THE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN IMPLEMENTING THE ADEDEJI, 2007 AND KAGAME, 2017 REPORTS ON AFRICAN UNION REFORMS

BY

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(10639105)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DECLARATION

I, RACHAEL TUHIMBISE hereby declare that; this dissertation is my personal work executed under the supervision of Dr. Juliana Appiah and no part of it has been duplicated from other sources without proper academic acknowledgement. This dissertation has not been submitted either in part or whole for the award of any other degree.

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RACHAEL TUHIMBISE                      DR. JULIANA APPIAH

(STUDENT)                                (SUPERVISOR)

DATE ..........................            DATE ..........................


DEDICATION

To the Almighty God

To my family and friends for their unwavering support

To my beautiful continent, Africa

May God bless us all!
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first acknowledgement goes to the Almighty God who led, guided, protected and provided for me during the programme.

I would also like to acknowledge the hard work and sacrifice of my parents Mr. and Mrs. Turyasingura who gave their very best into making me who I am. And for that, thank you for being a great source of inspiration on this journey.

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May God abundantly bless everyone.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACB</td>
<td>African Central Bank</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
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<td>African Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>Africa Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Constitutive Act</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOSOCC</td>
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<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>FAL</td>
<td>Final Act of Lagos</td>
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<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LPA</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan African Parliament</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
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<td>PSA</td>
<td>Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
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<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>Specialized Technical Agencies</td>
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<td>Specialized Technical Committees</td>
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<td>UEMOA</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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ABSTRACT

The African Union (AU) emanated from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had been in existence for almost four decades as the organ responsible for the attainment of the continent’s economic, political and social development. To achieve this vision, African states realized that a stronger institutional framework was needed to negotiate competitively on their behalf within the international context. The creation of the AU was a result of a compromise between three factions led by the Presidents of Nigeria, South Africa and Libya at the time, the outcome on how the AU was created never satisfied the parties and as such, they sought to reform the AU. To date the Organization has attempted to reform on three separate occasions with the first instance happening right after it had emerged in 2002, the second being the Adedeji reform in 2007 and lastly the most recent Kagame Reforms of 2017. This desire and intent to make the AU an efficient and effective organization has previously not translated into any fundamental and structural change in the institution and subsequently the continent. The study reflects on the circumstances surrounding the reform packages undertaken so far and assesses the challenges and prospects in implementing the reforms. The study revealed that the implementation of the reforms is indispensable for the realization of continents Agenda 2063. To ensure that the reforms are implemented, the study recommends that the AU Assembly takes ownership of its role as the leadership and final decision-making body of the organization in enforcing decisions. The study revealed that the lack of political support from African Heads of State undermines the current reform process.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the study

The AU was established in May 2001 and launched in July 2002 in Durban South Africa, as the institution responsible for championing the continent's global agenda. This event marked a pivotal experience in the life of the organization that was previously known as the OAU. The OAU was established: “to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations (UN)”.

These objectives and subsequent initiatives led to the setup of the AU with the renewed vision of integrating the continent politically and economically.

Prior to the establishment of the AU, the OAU Heads of State and Government met in Sirte, Libya under the leadership of Muammar al-Gaddafi in 1999 and issued the Sirte Declaration to transform the continental body into the AU. The Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999) was followed by the Lomé Summit (2000) in Togo where the Constitutive Act (CA) of the African Union was adopted as the framework under which the African Union would operate and was ratified by 53 African states at the time. In 2001, the roadmap for the implementation of the AU was adopted during the Lusaka Summit followed by the Durban Summit (2002) which launched the AU and held the 1st Assembly of the Union.
In January 2007, during the 8th Ordinary Session of the AU in Addis Ababa, a decision was reached to host the 9th Ordinary Session in Accra, Ghana under the theme “Grand Debate on the Union Government”.

The purpose of the session was to revive the conversation on establishing a Union government for Africa. The conversation, however, transformed into reforming the AU. The outcome of the July 2007 Session was the Accra Declaration, which established a committee of eminent persons led by Professor Adebayo Adedeji to deliberate on the challenges, prospects and roadmaps towards Africa’s development. The audit resulted in the presentation of the Adedeji Report to President John Agyekum Kufuor, the then Chairman of the AU with an elaborate assessment of the Organization since its inception in 1963 to 2007. The analysis was categorized into three main areas: a brief overview of the integration process since the 1960’s; an in-depth assessment of the current state of integration within the organization and other Regional Economic Communities (REC’s) and the formulation of roadmaps and benchmarks to move the integration process forward.

The report came up with a total of 159 elaborate recommendations, 23 of these recommendations required immediate response and 8 principal benchmarks upon which progress would be measured. The responsibility to implement the recommendations was referred to the respective bodies within the AU to create effective road maps in order to achieve the required results as per the benchmarks. The panel did not give a fixed time line for the implementation process but was of the view that by 2011, all recommendations would have been fully implemented to facilitate another audit in 2012. The panel also recommended immediate commencement of the implementation process, submission of road maps by the respective departments within the AU and an annual progress report to assess the process of the reforms. These recommendations, like several other AU resolutions, were shelved and barely implemented.
In May 2013, the AU celebrated 50 years of African Unity, which was marked by extended celebrations in various African communities around the world but, more so, at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with the theme “Pan Africanism and African Renaissance” as expressed in the Solemn Declaration. This provided an opportunity for the Organization to reflect on its past, reawaken the ideals of the founding fathers and chart a better path for the continent. Discussions held in celebration of the milestone varied on a wide range of topics across different groups to include the standby force, the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and more importantly Agenda 2063. Following an assessment of the Organization’s fifty years of existence, the AU embarked on Agenda 2063 under the leadership of H.E Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, then Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), as the development plan seeking to address earlier and contemporary continental initiatives.

The Heads of State and Government who gave the AUC the responsibility of preparing the First Ten Year Implementation Plan adopted agenda 2063 - under the theme “The Africa We Want” in January 2015. The plan is built on six foundations, which are The AU Constitutive Act, The African Union Vision, The Eight Priority Areas of the Solemn Declaration, The African Aspirations for 2063, Regional Continental Frameworks and National Plans and Visions. In 2016 July, during the retreat of Heads of State and Government, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance decided to conduct a study on the institutional reforms of the AU under the leadership of H.E. Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda.

On 29th January 2017, the report on the institutional reforms of the AU were presented by H.E Paul Kagame who was then entrusted by the AU to appoint a Pan-African advisory team to assess the AU and consider proposals for the reform. The team reviewed the 2007 Adedeji
Report and in consultation with Dr Dlamini Zuma and various African Heads of State, nine key findings were made which contributed to the reform areas.\textsuperscript{11} The Kagame Report focuses on five key areas: Focus on key priority areas with continental scope; Realign AU institutions; Connect the AU to citizens; Manage the business of the AU efficiently and effectively and Financing the AU sustainably. These are further broken down to 21 reform decisions which will go into the process of ensuring AU addresses the interests of the peoples of Africa in a more effective way.\textsuperscript{12}

A review of the Kagame and Adedeji Reports reveal that to a large extent, the recommendations proposed in the Kagame report were drawn from the Adedeji report, which was never implemented. Whereas the Adedeji Report provides a 215-page comprehensive status report based on an audit process of the AU as at December 2007, the Kagame Report comes as a review of previous reports without a basis on the current state of the Organization. It is eleven years since the Adedeji report was submitted for implementation, however, an assessment of the benchmarks clearly indicates that most reforms were never implemented. Furthermore, several attempts to table the Adedeji Report for implementation in subsequent meetings following its presentation never materialized as evidenced in its removal from the agenda of the 2009 Summit. The study assesses the need for reform within the AU considering the organization is plagued with a chronic failure to implement its decisions and previous reform initiatives.

\subsection*{1.1 Statement of the Research Problem}

As the rest of the world welcomed the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century amidst the rapid rate of globalization, Africa joined this wave while facing various challenges such as: chronic poverty, political instability, corruption, food insecurity, terrorism and conflict among others.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, advancement in
technology around the world has not only facilitated but expedited the rate at which developed countries have grown leading to an even wider development gap between the North and South but more so for the African continent. According to the World Population Review, Africa boasts of a population of almost 1.3 billion people, growing at a rate of 2.52% as at 2018 and comprising a youth population of at least 55%.\textsuperscript{14} With the projected increase in population coupled together with weak institutions, Africa’s development challenges will only escalate leaving the continent in a vulnerable position where it is constantly trying to barely catch up with the rest of the world.

The OAU and AU put together have been and are the Organizations responsible for addressing the challenges facing African’s both continentally and globally. The AU, however, has failed to sufficiently match its capacity to its mandate. Previous efforts to align the institution through various resolutions and reform packages proposed by African Heads of State (HOS) and Government and other stakeholders have been followed by a consistent lack of implementation. This posture has rendered the Organization “unfit for its purpose” not only for Africans, but also for its partners and deprives the continent of any prospects of sustainably overcoming its challenges. This study assesses why previously proposed reforms of the AU were not implemented and what challenges account for the lack of implementation in order to understand the potential impediments the Kagame reform process might encounter.

1.2 Research Questions

1. What factors account for the call for reforms within the African Union?

2. What accounts for the lack of implementation of older reform proposals?
3. How can the African Union begin to reinvent itself to mitigate the challenges and ensure the Kagame Reforms are implemented?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1. To examine the circumstances under which the African Union called for reforms.

2. To assess what challenges account for the lack of implementation of older reform proposals.

3. To evaluate whether the African Union is well positioned to implement the Kagame Reforms.

1.4 Scope of the Study

This study will be limited to the African Union since inception in 2002 and the proposed institutional reforms in the Adedeji, 2007 and the Kagame, 2017 Reports.

1.5 Rationale of the Study

While it may be too early to predict the effects of the Kagame Reforms, the study seeks to examine the lessons learnt from the Organization’s experience with the Adedeji Reforms of 2007 and their influence on the current reforms. Attention is drawn to the AU’s inability to implement the reforms while contributing to the ongoing discourse on how the AU can position itself to deliver on the Kagame reforms.
1.6 Hypothesis

Based on its lack of implementation of past reform agenda’s, the AU is not well positioned to implement the Kagame Reform.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The study on the African Union Reforms will be analyzed through the framework of the rational design theory of international institutions. Its proponents are Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. Significant amounts of research have been undertaken on whether international institutions really matter and how they operate, however, in this case, the attention will be drawn to how they relate to the problems states face. Koremenos et al define international institutions as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior”. Their definition of international actors is not limited to states but includes non-state actors such as intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations and multinational firms.

The theory is placed within the rational choice of analysis where it presumes that states use international institutions to further their own goals thereby designing institutions accordingly. According to the theory, states and other international actors pay attention to the design of international institution by focusing on the logic behind the development to produce cooperative outcomes that further their own interests. The theory aims at identifying institutional weaknesses and provide various solutions that international institutions adopt to remain effective by providing a framework for the variation in institutional forms. The proponents argue that
rational design theory facilitates a better understanding of institutional arrangements among multiple participants by providing a broad range of design features that influence the formation or change in international institutions.\textsuperscript{20}

The rational design theory is based on four assumptions;

- States and other international actors, acting for self-interested reasons, design institutions purposefully to advance their joint interest.

- The value of future gains is strong enough to support a cooperative arrangement.

- Establishing and participating in international institutions is costly.

- States are risk averse and worry about possible adverse effects when creating or modifying international institutions.\textsuperscript{21}

States are often not in position to create and design new institutions from the bottom going up; therefore, events such as these seldom occur. High transaction costs of creating new institutions coupled with the high degree of uncertainty that accompany institutional creation, states tend to prefer reforming existing institutions to creating new ones.\textsuperscript{22} The theory then does not only provide an explanation to the institutional design of new international institutions but also provides an appropriate base for describing different policies undertaken by the institutions and a form of evaluating existing institutions.\textsuperscript{23} The rational design analysis examines cooperation problems stemming from various actor interests, keeping in mind that member states’ interests determine institutional outcomes.

The framework further explains that international institutions are designed in terms of membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility.\textsuperscript{24} Proponents of the rational design
theory attribute the variations in institutional design to distribution problems, enforcement problems, number of actors and uncertainty about behavior, preferences and the state of the world. \textsuperscript{25} Koremenos et al acknowledge that institutional reform depends on previous outcomes of the path dependent processes that the institution experienced and elaborate that a change in any of these factors may alter the nature of the institutional design. \textsuperscript{26} They further explain that the evolution of institutions can lead to rational choices of two kinds: First; modification in stages by imitating designs from institutions that work well in relatable settings and secondly; where states may abandon or join the international institution to suit their needs at the time. \textsuperscript{27}

The rational design theory is not without its limitations and has come under criticism by scholars like Alexander Wendt and John S. Duffield. Wendt’s critique on the limitations of the rational design approach argues that the analysis is insufficiently forward-looking and does not address important normative concerns. He questions the decision to focus on rational choice explanations without engaging other competing approaches or what he believes are complementary but deeper explanations.

Wendt further offers two main critics: One is that the volume is not inclusive in its explanation of institutional design and therefore does not address important normative concerns. \textsuperscript{28} He relates the basis of the rational design theory to that of the functionalist claim where actors chose institutions because they expect them to have a positive function and points out that this hypothesis is associated with sociological and constructivist approaches to institutions. \textsuperscript{29} Wendt’s second criticism is that there are other rationalist models such as those based on rent-seeking states or political leaders seeking to extend their stay in office which then makes
collective-action problems and incomplete information one possible rationalist model to institutional design.\textsuperscript{30}

John S. Duffield’s criticisms of the rational design theory falls into three arguments based on matter of choice and the ability of the theory to offer a satisfactory explanation of institutional forms.\textsuperscript{31} He cites the first limitation in the scope of the project as explained by the narrow empirical domain to which the project applies which is further expressed in the narrow conception of institutions and the limited set of questions asked in terms of institutional design.\textsuperscript{32} He identifies the second limitation in the projects analytical framework by citing that the dependent variables, independent variables and conjectures analyzed in the framework do not include several important items and offers no logical explanation for excluding them. Duffield points out that interests, power and capabilities of actors were excluded whereas power considerations significantly affect the design of international institutions.\textsuperscript{33} Duffield’s third criticism is on the theory’s limitation in its efforts to evaluate the framework through empirical analysis by having a limited selection of cases, failing to operationalize the variables and a general lack of empirical support.

Despite its criticisms, the theory provides a promising approach to the discourse on AU Reforms, how the organization operates and how it attempts to resolve cooperation challenges among member states. The theory is also relevant to the analysis and largely explains the variables that influence the effectiveness of international institutions. The theory also assesses the organization on a scope that is central to the operations of the organizational structure of the African Union both externally and internally. Finally, it also gives the basis upon which the administrative
reforms the organization undertakes can be evaluated against the prevailing circumstances at the time.

1.8 Literature Review

To undertake a thorough study on African Union Reforms, a review of relevant literature from different authors who have written on different aspects of the subject: Thomas Kwasi Tieku in his work "Explaining the clash and accommodation of interests of major actors in the creation of the African Union" examines at the circumstances that led to the creation of the African Union. The author traces this back to 1993 where the inefficiencies of the organizational structure necessitated the formation of a new organization and later gained momentum in the 1999 Algiers Summit. He states that the election of Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa as Presidents of influenced the policies that created the AU as an extension of their respective Foreign Policies. Tieku further states that upon realizing the intent of the two prominent African presidents, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi calculated a comeback into the African political scene with his own agenda for a ‘United States of Africa’.

Tieku recounts that Pan-Africanism charted the path for OAU from which the AU emerged and recognizes the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Abuja Treaty that were instrumental in creating the policy that guided the formation of the African Economic Community (AEC). He points out
that the OAU structures at the time were not sufficient for the task at hand which forced African leaders to pursue institutional reforms. To gain an in-depth understanding of the foundations upon which the AU was built, the author posits that the various interests are critically analyzed.\(^{35}\)

The author elaborates on the reforms under three different packages. First, as Mbeki’s efforts to strategically align South Africa as an investment hub on the continent, second as Obasanjo’s strategy to promote collective security on the continent without Nigeria losing its status on the continent and lastly Ghaddafi’s futile endeavors to move the tide in his favor by hosting two summits and proposing amendments to the Constitutive Act (CA).\(^{36}\)

The author’s work is relevant to the study because it evaluates the contending reform packages presented by the different actors and presents a basis for comprehending the inception of the AU. He also highlights policy implications for the AU based on the verifiable experience of the European Union (EU).

Nsogururua J. Udombana in his article “The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A legal Analysis” gives a comprehensive report on the institutions within the African Union, comparing them with those in the European Union while identifying strengths and weaknesses.\(^{37}\) The author follows with a brief account of the AU Act, the legal status of the AU, proposals on strengthening the organs within the AU and the relationship of the AU with its members. According to Udombana, the international system has evolved to the extent that states cannot ignore the place of international institutions more so where these institutions carry significant weight on the global stage. He opines that municipal law is therefore compelled to recognize International law as well as international life.\(^{38}\)
Udombana explains that AU Constitutive Act gives the AU its legal personality, contains Articles that provide the framework within which the institution operates through the various organs that perform specific tasks effected by those employed by the AU. He further explains that the nature of the organs within the organization form the character of the international organization and as such the institution is mindful of the organs it creates internally to achieve its set objectives. In Udombana’s view, the AU should adopt a flexible, heterogeneous and issue-specific policy making style for its institutional structure that will enable the AU to competently deliver on its mandate.\(^39\)

This article is relevant to the study because it provides a detailed analysis of the structure of the AU through the constitutive act and the organs within the institutions. The author provides comparisons between the AU and EU and provides suggestions on how to strengthen the AU.

Writing on, “Integration in Africa: An Appraisal of the Constitutive Act of the African Union”, Juliana Appiah seeks to assess whether the underachievement’s of the OAU can be superseded by the creation of the AU within the framework of the CA. She points out that the desire for integration was born by new independent African States as the conduit for developing the continent socially, economically and politically. The author reviews the challenges experienced by the OAU in attaining its intended purpose and highlights its achievements albeit modest.\(^40\) In her appraisal of the CA, she explains the aim for establishing the AU and examines the organs that comprise the AU as described in the CA against parallel organs that existed in the OAU and those that exist in the EU.
Appiah points out that Africa’s integration efforts are because of the leaders realizing and understanding that integration is pertinent to the continent’s growth and cites that the conditions necessary for long-term growth include peace, stability and good governance among others.\(^{41}\) To achieve these goals, she emphasizes that African leaders must take responsibility for the implementation of the set mandate considering one of the major challenges is attributed to lack of political will among the leadership. The author acknowledges that beyond the continent, the inevitable world order creates an international challenge in the form of globalization where Africa remains a net importer of manufactured goods further leading to the incapacitation of African economies.\(^{42}\)

The contribution of the article is relevant to the research because it focuses on assessing the organs of the AU in comparison with the organs in the OAU while making possible suggestions on the makeup of the institution. The article also highlights the fact that continental attention should be drawn to globalization and its effects on Africa.

On “The EU as a model for the African Union: The Limits of Imitation”, Olufemi Babarinde states that the AU despite having an organizational structure that was adopted from that of the EU and having a fifty-year gap between them, it will have to create its own path in the annals of history.\(^{43}\) He delves into the history of regional integration on the continent dating back to 1910 with the creation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) all the way to the establishment of the African Union in 2002.\(^{44}\) Babarinde examines the organization’s organs and the hopes for
which they were created. In a detailed account, the author presents the AU’s achievements, failures, challenges and opportunities.

The author argues that part of the OAU’s failure can be attributed to the increase in civil wars and cross border conflict, in the sense that this exposed the inability of the organizations structures at the time in containing the crises internally but rather seek the mercy of external donors. He posits that the move from the OAU to the AU still creates a challenge in building consensus among its membership of an excess of 50 members. Babarinde compares this experience to that of the EU that had a membership of six states at inception with a common goal of uniting economically. He further states that regional integration in Africa will be more beneficial in the case where intra African trade is the cord that binds the various economies on the continent.

The author’s analysis is relevant to the study because it draws useful parallels between the AU and EU while identifying commonalities and differences between the two organizations. He also suggests possible ways in which the organization can address some of the challenges.

Boni Yao Gebe in his work on “The Quest for a Union Government of Africa: Reflections on the Vision and the Realities of Political Integration” gives a historical account of the unrelenting passion expressed by the early Pan-Africanists in uniting the peoples of the continent. He recounts the journey of establishing the OAU down to that of the AU and the challenges creating a union government for the continent. The author provides a detailed account of the events that surrounded the call for reform within the African Union in January 2007 during the Addis Ababa
Ordinary Session. The Accra Summit of 2008 followed closely behind the Addis Summit where the ‘Great Debate’ was held to discuss the Union Government.

The author acknowledges that the posture exhibited by African leaders at the time was nothing new compared the previous undertakings on similar matters by noting that once again the continent was divided along the same lines on how to approach the creation of a union government. Gebe points out that the conversation eventually degenerated from the intended debate to the call for reforms within the organization upon which Professor Adedeji and other prominent African were selected to spearhead the process. This Summit was concluded with the Accra Declaration that contained recommendations for the AU at national, sub-regional and continental levels.

This article is fundamental to the study because it gives an in-depth analysis of the events that led to the Adedeji reforms of the African Union with specific mention being given to the existing institutional structure at the time.

In “Briefing: The African Union at Ten – An Appraisal”, Tim Murithi gives an account of the AU’s performance in its first 10 years of existence which were celebrated on 9 July 2012. This period happened to coincide with robust conversations on good governance and humanitarian intervention following the Arab Spring in North Africa and the contested 2010 elections in Ivory Coast. He highlights the fact that Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma’s ascension to the office of the Chairperson of the African Union was because of South Africa’s strategic and deliberate intention to reform the AU. Murithi draws his main discussion around AU’s endeavor in
influencing norms that would facilitate Africa’s growth. He also acknowledges the need for the continent to be represented as one block in the international scene.

The author points out that the AU has the responsibility as a continental leader to guide the affairs of the people within their area of influence by preserving the norms that are critical to the sustenance of their lives. He further points out that the norms like peace and security, democracy and human rights play an important role in stabilizing the continent to promote social, economic and political growth. Murithi recognizes the continental initiatives undertaken by the in restoring peace in areas like Somali, Burundi and Darfur as pertains to peace and security while acknowledging the economic efforts presented in New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). While citing a few successes, the author recognizes that there is still a lot of work to be done to combat the challenges ahead that lay ahead for the continent, which will require more action and implementation.

This briefing is important to the research because it puts emphasis on the efforts made by the AU to become a common voice on the continent and internationally by influencing UN reform through the Ezulwini consensus. The article also highlights the challenges faced by the AU in achieving this goal.

In “An African Union for an Emerging Continent: Reforms to Increase Effectiveness” Mwangi S. Kimenyi contends that the AU’s response to the crises on the continent indicates the Unions failure to the lead the continent. He argues that this failure signifies that the organization’s
dysfunctional state hampers its efforts to address formidably the continents challenges and as a result, its credibility has come under scrutiny from members and outsiders. The author points out that for an organization operating in the magnitude of a representative continental body, a clear understanding of the diverse challenges facing the continent at the grassroots level is crucial to the developing the solutions required to address these issues.\textsuperscript{53} He further acknowledges the lack of competence with the organization; corruption and other negative tendencies need to be addressed for the smooth operation of the organization.\textsuperscript{54}

In raising the need for reform, Kimenyi recounts the journey the cause for African Unity has undertaken since 1963, when the OAU was establishment and later disintegrated to birth the AU. He points out that the whereas the AU has formulated well-meaning developmental policy initiatives to address the continents issues, their impact hasn’t been felt in over 10 years of the organization’s existence since Africa remains at the tail end of international system. In a bid address the current state of Africa, the AU formulated “Agenda 2063” as the continents developmental agenda, which started in 2013 together with the Common Africa Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, which relates to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).\textsuperscript{55} To attain these goals, the author addresses the challenges the organization may have to overcome in 2015 to align the institution to its mandate.

Kimenyi’s work is relevant to the study because it tackles recent development proposals for the Union and makes the call for reform to provide the requisite leadership needed to drive the continent towards sustainable development.
1.9 Sources of Data

Primary and secondary sources of data were utilized for the study. Primary data included speeches from relevant actors connected to the AU, statements from the organization, official minute documents from various meetings and interviews. Semi-structured interviews with relevant personalities were utilized during the study and the primary sources included Ambassador David Etuket, former Director of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uganda; Samuel M. Atuobi, Senior Political/Elections Officer, African Union Commission & Dr. Thomas K. Tieku, Associate Professor, Kings University College, Western University. For secondary data, the research work relied on books, reports, journal articles and discussions relating to the AU and its organs and the reforms within the institution. The African Union Website and other online resources were also consulted in the form of articles, journals and newspapers.

1.10 Research Methodology

The study was conducted using the qualitative method to gain an understanding of the underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations behind the reform process. Information from both primary and secondary sources was collected to comprise the materials utilized for the study. The information generated from different sources was descriptive in nature and was analyzed to make deductions on the AU reforms.

1.11 Sampling Procedure
As part of the collecting primary data, the purposive sampling method was used to generate relevant information from well informed participants on the reforms. A non-probability sampling method was used to identify the interviewees who would provide relevant information to the study. The primary sources involved interviews with a sample size of three people out of the six that were expected. The sources included a Ugandan Ambassador who was the former High Commissioner to Nigeria from 2005 to 2008 and former director of Internal Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Uganda; a Senior Political/Elections Officer of the AU and an Associate Professor on International Institutions and the AU. The information generated from different sources was analyzed to make deductions.

1.12 Data Analysis

The data analyzed in the study included content from both primary and secondary sources related to the organization and the reform process. Various perspectives from the interviewees and secondary sources were incorporated into the study to generate a more comprehensive study on the implementation of reforms and resolutions.

1.13 Limitations

The first was the limited amount of information on AU reforms since its inception, especially information on the Adedeji reforms. Another limitation is the fact the Kagame Reforms were recently proposed in January 2017 and since then implementation has been moved from 2019 to 2021. Despite having a few publications, a more informed study on the implementation of the
Kagame Reforms will be relevant once the report is implemented. Thirdly, getting interviewees that were conversant with the reform process in the AU was a challenge.

1.14 Arrangement of Chapters

The study was organized in four chapters:

- Chapter one is the introduction.
- Chapter two presents the roadmap to the Kagame Reforms.
- Chapter three assesses the challenges and prospects in implementing AU Reforms.
- Chapter four presents findings, conclusions and possible recommendations.

ENDNOTES

4 Ibid., p. 51
6 Ibid., pp. 160 – 196.
8 Ibid.
11 Ibid., pp.3 – 4.
12 Ibid., pp.5 – 6.
16 Ibid., p. 762.
17 Ibid., p. 763.
18 Ibid., p. 762
21 Ibid., pp. 781 – 782.
24 Ibid., p. 763
25 Ibid., p. 773
26 Ibid., p. 767
27 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 1021
32 Ibid., pp. 412 - 415
33 Ibid., p. 420
35 Ibid., p. 253
36 Ibid., pp. 253 - 263
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 133.
41 Ibid., p. 27.
42 Ibid., pp. 38 – 39.
44 Ibid., p. 5
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p. 9
48 Ibid., p. 49
49 Ibid., p. 50
51 Ibid., p. 663
52 Ibid., pp. 664 - 665
54 Ibid., p. 28.
55 Ibid., p. 29.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ROADMAP TO THE KAGAME REFORMS

2.0 Introduction
This chapter is intended to give an appreciation of the continent’s integration history from Pan-
Africanism leading to the recent AU reforms proposed by President Kagame. A journey into the
evolution of the AU will assist in contextualizing the reforms by giving an account of the major
events that set the organization on this path, thereby providing an understanding upon which the
reforms and their implementation will be examined in the next chapter.

2.1 Pan-Africanism and African Unity
Pan-Africanism is defined as the consciousness and awareness of oneness that developed
amongst Africans due to the loss of freedom and dignity during the prolonged period of inhuman
treatment of Africans throughout colonial rule.1 The African people identified colonialism, and
any form of subjugation of the African man, as a common enemy and deepened the unity and
oneness of Africans. Thus, pan-Africanism stood for the movement towards self-rule and self-
determination of the African people.2

Slave trade on the African Continent had diverse effects on the African and among them was the
birth of the idea of Pan-Africanism. The pain and scars marked by this experience on the lives of
the people created the awareness and need to create an African Identity among the people. Pan
Africanism originated in the Americas following the American Declaration of Independence as
the reaction of African Slaves to their mistreatment by their Slave masters creating the need for
the gathering of all people of African descent to reclaim the dignity lost during the period of
colonization. Although Pan-Africanism has no single definition, it is important to note that the
“diaspora” first gave birth to the concept of Pan-Africanism. “The definitions are in consonance with the struggle for social and political equality and the freedom from economic exploitation and racial discrimination.”

W.E.B. Du Bois, Henry Sylvester Williams and Marcus Garvey led the search for Pan-Africanism in the diaspora. Their collective ideas on Pan-Africanism led to the organization of the first Pan-African meeting in 1900. They believed in Pan-African Philosophy and put in place the conference as a means to address the needs of Africans in the diaspora, which led to subsequent meetings around the globe. The Pan-African congress held in Manchester, England in October 1945 was a pivotal point in the history of Pan-Africanism that reinforced the spirit of African Unity among the people and merged Pan-Africanism and African Nationalism. It was attended largely by West African Students at the time who had also expressed their concern on holding the conferences in Europe as opposed to moving them to Africa.

In attendance at the conference were emerging African leaders from East, West and Southern Africa, who would later lead the Nationalist struggle within their countries of origin. They included Ghana’s, Kwame Nkrumah, Nigeria’s, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Kenya’s, Jomo Kenyatta among others. As a strong advocate of the African personality, Kwame Nkrumah defined Pan-Africanism to consist of four main stages, which included national independence, national consolidation, transnational unity and community, and economic and social reconstruction. Nkrumah’s quest for the national liberation of the Gold Coast at the time, set precedence for the rest of the continent and established momentum for the movement in Africa. With Nkrumah as the new face and voice of Pan-Africanism on the continent and influenced by Ghandi’s non-violence, the goal to unite Africa was set into motion. Unlike Kenya that used the Mau Mau
rebellion as a violent means to gain its independence, countries like Ghana in West Africa
together with Zambia and Malawi exercised measures that are more peaceful. Ghana experienced
the first breakthrough on the continent when it gained its independence in 1957 and later on
joined other African states in their struggle for independence.

2.2 The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
In light of the promotion of Pan-Africanism and African Unity across the continent, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 1963.
Thirty-one African countries united in their identity to create an organization whose primary
goals were African liberation and integration. The organization was set up primarily due to the
efforts of Kwame Nkrumah, President Sékou Touré of Guinea, President Modibo Keita of Mali
and Haile Selassie, the emperor of Ethiopia, during an era when decolonization and the euphoria
of independence, particularly in West Africa, was predominant.

The OAU emerged to deal with the continental affairs of a newly independent Africa that was
largely breaking free from European colonialism. The organization was established as a
compromise between the objectives of the 3 alliances that had developed out of the Pan-African
movement and as part of the discourse of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The underlying
objective for these three groups was a federation of African States or a United States of Africa.
The Casablanca Group or the radical school led by Kwame Nkrumah and made up of Ghana,
Guinea, the United Arab Republic (Egypt & Syria), the Kingdom of Morocco and the Algerian
Provisional Government. This group advocated for the immediate union of the African continent
to form the United States of Africa. The Brazzaville Group was primarily made up of former
French colonies like Central African Republic, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, People’s Republic of
Congo, Dahomey (Benin), Mauritania, Gabon, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Senegal, Niger,
Chad and Madagascar. This group advocated for a gradualist approach towards African unity that would entail regional economic and then cultural co-operation. The Monrovia group was made up of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Dahomey, Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), Chad, Upper Volta, Niger, and People’s Republic of Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Somalia and Tunisia. Just like the Brazzaville Group, the Monrovia Group wielded a gradualist approach to the prospect of African unity.\(^9\)

In spite of these ideological divisions, African states were united on a number of crucial issues such as the need to end colonial rule on the continent and guiding the relations among newly independent states. Another area of common interest was that the establishment of the organization would essentially drive the movement to attain these goals and provide a veritable platform for African participation in global affairs. Therefore, the aims of the OAU were explicitly spelt out, in Article II of its charter, as promoting unity and solidarity of the African continent, decolonizing Africa, protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, achieving global competence and attaining socio-economic transformation.\(^10\)

The main goal of the OAU was to ensure that Africans became the drivers and owners of their own natural resources, economic and political development. However, events on the international arena, at the time of the OAU’s creation, showed that a pan-African body of this nature would be made to suffer the scourges of an ideologically divided world as the existing US-Soviet Union rivalry had begun with the pan-African movement itself. For this reason, the organization’s institutions, mission, mandate and performance were fundamentally conditioned by the nature and character of the regional and international systems established at the time.\(^11\)
Every nation has the responsibility of meeting the basic needs of its citizens, however, the majority of African states have failed to provide these needs effectively and as such, they continue to exhibit the lowest Human Development Indices and (as a result of) are unable to provide successfully for the needs of its citizens. A regional organization such as the OAU was established to work towards alleviating this predicament thus, several continental initiatives were put in place to accelerate the pace of economic development and integration on the continent.\(^{12}\) The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) (1980) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL), as part of the Monrovia declaration adopted at the 16\(^{th}\) Ordinary Session of the OAU in 1979, serve as some of these initiatives that highlighted the indispensable nature of inter-African economic cooperation for the socio-economic transformation of the continent. The LPA represented the initial effort made by African countries to establish a comprehensive, unified approach to the economic development of the continent, more precisely a path of self-sustenance.\(^{13}\)

It originated from the fact that “Africa’s development could not be merely a passive result of the world system to which the continent had been bound by the historical legacies of slave trade, colonialism and the various neo-colonial associations and agreements such as the Lomé and Yaoundé Conventions with the European Economic Community.” The document represented Africa’s collective response to the World Bank’s Berg Report and blamed the structural dislocations of African economies, through the Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs) of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and their extreme susceptibility to external shocks like 1973 crisis.\(^{14}\) The LPA’s aim was that “Africa should first put its house in order otherwise; it risked remaining marginalized and ‘peripherized’ even in a reconstructed international economy.”\(^{15}\)
The OAU’s achievements included freeing African states from the vestiges of European colonialism, ending apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa, Rhodesia, and South West Africa and the establishment of the African Human Rights Commission (Banjul) aimed at promoting human and people’s rights on the continent. It also helped secure the decolonization of Zimbabwe and Namibia through organized diplomatic efforts, which directed financial, military and logistical assistance to the respective liberation movements. The OAU safeguarded the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, in Congo, where imperialists aimed to set up a puppet state through disintegration and the Federal Republic of Nigeria during the Biafra civil war in 1963. Further, the organization embarked on various actions in favor of the safety of African refugees for example the creation of a refugee status and the right of asylum to be recognized to refugees by all independent African countries.  

In spite of these achievements, through the 1990s, African leaders deliberated the need to amend the OAU’s structures to reflect the challenges of a changing world. The idea behind the OAU’s metamorphosis into the AU was partly driven by the collective agreement of African leaders that the former had outlived its mission, vision and mandate. That is, the establishment of majority rule in South Africa. Many critics believed that the OAU only united on the South African issue and was weak and disunited on other issues like the dispute over Western Sahara - involving Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and France – the attempted invasions of Zaire (the Shaba rebellions), the invasion of Benin and the Ogaden War against Somalia. In addition, the OAU was highly criticized by many in Africa for failing to act against coup plotters and was considered as an “old dictator’s club”. The prevailing circumstances highly contributed to the demise of the OAU and its subsequent replacement by the AU in 2002. On a whole, the organization was deemed as incapable of responding to serious intra-African conflicts or to act as
a pan-African body challenging foreign intervention.\textsuperscript{21} As a result, a 51-member African Union that aimed for closer political integration among African states replaced it in 2002.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{2.3 African Union}

The African Union emerged from the OAU, thirty years after the latter’s inception, and was formally launched in 2002. Throughout the 1990s, African leaders debated the need to amend the OAU’s structures to reflect the challenges of a world constantly in flux in a post-Cold War age.\textsuperscript{23} In March 2001, at an extraordinary session meeting in Sirte, Libya, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU established a new pan-African body. Although the union was the brainchild of the Libyan President, the States of South Africa, Nigeria and Libya were the main advocates for the establishment of the AU. President Ghaddafi modeled his ideas on the European Union, and it serves as the culmination of the OAU’s fragmentary process towards political cooperation and economic integration.\textsuperscript{24} Although Ghaddafi envisaged a United States of Africa (USA), Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo aimed for a more gradual approach that would begin with the consolidation of regional cooperation frameworks, such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), based on the belief that regional integration is a perquisite for continental integration.\textsuperscript{25}

The formation of the AU shifted the emphasis from supporting decolonization to leading Africa’s development and integration.\textsuperscript{26} The AU was conceived to achieve three broad goals. It intended to serve as a platform to bring together the numerous sub-regional institutions in Africa in order to establish continent-wide co-operation and integration among African states. In addition, the aim was to create the right conditions or a ‘Concert of Africa’ to enable African states cooperate on social, economic, political levels as a means of making war among them
unlikely. It was also designed to serve as a platform to help African states participate effectively in international markets and negotiations on trade, finance, debt etc.\textsuperscript{27}

Under the OAU, many initiatives undertaken between 1968 and 1980 affirmed that economic integration of the continent was a prerequisite for the organization to achieve its objectives. For example, in June 1991, through the Abuja Treaty, African leaders confirmed their commitment towards an African Economic Community (AEC) as it provided a framework to Africa’s self-sufficiency. The Constitutive Act of the Union proceeds from this treaty as it mirrors chapter III of the Abuja or AEC Treaty.\textsuperscript{28} Under the Constitutive Act, the Union’s role is to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent, promote peace, security and stability in Africa and additionally, promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels whilst simultaneously promoting the integration of African economies.\textsuperscript{29}

The fourteen objectives of the Union are set out in Article 3 of the CA and border along the lines of “greater unity and solidarity between African countries, the promotion of democratic principles and good governance, protection of human rights, coordination and harmonization between regional economic communities, which have been established or will be established in the African continent”.\textsuperscript{30} Magliveras and Naldi assert that the objectives of the organization reveal the realization by African states that the achievement of goals like better living standards, good health, developing research in science and technology among others is only possible through concerted efforts among states rather than on an individual basis. Thus, the AU’s reference to ideals like democracy, good governance, protection of human rights and popular participation are major improvements on the OAU Charter, which failed to address these matters.\textsuperscript{31}
Article 4 of the CA defines the principles of the Union. It reiterates the principles of domestic sovereignty and nonintervention, as it demands the defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member states. It also reaffirms the principle of noninterference by any member state in the internal affairs of another state. It does not express in any form intervention by the Union itself in the event of internal conflict, as a body concerned with peace, security, and stability on the continent. Rather Article 4(h) provides for the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” Some critics raise the high risk of inaction because intervention is only possible when the Union’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government make a decision.32

The organs and institutions of the AU are stated in the CA and their mandates are prescribed in Articles 5 through to 22. The Assembly of the Union, which is the supreme organ of the organization, is composed of Heads of State (HOS) and government or their duly elected representatives. The Executive Council (EC) is made up of ministers or authorities designated by member states and is responsible to the Assembly. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is the organ that ensures the full participation of African peoples in governance, development and economic integration of the continent.33 The Court of Justice has jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the Protocol that established the court.34

The Commission is comprised of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners, and staff members and acts as the secretariat to the organization. The Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) is comprised of members accredited to the Union and has the
obligation of preparing the work of the EC. The Specialized Technical Committees (STCs) are expected to address sectoral issues in the areas of rural economy, agriculture, monetary and financial affairs, trade, industry, science and technology, transport, health, education among other areas. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) is an advisory organ comprised of different social and professional groups of the member states of the Union. The financial institutions comprise of the African Central Bank (ACB), the African Monetary Fund (AMF) and the African Investment Bank (AIB).35

The creation of the AU has been described by Afro-optimists as indeed being ‘new wine in new bottles’. Nancy Soderberg states that through the creation of the AU “Africans are beginning to take responsibility for the continent’s many conflicts and with the right international assistance, the effort can tip the balance from war to peace”. Additionally, the creation of the AU itself shows Africa’s ability to rise up to face a plethora of 21st century challenges.36 On the other hand, Afro-pessimists are of the view that the AU has not been able to meet its goal because the continent continues to remain at the periphery of global activities like global production and trade. There exist constraints such as the high costs of doing business on the continent. This is not to say that there has not been progress as the continent has witnessed strides in the trade, communications, macroeconomic, policy and transport sectors. In addition, some regional economic communities have made progress in the areas of trade liberalization (West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA)), free movements of people (ECOWAS), infrastructure (SADC and East African Community (EAC)) and in peace and security (ECOWAS, SADC, EAC).37
2.4 Reforms

2.4.1 The Grand Debate on a Union Government of Africa
A Union Government for Africa was first envisioned by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana as the political and economic engine for driving the African Union towards the attainment of a United States of Africa.\(^3^8\) In September 1999, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi revived this dream during OAU Extra-Ordinary Summit in Sirte Libya by calling on African States to pursue and actualize the dream of uniting African states to confront its development challenges. This led to establishment of the AU in 2002, however, the modalities on how the AU was going to implement and achieve a union government was never agreed upon. At the 4\(^{th}\) Ordinary session of the Union held in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005, African leaders were once again confronted with the need to intensify their efforts towards establishing the Union Government. Ghaddafi’s proposal resurfaced and was brought to the table leading to discussions centered around ministerial portfolios in the areas of transport, communication, defense and foreign affairs.\(^3^9\)

A committee chaired by the President of Uganda in collaboration with various stakeholders held a conference themed “Desirability of a Union Government in Africa” which came out with a document stating the purpose, nature, scope, core values for the Union Government and the steps to be taken towards its achievement. The team working together with AUC comprised members from Botswana, Chad, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal and Tunisia. The conference came up with four main conclusions: the clear need for a Union Government, the Union as a representation of all the peoples of Africa and not merely Heads of states or states, REC’s as building blocks for the continental framework of the Union Government and that the process of integration would take
on a gradual approach. All this was agreed upon in line with the AU’s goal of attaining Africa’s political and economic goals.\textsuperscript{40}

Another committee of seven led by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria was tasked with refining the detailed processes required to realize the objectives of the Union Government while establishing the mechanism for making the AUC more effective. The detailed report “A study on an African Union Government: Towards the United States of Africa” was submitted to the 7\textsuperscript{th} Ordinary Session of the AU in Banjul, Gambia in July 2006 highlighting Africa’s challenges and potentials.\textsuperscript{41} Among the challenges included Africa’s reliance on external funding, mainly in the areas of technology, and skilled human capital, which undermined the continent’s potential in the face of globalization. This report highlighted areas such as continental integration, science and technology, environment and governance among others. This marked a degree of progress in establishing the Union Government however; the question of how to approach these areas remained unanswered.

The 8\textsuperscript{th} ordinary session of the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia revived the conversation of the United States of Africa as being led by a Union Government. During the summit, a decision was reached to host the 9\textsuperscript{th} Ordinary session in Accra, Ghana to commemorate the historical position it occupies as the first Country to attain its independence on the continent.\textsuperscript{42} This decision was upheld in celebration of Ghana’s 50 years of independence and as a tribute to Kwame Nkrumah as one of the founders of African Unity and his contribution to the liberation of African states. This came to be known as the “Accra Grand Debate” which delivered the” Accra Declaration”. The Accra Declaration echoed the need for a Union Government and recommended the following steps: rationalizing, strengthening and harmonizing REC’s, undertaking the audit of
the African Union and its organs, establish a ministerial committee to deliberate on the modus operandi of the Union Government.43

This debate like previous conversations on the Union Government gave rise to two factions, those favoring immediate unification and those opting for a gradual approach. Gaddafi once again led the maximalists who were of the view that ministries should be established in the main sectors such as foreign affairs, defense, transport and communication. This was supported by Senegal, Mali, Central African Republic, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea Bissau. On the other hand, the gradualists included Nigeria, South Africa, the Gambia, Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mauritius.44 They proposed a moderate process based on the harmonization of policies at national, regional and finally at a continental level. The debate did not conclude with a common position since the Gaddafi led group was in opposition to the first draft and subsequent report.

2.4.2 Adedeji Reforms
At the request of the Assembly of the African Union in line with the Accra Declaration of 2007, the Chairperson of the African Union who was also President of the Republic of Ghana, H. E John Agyekum Kufuor, appointed a high-level Panel led by Professor Adebayo Adedeji of Nigeria. The team comprised fourteen highly qualified members across the continent who were tasked with the responsibility of auditing the AU on and its organs for the very first time.45 With a six-month time frame, the team went to work and presented its report to President Kufuor on 28 December 2007 in preparation for the next summit in Addis Ababa.

The audit was carried out with the following general objectives:
i. A review and evaluation of continents economic and political integration agenda by the AUC, other AU Organs and REC’s.

ii. Reviewing the operations of the organs and Institutions of the AU as at 2007 to identify weaknesses and strengths in line with the goal of integration.

iii. Reviewing structures and processes to promote efficiency and coherence among the organs.

iv. Reviewing the nature of the relation between the AU institutions and Organs with other continental Organizations in line with the integration process.

v. Review global trends and their effect on the Africa integration process.

vi. Make concrete recommendations on policy, strategic orientations, institutions and structures, programmes, roadmaps and possible scenarios to accelerate the integration process.

The panel analyzed information from various decisions, declarations and resolutions of the Union and conducted interviews with officials from the AU, REC’s and other relevant institutions. The report was presented in three main segments: a brief on Africa’s integration process, an assessment of the AU organs including their mandates and relationship with REC’s, benchmarks from the recommendations for accelerating the process. In its assessment of the Assembly, the panel recommended that the leadership role it plays in the integration process is of utmost importance as opposed to items that have no relation to the process. The panel further recommended that a review of the implementation of past decisions be done prior to the next ordinary session.
A review of the EC revealed that in order to maximize its potential, members of the council would have to be re-designated to fit the issues concerning the integration process. They further advised that this arrangement would enhance the performance of the Ministers and make STCs irrelevant. In the area of Peace and Security, the panel recognized the contributions of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) despite the funding and logistical challenges and recommended that enhancing all the components of the AU Peace and Security Architecture (PSA) would fast track the integration process. Appreciating the fact that this would require more financial muscle, member states recommended self-financing since the peace and security budget relied heavily on external donors.

Auditing the PRC revealed that there was a disconnect in its oversight and advisory functions which required realignment in order to facilitate better performance with the AUC, Council of Ministers and member states. This lack of clarity had spilled over to create deeply entrenched tensions mainly between the AUC and the PRC along the scope of their mandates and how they interact with each other. The panel recommended that confidence-building measures should be put in place to enhance trust among the bodies. The panel further noted that the AUC also lacked clarity in the structure of its leadership highlighting the dysfunctional relationship between the AUC Chairperson and the commissioners. In this regard, the panel recommended that the Chairperson of the AUC should exert his or her jurisdiction as the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer and that the modalities of electing commissioners should be adjusted to enhance their working relationship.

Furthermore, the systemic lack of professionalism within the organization had led to management challenges within the organization in the form of poor supervision, which in turn
affected various reporting lines. Staff recruitment, performance, development and retention were other areas of concern where the panel advised on the establishment of an African Union Services Commission as opposed to hiring consultants to manage the recruitment process. Attention was also given to gender parity issues in the context of increasing the percentage of women working within staff which stood at 25% at the time.

The audit revealed that the Union had spread itself too thin to be effective in executing its roles by attempting to implement multiple decisions at a go, thereby revealing a lack of clear direction in the integration process. The panel recognized that the implementation challenges were at, not only the continental level, but spread across to regional communities up until the national levels. This brought to light the lack of policy harmonization among the different bodies responsible for the continents growth agenda. These findings led to the recommendation of setting up National Commissions for AU Affairs in Member states to facilitate the implementation process. In reforming the REC’s, the panel recognized that the REC’s needed to be streamlined to counter overlapping memberships in order to facilitate co-operation among them.

To accelerate the integration process, emphasis was made on intentionally infusing the Pan African culture as the ideology behind the organization and its efforts with a deliberate drive of spreading it among the youth on the continent. It was further recommended that the translation of official documents and the installation of a modern conference facility would enhance communication within the Union. The panel recommended that the Assembly strengthens and guides the institutions and organs of the Union on how the mandates were to be carried out. This particularly applied to the PAP, which needed to improve its performance in providing an interface between the union and the parliaments of member states. Similarly, the panel
recommended that ECOSOCC exercises its mandate of giving a voice to eligible Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and encouraging members states to financially support their activities. \(^5\)

Regarding the judicial organs, it was recommended that the Assembly through the EC render support of its jurisdiction as African Courts by ratifying protocols. \(^6\) The panel also encouraged that the AU, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and African Development Bank (AfDB) strengthen their ties at both trilateral and multilateral levels as a means of promoting continental integration. At a trilateral level, a joint secretariat was established to coordinate this process but dropped the ball when it came aligning REC’s. The panel recommended that the joint policies should be put in place to make the efforts covered by each organization more productive as they work towards integration. The panel also recommended that the organization increase their individual level of resource mobilization while gathering support from member countries.

The financing reform was another key area audited by the panel and it was noted that the Union was financed by member states contributions, voluntary contributions and external partners who donated the lions share. As a result, the AU was unable to execute several projects because funding was highly unpredictable and trickled in during the course of the year. The panel discovered budget management and procurement procedures were also lengthy which affected implementation of projects. Unnecessary spending was noticed in the over estimation of costs aligned together with over ambitious activity. This particularly came to light in the case of travel expenditures where the actual expenditure was less than the cost of travel. The panel recommended that the right checks and balances should be put in place to control spending and
encouraged the Union to seek alternative sources of funding with specific mention of the 0.5% levy on taxable imports as well as airline tickets within the continent.\textsuperscript{57}

To address the implementation challenge, the panel recommended that the African leaders take their place in facilitating the integration process.\textsuperscript{58} An immediate call for reform of the AU’s organs and institutions was raised in a summary of 21 recommendations that required immediate decision-making by the Assembly. While the panel recommended the development of national, regional and continental roadmaps by relevant actors to speed up the integration process they also highlighted the need for accelerators. Among these were the free movement of people across boarders as spelt out in the Abuja treaty as well as the CA, the development of transcontinental and inter-regional infrastructures, multinational African firms and the establishment of continental financial institutions as identified in Article 19b of the CA.\textsuperscript{59}

To measure the progress of the continent towards integration, the panel identified critical areas that would serve as benchmarks in this process with the help of best politicians and technocrats on the continent. Among them included:

i. Reforming the AU to create an efficient and effective organization.

ii. Popularization and internalization of Pan African Ideology as underpinned in the CA.

iii. Transforming the AU into a Union of the people by creating a sense of ownership among the people through deeper levels of engagement.

iv. Free movement of the peoples of Africa by completely removing all restrictions and the introduction of the Union Passport.
v. Rationalizing of REC’s as addressed in the Banjul Summit of 2006 in order to focus energies on priority areas.

vi. Establishment of a common market and an AEC as underpinned in LPA and FAL, 1980.

vii. Establishment of Continental Financial and Monetary Institutions which are: AIB, AMF and the ACB.

viii. Mobilizing African entrepreneurial elite in advancing national, regional and continental projects towards integration.\(^6^0\)

Lastly, an independent monitoring mechanism was to be established to assess the progress of the reform every two years and report on them.

The report came up with a total of 172 recommendations that were presented to the AU Chairperson in Accra, Ghana in December 2007 and later at the 10th Summit in January 2008 held in Addis Ababa.\(^6^1\) The Assembly could not reach a consensus on the reforms and pushed the item to the May 2008, extraordinary session of the Executive Council held in Arusha. The reforms were however contested by the AUC Chairpersons at the time, that is Alpha Omar Konare of Mali and Jean Ping of Gabon on grounds of lack of involvement of the AUC and other institutions on information availed by external sources. Another attempt was made in July 2008 on the implementation of administrative reforms that had no financial implication however this never came to pass until the reform conversation finally disappeared from the agenda in the January 2009 summit.\(^6^2\)
2.4.3 Kagame Reforms
It was not until 10 years later that the conversation of reforming the AU was revisited under the leadership of Dr. Dlamini Zuma who at the time was the incumbent AUC Chairperson. This conversation closely followed Agenda 2063 “The Africa We Want” in January 2016 which set out Africa’s agenda for the next 50 years.\textsuperscript{63} It was then realized that the AU and its organs had to be suitable for the task of achieving this vision and on 16th July 2016 during the Retreat of HOS Ministers of Foreign Affairs together with Ministers of Finance, a decision was made to entrust H.E Paul Kagame with the institutional reforms of the AU. Together with a High-Level Panel of nine, President Paul set out to compile a 16-page report that is now known as the “Kagame Report.” The report considered the Adedeji report and contributions from the HOS and Dr. Dlamini in coming up with the new reforms.\textsuperscript{64}

The panel’s assessment noted that the Union was divided along many levels starting from the member states to the AUC to the REC’s and other regional mechanisms. This division was exacerbated by the AU’s lack of focus on the especially in the area of prioritizing the most pressing needs of the continent. This coupled with inefficient working methods and the AU’s over dependence on external funding meant that the Union was unable to follow through on the decisions that had been made.\textsuperscript{65} With a consistent level of underperformance and lack of accountability the AU’s relevance to member states, citizens and external partners had waned over time. It was then decided that the making the AU more efficient and effective would entail focusing on key priority areas with continental scope, realign AU institutions to deliver against those priorities, efficiently manage the AU politically and operationally and self-financing the AU sustainably.\textsuperscript{66}
In a bid to address the lack of focus within the AU, the panel recommended that the Union should focus on areas such as political affairs, peace and security, economic integration and Africa’s global representation and voice. They further recommended that the mandates of the AU, REC’s and other Institutions related to the Union are streamlined with the principle of subsidiarity. The structure of the Union comprises 8 Commission Directorates, 31 Departments and offices, 11 AU Organs, 31 Specialized Technical Agencies (STAs) and at least 20 high level committees.\(^{67}\) It was noted that the assimilation of NEPAD into the AUC had not been completed and as such both organs are still performing parallel activities, the panel recommended that NEPAD should be fully integrated with a monitoring framework. The panel recommended that the APRM which was set up as a self-assessment tool for good governance needs to be strengthened track its implementation.\(^{68}\)

The panel recognized that the protocol adopted in 2008, where the Assembly agreed to merge the judicial bodies in the Union that is the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the Court of Justice of the African Union into the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was never ratified. The panel recommended that the organs should be reviewed to chat a new way forward. It was also noted that the PSC was not meeting its goals as envisioned in the PSC Protocol however, the report does not render further explanations on the same.\(^{69}\) Additionally, despite its success, the PSC continues to experience challenges in the area of decision making. The mandate of the PRC requires it to facilitate communication between the AU and member states while acting as an advisory body to the EC. However, it was noted that the PRC had substituted this mandate with the role of supervising the AUC’s daily activities.\(^{70}\)
The panel recommended that the number of STA’s be reviewed to ensure that they are aligned to the AU’s priority areas. Additional recommendations were made about establishing youth and women quotas, an African Volunteer Corps, availing the African Passport to all eligible citizens and establishing common continental platforms that will enhance this process. To achieve these reforms, the panel recognized that the management reform was key in the process and suggested a lean agenda of not more than three strategic items, moderation in the summits that take place per year, a troika arrangement among chairpersons to ensure continuity and strengthening the current sanctions mechanism. Operationally, recruitment and staffing required modification including that of the Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners.

Another critical reform was in the area of financing the AU considering that external partners fund 97% of the AU’s programmes budget while less than half of the member states had updated their 2016 contributions. With donor fatigue on the rise, a union that depends heavily on donor funding is likely to be affected and should therefore seek to manage its own affairs. In view of this, the panel recommended that the Kigali Financing Decision be implemented to move the Union from a place of dependency to self-sustainability. A committee of Ministers of finance was established under the Kigali Financing Decision to facilitate this process where member states finance 100% of the operating budget, 75% of the programme budget and 25% of peace support operations budget.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a detailed account of major events leading to the Kagame Reforms. The study demonstrated that the journey towards African integration traces its roots back to Pan-Africanism, which influenced the establishment of the OAU and later birthed the AU. The study illustrated that whereas the AU was established to advance the political and economic development of the continent, the dream is yet to be realized and as such has led to the reform efforts within the organization. The study revealed that despite efforts to reform the organization, several decisions remain unimplemented thereby keeping the AU and its institutions inadequate to fulfil its intended mission. Thus, Chapter three assesses the AU reforms in order to substantiate the challenges and prospects in implementing them.
END NOTES


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid.


16 Ibid. p.10.


30 Magliveras K.D., and Naldi G.J., op cit. p. 416
31 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
47 Ennin, E. op. cit.
48 Adedeji, A. op. cit., pp. 35-36.
49 Ibid., pp. 107-108
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Adedeji, A. op. cit pp 50-56.
54 Ibid., pp. 193.
56 Adedeji, A. op. cit pp 82-87.
57 Ibid., pp 156
58 Ennin, E. op. cit.
60 Adedeji, A. op. cit pp. 189-196.
65 Ibid. pp. 4
67 Kagame, op. cit. p 7.
68 Ibid. p. 8.
70 Kagame, P. op. cit. p. 10.
71 Ibid. p. 11
72 Ibid. pp. 14-15
73 Ibid.
CHAPTER THREE
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN IMPLEMENTING AFRICAN UNION REFORMS

3.0 Introduction
The previous chapter gives an appreciation of continent’s journey towards the attainment of African Unity from Pan-Africanism to the recent Kagame Reforms. African Unity was originally the desire of the founding fathers of the OAU/AU to not only liberate the continent but also foster it is social, economic and political development. The AU as an organization has failed to implement over 1,500 decisions that would enable it to achieve this vision.

The discussion in this chapter reflects on the factors that account for the reform by analyzing the prevailing circumstances at the time that each reform package was tabled. An assessment is made on the challenges and prospects of implementing AU Reforms to date with the aim of gaining a better understanding of the underlying problems. This discussion is imperative as it pertains to the ongoing discourse within the AU on how to sustainably overcome these challenges to create a more effective and efficient AU.

3.1 Accounting for the Call for Reforms in the AU

3.1.1 The First Call for Reform – African Union Authority
The AU was launched in 2002 as a compromise document of 54 Member states of Africa to revamp its predecessor the OAU. The Rational Design Theory argues that states find it cheaper to reform existing organization to creating new ones therefore African states set out to reform the AU shortly after it had been created. Given that the number of countries involved stood at 54
states at the time, it is safe to say that not every member’s interest was accommodated. When international organizations are created, the understanding is that every party is considered and accommodated, however, core parties tend to determine the institutional outcome. According to Tieku, right after the AU was created, the first attempt to reform the AU was made because both parties were not happy with the results of the compromise. He points out that Gaddafi in particular as the frontrunner of the Union government proposal was not happy that the AU had not been given a central governing body status like the United States of Africa or the fact that it was not given a central military command where Africa would have only military command.¹ However, there were others who were displeased about the fact that the AUC as an institution itself was not well designed therefore there was an attempt to come out with a new institutional design.

3.1.2 The Second Call for Reform – Adedeji
These processes led to the Grand debate that was held in Accra in 2007. To appreciate this process, one must recognize that there were two principal camps when the AU was created with different objectives. One desired a continental union government and the other group did not want a continental union government rather an administrative body that would help African states manage their mutual affairs. The first wave of reforms was led by the continental unionists and the second wave was led by individuals who did not want to create a United States of Africa but wanted to maintain a part of the status quo. This group was not creating a United States of Africa but an organization that would help to manage African states and their mutual affairs administratively.²
Ambassador David Etuket, who served as Uganda’s High Commissioner to Nigeria from 2005 to 2008, attended the Grand Debate where several countries spoke out against the creation of a Union government. The Ambassador cites the example of the Ugandan President Museveni who was vocal and spoke against the creation of an African Military command by arguing that, the immediate focus for African states was their regional identities and followed that by suggesting that the best approach was that various regional bodies in Africa should be mandated with the responsibility to develop themselves as separate entities.³

According to the Ambassador, the President further raised the fact that, as an East African, he was different from a West African, thus the creation of a United States of Africa at the time would not accommodate these regional differences. People like Museveni, Kagame and others who were not in support of a United States of Africa but rather wanted the AU to function properly, lead the second process. The offshoot of this was an extra-ordinary summit in 2007, which in turn led to the idea of creation of an AU Commission instead of the AU Authority as the first set of reforms.⁴ Its focus would go beyond military force or a central command but deal with the inefficiencies that had been identified in the Union. This process led to the reforms known as the Adedeji Report.

3.1.3 The Third Call for Reform - Kagame
The latest and most recent call for reform is the Kagame Reforms which are a continuation of the Administrative process for the camp that wanted to strengthen the Administrative Mechanism of the AU in helping African states address their mutual challenges. It’s important to note that the first process that led to the creation of the AU Authority was not implemented, however, the
second process, that is the Adedeji Reforms is the one that is continuing under the Kagame Reforms. Following the rational design argument that members states learn from past experiences and choose to do better, the Kagame Reforms came as a continuation of the Adedeji Reforms. This explains the categorization of reforms that have existed within the AU.

According to Tieku, the Adedeji Report was an attempt made by the AU in order to reflect what they thought the organization ought to look like. After the Adedeji’s report, an election was held, and Jean Ping from Gabon became the AUC Chairperson. The underlying intention was that he would implement these reforms, however, he failed to deliver on this task which led to his subsequent defeat in the next elections. Thus, the key reason why he was not re-elected can be attributed to the fact that he was not able to implement the Adedeji reforms. Following the election, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was ushered in as the new AUC Chairperson following a successful campaign by South Africa and defeating Kenya’s Amina Mohamed.

Despite several efforts, Madam Dlamini-Zuma was unable to implement the reform because her attempts to do so were met with a lot of pushback. Tieku gives an example of her proposal to merge the Political Affairs department and the Peace and Security department and move the director of Peace and Security, at the time, to head that newly merged unit. However, there was a blowback from the government of Mauritania, as the then head of Political affairs was Mauritanian. This move was supported by one of her Commissioners from Algeria who threatened to leave if her proposal was implemented. In essence, this situation among others raised a lot of contention so much so that it affected the implementation of the reforms.

During Dr. Dlamini’s tenure, Agenda 2063 was developed as Africa’s strategic framework for the continent’s development over the next 50 years. The Agenda gives priority to areas such as
youth and women, democracy, governance, infrastructure, manufacturing and agriculture while building on previous continental initiatives.\(^7\) According to Mr. Atuobi, this vision could not be implemented with the current institutional set up but rather a stronger organization was needed hence the push for the reform of the AU. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma wanted and needed strong political cover to accomplish this exercise and thus pushed for a new kind of a framework that would enable her to push for the reform of the institution.\(^8\) For this reason, Kagame was appointed by Heads of State in 2016 to lead that process.

### 3.2 The Challenges of Implementing African Union Reforms

While the African Union is quick to make declarations on African Integration, implementation remains a major challenge. This only goes to show that hopes and declarations can only go so far if they are not implemented. The rational design theory as the tool of analysis will be used to identify institutional weaknesses in the area of reform implementation. The theory identifies four broad problems: enforcement, distribution, uncertainty and number of actors.\(^9\) The decision to use all four is based on the gravity of the problem being analyzed of which they all apply to the AU as discussed below.

#### 3.2.1 Enforcement Challenges

The Rational Design Theory argues that member states will not enforce an agreement since incentives to defect are far greater thereby sacrificing long-term cooperation for unilateral cooperation.\(^{10}\) This case applies to the AU where there lacks a central body to punish any states that do not enforce an agreement, in that the Assembly plays both the role of the players and referee.
Under enforcement challenges is the fact that the Adedeji Reforms did not have political ownership from the HOS. Though the panel had been appointed by the AU Assembly to carry out the audit, the final report was created and submitted by an independent panel. Upon submission, none of the African leaders took ownership of it, neither did they push for it. As a result, the AUC Chairperson who did not have the political backing could not implement because he needed the support of a Head of State to champion this cause or advocate for it within the HOS level. Mr. Atuobi stated that from 1963, only 20% of the AU decisions have been implemented and as a result, the bulk remains unimplemented to date. He added that reforms and their political ownership go hand in hand in the sense that ownership at the HOS level creates a linkage between what happens at a continental level to the citizens of member states creating ownership at all levels.\textsuperscript{11} This failure of HOS in adopting the reform package led to their lack of implementation.

Amb. Etuket noted that at the time, anything that threatened the political power of HOS within the African Union would not live to see another day. The reforms were seen as a threat to the AU Assembly, which is the final decision-making body of the institution; therefore, any attempt to withdraw powers from the HOS was not welcome. Furthermore, Prof. Adedeji, who was a Nigerian Technocrat, could not further the implementation of reforms without political backing first from his home country and from within the Assembly.\textsuperscript{12} Another stumbling block for Adedeji could have been attributed to the fact that Nigerian political elites hold very little regard for the cause of Pan-Africanism or the African Union and in a general sense consider Nigeria as a continental superpower that is able to progress without the help of the Union.
Tieku explained that on a few occasions, Adedeji raised several issues on the reforms while trying to push for them for which he received blowback partly because the governments along the way had lost interest in Adedeji’s reports. During the same period, many African governments had experienced many changes which came with a new breed of leaders that had no recollection of the reform agenda and typical of Africa, the subsequent discussions moved further away from the reforms. According to him, this accounted for the loss of momentum with the Adedeji reforms.

Another argument under enforcement challenges within the Rational design theory is that when institutions are designed, there is no organ set up to implement the reform which contributes to why the Adedeji Reforms were not implemented. What this implies is that there was no agency instituted to ensure compliance with the reform mechanisms at the time. The AU is an organization that has been known for being highly bureaucratic and as such without an institution to enforce the reforms their implementation was doomed to fail from the start.

Moreover, within the AUC, the respective AUC Chairpersons at the time, Alpha Omar Konare and his successor Jean Ping, felt that the AUC and other relevant organizations had not been consulted. This contributed to the dismissal of the report by the chairpersons and at the same time the bodies that would have been tasked with the responsibility of implementation and as such ownership was absent right from the top. It was also noted that the reforms also lacked a clear time frame and implementation plans though this responsibility had been delegated to the respective bodies within the Union by the panel. Without these plans, the member states were unable to ascertain the benefits they would derive from the reforms. Whereas momentum had
gathered to accelerate the integration process by creating an efficient and effective Union with the Adedeji Reforms, this momentum was lost in less than a three-year period.

In Amb. Etuket’s view, the enforcement challenge of institutional capacity does not only lie at the level of the AUC but trickles down to the regional bodies and member states. He explained that in general terms, policies initiated at the continental level, are meant to be decentralized to the REC’s and further domesticated at national levels where national institutions are entrusted with implementation. However, that is not always the case when it comes to implementing these decisions. He further raised that this lack of cohesion in terms of policy harmonization among these institutions hampers the implementation of policies.\textsuperscript{16} He concluded by saying that the Adedeji reforms never even made it to the AUC therefore, the responsible bodies could not implement an unproved policy.

Another challenge was that the Adedeji reform was very ambitious and without an owner or political champion, it was going to be very difficult to get it implemented. Tieku expounded on this by stating that the reform was too elaborate and to some extent very ambitious because implementing Adedeji’s report would have meant for a reform of the working method of the AU, a review of the rules of procedures of the organs of the AU and a review of the legal instrument governing the African Union.\textsuperscript{17} For example, in the Adedeji report there was a clear idea that the Chairperson should be given the authority to appoint the commissioners and to appoint the deputies but at the HOS level, every report points that the Chairperson was not going to have that particular authority to appoint the deputy or dismiss or hire and fire the deputy as well as the commissioners.
Another example of an ambitious aspect of the Adedeji report was to ask the PRC to refrain from acting as the supervisor of the AUC. Ideally, preventing the PRC from interfering with the AUC would have strengthened the independence of the AUC from the grip of Foreign Ministers but it being a very radical reform, the PRC would have eliminated it before submitting it to the EC. Removing that controlling mechanism would essentially mean that the AUC would be entirely accountable to member states and to an extent would not be in a position to take certain actions independently. Indeed, if that responsibility was removed from the foreign ministers, they would then not be able to dictate to the AUC. The HOS would then only agree to the AUC’s proposals but the ambassadors are able to prevent any ambitious ideas from coming to the HOS or the Foreign ministers.

Another enforcement challenge is the lack of finances and according to Atuobi, the AU budget is heavily funded by external partners who contribute approximately 97% of the Union budget and the rest is covered by member states’ contributions. The remaining 3% raised by African States is inadequate to support programs that are of value to the continent. This condition creates a scenario where the AU cannot dictate its agenda on what programs it implements. Donor funded programmes, which are dictated by the partners interests are implemented over AU programmes. It then does not make sense for a continental body to be heavily dependent on external partners especially in a season where donor funding is on a decline but also, such a system that cannot be sustained and is therefore not in the interest of African states.

Amb. Etuket identified that there was a procedural challenge with the submission of the Adedeji report and was of the view that the decision-making process at the Union was not thorough in the sense that the Report did not go through the necessary or required process for its approval. This
assumption of a top down approach was not going to work without any buy-in from other organs within the organization. According to the organizations procedures, the report should have been submitted to the PRC which is made up of the Ambassadors from member states, they would then send their final decision to the EC, who would submit the reforms to the Assembly for approval. Tieku also believes following this process would have gathered enough support for the reforms in the sense that some of the ambassadors could have endorsed them. However, this was not done therefore procedurally it was difficult to get the report implemented.

Amb. Etuket further stated that policies are broad statements of intent that need to be thoroughly examined to ensure that they are implementable. He asserts that the reform lacked the requisite technical support from the AU organs and African states to ensure that the policy would cut across the stakeholders to ensure implementation takes place. The Ambassador gave the example of Gaddafi’s concept on a Union Government for Africa which was a good policy paper was not implementable in the context of African states at the time. Tieku further intimated that this non-implementation problem is reflective of the broader pattern within the AU itself, where wonderful decisions and policies are made but they often turn out not to be implemented at the state level by member states. He likened this experience to the fact that African leaders treat the OAU or the AU the same way Africa treats childbearing where many children are born without a care plan. Likewise, the AU makes decision without consulting relevant technocrats to figure out the best implementation plan.

3.2.2 Distribution Challenges
Distribution challenges according to the rational design theory are as a result of states looking for the best bargain among many alternatives. In a situation where actors’ interests are mutually achieved within an agreement there exists no distribution problem, however, challenges exist
where there are multiple alternatives and the benefits derived from an agreement are better for one member over others. In International Organizations (IOs), member states tend to contribute for self-interest, however countries with stronger economic capability tend to carry the biggest financial burden. This burden is not in equal proportion with the benefits accrued by these member states and as such, distribution problems occur.

This situation is typical of the AU where the bulk of the burden was and is shared among a five African States which included: South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria and Libya which was recently replaced by Morocco. Morocco recently joined this group upon its readmission to the Union and Libya dropped out following the revolution. This group of five contributes approximately 60% of the total AU dues collectively. Unlike the UN where the biggest contributors are given preferential treatment in the PSC among other benefits, the AU considers all member states as equals. The only benefit is a higher quota in terms of staffing presence within the organization for example the AU employs more South Africans than Uganda, which exists, in the 2 second tier. Tieku alluded to the fact that this being the only benefit acts as a deterrence to implementing reforms and as such, countries that belong to the first tier have previously felt that the AU is punishing them, though this has not been expressed outrightly.  

3.2.3 Uncertainty Challenges
The Rational design theory describes uncertainty as the degree to which actors do not have complete information about each other’s behavior, preferences and the state of the world, which tends to lead to a certain level of mistrust among states. This uncertainty among members of International institutions tends to lead member states into a position where they have varied
choices and preferences to mitigate potential disappointments which in turn presents different implications and consequences.

Uncertainty in the rational design theory takes on two dimensions that is actions of other states and the state of the world, however, in the case of the AU reform; focus will be on uncertainty of actions of other states. This can be likened to a prisoner’s dilemma, where on one hand, if all the countries implement the reforms then all African states benefit however, in the case that some countries do not implement, they become free riders because some states are not certain that others will implement it makes others they choose to sit on the fence.

For those that implement the reforms, the burden then becomes heavier because of the cost of inaction from other states. In that case, states tend to hold back information that would leave them vulnerable if the situation does not develop according to plan. Tieku argues that this behavior is typical of member states when it comes to financing the Union.\textsuperscript{25} As earlier mentioned, regional powers are still skeptical of the commitment of smaller economies since most of these countries have failed to meet their membership obligations both financially and otherwise. By this, other states would then be tempted to defect from payment since they still enjoy the benefits anyway. According to the prisoner’s dilemma, it is always attractive for countries to defect and not respect and fulfil their obligations. However, in the AU, the sanction regime is meant to address situations where if one does not remit, they are punished and when it is not applied, countries that comply they end up being the fools in the arrangement or agreement. The biggest challenge of the AU then is how to encourage and ensure that states engage fully in the reform process.
Uncertainty is also expressed as the fear of the unknown and in the case of the reforms, states are free to act independently in the international system when it comes to the implementation of policies in the pursuit of their national interest. African states have been known to guard their sovereignty jealously by failing to accede it in the form of ratifying and domesticating policies that have been agreed upon at a continental level. Gebe points out that organizational processes like AU institutional reforms, that are international nature require a considerable amount of decision-making by the AUC, a high level of technocratic input and a space for legal interpretation. For the reform process to be effective, member states need to grant the continental framework the necessary liberty and powers to act on their behalf in the implementation process. He points to the example of the European Union (EU) where various supranational entities have been entrusted with the mandates that override those of member states.\textsuperscript{26}

Amb. Etuket agrees with the fact that African states are not willing to cede their sovereignty. He further states that due to the fear of the unknown, states jeopardize policies by not adopting them or harmonizing them with their national policies which affects policy implementation. He argues that within the international system, states are generally suspicious of what other states intentions are however, for the Union to move forward in the integration process, careful consideration needs to be given to ensuring that reform policies are implemented.\textsuperscript{27} This can be translated into the fact that African states will have to sacrifice certain areas of their national interest to cater to the long term goals of implementing the reforms.

\textbf{3.2.4 Number of Actors Challenges}

According to the rational design theory, number of actors implies the actors that are pertinent to the combined well-being of members because the action of one affects other members within the
same agreement. Numbers may be determined by the number of actors within an institutional arrangement, relative importance to the issue at hand and power asymmetries among actors.\textsuperscript{28}

The African continent has 55-member states of which all are independent and sovereign states with equal representation in the AU. In the context of the AU, Tieku argues that the numbers argument takes on a more complex dimension where the reform must be accommodated by all 54+1 African States. Diversity is an important factor that should be taken into consideration when it comes to implementing reforms since it can be a source of contention among states. There are cases of different governance regimes, different leaders, different histories, diverse cultures, different ways of approaching problems and different languages. African states have their own interests and links with other organizations and some of these have masters who do not have the same interests as other countries.\textsuperscript{29} An example is the Francophone countries; whose master is still France, in that case France’s interest are taken into consideration. When it comes to national interest, France’s interests are different from the American interests and different from the African interests.\textsuperscript{30} Accommodating the interests of a vastly diverse continent then creates a challenge not only in coming up with the reforms but also implementing them in various contexts.

Another angle to the number of actors’ challenge is power asymmetries. Power asymmetries contribute to the challenge of implementation in such a way that members capabilities determine their influence on the decisions made in an international organization. States within the international system have interests in the international economy and tailor their national and foreign policies according to the individual states national interest and political agenda. For example, in the United Nations (UN), the United States of America (USA) holds the most power.
when it comes to decision making. This is backed by the fact that it contributes approximately 22% of the UN’s budget making it the largest financial contributor.\textsuperscript{31} With this power position, the USA can drive issues in the UN that are in line with its national interest. The AU has five economic powers on the continent and while the African Union may not accord them benefits such as those provided in the UN, countries like South Africa and Nigeria have been able to shape and influence policies within the AU. A good example is the power play between South Africa, Nigeria and Libya that dominated the conversation on the creation of AU.

Therefore, this means that, no two African states may hold the same exact view primarily in their respective foreign policies and secondarily in their appreciation of reforming the AU even when it comes to the big economies. The result of this is that states are suspicious of their fellow member states and may fail to agree on the modalities of reform especially when doubt still lingers between a genuine desire to improve the AU and individual states self-interest. Thus, for the reform to have a chance at being implemented, the AU should be cognizant of the number of actors and appreciate that the lens through which the reforms is viewed by African states is biased and should therefore come up with a compromise that will be of benefit to all if not, most states.

3.3 The Prospects of Implementing African Union Reforms
The AU has been known to make several decisions and declarations that are never implemented and as such has been labeled a “toothless dog”. If the Kagame Reforms are to be judged strictly by the AU’s history, one may conclude that the prospects of the reforms being implemented are close none. However, if one examines the context, the prospects of them being implemented
surpass those of earlier initiatives because certain measures have been put in place to ensure that the reforms are achieved.

3.3.1 The Presence of Political Support
This reform process appears to be promising to an extent because there is a strong political support by President Paul Kagame, who also happens to be the current AU Chairperson.\textsuperscript{32} One of the biggest challenges that has faced the implementation of previous initiatives is the lack of political will from African HOS. With ownership at the level of the AU Assembly, it is likely that the reforms have a chance at being implemented. Mr. Atuobi, revealed that this is a sharp contrast from previously unimplemented initiatives because this time, member states have taken initiative and given their commitment to seeing the Kagame reform process through.\textsuperscript{33}

Furthermore, for the reform to have any chance at being implemented there was a need to initiate new political momentum into the process. As a result, African leaders asked Paul Kagame to work with the commission to come out with the best way to reform the AUC. Atuobi agrees that there is renewed momentum among HOS by having President Kagame leading the reform process. Furthermore, there is an appreciable level of consensus among the Heads of State that the current reforms will be implemented considering that Kagame is a fellow African President and politician with a track record of reforming his own country,.\textsuperscript{34} Therefore, agreeing to implement the reform as HOS would not only serve to improve the commission but subsequently serve the interests of the African leaders. That decision was not only distinctive but was an attempt by the AU to ask sitting Heads of State to own key decisions that are important to the AU. For example, the Ghanaian President was asked to champion gender issues in the AU.
3.3.2 Support for the AUC Chairperson and AU Commission
The AUC is the organ responsible for implementing the reforms and as such, the responsibility of overseeing this process lies in the hands of the AUC Chairperson. As the incumbent chair, Mr. Moussa has taken strong administrative ownership of the AU by rigorously supporting the achievement of current reforms. According to Mr. Atuobi, having President Kagame as the champion for the reforms has created a strong support system for the AUC Chairperson. The implied approval of the AU Assembly has fostered a good relationship between the current AUC Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat and President Kagame which is crucial to the implementation process.

The implementation of the reform has been pushed to 2021 from the original year of 2019 to ensure that the structures being set up can handle the weight of the implementation process. Part of this is to ensure that the implementation is aligned with the appointment of new Commissioners who are set to join the organization in 2021. Tieku believes that H.E Moussa Faki Mahamat who is currently serving his first term of office which he assumed on 14th March 2017, would ideally want to run for a second term in office thereby ensuring that the reforms are implemented. He further asserts that an assessment of his performance over his first term in relation to the reforms will contribute greatly to the judgement on whether he can run for a second term of office.35 In that case, prospects of competently facilitating this process are good and even better once re-elected to carry out the actual implementation of the reforms.

3.3.3 Appointment of the Reform Implementation Unit (RIU)
The RIU was established in the office of the AUC Chairperson to ensure that the day to day activities of the reform are handled. This team comprising technical assistance and subject matter experts reports to the AUC Chairperson who in turn reports to the AU Chairperson who leads the
supervision of the reform. While the AUC Chairperson is responsible for implementing the
decision, the AU Chairperson is responsible for supervision and reporting to the Assembly on the
progress of the initiative. Atuobi is of the view that the appointment of the RIU will ensure
continuity in that the process will be carried on beyond changes in the African governments. He
also expresses confidence in the fact that the team that was recruited to carry out the reform is
made up of highly qualified personnel and that the work carried out so far shows a high level of
commitment. In comparison with the efforts put into previous reforms, he acknowledges that the
progress made by this team is far ahead of previous experiences.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{3.3.4 The need to follow process}
According to Tieku, another reason as to why he believes that the prospects for the
implementation of the reforms are very good is the fact that the initial mistakes that were made
in terms of processes at the beginning are being rectified before the implementation of the
Kagame Reforms takes off.\textsuperscript{37} Initially, Kagame did not use the standard way that reports are
submitted at the AU thereby creating procedural challenges within the organization. This ended
up frustrating the Southern, Northern and Eastern African countries who were now intent on
killing the Kagame Report.\textsuperscript{38} Upon realizing the need to follow process, Kagame had to back
track and now take it through the appropriate channels. As a result, the extraordinary summit was
convened to tease out the controversial issues in order to have better prospects for its
implementation.

\textbf{3.4 Criticism}
Although the prospects of implementing the reforms may be good, there remains a certain level
of skepticism about the fact that not every aspect of the reform will be implemented to the letter.
This first criticism appeals mostly to the most ambitious parts of the reforms that is the Financial Reform of a 0.2% levy is not being advocated for by any of the regional powers which leaves the smaller states with the responsibility of championing the reforms.\textsuperscript{39} Tieku argues that because the big economies have an interest in its non-implementation, the 0.2% levy may not the be executed. The big economies in Africa are those that belong to the first tier which includes: Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, all whose GDP is above 4%. These five countries together with Angola are expected to contribute the bulk of the AU budget which lies at 56%. He relates this to the distribution challenge where these countries are cognizant of the fact that their contributions to the budget will not be commensurate with the benefits derived from the organization.\textsuperscript{40} The benefits which are provided for under a quota system tend to only favor these economies in the area of staffing, which is perceived to be of lesser impact.

Tieku believes that another reason why the regional powers may be critical about paying the levy is that Rwanda which is led by President Kagame is in the 3rd tier which only pays a small amount to the budget. Furthermore, most African states are unable to fund their domestic budgets let alone their regional budgets and as such the expectation of funding the Union to a level of being financially independent anytime soon is but a dream.\textsuperscript{41} The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is an example of a REC that has implemented the same levy of 0.2%. Even though this amount is collected by member states, there have been challenges involved in remitting this money to ECCAS. In the case where member states can contribute more, their fear is based on the premise that the organization may hike the contributions without supplementing the benefits. Whereas it may be positive to hope that the reform will be implemented, going by this example makes the prospect of the AU being financially independent a fantasy.
Amb. Etuket’s skepticism is derived from the fact that the reform did not address most of the leadership problems that the AU must deal with and will therefore not make the AU as effective as it should be. He maintains the position that African Leaders have always made proclamations that never materialize in the form of implementation and as such the Kagame reforms will follow suit. While momentum may be high now, he senses that in a period of 2-3 years the momentum gathered would gradually wane. Mr. Atuobi also argues that the inefficiencies within the organization have not been addressed in that the bureaucracy still runs deep, there exists a poor working culture within the organization where the creation of departments has no effect.

3.5 Conclusion
This chapter accounted for the reform process within the AU over the past 16 years of its existence. The study reviewed the reforms undertaken so far and assessed the challenges and prospects in implementing AU Reforms. The study notes that previous reforms were not implemented due to several internal challenges within the organization and among African HOS. The study highlights that the Kagame reforms have good prospects under the current leadership and the new systems that have been put in place to ensure their implementation. The study further revealed that failure to address critical concerns in the AU may impede the implementation process of the reforms. The next chapter provides a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
ENDNOTES

3 Interview with Ambassador David Etuket, Former Director International Affairs and Uganda’s High Commissioner to Nigeria (2005 – 2008).
4 Ibid.
5 Interview with Dr. Thomas K. Tieku, Associate Professor, Kings University College, Western University.
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8 Interview with Samuel M. Atuobi, Senior Political/Elections Officer, African Union Commission
10 Ibid. p.776
11 Interview with Samuel M. Atuobi op. cit
12 Interview with Ambassador David Etuket op. cit.
13 Interview with Dr. Thomas K. Tieku op. cit.
14 Koremenos et. al Ibid. pp. 776
16 Interview with Ambassador David Etuket op. cit.
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42 Interview with Ambassador David Etuket op. cit.
43 Interview with Samuel M. Atuobi op. cit.
CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction
The study proceeded on the hypothesis that based on its lack of implementation of past reform agenda’s, the AU is not well positioned to implement the Kagame Reforms. On the basis of the hypothesis, the study set out to examine the circumstances under which the AU called for reforms in the institution since its establishment in 2002 and gives an account of all three undertakings. The study analyzed the Adedeji and Kagame reforms and assessed the challenges and prospects in implementing these Reforms. This chapter summarizes the findings of this research, draws conclusions and makes relevant recommendations for the AU on the implementation of institutional reforms.

4.1 Summary of Findings
The study revealed that since the inception of the AU, the organization has made three attempts at institutional reform. The first happened right after the inception of the Union because the two opposing parties could not come to an agreement on how the continent’s integration agenda would be pursued but also how the organization was going to implement this agenda. For that reason, African states went on to have the Accra Grand Debate in 2007 to not only reignite the need for continental integration among member states but to call for an in-depth audit of the organization. The study revealed that, following a heated discussion among HOS, it was agreed that the organization would take on an administrative role of facilitating integration by addressing the common interests of African states. It was on this premise and upon appointment
by the HOS that Professor Adedeji Adebayo led a high-level panel that presented a comprehensive status report on the AU as at December 2007.

The study revealed that the Kagame Reforms are the third call for reform and are an extension of Adedeji’s administrative reforms following the lack of implementation by the serving AUC Chairpersons at the time. It was further revealed that the reforms were initiated to facilitate the attainment of “Agenda 2063” under Dr. Dlamini’s term of Office.

During the study, the lack of implementation of previous institutional reforms in the AU was attributed to enforcement, distribution, uncertainty and number of actors’ challenges as supported by the rational design theory. The study revealed the proverbial lack of political will among African HOS in enforcing the reforms right from the continental level down to the national level. This lack of ownership of previous reform agendas by HOS prevented its adoption by the Assembly and subsequently by other institutions and organs within the AU. Furthermore, it was revealed that the Adedeji reforms were perceived to be over ambitious and without political backing they were bound to sit on the shelf. The study also disclosed that the previous reforms had not adhered to the processes that would have facilitated and improved its chances at being adopted among other organs of the AU. Without following the proper processes, policy harmonization among the various institutions was affected thus, the AU was handicapped when it comes to implementation.

Key among the findings was the distribution concern among the big economies on the African continent derived from the fact that their contributions were and are not equally proportional to the benefits they accrue from the membership. The study revealed that this acted as a deterrence to the implementation of reforms since the big economies perceived that the smaller economies were not carrying their weight thus benefiting from the labor of a few states. While several
African states may have interest in promoting cooperation within the AU, challenges such as these create a lot of uncertainty about the actions of other states thereby contributing to their pursuit of individual national interest over continental interest. In such events, African states have intentionally refrained from ratifying several agreements to guard their sovereignty within the system. In addition, the study noted that the African continent boasts of a multitude of diverse of cultures which creates a challenge when trying to converge policy and implementation.

While the implementation history of the AU dictates that decisions and reforms birthed by the same organization are doomed from inception, the circumstances under which the Kagame Reforms are coming around show there are considerable prospects in working towards their achievement. The study revealed that, while previous reforms lacked the requisite political will to enforce them, the Kagame Reforms have President Kagame as the champion and by extension, African states have rallied behind him to support this initiative. This has created new momentum among the HOS with an increased level of ownership among several organs within the AU. Further prospects of the reforms can be taken from the fact that a strong collaboration made up of the AU Chairperson, AUC Chairperson and the newly created Reform Implementation Unit has been put in place to ensure that the reforms are implemented.

Notwithstanding the foregoing fact that the prospects of implementing may be good, the study also revealed a level of skepticism about the implementation of the reforms. One major concern from the interviewees was regarding the implementation of the financial reform also known as the Kigali Financing Decision. In the first instance, regional powers are not interested in implementing it based on two facts that is, one, they are uncertain that the smaller economies
will carry their weight of the financial burden and two, as mentioned earlier the benefits are not directly proportional to their contributions. Aside that, the study noted that the underlying problems that may be affecting the AU such as leadership problems and organizational inefficiencies have not been properly addressed which could hamper the implementation of the reforms.

4.2 Conclusions
From the creation OAU to that of the AU, the founding dream was to create an organization fit enough to manage the social, economic and political affairs of the continent within the international system. The study then concludes that after 16 years of operation, the AU as an institution could have done better to improve institutional capacity with the Adedeji Reforms, however, that was not the case because they were never implemented. As the AU seeks to address the challenges facing the continent in areas of peace and security, poor governance, corruption, unemployment, droughts and famine, pandemics, climate change and rapid population growth, a fully functional organization will enable the continent to overcome these challenges that cannot be addressed by individual states due to their sheer magnitude.

The organization’s quest to create such an organization has been met with three sets of reform packages to date of which the Kagame Reforms present the most recent. Despite the efforts to reform, the AU has consistently failed to implement many of the decisions which has led to a dysfunctional AU whose relevance is not only undermined on the continent but within the international system. For the AU to comfortably implement the current reforms, it is imperative that the challenges faced in implementing previous reforms are addressed and overcome. Failure
to do so, will not only impede the progress of the current reforms but also take the AU back to an even more dysfunctional position.

The Kagame Reforms despite several criticisms, present an opportunity for the AU as an organization to become more effective and efficient to meet the challenges faced by the continent. In order to strengthen the union, the reforms have set out to focus on key priority areas with continental scope, realign AU institutions to deliver on the priorities, efficiently manage the organization politically and operationally, and sustainably self-finance the Organization. For the AU to fully realize its potential, the Kagame Reforms present another opportunity that will require the full commitment of African HOS and the various AU organs to fully implement these reforms.

Inasmuch as the reform implementation process will require a lot of hard and complex work for the leaders, the AU will have to ensure that the respective organs are given the authority required to implement as well as a mechanism to ensure that member states are held accountable for their misconduct beyond condemning and offering press statements. The successful implementation of the reform lies heavily on the ability of African states and their respective leaders to set aside their differences to pursue the common goal of continental integration.

4.3 Recommendations
For the AU to achieve success as an organization, the implementation of the reforms needs to be taken seriously to ensure a favorable outcome. For this to happen, African leaders will have to
make hard decisions for the good of the continent. These decisions will involve them ceding more of their sovereignty to the AU and its organs as a supranational body in charge of implementing decisions on behalf of the continent. This has been a consistent challenge among African states since the inception of the OAU and needs to be urgently addressed. This will enable the AU organs especially the AUC which to date remains a secretariat, implement the reforms and ensure member states comply accordingly.

Furthermore, the leaders of African states together with those leading the reform process within the AU will have to take into account that reform is a long and tedious process, and should therefore be handled with unwavering commitment until the reforms are implemented. This ought to be carefully considered because the current leaders may not retain their offices for entire implementation process, therefore transitions should be factored into the process to ensure continuity long after the leaders have moved on from their respective offices. To ensure continuity, the AU will have to hire competent staff that are able to deliver over and above their mandates and streamline the bureaucratic processes to ensure work runs smoothly.

As building blocks for the integration process and key to the implementation process, REC’s should be brought to the same level and carry more responsibility within the process. Currently ECOWAS and SADC are the regional bodies that have grown significantly in terms of cohesion and contribution to the integration of the continent and as such, other regional bodies should be brought to speed to ensure a more uniform implementation of reforms.

Policy harmonization is imperative to this process right from the continental level to the national level. For this to happen, continuous consultations will have to be carried out at all levels to ensure that the policies are relevant to the issues they are addressing and implementable within
the areas they intent to cover. Once the policies have been harmonized at the continental level, the REC’s should be able to seamlessly take over from them and in turn member states where the real impact of the policies ought to be felt.

A critical decision to the part of the reforms that is tied to general well-being of the AU and its member states is self-financing. Most African states are highly indebted such that they are unable to not only meet their domestic needs but also those of the continent. Resources are paramount to this process and it is therefore important for African states to carefully consider the Kigali Decision in order to come up with viable solutions to finance the Africa that will rise to meet global challenges.
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G. INTERVIEWS

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Interview with Dr. Thomas K. Tieku, Associate Professor, Kings University College, Western University.

Interview with Samuel M. Atuobi, Senior Political/Elections Officer, African Union Commission
Interview Questions on African Union Reforms

1. To examine the circumstances under which the African Union called for reform.
   a) After 16 years in existence, how would you assess the performance of the AU?
   b) What is the relevance of the reform process to the performance of the AU in achieving the continental vision?
   c) In 2017, under the leadership of President Kagame, the AU launched another set of reforms. What accounts for this set of reforms?
   d) Are these reforms attainable?

2. To assess what challenges account for the lack of implementation of older reform proposals.
   a) The Adedeji Audit report of 2007 proffered recommendations backed by a thorough study of the AU and its institutions. What accounts for the lack of implementation of these reforms?
   b) What have been the repercussions for the consistent lack of implementation?
   c) An assessment of both reports clearly indicates that the Kagame Report is an adaptation of the Adedeji Report. In this instance, what is different or new about the Kagame reforms?

3. To evaluate whether the African Union is well positioned to implement the Kagame Reforms.
   a) Does the current AU institutional arrangement favor the implementation of the reforms?
   b) What measures should be put in place to ensure that the reforms are implemented?
   c) What are the prospects of a reformed AU?