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BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for being with us beginning today. As we have proceeded with this very interesting and useful exchange of views, we have the opportunity to ask you some questions concerning the Treaty of Tlatelolco. And now I would like, with your permission, to deal with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and I would like to know how you see this treaty, in particular, the basic provisions contained thereon in connection with the questions dealt with by the treaty.

GARCIA ROBLES: Well, as the title of the treaty indicates, its purpose is non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I would like to stress that when we discussed this matter both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly, it was emphasized several times -- as a matter of fact it was constantly emphasized by the states belonging to the Third World or to the non-nuclear world, if you wish -- that non-proliferation should be understood as covering horizontal non-proliferation and vertical non-proliferation. That means that the number of states possessing nuclear weapons should not increase, but also that the number of these terrible instruments of mass destruction in the power of the nuclear states should not increase.
Now you asked me which are the most important articles, in my opinion. Well, they are Articles 1 and 2 which deal with the horizontal non-proliferation, and Article 6 which deals with the vertical non-proliferation.

There are other articles, no doubt, which are also important. Earlier I mentioned Article 4 in which it is said that nothing in the treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Article 5, which deals with an aspect of this peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, which at the time was considered, could become very important. That has not been the case, in my opinion, but it was the explosions, peaceful nuclear explosions, and to that purpose is devoted, Article 5.

But the most important in my opinion, I repeat, are Articles 1 and 2 which deal with the horizontal non-proliferation, and Article 6 which deals with the vertical non-proliferation.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. What factors would you mention as having added momentum to efforts aimed at concluding the treaty?

GARCIA ROBLES: Well, there have been, as you recall, an increase in the number of states possessing
nuclear weapons. China has detonated a nuclear device in 1964 and that gave more strength to the rumors and speculations as to several other states which could also become nuclear weapons states. I think that was the main factor.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. To what extent were other countries consulted while the super powers were drafting their joint proposal before it was introduced in the 18-nation Disarmament Committee?

GARCIA ROBLES: I must confess I don't know. It may be that each of the super powers consulted with the members of each respective alliance. But concerning the other states, the states which ... the states belonging to the Group of 21. The non-aligned and neutral states, I think we learned of the text when it was first distributed.

On the other hand, that was not strange. It was more or less in the same manner in which the super powers have proceeded. But naturally, that didn't mean that they considered the text which was circulated as a sacrosanct text which could not be changed. It was supposed that it was a preliminary draft of which any comments or any observations will be dutifully examined or considered.
BERASATEGDI: Thank you very much. That might also lead us to another question dealing with the role that you played in the consideration of this issue by the UNDC. Would you care to comment about it?

GARCIA ROBLES: At that time, as you probably recall, I was not in Geneva. I was Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, especially for Multilateral Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico. I used to come every year, but I was permanently there. So in the discussions here, the role I played was quite the smallest. But obviously, as you I am sure are fully aware, the action of the representative in Geneva needs to be in accordance with the opinion of the heads and the competent officers of the foreign office.

So in that respect, naturally yes, I played a role in the sense that I received the reports and I sent the instructions. But it was mentioned in particular one point which was dealt with while I was there and which I did not personally participate in the discussion but which was a very important one, and that is precisely the question of the inclusion of this Article 6 in the treaty. That was done, I repeat, while I was in the foreign office. Then in my personal capacity here, well it was merely to strengthen that in the discussions which
followed and to strengthen also what was to become Article 4 of the treaty.

Later on, because as you know, this draft treaty was examined by the Assembly on two occasions. It was examined by the assembly in the fall of 1967 and in the spring of 1968. In the fall of 1967, it was not possible yet to reach agreement and it went back to Geneva. Then again some minor modifications were made to the draft treaty and it came back quite improved, in our opinion and in the opinion of the neutral and non-aligned countries. It came back to a special session of the Assembly which was held in the spring of 1968. It was in this session where the draft treaty was finally approved.

It had become, I must add in this connection, it had become customary that whenever a draft treaty was sent by the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly, although in theory it was still open to improvements to amendments by the Assembly when it was considered by it, in practice, the super powers who as you recall were at that time the co-presidents, the co-chairmen of the committee of Geneva, were not willing to accept any modification. In this case they realized that if they wanted the treaty to be approved and to be approved by a substantial majority, it was necessary to make still some changes.
As a spokesman, on one of them I took the initiative. On the other one it was a joint initiative, but I had the privilege of acting as a spokesman from the non-aligned and neutral countries for two amendments which were introduced in the spring of '68, two amendments of substance which I repeat, had the characteristic of being something unusual.

The first amendment, you will find it in the preamble of the treaty, and it is the addition in the last paragraph of the treaty of a specific measure to the fact that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted -- this was the addition -- "with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources." That did not exist in the text which came from Geneva.

And the other addition which also was made at that session of the spring of '68 was the addition which you will find in Article 5 where it says, in the last part of the article that "Non-nuclear weapons states party to the treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, that is, the benefits which may derive from peaceful nuclear explosions, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of
non-nuclear weapons states. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear weapons states party to the treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements."

This last part existed, but what I said about the "international agreement or agreements and the appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear weapons states" was an addition which was made in New York.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. This is a very important point, the one you mentioned, I believe, because if memory doesn't fail me, this is the only occasion when the treaty, coming from the negotiating body, has been amended at the level of the General Assembly. It has never happened either before or after the NPT. It is the only case where in the General Assembly this has been done if, as I said, memory doesn't fail me. But I am sure that this is the situation.

Probably it's because of the fact that The New York times has recently mentioned your role in the elaboration of the treaty as that of a co-author. And I think in that respect one should keep in mind the fact that when the NPT was concluded there was already the experience of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
A lot of questions of significance for a N.P.T. have already been discussed and settled in the context of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and I feel that in that sense, one could also say that the Treaty of Tlatelolco produced additional impetus to reach agreement on the text of the non-proliferation treaty, although in many respects it is obvious that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is much more advanced than the NPT.

Berasategui: If you allow me, sir, could I ask you now, how well do you think that countries have lived up to the letter and spirit of the NPT?

GARCIA ROBLES: Well, there I think it will be necessary to make a clear differentiation. In my opinion, the non-nuclear weapons states have observed faithfully the commitments, the obligations they undertook in the treaty. On the other hand, it is unfortunate, but that is also completely exact, that the nuclear weapons states have treated as a dead letter, those commitments and obligations which they had contracted concerning Article 6 and also concerning the preamble, where as you will recall, they reiterated the obligation, the undertaking they had accepted in 1963 in the partial test ban treaty concerning the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests.

But to illustrate only the first of these obligations I mentioned and namely the obligation of
Article 6, that is to cease the nuclear arms race and to make something to achieve one day nuclear disarmament.

The two super powers with the most reliable figures which are at our disposal, they had in 1968 together 5,400 strategic nuclear warheads. In 1982, they had 18,000 nuclear warheads of the same quality. That is, strategic nuclear warheads. That is more than three times the number of '68. That speaks more eloquently than a long speech I could make on this subject.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you, Ambassador. How do you view the prospects for the treaty and for non-proliferation in general?

GARCIA ROBLES: Well, I had the opportunity to talk in a bilateral manner, so to speak, to high level representatives of almost all of the depositaries of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. And I had told them with the utmost frankness that we cannot do anything, that is the non-nuclear weapons states, for the future of the treaty, that the future of the treaty is in their hands, that in my opinion the only thing which can strengthen the treaty and the regime of non-proliferation, of horizontal non-proliferation, the only thing is compliance with the undertakings they, the nuclear weapons states, accepted in 1968. So they need to prove with deeds, not with words, that Article 6 means something for them.
BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Therefore, the forthcoming review conference of the NPT to be held in 1985 will certainly be a most important development in connection with the future of the treaty. Am I right in assuming that?

GARCIA ROBLES: You are quite right. I have participated in the two previous conferences. In the conference of 1975, as you know, it was possible to approve a declaration; a declaration which has been drafted by the chairperson of that gathering, Ms. Inga Parson. And it was as a recognition of her efforts that the Group of 77 States, parties to the treaty, accepted -- and I know it very well because I happened to be the coordinator of that group at that session -- accepted then that this declaration be made by consensus with the understanding that that consensus was to be interpreted in what concerned the Group of 77 I referred to, in the light of the declaration to be made on that occasion, a declaration which as you know is reproduced verbatim immediately after the declaration of ... and in that declaration it is said that the provisions of the declaration should be understood in the light of the proposals presented by the group of non-aligned and neutral states, in particular by the provisions of the protocols represented by those states.
So as a maximum concession, we accepted to give at least the appearance of consensus for the declaration. But then for the second review conference as you know, not even that was possible to achieve. The second review conference was a failure. And the third review conference will be still a bigger failure if nothing changes between now and then, which is regrettable because ... the non-proliferation treaty is something which is of interest to all the states of the world and all the peoples of the world. But to recognize that, we must act in accordance with the solemn undertakings of 1968.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. May I now turn to your tenure as permanent representative to the United Nations headquarters? May I ask you what led to your appointment as Mexico's permanent representative to the UN in 1971? And also, what were the main issues that you dealt with during those years?

GARCIA ROBLES: There were many issues of importance during those five years I spent in New York. But if you ask me which were the main issues, I will say they were of an economic nature. It was during that period, as you recall, that Algeria asked the convening of a special session of the General Assembly and that special
session introduced, as you also will recall, a declaration and a program of action on the establishment of a new international economic order.

The year after came before the Assembly what was to become the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. This charter was presented, was elaborated, as a result of an initiative from Mexico. And up to the last moment we had hoped that the charter could be adopted by consensus. Unfortunately, that was not the case, although the number of negatives votes was very small. The charter, as you know, is still in existence and I do hope that one day that chapter may become a document, an instrument which may obtain approval in the positive attitude of all countries in the world.

There were also during that period some other questions, these ones very controversial. As for instance, there was the question of the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the invitation to Chairman Arafat. There was also these questions of the policy of Zionism and a resolution of the General Assembly which equated Zionism to a racist policy. As you remember the votes on that resolution, and Mexico was one of those who voted in favor of the resolution. And the delegation of Mexico
explained in detail which were the reasons of principle which have moved Mexico to vote in favor of that resolution.

It happened, as you know, appointed minister of foreign affairs at the end of '75. And so from the 28th or 29th of December of last year I was in the foreign office of Mexico, in charge of the foreign office of Mexico. And a few weeks later, the minister of foreign affairs of Israel came to Mexico in a state visit because he had been invited since the previous year by my predecessor in the ministry of foreign affairs.

I remember that I offered to him, as is customary in those cases, a luncheon in the ministry of foreign affairs. But inasmuch as I believe in being frank and I believe in truth and frankness in international relations, I took the opportunity, both in my private conversations with him and in the speech I delivered at the luncheon, to point out that Mexico and Israel may differ sometimes in questions of belonging to the United Nations, in questions treated in the United Nations, but that that should not be an obstacle to Israel and Mexico having good cordial relations. We were both sovereign states and we, in what concerns Mexico, would never be willing to mortgage our sovereign right of our decision in international questions.
He understood it quite well and in his speech he said that he shared that point of view. So I think this proved that perhaps this position to which I referred before of being frank and truthful, pays sometimes in order to clarify the international atmosphere.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. It's been very interesting; the fact that you mentioned the importance of international economic relations during that particular period. Would you feel that that particular moment in the field of international economic relations there was an atmosphere propitious for conciliation and negotiation rather than confrontation between the north and the south, let's say.

GARCIA ROBLES: You mean during the seventh special session?

BERASATEGUI: Exactly.

GARCIA ROBLES: Yes, I will say so. I will say that that was the prevailing atmosphere and I do hope that that may continue in the future. I think that as you know at present the -- well, we shouldn't call them perhaps economic issues, preferably call them financial problems. The financial problems can become more acute. But I do hope that the fact that they have been discussed, thoroughly discussed by a considerable number of Latin
American countries on the one hand, and that I hope that with the same thoroughness they will continue to be discussed and with a spirit of understanding, I underline, by the industrialized and the banking countries of the world. Perhaps that will help to resuscitate and to reinforce that spirit of conciliation to which you referred to rightly a moment ago.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you, Ambassador. May I ask you now, while you headed the Mexican mission in New York, what changes did you observe in the way multilateral diplomacy was conducted at the UN?

GARCIA ROBLES: First, no doubt the situation as to the participating states in the United Nations was quite different at the beginning of the organization and in the time when I was here as the representative of Mexico. I am sure you will recall that at the beginning there were I think 59 states and then in the moment I was here it was not yet the 158 as it is now. But it was not far from that number.

So obviously, that immediately implies a difference in the discussions and in the decisions. And it should be mentioned that there was certainly a trend to make every effort to reach consensus in the decisions.
understanding on the part of the states -- you may call them Group of 77, Third World countries or neutral and non-aligned countries -- there was a clear understanding and they emphasized that on different occasions that this should not undermine or modify the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

So that means that you would make every effort. If you succeed, well, all the better. But if you don't succeed, if you fail, then you have applied the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. I must say that that is still, in my opinion, the case in the proceedings of the assembly. I have been participating in those proceedings uninterruptedly since I began to come here in 1967 with the exception of two years and a half which I spent as ambassador of Mexico to Brazil from '81 to '84.

All the other years I have been coming here to the General Assembly as the representative of Mexico in the first committee. And I have the clear impression that that position I just outlined is still the same, and that is why you see, if you examine that useful document published by the D.P.I., which by the way, I hope, again will be received with the same opportunity as in the past, when it was received one week after the assembly came to an end.
But as you can realize, if you examine that document, you will see that there are several resolutions which are approved by consensus but there are many others which are approved through vote. And in the vote sometimes, most of the times I will say, the resolutions are approved by an overwhelming number of positive votes and by a small number of negative votes. Something which I think it's a new factor during the past three or four years, you will notice that that number is so small that very often it's only one, which is ... and I don't need to say who is the one.

So in my opinion, I repeat, the situation was in that respect more or less the same at that time as it is now.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. In connection with what the UN is today and the possibility for comparison with what the UN was at the time of San Francisco, would you care to comment about it, what your views are? Because you were so actively involved in the actual drafting of the Charter that you could eventually give us a very useful indication of how you see the organization today as compared with what it was immediately after or during San Francisco? Would you mind assessing these two UN's, let's say?
GARCIA ROBLES: Immediately before San Francisco I think most of the countries, if not all, had the hope, the fervent hope I would say, that the United Nations was going to mark the beginning of a new era, that the lessons, the terrible lessons of the world war would help to banish forever the use of force in international relations, that the use of force, as the Charter clearly stated, would be permitted -- and in that it was a very substantial progress in comparison with the pact of the League of Nations -- were to be permitted only, exclusively in two cases.

First, in the case of self-defense, legitimate self-defense, but not the self-defense which any state would say, "Hey, I'm acting in self-defense now." No. In the case of self-defense against armed attack. That was a quite clear objective element.

And then the second, when the state was asked to participate by the United Nations in a collective action. That is Article 7 of the Charter which as you know, unfortunately had not yet been implemented. So in that respect it was an idealistic attitude which prevailed.

And immediately after the San Francisco conference when the United Nations met in London and then when from London they came to New York, I think that still
 existed. It did not last long, we must recognize, and perhaps the fault belongs to all the members of the United Nations. But I would say that it belongs mainly to the permanent members of the Security Council.

And so, what I said, I found also concrete proof, not only in the Assembly, not only in the meetings with the other principal organs of the United Nations but also in the Secretariat of the United Nations. Except as you know I was on loan from the foreign service of Mexico during 10 years and I was director of the political affairs division of the Secretariat from 1946 till the beginning of 1957. From August 1946 till April 1957.

Well, during that time, especially during the first part of that period, because 10 years was too long and that gradually the situation had begun to change. But during the first two or three years, it was clear that the members of the Secretariat of the United Nations believed in what they were doing. They were acting with enthusiasm for an ideal.

Unfortunately, as you know very well, perhaps in the Secretariat there still exists the opinion that however unfavorable the international conditions are, they are still doing a good job, a useful job, and I do share that belief. But at the same time, it is clear that
no one could now have the same feelings which we had during the end of the 1940s.

And then as to the votes in the various organs, you know very well that these votes, whether in the Security Council or in the Assembly, many of them are discouraging for anyone who takes seriously the provisions of the chapter.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. If you would agree, we would now move to disarmament and I would like to ask you a brief question in connection with the relationship between the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its protocols on one hand, and the United Nations and particular the General Assembly, on the other hand.

Not only since the treaty was open for signature in February 1967, but even before that there has been an obvious relationship between the idea of democratization of Latin America on the hand, and the activities of the UN in the fate of disarmament. And I believe that you have a very significant role in that respect from the very inception of the idea of making Latin America a nuclear weapon free zone. Would you care to comment about it?

GARCIA ROBLES: Yes. As I said a few moments ago, I have been in the Secretariat on loan from
the foreign service of Mexico from 1946 till 1957. Director of the political affairs division. Consequently, I have a thorough knowledge of the work being done by the Secretariat in the political field, in the field of disarmament.

I have known intimately several of the chiefs of section of the division who worked in that field, and I have reached the conclusion that for carrying out successfully a project of the type which was necessary for the treaty, originally called the Treaty for the Denuclearization of Latin America and subsequently and finally called the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, it would be most advisable to proceed in intimate association with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

And that is why when in 1965 the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America which was known with the acronym COPREDAL, since COPREDAL began its work at the beginning of 1965 I thought that it would be a very good opportunity for establishing that association. So I suggested -- and the commission of which I was chairman immediately accepted my suggestion -- I suggested that we invite the Secretary General of the United Nations to send a competent official to help the
COPREDAL in the drafting of the provisions which would be probably the most delicate provisions of the treaty dealing with verification and control.

And in that ... I repeat, I knew very well the officers, I sent the communication officially to the Secretary General, but I made it known to him through one of my friends in the Secretariat that I thought that the right person for that job would be William Epstein, William Epstein who was at that time chief of the Section on Disarmament.

And then the Secretary General immediately accepted. Mr. Epstein went to Mexico and we began the work on the drafting of those provisions. And I must say that perhaps I was not mistaken in my appraisal, because usually as you know, in any treaty or convention dealing with disarmament matters, perhaps the most difficult provisions are those dealing with verification and control. In the case of the Tlatelolco Treaty, those provisions on verification and control were the first to be accepted by the preparatory commission.

I was lucky that on the Mexican side we had also two or three very competent officers in this connection. I will mention one of them who was the main one. It is our present ambassador to Japan, who is well
known in the United Nations. He has been here several times. Mr. Sergio Gonzalez Galvez.

Well, Gonzalez Galvez together with William Epstein and two or three other junior officers of Mexico got together one day. They began at six o'clock in the afternoon, they ended perhaps at two or three in the morning, but they completed the essential draft provisions for that particular aspect of the treaty. And so that came then before the COPREDAL the next day. It was discussed, they were examined, and they were tentatively approved two or three days later.

They were not changed later on and they became an example and they became an inducement for the members of the commission to act as fast as possible with the other provisions. And it is proceeding in that matter, as you know, we were able to finish the whole treaty in two years which, for anyone who knows the time it takes to discuss matters on disarmament, it is really a record.

BERASATEGUI: I fully agree with you, Mr. Ambassador.

GARCIA ROBLES: But then that was just the beginning. When finally we had the treaty approved by the COPREDAL and opened to signature, it was approved February
12, 1967 and signed that very day by the representatives of 14 states on the 14th of February 1967. And the next step was that we send that to the General Assembly.

Well, if I have to go back, I think it's worth mentioning also that even before the COPREDAL, after the five presidents declaration of 1963, after that in the General Assembly of that year, I suggested that we put forward a draft resolution. I drafted it myself and I had the cooperation of nine other representatives of Latin America states.

Together with them, with the co-sponsorship of 10 Latin America states, we presented the draft to the General Assembly in 1963 and the General Assembly adopted it, as you recall. And it said that it welcomed the declaration of the presidents first, and second, that it asked the Secretary General to give to the Latin America states whenever they would request it -- and that is why my request later on was granted immediately -- whenever they would request it that the Secretary General grant them the necessary support and the necessary cooperation. That was the first step and second step again, on connection with the verification of procedures to which I referred just now.

Then what was the next step? The next step was that, as you know, the committee on disarmament met
usually before on the third Tuesday of February if I am correct. In any case, providentially, this Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened to signature on the 14th of February. I flew to Geneva and took the text of the treaty which was still, if we were to say that it was a piece of bread, it was still warm from the fire, and I took it to Geneva and I presented it to the conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

And then I did the same, but at greater length, during the next Assembly which was the Assembly of '67. I did the same in New York. And since that very moment, since the presentation of the treaty to the Assembly in '67 and in the resolution which the Assembly approved that year, a paragraph was included with the invitation to all the states which had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the treaty, and the invitation to the states to which Protocols 1 and 2 were opened, to sign and ratify such protocols.

As you know, since then it became a custom and year after year until the five nuclear weapons states signed and ratified Protocol 2, there has always been a resolution by the General Assembly. And even now, I repeat, Protocol 2 has been signed and ratified by all the five nuclear weapons states and when Protocol 1 has been
signed by all the four states to which it is open, and has been ratified by three of them. There is only one missing which is France. Even now, year after year, the Assembly repeats its invitation to France to ratify that protocol.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. If you allow me now, I would like to turn to the first special session of the General Assembly that voted for disarmament and there are few points that I would like to mention in that connection.

I would like to have your views concerning the significance of the final document adopted at the first special session. And particularly so, since you had a very prominent role, decisive role, I would say, in the adoption of the final document.

I remember that at that time and for quite a while in the last stages of work of the session you were appointed supercoordinator in the negotiations leading to the final text, a supercoordinator who was coordinating the work of chairmen and coordinators of drafting groups, etc. It was, I remember, a very difficult and long exercise with no weekends, no evenings free, nothing.

But I would like to listen to your comments about the first special session, the significance of the final document, what the consequences are of that first
I think the preparatory committee of this special session held four sessions. Am I correct?

BERASATEGUI: I think so, yes.

GARCIA ROBLES: Held four sessions. And during those four sessions we succeeded in preparing a substantial part of what was to become the final document. But as it happens in these cases, many of these paragraphs were still written in brackets which meant that no agreement had been possible yet.

In the special session of the Assembly the chairman, Ortiz de Rosas and with the cooperation of the representative of the Secretary General who was a very valuable member of the Secretariat, especially in the field of disarmament -- and the best proof is that now he is I think the chairman or the president of the executive committee of SIPRI -- was Ralph Bjornstead.

Well, Ralph Bjornstead cooperated very constructively with Carlos Ortiz de Rosas. And yes, Ortiz de Rosas had the support and the cooperation of the small group of officials among which I was one of them. But if I remember correctly, it was decided that there would be a certain small number of working groups to deal with the various sections of what was to be called the final document.
nuclear weapons. But for having something of the nature of the final document, it has been necessary to wait a little more than 30 years. And it was only in '78, as you know, that the Assembly approved, and approved by consensus. And the letters recall here that even two years ago in '62, the Assembly solemnly and categorically -- those are the terms of the concluding document of the second special session -- reaffirmed the validity of that final document.

Well, it was necessary, I repeat, to wait more than 30 years to adopt by consensus the final document which is a synthesis of what I will call the United Nations disarmament philosophy. You can call it also strategy. I prefer philosophy because the philosophy has principles, has purposes, has everything which is in the final document.

The role which I played there is not as important as you kindly said. It was one of your compatriots, Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas who, as you know, was the chairman of the only committee which the Assembly had. The normal assemblies have seven committees. But this Assembly had only one committee, an Ad-Hoc committee which dealt with the question of examining, discussing the eventual provisions of the final document and then giving a final approval to them.
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Well, Ralph Bjornstead cooperated very constructively with Carlos Ortiz de Rosas. And yes, Ortiz de Rosas had the support and the cooperation of the small group of officials among which I was one of them. But if I remember correctly, it was decided that there would be a certain small number of working groups to deal with the various sections of what was to be called the final document.
The first one was to deal with the introduction, the second one with the declaration, the third and fourth, because that part was very lengthy, with the program of action, and the fifth with machinery.

I was lucky and given the first one, the introduction. The introduction of the final document, as you know and does anyone who has read it knows, is not the usual introduction which just tells you this study or this work comprises of many parts, this is this, that is that, just a description of the contents. No, it's a substantive introduction.

We began to work and I had the good fortune of finishing first. So the job on the introduction was finished first and we approved that by consensus and so we sent it to the chairman of the ad hoc committee, here is the text and we have now no job. And it is because of that that then I was asked to act as what I think it was the magazine Disarmament Times which first used the term, as the supercoordinator. That means one who is entrusted with the coordination of the work of the other working groups.

And then with the good will and strenuous efforts on the part of all, we finally succeeded, and in the, it was I think the early hours -- it was past
midnight in any case of that date -- we approved the final document and then in the ad hoc committee that came to the Assembly in plenary the next day where there were about 40 or 45 or 50 interventions. Most of the explanations of votes you cannot do anything else in those cases. And I think at that moment we did not appraise yet in all its value what we had done.

It is only from the year after, and in particular as time goes by, that we have been appraising the exact value of that final document which I will not hesitate in calling it, I already said, that it is the document which defines the United Nations disarmament philosophy. I also sometimes call it the Bible for Disarmament.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. May I only add to what you say, first of all, that I believe that it took much more than luck for you to be the first to conclude successfully your part of the final document, and also the fact that the title of supercoordinator, that word I think was used by Ambassador Ortiz de Rosas himself when he proposed your your nomination to the ad hoc committee of this special session.

I am sure that I am not mistaken about that point, too. So it became very well known, not only
unofficially, but also officially in the records of the General Assembly.

Mr. Ambassador, now going back to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which was held in 1982, obviously the success of the first was not repeated in the second. There were some, I believe positive results, which I would like to ask your views of course about them. But certainly, the political situation has changed and in spite of the hopes that we might eventually conclude the Comprehensive Program on Disarmament, we were not able to succeed in the adoption of that document.

Could you comment on the second special session and if possible, compare the situation then with what it was at the time of the first special session of the General Assembly?

GARCIA ROBLES: There had been, as you know, a very favorable evolution of the relations between the two super powers between '78 and '82. After '82, we still had a positive element that was the signing in Vienna in 1979 of the SALT II treaty. I still remember. I was here in Geneva. I still remember that the two heads of the delegations which had signed that treaty in Vienna came to Geneva and made an oral report to the conference, to the
CCD. But as you know, for one of the super powers the treaty has never been ratified by it. As far as I know, it has not been ratified by any of the two. But one of them has constantly said that it is ready to ratify it anytime. Whereas the other one, no.

So I think there intervene, unfortunately, elements of internal politics. Because you cannot understand it otherwise. The two super powers have said several times that although they have not yet ratified it, they will live up to the obligations contracted in the treaty. Well, it must not be so bad, the treaty, if they are observing it in practice.

The situation was, I think, the one which the members of, today, the Group of 21 said both in Geneva and in New York and which is said in the resolution which the Assembly approved that same year of 1979, the situation was that we didn't think that the SALT II treaty was what we had been awaiting. No, we didn't think that it gave us those substantial reductions and important qualitative limitations which the Assembly has been asking year after year on the initiative of the non-aligned and neutral countries. But it represented a step forward even if it is a minor step forward.

So we welcomed the treaty. And immediately after that in another paragraph of the resolution you will
find that we said that we expected that immediately after the ratification the two major nuclear weapons states should act in accordance with the declaration of principles which was also part of the same document signed in Vienna. And in the declaration of principles it was said that they should continue immediately negotiations with the purpose, with the objective, of carrying out these substantial reductions and important qualitative limitations. But unfortunately, I repeat -- and in my opinion -- it is mainly due to internal politics of one of the super powers, that has not been possible.

That was the situation then which we contemplated in 1982, but that was just a symptom of the relations existing between the two super powers. You know very well that they have become gradually more and more apart and they have worsened. And then it is not a surprise that what we consider could be or should have been the main achievement of the second special session in the Assembly, namely a Comprehensive Program on Disarmament. It was impossible to adopt it.

What positive results, then, achieved the second special session? Well, in comparison with what we expected, very minor. One of them was what I mentioned already, the very solemn and categorical reaffirmation of
the validity of the final document of '78. The second one was the launching of the world disarmament campaign which had been proposed by Mexico in 1980 and then which became a reality in 1982. It was proposed at the opening meeting of the second special session. Those are, in my opinion, the main results of the second special session.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. In connection with the Comprehensive Program on Disarmament, would you care to comment on the main problems which prevented the adoption of the CPD at the second special session? And also how you see the future in connection with the Comprehensive Program on Disarmament. I understand that the Conference on Disarmament should renew its work and report to the General Assembly to the 41st Session in 1986.

Would you care to comment on how you see the future activities in addition to these problems with which we are confronted?

GARCIA ROBLES: Yes. The last program which we submitted which the Comprehensive Program on Disarmament working group at that time, you will recall the subsidiary organs of the Committee on Disarmament were called working groups. Now it will be called the ad hoc committee.
Well, the draft text which we submitted was some quite ambitious text, and consequently, in view of the bad state of the relations between the two super powers, which had all sorts of consequences from the standpoint of positions and principles, diametrically different positions between the two military alliances, because of that it was obvious that the Assembly would not be able to adopt a program which we may call an ambitious program which we submitted to it.

The text we sent from Geneva was a text which, 70% of it was between brackets. It would have been really a surprise if the Assembly in the conditions I have outlined would have been able to glean from brackets those texts. What did we do then? The Assembly sent it back to Geneva and ask that the Committee on Disarmament try to endeavor to send a revised text to the 38th Session.

And I recall that we said to the members of the Comprehensive Program, to the members of the subsidiary organ, I told them here, "Well, we must be realistic. At this time it will be impossible to have a text like this with no brackets. The Assembly has asked us to review this text and to send the text back, a revised text to the 38th Session. We cannot perform miracles, but let us try to do then whatever we can for a
less, much less ambitious text than the one we send them. And I would suggest to you that we do the following:

"Whenever we have a particular text with a particular paragraph in which we cannot, after a reasonable period of discussion, where we cannot achieve agreement, let us use the corresponding text of the final document which I hope nobody will refuse to maintain the consensus of '78 and let us put it there."

That is what we did. And that is how, as you know, we succeeded in presenting to the Assembly at the 38th Session a text which has practically no brackets. It has some blank spaces with an asterisk on the bottom saying this is being discussed, or an indication on the corresponding paragraph between parentheses saying "This is not yet agreed," something like that. I will mention later on which are those paragraphs. But you can count them with the fingers of your two hands and you'll have a few fingers left. I am sure they are not dead. And the rest was entirely clean of brackets.

But what the Assembly had said then when it examined that, they said, "All right, let us see if we can reach agreement here on those very few paragraphs on which it was not possible in Geneva." Well, let me give you an example of those paragraphs.
One paragraph, it would be the paragraph which in the text we sent from Geneva had No. 5. And it says, "USSR-United States Strategic Arms Negotiations." And then, "(Consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the text are underway.)" Those are then the Strategic Arms Negotiations.

Then 6, "Bilateral Negotiations on the Limitations and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons in Europe." Again, "(Consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the text are underway.)"

Then you come to Paragraph 8. "Avoidance of the use of Nuclear Weapon and Prevention of Nuclear War. (Text Pending.)"

There are three or four more, but they are much less important this. But these three are very good examples to illustrate how difficult it would have been. I would say it was impossible, not difficult, to reach agreement in the Assembly. And the best proof of it is that the Strategic Arms Negotiations and the Bilateral Intermediate Nuclear Weapons Negotiations of that time not only have not made progress, but as you know, have been interrupted, have been broken down.
So the Assembly then, in my opinion, proceeded in a realistic way. What did it do? It sent it back to the committee which is now the conference, and it asked the conference to submit to the next session -- that is the 39th -- a progress report. It didn't say a new text or revised text, etc., because it was obvious that it was impossible and that nothing would happen between the last session and the 59th which would permit us to reach agreement.

So a progress report. And what else? Well, to renew its work on the elaboration of the drafter Comprehensive Program on Disarmament in order to enable the Conference on Disarmament to submit a complete draft program to the 41st Session of the General Assembly in 1986. That, I think, if there is good will on the part of all states, in particular of the two super powers, it should be feasible, because 1986, it is two years again.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. May I now turn to another subject which is being considered, or should be under consideration now in the Conference on Disarmament? And it comes to my mind also in connection with the third review conference of the NPT which we discussed before, and this is the question of the achievement of a nuclear test ban.
In particular, I would like to know how you see the situation at present in connection with this very important item? Mainly, what are the problems to be solved before an agreement can be reached? And also, if you see any need for further work on issues related to verification of and compliance with the treaty, with the nuclear test ban treaty.

GARCIA ROBLES: In my opinion, the main issues to be reviewed by the next third review conference on the NPT are those which I have already mentioned before. The question of compliance with the obligations imposed by the treaty on the nuclear weapons states. That is to what extent, if any, has Article 6 of the treaty been implemented? And to what extent, if any, have the provisions of the preamble of the treaty with the nuclear weapons tests have been implemented?

Then you say, what could the Conference on Disarmament do? Again, I repeat what I said before. Those who can do something in this connection are the nuclear weapons states and in particular, the three nuclear weapons states which are depositaries to the treaty. That is, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. But what could we do here?

Well, we could perhaps do something if we were to proceed as we have been trying to do it since the
inception of the Committee on Disarmament, to proceed to encourage, to invite, to urge those nuclear weapons states to at least begin by taking action in connection with this issue which has plagued the United Nations for a quarter of a century, for more than a quarter of a century. That is, the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests.

And you asked me which are the main problems, that is, those that I see, and whether I think that the issues of verification for the compliance of the treaty have the importance which some countries seem to attach to them.

In this connection, I am of the same opinion of the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, who in 1972 -- that is 12 years ago -- said in the message he addressed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that the only thing which was needed was political will, that there was no issue, no aspect of this problem which had not been exhaustively examined, exhaustively discussed by the United Nations. The only remaining question left, he said, is having political will.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. In connection also with another very important issue in the agenda of the CD, the question of
the prevention of nuclear war. How can the Conference on Disarmament contribute to deal with this most important and urgent issue? And what would be, in your opinion, the most significant measures that could be taken in that respect?

GARCIA ROBLES: They are all in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. You can take the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament; one, a comprehensive test ban; two, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; three, prevention of nuclear war; and I think four, prevention of an arms race in outer space. And those are, in my opinion, concrete measures which have particular importance for the prevention of nuclear war.

There are others which are not so specifically included, although implicitly they are, and you will find many specific references to them in the intervention through delegations. I could mention to you two or three of the delegation of Mexico. One of them is the freeze, the freeze of nuclear weapons. And the other one is the prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.

As you know, China and the Soviet Union, the first in '54, the second in '82, have both renounced to the first use of nuclear weapons. And the delegation of
Mexico has suggested that the other three make similar declarations and that immediately the five begin negotiations in order to conclude a treaty, a convention, a protocol, whatever you wish to call it, for giving full binding legal force to such a committee.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Ambassador. You mentioned, among the measures which might assist us in preventing nuclear war, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament which is also on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. And in that connection, may I ask you a question concerning a particular subject to which I believe you have given a lot of thought? And it's the following:

Either a presence in the absence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear issues among the two major powers or even why they were being held -- hopefully they would be held in the future -- how can the Conference on Disarmament make a contribution to the solution of problems in this field? Particularly, I am thinking on the connection between bilateral negotiations on the one hand and the multilateral negotiations that should be held on the Conference on Disarmament, and in particular, the relationship between those bilateral talks and the Conference on Disarmament.
GARCIA ROBLES: I think it's a very pertinent question you have made, and I think it should prove easy to the nuclear super powers to make use of the instrument which they have in the Conference on Disarmament in order to review their bilateral negotiation.

On the other hand, I don't think that a multilateral forum is a favorable forum for bilateral negotiations, even without the establishment of a subsidiary organ which would comprise only the two super powers.

Let me begin with the last point I make. You will recall that in 1962 the committee which was then known as the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee, had just been created by the Assembly at the end of '61. In March '62 it met for the first time in Geneva and a few days later it received two drafts for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. One from the Soviet Union, one from the United States.

Obviously, to negotiate general and complete disarmament under effective international control, that is mainly a business of the super powers. Everybody will understand that. But they themselves did not think that the fact of submitting that to a multilateral organ of 18 members would make in any way more difficult, or it would
create obstacles to the bilateral negotiations. Otherwise, it would be impossible to understand why they submit that. That is such an ambitious program.

But then even, I repeat, if they had changed their minds between 1962 and 1982, all right. You will recall that in the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament there is a specific provision, and I remember it very well because it was myself who suggested the inclusion of that there. So it is said there before the committee that the Conference on Disarmament is entitled, or may create subsidiary organs which will be open to all the members -- and then this is the addition which the delegation of Mexico suggested and which was approved by consensus then in 1979 -- unless the committee decides otherwise.

And I explained there that the reason why I was suggesting that was because the occasion may arise when the two super powers want to be alone. All right, let us give them the possibility of being alone. Then if the committee decides that this particular subsidiary organ will be limited to the two, it will be done that way. And that is why I have recalled that in Geneva, I have recalled that in New York.

They could do that if they so wish. They are here. They don't need to go to a new forum. They are
and they are members of the Conference on Disarmament ... so it will be enough to make use of that particular provision of the rules of procedure and they could immediately renew on a bilateral basis, but within the ... framework of the Conference on Disarmament and that I think will make perhaps things easier when the two super powers or any two negotiating states cannot reach immediate agreement. The contribution of a conciliator very often is decisive for achieving good results. But that, I think, gives an answer to what you were asking.

BERASATEGUI: Certainly, Ambassador. Thank you very much. Going now into the subject matter of chemical weapons, there have been some important moves lately in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The draft convention has been received by one member. Another member has expressed certain views on the question of verification of destruction of the stockpiles which seemed to open the way for some progress on this particular subject.

Would you care to comment on what you see as the prospects for concluding a convention on this question of chemical weapons and what would be the significance of such a treaty if concluded?

GARCIA ROBLES: I must say that in view of the existing circumstances, of the important items
included in the agenda of the Conference, this is the one which in my opinion offers more possibilities of substantial progress in the near future. That does not mean that I hope the Conference will be able to conclude a draft treaty or a draft convention in this year. But that means that in my opinion it can do some ... this year and perhaps finish the draft for next year.

What is the basis for that assessment? Well, it is the one you just referred to, these contributions of the two super powers and the fact, I should add, that fortunately, this subsidiary organ has an able and totally objective chairman, which is, as you know is Sweden's Ambassador Rekaos and I am sure that he will have the cooperation of everybody and I think that the structure which has been given to the working group, the creation inside of it of contact groups which have been created on a very logical basis make me hope that in this case we may achieve some progress.

Then you were asking me what would be the importance. Well, it would be very important. Here, it would not be only symbolic value. I think that immediately after nuclear weapons I would place chemical weapons as an instrument of mass destruction. It is not the case with chemical weapons as it was with the
biological weapons. You will remember that when it was possible to achieve agreement on that and adopt the convention not only to eliminate but to destroy everything. So it's exactly the same as here.

At that time, even that certain moment as you will recall, they were put together. But it was not the case, I repeat, it is not the case with chemical weapons, the case of what happened with the biological weapons. It was said at that time that had been possible to reach agreement because the generals have come to the conclusion that it will be as dangerous for the enemy as for the one who used the biological weapons because the winds will bring the bacteria from one side to the other.

Well, I don't know if that is correct, but in any case there is no doubt that from the military standpoint and from the standpoint of destruction, the chemical weapons come immediately after the nuclear weapons.

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Ambassador. You mentioned a few moments ago, among one of the important measures which could help us to prevent nuclear war, the question of an arms race in outer space. Would you care to comment about this?

GARCIA ROBLES: Yes. I think that from the various items on the agenda, perhaps this is the most
urgent one. From all that I have read, the situation which confronts the world at present in connection with the prevention of an arms race in outer space is quite similar, if not identical, to the situation the world confronted a few years ago when one of the super powers, the Soviet Union, was willing to enter immediately into negotiations in order to prohibit the weapons known by the acronym MIRV, multiple independent re-entry vehicles.

At that time, no one of the two super powers had such weapons. But it seems that the experts in the military field of the United States thought that the United States was pretty well advanced in that and that consequently it would be to their advantage not to negotiate. All right, they didn't negotiate, and they had the MIRVs and the Soviet Union did not have them for two years or three years. But after two or three years they had them. And I think that the experience proved that it is just a question of a little more time and there is no weapon which will be the exclusive preserve of one side.

Consequently if we embark in this, if we don't put a stop through negotiations to the question of the arms race in outer space, we will have a specialized race in that field which will last two, three, four more years and which will elevate to a higher level this dangerous competition between the two super powers.
BERRASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Before we move to the last questions, I would only wish to mention the remaining item on the agenda of the CD, that dealing with negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states which at present seems to be confronted with a stalemate.

Do you see any possibility for the Conference to proceed finally to a common formula, or are you in a way pessimistic about the chances that we might move forward in this particular field?

GARCIA ROBLES: As far as I remember, the desire of many if not all the non-nuclear weapons in connection with guarantees, that they be given one of these instruments called solemnly binding legal instruments. That is in a treaty a conventional protocol. For that, my opinion is that the best way if not the only, is the one which was followed in connection with Tlatelolco, that this protocol appended, or part of a treaty establishing a nuclear weapons free zone and that nuclear weapons free zone does not need to cover a continent, it can be a nuclear weapons free zone of two states.

BERRASATEGUI: Thank you very much. Yes, precisely this is one of the areas where certainly the Treaty of Tlatelolco has shown the way for the future.
May I, Mr. Ambassador, now go into the subject that was probably the most positive result of the second special session that the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the proclamation of the World Disarmament Campaign. We do know that you had a very important role in the launching of the campaign. As you said before, it was a Mexican proposal which you presented to the second special session.

Could I ask you what do you expect that the campaign should accomplish, particularly in view of the statement that you made on October 4, 1983 when you said that, and I quote, "Perhaps the voices of hundreds of millions of human beings of all areas north and south, east and west, may have a greater possibility of persuasion than the very scarce ones shown until now."

GARCIA ROBLES: The origin of the World Disarmament Campaign is to be found in a draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly in 1980 on the initiative of Mexico. If we go a little further, as you know, there is the advisory board on disarmament studies in which the members are there in their personal capacity. And I remember that one day one of my colleagues, because I am a member of that board, said, "Well, we are an advisory body on disarmament studies, but why shouldn't we put forward ideas as to possible studies?"
The idea seemed to be very good and the chairman of the advisory body said, "Well, all right, for the next meeting, tomorrow, I do hope that you will give me a piece of paper with your suggestions." Well, each one of us put forward a suggestion on the paper. Next day the chairman said, "Well, I have here 14 suggestions on disarmament studies. But I think that the advisory board could not suggest to the Secretary General 14 studies. It would be too many.

"What do you think if we do this: I am going to give you the list, the Secretariat will prepare the list which will ... of all those who have suggested and each one of you will put on a piece of paper three studies in your language that you favor them, and then we will see what happens."

Well, that was done that way and I was very lucky since the one I had suggested which was the World Disarmament Campaign came on top. I think it got almost the unanimity of them. Well, there were in addition to that another two. But the World Disarmament Campaign was the most favored one. So the chairman sent a letter to the Secretary General explaining what had happened and suggested three studies, World Disarmament Campaign and two others. I don't remember which ones they were.
But unfortunately, as you know, that is not enough. Perhaps one day it will be enough that the advisory board on disarmament studies suggests something to the Secretary General and if the Secretary General approves, that will become then mandatory to the Assembly vote. For the time being it is not the case.

Now when the first committee met, the chairman read the letter from the Secretary General saying that he had received from disarmament studies the advice of the board ... and he approved. But I asked the chairman what's going to happen then? He said, "Well, if the delegation puts forward a draft resolution, otherwise nothing will happen."

And it was then that together with some of my colleagues, we put forward a draft resolution which I drafted myself and the draft resolution was a very modest one. It just asked the Secretary General to prepare a study on the advisability of launching a World Disarmament Campaign, which would be its purposes, how it would be organized, etc.

So you know the Secretary General made that study. That was 1980. It was submitted in 1981, and in 1981 then the Assembly approved the study and asked the Secretary General to make a more concrete study already
suggesting the modus operandi for the campaign. And that was the result of a second story of the Secretary General in 1982 for the special session. That came to the special session, because as you know, the special session is in the spring and the other one had been in the winter of 1981.

So the Assembly launched the disarmament campaign and in the winter in the regular session of '82 it adopted another resolution where it invited the states to give contributions and decided to have a pledging conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, a pledging conference which had just been held at the 38th session of 1983.

Unfortunately, up to now the amount of the contributions is relatively small. It is perhaps a little more than what is spent in armaments in two minutes. That is all we have been able to get up to now. It is a little more than the equivalent of three million dollars. I say the equivalent, because several of the contributions were not made in dollars. And the contributions then were those which were made on a voluntary basis prior to the pledging conference. That was the case of Mexico. That was the case of Sweden, the case of India, and those which were made during the pledging conference.
Together, those contributions prior to the pledging conference and those made in the pledging conference amounted to a very modest sum. But then the Assembly at its last session, at the 38th session, has adopted another resolution in which it takes note with satisfaction of the progress made and so on, and decided that at the next session, at the 39th session, there will be a second pledging conference for those states which have not yet had the opportunity to contribute.

So in my opinion, the pledging conference will help. But that is not the only way. One of my colleagues, a colleague from Sweden, pointed out to me in a recent visit he made to New York that they have asked the Swedish government whether it would be willing to allow that a lottery, since they have a lottery in Sweden for public health and so on and so forth, whether it would be willing to accept one tenth or one twentieth, a very minor amount, of the product of that lottery be given to the World Disarmament Campaign.

And once I know more in detail the particulars, I could do something similar in Mexico. We also have a lottery and the lottery which has three draws every week ... per year because those are the ordinary, it has some special draws. The Mexican lottery may have
something like 40 draws in the year. And just as that procedure, some other procedures could be found for the World Disarmament Campaign collecting funds.

So I am optimistic as to the future of the campaign. And I really think that it was necessary to think of something similar because what has happened since 1978 when we approved the final document which I said is a very good document, a very sound one. It is something where you find in practical terms the way of making it reality, what is the philosophy of the United Nations.

Well, in spite of that as you know, nothing has been done. Nothing at all since 1979 that the committee ... it has been impossible to achieve a single multilateral instrument, however modest, in spite of the hundreds of interventions, perhaps I could say thousands. But if you add the interventions in the plenary in the Assembly, in the first committee in the Assembly, those here, I think you can certainly say thousands of interventions in spite of that and in spite of all other efforts made, nothing has been done.

And perhaps if what I said there, and I have just repeated in Leningrad last week where as you know there was a conference precisely on the World Disarmament Campaign. And what I said there and I repeated last week
in the part you quoted and which seems to me very appropriate to close our very interesting conversations.

"Perhaps the voices of hundreds of millions of human beings of all areas, north and south, east and west, may have a greater power of persuasion that the very limited which have had up to now, both the resolutions of the Assembly and the interventions of the representatives of the state members."

BERASATEGUI: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for your very kind concern about this program. We've been exhausting your patience and we would like to express how grateful we are for all the assistance that you have given to us today as well as in previous days in connection with this program. We are very grateful to you. Thank you very much.

GARCIA ROBLES: It has been a pleasure.