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Ambassador Bennett, I first want to express appreciation for your participation. To begin I want to ask you, if I may, to indicate what your role was, what you were doing and why, at the time of the San Francisco Conference on the founding of the United Nations.

Well Jim, I am very glad to participate because I know that anything you are involved in will be first-rate, and will be handled in the proper way, so it is a pleasure to take part. I don’t think I have any major contributions to make. I was a very minor figure at the time, a junior officer, and I went out on the staff - I was really working directly with Avra Warren, who was Director of the Office of American Republics at that time. I had served in two embassies with him, he had arranged for me to be borrowed from the Army, for the period of the Conference. I was a buck private in the Army, having gone into the service in December 1955 as a volunteer from the Embassy in Panama. This was April 1945, so I went out as Assistant on the Delegation. Warren’s work was subsumed in the activities of Nelson Rockefeller, who was Assistant Secretary for Latin America at that time. We got there by a very circuitous route. I flew with Warren. We went by way of Argentina to San Francisco because we went down there to get Argentina into the war
so that she could be invited to the conference at the last minute. This was literally April '45. I forget the date that it opened. Was it the 25th?

JS It was the 23rd, I believe.

TB 23rd. At any rate, we left Washington on about April 12th. President Roosevelt had just died, and while we were in Buenos Aires there was a great memorial service for him at the Colon Theater, the great opera house. We [first] flew to Panama and joined up with the Commanding General there, General Brett of Swoose fame in the Philippines, and we flew down in the Swoose that he still had, he was using that plane. We flew down to Chile and across the Andes and were met by a welcoming escort of, I think, forty Argentine planes. They were so antiquated and so slow that we had to throttle down the Swoose to almost collapsing speed in order to the let the escort keep up. But we arrived in Buenos Aires to a great welcome. At the same time the Atlantic Fleet had come down to Argentina; I forget that Admiral's name. It was, I think, one cruiser and two destroyers. It wasn't a huge fleet. At any rate, this was meant to bring the imposing presence of the United States from all directions. Argentina, of course, was fat and happy in those days but they had sat out the war and, as I
understood it, the other Latin American nations with their sense of hemispheric solidarity had made such a howl about Argentina being able to take part at San Francisco that this formula was devised. They would declare war literally in mid-April of '45 and thereby gain an invitation to San Francisco. I believe there was some kind of deal, which I forget, with the Soviets over Poland.

JS That came later.

TB Was it later?

JS That came at San Francisco.

TB That was at San Francisco. I don't know if you would be interested in all of this.

JS Very much so, very much so.

TB That is how Warren and I got to San Francisco. Flying back up the west coast of Panama and then from Panama to California. There we joined, as I say, the overall Latin American staff headed by Nelson Rockefeller.

JS Argentina did agree at that point to declare war?
TB Oh yes, they did declare war. They arrived in San Francisco and then with Argentine self-esteem acted as though they had been in the war the whole time.

JS This brings up an interesting question. I have read in some places, in some material, that in fact, the position of the United States as a government and of the State Department even at point was still that Argentina should not be invited to become a member of the United Nations, but that this was rather the position of the Latin American bureau and of Nelson Rockefeller.

TB I suspect that is true. I was not privy to that high policy, but it certainly was controversial and there were plenty of people who did not think Argentina deserved to be either at the conference or a Charter member. On the other hand, I can understand Rockefeller’s position in wanting to cater to the views of the Latin Americans; and certainly it was a very strong Latin American feeling that their sister republic should be at the meeting.

JS Do you think that was the principal motivation in Mr. Rockefeller’s support of Argentina - that is, to maintain solidary among the Latin American countries?
TB  I would have thought so. What other motive would he have had?

JS  Well, this is - I must put it that way because in fact I have interviewed a Soviet ambassador who was present as one of the advisors ... So we were just talking about Nelson Rockefeller and I was saying that, in fact, a Soviet ambassador whom I had interviewed on the same subject suggested, perhaps naturally, that part of Mr. Rockefeller's motivation were the financial interests of the Rockefeller family.

TB  That's what you might expect a Soviet official to say about a Rockefeller. I don't believe that for a minute. I simply don't. I just don't agree with that - that's a Soviet canard.

JS  I think probably the connection would be rather dubious in any event. The fact that you went there at this point on this subject is especially interesting because as you may know, the logo and all of the stickers and so forth had been designed by that time for the San Francisco Conference, or the UN Conference, and they showed the world in a different way. The center of the world was the western hemisphere and it was so designed that Argentina did not appear on this.
TB It fell below the curve.

JS That is another thing that suggests that perhaps in Washington there was an assumption that Argentina would not...

TB Yes, well I think it was a very last minute thing. I don't know just how the Warren mission was cooked up, whether there were lots of goings on, throw him into the breach at the last minute - but certainly it was a last minute thing, within less than two weeks before the conference. One little footnote which is not pertinent particularly to this, but it interesting. When we had our meetings in Buenos Aires in the Casa Rosada, an Anglo-Argentine, Rawson [Farrell], was then the President, but the Vice President was none other than Juan Peron and he was clearly calling the shots. At that time in 1945 he was already the guiding force in the government structure. During my entire career for 40 years his baleful spirit has guided Argentina. You know, at that time Argentina was a rich, wealthy country and considered itself on a par with the United States; and most Latinos gave them equal billing in the American system. But since '47 they have fallen and fallen.
JS Just another side of that connection - the President's name was Ros?

TB Rawson [Farrell].

JS Because later during the Falklands war the Argentine ambassador was named Ros. There is obviously no connection.

TB Well as you know, at one time the English used to refer to Argentina as the 8th dominion, there was so much English influence there, and there are very powerful Anglo-Argentine families to this day.

JS To go on now to San Francisco - would you give your impressions. What was it like as you saw it as a very young officer without extensive diplomatic experience at that point?

TB It was a very exciting time. The world was gathered, at least the victorious world was gathered. Of course the war was still going on in the Pacific. It actually ended in Europe while we were there, and I remember the day on the Floor of the Assembly when some European delegate raced in with a newspaper with the headlines "Nazi surrender". So that was an exciting time. And of course
San Francisco was an exciting place, because people were on their way to the Pacific and therefore celebrating before they left, or else coming home and certainly celebrating on getting home. So there was a lot of excitement in the air, quite aside from the bracing climate that I think affects everybody in San Francisco. 

One of the great figures there was Smuts of South Africa. He was legendary, of course. You had the Saudi princes who were apparently on one of their first forays into world society outside their desert realm, and there were many tales of how they didn’t know how to use hotel facilities and tore up the rooms and that sort of thing, That was probably exaggeration. Of course you had the Ethiopians there. In fact, that shows a great different in the times. Egypt, South Africa and Ethiopia were the only African countries represented at the founding of the United Nations, maybe Liberia too.

Whereas there were many Latin American countries?

I was going to get to that. Latin America played a much larger role there than later because there were twenty Latin countries and the original Charter membership was only 51, so they were roughly 40% of the whole. And of course, the Latin Americans have always prided themselves on legal documentation, and they love to write
constitutions, and they like to debate fine points of law. They had a field day at the conference and took a very prominent role in all of the debates. There were 20 votes if they voted unitedly, so they had quite a powerful influence. And of course, the inter-American system and the American participation - well it was a far more vibrant and vital institution then than is sadly the case today.

JS Yes, by then the OAS already existed, I believe.

TB It was still called the Pan American Union at that time...I believe the big Charter changes were made around 1948.

JS It may have been called that but there was a regional organization.

TB Oh yes, that was the original regional organization. It went all the way back to - I think - 1892. We were very proud in the Latin American field, which is where I was working in those days. We had been the forerunner for the world, many examples of international cooperation and treaties which led to multilateral action had first been used in this hemisphere and then been applied in a larger frame elsewhere.
JS And were the Latin American delegations conscious of the importance then of including the provision for regional organizations in the Charter?

TB Indeed they were. In fact, I would have thought they were the principal impetus for it. Senator Vandenberg took up that cause and there was a great debate, but I remember that he was very firm that we had to have this. Certainly the Latinos were not going to let their organization be set aside. I would say that was one of the great issues, one of the fundamental issues of the Charter writing.

JS And that was in fact settled satisfactorily from the point of view of the delegations there.

TB I think so.

JS The other issue that I wanted to question you on was the veto because I believe that the Latin American countries in general were very opposed to the veto privilege.

TB They were not happy with it, no, it is quite true. And one can understand why and...
JS Now how did your little subdelegation, so to speak, the Nelson Rockefeller delegation, were you asked to influence and persuade the Latin Americans to go along with the veto provision? Was there much lobbying done in a sense?

TB Oh yes, a great deal and I think not just Nelson Rockefeller and his group but there were other members of the delegation that took part. Of course, Senator Vandenburg played a very large role in that as in other things, and in dealing with the Latins.

JS So from this point of view Senator Vandenberg’s position was important then in the...

TB I should think so, very much. Well I’m thinking more now of the regional organization. I don’t recall any particular activity about the veto, but that would have been just part of our general everyday work trying to get other delegations to go along with our views.

JS There was another issue that Senator Vandenberg was particularly interested in and I’d like to ask you what the Latin America position was. This was on the question of the authority of the General Assembly to revise treaties. Does that bring back............In the end, it
was not reflected in the Charter.

TB I don’t have any recollection of that.

JS You mentioned Field Marshal Smuts and this raises the question of the actual drafting of the Charter itself. It is indicated in some places that Smuts brought along kind of a draft with him. He was already aware, of course, of the agreements that had been reached at Dumbarton Oaks. Virginia Gildersleeve who was a member of the US delegation has indicated that she and one assistant from Columbia University (or Barnard) actually wrote the preamble to the Charter. Was any of this known? What was the impression there of who was doing the drafting?

TB Dumbarton Oaks had done the preparatory work and people worked from that. I wasn’t that close in on internal delegation activities. As I say, our own little group was separate from the rest of the delegation.

JS How was that? I think that was before we started this interview. Your group was separate and had different quarters?

TB We were at the St. Francis Hotel whereas the main part of
the delegation was at the Fairmont. We had our delegation meetings at the Fairmont and I would assume that Rockefeller or Warren was present at all delegation meetings, but there was that separateness so we were not as close in on intimate everyday happenings as we would have been otherwise.

JS Were you aware of any frictions within the US delegation, particularly with reference to Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Stettinius?

TB Well I think the general impression of Mr. Stettinius, and not just from my vantage point as being on the Rockefeller team, was that he wasn’t the brightest man in the world. I remember being at one of the receptions - do you really want this?

JS Yes.

TB San Francisco turned itself inside out for this conference and all the dowagers gave very glittering receptions to which everybody went. I was standing near some redoubtable lady who walked up to Walter Lippmann and said "look at our Secretary of State over there. Isn’t he a magnificent man, so handsome, that wonderful shock of white hair on such a leonine head?" Walter
Lippmann looked at her with cool disdain and said, "Madam, that is but the marble fretwork that adorns the ivory dome." That's a true story.

Rockefeller had been running a free and easy show and operating on his own momentum. It didn't always ride well with Stettinius and his associates, or whatever amounted to his staff organization, because Rockefeller was an extra wheel - and one that rolled pretty fast at times. And of course he was a very lavish entertainer. He was always doing things for individual delegates. I remember the original Trader Vic's that was across the bay in Oakland, wasn't even in San Francisco. It was still new and the idea of exotic tropical food and drink was something unusual. Well, Rockefeller took over the whole place one evening and had a big bash for the Latin Americans and we all had to get over to Oakland to do it. It was quite a party, as it turned out. That is the kind of thing that he liked to do, he was that sort of outgoing person and had the resource to finance it.

JS Who were the Latin American delegates who stood out in your mind at the time as being leading influences?

TB I was afraid you were going to ask me that. One of the Peruvians (who later was a fixture at the United Nations in New York, Belaunde) was such an orator that he would
stand out in anybody’s memory. The Mexican was substantively much more important than Belaunde - what was his name?

JS I know who you mean.

TB If I were better organized, somewhere in all my effects I have got a delegation list from San Francisco.

JS Yes, that documentation exists.

TB The Colombian made contributions and of course the Colombians are first rate jurists, as you know. I don’t recall any particular prominence from the Chileans. The Brazilians played a role.

JS The Secretariat was headed by Alger Hiss, Secretary-General, and there are two questions I’d like to ask you in this connection. First, for obvious reasons, most of the Secretariat was American at that point, and I wondered did this create resentment, particularly among the Latin American delegations that you were aware of? Was there some distrust of the Secretariat as a result?

TB I’m not aware of any on that grounds. I think people realized that America was the big power and we had done
the preparatory work along with a few others, and after all, it took place on American soil. I think it would have been accepted, particularly in those days. Maybe not so much now, but then we were the dominant power and there was every reason for it to be largely American. I don’t think the Latins had any fondness for Alger Hiss and certainly he never showed any for them. He was very European-oriented, I suppose you could say, but certainly he didn’t have any time for Latin Americans and they knew that. So they didn’t like him.

JS

What was your impression of how Alger Hiss functioned as Secretary-General?

TB

Well from our point of view, in my particular little bailiwick there, he was quite removed and aloof and had very little time for our concerns, although we were dealing with 40% of the votes in the conference. I didn’t have a very favorable impression. There was one time (I forget what the issue was) when he lost his temper completely and began to scream and rage in anger and "why weren’t we helping out", and so forth. His rudeness left a bad taste. I’m sorry to say that I don’t remember the details - it was some message that didn’t get through.
Yes, well he was much involved in the substance as well as the administration.

After all, he had worked on the Preparatory Commission and it was, I think you could say, as much as his document as anybody’s, as far as the origins. I don’t mean in the end that it was - the draft we were working from was his creation as much as anybody’s.

Now one of the really controversial issues was, as we have said, the question of Argentina’s membership. There was one principle which was supported, I suppose, by a good many of the Latin Americans and that was the principle of universality. Was this a strong element in the argumentation that was used in terms of supporting Argentina?

You mean that everybody should be involved and should reach out and.....well it would have been, yes. But my recollection is primarily Latin American solidarity. They wanted Argentina there, they didn’t want any single American republic to be absent from this great conclave of nations which was writing the future.

And the other two controversial membership questions: one was the status of Ukraine and Byelorussia and the
other was Poland. They got mixed up, to a certain extent. How did you see that at the time?

TB
As we were talking earlier, I recall there was some deal involving Poland, which was the way we worked it out with the Soviets on Argentina. I don't recall Byelorussia and Ukraine being a part of that, but I may be wrong.

JS
It was somewhat separate but it did enter a little bit.

TB
Now, was it Polish membership that was part of the deal?

JS
No, it was the question of the government of Poland.

TB
Which one would represent Poland...

JS
Which one would represent Poland, and an agreement had been reached at Yalta that by the time of the conference the combined government would be from Warsaw, but this was not the case and never was the case. So this created...

TB
That was the first great Soviet deceit over Yalta.

JS
That's right, some saw that as the beginning of the Cold War in that particular question. Which brings me to....
probably this was not perceptible from what might be called the Latin American perspective, but were you conscious of any tensions between East and West - and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union - as the conference went forward?

TB

Obviously we had differences on things. I'm not able to be very specific. There was a special atmosphere, you know, in those days when the war was just over. The Soviets had been our ally. There were people on Alger Hiss's staff (and I assume they represented him) who said "we've got to give in to the Soviets on this on this issue so as to bring them in from the cold, we want to bring them into the world community", etc. etc. Well that was a laudable objective, to make them a part of the world community, but it was pretty clear to many of us that the Soviets were working very hard for objectives that were not in our American interests.

So I felt that some of the Hiss staff were naive, to say the least. Now there have been chargers that there was much more, but I won't pass judgment on that. And of course you remember that Averell Harriman made a special trip out to San Francisco - in May, I guess. It was fairly well into the conference, maybe early June, during which he warned that the Soviets were playing for keeps on some of these things and we should wise up and not
just give them everything they wanted. You must be familiar with this...

JS No, as a matter of fact that is not in the records that I have seen.

TB Really? Well I remember distinctly his making a special trip and I'm sure that's been written up, his early warnings.

JS Certainly his early warnings are, but not the trip to San Francisco.

TB I hope my memory is not playing me false, but I'm quite sure he was there and took part in delegation meetings for 2 or 3 days.

JS Because this was the period when he had sent the message to Roosevelt from Moscow.

TB During his long career, and particularly his later career, of trying to work for Soviet/American cooperation, he always had very clear eyes on what was happening. And indeed, he did, in my little crisis in the Dominican Republic in '65, he saw very clearly the leftist drive there. He was then Under-Secretary for
Economic Affairs and he made it his job to try to persuade the American labor unions that the Dominican confrontation was for real, that there was a real leftist drive there and that the American press was badly misinformed and reporting incorrectly.

I’m really saying that Averell Harriman always had very clear eyes on Soviet overall policy, along with his feeling that we had to work together.

Pursuing that a little bit in terms of the Latin Americans, Molotov was there as the head of the Soviet delegation at the beginning of the conference. One of the innovations foreseen in the United Nations Charter was the use of military force under what became Article 42. What was the attitude of the Latin American delegations as you perceived it toward this possibility of enforcement?

I would say - and this is based more on general knowledge of the Latins than on specific recollections - not enthusiastic. This was part and parcel, of course, of their protection of the regional organizations. They did not want to see the United Nations mixing in Latin American problems. And for years it didn’t happen, you know. It’s only lately that the United Nations has begun to supersede the OAS in some of these things. That I
think is a reflection of the modern desire to balance off the United States, which was not so much there in those days.

JS There is another area I wanted to ask you about. Some of the American planners had originally foreseen a provision in the Charter under which the Security Council could impose a solution to a particular conflict situation. That was not accepted in the end. Did Latin Americans have views on that?

TB Well, they would oppose it.

JS Yes, they were in opposition. It is my impression that they were the strongest opposition.

TB I would think so. No, they didn’t want the rest of the world – we were bad enough, their having to deal with us – they didn’t want the rest of the world running their affairs. Of course, American and Latin American relations were good in those days with the Good Neighbor policy. They adored Roosevelt and he had done a lot to improve relations in this hemisphere.

JS So the United States could, in fact, could in the end on Latin American support?
TB In those days, yes. And how we leaned on them at the time of the Israeli vote! I happened to be on the floor of the United Nations that afternoon when Israel was decreed, was voted. That was in 1947. My wife and I were in New York and Avra Warren was on the delegation again that year and we’d gone over to see him that day. So he took us into the chamber and we sat there during that vote.

JS Yes, that was on the partition resolution.

TB Yes - with all the rabbis signalling their wishes from the gallery - was that Schindler?

JS I’m not sure he was there yet.

TB I believe it was Rabbi Hillel Silver. The poor Haitian got clobbered because he was about to vote wrong.

JS Yes - this is a little off San Francisco but in fact the United States was strongly in favor of that particular resolution.

TB Indeed so.
But a few months later the United States was pursuing a different policy - at least the State Department was - at the time in respect to Israel. The other subject I want to ask about is human rights. This again was a relatively new concern for inclusion in an international document. Were the Latin Americans concerned about this - what was their thinking?

In general terms, they tend to be highly legalistic, as you know. They react to anything they think is going to give somebody a right to poke into their affairs. Certainly some of them wouldn't have wanted their human rights programs and policies looked into in those days.

Was it your impression that Nelson Rockefeller - you say that he probably attended the delegation staff meetings - did he interest himself in the substance of the Charter as it was developing then?

Primarily as it related to Latin American interests, I would say.

So he was rather parochial in his approach?

Well, that was his brief - to work with the Latin Americans. And that was his love anyway, and a love that
went far beyond the Rockefeller family interests. (I reject that latter argument). It’s not that I’m an uncritical admirer of Nelson Rockefeller, but on his devotion to Latin America I would give him 100%.

JS In that sense, he was going his job in San Francisco?

TB I would say so.

JS Did he have a very large staff surrounding him?

TB No, not so big. Susie Cable was his girl Friday, secretary and all the rest of it. She later married Chris Herter - that did not last. You never knew whether people were working for Nelson Rockefeller privately (out of his private funds) or if they were government people. They got all mixed up together.

JS Now the Secretary-General, as defined in the Charter, is something different than the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. Again - were you aware of any concern among the Latin American delegations as to giving a Secretary-General too much or too little power?

TB No, I don’t recall anything particular on that.
Actually there was surprisingly little debate. So you would confirm that?

Yes, I don’t recall that as being...

Article 99 went through with no controversy as far as I know.

I’m not aware of any.

That’s the way it was. Are there other aspects of the Conference in San Francisco that stand out in your mind that have lasted this long?

Just generally, that it was an enormously vibrant and hopeful period, you know, that now we’d vanquished the Nazis and the Japanese were on the way to being finished. And now we can build a brave new world. We can turn it over to this new organization and we won’t have to worry any more.

So now I’d like to go to a philosophical question. A good many years later you served in a senior position at the United Nations. At that point as the US Ambassador to the United Nations, did you feel that the United Nations had in any way lived up to the expectations at
San Francisco? In what sense did you see that the Organization had departed from the original concept or dream?

I’ve always thought it was unfair to blame the United Nations for some of the disappointments that have developed over the years. You can’t blame the United Nations for things that countries themselves won’t allow it to do. Unfortunately it’s on the big political issues which, of course, get the major headlines, that the United Nations is weakest. That is simply because the United Nations is only the creature of the governments that make it up. It only has the power that governments are willing to cede to it, to allow it to exercise.

The Ambassadors are not free agents, they carry out their governments’ policies. As long as governments are not willing to give up any sovereignty to the United Nations - and ours is no more anxious to do that than any other - well, obviously the United Nations can’t act on its own in some of these big crises. So I think it has been unfair to say the United Nations has been ineffective.

Now I think it has done excellent work in the less heralded things such as world health, development, that kind of thing - UNICEF. Those organizations seem to me to have lived up to their promise. They haven’t always -
you've had some outrageous bureaucracies here and there as you know. But by and large, on the social and economical things I think they have a pretty good record.

And certainly peacekeeping - I have heard Henry Kissinger say that if the United Nations hadn't done anything other than peacekeeping, it would have made it worthwhile. But there again - the United Nations can't make the peace. Individual nations have to make the peace: the United Nations can only try to hold a line between them.

I think the "failure" of the United Nations is in part due to the excessive optimism and naivete of the American public which said, "oh here's a great organization, we'll let it do foreign policy and we won't have to worry anymore". Well it never was that simple, but we do oversimplify things in public opinion so that when the world kept on being mean and ugly, the United Nations got the blame.

I was Ambassador at the United Nations during the Indian/Pakistan war, '71 or 72; the Indians were going to have their way over Bangladesh and there wasn't anything the United Nations could do. Later on we stopped one Iraq/Iran war, that was the one that never happened. But you don't get credit for things that don't happen. And then I was very actively engaged in the Greek/Turkey crisis, the Aegean problem, when they almost
went to war that summer of '76. Bill Scranton was then the US Representative, but he was away from New York and insisted that I take over the chair as the Acting US Representative. When he came back he said, "you've handled it up to now, so you go on handling it." Well, there was certainly success there in keeping two allies from going to war.

JS Which actually is not often mentioned, that particular crisis.

TB No, no it's not and yet it was quite serious at the time.

JS Going on to the question of the Secretary General and how are Secretaries General chosen. You were in the US mission at the time that Mr. Waldheim was elected as Secretary General the first time. I wonder could you describe the process as you witnessed it at that time.

TB Well, Waldheim was a very active candidate. He certainly touched all the bases, took people to lunch and dinner to have them know his views and be favorably disposed to him. Jacobson was rather stand-offish as I recall and took great umbrage always blamed us for his never being chosen whereas I think he was a soldier so he would have blackballed him til...

JSS As far as you know then the United States was not favoring Jacobson that strongly.

TB I don't think I was privvy to some of the top-level
stuff. I have a feeling people thought that he was more qualified - was more of a professional in that sense - and there was a high respect for him. But I don’t think we leaned heavily in his favor, in fact I’m quite sure we did not.

JSS And there was an Argentine candidate, I think, Ortiz Sarosis?? at that point.

TB Was he a serious candidate?

JSS Well, I think he thought he was.

TB I don’t think anybody else did. Was there anybody else? I don’t recall anybody else.

JS Those are the two that are usually mentioned. And both would have been subject to Soviet veto, probably.

TB I don’t regard the Argentine as a really very credible candidate. Wonder what’s happened to him? He stayed there.

JS He has just become the Deputy Foreign Minister.

TB Has he been in diplomacy all this time?

JS Yes, he was Ambassador to London most recently. He has just gone back.
TB He was a good diplomat, actually. He and George Bush were friends.

JS Now there is this whole question of Waldheim as to the failure to be aware of some of his background. How do you explain this, having been so closely associated?

TB I always understood that the British (and I believe, the French) had gone through the records and had concluded that there wasn’t enough negative to block him. Now whether we went at it carefully here in Washington, I’m not aware - or that we thought of it in those terms. I’ve always felt that if the charges against him were really serious, as they have later been blown up to be, then surely he could never have been elected. But I think he handled the case absolutely miserably. A lot of his woes are due to his trying to fudge things and pretend things that didn’t happen, or deny things that did happen.

JS But as far as you observed the progress of that election, the question of Mr. Waldheim’s past activities really did not come up?

TB No I don’t recall that there was any discussion of his having served in the Nazi Army and that sort of thing.
He was considered an Austrian and as such, a patriotic Austrian. He had been foreign minister, of course, and in the diplomatic service. He was a neutral, therefore.

JS

A good bit has been said about the need to establish criteria or qualifications for Secretaries-General, in particular, some management capacity. In your experience on this question, did it come up at all as to whether Waldheim or one of the other candidates could manage the Secretariat?

TB

I guess that’s what I was thinking about when I said there might have been some feeling that Jacobson was the more able of the two. Now I didn’t relate that to managerial capacity, but that would be part of it, I suppose.
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UNITED NATIONS OPAL HISTORY PROJECT
ORAL HISTORY AGREEMENT

I, W. Taylor Bennett (Interviewee) hereby agree to participate in the United Nations Oral History Project, sponsored by the Yale University Institution for Social and Policy Studies, and consent to the recording by magnetic audio tape of (an) interview(s) with James Sutterlin (Interviewer) on July 24, 1990 (Date) at Washington, D.C. (City), (State).

It is my understanding that a typed transcript will be made of such tape(s) and returned to me for any necessary corrections. I hereby agree that if for any reason I have not returned the transcript with my corrections to the Institution for Social and Policy Studies within three months of the time it was sent to me, the Project Staff may edit the transcript and make it available for research and other use as provided here below.

In the understanding that the tape(s) and transcript(s) will be preserved at the United Nations and made available for historical, scholarly and (as deemed appropriate by the United Nations) public information purposes, and that copies will be placed on deposit at Yale University for research and study, I hereby grant, assign, and transfer legal titles and all literary rights in the tape(s) and transcript(s) to the United Nations. However, it is agreed that neither the United Nations nor Yale University will publish or authorize publication of the transcript(s) or any part thereof during my lifetime without my written permission.

W. Taylor Bennett
(Interviewee)  
24 July 1990
(Date)

James Sutterlin
(Interviewer)  
July 24, 1990
(Date)

(For the Institution of Social and Policy Studies)