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POWELL: Now, Lord Gladwyn, I want to express, to begin with, our appreciation that you have agreed to do some supplementary questions because we want to have this oral history record as complete as possible. Now, you were in the foreign office during the war, I believe, in 1942 and ’43 in the Economic and Reconstruction Department. When did you first begin to discuss or begin to think about the nature and shape of a postwar organization which would assist in maintaining international peace and security?

GLADWYN: Well I joined that department which in fact I formed about the middle of nineteen hundred and forty-three, I suppose. I came back to the Foreign Office then. I had been in Economic Warfare before then. I managed to recruit one or two people and we began working on, first of all, on the economic side—the economic problems that would arise at the end of the war like refugees, and food, and so on and so forth. But after a bit, after about a few months it became evident that you couldn't separate those kinds of problems from political problems, and so more and more, the department concentrated on what was going to happen politically after the war—whether you could—whether there was any chance to form some kind of international organization which should organize all the other things which had to be done. And so, we got out various schemes and discussed them in the Foreign Office, and with other people too.

I think the first broad scheme we got out was in ’44, a thing called the
"Four Power Plan" because our general directive was, from above, was that whatever scheme for postwar political cooperation you conceived of then, you had to contemplate cooperation with the Russians because they were our allies, they were—in fact, if it hadn't been for the Russian victory we should all ourselves now be in saltbines, I mean we have to recognize the fact that the Russians they largely won the war, with our help of course too, from our economic help. Even so, the directive from on high, from Churchill downward, was that any scheme which had to be worked out for international organization had to contemplate cooperation with the Soviet Union. And of course with the United States and indeed with ourselves, principally, and other powers. So, that was the general impression we had to have. We couldn't get out any scheme which was based on the idea that there was going to be a Cold War and that the one thing after the war was to break with the Russians; that would have been quite inconceivable. Nobody would have agreed to that. It was the last thing that the Americans wanted, and in fact, it was Roosevelt above all and indeed all the Americans, who shared this view that the great thing after the war was to have cooperation with the Russians, without which, they thought, quite rightly, that no international organization would work. And so, we had, broadly speaking, to get out some kind of scheme which was based on cooperation between the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth and Empire, which was in existence still, after all, and even then it represented, goodness knows how much—a third of humanity, India was still being run by the English then, and so on. And indeed, after reflection, the French, because the French, after all, they still had their empire and it was an enormous concern. And then of course, the Americans insisted that China, which was in a state of anarchy really, should be brought in because, in principle, and according to the Americans anyhow, China would eventually be a great Power, which was perfectly true. And therefore, you had to
contemplate some kind of association between the—of a sort with (?) the great
Powers, and that had to have been a basis for any scheme you considered. That
was the sort of general directive we had.

So we got out a thing called the "Four Power Plan", originally, which I
think probably didn't consider France at that moment, I think, but, it was all
rather a great Power conception, I think, and duly so. And that was then . .
. that was the basis of our thought. But after that, we got in touch with the
Americans, and the Americans, of course, having come into the war in '44, were
thinking very hard about what kind of organization there should be after the
war. They had their own ideas, and we went and cooperated with them (?) and
exchanged views and so on. And then, our own Four Power Plan was modified.
We got out a thing called the United Nations Plan, which was something not
very dissimilar from what eventually the United Nations was, I think. And
then finally there was the conference at Dumbarton Oaks in '45 . . . was it
'45?

POWELL: '44.

GLADWYN: '44, of course, yes, '44, when we got in touch with the Russians and
the Russians agreed to come to this conference, and they put forward their
plan, which was even more "great Power" of course, than ours, or the American
plan.

POWELL: Was that really the first contact, at Dumbarton Oaks, with the
Russians?

GLADWYN: Yes, I know, I think we'd had some indication of their view before,
but we got their plan, their own project, a little bit before Dumbarton Oaks.
And we studied that, and the Americans studied it, and then the conference started. And of course, one has to recognize that Dumbarton Oaks was the one conference, I think, the only conference, in which the Russians really went all out to please, and were extremely cooperative. Gromyko talked English all the time, Arkady Sobolev, who was of Leningrad, his number two, was a great friend of mine, and he was extremely obliging. They had a legal advisor whose name I forget, who was first class. And they really put forward constructive ideas and really had extremely good ideas. They seemed to concentrate on politics, they weren't so keen on economic cooperation, but they agreed to have an Economic and Social Council, that was agreed with them and so on. And generally speaking, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were reasonable, except of course, for the one outstanding issue of voting in the Security Council, on which they insisted, up to that point, in having a veto on almost everything, you see. And we and the Americans simply couldn't accept that. But, it was a matter of fact, it was the famous Yalta voting formula which eventually got agreement with the Russians at Yalta. . . . That particular formula essentially was that the decisions under the relevant part of the Charter which dealt with peaceful cooperation and so on should not be subject to a veto, but that the vetos only apply when it was a question of taking actual(?) decisions. That was of course, the formula which I remember I helped to put through when I saw Sobolev off in London afterwards, in the American Embassy, in the Soviet Embassy(?) and then Jimmy Dunn I think had a talk with the Russian ambassador in Moscow, and Harry Hopkins, I hear there handled it. (?) But anyhow, when we got to Yalta, rather to our surprise, suddenly it came up and Stalin said quite quietly, "Oh, yes, of course, yes, Molotov's talked to me about this, we agree." And so then, of course, having got agreed on that formula, it was all set for the Pour Power Agreement and the Conference of San Francisco, which was then decided on at Yalta, and it happened on the
twentieth of April, which is my birthday, incidentally.

We went ahead on those lines and then of course, it was further elaborated in the Conference of San Francisco. There was less of a great Power conception and more of a ... rights restrictive of the smaller powers and so on, and eventually the right that originated in the Charter. That was the history, broadly speaking, in two words, of the Charter. It was nearly held up altogether, as you know, by the Russians making an effort in the last resort, in the Conference of San Francisco, to go back effectively on the veto, to have a veto even on procedure and--

POWELL: --discussion.

GLADWYN: Discussion, yes. And that week, Harry Hopkins was sent over to see Stalin, and Stalin overruled Molotov and said the way was clear for the Soviet signature of the Charter.

POWELL: I want to correct you on one thing--the date of your birthday. It was April twenty-fifth.

GLADWYN: Twenty-fifth, yes. Why, what did I say?

POWELL: Twentieth.

GLADWYN: No, no I didn't.

POWELL: Well anyway, I have a legend, which I want you to confirm or deny. And this concerns Yalta, and I have heard this story, that when, after the decision was taken to hold this conference at San Francisco, it was a question
of the date. And a voice from the back of the British delegation said, "How about April twenty-fifth?"

GLADWYN: That's perfectly right, yes.

POWELL: And, it was somebody, maybe it was Churchill, who turned around and growled, "Why April twenty-fifth?", and you replied, "Because that's my birthday." And no one could find a better reason or a better date, and that's why the San Francisco Conference opened on your birthday. Is that true?

GLADWYN: Yes, perfectly true, absolutely.

POWELL: Why didn't you put it in your memoirs? (Ms. Akao laughs in the background.)

GLADWYN: It happened in the ... British delegation actually: the meeting was there in the British delegation in the—what was the name of the palace—I can't remember ... which we were ensconced in ...

POWELL: Tell me, about Yalta, one thing that always intrigued me and indeed, at Dumbarton Oaks too: did you get the impressions that the Russians were really enthusiastic about the idea of the UN, or were they going along with a Western idea so that they would have some leverage for what they wanted to do in Eastern Europe?

GLADWYN: Well, I think they were less enthusiastic, so to speak, I suppose, than they were at Dumbarton Oaks. And they were more suspicious of the West in Yalta than they had been at Dumbarton Oaks, there was a very simple
reason. At Yalta, they had advanced into the . . . and almost got into the territory of the Old Reich (?), and it was pretty certain they were going to win the war. In Dumbarton Oaks of course, it was not so, and indeed, no doubt, they suspected we were going to do a deal with the Germans and all that, you know, they're very suspicious people. But (laughs) at Yalta, presumably, they thought they were in a stronger position, and they could probably take a tougher line, I think. But they didn't abandon Dumbarton Oaks, no, nor did they early at San Francisco, except on one occasion. There was a row about whether the Poles should be represented—the Lublin Poles—

POWELL: Or the London Poles, yes.

GLADWYN: Well that was a great, that was a side issue really, but very important. But it had nothing to do with the Charter.

POWELL: Now . . . to turn to the San Francisco Conference, you had a very high level delegation there.

GLADWYN: Yes, we had. Well, of course, Eden had to go back.

POWELL: Because of the general election.

GLADWYN: Was it the general election?

POWELL: Well there was one in the summer of '45.

GLADWYN: Yes, that's true, well then of course, yes, and then it was early at Potsdam—
POWELL: Potsdam, too, yes--

GLADWYN: they knew the result. Yes, he had to go back. Lord Halifax wasn't allowed to go far (?). Yes, at that time there was a sort of interim Government, you know, the Labor Party had gone and--the Labor Party had resigned from the Government and there was interim Government going on, and there was Churchill in command, and Halifax was there, no, Halifax was ambassador in Washington. . . .

POWELL: What I was going to ask you, basically, was the--I mean, with this leadership you had Lord Cranborne as well and so on. Were they--sort of window dressing and was the work really done by you and Sir Alexander Cadogan?

GLADWYN: Well, yes, more or less, I think, yes, I think I've--so they were--they made the sort of speeches--

POWELL: I mean, you were the two professionals.

GLADWYN: Yes, and the politicians made the speeches. Alec Cadogan, of course, was a very great--he was there most of the time. There was a great intelligent lawyer called Sir William Malkin. But Leo Pasvolsky, of course, was the great figure on the American side.

POWELL: He was the equivalent of Professor Charles Webster.

GLADWYN: Yes, he was really, yes. And he was more important because he was--Leo Pasvolsky was very--he had more political influence than Professor
Webster. But nevertheless, he was there, and, of course, a lot of work was in the so-called "Coordination Committee", in which Pasvolsky and I sat, you see, at the end of it.

POWELL: Was that your principal function there—I was going to ask you were you—

GLADWYN: No, I was Secretary to the main Ministers' (?) Meeting, you see, too, I was Secretary of that. And there was a sort of sub-committee of that, which I sat on too, with Jimmy Dunn, and people like that, there were a couple of executives, there were now, and Pasvolsky of course. I think most of the work was done there, yes. Some of the work was done in the committees, you know, under the people like Evatt, and so I think we had rows about various things and altered the Charter in some respect, yes.

POWELL: Did you get to know Stettinius?

GLADWYN: Ah . . . what was his name? . . . Ed.

POWELL: Edward, yes.

GLADWYN: Ed. Ed Stettinius. Yes he was a splendid man, but he wasn't very effective.

POWELL: I was wondering about that.

GLADWYN: Oh, no. He was a very nice man, and—
POWELL: Sort of a lightweight, wasn't he?

GLADWYN: --an able businessman, but politically, a lightweight. Whenever Molotov used to say something awful at the meeting, (Powell laughs) he used to turn around to his people and say (imitates an American accent), "Hell, what do I do?", he would say, "Hell, what do I do?", and he had no idea really, what to do, actually. (laughter)

POWELL: Now, what were the working methods of the British delegation there at San Francisco? Did you have to refer many questions back to London for the consideration of the Prime Minister?

GLADWYN: No, no, no, not much, no, hardly at all, no.

POWELL: I mean, after all, you did have Eden there and you did have Attlee there.

GLADWYN: Attlee came, but he wasn't in any position of authority. I saw a lot of him there, but he wasn't in any position of authority. He was just there . . . he was just a Labor leader in opposition, at that time . . . a very nice man, and frightfully able. (In response to Powell handing him something) Thank you. (?)

POWELL: What about some of the other personalities at the Conference? I'm thinking about Herbert Evatt, Romulo and so on. Did you get to know them?

GLADWYN: Oh, yes Bert Evatt, of course, but he was principally concerned in pushing his own canoe, and (Powell laughs) becoming an international
POWELL: He did that rather well—

GLADWYN: --in order to impose himself in Australia, back home, you see. And he wasn't a very nice man really, no; I quite liked him myself, but he was a .. well ... a terrific sort of a politician and .. . a bully in some ways, too. He was effective, of course, a very effective lawyer.

POWELL: And he sort of led the revolt of the smaller-medium Powers.

GLADWYN: Yes, he did that. With some success, with some success. He did get certain amendments of the Charter which were of certain importance, yes he did.

POWELL: Well, now, did you see, say, for example, Field Marshall Smutts? Was he around very much?

GLADWYN: No, I don't think he was there--no, not very much, no--he came up a bit. He did the . . .

POWELL: I think the Preamble of the Charter.

GLADWYN: The Preamble, yes. He cooked up that with Professor Webster.

POWELL: Oh, he did?

GLADWYN: That was his main con—Webster was very largely responsible for it,
but Smuts had the idea, writing these fine Labor sentiments into the Preamble. Yes, that's what he did, yes. I think also he was quite keen on the bit in about the Internal Affairs of States. (laughter)

POWELL: He was forward-looking, in other words.

GLADWYN: Oh, yes.

POWELL: Tell me this: You were there on June 26 when the Charter was signed. I guess the atmosphere on that day—there was pretty well optimism unrestrained. Did you have your reservations then?

GLADWYN: Well, I never thought it was going to be—sort of—anything so terrific as all that, within a short peace and all that(?), no I didn't. And so, I thought that everything would depend on whether there was a row between the Americans and Russians, and by that time it looked as if there well might be. I thought we had to do it, and no choice, it was the only thing to do. But no, I was never as optimistic as all that. Never so optimistic as many Americans were. The Americans were actually convinced it was going to be a new world, you see. However, we in England, after all, we had seen the collapse of the League of Nations, and so we were less optimistic perhaps.

POWELL: Now, before the delegates left San Francisco, the UK Government had invited the Preparatory Committee to meet in London and then hold the first session of the General Assembly there.

GLADWYN: Yes.
POWELL: I always felt that that was an extraordinary gesture. Your country had hardly had time to catch its breath from the war, there were shortages everywhere, rationing was in effect, accommodations for overseas visitors were going to be very difficult.

GLADWYN: It was very difficult, yes.

POWELL: This must have been a Cabinet decision, and presumably—when was it made, do you know?

GLADWYN: I can't remember when it was exactly made, I don't know, but it was made. I didn't have a hand in making it.

POWELL: Did you, in effect, come to San Francisco with that invitation in your pocket?

GLADWYN: No, no, no. Only afterwards. Well, yes, at the end.

POWELL: Yes.

GLADWYN: It was decided at the end that I should effectively take over from Alger Hiss, who had been running the San Francisco Conference--

POWELL: That's right, he was the--

GLADWYN: Dean Acheson was going to be transferred, effectively, to London the first of February. Therefore, I'd have to dispatch a commission on the Executive Committee before that. Then, rather at the last minute, it
was decided that I should do it as I was going to be the equivalent of Alger Hiss. But, it was only decided rather at the last minute, I think. It wasn't easy in London, certainly it wasn't conducive (?) to get Church House all ready and to get the restaurant going, and the whole . . .

POWELL: Central Hall.

GLADWYN: . . . Central Hall all ready in time, that kind of thing. Then apart from that, we had to get all kinds of very difficult questions settled about procedure and the rules of procedure, and all that, which had great political consequences.

POWELL: Well, I was going to ask you, you started out, you had David Owen--

GLADWYN: He was the first man, the first chap, yes.

POWELL: Yes, and then Brian Urquhart--

GLADWYN: And then after that, and then Brian Urquhart came into my office, and I just got into the Church House(?). He was the first man to come into my office. He applied for the job--

POWELL: But you had no budget, you had no staff . . .

GLADWYN: No staff, no. Well, I eventually got some money from the Foreign Office, yes.

POWELL: It must have been an appalling job.
GLADWYN: Well, we had to recruit very quickly: a financial man, an administration man . . .

POWELL: I remember Colonel Holt very well.

GLADWYN: Yes, he was a very nice man, yes. We got quite a good collection and got people who came on to the U.N. . . . there was old Ben Cohen, you know.

POWELL: Picture right up there. (Motions to Cohen's picture) He was our first Assistant Secretary General for Public Information.

GLADWYN: And then there was Hoo.

POWELL: Yes, Victor Hoo. And Adrian Pelt.

GLADWYN: Oh, yes, yes, yes.

POWELL: Yes, you had quite a team there.

GLADWYN: And at the end, there was a great business because Mr. Lie would take on all these people. I recommended that he would do so because they all seemed pretty able, you see. But for about a week he didn't know whether they were going to be taken on. And so the rhyme went on I think to say, "They didn't know whether they were coming or going: Koo, Hoo, Cohen and Owen." (laughter)

POWELL: Well, they're so many things I want to ask you and I've gotten my eye
on the clock. Now for one thing, that first day in the General Assembly in Central Hall, I was there, and it didn't go according to the script.

GLADWYN: Didn't it, I've forgotten.

POWELL: There was ... Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium that everybody expected was going to be elected President of the General Assembly. And then Vishinsky suddenly gets up and nominates Trygve Lie and Dimitri Manvilsky gets up and seconds the nomination, and calls for it by acclamation. And you--

GLADWYN: --No, Spaak was the President, you mean the Secretary-General.

POWELL: No, I mean that Spaak's name had not been mentioned, and you and Andy Cordier were up there on the podium sorting ... no, Zuleta Angel was up there.

GLADWYN: Who?

POWELL: Angel. Zuleta, the President of the Preparatory Commission--

GLADWYN: Oh, yes, Zuleta, Zuleta, that's right--

POWELL: And they were trying to sort this out and finally, they--

GLADWYN: Zuleta the was President--

POWELL: of the Preparatory Commission.
GLADWYN: And then he sat in the chair when the Assembly first met.

POWELL: That's right. And it took him several minutes sort it out and finally they found in the Rules of Procedure that there were going to be no nominations, and no seconding, and the balloting was going to be secret. And so, suddenly, they went into secret ballot and the man whose name had never been mentioned that afternoon, Paul Henri Spaak, (laughs while speaking) had been elected President of the General Assembly.

GLADWYN: Yes I remember that, now it's coming back to me, yes.

POWELL: And, of course, I've always wondered why the Russians did this maneuver. Did they hate Spaak that much, or did they have their own candidate as the post of Secretary-General? I've heard they had a Pole or a Yugoslav in mind.

GLADWYN: Oh yes, they did put forward a Pole, I remember, but I can't remember who it was.

POWELL: And that they wanted to sidetrack Lie by putting him in as President of the General Assembly. I don't know what the story was.

GLADWYN: Very likely, but we didn't know exactly what the Russians were up to, we didn't know.

POWELL: Now, when were you first aware that Lie was going to be the candidate for Secretary-General, do you remember that?
GLADWYN: Well, some time went by before his name came forward. Our candidate was Mike Pearson, of course. And, failing that, of course, we did like Spaak. But both were ruled out by the Russians, particularly Mike Pearson.

POWELL: Thought he was too close to the Americans?

GLADWYN: North Americans, yes, and that kind of thing. Indeed, at one stage, even my name was put forward, but that was quite impossible because I was a member of Britain, and they've never been accepted by the Russians anyhow. But, it was evident that there would have to be a Scandinavian or something like that. And then eventually, Lie was rather thought of as a second best, in a way, I think. And his name came forward, and nobody particularly objected to him, and the Americans and Russians accepted him.

POWELL: And when he actually took over, he was elected I think—he gave his acceptance speech in the General Assembly on the second of February—was there a kind of a "hand-over"? Did you sit down with him for a series of conferences?

GLADWYN: Yes, yes, we did he came over and we had long talks about whether he should take on the staff, and that kind of thing. And generally speaking, I'd sort of run(?) and yes, I can't remember exactly, but we'd have talks with him, of course. . . . He was a quite sensible old boy, you know.

POWELL: He had a rough time for a good share of his--

GLADWYN: Over here.
POWELL: Yes, over here, yes.

GLADWYN: Yes, I know, yes. And instantly, of course, he called to the Russians over the Korean War.

POWELL: Yes. Tell me this: when you sort of vacated your office in Church House, you remained a member of the British delegation to that Assembly?

GLADWYN: Yes, I came, I sat behind them, yes I did. Yes, I switched over and became a member of the delegation. And then I went back—when I was over—I went back to the Foreign Office, and took up a job as Undersecretary. By that time, Mr. Bevin chose me as the chap who would be responsible for negotiating the peace treaties, you see, so I switched over to that, and really, came away from the United Nations for a long period.

POWELL: But then you went back to the UN in 1950.

GLADWYN: What do you mean—oh, in 1950—at that time, after the peace treaties were over, I had more time as Undersecretary, and as Deputy Undersecretary of State. I had come to the United Nations' side then too, yes.

POWELL: But I mean, when you actually came here to New York, it was just at the time of the Korean War.

GLADWYN: Oh no, I came before, when the first Assembly, when the second Assembly were, I came over then, with the delegation then. In spite of the fact I was dealing with treaties, too. I came over to the delegation here.
POWELL: And you sensed at that time the increasing hostility between the Americans and the Russians.

GLADWYN: Oh, yes, very much so. After one of Molotov's speeches, he talked about the two camps, and that kind of thing. I remember approaching Sobolev very much about that. Didn't get any change out of him.

POWELL: Now, you were here—when did you arrive—in July of 1950, I think—

GLADWYN: Two days after the Korean War had broken out, yes.

POWELL: ... And almost immediately became known in almost every American home, I think.

GLADWYN: Well, it wasn't my fault, I know—

(laughter from Mr. Powell and Ms. Akao)

POWELL: (laughing) Nobody's accusing you of anything, Lord Gladwyn.

GLADWYN: Well, I don't know, it's not a sort of normal thing for a diplomat to do, and not a thing you like doing, anyhow. As I didn't like ... publicity at all.

POWELL: Well, I mean, after all, you and Mr. Malik had some—

GLADWYN: Well yes, I scored off Malik of course,(?) and so on. Malik I quite liked, personally—
POWELL: I was going to ask you, how did you get along with him personally, outside the conference room?

GLADWYN: Quite alright, quite alright, yes, he's quite a good man. But, actually, I really took him on intellectually, really, and made some speeches attacking Marxism, and generally speaking, their absurd idea of history and (?) running everything and so on and so forth. And that's really what I suppose I made my name on, yes.

POWELL: Well now tell me, ... when Trygve Lie's first term was up as Secretary-General, the US managed to get that Assembly extension without taking it back to the Security Council, which many students, I think have since said, or scholars, have said that this was a very dubious legality.

GLADWYN: Might be, but there was nothing else to be done, really, because the Russians wouldn't agree to any successor, and we couldn't really just sack Lie, and what could you—they wanted to run it with a sort of nameless troika, or something like that.

POWELL: The British didn't object too much to that extension ...

GLADWYN: No, no, of course they didn't want Lie in tears. They were happy a successor to Lie, but until they got agreement we weren't going to give them any—quite happy, in fact, we wanted Lie to carry on.

POWELL: Well when Lie finally decided to resign and the Security Council was faced the question of finding a second Secretary-General, I believe I read that it was you who came up with the name of Hammarskjöld.
GLADWYN: That's perfectly true. For a long time we couldn't get agreement on anybody, everybody was vetoed by the Russians you see, and so on, we were all despairing. (?) And it was in the final meeting somewhere over here, I think I said, "Well, what about a Swede, I know—I have met a Swede I think could do, his name is Dag Hammarskjöld, I don't him very well, but I think he's extremely competent and he's an economist, and I think a very admirable man. I really don't know very much about him, but I suggest that he ought to be considered." And I said, "I can't put him forward because I haven't got any authority to do so." But then, by the next meeting, the Frenchman, Hapneau, (?) put him forward officially. But that was how it came about and then the Russians, to our amazement, agreed.

POWELL: And that was it.

GLADWYN: And that was it, yes.

POWELL: Now, in view of what (chuckling) . . . happened in the next few years, including Suez and the Congo, did you ever regret putting Hammarskjold forward?

GLADWYN: No, not exactly. I think he did what he could, but he wanted to be a sort of lay Pope, and circumstances were against that, really.

POWELL: (chuckling) I must remember that phrase, I like it very much.

GLADWYN: (chuckling) That's what he wanted to be. One time, in the Congo, he almost succeeded in being, but it was quite evident he couldn't be it really,
it was impossible. But he was a very able man and I think he did some good, too in bringing the whole thing together. But he was an odd character, of course.

POWELL: But do you think he may have stretched the limits of the office of the Secretary-General a little too far that time?

GLADWYN: Well probably, I think he did. But of course, there was always Article Hundred, of course, he could appeal to that and bring forward things under that. But I think he did probably a bit too much, yes. Obviously, he realized that he couldn't do that kind of thing when he was killed. I don't know what happened to him when he was killed, whether that was--have you got any information about that? Was it a plot to kill him, do you think, or was it just an accident?

POWELL: I don't think so. I've talked to Brian Urquhart about this many times and I think, at best, it's an open verdict, but I think it was probably just bad flying.

GLADWYN: Bad flying, yes. In the middle of a desert somewhere, yes.

POWELL: Yes, yes, I don't think so.

GLADWYN: The plot theory seldom works, you know, when it comes to the factors, it's awfully difficult.

POWELL: Now, you had left the UN by the time that U Thant arrived.
GLADWYN: I wasn't here when he arrived, no.

POWELL: No, I mean but you have, from the vantage point of the Foreign Office, you observed his performance.

GLADWYN: Well, I was in Paris by that time. I wasn't observing the United Nations much in Paris, I had too much to do.

POWELL: No, but did you get any impression of him?

GLADWYN: Not much. Of course, I had very little to do with the United Nations then. All I did was meet him once or twice at parties and he seemed a very good chap. The (?), good Buddhist, and so on, and no doubt, very suitable. I really don't know much about him.

POWELL: Now, since this is the fortieth anniversary year of the UN, and we've just finished this tremendous Commemorative Session, there are a few general questions I think I'd like to ask you.

(Ms. Akao asks to turn the tape over)

END OF SIDE ONE

POWELL: You were at Dumbarton Oaks, you were at Yalta, and at San Francisco. How has the Charter, which you helped to draft, stood the test of time? Is it in need of revision?

GLADWYN: Well, I don't think you can revise it, because under the Charter itself, it can only be revised with the consent, effectively, of the
Russians. You have to have American and Soviet agreement on any of this. And if you got that, you probably would be able to. They'd still be subject, in principle, to veto; China and--

POWELL: But my question is, is it in need of revision, whether it possible or not.

GLADWYN: Well, no, I think really, if could get any kind of American-Soviet cooperation, you could make the present Charter work perfectly well, in my view. I don't see why it would be necessary to revise it, I don't think. It might possibly get the question of the voting in the Assembly rather regulated. It seems rather absurd now when you get States that are minute, of a hundred thousand, twenty thousand people having one vote, and China, a hundred million people, a billion people with one vote too. In principle, it seems to me to be rather wrong. But I daresay, it's the only way to make it work at all.

POWELL: I was going to say, it's an extremely sensitive issue... on the part of the mini-States, yes.

GLADWYN: I suppose, but even so, it seems rather ridiculous, really.

POWELL: What do you think about the attitude--

GLADWYN: I once thought of a good thing to have a resolution--we were going to give a resolution to the Assembly with rather more power... and make them more effective. You might have a system whereby it would have to be a two-thirds resolution embodying two-thirds of the population of the world...
in which case there'd have to be a— you know— out of four billion people, or more, there'd have to be three billion people and I would think their representatives here would have to vote for it. (?)

POWELL: Well, we got China and India and (laughing) Pakistan and Indonesia.

GLADWYN: India and China, they would only be two. You wouldn't have two-thirds of them. (laughter) You would have to have America, and Europe and Russia, or one of them, to come in, too.

POWELL: Yes, that's true. Well, what about the attitude of Member States, Lord Gladwyn, toward the UN? They seemed to have lost a lot of the enthusiasm—

GLADWYN: Who?

POWELL: -- the Member States— that they had forty years ago.

GLADWYN: Oh, I don't think that the average person cares much about the United Nations nowadays, there's very little enthusiasm for it. But, I really don't think it matters very much, it's a Government's matter. If you can get the Governments to be reasonable, then it doesn't very much what people... the populace thinks. It just may come about, (?) and then they automatically think it's a good thing. If you can get agreements between the Great Powers, notably the Soviet Union and the Americans, everybody would be a little happy. And then of course, the stock of this organization will just go... it'll go straight up. You can't increase the stock of this organization by
organizing propaganda, and saying, "It was a very good show, you must all come and help me (?)", you see. It doesn't do much good.

POWELL: Now, do you think this . . . Commemorative Session of the last ten days or so, with all these Heads of State and Government, was this a ritual, or do you think that they really felt that this place is still important?

GLADWYN: Yes, I think so, yes it still is important simply as a meeting ground, it is important, I think really. And if there's ever going to be any kind of a lackening of tension between the super-Powers, it's quite likely to happen here, in the corridors, people meet each other, in minor ways, and . . . certainly, the situation would be worse off if it didn't exist, there's no doubt about that. And, I think there was an article in the New York Times just the other day that said such as that, and I agreed with it. But, I think everything depends certainly, on the Governments being reasonable. Of course sometimes, it's arguable that the whole human race has gone mad, of course, it's quite possible to think that. But, on the assumption that it hasn't gone mad, you must go on the assumption of course, that the human race has not gone mad, what the Germans call the "Uber Alles" theory. And that's the only thing you can do. Of course, if they had all gone mad, there's nothing to be done, we should all be blown up. But seeing that it's absolute—if reason has anything to do with it at all, it must mean that nuclear war is out, of course, people don't really want—even Governments don't really want to be blown up, and therefore, it probably won't happen.

POWELL: No, they wouldn't have anybody to govern.

GLADWYN: Well, it would all be in smoke; there would be a nuclear winter, and
that would be the end.

POWELL: Do you find that the fact that the UN has increased from say ... 51, at the time of the signing of the Charter, to 159 today, has that--

GLADWYN: 51?

POWELL: 51 at San Francisco. There were 51 Member States.

GLADWYN: Oh, then, yes, I see. Well, of course, it's made it much more difficult to govern. I myself think it was rather a mistake to do it with everybody. There ought to have been a numerical limit—limitation, really ... (?) that's what I view myself. Otherwise, it would have San Marino, or Monaco, or Andorra, or anywhere(?) on an as equal level with China. It does seem a little odd, really. I think there ought to have been a numerical limit, perhaps, a million people, or something like that, myself.

POWELL: Or a class of Associate Membership, or something like that.

GLADWYN: Well, they could have all got together and had an Associate Membership or something like that, yes.

POWELL: Yes. Well, I think it's too late. What about the Security Council? You--

GLADWYN: Indeed, the Europeans, of course, ought to one member really, if it comes to that. The EEC ought to have one member ... . That would have reformed the Security Council itself, wouldn't it?
POWELL: It certainly would. (laughter) I can see Britain and France competing for the same seat.

GLADWYN: Well, we could toss up, or something.

POWELL: Yes. Now, you sat on the Security Council for a long time. How do you think it is effective?

GLADWYN: Well, in my day, it was quite effective, really, yes. We did do—we took some sensible decisions. Of course, in my day, it was quite different. Even after the time I left, at the end of '54—beginning of '54—we had Commonwealth Meetings, and we had Commonwealth Policy. Even the Indian came along and we informed the Commonwealth Policy, which was then adopted by me in the Security Council, and all of that. But things have changed very substantially since then.

POWELL: But you do now have Common Market consultation, don't you?

GLADWYN: Yes, we have Common Market consultation, that's quite true. That didn't happen in my day. It wasn't formed.

POWELL: Now, your . . . first employee and your protégé, Brian Urquhart, I guess maybe . . . your second employee . . . is now in charge of the UN Peace-Keeping Operation. And, peace-keeping is not a device provided for in the Charter.

GLADWYN: No, it came on at will (?) . . . in form it came out of the sort of
Military Staff Committee idea, in a way.

POWELL: Yes. But, some people considered it one of the most important UN contributions. What do you think about it?

GLADWYN: I think one can exaggerate that, but I think it has played a role, and indeed, a beneficient role. There are about five in operation now, and they can't do very much, but they do hold the ring.

POWELL: In Cyprus.

GLADWYN: Yes, certainly in Cyprus, and even in Lebanon, to some extent, and therefore, it's obviously a good thing as such, yes. I think what exaggerates the importance, if things got really tough, of course, I daresay they'd all be killed or something, but, they can't shoot anyhow. But it does do--yes, I quite agree it is a new donation, new necessity (?) which has had a certain effect.

POWELL: And then one final question, if I have the time, Lord Gladwyn. How do you consider the future of the United Nations? Do you think about it?

GLADWYN: Well I think unless, as I said, the human race goes mad, it means that they'll get agreement on arms, eventually. Then the thing will sober up, I would think, and it'll be more useless, more power will degenerate in this particular machine. (?) It all depends, really on whether you can get--in my view I think it definitely depends on the two super-Powers coming and getting an agreement on arms, agreement on some part, and that would lead to some kind of active cooperation, if you like. Indeed, it's absurd not to think of it
because their interests, in many ways, are identical.

POWELL: In talking simply in the terms of the Soviet Union and the United States, where does China fit into this . . . equation?

GLADWYN: Well, China hasn't really organized itself yet, but it will. I was there about three--I'm a hero in China, you know, because when I was . . . President of the Security Council--I think it was just when they were coming into the war--anyhow, I managed, as President, to overrule the veto of Chiang Kai-shek, you see, the representative of Chiang Kai-Shek, overrule the double veto, so to speak, and got the Americans to abstain, with great reluctance, and therefore addressed an invitation to the Red Chinese, "come and represent it here." And General Woo came over with the delegation, and he had lunch with us and all that. It didn't do much good, they stayed with the Russians and went back. But still (?), it was the first time that Mandarin was talked in the Security Council, and they were very grateful of that. So then I went to China about two or three--three years ago--I found that General Woo was the Vice Chief of General Staff at Peking. I was received with great acclaim as a sort of hero and a sort of friend of Red China. And indeed, after that, I lost my popularity here because the China lobby then attacked me like anything. And I was a villain, more than a hero, then.

POWELL: I must add one story there for the record. I believe that Sir Binnacle Shiva Rao.

GLADWYN: Who?

POWELL: Sir Binnacle Rao was on the Security Council as the Indian
representative.

GLADWYN: Yes he was, yes.

POWELL: And I remember the remark of The Economist at the time: that General Woo did all the "Raoing" and Sir Binnacle Rao did all the "Wooing". (laughter)

GLADWYN: They liked it. I had forgotten that. But they liked it. Sir Binnacle Rao was a blameless character, very nice. General Woo was rather tough, but a good chap.

POWELL: Well, do you have any final thoughts you want to give us before we terminate this interview?

GLADWYN: No. I think it must go on, and peg away, and I think it's just not necessary to be completely gloomy. Unless, as I say, you have the impression of the human race as gone mad. I remember that—slightly at the end of the interview—when we were in San Francisco, the Russians had a Legal Advisor called Golunsky. And he was very gloomy, he died of consumption shortly after this, but he was very gloomy, very nice, and we fraternized. He used to come dine with us, you see. And found out he was about the gloomiest man in the world. He thought that the human race was devouring the fair face of nature, and it was like a sort of proliferation of bacilli, which had gone out of hand, you see, and the population were going mad and it was a staggering proliferation of bacilli, which unless checked, would absolutely devour nature and reduce the world to an impossible desert. The great thing therefore, was to check this proliferation, you see. He had hopes that there might be a plague: this was before the explosion of the atom bomb; he had hopes that
there would be a plague, you see, and something would happen. Otherwise, he thought we were completely doomed. And that was that. He was a very gloomy man indeed. There was something in it, though—

POWELL: That's a sideline on San Francisco I had never heard before.

GLADWYN: This was Golunsky, a very nice man, but he was very gloomy.

POWELL: But you enjoyed San Francisco.

GLADWYN: Oh yes, it was great fun, yes. Oh, they had Jimmy Dunn, I used to cooperate with him very much.(?) I remember particularly Alger Hiss, very much.

POWELL: I was going to ask you, you took over from Hiss, but—

GLADWYN: No, I never liked him very much. He was a very arrogant man, I thought.

POWELL: Yes. Well, thank you very much, Lord Gladwyn, I'm delighted that you were able to give this time to us, (Gladwyn interjects: not a bit, I hope it was useful?) and if we have a supplementary question or two, we may Eric Jensen of the London Information Centre to locate you in London and put you in front of a microphone again.

GLADWYN: Certainly. I was going to get ready for this monster party. They're going to be two hundred people at dinner . . .

END OF SIDE TWO.

END OF INTERVIEW