulties faced by UN peacekeeping missions in the field, all constitute the factors that necessitated UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century. The study established that, the structural difficulties as well as well as the short falls in the current makeup of the UN demanded that certain reforms should be put in place.

Regarding the second objective, the study revealed that, these reforms are many, but however, the most prominent peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century were the Brahimi Report in 2000 and the HIPPO report in 2015, which were landmark reforms and covered almost every aspect of the UN peacekeeping architecture. These reforms have aided to putting forward a more holistic peacekeeping approach, calling for more effective POC mandates and strategies, new peacebuilding architecture, the use of robust force to protect civilians, inter-organizational cooperation and attempts to tackle SEA in UN peace operations.

On the third objective, the study found out that, the UN reforms have had and continue to have major implications on peace operations in Africa. For example it was found that, these reforms have helped to put the protection of civilians at the forefront of third generation UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa. This can be seen by how POC mandates have become the cornerstone of every UN peace operation, as these conflict environments have become very dangerous and civilians had become very vulnerable to armed groups during ongoing conflicts in Africa.

Furthermore, the study found out that recent peacekeeping reform in the 21st century has changed the composition and nature of current UN peace operations. Thus, these reforms ushered in third generation peacekeeping operations, which are very robust and multidimensional. Most of these missions have been deployed under Chapter VII mandates, and authorized to use robust force at the tactical level to protect civilians and the missions’ mandates, in conflict situations where there is no peace to keep. This robust turn of UN peacekeeping has also led to the development of stabilisation missions (MONUSCO, MINUSMA, and MINUSCA), which have more enforcement powers to protect civilians (the use of the FIB in the DRC)

The study also revealed that, current reforms have affected UN and AU cooperation on peacekeeping keeping in Africa. Since the inception of the Brahimi report in 2000, the UN has cooperated with the AU to tackle some pertinent security issues on the continent. Both organizations have been involved in strategic, institutional and operational collaborations to help deal with security challenges in Africa. The AU has become a strategic partner to the UN as it has over half of its peacekeeping missions in Africa. Both organizations have worked to establish a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, and the UN continues to support other AU security initiatives by providing financial, technical and logistical support for the AU.

Peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction has been impacted by these reviews, as it has helped to the successful draw down of UN missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi and Cote d’Ivoire. The UN has been able to help these states recover from decades of bloody civil wars into
functioning states. This has help attain sustainable peace in the aforementioned countries. Clearly, the research objective of examining some of the implications of the UN peacekeeping reforms in the 21st century on peacekeeping operations has been met to a very large extent.

In respect to the other aims of this research which was to look at the implementation challenges confronted by the United Nations as far as peacekeeping reforms are concerned, the study found out, that, factors such as, inadequate financial, human and logistical resources, coupled with other issues such as, the structural limitations confronted by the United Nations, conceptual ambiguities and the issues regarding a lack of a clear POC and stabilization doctrines, lack of local ownership of peacebuilding strategies, and the lack of accountable measures to prosecute SEA offenders and a host of other concerns, actually constitute some of the implementation challenges that the UN is facing in its bid to put in place very critical reforms that are needed for the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in the world.

4.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, the study has been able to identify and explain the key factors that give rise for the need for the UN to re-strategize and reform some of its policies on peacekeeping in the 21st century. The study has also identified some of these reforms that have been put in place by the UN in the 21st century and the importance of such reforms towards peacekeeping in Africa. The findings of this study therefore show that the introduction of UN peacekeeping reforms has improved the conduct of peacekeeping operations in Africa. This therefore justifies the hypothesis of this study.

The study has also been able to thoroughly discuss some of the implications of these reforms on peace operations in Africa, as well as some of the implementation challenges and the way forward
for peacekeeping operations in Africa, in the areas of POC, robust and achievable mandates, peacebuilding, UN-AU cooperation, and sexual exploitation and abuse. It is therefore worth concluding, that, despite the efforts demonstrated by the United Nations, towards peacekeeping in Africa and elsewhere, the changing security dynamics across the globe demands that, the United Nations take a second look at its strategies and mechanisms in the 21st century.

It is also, worth concluding that, notwithstanding the commendable steps that the United Nations has taken over the years towards instituting critical reforms towards peace operations, it is still very imperative, that the UN go a step further to look at critical issues such the need for a stabilization and counterterrorism doctrines, implementation of robust political solutions to accompany POC mandates, and more effective accountability and protection to combat SEA

4.3 Recommendations

Having researched and perused a considerable literature on the subject matter under study, and taking cognizance of the implementation challenges facing the UN, it is therefore recommended that the following suggestions are taken on board.

A. Protection of Civilians

- The UNSC needs to clearly define its POC doctrine and provide the appropriate resources to aid peacekeepers implement POC mandates. It is not only enough to initiate numerous POC policies for UN peacekeeping without having a clear and achievable means to implement it.

- The UN must do more to back POC mandates with robust political solutions as the use of military strategies to protect civilians has not always yielded the most favourable results.
B Use of Force and Achievable Mandates

- The need for a clear stabilization doctrine for current UN peace operations. Thus, it is imperative for the UN to distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This lack of distinction had resulted in most TCCs ordering their troops from using robust force during UN peacekeeping operation, as it is against the core principles of traditional peacekeeping, and their UN troops lack the requisite capabilities to work in such volatile conflict environments.

- UNSC should desist from issuing template mandates for peacekeeping operations as no conflict is the same.

- The UNSC, Secretariat, and the DPKO and DFS need to develop a counterterrorism doctrine for some of its current peacekeeping operations. MINUSMA is a clear example of how peacekeepers are ill prepared to deal with asymmetric threats, and this has virtually made them ineffective in stabilizing northern Mali.

C Peacebuilding

- The DPKO needs to develop peacebuilding strategies that will place the locals at the centre of it. Also governments should be inclusive and not relegate any group from being a part of the new formed governments

- The Peacebuilding Commission should be adequately funded to be able to implement peacebuilding strategies.

- The UN must work to develop more conflict prevention strategies coupled with robust political solutions to attain sustainable peace, and prevent the country from relapsing back
into conflict.

- UN missions should address the root causes of conflict in order to achieve sustainable peace.

D UN-AU Partnerships

- There is the need for an inclusive, and consultative decision making process between both organizations. The UNSC should regularly consult with the AU when drafting peacekeeping mandates; this makes it easier for the UNSC to draft clear and achievable mandates for UN and AU peace operations.

- The UN and the AU must have a clear understanding and applicability of Chapter VII during peacekeeping operations.

- Adequate financial, technical and logistical support should be given to the AU to help tackle its numerous security challenges.

- The UN should assist the AU to build its capacity of its security institutions to deal with its own security challenges.

- The UN-AU relationship should be more complementary and not that of competition, and more about division of labour.

E Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)

- The UN needs to improve its victim protection strategies in order to assist SEA victims. With much UN focus on policy, it must also place greater emphasis on providing psychological, legal, medical and financial support for victims.

- UN member states need to do more than just lip service, by conducting effective investigations and prosecuting offenders, only be doing this can they help
tackle SEA in UN peace operations.

- Cumbersome bureaucratic hurdles that makes it difficult for the UN to effectively conduct investigations should be removed. This can be done by having very transparent and independent reporting and investigative channels to assist in such a time-sensitive issue.

- The UNSC must ensure the robust implementation of already existing SEA policies order to improve accountability in its fight against SEA.
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APPENDICES

Interview Guide

An Assessments of the United Nations Peacekeeping Reforms and its Implication n Peace Operations In Africa

My name is Moses Kofi Annor. I am an MA student from the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana. I am conducting a research on the above question. All responses will be used for academic research purposes only. Thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

The general objective of this research is to assess: how UN peacekeeping reforms(Brahimi Report and HIPPO Report) have impacted UN peace operations in Africa in the 21st century.

Key areas of the reforms to be discussed: (i) Protection of Civilian, (ii)UN partnerships with other regional organizations, (iii) Mandate(Robust, clear and achievable mandates), (iv) Peacebuilding (Human Rights, Rule of Law, Transitional Justice), and (v) Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)

SECTION A: Brahimi Report-2000

1. What was the nature of the Brahimi report?

2. In your opinion, how did the Brahimi Report impact on the various UN peace operations in Africa in the areas of;

(i) Protection of Civilians

(ii) UN Partnerships with other Regional Organization(AU)
(iii) **Mandate (Robust, Clear and Achievable)**


(iv) **Peacebuilding**


3. What were some of the shortcomings of the Report for the UN and the Missions in relation to the key areas, and how were they addressed?

(i) **Protection of Civilians**


(ii) **UN Partnerships with other Regional Organization (AU)**


(iii) **Mandate (Robust, Clear and Achievable)**


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(iv) Peacebuilding

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SECTION B: HIPPO REPORT-2015

1. What was the nature of the HIPO report?

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2. In your opinion, what has been the impact/implication of the Report on UN peace operation in Africa in the areas of;

(i) Protection of Civilians

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(ii) UN Partnerships with other Regional Organization(AU)

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(iii) Mandate(Robust, Clear and Achievable)

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3. What are some of the shortcomings of the Report for the UN and the Missions in relation to the key areas?

(i) Protection of Civilians

(ii) UN Partnerships with other Regional Organization (AU)

(iii) Mandate (Robust, Clear and Achievable)

(iv) Peacebuilding
(v) Issues of SEA and the need for Accountability

4. How can the UN address the challenges identified in order to improve its peacekeeping operations in Africa?