UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

THE POLITICS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE UNITS IN GHANA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WASTE MANAGEMENT AND BUILDING PERMIT IN THE ACCRA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY (AMA)

BY

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THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MPHIL IN POLITICAL SCIENCE DEGREE

JULY, 2018
DECLARATION

I, Mohammed Nuhu Adam, hereby declare that this work is the result of an independent investigation which has not been presented by anyone for any academic award in this institution or elsewhere. All references used in the course of the study have been duly acknowledged.

I am solely responsible for any shortcomings in this work.

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ABSTRACT

The delivery of waste management and building permit has engaged the attention of governments, development partners and citizens because of its deleterious consequences on public health, the environment and socio-economic development. Several frameworks and regulations including the Local Governance Act, 936 (2016), Environmental Sanitation Policy (1999), National Building Regulations, LI 1630 (1996), and the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1945 (Cap 84) have been implemented to safeguard the environment and the development of physical structures in Ghana. In addition to these regulations, there also exist formal environmental sector agencies and planning institutions like the Lands Commission, District Assemblies, Town and Country Planning Department, Environmental Protection Agency, Hydrological Service Department and the Ghana Health Service. Nevertheless, the low level of human and financial resources and the lack of accountability mechanisms have dominated their functions, structure and operations.

As a contribution to the literature on political economy and service delivery, this study examines the politics inherent in public service delivery in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) using data obtained from policymakers, service providers and clients/citizens through semi-structured interviews. Specifically, the study examines how accountability in the AMA has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services. Due to the qualitative nature of the study, the purposive and convenience non-probability sampling methods were largely adopted in the selection of respondents.

The study found that accountability in the delivery of waste management is weaker than building permit in the AMA. This can be attributed to several factors: including, the poor attitudes of
citizens, financial constraints, political interference, land title insecurity, statutory violations and non-conforming land issues. This situation has undermined the efforts of actors at strengthening accountability in services delivery in the AMA. Accordingly, service delivery is characterized by delays and failures. Some of the policy recommendations include an expansion in infrastructure at the AMA; increase in funding to AMA; recruitment and training of staff; embarking on advocacy and sensitization campaigns; introduction of building consultancy firms in the building permit acquisition stream; participatory planning approaches; and enforcement of laws and regulations.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my beloved uncle, Mr. Mahmoud Ahmed Ibrahim for his unrelenting support which has made this work a success. I will forever remain indebted to you. May ALMIGHTY Allah bless you abundantly!
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I thank Almighty Allah for making this study a success. Second, I wish to thank my supervisors, Prof. Joseph R.A. Ayee and Dr. Abdulai K. Mohammed. I say thank you for your patience, guidance and the insights you gave me during the course of this study.

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Fifth, I say a special thank you to the Director of Waste Management at Zoomlion Ghana Limited, the Deputy-Directors of the Departments of Environmental Health and Sanitation Directorate (EHSD) of the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources (MSWR) and the Town and Country Planning (TCPD), the officials of the Departments of Works (AMA/Works) and Waste Management (AMA/WMD), the household heads, residential owners and community leaders in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) for the willingness with which they responded to the interview and volunteered information.

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<td>Accra Metropolitan Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLTS</td>
<td>Community Led Total Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHSDs</td>
<td>Environmental Health and Sanitation Departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESID</td>
<td>Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCPSE</td>
<td>Global Center for Public Service Excellence</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Growth Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRD</td>
<td>Land Registration Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVD</td>
<td>Land Valuation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>Metropolitan Coordinating Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>Metropolitan Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLGRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMDAs</td>
<td>Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSWR</td>
<td>Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PHC</td>
<td>Population and Housing Census</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<td>PSRC</td>
<td>Public Sector Research Center</td>
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<td>Public and Vested Land Management Division</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SMDCs</td>
<td>Sub-Metropolitan District Councils</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNPAS</td>
<td>Street Naming and Property Addressing System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUSP</td>
<td>Sustainable Urban Services Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>Town Council Ordinance</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCPD</td>
<td>Town and Country Planning Department</td>
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<td>UESP</td>
<td>Urban Environmental and Sanitation Policy</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Healthcare</td>
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<td>World Development Report</td>
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<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Waste Management Departments</td>
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<td>ZL</td>
<td>Zoomlion Ghana Limited</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction and Background

This study examines the politics of basic service delivery in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) in Ghana. In this connection, the study seeks to identify the various actors involved and the major roles they play in the management of waste and the issuance of building permit and the accountability mechanisms in place in the AMA. In addition, the study assesses the sectoral differences in the governance of waste management and issuance of building permit and highlights the opportunities and recommendations for strengthening the governance of waste management and building permit services in the AMA. This study complements the existing political economy and development literature by deepening understanding on the modalities of governance of basic services in the public sector. This may thereby inform public policymakers and practitioners to strengthen the delivery system of basic services and/or stimulate developing countries governments’ efforts at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The chapter begins with a brief background of the study, followed by a description of the problem statement, the study objectives, research questions and the significance of the study. In addition, it outlines the scope of the study and a brief arrangement of chapters of the entire study.

The constraints of poor service delivery outcomes and performances in many developing worlds including Africa are attributed in part to the absence of resources (Kimenyi 2013). For instance, to provide social services like education and health, one needs equipment as well as supplies. Trained teachers, textbooks and classrooms are very essential in the provision of quality education. Similarly, trained medical personnel, quality drugs and prescription or diagnosis equipment are very key in the delivery of health services. However, scholars argue that in order
to minimize the gap between resource and service delivery outcomes and ensure value for money, there is the need to internalize governance in service delivery practices and processes (Kimenyi 2013). In other words, service delivery is poor in many African countries because accountability is equally poor.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008) suggests that effective service delivery is achieved by governments universally where there are accountability mechanisms between citizens and their leaders. It has been argued by the International Growth Centre (IGC) that citizens of many low-income countries depend extensively on the state for the provision of basic services either because of the inability of the market to provide them or extreme poverty (IGC 2017). A post-Millennium Summit report (2014) by the World Bank underscored the significance of accountability in achieving effective and efficient service delivery.

The World Bank’s accountability framework has dominated scholarly debates and development thinking and has also shaped the understanding of scholars, practitioners and policy makers on service delivery in recent years (ESID 2014). This framework is important for two main reasons: first, it emphasizes the dominant role of politics in the accountability processes, and, second, it concentrates on top-down hierarchical and participatory paradigms (ESID 2014).

In a recent publication, Lieberman (2015) remained convinced that the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report titled “Making Services Work for Poor People” has stimulated global debate on the unfortunate situation of the poor in low and middle-income countries with respect to inadequate delivery of education, health, water and sanitation, and electricity services. He therefore continues to reiterate global focus on accountability as the basic and foundational unit of service provision and access (Lieberman 2015).
The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) regards basic services as being dependent upon the broader governance environment (ODI 2013). For this reason, it concluded that any analysis of the politics of service delivery must first and foremost place emphasis on the incentives of various relevant actors and must also take into consideration the strategies to address the specific features of the context that gave rise to those incentives in the first place (ODI 2013).

Similarly, Batley and Mcloughlin argue that politics is largely considered as central to the performance of public services, nevertheless, few research exists that distinguishes between services in explaining these effects (Batley and Mcloughlin 2015). Any effort to understand and compare the politics of different services should be dependent on a framework- designed to incorporate the nature of the good, type of market failure, tasks involved in delivery and demand for a service- hitherto considered broadly as economic and managerial concerns (Batley and Mcloughlin 2015).

Apart from the post-Millennium Summit researches conducted by the World Bank, other multilateral, bilateral, development institutes and think tank groups and agencies have also devoted substantial attention on studying the significance of governance for achieving sustainable development. The term governance defies a single definition. However, in all these definitions there is a common thread that runs through them. The common denominator central to governance discourse is improved public accountability. Accountability is important in promoting governance and reducing ineffective delivery of public services. Governance may be understood as the “manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank 1992:1). Post-2000 has witnessed major policy directions in the development and aid literature on the significant trends and patterns of governance. Some of these policy directions have direct consequences on the capacity
of the state to fashion out strategies and processes that are geared towards sustainable development as well as the building of public trust in public sector institutions.

Despite the significant attention paid to developing the political and administrative capacity of public sector agencies in developing countries over the last five decades, there is increasing evidence that these investments have not led to improved and sustained policy formulation and implementation performance (Cohen 1993). For instance, the Word Bank’s report on governance opines that extreme poverty is still prevalent in 1 billion people or 14 percent of the world’s population (World Bank 2017). This report goes further to argue that despite the fact that substantial gains have been realized over the past 45 years, developing countries still fall many years behind the rate of development with developed countries. For instance, Sierra Leone’s child mortality rate under 5 years corresponds to Portugal’s rate 58 years ago (World Bank 2017). Similarly, individuals within countries who occupy the bottom of the income distribution, orderly lag behind those at the top. For instance, India’s poorest 20 percent population is averagely 25 years behind the wealthiest 20 percent (World Bank 2017).

To this end, the World Bank concludes that tackling the myriad of challenges and problems facing today’s developing countries - such as unemployment, poor service delivery, violence, slowing growth, corruption, and the sustainable management of natural resources - calls for an integrated approach by which state and non-state actors and players collaborate to design and implement policies and programs. This is the broader sense in which the World Bank has used the concept of governance (World Bank 2017).

There is therefore the need to understand governance and effective basic service provision and collaboration between state and non-state actors, on the one hand, and beneficiary/customer or communities, on the other. This is significant in the facilitation of collective efficiency that can
come about through joint action and accountability as people/agencies become entangled in networks of users, suppliers, consumers and producers (Milward and Provan 2000).

This study examines how accountability mechanisms can be strengthened to achieve effective service delivery in the public sector of the West African State of Ghana using the provision of waste management and building permit services in a local government unit as a case study. The two major empirical questions raised in this study are: first, the degree at which basic services are delivered by actors/agents (policymakers, service providers and citizens) and whether they operate independently or are influenced by the accountability mechanisms; and second, how effective is the mode of delivery of these basic services for the case of waste management and building permit in Ghana.

1.1 Problem Statement

Waste management and building permit are distinct public services that are largely provided by the metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies (MMDAs) in Ghana under the supervision of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). The 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution confers wide range of powers and responsibilities on MMDAs in their defined geographical boundaries with as many as 86 functions being transferred to them (Ayee 1996). This assertion by Ayee is widely supported by the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936) which mandates MMDAs to perform political, administrative, legal and financial functions.

However, the low level of human and financial resources, especially, with respect to the provision of public services like waste management and the issuance of building permits, and the lack of accountability mechanisms are but some of the constraints that have characterized the multiplicity of functions, structure and operations of MMDAs in Ghana. Therefore, some
strategies and mechanisms put in place by MMDAs to overcome these constraints include, privatization, contracting-out, out-sourcing and public private partnerships (PPPs) to provide services to citizens. The consciousness that multiple non-state actors can be involved in the provision and management of public services has engineered a global paradigm shift in policies and practices from a single state actor or player (government) to many non-state actors and players (governance). Unfortunately, most of these non-state actors (private agencies and for-profit organizations) and community-based organizations (CBOs) are incentivized by their profit maximization philosophy which in most cases does not seek the interest of citizens. This therefore, resonates discussions about accountability in public service delivery.

Many studies conducted on building permits processes, procedures and challenges in Ghana (Agyeman et. al. 2015; Agyeman et. al. 2016; Amadu 2014; Botchway et. al. 2014; Hammah and Ibrahim 2014; Somiah 2014) identify the inability of district assemblies (DAs) to issue permits within the stipulated three months period as a result of accountability failures in the processes. In examining the processes and procedures for the application and issuance of building permits in the metropolitan cities of Accra and Kumasi, Amadu (2014) found that, applicants had to wait for over six months before getting feedback on their building permits applications in Accra and Kumasi. The delays according to Agyeman et. al. (2016) and Botchway et. al. (2014) serve as a precursor on the one hand for the issuance of false permits by so called middlemen and on the other, the mushrooming of unauthorized structures by some land owners and developers because of the problem of land insecurity which forces them to initiate projects in order to safeguard lands which had already cost them large amount of money.

Similarly, a cursory examination of studies on waste management in the rapidly urbanizing cities in Ghana underscored the significance of accountability in ensuring quality sanitation services.
For example, studies on the impacts, issues and experiences with waste management in Ghana (Samwine et al. 2017; Quartey et al. 2015; Addaney and Oppong 2015; Amoah and Kosoe 2014; puopiel 2010) bemoan the low levels of accountability in waste management services. Chronicling the issues responsible for solid waste management in the urban cities of Tamale and Wa and drawing experiences from these cities, Puopiel (2010) and Amoah and Kosoe (2014) propose a comprehensive approach that fuses accountability and institutional structures in order to improve inefficiencies in waste management.

In the same vein, Quartey et al. (2015) and Samwine et al. (2017) examine the impacts of plastic and solid waste disposal in Accra, and concluded that improved accountability may ensure effective environmental management of sanitation services in the country. Addaney and Oppong (2015) revealed that, despite the fact that actors are motivated to achieve high levels of commitment with respect to sustainable waste management services, the low level of accountability coupled with the lack of technical and financial wherewithal of these actors hampers their services.

From the foregoing discussions, it is recognized that, within the framework of an all-encompassing decentralized public service delivery, it is expected that the management and provision of basic services at the local level will be accountable as conceived by governments, practitioners, scholars and development partners. Considering the above expectations on one hand, and the ineffective and poor delivery of basic services in the country on the other, the issue is whether accountability in public institutions has the potential to strengthen the delivery of basic services.

Unfortunately, there is inadequate literature on the role of actors and their incentives in basic service delivery in Ghana. This study aims at filling this gap. Studies on service delivery in
Ghana were limited to public perceptions (Braimah et. al. 2014; Yoada et. al. 2014) and the extent of access (IEA Ghana 2017; Ganle et. al. 2015; Ryan and Adank 2010; Agyepong 1999) on the delivery of these services. The limited knowledge in this area of research provides sufficient motivation for this case study focusing mainly on intersectoral analysis between waste management and building permit services in Ghana, the actors and their incentives.

This study examines the politics of service delivery in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) using the delivery of waste management and building permits as case studies. The focus on these services is not to establish any specific link but rather because of their direct public health, environmental and costs implications on citizens. Specifically, it discusses the role of the actors and their incentives in the provision of the two services in the AMA and how accountability is either strengthened or compromised. This will deepen the understanding on service delivery and how accountability can be improved at the local level.

1.2 Hypothesis

The hypothesis which underpins this study is that accountability in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services. In other words, the larger the role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit services, the more accountability is improved in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly.

1.3 General Objective

The general objective of the study is to examine how accountability in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services.
1.4 Specific Objectives

Specifically, the study seeks to address the following objectives:

1. To identify the various actors, their roles and incentives in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA;
2. To assess the accountability mechanisms in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA;
3. To analyse the sectoral differences in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA and the consequences for service delivery; and
4. To suggest or recommend feasible institutional and policy options for improving and strengthening the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA.

1.5 Research Questions

The burden of this study is to identify how accountability in the AMA has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services. In this vein, the following specific questions are posed for interrogation:

1. Who are the actors and what are their roles and incentives in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA?
2. What are the accountability mechanisms in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA?
3. What are the differences between waste management and building permit delivery and what are their consequences on service provision in the AMA?
4. How can the challenges of waste management and building permit delivery be addressed for improved service delivery in the AMA?
1.6 Location of the Study in Political Science

The study falls under Comparative Politics, a sub-field of Political Science with specific emphasis on the politics of service delivery including waste management and building permit in local governance units in Ghana, using the AMA as a case study.

1.7 Significance of the study

This study is significant on two grounds. First, the study complements the frontiers of knowledge in political economy and service delivery by identifying the main actors, their roles and incentives and how they contribute either positively or negatively to promoting accountability such as demands from citizens in service delivery.

Second, the policy recommendations of the study may be useful to policymakers undertaking service delivery and officials of metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs). This is likely to improve the quality of public services being delivered at the local level in Ghana.

1.8 Scope of the Study

Geographically, the study was confined to the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The AMA was selected for a qualitative intersectoral comparative case study because of the following reasons:

a. It has evidence of improper land use, planning and management which hinders the effective collection, transportation and disposal of sanitation and waste management services (Boadi and Kuitunen 2003). Furthermore, Accra has an estimated population of 1,665,086 citizens and a daily influx of 500,000 visitors which makes it one of the fastest growing cities in Africa (AMA 2014). The presence of these individuals adds to the waste production capacity of the AMA and
further constrains officials in their efforts to rid the AMA of filth. In addition, the discourse on waste management and building permit is more pronounced in Accra than other urban centers because of its central role in governance and economics and the multicultural environment it represents taking into account that about 80 percent of the population of Accra live in low income and high-density populated areas (Colan Consult 1998; cited in Boadi and Kuitunen 2003).

b. The Accra Metropolis is relatively attractive to high-calibre bureaucrats due to the availability of social amenities including good road networks, office spaces, decentralized departments, hospitals, banks, condominium apartments and hotels and other human resources ranging from career bureaucrats to professional assembly members who play key roles in the delivery of public services. According to Ayee and Crook (2003), close to 90 percent of elected District Assembly members in 1992 were professionals in various fields including engineering, electricals, business and consultancy. Currently, the AMA boasts of 140 assembly members (Fieldwork 2018). Therefore, it is important to examine how the roles and incentives of these actors strengthen or undermine accountability in waste management and building permit in the AMA;

c. The AMA is one of the largest Assemblies with severe public service delivery constraints in waste management and building permit (Fieldwork 2018). Considering the fact that, poor service delivery constraints may be explained in part due to the break down in accountability relationships among service providers, policymakers and beneficiaries/clients, the examination of the roles and incentives of actors in the AMA can be used to measure how accountability relationships improve service delivery or otherwise;
d. Without empirical data, attempts to measure whether there has been any improvement in the waste management and building permit sectors will be largely based on perceptions and conceptions. Even though many studies have been conducted on waste management and building permit in Ghana, a few compares them using an intersectoral case study in the AMA;

e. It also works with quite a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), private entities, development partners, experts and consultants to deliver public services. These actors, their roles and incentives are fundamental in strengthening or undermining accountability in public service delivery, especially, waste management and building permit; and,

f. The Urban Environmental and Sanitation Policy (UESP) which was implemented in 1999 mandates MMDAs to privatize about 80 percent of their sanitation and waste services and the AMA is one of the Metropolitan Assemblies which has responded to this directive as stipulated in the UESP document (Fieldwork 2018). Since waste management is one of the essential public services of the AMA, and building permit is another, and both services have direct public health, physical and environmental implications on citizens, it is therefore appropriate to compare the extent to which politics shapes the role and incentives of actors in their delivery. Additionally, it is also important to analyze how the similarities and differences in sectors, namely, waste management (public private partnership) and building permit (in-house delivery) impacts service delivery in the AMA.

The focus on waste management and building permit in this study is because of their direct public health, environmental and costs implications on citizens. The effective or ineffective delivery of these services can have impacts on the rapid urbanization, poverty reduction, growth and development in the country. In other words, the delivery of waste management and building
permit is fundamental to good health, rapid urbanization, poverty reduction and improved public services.

For example, the World Bank (2012, ix) contended that uncollected solid waste adds to flooding, air pollution and public health challenges including respiratory ailments, diarrhoea, dengue and yellow fever. Currently, solid waste costs citizens and their governments US$205.4 billion annually and this figure is projected to increase to US$375.5 billion in 2025 (World Bank 2012). Similarly, Botchway et. al. (2014) concluded that the advent of unplanned siting of building structures by unscrupulous developers and land owners in Ghana is partly attributed to the huge costs in acquiring land and the delays in the procedure for acquiring building permit. Therefore, the selection of waste management and building permit from amongst other essential services in the AMA is justified on the grounds that the public health and environmental impacts and costs of these services on the socio-economic growth and development of the country are enormous and overbearing. This study therefore aims to highlight strategies to maximize benefits and minimize the serious adverse impacts these two services have on public health and the environment in Ghana.

1.9 Delimitation of the Study

The study covered from 2000-2017 period. This is because, it was 2017 in which work on this study started, and that is therefore the year chosen as the end-point. The reason for selecting 2000 as the starting point may need some explanation. It was post-2000 that accountability became the fulcrum in debates on service delivery following the publication of the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report (WDR), which stated emphatically that constraints in service delivery are the results of constraints in accountability relationships (Joshi 2013; World Bank 2004). Since this study seeks to highlight the commonalities and differences of not only the roles
and incentives of actors in waste management and building permit but also the accountability mechanisms in place, it is significant to consider the aforementioned period. In addition, it is almost two decades since the UESP was implemented in waste management services in the AMA (1999-2017). Therefore, it is significant to ascertain its prospects, challenges as well as the way forward in the AMA.

1.10 Organization of the Study

The study is structured into six chapters. Chapter one contains the general overview of the study. Specifically, it introduces the background of the study, statement of the problem, research aims and objectives, research questions, significance of the study, scope of the study and the organization of the study. Chapter two presents the relevant theoretical framework and literature review on the politics of service delivery. Chapter three concentrates on the methodology of the study. In more specific terms, it discusses the various methods that were used in the collection and analysis of data. It also throws further light on the choice of various tools as well as ethical considerations of the study. Chapter four presents the findings and analysis of data. Chapter five discusses the findings of the study. Finally, chapter six comprises the summary of key findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study.
References


CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to a review of the literature on the politics of service delivery. It first deals with the general literature, followed by that of Africa and developing countries and Ghana. The general picture portrayed by the literature so far is that accountability is a recurring theme of the debates on service delivery (Joshi 2010). Accountability gained recognition in the service delivery circles following the publication of the World Development Report (WDR) of 2004, which argues that the break down in service delivery are directly linked to the break down in accountability relationships (Joshi 2013; World Bank 2004). Accountability is broadly conceived as the framework for strengthening public services (Joshi 2013) and this explains the difference in achievements of improved public services between different sectors and countries.

2.1 General Studies on the Politics of Service Delivery

The literature shows that actors’ roles and incentives are essential in service delivery outcomes and performances across different countries.

Batley and McLoughlin (2015) opined that politics is widely conceived as influencing and being influenced by the outcome of service delivery, yet, not much has been done in explaining the impact with respect to specific public services in this regard. In this connection, they propose a service characteristics approach which can be used to understand and compare the politics embedded in different services. This approach is built on how economic and managerial imperfections such as the nature of the good, type of market failure, tasks involved in delivery, and demand for a service impact political commitment, organizational control and user power.
While their study uses an approach that concentrates on the indicators of market imperfections where poor people have the power to hold providers to account, mainly through the short route of accountability, this study extends their approach to incorporate the long route of accountability where citizens exert pressure on policy makers/politicians who in turn demand accountability from service providers.

Based on theory and case studies, the World Bank (2007) examined the different frameworks of governance structure available in metropolitan centers in developed and developing countries. The study argued that there is no universally acceptable framework for metropolitan governance and that frameworks are dependent on the metropolitan city under consideration. It further observed that perhaps the human development sectors receive the maximum interactions between citizens and service providers and that the quality of these interactions, for instance, students and teachers, patients and doctors, can improve the quality of human services in these sectors together with the relationship between citizens and their governments (World Bank 2012). Regardless of the adverse economic and social impact of the global economic recession since 2006, citizens’ satisfaction with respect to service delivery in Eastern Europe and Central Asia was much lower than Western Europe (World Bank 2012). Three main reasons account for this. First is the relatively higher access of public services in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Second is the relatively higher recorded cases of unofficial payments. Third is the relatively insufficient grievance redress mechanisms. Taken together these studies provide very useful insights into constraints in service delivery gaps in Eastern Europe and Central Asia that are not different from Africa. Our study will extend these works on the governance of service delivery by examining how accountability relationships among policymakers, service providers and
citizens strengthen or undermine the delivery of waste management and building permit and the implications of these delivery gaps on poverty reduction in Ghana.

Through its sustainable urban services policy (SUSP), the USAID (2013) provided mechanisms for countries and communities to improve the delivery of key services in urban areas. It projected that urban population will receive an additional 1.4 billion people by 2030 and this increase in urban population is expected to have an impact on urbanization and poverty reduction especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America where more than half of this urban population is expected to take place. It is as a result of rapid urbanization in developing countries especially Ghana that this study examines the issuance of building permit and waste management in a comparative perspective due to their adverse impacts on public health and the environment in the country. This study further extends to propose policy recommendations that will aid in the improvement of urban service delivery and the integration of policy and programmes in urban communities to increase the potential of a rapid urbanized world.

The PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Public Sector Research Centre (PSRC) (2007) examined public sector organisations in different parts of the world. It combines its many years of experience working with the public sector and personal interviews conducted with public sector leaders and policy makers, and identifies five key enablers as instrumental in delivering services consistent with the needs and preferences of customers. These enablers are; customer-centrality, connected government, capacity building, innovation and delivering on customer promise. It concludes that, opportunities and challenges facing public sector organisations are similar, however, the processes and strategies used as well as the outcomes remarkably differ. In other words, there are several approaches and these approaches do not yield instantaneous results. In this connection,
this study examines the usefulness of the accountability approach to the delivery of waste management and building permit in Ghana.

ODI (2012) reviewed existing evidence on political economy constraints and incentive problems using a case study of three sectors, namely, health, education, water and sanitation across different countries. It identified a set of five key political economy constraints and incentive problems that undermined performance. These are; political, market imperfections, policy incoherence, absence of effective performance oversight, lack of collective action and moral hazard. It, however, noted that, not all constraints were available in the cases reviewed and that each case has its own sets of historical legacies and institutional structures which determine whether and how these constraints unfold. Nonetheless, the post-2015 environment offers a unique opportunity to deliver public services based on the principle of collective action in order to alleviate the plight of the poor (ODI 2013). The principle of collective action can be used to deliver effective public services and reduce poverty where accountability is central in service delivery. Unfortunately, the ODI’s 2013 study does not examine the link between accountability and effective public services, which is the focus of this study. It paid much attention on a service characteristics approach which it argued that the in-depth analysis of the approach can foster change by educating actors on structural weaknesses and specific organizational reforms and policies (ODI 2014). It, however, concluded that emphasis on institutional capacity and politics is important in delivering public services – a theme which our study examines in waste management and building permit in Ghana.

Hilvert and Swindell (2013) argued that the constraints faced by local government managers and other public officials serve as an avenue to galvanise innovative ideas in order to deliver high quality services through less expensive means to achieve economic growth. They argued that
local officials should consider some factors before they entered into collaborations with private, nonprofit or other public organisations. These include: examining the philosophy behind collaboration, considering the type of collaboration to pursue, determine the number of partners, and identify obstacles and benefits. Although, the authors identified actors and their roles and incentives in service delivery in their study, they did not tell us how the roles of the actors improve or undermine service delivery in local governance units. Our study addresses this gap by examining how the roles of actors in waste management and building permit strengthen or undermine service delivery in Ghana.

In its sixth International Rural Policy Conference in Cologne, Germany, OECD (2008) examined the incentives behind the provision of public goods and services delivery as the backbone of rural community development and key in offering competitive advantage to rural regions. It identified certain key incentives that are significant in improving service delivery in rural communities. These include, the provision of services maps the assets of different rural communities, equity and efficiency tradeoffs should be carefully balanced, service delivery should be guided by a redefinition of rural-urban contracts, government should depart from the philosophy of rural spending to rural investment, the adoption of inclusive governance is key to service delivery and service delivery innovations should be encouraged. This study has identified incentives of actors in rural service delivery; our study, however, seeks to identify incentives of actors in urban service delivery and show how these incentives have characterized the delivery of waste management and building permit in Ghana.

In examining the daily mediation of conflict between citizens and state institutions, Berenschot (2010) assessed the role of municipal councillors as major actors in the politics of public service delivery in India. He contended that, political mediation is deeply rooted in the processes,
procedures and guidelines of interactions between citizens and state institutions. He argued that this relationship is a function of low levels of state capacity for public services and strategies used by local politicians to win elections. While his work finds strength in identifying actors and their relationship in service delivery, it fails to show the extent of the relationship among various actors in the service delivery chain. This study uses the accountability framework to examine the extent of the relationship between actors in public service delivery in Ghana using the delivery of waste management and building permit.

2.2 The Politics of Service Delivery in Developing Countries

This section reviews the literature on the politics of service delivery, particularly in Africa and developing countries in general.

Based on the analysis of five case studies - China, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Kyrgyzstan- examining citizens’ engagement interventions in low- and middle-income countries, the UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence (GCPSE) (2016) argued that politicians and public officials are important actors in the improvement of development outcomes through citizen engagement and therefore there is the need to strengthen accountability in the public sector. This study advocates the strengthening of accountability in public service delivery as a measure to curtail non-performance. In this connection, our study extends the work of GCPSE by examining how accountability relationships between various actors in the service delivery chain can be exercised to improve service delivery outcomes and performances in the delivery of waste management and building permit in Ghana.

Besley and Ghatak (2007) contributed to the contemporary discourse on the significance of the public and private sectors in the provision of public services and how the behaviours of actors,
especially state actors, are governed by incentives. They argued that, when it comes to service delivery in Africa, three main actors and their incentives are very important. These are, politicians, bureaucrats and non-profit organisations (NGOs). They therefore identified that incentive problems are bound to occur anytime issues of employee motivation or projects selection that delivers goods and services that have larger social ramifications come to the fore.

General issues of finance and policy are the preserve of politics. Thus, sound financial management and effective service delivery depend on well-functioning political institutions. Bureaucrats on the other hand can be held to account through the use of formal contracts and standard methods which have gained recognition in the private sector. This means that contracts can be designed using incentive pay and performance targets as the foundation for retaining jobs. NGOs are private entities underwritten largely by private partners and governments that are operated on non-profit basis. They concluded by emphasizing accountability as an essential pillar for reforming public service delivery in Africa together with the assessment of service delivery based on sound practices, policies and principles. This thesis extends their work by using the accountability framework to examine how the relationships among various actors can result in improved public services delivery in Ghana, particularly, waste management and building permit.

Khale and Worku (2013) examined the factors that have impacted service delivery in Gauteng and North-West provinces in South Africa. Specifically, the study focused on two case studies, namely, Tshwane District and Madibeng Municipalities. They found that there was no significant difference between the two cases on the expectations of citizens on services delivery. This study is re-echoed by Sartorius and Sartorius (2016) who reported low inequality in the richer urban districts and the poorer rural areas but high inequality in the industrialized districts of local
Municipalities in South Africa. This inequality gap, according to Booysen (2007) had resulted in about 900 grass-roots protests prior to the March 2006 local government elections in South Africa. She concluded that despite the protests, turnout was maintained and the support for the incumbent ANC government soared. However, this contrasts the findings of Antwerpen and Ferreira (2016) who observed that employees were largely satisfied with their work environments and other work factors in South Africa. Taken together these studies provide very useful insights on the impact of work factors on employee wellbeing and satisfaction in service delivery, our study seeks to examine not only whether there exists service delivery inequality between waste management and building permit in Ghana but also how it can be overcome. Similarly, their study links ineffective service delivery in South Africa to low levels of accountability and transparency. Our study complements this study as it examines in detail how the accountability relationships in public services delivery undermine or strengthen waste management and build permit in Ghana.

Resnick (2014) examined the role of politics and policies in urban governance and service delivery in Africa. He argued that, as a result of decentralization strategies and practices in Senegal, South Africa and Uganda, central governments have transferred powers and responsibilities to local government authorities to provide basic services. However, comprehensive administrative structures and endemic poverty deprived local governments of the needed resources to redeem themselves of their new found roles. He identified that opposition parties had excessive control in major cities, a situation he described as harmful to service delivery. This is because, there is the lack of incentive on the central government to assist municipal governments improve their performance. His findings serve as the starting point for our study. The assertion that there is the absence of incentive on the part of policy makers to aid
local government units to improve outcome and performance may help us explain why policymakers/politicians are reluctant to honour their part of the bargain when they enter into an agreement with private entities with the aim of improving service delivery in local governance especially waste management and building permit in Ghana.

Jones et. al. (2014) employed evidence-based review to examine the governance and political economy factors of urban service delivery in developing countries in five selected sectors. These are transport, solid waste management, social housing, emergency services and water and sanitation. They argued that governance and political economy variables are very essential in assessing the effectiveness of urban services. This thesis is using accountability as one of the key variables of governance to examine the effectiveness of urban service delivery in Ghana. Nevertheless, they observed that the literature is skewed to some service delivery sectors more than others, and that gaps exist on key governance challenges in urban centers and how to overcome these challenges. In this connection, they recommended the need for comparative and empirical studies on the under-researched areas - theme taken on this thesis - by comparing the delivery of waste management and building permit in Ghana. Specifically, our study compares the governance of waste management and building permit and seeks to prescribe policy recommendations on how to overcome urban governance problems and challenges in Ghana.

In another development, Jones et. al. (2014) reviewed the existing literature on the political economy of four major urban services. These are; solid waste management, water supply, transport and healthcare services. They recognize that the urban service centers have both limitations and opportunities. However, they argued that more can be achieved from the opportunities presented by the urban services environment especially with respect to increasing developmental leadership. They concluded that highly populated urban areas increase pressure
on service delivery systems culminating in several unplanned and unregulated service providers. Their study recognized the roles of state and non-state actors in urban service delivery. This thesis examines how the roles of these actors and their incentives strengthen or undermine accountability in waste management and building permit in Ghana.

Omar (2009) critically assessed the governance of social services by urban governments in Nigeria. He argued that social services performance has consistently been inadequate and that the constraints or challenges are not as a result of lack of funds but rather lack of transparency and accountability in governance, lack of qualified staff and administration, and the acrimonious relationship between urban residents and urban governments (‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality). The findings of this study are significant taking into account that lack of accountability is one of the greatest challenges of improved service delivery in Africa. Our study extends his work by examining how accountability relationships can address the weaknesses in the governance of waste management and building permit in Ghana. It also extends the work on the Nigerian experience and has the potential of giving a comparative slant to service delivery under different conditions.

Stren (2014) examined urban service delivery in sub-Saharan Africa and the role of international assistance. He intimated that since the 1970s, sub-Saharan Africa has been the recipient of considerable international urban assistance which was tied to specific strategies and processes. He identified the World Bank as the main actor in urban assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. However, due to reforms, the World Bank has been obligated to decentralize its operations in a more transparent and accountable manner. He acknowledged that international urban assistance in sub-Saharan Africa has chalked successes and constraints. Notwithstanding the constraints, he concluded that sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly positioning themselves to mitigate the
constraints collectively and on their own terms. Our study examines how Ghana strategically positions herself to mitigate challenges with respect to urban services delivery. Specifically, we examine the extent to which accountability relationships in waste management and building permit strengthen urban services in Ghana using the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) as a case study.

After methodically examining the challenges of water, sanitation and health (WASH) services delivery in district governments in Malawi, Byrns and Hughes (2016) threw further light on some essential mechanisms for improving WASH services. These include; the design of governance framework in the midst of resource constraint, build public financial management and effective management skills, and the institute of independent teams in the district level. Their study highlights the design of governance framework as a tool for improving WASH services. Our study examines accountability relationships framework as a tool for improving waste management and building permit in Ghana.

In examining public service delivery from the perspective of recruitment policies in Nigeria and South Africa, Okeke-Uzodike et. al. (2014) assessed the quality of service delivery, the link between service delivery and the capabilities of the human resources providing the services. They found that recruitment policies in Nigeria and South Africa have well-intended motifs, however, they contribute largely to the poor service delivery environment. They recommended a radical departure from socio-political recruitment context to merit-based recruitment processes. This study complements the work of Okeke-Uzodike et. al. (2014) by examining public service delivery from the perspectives of policymakers, service providers and beneficiaries. It specifically assesses the effective or ineffective delivery of waste management and building in a local government unit in Ghana.
In an attempt to account for the factors that contribute to poor water service delivery, Odaro (2012) compared public services to private service delivery and their impact on development in sub-Saharan Africa. He pointed out that, the public sector is engulfed with funding and accountability constraints and at the same time the public private partnership in many public agencies has largely remained unsuccessful, it has therefore not improved the conditions of the poor with respect to water services in many sub-Saharan Africa. While his study is on the factors that account for poor water delivery and its impact on development in sub-Saharan Africa, this study examines how the roles and incentives of actors have strengthened or undermined waste management and building permit in Ghana.

After conducting interviews with researchers and practitioners in the field of service delivery in developing countries, Rogger (2009) underscored the significance of the World Development Report 2004 that situated accountability as the backbone of service delivery. In his study, he reiterated the assertion that accountability is central to service delivery. This work complements that of Rogger (2009) by examining how actors and their incentives strengthen or undermine accountability in public services delivery in Ghana.

Manda and Mwakubo (2011) examined the role of institutions in service delivery in Africa. Specifically, they assessed the quality of health and education services in sub-Saharan Africa. They found that the low level of spending in both health and education sectors was a recipe for institutional decay in many African countries. They argued that a microeconomic approach that combines political and bureaucratic incentives and limitations will deliver much more services in the future. While their study concentrates on the role of institutions in service delivery, this thesis examines the role of actors, their incentives in waste management and building permit and how
they have either promoted or undermined accountability using the World Bank’s (2004) framework of accountability relationships.

Lewis et. al. (2016) contended that many developing countries such as Indonesia are increasingly turning their attention to some intergovernmental incentives to optimize local government outcomes in the area of service delivery. They argued that any analysis of local government performance must take into account the choice of method as well as its effectiveness and transparency. Our analysis of service delivery outcomes and performances in waste management and building permit is based on the incentives of actors and how these incentives determine the role of actors which ultimately improves or undermines accountability in service delivery in Ghana.

Using Uganda and South Africa as case studies, Tshiyoyo and Koma (2011) compared public service delivery by local governments and their implications for regional integration in Africa. They contended that local governments in Uganda and South Africa play key roles in encouraging new approaches of governance. However, public service delivery remains a challenge in many communities in Africa. They argued for the creation of synergy between local leaders and community governance to improve service delivery in Africa. Therefore, our study aims at widening local governance through the analysis of accountability relationships among various actors, their incentives in the service delivery chain as a synergistic tool in waste management and building permit in Ghana.

Madumo (2016) examined the depoliticized service approach as an indicator for effective service delivery in Africa. He argued that depoliticisation will bring about better local governance where improvement and sustainability of public services are maintained. He concluded by highlighting the separation of politics from administration with respect to public services in order to ensure
development. His study also examined depoliticisation as a strategy in ensuring effective service delivery. This study extends the literature by examining how accountability relationships can ensure improved service delivery in developing countries including Ghana.

Using an agent-based model to examine the extent to which corruption and management practices affect the performance of water service delivery (WSD), Bellaubi and Pahl-Wostl (2017) compared the management of WSD and the institutional dynamics of actors involved in various water systems in Kenya and Ghana. They argued that WSD in Kenya and Ghana has both low quality, weak integrity and accountability mechanisms in place, which are made susceptible to corruption. They further argued that WSD in Kenya and Ghana is characterized by utilitarian and opportunistic management systems and practices. Their findings show that corruption risks and opportunistic practices have negative impacts on the performance of WSD in Kenya and Ghana.

Batley (2004) examined the politics of service delivery reform on health, water, agriculture and business services by identifying the leaders, supporters and opponents of these services in developing countries. He interrogated the extent to which policymakers and citizens of Ghana, Zimbabwe, India and Sri Lanka and the international financial institutions and development partners are involved in the design and determination of reform. He concluded that, in theory, it is recognized that citizens are the principals over policymakers as their agents, and policy makers are the principals over public service officials as their agents. In reality, however, external actors and major government officials usually play the role of principals in the design and adoption of reform. His analysis identifies the interests of key actors and how they are affected by institutional and sectoral factors. This thesis extends the work of Batley (2004) as it seeks to
identify how the incentives of actors foster the realization or otherwise of accountability for improved waste management and building permit in Ghana.

2.3 The Politics of Service Delivery in Ghana

This section reviews the literature on the politics of service delivery in Ghana. The literature portrays actors’ roles and incentives as fundamental to service delivery, however, constraints including low levels of accountability impede their operations.

Commenting on health service delivery through the eyes of a district medical officer in Ghana, Agyepong (1999) argued that the challenges of global economic recession and limited resources forced sub-Saharan African countries including Ghana to reform their health sector in a way that seeks to achieve adequate quality and coverage of health care to citizens. Specifically, she examined aspects of Ghana’s health services delivery, and patterns in coverage and utilization and concluded that strategic interventions were needed to improve the health services in Ghana. She outlined some interventions including: awareness creation among care providers and health managers; the use of performance indicators to assess and reward health providers’ use of resources at the lower level to improve coverage; central government regulations should be more flexible for resource allocation and use; and, integrate service delivery at the lower level with more decentralized planning to make services better responsive to local preferences and needs.

While her study examined service delivery from the perspective of a district health officer (service provider), our study extends her work by examining not only the role and incentives of service providers in waste management and building permit in the AMA but also those of policymakers and citizens.
Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) (2016) examined the politics of health and education services delivery in Ghana and concluded that politicians are incentivized to invest in short-term and transparent projects in the health and education sectors which enabled them to canvass for periodic support from their constituents, rather than improve quality health and education standards for long-term gains. This strategy by the politicians results in poor health and education outcomes. It argued further that these outcomes are an indicative of the character of politics and the interface between politics and health and education governance structures in Ghana. The implication is that, the education sector, which is long regarded as essential for state actors, is now an avenue to retain power and promote parochial interests (ESID 2016). However, it is likely to discover relationships between good performance and better outcomes at the place of delivery and the effective forms of politics at the lower, sector and national spheres (ESID 2012). Taken together these studies provide very useful insights into the politics of healthcare and education in Ghana. Our study complements the literature as it focuses on not only the role and incentives of non-state actors particularly poor citizens but also how these incentives strengthen or undermine accountability in waste management and building permit in the AMA

Ganle et. al. (2015) used qualitative data from 185 expectant and lactating mothers, and 20 healthcare providers in six selected communities in Ghana to examine the strategies that can be used to minimize health system challenges and maximize skilled delivery services. Some of the strategies they identified include: increasing available maternal health infrastructure and resources, designing special programmes targeted at women most in need, bolstering the quality of maternal care services and establishing collaborations and partnerships with traditional birth attendants and other private agencies. Their findings call for structural changes including doctor-
patient relationships that impact positively on the healthcare seeking behaviours of women. This study complements the literature by examining the short route of accountability as a mechanism to minimize constraints in waste management and building permit services in the AMA. In this connection, the study argues that in the event that the long route of accountability breaks down, service delivery fails miserably and thus citizens may directly demand accountability from providers using the short route of accountability.

Drawing data from key survey evidence, IEA-Ghana (2017) shed light on Ghana’s access to basic services in the primary areas of water, sanitation and healthcare (WASH). It argued that while access to these basic services are conceived as basic rights, they remain instrumental for human development. However, in many developing countries including Ghana, access to WASH services remains farther away from being realized. Even though, it argued that some modest gains have been chalked with respect to WASH services in Ghana, a lot needs to be done as majority of poor people especially in the rural areas largely lack access to WASH services. It therefore concluded that gaps in access to WASH services in Ghana can be addressed with urgent policy priority, private sector partnership, decentralization reforms and good governance. Our study extends the literature by examining the gaps in accountability relationships in the delivery of waste management and building permit services.

Abaitey (2011) examined the role of non-state actors in promoting sanitation services in poor urban areas in Ghana. Specifically, she focused on Ashaiman which is one of the poorest urban localities in Ghana. In her view, poor attitudinal problem is one of the major challenges that faces local government authorities in their effort to maintain good sanitation as well as benefit from the several reforms and initiatives by the central government, the private sector and civil society organisations. She found that, despite the availability of several community-based actors
in sanitation services in Ashaiman, they are yet to be recognized as key players and partners in the process of reform and change. Therefore, she recommended collaboration between local government agencies and non-state actors, especially, community-based groups in sanitation service delivery in Ghana. This study extends the literature as it examines how policymakers, service providers and citizens use accountability relationships to coordinate their roles and incentives in waste management and building permit in the AMA.

Using quantitative data with simple statistical tools, Braimah et. al. (2014) examined the politics prevalent in implementing Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Some of the major constraints they identified in their study include: the inability of residents to afford health services, the availability of gaps between the health treatment received and the premium paid, the lack of information with regard to the coverage of health cases on the NHIS and the drugs the scheme fails to provide. They therefore recommended the collaboration between the public and private sectors in order to eradicate corruption, adhere to merit-based employment, improve institutions and initiate local ownership of public policies that will transform the NHIS and other policies to the level of high performance. Our study uses qualitative data to examine the politics of waste management and building permit in the AMA.

Ayee and Crook (2003) examined the impact of public-private partnerships on urban environmental sanitation in Accra and Kumasi. Specifically, they traced the historical trajectories of public toilets policies in these cities and how these policies contributed to undermining the environmental sanitation of poor communities. They identified the politics of patronage at the community level, failure of regulation, and the connection between local government patronage and community groups as the factors that exacerbate political conflict and result in poor management of environmental sanitation in urban communities. They recommended the
complete public provision of basic infrastructure, independent and accountable sanitation services by non-state agencies and the application of ‘conflict of interest’ laws on elected local politicians. This study extends the literature to examine how actors use their role and incentives to undermine or widen accountability in waste management and building permit in the AMA.

After critically reviewing the water sector, Ryan and Adank (2010) identified some mechanisms for ensuring access to safe and affordable water services in peri-urban and urban Ghana. These mechanisms include improving utility performance and coverage and overcoming barriers in connecting to the utility network. They recommended the deployment of alternative water service providers, either independent, accountable or intermediate providers, to improve the water services beyond access. While their study focused on access to water service delivery in peri-urban and urban communities in Ghana, this study examines the role and incentives of actors and how they strengthen or undermine accountability in the delivery of waste management and building permit services.

Using primary data collected from the officials of GWCL/AVRL, Egyin (2011) examined the challenges undermining water supply in the Sunyani Municipality. She found that the attitude of GWCL/AVRL officials in response to grievances was very poor. She concluded that the ineffective delivery of water services due to poor leadership and lack of skilled personnel results in the use of untreated and contaminated water sources leading to water borne diseases. This study complements the literature to examine policymakers and citizens’ incentives in waste management and building permit and how it reinforces accountability in the AMA.

After conducting a descriptive univariate analysis of data collected from the field, Azila-Gbettor et. al. (2013) found high levels of relationship between the physical environment and quality healthcare delivery and the choice of public healthcare facility in Ghana. They concluded that, to
achieve improved healthcare services in Ghana, there is the need to improve squarely the physical environment which houses the healthcare facility. This study complements the literature as it discusses the relationship between accountability and waste management and building permit and their implications for service delivery in the AMA.

In examining the politics of privatisation, the role of environmental health officials in Accra and Kumasi, Ghana, Crook and Ayee (2006) assessed the impact of internal and external organizational relationships in the formation of client-based working systems. They found that positive organizational culture is a necessary but not sufficient condition to withstanding the negative impact of privatisation on the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ ability to compel standards. Again, this relationship could not eradicate the weaknesses in training and motivation structures which was thought to have coexisted with the changes in service delivery. This study complements the literature as it examines the incentives of service providers, policymakers and citizens and how these incentives have either contributed to undermining or strengthening accountability in waste management and building permit in Ghana.

Addaney and Oppong (2015) examined factors responsible for sustainable solid waste management in Ghana. They found that actors have high levels of commitment to achieving sustainable solid waste management, however, low levels of technical and financial wherewithal coupled with the lack of integrative framework hamper their work. They therefore argued that, municipal assemblies can achieve sustainable solid waste management through credible and fair legal systems, strong institutions, building the capacity of the private sector and implementing cost recovery programs. They recommended the creation of legally friendly, technically sound, financially viable and market-oriented environments for various actors to register their claims and grievances in service delivery in Ghana especially solid waste management.
2.4 Local Governance Institutions in Ghana

In Ghana there are several important local governance institutions including the Local Government Service, National Association of Local Authorities of Ghana and District Assemblies (DAs). Key among these institutions is the DAs which have been delegated the highest political and administrative authorities, development authorities, planning authorities, budgeting authorities and rating authorities. Consequently, the DAs have been assigned 86 functions that enable them to provide deconcentrated, delegated and devolved local public services (Ayee 2006). They can also make bylaws, which are to embolden them in their public service delivery functions. In spite of the legal frameworks, the DAs continue to deliver poor or ineffective public services. For instance, their delivery of services is hampered by poor infrastructure, especially road networks and waste collection stands in both old and new settlements, which has negative impacts on service delivery (Asase et. al. 2009). In addition, the bad attitudes of citizens such as indiscriminate disposal of household wastes due to the absence of effective environmental public health education and service promotion strategies (Asase et. al. 2009).

Furthermore, Post (1999) has pointed out that waste management services by the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) have largely deteriorated over the last 10 years. This is because of the astronomical increase in population which has out-grown resources in meeting the demands of the urban population. This situation has limited the KMA’s capacity to provide adequate waste management services and prevent environmental degradation. Consequently, the KMA is only able to collect a fraction (about 40%) of domestic refuse generated each day by households, institutions and markets in Kumasi (Post 1999).
Similarly, Nyarko et. al. (2011) discussed local authorities, community and private operators’ partnerships in small towns water service delivery in Ghana. Even though they found that weak monitoring and regulation by DAs impacted negatively on their performance of partnerships with private operators in the community managed small towns’ water service delivery, they at the same time pointed out that effective monitoring of performance by the DAs strengthened existing accountability relationships between and among public private partnerships. They saw accountability not merely as private operators submitting reports to the DAs, but as the DAs responses and interests to feedback which has the potential to increase the commitment of the private operators to the accountability relationships. In other words, accountability, either ‘long or short’ is cardinal to public private operator partnerships for small towns’ water service delivery in Ghana.

It is against this backdrop that this study examines how accountability in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services. Specifically, the study seeks to identify the various actors involved in the delivery of the services and their incentives, and how accountability relationships, either short or long, have shaped the delivery of waste management and building permit services in the AMA.

2.5 Politics in Ghana

Unlike the politics of service delivery, much ink has been poured on politics in Ghana in general. Most of these studies have three basic characteristics. First, they emphasize the cardinal role of actors and the nature of the state in Ghana at the central government level as opposed to the periphery. Second, they point out several arguments on the weak nature of the Ghanaian state. These arguments include dependence on foreign aid; the inability of the government and political system to fight corruption; a bureaucratic system that is too weak to accommodate hierarchical
changes; the over-reliance on quantity as opposed to quality by the political elite and leadership; weak administrative capacity to handle resource-based conflicts; and the consideration that poor service delivery has been at the forefront of public sector reform throughout the past four decades (Ohemeng 2010; Ayee 2001 and 2016; Amponsah 2016 and ESID 2016). In other words, the studies focused more on the formal legal and administrative apparatus of the state largely without the consideration of the role of non-state actors and officials. For instance, Amponsah (2016) shows that in Ghana the implementation of reforms especially in the market sector will only work if a “market augmenting state” framework of development supports them. He further demonstrates that this framework focuses on the establishment of political and economic structures and institutions that limit the powers of the state, while providing fertile grounds for weak domestic private companies to thrive. He then concludes that given the availability of this framework, market liberalization reforms in Ghana will achieve significant positive results including increased private investment, growth and development. Third, in addition to the weak nature of the Ghanaian state, most of the studies focus on Ghana’s economic stagnation (Hutchful 1995).

Two things can be distilled from these studies on Ghana. First, the studies assume that the role of actors especially state actors is key in the delivery of services. Second, there has been little attention given to linking accountability to service delivery. This is the interest of this study. The study argues that the delays and failures in service delivery are because of the lack of accountability relationships among the various actors in the service delivery chain. It also emphasizes that the delivery of waste management and building permit, like other essential services in Ghana, was largely the preserve of local governments and other actors, some of whom have survived, others have built fire belt, while others are no more, and the outcome and
performance of which was determined by the participation of the major actors within the service delivery chain.

**2.6 The Delivery of Waste Management in Ghana**

Generally, waste management is the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) in Ghana. However, this responsibility has been devolved to the decentralized Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) leaving the MLGRD to play a supervisory and monitoring role. The MMDAs therefore are in charge of waste collection, transportation and final disposal through their various Waste Management Departments (WMDs) and their Environmental Health and Sanitation Departments (EHSDs) (Samwine et. al. 2017).

There are several policy frameworks that undergird the delivery of waste management in Ghana. These include: the Local Governance Act, 936 (2016); Environmental Protection Agency Act, 490 (1994); Pesticides Control and Management Act, 528 (1996); Environmental Assessment Regulations, LI 1652 (1999); Environmental Sanitation Policy (1999); and Guidelines for the Development and Management of Landfills and Bio-medical Waste (2000). These acts, regulations and legislative instruments were drawn from the National Environmental Action Plan (MLGRD 2004).

Since May 1999, the enactment of the Urban Environmental and Sanitation Policy (UESP) and by-laws have expanded the nature and scope of waste management to include private actors and agencies as well as redefined the responsibilities, strategies and principles of environmental health and sanitation, constraints and challenges (Table 2.1). For instance, Anomanyo (2004) intimated that the desire to provide effective waste management services enabled the AMA to
demarcate its boundaries into waste collection zones where private companies were contracted to manage waste in either one or more zones. This situation led to the contracting of about twenty (20) private waste companies in the AMA which are outlined in Chapter Four. These include: Ako Waste Management Limited, Daben Cleansing Construction Services Limited, Gee Waste Limited, Liberty Waste Service Company, Vicma Waste Construction, Jekora Ventures and Zoomlion Ghana Limited (ZL). The focus on ZL in this study is because the selected electoral area (Kotobabi Electoral Area) is a demarcated boundary of this private waste company. However, by-laws have weak enforcement systems because they are unable to effect sanctions or penalties on individuals and waste agencies that exhibit poor waste management practices (Fieldwork 2018).

Table 2.1: **Actors and their roles and interests in Waste Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Actors</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waste Management Department (Accra Metropolitan Assembly)</td>
<td>Policy implementation through the preparation and approval of waste collection; transportation; final disposal; and, capacity building initiatives.</td>
<td>Public health, revenue generation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoomlion Ghana Limited</td>
<td>Policy implementation through the managing and disposal of waste for potential waste generators; infrastructural support to communities; and, capacity building initiatives.</td>
<td>Public health, revenue generation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/Opinion leaders</td>
<td>Organization of groups that are affected by activities in the waste management sector; and sensitization and education.</td>
<td>Public health, aesthetics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Individuals</td>
<td>Generators of waste</td>
<td>Public health, aesthetics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: Fieldwork 2018.**
2.7 Challenges of Waste Management Delivery in Ghana

Waste management is a multifarious issue that has engaged the attention of successive governments, local authorities and development partners in recent years. Accordingly, its delivery is without problems and challenges. According to the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Center, because of scoring political points, policymakers/politicians are disincentivized to invest in long-term programs and projects (ESID 2016). The poor attitude of citizens in complementing the efforts of local government units hampers the effective delivery of waste management (Samwine et. al. 2017; Yaoda et. al. 2014; Egyin 2011; and Abaitey 2011). Financial constraints undermine health officials’ efforts to invest in medical supplies and equipment (Aikins 2014, Addaney and Oppong 2015). Moreover, the inadequate provision of storage equipment including dustbins and skips compels citizens to dump waste in open spaces and unapproved sites in the Tamale and Accra Metropolises (Ontoaneyin 2014; Puopiel 2010; Boadi and Kuitunen 2003). Finally, reduced political arm-twisting in the operations of private waste companies would arouse the interest of more private companies and groups (community base organisations) into the waste sector to help manage environmental health and sanitation challenges in Ghana (Aweso 2013).

2.8 The Delivery of Building Permit in Ghana

Ghana’s population has experienced some rapid changes from a little over 6 million in 1957 to 18 million in 2000 and to 24 million in 2010 as recorded by the national census figures (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). The rapid population changes have brought about the proliferation of structures over the last 30 years (Amadu 2014) with its attendant constraints mostly in urban centers. This can be explained in part as the metropolitan cities of Accra, Kumasi, Tema,
Sekondi-Takoradi, Cape Coast and Tamale contain nearly 50 percent of the entire population (Ghana Statistical Service 2012).

The Local Governance Act 2016, Act 936 enjoins MMDAs to plan, manage and regulate systematic physical developments within their jurisdictions. They are required to effectively manage the issuance of building permits squarely with the development plans of the Assemblies. Citizens and organisations that intend to put up a structure whether for residential or commercial purposes in any assembly must seek to obtain a building permit. The rationale is to ensure that proposed projects are consistent with the building regulations and development control guidelines of the Assemblies (MLGRD, 2016). In the spirit of ensuring that physical developments conform to the processes, strategies and guidelines of the MMDAs, other acts and regulations exist to strengthen their operations. These include the National Building Regulations, LI 1630 (1996), the Environmental Assessment Regulations, LI 1652 (1999), the Fire Service Regulations, LI 1724 (2003) and the Lands Commission Act 767, (2008).

For instance, clause 8 (1) of the National Building Regulations, 1996 (LI 1630) requires that applicants submit to MMDAs their development particulars which should be assessed and approved within three months. Similarly, the Local Governance Act 936, 2016 also sums up the various roles of stakeholders (Table 2.2) and the processes and procedures applicants must go in acquiring building permits for the construction of authorized structures in Ghana. This is because, issuing building permits within a short period of time is key in ensuring satisfactory services for clients (World Bank and IFC 2013).
Table 2.2: **Actors and their roles and interests in Building Permit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Actors</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town and Country Planning Department (Accra Metropolitan Assembly)</td>
<td>Policy formulation and implementation; management of human settlement; monitoring and evaluation; and advisory services.</td>
<td>Safe structures, revenue generation and conformity of buildings to plans and regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Department (Accra Metropolitan Assembly)</td>
<td>Policy implementation and education; development control measures; monitoring and evaluation; and capacity building initiatives.</td>
<td>Safe structures, conformity of buildings to plans and regulations, revenue generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/Opinion leaders</td>
<td>Organization of groups that are affected by activities in the permit sector, fighting for citizens’ rights, and sensitization and education</td>
<td>Safe structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Individuals</td>
<td>Acquire plots and build individual homes and houses</td>
<td>Safe structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Institutions</td>
<td>Publication of research findings and recommendations to building permit challenges and constraints, advocacy campaigns and contributing to development of standards</td>
<td>Safe structures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Local Governance Act, 936, 2016 and Fieldwork 2018.

**2.9 Challenges of Building Permit Delivery in Ghana**

There are political, logistical, financial and security challenges of building permit, which are considered inimical and debilitating. The lack of funding has had considerable negative impacts on field inspection, logistics and capacities of employees in the Sunyani East and West Municipalities (Agyeman et. al. 2016). Inadequate logistics hamper the efforts of officials of the Town and Country Planning Departments in Kumasi and Accra (Amadu 2010). Adequate security is key to the realization of the monitoring, supervision and evaluation functions of the Building Inspectorate and Planning Inspectorate Divisions of planning authorities in Ghana. Moreover, the excessive political control in the affairs of development control officers in Kumasi undermine their supervisory role in the delivery of building permit (Asante and Sasu 2018). In addition to the selling price of lands, the procedure for acquiring a title to the land reduces public trust and confidence in the Town and Country Planning Department in Kumasi (Botchway et. al.
Statutory violations and non-conforming land issues are largely the result of land administration in Ghana (Abusah 2004).

2.10 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this study is based on the concept of accountability. This concept is adopted from the World Bank’s (2004) framework of accountability relationships which has pointed out that service delivery is inextricably linked to the accountability relationships among various actors in the service delivery chain. Accountability is a term of many meanings. However, there is no generally accepted definition that applies to all forms, types and degrees of accountability. In most cases, any definition so given, will depend on the aspect of the concept that a scholar wishes to highlight. Nonetheless, the basic understanding as answerability and enforcement in public services cuts across most, if not all definitions. According to Schedler (1999:17), accountability is the court where “A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past and future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”. Similarly, Paul (1992) sees accountability as implying the ability to hold individuals and groups responsible for performance which is measured as objective as possible. Malena et. al. (2004) also define accountability as the obligation of power-holders to account for or take responsibility for their actions. They refer to power-holders as individuals who occupy political, financial or other forms of power including officials in government, corporations, international financial institutions and civil society organisations. In short, accountability is the willingness of office holders to accept responsibility and to subject their actions and inactions to account. A fourth definition, which has broadly conceived accountability from both legal and public perspectives, is the one by Dwivedi and Jabbra (1988, cited in Dwivedi 1994, p.54), which refers to accountability as ‘(a) the methods by which a
public agency or public official fulfills its duties and obligations, and (b) the process by which that agency or the public official is required to account for such actions’.

To conclude, what is evident from all these definitions is the need for policymakers and officials in government and the non-governmental sector to (a) justify their actions through laid down processes and procedures that compel them to provide answers to the citizens for their stewardship, and (b) minimize or reduce drastically their abuse of power and authority in public service delivery. For those office holders who are found to have abused their power and authority, accountability then provides the medium through which the citizens can seek redress (Ayee 1994, cited in Ayee 2006).

2.11 Accountability Relationships in Service Delivery

The various functions of government can be largely classified into three broad categories, that is, service delivery, policymaking and oversight and accountability (World Bank 2000: xii). As mentioned in Chapter One, most of these functions are executed by various public sector institutions and, in order to effectively perform these tasks, public sector institutions have to partner the private sector and other public agencies. In the early introduction of the analysis of poor-quality service delivery outcomes and performances in Africa, many public institutions were approached and analyzed largely due to the absence of resources (Kimenyi 2013) and not at the break down of accountability relationships. In other words, accountability relationships did not take center stage in the analysis of the constraints of poor service delivery outcomes and performances. However, since the early 2000s following the accountability framework of the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report (WDR), which underscored constraints in service delivery as the results of constraints in accountability relationships (Joshi 2013; World
Bank 2004), many analyses of the break down in the delivery of basic services have been undertaken with keen interest on accountability relationships.

The World Bank’s framework of 2004 applies the long and short routes of accountability to analyze and assess the service delivery outcomes of public institutions in a systematic manner. As shown in Figure 2.1, citizens or clients have a direct relationship with the service providers. They enjoy similar relationship when they buy building material or grocery in the market. Thus, in a competitive-market transaction, they receive the service because they have the power to hold the service provider accountable. This is what the World Bank (2004) terms “short route of accountability”. That is, the citizen pays the service provider directly; he can observe whether or not he has received the building material or grocery; and if he is dissatisfied, he has the power to halt subsequent business transaction or in the case of fraud, he exercises legal and social sanctions.
Figure 2.1: The Framework of Accountability Relationships


However, the delivery of waste management and building permit has no direct accountability of the service provider to the citizen. This is because, these services are not provided through a market transaction but through the responsibility of the government. That is, through the long route of accountability where citizens are expected to exert pressure and influence on policymakers, and policymakers will in turn influence providers (World Bank 2004). When the relationships along this long route break down, service delivery fails miserably. This may be characterized by the outbreak of cholera, dengue, yellow fever, and the mushrooming of illegal structures in Ghana. Therefore, improving service delivery outcomes for the citizens or clients who are the weakest actors in the relationships require strengthening the short route of accountability in the framework (World Bank 2004; Devarajan et. al. 2011).
For effective service delivery, the accountability framework assumes that actors in the service delivery chain should be linked in a network of accountability relationships. The first of this accountability relationship is the one involving the citizens or clients and the policy makers which is called voice (World Bank 2004). This voice relationship implies that policy makers are accountable to citizens and that they exert control on the policy makers in order to achieve their objectives. In reality, however, this is rarely achieved, either partly due to the inability of citizens to participate in the formulation of the collective objectives because they lack information or due to the intrinsic weaknesses in the electoral system. Even if citizens were able to hold policy makers accountable, there is no guarantee that service delivery will be effective unless policy makers ensure that service providers improve services to them (World Bank 2004).

The other essential accountability relationship is between policy makers and service providers and this is termed compact (World Bank 2004). The compact relationship entails decoupling physically and mentally the policy maker from the provider, where the provider enters into an agreement with the policy maker with the aim of providing a service, in return for being rewarded or sanctioned depending on performance. Like the citizen-policy maker relationship, an essential element in the policy maker-provider relationship is information. The policy maker can specify the terms of the agreement based on available information. This is important not only for monitoring service providers but for other actors to learn about service delivery (World Bank 2004).

The last but not least relationship is the one between frontline providers and the clients which is referred to as client power (World Bank 2004). Client power relationship assumes that clients can directly hold service providers accountable. This relationship is also termed the short route of accountability. It is worthy of note that the accountability framework does not reject the long
route of accountability due to its weaknesses, however, it calls for a complementarity of both long and short routes of accountability in order to improve service delivery outcomes for poor people (World Bank 2004; Devarajan et. al. 2011).

When the voice, compact and client power are strengthened, accountability improves and service delivery failures become minimized (World Bank 2004). This can be achieved when the various actors in the service delivery chain are incentivized and understand their roles. However, since the actors have divergent interests, anxieties and preferences, service delivery challenges are bound to occur and the inability to check this incentive problem impact on the effectiveness of delivery (World Bank 2004; Devarajan et. al. 2011).

2.12 Advantages of the Theory

First, the accountability relationships framework makes it easy to identify how service delivery failures can be interpreted as a breakdown in one or both of the links in the long route of accountability (Devarajan et. al. 2011; Joshi 2013). Second, it brings actors and their incentives to the forefront and links principal-agent concepts to politics and organizational behaviour (ESID 2014; Rogger 2009). Third, it recognizes the role of politics in accountability processes. Finally, it concentrates on the need to strengthen service delivery especially for the poor and highlights the important role of accountability (Devarajan et. al. 2011).

2.13 Disadvantages of the Theory

While the accountability framework has dominated the understanding of service delivery within policy debates and development literature in contemporary times, it has been criticized for its emphasis on top-down hierarchical and participatory approaches (ESID 2014). The argument is that the focus on the approaches turns a blind eye to the larger political context that molds the
success of these approaches and oversimplify the various actor relationships which are major components of political and organizational behaviour (ESID 2014). For this study, this means that, the accountability framework creates the impression that citizens (principals) through their policymakers (agents) easily hold service providers accountable. However, this is rarely achieved due to either the inability of citizens to participate in the formulation of public policies and programs or the intrinsic flaws or weaknesses in the electoral processes. Additionally, it is relatively weak on how politics actually works and on associated issues of drivers of the behaviour of the state (ESID 2014).

2.14 Deployment of the Theory

Since the accountability relationships framework highlights the actors in the service delivery chain and their link in a well-functioning accountability relationships, the study uses it to examine the role of actors, their incentives in waste management and building permit and how they either promote or undermine accountability in local governance units in Ghana. Specifically, the effectiveness of service delivery therefore largely depends on the framework of accountability relationships between the citizens, policy makers and service providers. Therefore, this study uses the accountability relationships framework to ascertain how the relationships between actors and their incentives in waste management and building permit have improved or undermined accountability in the AMA.

2.15 Conclusion

The chapter has reviewed the various studies on the politics of service delivery from the global perspective to Ghana, particularly, the role and incentives of actors in service delivery and has found that service delivery outcomes and performances in several countries are determined by
the major roles and interests of actors in a network of accountability relationships. It is important that these accountability relationships are understood in the context of the political economy of Ghana and therefore this study seeks to highlight it using the delivery of essential and distinctive services including waste management and building permit.
References


CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology adopted for the study. It discusses the research paradigm, research approach, target population, the sample size and sampling techniques, sources of data, data collection methods as well as the method of data management and analysis.

3.1 Research Paradigm

Paradigms occupy the central role in the sciences. The evolution of the word paradigm is associated with the seminal work of Thomas Kuhn entitled, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, which was first published in 1962 (Mouton 1996:203). Since the work of Kuhn, the idea of a paradigm has become extant. Several scholars have contributed richly to the literature on what constitutes a paradigm. In general, a paradigm is best understood as a whole system of thinking (Neuman 2011:94). In this sense, a paradigm can be said to be an established tradition in a particular discipline (Mouton 1996:203).

Specifically, Jonker and Pennink (2010) define research paradigm as “a set of fundamental assumptions and beliefs as to how the world is perceived, which then serves as a thinking framework that guides the behaviour of the researcher” (p. 3). The study aims at understanding the politics of service delivery in local governance units in Ghana by examining the role of primary actors, their incentives and how accountability has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services using the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) as a case. This study is therefore undertaken from an interpretive paradigm as this paradigm enables the researcher to offer explanations to the politics inherent in basic service delivery in
the AMA from the perspective of policymakers, service providers and citizens/clients/beneficiaries.

The values and experiences of the respondents and the researcher largely shape the collection of data and the analysis thereof. The interpretivist paradigm, which reality is the creation of social actors (Hennink et. al. 2011) was chosen for this research as it assisted the researcher to pose the what, the why and how questions so as to dig deeper into the politics inherent in public service delivery in local governance units in Ghana by drawing inspirations from existing literature.

3.2 Research Approach

The researcher drew from fundamental qualitative approach using semi-structured instruments or questionnaires. Creswell argues that qualitative research is often where “the inquirer makes knowledge claims based primarily on the multiple meanings of individual experiences socially and historically constructed, with an intent of developing a theory or pattern or advocacy/participatory perspectives (i.e., political, issue-oriented, collaborative or change-oriented) or both” (Creswell 2014:183). Creswell argues further that “a qualitative approach uses strategies of inquiry such as narratives, phenomenologies, ethnographies, grounded theory studies, or case study” (Creswell 2014:187).

Despite the fact that several studies have been conducted on the politics of service delivery, a few studies compare waste management and building permit services by local governance units in Ghana. The comparison in this case does not seek to establish direct link between waste management and building permit since these services are distinct but rather how accountability has strengthened the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Consequently, approaching this study from the qualitative approach is appropriate taking into
consideration the experiences of both state and non-state actors in the governance and delivery of basic services in the AMA. This study seeks to understand the politics of service delivery from the viewpoint of both public and private actors and players of the AMA. In view of that, the researcher used open-ended questions with the main expectation of creating relevant themes from the information.

The qualitative approach is largely helpful in acquiring specific social data about the qualities, sentiments, practices and social settings of specific groups of people. The use of this approach in this study enabled the researcher to utilize open-ended and probing questions which gave the respondents the avenue to relate to the study in their own words and not by pigeon-holing them to select from a list of given alternatives. The open-ended inquiries provoked reactions that were important and socially notable to the respondents; unanticipated by the researcher; and logical and rich in nature. Another reason why this methodology was preferred is that it allowed the researcher to probe further and deeper to a number of the responses; for instance, the researcher asked follow-up questions on the responses of the respondents using why, why not or how. The researcher listened attentively to what the respondents uttered after which they were asked to expatiate further on their responses.

### 3.3 Research Design

Research design is mainly concerned with the “… aims, uses, purposes, intentions and plans within the practical constraint of location, time, money” and the availability of the researcher (Hakim 2000, p.1). To this end, the specific research design for this study is the case study method. This is because the study seeks to investigate in detail the role of primary actors and their incentives and how accountability has strengthened the delivery of waste management and building permit services in the AMA. The study relates to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions raised
with respect to the AMA’s public service delivery outcomes and performances. The circumstances of the study required a case study to describe and provide useful explanations to the issues at stake.

The focus of the study is to investigate in detail how and why the AMA is delivering its waste management and building permit services. Baxter and Jack (2008) noted that ‘qualitative case study’ is one of the ways of conducting studies that enhance investigation of a phenomenon within its current setting by making use of a number of different types of information. In this connection, they emphasized the point that the issue undercover is not investigated through a single viewpoint but rather multiple viewpoints taking into consideration various features of the issue to be uncovered. The descriptive nature of the study enabled the researcher to describe the nature, scope and the current state of public service delivery including waste management and building permit in the AMA.

The AMA was selected for a case study because of the evidence of improper land use, planning and management which hinders the effective collection, transportation and disposal of sanitation and waste services (Boadi and Kuitunen 2003). Furthermore, Accra has an estimated population of 1,665,086 citizens and a daily influx of more than two million visitors which makes it one of the fastest growing cities in Africa (AMA 2014). The presence of these individuals adds to the waste production capacity of the AMA and further constrains officials in their efforts to rid the AMA of filth. In addition, the discourse on waste management and building permit is more pronounced in Accra than other urban centers because of its central role in governance and economics and the multicultural environment it represents taking into account that about 80 percent of the population of Accra live in low income and high-density populated areas (Colan Consult 1998; cited in Boadi and Kuitunen 2003).
3.4 Profile of the District

Since 1898 when it was first established, the AMA has undergone several changes with regard to name, jurisdictional boundaries and number of Sub-Metropolitan District Councils (SMDCs) (AMA Online 2018), to which we will return later. The AMA is one of the 254 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in Ghana and among the 26 such districts in the Greater Accra Region with a population of 1,665,086 as of 2010 (Metropolitan Composite Budget 2016). It is worth noting that Accra is the district, regional and national capital of the Republic of Ghana. The AMA shares boundaries with the Ga West Municipal to the north, Ga South Municipal to the west, the Gulf of Guinea to the south and La Dadekotopon Municipal to the east (Appendix C). It covers a total land area of 137 square kilometers. It derives its legal existence from the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana, Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936), and Legislative Instrument 1615 which also established the six (6) SMDCs in 2004. Currently, the AMA is guided by Legislative Instrument 2034 of 2012 (Metropolitan Composite Budget 2017).

3.5 Establishment

The Town Council Ordinance (TCO) of 1894 established the Accra Town Council. Prior to this period, there were several attempts to establish a Town Council in Accra dating back to 1859 (Metropolitan Composite Budget 2013). The Accra Town Council held its first meeting on 14th February 1894 and subsequently operated for 47 years before the advent of the 1944 Coussey Constitution in the Gold Coast (Modern Ghana Online 2018). This constitution was amended in September, 1953 to accommodate more members in the Accra Town Council. In this connection, the Council rose from 14 to 31 to form the Accra Municipal Council (Modern Ghana Online 2018).
The promulgation of the Local Government Act 1961, (Act 54) recognized Accra as one of the 58 District Councils created under the new local government system (Modern Ghana Online 2018) with the objective of promoting efficient administration and addressing constraints in social amenities and services for the citizens. This Act also saw the creation of six area councils which are now termed Sub Metropolitan District Councils (SMDCs). These are: Ablekuma, Ashiedu Keteke, Okaikoi, Kpeshie, Ayawaso and Osu Klottey.

Accra was declared a city on the 28th June, 1961 and subsequently, became Accra City Council. In August 1964, the Accra-Tema City Council was established out of the remnants of the Accra City Council. The AMA was established by PNDC Law 207 which was replaced by the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) which was also replaced by the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936) and Legislative Instrument 1615 which also established the six (6) SMDCs in 2004. The SMDCs were later increased to thirteen (13) by Legislative Instrument 1718 in 2004 (Metropolitan Composite Budget 2013).

In 2008, the Ledzokuku-Krowor Municipal Assembly (LEKMA) was created out of the AMA. This resulted in the reduction of AMA’s SMDCs from 13 to 11 and the subsequent enactment of new Legislative Instrument, L.I 1926 in 2008. The 11 SMDCs were: Ablekuma Central, Ablekuma North, Ablekuma South, Ashiedu Keteke, Ayawaso Central, Ayawaso East, Ayawaso West, La, Okaikoi North, Okaikoi South, and Osu Klottey. Of the 11 SMDCs, La SMDC was later upgraded to a Municipal Assembly status and this further reduced the number of the SMDCs to 10. Subsequently, Legislative Instrument 2034 in 2012 was enacted and this legislative instrument guided the AMA until 2018 when 38 new districts were created.

In 2018, the central government created 38 more districts which brought the total number of districts from 216 to 254. Six (6) districts were directly carved out of the AMA and this resulted
in reducing the SMDCs from 10 to 6. They are: Osu Klottey, Ashiedu Ketek, Ablekuma South, Ablekuma_Central, Ayawaso_Central and Okaikoi South.

Accordingly, the newly created Municipal Assemblies from the AMA and their legislative instruments (LIs) are: Okaikoi North (LI 2307), Ayawaso West (LI 2312), Ayawaso North (LI 2311), Ayawaso East (LI 2310), Ablekuma North (LI 2308) and Ablekuma West (LI 2309).

The General Assembly (GA) of the AMA has a total membership of 120, which consists of 79 elected members, 32 government appointees, 8 Members of Parliament (MPs) and one (1) Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) (Fieldwork 2018).

### 3.6 Population and Administrative Councils

The 2010 Population and Housing Census (PHC) puts the population of the AMA at 1,665,086 representing 42 percent of the total population of the Greater Accra Region and 17 percent of the total population of Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service 2014; Metropolitan Composite Budget 2016). Of the total population, 51.9 percent and 48.1 percent are female and male respectively.

A total of 70.1 percent representing persons 15 years and above constitute the bulk of AMA’s population (Metropolitan Composite Budget 2016).

For accessible and accountable local governance and service delivery at the lower level, the AMA is further divided into six (6) SMDCs, which have been stated earlier, as follows: Osu Klottey, Ashiedu Ketek, Ablekuma South, Ablekuma_Central, Ayawaso_Central and Okaikoi South.

There are 7 electoral constituencies within the AMA’s jurisdiction. They are: Ayawaso Central, Okaikoi Central, Okaikoi South, Ablekuma Central, Ablekuma South, Odododiodioo, and Klottey Korley.
3.7 Vision Statement

The vision of the Assembly is to become ‘A Smart, Sustainable and Resilient City’ (AMA Online 2018).

3.8 Mission Statement

The Accra Metropolitan Assembly stands to ‘improve the quality of life of people living within the city of Accra by providing leadership and opportunities for social and economic development whilst maintaining a clean, attractive and secured environment’ (AMA Online 2018).

3.9 Core Values of the AMA

The AMA strives for transparency, accountability, integrity, efficiency and effectiveness through the following five main core values:

a) Innovation and Creativity: The AMA embraces information and communication technologies (ICTs), promotes best practices and consistently explores new ways of delivering services.

b) Effective Partnership: The AMA forges long term sustainable partnerships with all stakeholders.

c) Respect and Responsiveness: The AMA understands and values the contributions of the people and priority needs of the city.

d) Dedication and Discipline: The AMA keeps its commitments with the city dwellers and serves with a sense of urgency.

e) Safe and Accessible Neighbourhoods: The AMA creates safe environments for the well-being of and for the people we serve (AMA Online 2018).
3.10 Functions of the AMA

The functions of the AMA as prescribed in section 12 (3) of the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936), which mandates it to perform, among other functions, the following:

a) be responsible for the overall development of the Assembly;

b) formulate and execute plans, programs and strategies for the effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district; and,

c) initiate programs for the development of basic infrastructure and provide municipal works and services in the district (MLGRD 2016).

3.11 Organizational Structure

To deliver on its mandate, the AMA has about 16 departments and other units (Figure 3.2) which together report directly to the Metropolitan Coordinating Director (MCD). The MCD is a career public servant who assists the Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) in the implementation of the policies and programmes of the General Assembly (GA). In the day-to-day performance of its functions, the AMA works through fourteen (14) sub-committees, which are Social Services, Finance and Administration, Development Planning, Revenue Mobilization, Justice and Security, Education, Works, Environmental Management, Youth and Sports, Culture & Trade and Industry, Disaster Management, Food and Agriculture, Health, and Women and Children. The environmental management, development planning and works sub-committees are directly involved in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. These sub-committees perform mainly deliberative functions and submit policy recommendations to the Executive Committee (EC) for further considerations and then to the GA for final decisions and approval.
Figure 3.1: **Organogram of Accra Metropolitan Assembly.**

Source: Fieldwork 2018.
3.12 The Scope of Services

The AMA provides core services in the following areas:

I. Building permit
II. Business Operating Permit
III. Marriage Services
IV. AMA Commercial Drivers Permit
V. Out-of-home Adverts Permit
VI. AMA registration of NGO
VII. Public Health Services

Waste management and building permit were selected from among many services in the AMA including marriage services, public health services, registration of NGO etc., because it has direct public health, environmental and costs implications on citizens. The ineffective delivery of these services can have debilitating consequences on rapid urbanization, employment, poverty reduction and improved public services. For instance, the World Bank (2012) pointed out that uncollected solid waste adds to flooding, air pollution and public health challenges including respiratory ailments, diarrhoea, dengue and yellow fever. Similarly, Botchway et. al. (2014) noted that the advent of unplanned siting of building structures by unscrupulous developers and land owners in Ghana is partly attributed to the huge costs in acquiring land and the delays in the procedure for acquiring building permit. This situation has resulted in an increase in the average distance to be covered by waste management companies and additional cost to their operations (Boadi and Kuitunen 2003). Additionally, the comparative case study approach was adopted because of the researcher’s interest in highlighting the similarities and differences of not only the
role and interests of actors but also the accountability relationships in the delivery of waste management and building permit and its consequences for service delivery in the AMA.

### 3.13 Sources of Data

Two main data sources were used for the study. These are primary and secondary sources of data. Primary sources of data are mainly considered as information gathered from the data source which have not been exposed to any form of interpretation or analysis. In other words, primary source of data remains the preserve of the researcher; the researcher himself/herself gathered the information using a variety of collection tools, for instance, observations, interviews and questionnaires as opposed to relying on available data (Wilson 2010).

The primary source of data for this study was gathered from in-depth interviews conducted with senior level officials of the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources (MSWR), Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD), Waste Management Department (WMD), Works Department (Works), Zoomlion Ghana Limited (ZL), residential owners and household heads, opinion and community leaders in the AMA. These respondents are the key policymakers, frontline service providers and beneficiaries of waste management and building permit services and therefore taking into account their incentives and the analyses of the specific strategies that gave rise to those incentives is important in understanding the politics of service delivery within a broader governance structure in the AMA.

Secondary source of data is the information that has been gathered by other investigators ranging from yearly reports, publicity materials, available case reports, periodicals, journal articles and newspaper reports as well as government printed sources (Wilson 2010). The secondary data for this study was gathered from policy documents, annual reports, legal and legislative instruments,
research results, articles, textbooks, internet and other publications. One of the main benefits of this data source is the ability to save resources, for instance, time and money (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005).

3.14 Target population

In a broad sense, research population may be conceived as the entire set of cases from which a sample is drawn (Wilson 2010). Polit and Hungler (1997) define population as the totality or aggregate of the objects, subjects or members that correspond to the specifications. In this study, the target population was the male and female residential owners (residence with building permits) and household heads within the AMA, senior level environmental health and sanitation officials (EHSOs) of the WMD, ZL and the MSWR, TCPD Officers, development control officials, local chiefs, youth leaders and community leaders. These sample cases were targeted because they are the policymakers, policy implementers and beneficiaries of waste management and building permit services and therefore they play key roles and interests which should not be overlooked in the analysis of the politics of service delivery in local governance units especially in the AMA.

3.15 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

One of the critical elements of experimental studies is the sample size. This is because sample sizes hinge on making derivations around masses or common people from a sample. According to Onwuegbuzie & Collins (2007), the researcher’s decision to select a sample size is similar or the same to the sampling plan as this decision determines the extent to which the researcher can make factual and/or expository speculations or claims.
A total number of 33 respondents was used for this study. First, using deliberate or purposive sampling technique, 10 key stakeholders were selected from the WMD, TCPD, ZL and the MSWR. These respondents were selected for the interview because they had first-hand experience, information and requisite knowledge on how their role and incentives undermine or strengthen accountability in service delivery, particularly waste management and building permit services in the AMA.

They are: 2 senior officials from the MSWR including the deputy director of EHSD and the programs coordinator; 2 senior officials from ZL which include the director of waste management and the operations manager; 2 senior officials from the WMD which include the administrative director and the senior officer in charge of waste treatment and final disposal; 2 senior officials from the TCPD including the deputy director and the head of the Planning Inspectorate Division (PID); 2 senior officials from the Works which include the chief building inspector and the senior technician engineer; 1 local chief; 1 women’s leader and 1 youth leader.

Second, probability and non-probability sampling techniques (stratified, simple random and convenience sampling techniques) were used to sample 20 household heads and residential owners using the 2010 Population and Housing Census’s total households’ size of 450,748 in the AMA (Ghana Statistical Service 2014).

To get fair and representative respondents, the following was conducted:

a. The study area, i.e., the Accra Metropolitan Assembly was stratified into 6 SMDCs (Osu Klottey, Ashiedu Keteke, Ablekuma South, Ablekuma Central, Ayawaso Central and Okaikoi South) and 1 of them (Ayawaso Central) was selected through the use of a simple random sampling technique;
b. The selected SMDC was further stratified into town councils (TCs) (Kokomlemle, Alajo, Aryee Diki, Abelenkpe and Kotobabi) and 1 of them (Kotobabi) was selected through simple random sampling technique; and finally,

c. The selected TC was in turn reduced to electoral areas (EAs), i.e., the Kotobabi electoral area was used as the sample frame. At this point, convenience sampling technique was used to select 20 household heads and residential owners from 9,309 household units (Ghana Statistical Service 2014) as respondents for the study.

These sampling techniques were considered because the Accra Metropolis, in addition to being densely populated is also a heterogeneous society and therefore the use of only simple random sampling technique was not feasible. Accordingly, Accra has a poor street naming and property addressing system (SNPAS) where house numbers are not serially arranged. This made the combination of a convenience sampling with simple random sampling procedure feasible and appropriate. This method is reported to be inexpensive, available, and accessible (Berg 2001) for data collection.

To ensure gender balance, female to male ratio was 9:10 respectively. This is consistent with the 2010 Population and Housing Census which stated that female to male headship in the Accra Metropolis was 19.6 percent to 37.5 percent respectively (Ghana Statistical Service 2014). To avoid under- and over-representation, quota sampling technique was considered.

Third, three (3) people representing 9.1 percent of the respondents were allocated to the community and opinion leaders including local chiefs, women leaders and youth leaders. The criteria of occupation, educational status, years of work, building permit status, etc., were also considered during the selection and interviews with the respondents.
The selection of officials from the MSWR was consistent with their policy formulation, guidelines and backstopping, supervisory and monitoring roles of environmental health and sanitation in MMDAs in Ghana. The officials of the WMD, Works and TCPD were selected because they are the frontline providers charged with the responsibility of waste collection, transportation and final disposal and the issuance of building permit and can therefore be better positioned to describe the extent to which accountability has improved the delivery of services in the AMA. The staff of the ZL were also key in providing information on their role and incentive as a private waste agency, which has been tasked with the responsibility of waste collection, transportation and disposal in the Kotobabi electoral area as well as the strategies aimed at addressing contingencies with respect to policy implementation.

All other respondents were selected because they were the clients/beneficiaries of services from the two sectors. In a market economy, these clients use their power to directly hold service providers accountable. This is termed the short route of accountability. However, in most developing countries including Ghana, it is the government that has the responsibility of providing basic services to citizens and most of these services break down due to the absence of accountability relationships. It is however, important to collate the views and experiences of these actors (household heads, residential owners, opinion and community leaders) on how they were able to hold service providers accountable through the long route of accountability, mostly via elected representatives and policymakers through to service providers. In other words, the role of citizens/beneficiaries and their incentives in waste management and building permit outcomes and performances were essential in determining how accountability has strengthened the delivery of basic services in local governance units.
The selection of the 33 respondents was consistent with Marshall’s (1996) view on the selection of respondents for a study. He stated that the number of respondents becomes certain once new pattern of explanations ceases to emerge/flow from the data being collected.

3.16 Data Collection Process

The study commenced with a review of secondary data from multiple sources which were largely linked to the research objectives. Primary data was collected through in-depth interviews. Research questions were raised to cover the thematic areas of the study in order to generate as much information as possible. The questions were suitably raised so as to conform to the objective of the study as well as unanticipated obstacles and limitations that were visible along the way especially during the data instrumentation process. To smoothen the data collection stage, instruments such as recorders, pens, pencils, erasers, field log and others were used so as to capture detailed data for the transcriptions and analysis of vivid account in the data collection process. Due to the nature of this study, the researcher recorded observations, experiences and understanding of major policymakers, service providers and beneficiaries in the data collection process.

3.17 Data Management and Analysis

The data processing system to manage data collected from the field was designed to ensure that results of the primary data were available for analysis and interpretation. The aim of this process is to achieve verifiability, consistency, checking and exporting and themes creation. Qualitative data analysis basically involves disassembling, fragmenting and reassembling information to shape significant discoveries so as to draw relevant conclusions (Boeije 2010). The data gathered from the in-depth interviews were analyzed using Miles & Huberman (1994) approach to
qualitative data analysis. The data was coded to describe patterns and themes from the perspectives of respondents, so as to understand and explain these patterns and themes. During the data analysis process, the data were structured categorically, and systematically, reviewed repeatedly, and recurrently coded. An emergent line of thinking was recorded. Recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. Field records and diary entries were examined and re-examined to ascertain the correctness of data collected and recorded.

3.18 Ethical Consideration in the Study

The study considered ethical issues which were significant to the timely and successful completion of the study. In this connection, an introductory letter was obtained from the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, and submitted to respondents in the various Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The respondents were accordingly informed of the aim and objective of the study which enabled them decide to participate or not. By this, participation became voluntary and the insecurities surrounding confidentiality were put to rest. To further assure the respondents that they were protected, code names were handed them in the presentation of findings, analysis and discussion segments in chapters four and five.

3.19 Limitations of the Study

The study was limited to the AMA although there are five (5) other Metropolitan and about 248 Municipal and District Assemblies in Ghana. Waste management and building permit were selected from a host of public services, not because they have any direct link or relationship but because these two distinct services have inimical and pernicious consequences on politics, governance, environmental and socio-economic development. Similarly, it was largely limited to solid waste management because it is easier to deal with solid waste than liquid waste. But more
importantly because of the critical nature of solid waste as more and more volumes of solid waste are generated daily by households, individuals and organisations in the Accra Metropolis. Accordingly, similar studies on the remaining MMDAs will help to throw further light on the roles and incentives of actors and their accountability relationships as these are important in understanding the political economy of service delivery in local governance units in Ghana.

Additionally, some of the officials in the AMA were reluctant to give important documents and information for the study as they argued that the moment the information get to the public, they will lose their jobs immediately. These limitations do not, however, affect the scientific basis of the study, the data analysis, findings and conclusions as they are common to almost all studies undertaken elsewhere. Therefore, the researcher concludes that the study has not suffered significantly as to negate the objectives it sets out to achieve.

3.20 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the methodology adopted for the study. It has identified and justified the various methods, procedures and processes that were used to collect, record, manage and analyze data for the study. Specifically, the chapter has examined the research paradigm, approach, design, sources of data, sample size and sampling techniques, methods of data collection, management and analysis. The subsequent chapter presents the findings gathered from the field and the interviews that were made with the respondents.
References

Accra Metropolitan Assembly website. Available at: www.ama.gov.gh

[Accessed on: 5th January, 2018].


CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the study. Specifically, it deals with the role and incentives of various actors in waste management and building permit in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), the accountability mechanisms in place and the differences between waste management and building permit and their consequences on service delivery in the AMA. In addition, it discusses the challenges that inhibit the effective delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. The hypothesis that guides the study is that accountability in the AMA has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services. In other words, the greater the role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit services, the more accountability is improved in the AMA.

Respondents were coded R1, R2, R3, in that order to R33 where R= Respondents and 1, 2, 3… = the number in order of interviews. R1 and R2 are officials of the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources (MSWR). R3 and R4 are officials of the Department of Waste Management in the AMA (WMD). R5 and R6 are officials of Zoomlion Ghana Limited (ZL). R7 and R8 are officials of the Department of Works in the AMA (Works). R9 and R10 are officials of the Department of Town and Country Planning in the AMA (TCPD). R11 to R20 are household heads. R21 to R30 are residential owners and house owners. R31 is a women’s leader. R32 is a local chief and R33 is a youth leader. The coding system will be used to link response(s) to respondents.
4.1 Background Information of Respondents

The respondents were household heads, house owners or residential owners, a youth leader, a women’s leader, a local chief and officials of the MSWR, WMD, Works, TCPD, and ZL. All the officials of the AMA, ZL and the MSWR were graduates. A few of them were pursuing masters including the youth leader. Similarly, some of the household heads and residential owners had professional certificates. However, majority of them were traders and businessmen who were literate. All the respondents, therefore, were well educated and had the capacity to understand and make meaningful contributions to the subject matter of the study. It is also significant to find out the number of years respondents have been working with the AMA. The responses show that the majority of the officials have worked for less than five years in their administrative capacities in the AMA even though they have been in the local government sector for an average of 10 years (Table 4.1). This situation is common in most public institutions especially the local government sector because senior level officials and staff cannot stay at a particular post for more than four years. That notwithstanding, most of the respondents demonstrated a high level of professionalism with respect to the subject matter of the study. The number of years an employee remains in employment sharpens his/her level of experience. It can therefore be concluded that the majority of the respondents were experienced.

4.2 Key Findings

The findings of the study are provided under seven thematic areas to which twenty-three household heads, residential owners and community leaders and ten senior level officials of the MSWR, WMD, Works, TCPD and ZL responded. The thematic areas are based on the four research objectives and the hypothesis that guide the study.
4.3 Identifying the Role and Incentive of Actors in Waste Management and Building Permit

The first objective of this study is to identify the primary role and interest of actors in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Since the study compares two services, the discussions are done concurrently using data collected from respondents in the AMA. The essence is to highlight the similarities and dissimilarities of not only the role and interests of actors but also the accountability relationships in the delivery of waste management and building permit services in the AMA.

4.4 The Role of Actors in Waste Management and Building Permit

The main roles of the actors in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA are: waste generation; acquisition of land for building; policy formulation, guidelines and backstopping; policy implementation and education; management of human settlement; development control; monitoring, evaluation and supervision; and advisory services.

4.4.1 Waste Generators/House Owners

There are three main actors in the service delivery chain, namely, beneficiaries or citizens or clients (household heads/residential owners/community leaders), policymakers (MSWR) and service providers (WMD, Works, TCPD and ZL). To be able to exert control or demand accountability, each actor needs to understand the role it plays and the consequences in waste management and building permit in the AMA. The findings showed that 84.6 percent of the household heads are the waste makers except R12 and R19 who did not know the role they played in waste management. Similarly, 60 percent of residential owners identified their role as
house owners or property owners. R33 and R21 who understood their role in waste management and building permit had these to say:

R33; “...I play a key role in waste management since the youth look up to me so I send messages across for them or educate them to keep the waste that they produce safe”.

R21; “I have never thought about the important role I play in building permit. I guess I can say I bought this house on the market five years ago”.

R11 on his part agreed that waste is life. He argued that no human being can live in a day without producing waste and that even though the degree of waste that we produce might not be equal, we produce some amount of wastes that requires attention.

However, R23, R25, R26, and R28 were unsure what role they played in building permit in the AMA. At first, R25 and R28 were reluctant to share any opinion on the question and when they did, they pointed out that:

R25; “My role in building permit. I really don’t know. Can we move to the next question please?”

R28; “… why do you start the interview with a question like this. If all your questions are going to be like this then I’m afraid you won’t have much response from me....”.

From the findings, 40 percent of the residential owners did not have an appreciable level of understanding on what constituted their role in the delivery of building permit in the AMA. Comparing their response to that of the household heads, the study found that 84.6 percent of the household heads had a better understanding of their role in waste management in the AMA. The reason for this is because of the varied interests of the actors in the delivery of waste
management and building permit in the AMA. To a very large extent, the interest one seeks to achieve determines the role he/she plays. We will come to see later that household heads sought public health as their primary interest in the delivery of waste management. They are therefore more aware of the role they played in waste management than residential owners in building permit in the AMA.

4.4.2 Policy Formulation, Guidelines and Backstopping

The study found policy formulation, guidelines and backstopping as another essential role of actors in the delivery of services in the AMA. This role was found to be associated with the officials of the MSWR who largely formulated policies and programs, gave guidelines and rendered support services to the Assemblies to do the actual policy implementations. They also used education as a tool to enforce their policy formulation and guideline role in the AMA. Interviews with R1 and R2 revealed the following:

R1; “We develop the policies, we come out with the guidelines and see how we can do training and other things with the Assemblies. After that we also give support services to the Assemblies which is called backstopping for them to do the actual implementation. This is exactly what we do from here”.

R2; “We go to the ground and see what is happening for ourselves. If the Assemblies need something then we come back and see how to draw a program for that. We also formulate policies and give the guidelines so that it will enhance the sort of things the Assemblies are doing. We are also doing a lot of education now. The Ministry has a directorate that does education. We are trying to support the Assemblies to move very fast in line with their waste objectives”.
The officials in the MSWR who are mandated to perform the policy formulation role have a clear understanding of their role as this is significant in the larger scheme of things towards the realization of effective service delivery in the AMA.

4.4.3 Policy Implementation and Education

The World Bank’s 2004 accountability relationships framework identifies frontline service providers as key actors in the implementation of services in public institutions. The findings of the study largely affirm the view of the relationships framework as the WMD, Works, TCPD and the ZL are the policy implementers and educators in the AMA. It was also revealed that some coordination existed in the policy implementation and education role of the actors. For instance, 40 percent of officials confirmed that there is some collaboration between the Works and the TCPD in the issuance of building permit. Similarly, another 40 percent found that the WMD works closely with ZL in the discharge of waste services in the AMA. R3, R5, R8 and R10 had these to say:

R3; “The AMA plays a major role in waste. As a public institution, we are responsible for the implementation of waste and therefore we come out with policies and programs. We work with the private companies as they are supposed to give us reports of what is happening. We are also expected to educate citizens to know how they can reduce the wastes they generate”.

R5; “Zoomlion is the leading private company in charge of waste implementation and education in Ghana. Our records are there for all to see”.

R8; “This department is one of the implementers of AMA’s building permit services. We liaise with the TCPD to issue permits to people”.

University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
R10; “...we implement planning and management functions of the AMA. We also do a lot of education on our services and the procedures to follow when applying for a building permit”.

The above comments from the respondents allude to the fact that they have had the experience in policy implementation. Experience plays a vital role in the day to day decisions of employees. Therefore, it is likely that, these officials who have had so many years of work experience in the AMA will use it to facilitate their implementation and education role in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA.

4.4.4 Management of Human Settlement/Development Control

Another key finding of this study on the role of actors in service delivery is the management of physical and human settlement and the control of developments. Urbanization has led to the proliferation of shanty towns, squatter settlements and the mushrooming of illegal structures in Ghana. With this knowledge therefore, the study sought to enquire what role officials in the AMA play in addressing this challenge. Interviews with R9 and R7 showed that one of the major roles they played is to control the extent to which buildings are springing up especially illegal structures and the tool they use to achieve this is the permitting function.

R9; “Among the numerous functions that the department is mandated to perform is the management of human development, supervising development as it happens and the growth of development of settlements, towns and cities. And one of the tools that the department uses to execute its mandate is the permitting function”.

R7; “Our role is about development control. We play the role of controlling the levels at which buildings are put up. It is the assembly’s role to control development within its metropolis with keen interest on illegal structures”.

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Considering the number of years R9 and R7 have worked in the AMA (Table 4.1) and their understanding of the role they play in building permit, it is possible to say that even in the face of constraints they will know what to do to ensure the implementation of their role so as to deliver better services to citizens.

4.4.5 Monitoring and Supervision

Findings of the study reported monitoring and supervision as one of the roles that was significant and available to all the officials in the AMA. Interviews with respondents revealed that this role is very necessary in the daily activities of officials in the AMA. It is through the monitoring, supervision and evaluation functions of the AMA that they fine-tune their work as they receive live updates or reports from officials on the ground. The delivery of waste management and building permit is unthinkable save in terms of its monitoring, supervision and evaluation role in the AMA. Officials had these to say about their monitoring and supervision role:

R4; “We monitor and supervise the operations of waste management entities including the private companies. We are also supposed to supervise pre-collection and secondary collection of wastes. Pre-collection is what happens in the household, the kinds of containers that need to be there, etc. Secondary collection on the other hand is where the vehicles go to dispose of the garbage after they pick it from the household. So we are supposed to supervise it all”.

R5; “Here at Zoomlion, we have a monitoring and supervision unit. This unit is very effective and I can tell you for a fact that this company is doing well because of it”.

R9; “Beyond the permitting, we also have the monitoring and evaluation function. This is where the boys go round using paints to effect ‘Stop Work, Produce Permit’ on buildings. This function is performed by the Building Inspectorate Unit of the Works Department. Until this new law, our
department was not involved in the monitoring aspect. However, the new law has made provision for us to be part of the monitoring. So the new law now provides for a planning Inspectorate Division from our department to go round to monitor the physical development as they happen in Accra”.

R7 pointed out that monitoring and supervision are key as it is through these functions that his department ensures that physical developments carried out or being carried out do not encroach on a community right of space or interfere with the use of the space.

4.4.6 Advisory Services

Another fundamental role is advisory services. R3 and R10 saw the rendering of advisory services not only to the public sector but also private individuals and organizations as a key role they play in waste management and building permit in the AMA. R10 alluded to the fact that the TCPD does not exist only to issue permit but also receive complaints from aggrieved clients with respect to their properties; advise the AMA in terms of land acquisition, planning, management and use of land properties in the interest of the public. He further intimated that the department works largely with the courts on land litigations and non-conforming land issues. Non-conforming lands are designated or earmarked lands for social activities including schools, hospitals, roads, recreational centers, etc., which are eventually sold without recourse to the original plans of the lands. R3 on his part saw the rendering of advisory services to the government and the private waste contractors including ZL as key to waste services outcomes and performances. He stated that “the pieces of advice that we give them help to improve the waste management operations in the AMA”.
The findings show that apart from 40 percent residential owners, 84.6 percent of the household heads knew and understood their role as waste generators in the delivery of waste management in the AMA. The more actors understand the role they play, the likelihood is greater that, they will play that role to the best of their understanding. From the responses, it is true that 73.9 percent of residential owners and household heads understood their role and if that is the case, then they should be seen to play a greater role in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. However, this is not the case largely due to constraints and impediments that will be discussed later. These constraints and impediments have undermined accountability and the efforts of citizens and officials to play a more robust role in service delivery in the AMA.

4.5 The Interest of Actors in Waste Management and Building Permit

The second objective of this study is to find out from the respondents their interest in waste management and building permit in the AMA. It is clear that public health and the survival of the human race, revenue generation, aesthetics, development of safe structures and conformity of buildings to plans and regulations were the main interests of actors in waste management and building permit in the AMA.

4.5.1 Public Health

About 92.3 percent of the household heads revealed that waste management is a priority to them and that there is the need to tackle it urgently and independently. Findings of the study also support this claim as the central government has set up a new Ministry for Sanitation and Water Resources to deal with water services and coordinate all environmental health and sanitation in the country. R1 on his part believed that the creation of the new ministry is the government’s
response to the many water and sanitation challenges that continue to plague the country and which require special attention. R2, R17, R4 and R6 had these to say:

R2; “This Ministry is not only interested in waste management but also sanitation and water resources. Sanitation is the responsibility of this Ministry. It is our responsibility to take sanitation seriously and make sure that sanitation issues are addressed at every point in time for public health and the safety of citizens”.

R17; “Why I am interested in waste management is that I want to live long and see my family also do the same. The only way I can ensure the health of my family is to take waste seriously”.

R4; “The first and foremost interest is to give health to people. If we as city managers in the AMA do not take interest in waste management then it means that we are doomed. If it is up to me I will say waste is the most important element of human activity. Every human being has to take interest in it and it is the most important thing we need to look at if our society will have survival and the future will be better”.

R6; “Here at Zoomlion our interest in waste management is the general health of citizens. We know the problems that will occur if waste is left unattended to so we are more interested in the health of citizens”.

Evidence from the study showed that public health and the continuation and survival of the human species are one of the principal interests of not only citizens but also service providers and policymakers in waste management in the AMA. Officials of the WMD, ZL and the MSWR saw this as the overriding interest in the delivery of waste management in the AMA.
4.5.2 Revenue Generation

The TCPD is one of the largest sources of revenue in the AMA. On the contrary, the WMD is one of the largest spenders and therefore it is not surprising that R4 referred to the department as a liability on the AMA. Revenue generation is key for the two departments in the delivery of services in the AMA. For instance, in 2014 and 2016, the TCPD generated a total revenue of GHS 6,588,742.59, and the WMD generated GHS 744,000 (Table 4.2). This figure covers both subventions and internally generated fund (IGF). The WMD generated a total revenue of GHS 1,176,000 compared to GHS 8,988,788.35 of the TCPD in the three fiscal years (Table 4.2). This suggests that even though waste management is a priority in the AMA, its contribution in terms of revenue is not encouraging. This is, however, not surprising considering the fact that sanitation and waste management are largely provided for free, especially, the refuse storage and collection as citizens are unwilling to pay up to recovery prices. The TCPD generated the least amount of its three fiscal years in 2017 (GHS 2,400,035.76). This is because 2017 was post-elections year and generally developments tend to halt or stagnate in Ghana during the period of elections and immediately after.

R7 and R9 stated that even though section 92 (2) of the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016 mandates Planning Authorities to impose development charges and utilize the proceeds for the provision of infrastructure and services, the TCPD’s permit fees have been increasing and this increase has the potential to affect service delivery. Analyses of the permit fees confirmed this assertion. The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) through its annual Local Government Bulletin imposes rates and fee-fixing resolution on Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in Ghana. In this Bulletin, the fees and rates for a
particular financial year are outlined and calculated based on the total estimated cost of construction or development.

For example, in 2016 building permit fees were charged at 0.624 percent for 1-2 storey buildings, 0.60 percent for 3-5 storey buildings and 0.40 percent for 9 and above including a processing fee of GHS 50.00. In 2017, however, building permit fees were standardized at 0.40 percent of the total cost of development plus a processing fee of GHS 66.00. Even though the permit fees remained at 0.40 percent of the cost of construction in 2018, the processing fee has shot up again to a staggering GHS 85 (Local Government Bulletins 2016, 2017 and 2018). This increase in processing fees in addition to construction materials, equipment and tools has triggered a massive dissatisfaction from about 50 percent of the residential owners.

Table 4.2: Revenue and Expenditure of TCPD and WMD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue (GHS)</th>
<th>Expenditure (GHS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCPD</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2,990,213.53</td>
<td>1,760,132.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>3,598,529.06</td>
<td>1,600,332.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2,400,035.76</td>
<td>1,304,242.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,988,778.35</td>
<td>4,664,707.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Subventions</th>
<th>IGF</th>
<th>IG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCPD</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>1,804,664.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>2,008,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td>5,790,319.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from the TCPD/WMD Budget and Account Offices 2018.

4.5.3 Aesthetics

Promoting aesthetics is another role of actors in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. About 53.8 percent of household heads saw the need to beautify their communities as another motivator to improve their health and lifespan. Similarly, 40 percent of residential owners pointed out that effective planning was key to the realization of a clean and
attractive environment. R11 saw the need to beautify Accra through which Ghana can be put on the global map as countries like Kenya, Sudan and Rwanda are gradually making names for themselves in the area of waste management. R1 and R6 had these to say:

R1; “It is important that we make our cities beautiful. One of the ways to do this is to play our parts well”.

R6; “Zoomlion is committed to making Accra a beautiful city. Recently the president announced that he will make Accra one of the neatest cities in Africa and we are glad to be associated with that objective”.

4.5.4 Safe Structures

Section 8 (1) of the National Building Regulations, LI 1630 stipulates that “where a person submits an application for a building permit, the District Planning Authority shall notify him within seven days of the receipt of the application and shall within a period of three months thereafter notify the applicant whether the application is granted or refused”. From Table 4.3, out of a total of 562 building permit applications from 2013 to 2015, 52.1 percent was issued after 90 days. These applicants, having waited for a period of 90 days without any such notice, are mandated by section 8 (2) to begin development on the assumption that their applications have been granted. This suggests that 80 percent of the residential owners who saw the issuance of building permit as leading to the development of safe structures in the AMA was incorrect taking into account that more than 50 percent of building permit was issued after 90 days from 2013-2015. The delay in the issuance of building permit can be explained partly due to the inability of the Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) - chair of the Statutory Planning Committee (SPC) and representative of the president in the assembly to attend regular meetings of the SPC
because of his busy schedule. The implication is that it has led to the increase in unsafe structures and unauthorized physical developments within the Accra Metropolis. R10 was on point when he affirmed that a cursory examination of the collapsed buildings in Accra and elsewhere in Ghana revealed that they had no permit.

Table 4.3: **Duration and Number of Building Permits Issued in the AMA from 2013-2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1-3months</th>
<th>3-6months</th>
<th>6-12months</th>
<th>12months and above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>269</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from the office of the TCPD, Accra, 2018.

**4.5.5 Conformity of Buildings to Plan and Regulations**

Section 91 (1) of the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016 stipulates that “a person shall not carry out a physical development in a district except with the prior approval in the form of a written permit issued by the District Planning Authority”. This is to ensure that physical developments within communities are in line with the approved plans and regulations of the District Planning Authorities. The findings revealed that 50 percent of residential owners had a huge stake in ensuring that buildings and developments conformed to the plans and regulations of the AMA. R7 saw it as one of the main functions of the Building Inspectorate Unit of the Works. He argued that the monitoring and evaluation role of building inspectors is important in ensuring that developments conform to lay down rules and regulations in the Accra Metropolis.

Waste management is a priority not only to the citizens as it serves public health and environmental interests but also the central government as a new ministry has been set up to collaborate and coordinate environmental health and sanitation in the country. 84. 6 percent of household heads knew and understood their role more than 60 percent of residential owners in
the delivery of services in the AMA. Even though actors understood their role, it was not enough to conclude that they would play a larger role in order to achieve the interests in waste management and building permit in the AMA without the inherent motivation to do so.

Respondents were asked whether they were motivated to carry out their role in waste management and building permit in the AMA and the reason(s) for the motivation or otherwise. Out of 33 respondents, 33.3 percent of household heads, followed by 24.2 percent of residential owners and 24.2 percent of officials were not motivated to perform its role in waste management and building permit as it pointed out grave constraints in funding and infrastructure (Tables 4.2 and 4.5 respectively). Table 4.2 shows that, the WMD generated a total revenue of GHS 1,176,000 including IGF and subventions from the AMA in 2014, 2016 and 2017 fiscal years. However, its expenditure for the same fiscal years amounted to GHS 5,790,319.97. Similarly, the analyses of the infrastructural situation of the WMD showed that there were huge deficits in terms of storage, collection and transportation equipment and tools (Table 4.5). This situation inhibited the efforts of officials to play an engaged role in service delivery which undermined accountability in waste management and building permit in the AMA. According to R1:

“This Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources was actually set up by the president when he assumed office in 2017. He declared water and sanitation as key issues that his government will tackle. But as we speak this directorate is yet to receive its fair share of budget for the 2018 year. So when the Assemblies are putting pressure on us to deliver, sometimes it is because we also have challenges like the way they do”.

R10 considered his lack of motivation as unacceptable in this modern day and age. He was of the view that the poor conditions of service for AMA employees (some middle and lower level staff)
demotivated them to effectively perform their task. He further noted that he was not entitled to allowances and salary increments as his salary was based on the AMA’s 2011 salary scale. An analysis of this salary grade revealed that employees are ranked as lower level staff and paid an average salary of GHS 450 a month. Table 4.4 shows the average salaries of staff in the TCPD and the WMD.

Table 4.4: Average Salary Grades of Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Average Salary (GHS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCPD</td>
<td>Senior staff</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle staff</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower staff</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Senior staff</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle staff</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower staff</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: Fieldwork 2018.**

The salaries, allowances and additional remunerations including accommodation, medical treatment and any other facilities of the senior level staff of the TCPD are in accordance with section 66 of the Civil Service Law, 1993 (PNDCL 327). On the contrary, that of the senior level staff of the WMD are determined by the Local Government Service Act of 2003 (Act 656). Table 4.4 shows the disparities in average salaries between the middle and the lower level staff of the two departments. These personnel are key to the monitoring and supervision role and for that matter more attention needs to be paid to not only their salaries and allowances but also their remunerations and other facilities.

Demonstrating the lack of motivation and the unwillingness to deliver waste management and building permit services by 81.7 percent of respondents is not surprising. This is because the constraints in service delivery will demotivate actors. The implication is that the prevalence of
challenges in service delivery constrains actors from performing a larger or greater role and strengthening accountability in waste management and building permit services in the AMA.

The next subsection discusses findings on the accountability mechanisms in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA.

4.6 Accountability Mechanisms in Waste Management and Building Permit in the AMA

For several decades in many global south countries, poor service delivery outcomes and performances by public institutions were approached and analyzed based on the constraints of resources (Kimenyi 2013) and not the absence or break down in accountability relationships between the various actors in the service delivery chain. However, since the early 2000s, following the publication of the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report, many discussion and analyses of the ineffective and inefficient delivery of public services have been conducted largely with specific interest on accountability relationships.

The framework of accountability relationships is made up of three relationships which together form the long and the short routes of accountability. These are voice, compact and client power. When they are strengthened, accountability improves and service delivery constraints become minimized (World Bank 2004). This can be achieved when the various actors in the service delivery chain are happy and motivated to carry out their roles in order to achieve their interests. However, since the actors have different roles and seek to achieve different interests, conflicts or constraints are bound to occur and the inability to address these constraints undermine the accountability relationships. The voice, compact and client power mechanisms are used to examine the delivery of waste management and building permit services in the AMA.
4.6.1 Voice Mechanisms

The voice is the first of the accountability relationships. It involves the relationship between policymakers and citizens. It implies that policymakers are accountable to citizens and that they exert control on the policymakers in order to achieve their objectives (World Bank 2004). On this note, we asked the household heads and residential owners to whom did they complain and whether the complaints were addressed. From the findings, 69.2 percent of household heads and 70 percent of residential owners indicated that they complained to the WMD, ZL and the TCPD. However, they were quick to point out that the complaints fell on deaf ears since nothing had changed.

R12 and R33 directed their complaints to their assemblymen. This implies that policymakers are far away from the citizens and so it is difficult for the citizens to exert pressure and control over them. This is a limitation on the relationship between the policymaker and the citizen in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Notwithstanding the limitation of the citizen-policymaker relationship, citizens are determined to exert direct pressure and control on their service providers. But when they do, service delivery does not improve because their complaints are unattended to. We will come to learn later that it is because of the limitations in the relationship between the policymakers and the service providers (compact mechanism) that the complaints of the citizens are not addressed.

A key ingredient of the voice mechanism is information. This is significant not only to the citizens but also the policymakers as they rely on information to strengthen their relationship with the service providers. To find out whether citizens received information from policymakers, household heads and residential owners were asked the medium through which they received information in the AMA. The findings showed that 61.5 percent of household heads and 70
percent of residential owners indicated that they received information through the post office, phone calls, town hall meetings, public announcements, etc., however, they described the information flow as weak, untimely and irrelevant. R16 had this to say:

“... how can someone give you information when he himself is complaining of not having it?”

Due to the use of traditional communication systems, R2 on his part recommended that it was time Assemblies ventured into modern forms of communications like E-mail, Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, Tango, etcetera.

Seventy (70) percent of residential owners and 61.5 percent of household heads lacked the information to hold policymakers accountable for the delivery of building permit and waste management in the AMA. This is affirmed by the World Bank (2004) that it is only in theory that citizens are able to hold policymakers accountable for service delivery. In practice however, citizens lack the motivation to participate in the formulation of the collective objective because they either lack information or due to the intrinsic flaws in the electoral system. The World Bank (2004) further assert that even when citizens have the information and are very well motivated, there is no guarantee that service delivery will improve unless policymakers are committed and ensure that they hold service providers to account in order to improve services to the citizens.

Policymakers were asked how they held service providers accountable in order to ensure that they improve their services. R1 agreed that it is difficult to hold service providers accountable largely because contracts were not signed by him or his Ministry since the MSWR was recently set up to coordinate environmental health and sanitation; it was therefore reviewing agreements signed by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). However, he believed that if contracts were signed with service providers then the reward and sanction
schemes in the contract should apply when the provider honours or fails to do so his side of the bargain.

It seems compelling to say that the voice accountability mechanism was weak in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Responses reveal that 69.2 percent of household heads and 70 percent of residential owners did not hold policymakers accountable for service delivery in the AMA. Similarly, 70 percent of residential owners and 61.5 percent of household heads hardly received any information, their complaints were not addressed and policymakers were handicapped with regard to holding service providers to account, the last thing that citizens count on to improve service delivery.

Respondents were asked whether they were happy with the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. The import of this question is to find out the state of mind of the respondents as they lacked information while their complaints were not addressed. The responses were varied. Out of 33 respondents, 36.4 percent of household heads, followed by 27.2 percent of residential owners and 21.2 percent of officials were not happy with the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Even though, respondents were generally not happy, they seemed to take inspiration from the client power mechanism as they saw it as a duty upon themselves to hold service providers accountable in the AMA. This afforded them the opportunity to maximize their role and attain their interest in service delivery in the AMA.

In contrast, R9 expressed a mixed feeling since she found the behavior of some of the building inspectors in the AMA appalling. She was worried about the numerous complaints that she received from clients as a result of her daily interactions with them on the delivery of building permit in the AMA. She explained that due to the lack of information and understanding of the
process and procedure of building permit, building inspectors took advantage of the situation to lure residential owners into paying some money to them.

Having spent about 25 years working with the Building Inspectorate Division of the Works, R7 is worried about the inability of government to provide security personnel to the few building inspectors in the AMA. He did not understand why it had become a normal practice for land guards to be defending properties with ammunitions while building inspectors are without a single rifle or police escort.

R4 also expressed his unhappiness by saying that the government was doing very little to ensure that his department functions at the 20% capacity that is expected. Yet when there were challenges in the AMA, the government expects the WMD to solve them.

For R1, he was neither happy nor sad. He argued that the creation of a new ministry (MSWR) to handle sanitation and water resources is the step in the right direction. He reiterated that it is only a matter of time that the policies and programs of the MSWR will mature so that Ghanaians can see and judge for themselves what their tax payers’ money is being used to tackle the problems and challenges of sanitation and water resources in the country.

Although 6.1 percent of officials expressed mixed feelings with respect to how happy they were with service delivery in the AMA, 84.8 percent of respondents were not happy with the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. This implies that the limitations actors faced in the delivery of waste management and building permit constrained them to actively play their role and achieve their interests. This reinforces the view that the delivery of waste management is weaker than building permit while at the same time clients or beneficiaries are powerless to hold policymakers and service providers accountable in the AMA. It also indicates
that, if all the barriers to the delivery of waste management and building permit (especially infrastructure and funding) are minimized or better still removed, actors will be happy and motivated to play an even greater role in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA.

4.6.2 Compact Mechanisms

It involves the relationship between the policymaker and the service provider. It implies that the policymaker is physically and mentally separated from the service provider, and that the two enter an agreement with the objective of providing a service which in return the policymaker rewards or sanctions the service provider based on performance. However, the policymaker is the same as the service provider in the delivery of building permit in our case study.

Even though the TCPD is a decentralized department under the AMA and by extension the MLGRD, when it comes to the delivery of building permit, its mandate is to liaise with Works to deliver the permit.

According to R9; “...building permit is issued by this department and the Works. No other Ministry or Agency is involved. However, if you talk about complex structures and developments then we have other Agencies like the EPA, Lands Commission, Fire Service, Health Service, etc. But since your work is about the delivery of building permit then we are the sole agency in charge and therefore we are the policy formulators and implementers”.

Respondents from the MSWR, WMD, and ZL were asked the reward and sanction schemes that are available in the delivery of waste management in the AMA.

Evidence shows that performance-based contracts exist between the WMD and the private waste companies. Some of the terms of the contracts include; the jurisdiction of a waste company may
be extended or reduced based on performance; recommendations may be given to waste companies to enrich their resumes for job seeking elsewhere; and contracts may be terminated or abrogated if the private contractor failed to meet performance targets. However, the contracts are silent on clear performance targets and measures and timeliness and quality as indicators for measuring service delivery in the AMA. The WMD does not crack the whip on waste companies like ZL for non-performance because of its huge capital investments in the waste management sector. This implies that citizens are at the mercy of non-performing waste companies who do not see the urgency to maximize their performance because the policymaker who is supposed to enforce the regulations in the contract either lacks the information as shown below or is simply unwilling to do so. It also reinforces the view that the delivery of waste management is weaker than building permit as reflected in the powerlessness of the household heads who pay for waste services but do not enjoy them.

Like the citizen-policymaker relationship, information is key in the policymaker-service provider relationship (World Bank 2004). This is because the policymaker needs information in order to clearly stipulate and monitor the terms and conditions of the agreement. But more importantly, the policymaker needs information so that he can provide answers to the other actors especially the citizens who have a large interest in service delivery and will ensure that their voices are heard. Officials from the WMD and ZL were asked how they provided information to the MSWR to monitor their performance in service delivery. R4 had this to say:

“...the aspects of information, education and communication are just not there. However, we try our best using the formal and the informal ways. We write letters to either the chief director or the director of environmental health and sanitation at the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources. Also, we verbally communicate with them especially if the situation is serious”.
However, R6 reported his operations to the WMD, which is an important part of the agreement that the ZL signed with the AMA.

“We give reports in different forms. Both to the AMA and the Ministry. From daily, weekly, monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, etc. Sometimes, depending on the gravity of the situation, the report has to be immediate”.

R3 corroborates this assertion below.

“...the private agencies on the other hand submit reports on their operations to us. Then also there are live updates where we call them to respond swiftly to waste problems within their jurisdictions”.

The service providers were asked how their clients/citizens rate the delivery of their services. Out of 8 respondents, 75 percent of them indicated that their clients saw their services as poor, which was not entirely their fault as service providers. They agreed that they had their own constraints in terms of funding, logistics, personnel and infrastructure. However, the bigger challenge is the poor attitudes of the clients themselves who indiscriminately threw about waste. The officials complained that because waste is generated every time, it is difficult for the citizens to keep track and believe that service providers are doing their work.

However, R10 was of the view that his department’s ratings may have gone up. He explained that from 2013-2015, out of a total of 562 building permit applications, 269 representing 47.9 percent was issued within the stipulated 90 days. He believed that the once in a month meeting of the SPC which started in March 2013 may have accounted for this improvement. This was corroborated by R29 who said that his building permit renewal in September 2014 was faster than he anticipated.
The two accountability relationships examined, that is, voice and compact are what the World Bank (2004) refers to as the long route of accountability. It assumes that citizens exert control on policy makers who also exert control on service providers. In this study, with the exception of R12 and R33, 69.2 percent of household heads and 70 percent of residential owners did not exert control on policymakers who also find it difficult to exert control on service providers. Again, 52.1 percent of building permits was issued after 90 days from 2013-2015 in the AMA. Moreover, the WMD lacked funding as its major source of revenue was subventions from the AMA which were irregularly paid and its IGF from the cleaning of Kaneshie Market was paltry (Table 4.2). This signifies that the long route of accountability is weak in services delivery in the AMA. But more importantly, it revealed the vulnerability of actors especially the household heads who lacked power to expand their role in order to achieve their public health interest. Therefore, it is not out of place to conclude that the delivery of waste management is weaker than building permit in the AMA.

4.6.3 Client Power Mechanisms

It involves the relationship between service providers and citizens. It assumes that citizens can directly hold service providers accountable. It is also termed the short route of accountability (World Bank 2004).

The findings showed that 69.2 percent of the household heads and 70 percent of the residential owners held their service providers including the WMD, ZL and the TCPD accountable except R12 and R33 who held their assemblymen accountable for waste management and building permit in the AMA. This shows that when the long route of accountability breaks down citizens directly hold the service providers accountable in the AMA. However, these respondents also
indicated that their complaints were not addressed, which reveals the limitation in this accountability mechanism in the AMA. Below are excerpts from R23 and R20:

R23; “Building permit is the work of the Town and Country Planning Department so that is where I go to complain. But I don’t think they really care because nothing has changed. I was there early this year and it’s the same old story”.

R20; “I think giving information to people in order to improve their work is very important. But the issue is that I don’t think the AMA is interested in what we have to say. They don’t, if they did things will be better now”.

R6 has this to say in response to the comments above:

“...our clients complain sometimes that our services are poor. We are humans and we have our strengths and weaknesses so we are trying to improve all the time”.

Evidence from Tables 4.2-4.9 (excluding Table 4.7) suggests that the delivery of waste management seems weaker than building permit in the AMA, taking into account the available data from officials on revenue sources, the duration and number of permits issued from 2013-2015, central government’s allocated budgets on waste management, average salaries of officials, and qualifications and availability of personnel in the WMD and the TCPD. These constraints have dominated the role and interest of actors and often undermined their efforts in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. It shows that the voice, compact and client power mechanisms are weak in the AMA and therefore service delivery is characterized by delays and failures. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of equipment and logistics including storage, collection and transportation and final disposal sites in the AMA (AMA 2014).
4.7 Sectoral Differences between Waste Management and Building Permit in the AMA

This section discusses the sectoral differences between waste management and building permit. It reveals disparities with respect to the two sectors in the following areas: ministries; equipment/logistics; privatization/outsourcing; staffing; scope of services; and funding. These are examined below:

4.7.1 Ministries

The WMD and TCPD are two decentralized departments under the AMA which are supposed to be autonomous and equal in status. The reality, however, is that they are not. They are two different departments that fall under two different ministries. While the WMD coordinates, collaborates and reports directly to the Director of Environmental Health and Sanitation Directorate of the newly created MSWR, the Works and TCPD collaborate with the MLGRD. R1 makes a clear distinction of the two sectors. He argued that:

“...this Ministry has been in place for more than a year and half now so it is fairly new. Hitherto this department was under the MLGRD, but it is now a directorate under the MSWR. Once the word sanitation comes in, it means everything related to waste management and sanitation should come under this particular department of this ministry”.

However, the two departments share similar traits in terms of the policy implementation, education, monitoring and supervision and evaluation functions they perform in the AMA.

4.7.2 Equipment/Logistics

Table 4.5 shows that even though the two departments need more equipment and tools to fully perform their work, the WMD needs urgent attention as its services impacts the lives of more
citizens than the TCPD. The analyses of the WMD’s equipment base from Table 4.5 are grouped under storage, collection and transportation equipment. In terms of waste storage, the WMD has deficits of 350 dustbins and 85 skips or communal containers. If the additional dustbins and skips are not provided, this could result in citizens dumping wastes at unapproved locations. It could also undermine the mandate of the WMD to perform at its 20 percent capacity. Accordingly, R1 revealed that infrastructural deficit is one of the items that needs to improve in waste management in the AMA and that the MSWR is taking steps and making plans to invest more in equipment and infrastructure.

Table 4.5: **Equipment Base of TCPD and WMD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>TCPD (Number Available)</th>
<th>Number Required</th>
<th>WMD (Number Available)</th>
<th>Number Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4x4 Vehicles</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Maps</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buses</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey instruments</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dustbins</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skips</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skip loader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compaction trucks</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll on/Roll of trucks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Fieldwork 2018.

### 4.7.3 Privatization

While the WMD is opened to public private participation (PPP), the TCPD delivers services solely without any private participation. The Urban Environmental and Sanitation Project (UESP) is an initiative of the central government and the World Bank in 1999. This initiative, among other things like funding and technical assistance, mandates local governments to privatize refuse collection in their jurisdictions (MLGRD 2001). The aim is to infuse the
business traits and qualities of the private sector in key public service delivery at the local level. Under this agreement, the WMD retains 20 percent of the delivery of sanitation and waste management and outsources the rest to private companies including Zoomlion Ghana Limited. However, building permit is largely provided by the TCPD with collaboration with the Works. This is because prior to decentralization and its implementation in 1993, the TCPD was a centralized department with a head office, regional and district offices that was mandated by the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1945, Cap 84 to plan and manage the development of human settlements in an orderly manner in Ghana. This mandate has largely remained the same till today in addition to its guidelines, regulations, procedures and structures in the AMA.

### 4.7.4 Staff

From Table 4.6, the TCPD and WMD have a total staff strength of 42 and 37 respectively. However, the WMD has deficits of 23 supervisors and 17 operators and engineers. Out of this, 14 supervisors and 6 drivers are above 55 years old. The average ages of the WMD and TCPD’s staff are 47 and 29 years respectively. The officials of the WMD pointed out that this situation undermines the essence of decentralization and local governance where officials are at the heart of service delivery in the local level. Analyses of the conditions of service of the two departments revealed that the Directors and Senior Planners of the TCPD who are mainly civil servants enjoy better remuneration and other facilities like accommodation and medical treatment allowances than their colleagues in the WMD who are largely local government staff. Whereas the salaries and allowances of the senior staff of the TCPD are determined by the Civil Service Law 1993 (PNDCL 327), that of the senior staff of the WMD are determined by the Local Government Service Act 2003 (Act 656). However, R9 was of the view that measures
have been put in place to transfer all senior civil servants from the Civil Service to the Local Government Service since they are now operating under the MLGRD.

The study further discovered that it is not just about the limited number of staff that is the problem but the quality too. Whereas the staff of the TCPD had better qualifications (Table 4.6), undertake periodic trainings, seminars and conferences abroad, the situation is different for the staff of the WMD and to some extent the Works. As a result the TCPD boasts of more technical and qualified staff than the WMD and Works. R9 narrates her experience in Rwanda:

“I was in Rwanda last year for a conference on building permit. As I speak to you now plans are on the table to incorporate and implement some of the findings and reports that I made from the trip”.

R7 who has been with the Works for 25 years now cannot remember the last time the department attended a conference abroad or conducted in-service trainings for building inspectors. This stemmed from the fact that whereas there are well established professional associations like the Ghana Institute of Planners (GhIP), Ghana Institute of Architects (GhIA) and the Ghana Institute of Surveyors (GhIS) for the training of its members who are also personnel of the TCPD, the same cannot be said of the staff of the WMD.
Table 4.6: Staff of TCPD and WMD in the AMA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Number Available</th>
<th>Number Required</th>
<th>Qualifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCPD</td>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MSc Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Town Planners</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>BSc Human Settlement Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building Inspectors</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>BTech/BSc Building Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surveyors and Architects</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>BSc Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>BA Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>BSc Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervisors</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Dip. Environmental Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operators</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>SSCE/Diploma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>License C,D,F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: Fieldwork 2018.**

4.7.5 Scope of Services

Another key difference is the depth of services. Waste management is pervasive and impacts the lives of more citizens than building permit. This stems from the fact that waste generation is an activity that is common to all citizens even though they are largely powerless and considered as the weakest actors in the service delivery chain. R4 summed this appropriately below:

“every citizen generates waste which needs to be collected if we all want to survive but I’m not sure whether we all need building permit”.

4.7.6 Funding

The WMD has two main sources of funding. First, is the internally generated fund (IGF) derived monthly from the cleaning of Kaneshie Market. It is GHS 6,000 which amounted to GHS 72,000 in a year (Table 4.2). As a result of the paltry revenue, private contractors like ZL do not take
interest in cleaning the Kaneshie Market. Second, the AMA gives a total of GHS 15,000 a month to the WMD, which is erratic and unreliable. It was found that as at May 2018, the WMD had received only January subvention, the rest were outstanding. Though the release of subventions is irregular and untimely, the WMD does not eventually receive the outstanding balance whatever the case maybe. For example, in 2014 and 2016, subventions were given for five months. This figure amounted to GHS 300,000. In 2017, subventions were released for another six months which amounted to GHS 360,000 (Table 4.2). The rest was not released. A total of GHS 1,176,000 including IGF and subventions was made available to the WMD for its waste services in the 2014, 2016 and 2017 fiscal years which paled in comparison to the GHS 8,988,778.35 available to the TCPD in the same fiscal years. This suggests that waste management is only a priority on paper in the AMA. However, it reinforces the view that the participation of the private sector in waste services has not only increased the IGFs of Assemblies in Ghana (polluter pay policy through house-to-house refuse collection and public refuse dumping user charges) but also injected equipment, machines and tools which can contribute to improving the state of sanitation and waste management services. For example, ZL spent 35 percent of its 2017 budget on equipment and logistics in the AMA (Table 4.9).

4.8 Reasons for the Differences in Waste Management and Building Permit in the AMA

Having identified the differences, it is significant that we try to ascertain how the differences came about in the two sectors.
4.8.1 Funding

The first reason which was deduced from interviews with various officials in the AMA revealed that the delivery of waste management is only a priority of the central government on paper. This is indicative of the fact that, even though a new ministry (MSWR) has been set up to coordinate and collaborate environmental health and sanitation in the Assemblies, the lack of political will (Table 4.8) to provide funding and infrastructure hampers the effectiveness and efficiency of waste services. This is compounded by the lack of training and capacity building of staff as affirmed by R3 and R7. On the contrary, R9 saw training, seminars and conferences as essential to the work of the TCPD.

4.8.2 Duplication of Services

There is duplication of services. Until the introduction of the UESP in 1999, waste management was the sole responsibility of the AMA/WMD. This implies that the AMA through the WMD complied with section 12 of the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016 which mandates the AMA to provide facilities, infrastructure, services and programs for effective waste management to improve the environment and promote public health within the Accra Metropolis (AMA 2014). However, it was found that the implementation of UESP has introduced about 20 private waste companies (Table 4.7) in the AMA and ceded 80 percent storage, collection and final disposal of waste services to them. These private companies perform similar or same roles and functions to complement the 20 percent capacity of the WMD in the delivery of waste services in the AMA. In addition, the presence of many informal waste pickers and scavengers who have not been integrated into the waste management stream was identified by Fagariba and Song (2016) as important actors in the collection and disposal of waste services in the Accra Metropolis.
4.9 Consequences of the Differences on Service Delivery in the AMA

Service delivery is weak in the AMA mainly due to the constraints in the accountability relationships. However, there have been some positive developments which require attention.

On a positive note, the differences in sectors have led to coordination and collaboration between actors in the service delivery chain. For instance, the MSWR collaborates with environmental health officers in the WMD to tackle waste and sanitation services in the AMA.

Similarly, there is coordination in the monitoring, supervision and evaluation function of various actors especially between the TCPD (Planning Inspectorate Unit) and the Works (Building Inspectorate Unit).

Whereas there is coordination in the permitting, monitoring and supervision functions of the AMA, the study found a lack of coordination in the planning functions of the Assembly. R10 argued that even though the role of the TCPD is the management and planning of human settlement in the cities and towns, it does more of management than planning since Accra is largely developed. Even so, there are challenges with the little planning that is done. He cited ‘smaller assemblies’ as the ones doing more planning since their jurisdictions are largely undeveloped. He recommended a participatory planning approach to deal with this challenge.

There have been positive and negative impacts on service delivery. On the one hand, there has been the recruitment of 2000 sanitation brigade to partner environmental health officers (EHOs) in the AMA. There are plans by the MSWR to support the AMA with transfer stations, monitoring and supervision have improved as all actors consider this as an important component of their service delivery. This notwithstanding, there is lack of coordination or partnership on the
planning functions of the assembly which makes it difficult for citizens to feel the positive impacts of service delivery in the AMA.

4.10 Challenges of Waste Management and Building Permit in the AMA

The AMA’s delivery of waste management and building permit has not met the satisfaction of citizens as can be derived from the studies of Boadi and Kuitunen (2003), Amadu (2010), Yaoda et. al. (2014) and Fagariba and Song (2016). Yaoda et. al. (2014) found that 62.9 percent of residents in Accra were dissatisfied with waste services because of its cost and delay in collection. Similarly, Amadu (2010) found that among other things like logistics and poor attitudes of citizens, the inability of the Statutory Planning Committee to meet regularly results in delay in issuing building permits to citizens in both Accra and Kumasi. However, even though there are attitudinal and logistical constraints in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA, there is still room for improvement.

There are eight areas that need improvement in order for the AMA to improve waste management and building permit services to its clients or citizens. These are: poor attitude of citizens; lack of political will; financial constraints; inadequate logistics; political interference; land title issues; statutory violations and non-conforming lands; and security. These challenges are discussed below:

4.10.1 Poor Attitude of Citizens

One of the major challenges in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA is the poor attitude of citizens. The findings show that 46.2 percent of household heads were emphatic about the contributions of citizens to the poor delivery of waste management which added to the loss of revenue in the AMA. For instance, R22 noted that some of the
residents in his house sometimes waited after midnight before they dumped their refuse in the communal container. He believed this move is to avoid the payment of fees as there is no attendant at the communal point at midnight. Similarly, R9 did not mince words when she was talking about the attitude of applicants during the building permit process:

“Unfortunately, we have some clients who are not serious with the application process. They come to us with drawings that are outrageous. I am not an architect but I can do better than some of the drawings I see here sometimes. This raises the question whether these people contacted professionals for these drawings or they did it themselves”.

R4 and R7 pointed out that the poor attitude of citizens in waste management and building permit in the AMA is exacerbated by citizens’ poor treatment of environmental health and sanitation officials and building inspectors which dampened their spirit (environmental health officers and building inspectors) and reduced their level of motivation.

4.10.2 Lack of Political Will

The low level of political will exercised by policymakers/politicians is another hindrance to the delivery of waste management in the AMA. This is evidenced in the central government’s budgetary allocations for sanitation and waste management from 2015-2018 by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning as indicated in Table 4.8.

The table shows that the central governments from 2015-2018 had allocated a total of GHS 795 million to implement the activities of waste management and sanitation in Ghana. This figure pales in comparison to the total amount of GHS 8,988,778.35 million generated internally by the TCPD in 2014, 2016 and 2017 fiscal years as seen in Table 4.2. This suggests that waste management is more of a priority in theory than in practice and because of scoring political
points policymakers are more interested in outcome than impact. This is corroborated by UNICEF (2015) which estimated a funding gap of US$108,292,953 million in sanitation services in many developing countries from 2015-2017. The lack of political will is exacerbated by the activities of vigilante groups who caused massive distractions to waste services in the AMA. R31 and R33 intimated that some of these groups are convinced that the waste management sector is a very lucrative one and so when ‘their government’ comes to power they can seize communal container centers in order to collect fees. They pointed out that this situation is not only unhealthy for the delivery of waste management but also undermines the efforts of officials to play their role and achieve their interests in service delivery in the AMA.

Table 4.8: Allocated Budgets on Waste Management and Sanitation in Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Allocated Amount (in million GHS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>187.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>168.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>255.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>183.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>795.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from the MOFEP Online 2015-2018.

4.10.3 Financial Constraints

From Table 4.9, the ZL spent 66.3 percent of its expenditure on fuel and equipment in 2017. However, the share of equipment alone is 35 percent. This suggests that the introduction of private companies including ZL in sanitation and waste management has led to an increase in the equipment and tools of the waste sector in the AMA. In addition, the increase in the number of equipment and tools has in turn contributed to the improvement in the delivery of waste management. However, only 60 percent of GHS 38,320,149.00 million was paid as revenue to ZL by the government. This figure amounted to GHS 22,992,089.40 million which was less than the total expenditure of GHS 24,488,043.80 million in 2017. The delay in the payment of
revenues from the government inhibits the capacity of private waste companies to effectively deliver waste services and exposes them to the mercy of banking institutions in accessing loans with high interest rates. R5 and R6 argued that the inability of ZL to receive prompt payments made it difficult to pay the salaries of workers, purchase fuel and undertake maintenance services on equipment and tools (AMA 2014).

R4 saw the financial constraints of the WMD as a major factor in undermining the 20 percent capacity that the department is supposed to operate. Officials of the WMD are handicapped when it comes to financial resources to perform their tasks. However, R1 was of the view that in order to address this challenge citizens should be willing to pay more for the wastes that they generate.

Table 4.9: Availability of Financial Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Item</th>
<th>Revenue (in million GHS)</th>
<th>Expenditure (in million GHS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Annual Budget in 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>38,320,149.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGF</td>
<td>2,640,228.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Operational Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>8,574,053.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>4,261,362.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>7,668,212.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>3,978,813.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5,602.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>40,960,377.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,488,043.80</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from the Office of Zoomlion, Accra, 2018.

4.10.4 Inadequate Logistics

The study found that inadequate logistics hinder the smooth delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Analyses of logistics and equipment in Table 4.5 revealed that the WMD lacked the logistics required for the proper storage, collection and transportation of waste to final disposal sites. In addition to this, the AMA has not acquired and operated a sanitary landfill site which should have a minimum lifespan of ten years (AMA 2014). Adequate logistics
is needed for the monitoring and evaluation function of the AMA with respect to the delivery of building permit. This function is largely performed by the Building Inspectorate Division of the Works and the Planning Inspectorate Division of the TCPD. However, findings from the study revealed that the Works is challenged to some extent in the performance of this function. R7 corroborated this below:

“No vehicles for day to day routine inspection. Currently, this division has only one vehicle. This vehicle is used by the director, field inspectors and the public health unit”.

4.10.5 Political Interference

There are many planning regulations guiding the development of structures in Assemblies in Ghana. For instance, the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016, National Building Regulations of 1996 (LI 1630), and the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1945 (Cap 84) are but a few. In addition to the above regulations, there also exist direct or formal land management and planning institutions like the Survey Department, Lands Commission, Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands, District Assemblies, TCPD and the Land Title Registry and a few indirect or informal institutions like the Environmental Protection Agency, Ghana National Fire Service, Ghana Electricity Company, Ghana Water Company Limited, Hydrological Service Department, and the Ghana Health Service. The heads of these institutions are appointed by the central government and they also serve as co-opted members of the Statutory Planning Committee. This body is the final decision-making body on building permit in the AMA and the chair is the Metropolitan Chief Executive. The availability of these numerous institutions and personnel interferes with the issuance of building permit in the AMA as affirmed by R9 below:
"Permitting is a subset of planning and planning decisions are political decisions. The chairman of the approving committee is the Metropolitan Chief Executive who is appointed by the government. This makes political interference a major thing in the building permit process”.

On his part, R7 recounted the incident that took place on 15th March 2014, when his team seized the tools of unauthorized developers in Accra and on their way back to the office, a well-known politician called him to return the tools. Upon their arrival, the developers hooted and laughed at them.

Similarly, R6 and R3 pointed out that waste management concerns the public health of citizens and as such should not be considered as an avenue for scoring political points. They argued that politicians should concentrate on politics and allow experts and professionals to handle the waste management sector. This can be achieved if politicians become drivers of change by making more financial commitment to the waste sector and logistics and tools available to employees.

4.10.6 Land Title Issues

One of the key requirements in the process of building permit application in the AMA is the production of evidence of land ownership by applicants such as land title, certificate or documents depending on the type of land. After that confirmation is sought from the appropriate land sector agencies such as the ‘Old Lands Commission’, Survey Department, Land Title Registry and the Land Valuation Board. As part of land reforms, these four agencies have been integrated into one corporate agency to form the ‘New Lands Commission’ which now comprises four distinct divisions. These are the Public and Vested Land Management Division (PVLMD), Land Valuation Division (LVD), Survey and Mapping Division (SMD) and the Land Registration Division (LRD). For instance, if the land is a family land then the applicant will
have to take a confirmation from the LVD. Similarly, if the land is a public land then confirmation will have to come from the PVLMD. The participation of these formal land management and planning institutions in the building permit chain not only makes the process sporadic, cumbersome and expensive but also causes delay in the issuance of building permit (Abusah 2004).

R9 reported that land title is one of the leading causes of delays because applicants do not have claims to their land.

“... most of the time when we are verifying the documents, we realize that applicants don’t have strong claims to their land. In such situations what we normally do is that we ask them to go for confirmation of land from the Lands Commission and this adds to the delay in the process”.

R7 saw land title as key to acquiring building permit. He pointed out that if a developer has no title to a land then he equally has no need for a building permit because the TCPD cannot issue a building permit to an applicant without a genuine title to a land.

**4.10.7 Statutory Violations and Non-Conforming Lands**

Residential owners and developers fall foul to statutory violations and non-conforming land issues. Statutory violations are clear technical violations with respect to buildings. For instance, in order for excessive air circulation around the house, developers must allow some space between their walls and the main building or leave a 10 feet gap between their building and the next building. On the other hand, non-conforming lands are designated or earmarked lands for public purposes. Examples include lands designated by the state for the construction of schools, hospitals, recreational centers, roads, etcetera. Interviews with the officials of the Works and TCPD revealed gross violations on the part of developers and residential owners.
R10 was asked whether there are regulations to address the sale of non-conforming lands. This is what he had to say:

“...but in all these, there is still room in the regulation for somebody who has been given a land which technically we call “Non-Conforming land” to apply for a change of use. This is also an application in itself. By regulation, it is available only if you can justify why that change in land use is necessary. It will be presented as an application and then it will be approved”.

However, R7 did not blame the residential owners entirely for the non-conforming land issues. He saw it as an opportunity for the family heads and chiefs to make extra income. He blamed family heads and chiefs who are the custodians of some lands and they know better what those lands have been earmarked or designated for.

4.10.8 Security

Interviews with officials of the Building Inspectorate Division of the Works and the Planning Inspectorate Division of the TCPD showed that the lack of security in their work is one of the hindrances to the monitoring and evaluation function they perform. R7 argued that the lack of security instils fear in building inspectors as they confront armed land guards and private security on a daily basis. R8 on his part explained that adequate security is essential in the attainment of effective and efficient monitoring and evaluation system.
4.11 Conclusion

The chapter has shown the diverse role played by several actors in waste generation and building permit. The interests of actors in waste management and building permit are in public health, revenue generation, aesthetics, development of safe structures and conformity of developments to plans and regulations.

Furthermore, voice, compact and client power mechanisms in the AMA seemed weak hence the delay in the delivery of waste management and building permit. There are wide sectoral differences in terms of the two service delivery sectors. In major cases of disparity, the WMD was undermined as it has inadequate equipment and logistics, lacked qualified personnel and poorly funded.

Finally, some of the challenges in the delivery of services include poor attitudes of citizens, lack of political will, political interference, lack of funding, infrastructure, logistics, inadequate security and land title issues.
References


TABLE 4.1: **Demographic Profile of Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>CODE NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>YEARS OF WORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>R1</td>
<td>Deputy-Director of Environmental Health and Sanitation Directorate (Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>R2</td>
<td>Programs Coordinator (Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>R3</td>
<td>Administrative Director of Waste Management (AMA)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>R4</td>
<td>Senior Officer in Charge of Waste Treatment and Final Disposal (AMA)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>R5</td>
<td>Director of Waste Management (Zoomlion Ghana Limited)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>R6</td>
<td>Operations Manager (Zoomlion Ghana Limited)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>R7</td>
<td>Chief Building Inspector of Works Department</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>R8</td>
<td>Senior Technician Engineer of Works Department</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>R9</td>
<td>Deputy-Director of Town and Country Planning Department</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>R10</td>
<td>Head of Planning Inspectorate Unit (Town and Country Planning Department)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>R11-20</td>
<td>Household Heads</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Males 6 Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>R21-30</td>
<td>House Owners/Residential Owners (Houses with permit)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Males 3 Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>R31</td>
<td>Women’s Leader</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>R32</td>
<td>Town Chief</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>R33</td>
<td>Youth Leader</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Fieldwork 2018.

Table 4.7: **20 Waste Companies which Participate in Waste Management in the AMA**

|-----------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|

**Source:** Compiled from the AMA 2018.
CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the outcome of the results obtained from the study based on the literature review, theoretical framework, hypothesis and research objectives. It begins with the discussion of the role and interest of actors in waste management and building permit in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), the accountability mechanisms in place and the sectoral differences and its consequences on service delivery in the AMA. It further outlines the challenges that inhibit the effective and efficient delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. In doing so, the hypothesis which underpins the study is either accepted or rejected as the study will show.

5.1 Hypothesis

The hypothesis which undergirds this study is that accountability in the AMA has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services. In other words, the greater the role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit services, the more accountability is improved in the AMA.

5.2 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The study collected data on the demographic characteristics of respondents with respect to their level of education, occupation, years of work, position or designation and residential building permit status. This is important because the knowledge and understanding of respondents on
these issues would enable the researcher to establish the relationship between variables in the study.

5.3 The Role of Actors in Waste Management and Building Permit in the AMA

Understanding the role of actors in the delivery of waste management and building permit is considered key to minimizing its debilitating environmental, health, physical and socio-economic consequences on the citizens. Findings of the study revealed that actors play diverse roles in service delivery and these are: waste generation; acquisition of land for building; policy formulation, guidelines and backstopping; policy implementation and education; management of human settlement; development control; monitoring and supervision; and advisory services.

Household heads and residential owners were asked questions regarding their role in waste management and building permit in the AMA. About 84.6 percent of the household heads and 60 percent of the residential owners identified their role as waste generators and house owners respectively. It can therefore be concluded that majority of the respondents knew and understood their role in service delivery in the AMA. This is supported by the World Bank (2012), Addaney and Oppong (2015) and AMA (2014). The World Bank (2012), found that waste generation is common among inhabitants of different cities in the world. They pointed out that citizens generate about 1.3 billion tons of solid waste per year and this figure is expected to rise to 2.2 billion tons in 2025 as a result of rapid urbanization. Similarly, Addaney and Oppong (2015) noted that the residents of Awutu Senya East Municipality generated 15 tons of wastes in 2009, however, this figure had increased to 23 tons in 2014 mainly due to urbanization. This notwithstanding, 40 percent of residential owners had no understanding of what constituted their role in building permit. This is an indication that waste management is more pervasive and affects the lives of more citizens than building permit.
Policy formulation, guidelines and backstopping were largely reported as an important role of officials of the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources (MSWR). This finding is consistent with the study of Samwine et. al. (2017) who stated that the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016 mandates the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) to formulate policies and programs and supervise Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) to undertake policy implementation in Ghana. The study further revealed that one of the tools used by the officials in the MSWR in furthering their policy formulation and guideline role is education. This conforms to the view that the MSWR complements the efforts of the Assemblies in creating awareness and sensitization through public education.

The study further discovered that the Departments of Waste Management (WMD), Works (Works), Town and Country Planning (TCPD) and Zoomlion Ghana Limited (ZL) are the policy implementers and educators in the AMA. Similar studies reaffirm this assertion (Aweso 2013; Yaoda et. al. 2014; and Samwine et. al. 2017). According to Samwine et. al. (2017) and Yaoda et. al. (2014), MMDAs are responsible for the storage, collection, transportation and final disposal of solid waste through their environmental health and sanitation departments (EHSDs) and the waste management departments (WMDs). This view has been reinforced by section 12 (3) (b) of the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016 which mandates MMDAs to “formulate and execute plans, programs and strategies for the effective mobilization of resources necessary for the overall development of the district”. In addition, officials reported that education is essential to their policy implementation role. This is important because of the view that low levels of education contribute to poor waste management practices. It is in this regard that Aweso (2013) called on waste management agencies to intensify their public education and sensitization as it is key in broadening citizens’ horizon and knowledge on systematic waste sorting and separation.
Furthermore, the study reported that the Works and the TCPD largely saw to the management of human settlement and the control of development in the AMA. This is because section 91 (1) of the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016 stipulates that “a person shall not carry out a physical development in a district except with the prior approval in the form of a written permit issued by the District Planning Authority”. Our finding is supported by many studies (Abusah 2004; Botchway et. al. 2014; and Asante and Sasu 2018). Abusah (2004) and Botchway et. al. (2014) revealed that MMDAs issue building permit as part of an administrative procedure designed to ensure that it manages settlements and control the development of communities in line with plans and regulations of the district. The studies of Abusah (2004) and Botchway et. al. (2014) have been reinforced by Asante and Sasu (2018) in a study on the incidence of building collapse in Ghana. In this study, the authors found that development control departments (DCDs) were largely responsible for the control of structures within the Kumasi Metropolis. However, the DCDs were constrained in this role because many developers were not aware of the existence of the National Building Regulations, LI 1630. This implies that structures were put up without approval from the Statutory Planning Authorities (SPAs). It is in this regard that Somiah (2014) has suggested that there is the need for development control agencies to increase education and create awareness of the importance of their role and function in national development.

Monitoring and supervision were key to the strategies and procedures of waste management and building permit in the AMA. This is corroborated by Aweso (2013), who found that 80 percent of the ZL’s field workers in the Ablekuma Central Sub-Metropolitan Area saw monitoring and supervision as the most effective tool of the strategies used in waste management. However, our findings further revealed that officials were in need of additional personnel to further boost their monitoring and supervision units. This is supported by Agyeman et. al. (2016), who found that
the number of building inspectors was inadequate in the Sunyani East and West Municipalities and this inhibited them from ensuring that developers complied with development plans and reported any unauthorized structures to the SPAs. The result was that over half of field inspection and monitoring activities were randomly conducted, leaving many illegal structures unnoticed.

The study further reported that the TCPD rendered advisory services not only to Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) on issues relating to land acquisition, planning, management and use of land properties but also the private sector. The court is a principal institution with respect to the realization of this role. This is affirmed by R10 below:

“We provide advisory services not only to government agencies but the private sector as well. For instance, we advise the Assembly in terms of planning, land use issues, land acquisition and land properties in the interest of the public. Also, if somebody wants to buy a property, he/she brings the site plan for us to check and advise him whether what he wants to buy conforms to the plan of the area. Apart from advisory services to government agencies and the private sector, we also work with the courts on land issues”.

These remarks are supported by section 103 (2) of the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016 which stipulates that:

“A landowner shall not sub-divide or allocate land for use, development or occupation in a town, city or the suburb of a town or city or in an area where there is an approved planning scheme except in consultation with the District Planning Authority or a sub-district acting on behalf of the District Planning Authority”.
5.4 The Interest of Actors in Waste Management and Building Permit

The interest that actors seek is likely to influence the role they play. In effect, if actors have a keen interest in service delivery then the likelihood is greater that they will play a larger role in its delivery. The study found that public health and the survival of the human race, revenue generation, aesthetics, development of safe structures and conformity of buildings to plans and regulations were the main interests of actors in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA.

About 92.3 percent of the household heads saw waste management as a priority to them because of its debilitating environmental, health and cost implications. In response, the central government has set up a new ministry (MSWR) to coordinate environmental, health and sanitation and water resources in the country. Similar studies have found that waste management has huge public health, environmental and costs implications on governments and citizens. For instance, the World Bank (2012) found that solid waste alone costs citizens and their governments US$205.4 billion every year and this figure is projected to increase to US$375.5 billion in 2025. This is important because the inability of governments to provide adequate funding for waste storage, collection and final disposal can lead to environmental health hazards including flooding, diarrhoea, yellow fever, dengue and respiratory ailments. It is in this regard that the National Coordinator for the Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) program under the MSWR, challenged MMDAs to devise strategies to improve sanitation in their communities (Daily Graphic 2018). However, Samwine et. al. (2017) argued that local government units can safely store, process and dispose wastes with a reduced environmental, cost and health impacts on the environment while at the same time extracting valuable resources from it. This view of Samwine et. al. (2017) has been buttressed by the acting Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), who stated that if the components of the waste were extracted well, it could create incomes for officials and citizens without any health problems (Daily Graphic 2018).

Revenue generation was key to the operations of the AMA. The TCPD was one of the largest sources of revenue in the AMA. It had generated a total revenue of GHS 8,988,778.35 within 2014, 2016 and 2017 fiscal years. At the same time the WMD had spent GHS 5,790,319.97. Similar studies have found that revenue generation is key in the operations of District Assemblies (DAs) in Ghana (Aweso 2013; Samwine et. al 2017; and Amadu 2010). According to Aweso (2013), the AMA spent GHS 1,711,984.20 on waste management in 2009, out of a total generated revenue of GHS 4,003,158.64. However, Samwine et. al. (2017) reported that the rapid increase in the volume of waste has contributed to the significant growth and development of the waste sector. They asserted that in 2007, Waste Management and Remediation Services were an integral part of the U.S Economic Census which generated over US$73 billion of revenue (U.S. Department of Commerce 2009, cited in Samwine et. al. 2017). In effect, the more actors understand their role, the more likely they are to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs and health implications on their lives. Amadu (2010) found that 58 percent of permit applicants and officials in Accra and Kumasi saw permit fees as an important source of revenue to the AMA and KMA respectively. The studies of Samwine et. al. (2017) and Amadu (2010) have been corroborated by Michael Gyato (Deputy Minister of Sanitation and Water Resources) who affirmed that waste management has the potential to serve as a source of raw material thereby creating more revenue for the Assemblies and employment opportunities in agricultural and manufacturing industries for the teeming unemployed youth in Ghana (The Finder 2018). However, Tahiru et. al. (2014) found that even though development charges and fees are one of
the major revenue sources of Assemblies in Ghana, the AMA loses revenue mainly because of its revenue collection processes and procedures which are mainly manual, inefficient, cumbersome and tainted with fraud.

The study further showed that 53.8 percent of household heads saw the need to live in a beautiful environment as a great booster in managing their wastes. This is supported by Azila-Gbettor et. al. (2013) and Aweso (2013). Azila-Gbettor et. al. (2013) found high levels of relationship between the physical environment, quality healthcare delivery and the choice of healthcare facility in Ghana. They concluded that the improvement in healthcare delivery is contingent upon the simultaneous improvement in the physical environment which houses the healthcare facility. Similarly, Aweso (2013) also found that 91.1% of respondents said that the presence of Zoomlion in the Ablekuma Central Sub-Metropolitan Area has made the area one of the neatest in Ghana. However, they added that Zoomlion needs to do more to improve its waste services to citizens.

The studies of Azila-Gbettor et. al. (2013) and Aweso (2013) have been reaffirmed by Nii Tetteh Adjabeng II (the chief of Adabraka in the Greater Accra Region) in a courtesy call on the management of the Graphic Communications Group Limited (GCGL) in Accra. According to him, the launching of the “Clean Adabraka” annual sanitation project was to rid the community of filth and make Accra the neatest city in Africa (Daily Graphic 2018). He concluded by calling on the traditional community to initiate similar campaign projects to address sanitation and waste management challenges in their communities.

Moreover, out of a total of 562 building permit applications, 52.1 percent of building permit was issued after three months from 2013-2015. This contradicts the findings of Agyeman et. al. (2016) that 82.3 percent (417 applications) and 99.8 percent (466 applications) of permit were
issued in Sunyani East and West Municipalities respectively from 2012-2014. The difference in finding could be attributed to the following reasons. First, Agyeman et. al.’s (2016) study was in a Municipal Assembly while the current study is in a Metropolitan Assembly and this is reflected in the total number of building permit applications received by both Assemblies. Second, Accra is the national, regional and district capital and therefore the busy schedule of the chair of the Statutory Planning Committee (SPC) who is also the Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) contributes to the excessive delay in issuing building permits. The inability of the AMA to issue building permits within the stipulated three months has contradicted the view of about 80 percent of the residential owners who saw the issuance of building permit as leading to the development of safe structures. It has further violated section 8 (1) of the National Building Regulations, LI 1630 which mandates District Planning Authorities to notify applicants whether their applications have been granted, deferred or refused. The delay in the issuance of building permit may compel developers to put up structures because they had already spent fortune in acquiring the land and purchasing development materials, logistics and tools.

The findings of the study revealed that 50 percent of the residential owners saw the issuance of building permit as one of the key strategies used by the AMA to align developments to planning rules and regulations. This is supported by Botchway et. al. (2014) who found that building permit approval was a key measure undertaken by the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) to ensure that residential and commercial developments conformed to guidelines, rules and standards of Planning Authorities. The study of Botchway et. al. (2014) has been reaffirmed by section 91 (1) of the Local Governance Act, Act 936, 2016 which mandates the AMA to inspect any physical development within their jurisdiction before a written permit can be granted.
Respondents were asked whether they were motivated to carry out their role in waste management and building permit in the AMA and the reason(s) for the motivation or otherwise. Out of 33 respondents, 81.7 percent was not motivated to perform its role in service delivery in the AMA. The implication is that the prevalence of challenges in service delivery constrains actors from performing a larger or greater role and increasing accountability in waste management and building permit in the AMA.

5.5 Accountability Mechanisms in Waste Management and Building Permit in the AMA

Respondents indicated their lack of motivation with the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Out of 33 respondents, 81.7 percent of household heads, residential owners, policymakers and service providers were not motivated to carry out their roles in service delivery. These actors expressed concern with the government’s inability to address constraints including financial resources, security, logistics, and personnel in the AMA. It is ironical that even though waste management constitutes a key priority on the agenda of not only the government but also the citizens, it is inadequately funded making it difficult to achieve the public health interest that it seeks. Based on the underlying view that government funding is a major source of revenue for Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), R1 is convinced that while it is a worthwhile call by the president to declare environmental health and sanitation and waste management as important issues that his government intends to address, it is an effort in futility until the necessary infrastructure and funding to back the declaration is released. He indicated that the government is yet to release the budget of his department for the 2018 financial year and already there is pressure on the Ministry to deliver in line with its public health objective.
Although R1 did not clearly mention the accountability relationships, a careful consideration of his position points to that. Considering the fact that, parliament has passed the budget for all MDAs in the 2018 fiscal year in Ghana, what could possibly be the cause of the delay in releasing the funds of a ministry that the government ranks so high on its agenda? Therefore, based on the framework of accountability relationships, the voice mechanism could be used as an incentive to demand information, collective action and sanctions through parliament on the executive thereby encouraging it to expedite the process of allocating funds to its MDAs.

One of the principal pointers to arriving at a decision whether to accept or reject the hypothesis of this study is to establish how improved accountability has become and whether citizens were able to hold service providers accountable in the AMA. As demonstrated under the literature review, in many developing countries, poor service delivery outcomes and performances were approached and analyzed due largely to the constraints of resources (Kimenyi 2013) and not the failure of accountability relationships between the various actors in the service delivery chain. It was therefore not surprising that, respondents agreed to the view that the relationship between the various actors in the delivery of waste management seemed weaker than building permit in the AMA. The responses pointed out that, the voice, compact and the client power accountability mechanisms were weak in the AMA.

With respect to the voice mechanism, 69.2 percent of household heads and 70 percent of residential owners indicated that when they made complaints mainly to their service providers, they did not address it. While some of the respondents made complaints about the lack of information or escalating fee charges, majority of them complained about the delay in collecting waste or issuing building permit. R21 and R28 directed their grievances to the TCPD but they did not think the department was interested in what they had to say. Similarly, R11 and R20
made complaints to the WMD and ZL but the delay in collecting waste remained. Interesting, the service providers did not deny the lapses in the delivery of their services, they however selected which grievance to address. R9 was emphatic when she said that:

“...as for the complaints we hear them plenty but we cannot solve all of them so we try to deal with the most pressing ones”.

However, R12 and R33 indicated that they complained to their assemblymen. They pointed out that it was their duty to hold their lawmakers accountable for service delivery in their community. This view is affirmed by the World Bank (2004) that the voice mechanism implies that policymakers are accountable to citizens and that they exert pressure and control on the policymakers in order to achieve their objectives. They further argued that in order for citizens to maximize their role in service delivery, they need information as it serves as a conduit or link not only between the citizens and policymakers but also the policymakers and the service providers.

Respondents were asked the medium through which they received information and how frequent did it flow. While 61.5 percent of household heads and 70 percent of residential owners craved for a modern communication system, they bemoaned the weak, untimely and irrelevant flow of information in the AMA. R26 and R24 expressed shock at their inability to receive information from the TCPD in this modern age. Their view is supported by R10 below:

“...on our part we have lots of work to do in that area. To make the information timely and available in the simplest language for everyone to understand”.

Similarly, R18 and R16 expressed their unhappiness with what they described as the AMA’s century old traditional town hall meetings. Their view was corroborated by R4 below:
“...the aspects of information, education and communication are just not there. However, we try our best using the formal and the informal ways”.

This goes to suggest that citizens lacked the motivation to hold their policymakers accountable. They were unable to receive regular and timely information and their grievances were not met. This is largely because those grievances were directed at the service providers. However, the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA is not in a competitive market transaction where the citizens have the power to directly hold the service providers accountable through the exercise of social sanction or discontinuing with the transaction if they were unhappy, etc. In this case, citizens have to direct their complaints to the policymakers who will in turn ensure that service providers improve their services to them. The implication for this study is that, the voice mechanism is weak because of the inability of citizens to access timely and relevant information from key policymakers and to address their complaints.

Analyzing this from the perspective of the World Bank (2004), the implication is that, a strong voice, compact and client power mechanisms will serve as an incentive for the citizens to play a larger role in order to improve waste management and building permit in the AMA. Conversely, a weak voice, compact and client power mechanisms will disincentivize citizens’ enlarged role in service delivery. Therefore, given the fixity of a weak voice, compact and client power mechanisms (especially with the citizens who are considered the weakest actors in the service delivery chain) in the AMA, it will not be out of place to reject the hypothesis that, the larger the role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit services, the more accountability is improved in the AMA. Thus, the minimal role and incentive of actors in waste management and building permit will undermine accountability in service delivery in the AMA. But the question that arises is; what if the actors are happy and determined to play a minimal role
despite the lack of accountability in service delivery in the AMA? An answer to this in the affirmative will mean that accepting the hypothesis at this stage will be a miss of point because the import of innate happiness and determination that actors have to play a minimal role and achieve their interest despite the limitations in accountability, is lacking.

Respondents were asked whether they were happy with the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Out of 33 respondents, 36.4 percent of household heads, followed by 27.2 percent of residential owners and 21.2 percent of senior officials were unhappy with the delivery of services in the AMA. It is not surprising as the actors cited constraints including financial resources, logistics, infrastructure, security and political will which had characterized their operations in the AMA. Some of the residential owners were not convinced that the delay that engulfs the delivery of building permit would be addressed soon. Similarly, some household heads pointed out that the WMD and ZL need to improve the delivery of their services in the AMA. For instance, R20 is not happy with the services of ZL. He argued that:

“Although there are some challenges in the operations of Zoomlion, waste management should be better under them but I’m not really seeing any difference between them and the AMA”.

Similarly, R18 emphasized her unhappiness with the collection and disposal of waste management under the WMD. She intimated:

“I’m not happy with the AMA because they are not doing too well in waste management. They have to improve upon their waste collection and final disposal. When they do these then the quality of waste delivery will be good”.

Beyond the basic understanding that section 7 (3) of the National Building Regulations, 1996 (LI 1630) stipulates that building permit shall ordinarily be valid for a period of five years after
which a developer needs to renew his permit, R30 and R26 were not happy because of the delay even though they satisfied the legal requirement for the renewal:

R30; “I am not happy because my building permit renewal process was too long”.

In her own words R26 said:

“Well, I will say I’m not happy with their services and I hope they can do more now”.

These remarks suggest that respondents were not happy with the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. However, R9 expressed mixed feelings taking into account the behaviours of building inspectors in both the Building Inspectorate Division and the Planning Inspectorate Division of the Works and TCPD respectively. She revealed:

“...being in a human institution, the process involves a lot of human interactions. So to be honest with you, there are occasions where we have deviants doing their own things. We have had some damaging reports and there are times people come to complain about the behaviours of some of our field staff harassing people, extorting money from them and all that....”

R7 was worried about the inability of government to provide security and protection to the few building inspectors in the Works and TCPD. He did not understand why it had become a normal practice for land guards and private security personnel to be defending properties with ammunitions while the building inspectors were without adequate security.

R5 was not happy with the lack of prompt payment of subsidies from the central government. He pointed out that in 2017 about GHS 17, 968,287.60 of ZL’s revenue was not released by the government and this had been outstanding. This figure amounted to 40 percent of ZL’s revenue in 2017. This situation makes it difficult for private waste companies to pay the salaries of their
employees, purchase fuel and undertake maintenance services on equipment and tools (AMA 2014).

Although 6.1 percent of respondents expressed mixed-feelings, 84.8 percent of them were unhappy with the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Thus, most actors were unhappy with the minimal role they played in the delivery of services in the AMA. This implies that, the break down in the accountability relationships was the result of actors playing a lesser or minimal role in service delivery in the AMA and not necessarily the constraints in resources including personnel and salaries.

To accept or reject the hypothesis, another variable of analysis was examined and that was whether respondents were willing to pay additional fees to improve service delivery in the AMA. Findings reveal that, 86.9 percent of household heads and residential owners were unwilling to pay additional fees as they believed the AMA was collecting enough fees already for waste management and building permit services yet they saw no major improvement. This is affirmed by the response of the service providers when they were asked how their clients rate their services. R3, R5, and R8 agreed that their service delivery was rated poorly by their clients. However, they pointed out that even though they were constrained with logistics, infrastructure and funding, the bigger challenge was the poor attitude of the citizens themselves who indiscriminately threw about waste.

R10 was of the view that his department’s ratings may have gone up because of its ability to issue more than 45 percent of building permits from 2013-2015. This is seconded by R29 who opined that it took him less than a month to renew his building permit in September 2014.
It is therefore not surprising that citizens were unwilling to pay additional fees since they did not envisage any major improvement in service delivery in the AMA. This supports the view that, service delivery is weak in the AMA but in comparative terms, waste management is weaker than building permit. Interestingly, this is so because accountability mechanisms are equally weak in the AMA.

Apart from R32, R25 and R13 who welcomed the idea of making an additional payment to improve service delivery, 47.8 percent of household heads and 39.1 percent of residential owners did not see the payment of additional fees as the answer to the challenges in service delivery in the AMA.

R12, R16, R21 and R29 considered service delivery in the AMA as shameful and discouraging. They were therefore not ready to pay additional fees anytime soon or in future unless there was the commitment from the policymakers to the service providers that service delivery would improve.

Analyzing from the compact mechanism of the accountability relationships framework - the relationship between policymakers and service providers which assumes that service providers are accountable to policymakers and that they need information and commitment to ensure that reward and sanction schemes are activated in order for service providers to improve their services - the propositions of the above respondents suggest a contrary. Thus, they were unwilling to make additional payment because policymakers were not committed and unwilling to address information gaps in monitoring service providers or to strengthen existing sanctioning mechanisms in waste management and building permit in the AMA. The compact mechanism in this regard could be viewed as a contradiction; citizens were unwilling to pay additional fees because policymakers lacked the commitment and zeal to activate clauses in the agreements of
the service providers that will ensure that they improve the delivery of waste management and building permit to citizens.

Also, R18 and R30 were unwilling to pay additional fees as they cited minimal improvement in the delivery of building permit and waste services in the AMA.

Being the local chief brought a lot of responsibilities on his shoulders and R32 though unwilling to pay extra fees himself, suggested this to the AMA:

“No, I won’t pay additional fees. But I think the AMA should start a discussion on the matter or send it to parliament for an approval. That way Ghanaians will see how important it is to the Assembly that we pay more fees to improve services. In all of this, education and sensitization will be key”.

R31 on her part thought that it was too early to start talking about charging citizens fully for waste management in Ghana. She believed it would be difficult for most people to agree that paying additional fees were necessary in the AMA considering the fact that the Assembly had not done much to warrant the additional fees payment.

R13 was pessimistic about the future of waste management and building permit delivery in the AMA.

From the foregoing discussions, it is convincing that, while the delivery of waste management and building permit is fixated with weak accountability mechanisms, actors are unwilling to play a larger role and achieve their interests in the AMA. This is interesting as it contrasts the view that the larger the role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit, the more accountability is improved in the AMA. Data from officials and responses showed that, the weak accountability mechanisms have demotivated actors from playing a greater or enlarged role in
order to achieve their interests in service delivery in the AMA. They are dissatisfied and demotivated with the weak accountability mechanisms especially the long route of accountability in the AMA.

The study’s hypothesis that: the larger the role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit services, the more accountability is improved in the AMA therefore stands rejected. The role and interest of actors in waste management and building permit have a minimal impact on accountability in the AMA.

5.6 Sectoral Differences between Waste Management and Building Permit in the AMA

It is expected that once the MLGRD was earmarked as one of the pioneers for the decentralization program in Ghana, steps taken to decentralize the Ministry would have been simultaneous in both Departments. However, findings revealed that the WMD reported its operations directly to the head of the environmental health and sanitation department (EHSD) of the MSWR. Similarly, the Works and the TCPD collaborated with the MLGRD. This contradicts the findings of Yaoda. et. al. (2014) which reported that general waste management in Ghana is the responsibility of the citizens. This notwithstanding, the two departments performed policy implementation, education, monitoring and supervision and evaluation functions in the AMA.

Even though the two departments need more equipment and tools for their operations, the WMD was in dire need because of the nature and scope of its services and consequences on the citizens and the environment. The study found that the WMD had deficits of storage, collection and transportation equipment including 350 dustbins, 85 skips, five (5) compaction tracks and nine (9) skip loaders. A study by Puopiel (2010) also found that only two (2) compaction trucks were available for the entire Tamale Metropolis and additional 200 tricycles were needed by the
Assembly’s Waste Management Department (TMA/WMD) for its door-to-door collection of waste in the metropolis. The study of Puopiel (2010) has been corroborated by the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the AMA/WMD who reported that the department needs between 300 to 400 storage containers to perform about 60 percent of its waste storage services (Independent Newspaper 1996, cited in Boadi and Kuitunen 2003). This situation had undermined the efforts of officials in providing waste services since citizens indiscriminately dumped waste at unapproved points due to the scarcity of storage equipment and tools.

Privatization was another key area of difference. Addaney and Oppong (2015) argued that privatization emerged as a confidence booster in the waste sector but has been stalled largely because of the lack of financial commitment from government to private companies designated to collect and dispose waste in Ghana. Similarly, Samwine et. al. (2017) opined that local governments should see privatization of waste management as a potential business opportunity where they can milk the maximum benefits with minimum impact on the environment as possible. However, building permit was largely delivered by the TCPD with collaboration with the Works. Amadu (2010) found that while applicants purchased ‘Form A’ from the TCPD, ‘Form B’ was acquired from the Works. Again, while the TCPD served as a secretariat for the Statutory Planning Committee, the Works was the issuer of the final permit.

The WMD had deficits of 23 supervisors and 17 operators and engineers. In addition to this, 14 supervisors and 6 drivers were aged. This is corroborated by Puopiel (2010) and Addaney and Oppong (2015). Addaney and Oppong (2015) found that the Awutu Senya East Municipality had deficits of 26 technicians and 45 non-technicians in 2014. Similarly, Puopiel (2010) found that Zoomlion Ghana Limited had only one regional operations supervisor in the Tamale Metropolis, an area with over 30 communities. He further revealed that the TMA/WMD had one (1)
engineer, eight (8) technicians and three (3) supervisors. He considered these numbers to be woefully inadequate in addition to the fact that these personnel held diploma and certificate in environmental health. Our study revealed that the staff of the TCPD were young and had better qualification. This is corroborated by section 186 of the National Building Regulations (LI 1630), which mandates planning authorities to be officials who have undergone an approved training in building and are versed in the construction of buildings, structural design and analysis, building maintenance, law related to buildings, principles of town planning and design principles.

It was further discovered that waste management is pervasive and impacts the lives of more citizens than building permit. R4 summed this below:

“every citizen generates waste which needs to be collected if we all want to survive but I’m not sure whether we all need building permit”.

The WMD was largely dependent on subventions from the AMA and these were hardly paid in full. For instance, in 2014, the revenue available to the WMD including subventions and IGFs amounted to GHS 372,000. This is affirmed by Addaney and Oppong (2015) who found that the revenue available to Awutu Senya East Municipality in 2014 was GHS 130,000. It is because District Assemblies (DAs) are incapable of financing waste management alone that is why the polluter-pay-policy was introduced to complement the sources of funding of Assemblies. However, our study showed that since 2009 the AMA and not the WMD has retained the user fees from the dumping of refuse at “Lavender Hill” site, Korle Gonno in Accra.
5.7 Reasons for the Differences in Waste management and Building permit in the AMA

First, is that waste management is only a priority of the central government on paper. Thus, even though a new ministry has been set up to coordinate and collaborate environmental health and sanitation in the Assemblies, the lack of funding and infrastructure hamper its effectiveness and efficiency. A similar study reported that even though 76.5 percent of residents in Accra said that waste management was a priority to them, over 83.8 percent of them added that its management should be the responsibility of children (Yaoda et. al. 2014).

Second, is the duplication of services. The study revealed that close to 20 private companies perform similar or same roles and functions to those of the WMD in the delivery of sanitation and waste management. These companies include Zoomlion, the leading private company together with the presence of many unofficial or illegitimate waste pickers and scavengers (Fagariba and Song 2016) performed sanitation and waste services in the AMA.

5.8 Consequences of the Differences on Service Delivery in the AMA

There were positive and negative consequences on service delivery in the AMA, which are considered mixed.

On a positive note, the differences in sectors have led to coordination and collaboration between actors in the service delivery chain. R1 summed this below:

"The minister recently announced the hiring of over 2000 sanitation brigade. They will start working in June this year. They are going to work with the environmental health officers (EHOs). The EHOs at the Assemblies will be the lead and they will follow...."
It is in this regard that Ganle et. al. (2015) have called for an increased in collaborations and partnerships with both state and non-state actors as key strategies to minimize health system constraints and maximize skilled delivery services.

Similarly, there is coordination in the monitoring, supervision and evaluation function of various actors especially between the TCPD (Planning Inspectorate Unit) and the Works (Building Inspectorate Unit).

Whereas there is coordination in the permitting, monitoring and supervision functions of the AMA, the study found lack of coordination in the planning functions of the Assembly. Samwine et. al. (2017) intimated that the lack of proper planning of environmental health and sanitation agencies lead to their inability to predict and forecast the quality of waste to be generated. It is in this regard that Agyepong (1999) has suggested that strategic interventions including integrating service delivery at the lower level with more decentralized planning were needed to make services better responsive to local preferences and needs.

5.9 Challenges of Waste Management and Building Permit in the AMA

There are a plethora of challenges and problems that confront the AMA in its service delivery efforts. These are: poor attitude of citizens; lack of political will; financial constraints; inadequate logistics; political interference; land title issues; statutory violations and non-conforming land issues and security. These challenges are discussed in the paragraphs below:

The findings of this study have shown that ineffective waste management and building permit delivery in the Accra Metropolis are explained in part due to the poor attitude of citizens. Indeed, as has been rightly pointed out by Abaitey (2011) and Egyin (2011), poor attitude of citizens undermines the efforts of local government authorities to maintain good sanitation and water
resources and benefit from the several initiatives jointly provided by state and non-state actors. According to Yaoda et. al. (2014), the fight against waste management does not only require capital investment but social and behavioural factors are key in a successful waste management. Similarly, Samwine et. al. (2017) found that poor attitude of individuals in complementing the efforts of waste management authorities in Ghana is one of the major challenges hampering the effective delivery of waste management. The studies of Samwine et. al. (2017), Abaitey (2011), Egyin (2011) and Yaoda et. al. (2014) have been reinforced by Michael Gyato (the Deputy Minister of Sanitation and Water Resources) who shared his observation on the public’s attitude towards sanitation. He pointed out that, “littering constitutes one of the major environmental nuisances practiced by the majority of the general public. There is no doubt that the poor attitude of the people towards sanitation is one of the biggest challenges we have as a country” (The Finder 2018, p.2). He further stated that this attitude is responsible for a significant number of health issues across urban centers in the country, leading to the spending of money on preventable illnesses and diseases.

Another important challenge in the delivery of waste management and building permit is the lack of political will on the part of the policymakers/politicians. This is supported by ESID (2016) who pointed out that, for lack of political will, politicians are not incentivized to commit resources into long-term projects in order to improve standards and gains. It further argued that, this view of the politicians result in poor outcomes and performances especially in health service delivery in Ghana.

Findings reveal that actors have high levels of understanding on what constituted their role and interest in waste management and building permit in the AMA, however, the low levels of financial wherewithal hamper their work. This resonates strongly with the studies of Aikins
(2014), Addaney and Oppong (2015), Samwine et. al. (2017) and Agyeman et. al. (2016). For instance, Aikins et. al. (2014) found that health workers were constrained in their work due to the inability to purchase medical supplies and equipment. Similarly, Agyeman et. al. (2016) found that the inability to acquire funding to introduce state-of-the-art technology, embark on field inspection, purchase logistics and develop the capacities of employees was the major stumbling block affecting the delivery of building permit in the Sunyani East and West Municipalities.

The delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA requires an adequate supply of equipment and logistics including vehicles and tools for monitoring and supervision, waste collection and transportation equipment for waste treatment and final disposal. However, it was found that equipment and logistics hinder the operations of employees in services delivery in the AMA. Several studies have found deficiencies in logistics and tools in service delivery in Ghana (Addaney and Oppong 2015; Samwine et. al. 2017; Aweso 2013; Puopiel 2010; Boadi and Kuitunen 2003; Ontoaneyin 2014; Amadu 2014; and Botchway et. al. 2014). In his investigation of the processes and procedures for the application and issuance of building permits in the Metropolitan Areas of Accra and Kumasi, Amadu (2014) found that 63% of applicants agree that inadequate logistics hinder the progress of building permit delivery in the two metropolitan cities of Ghana. Similarly, Ontoaneyin (2014) found that 83.2% of respondents dumped their waste in open spaces due to inadequate communal containers in the Tamale Metropolis.

Political interference is another key challenge in the delivery of services in the AMA. This is affirmed by Botchway et. al. (2014), Aweso (2013) and Asante and Sasu (2018). Asante and Sasu (2018) found that excessive political interference was one of the biggest constraints to the supervisory role of the development control officers (DCOs) in Kumasi. This suggests that
DCOs are handicapped with respect to enforcing section 10 (6) of the National Building Regulations, LI 1630 which empowers them to call for the demolition of structures that have not been inspected. Similarly, studies have found that political interference inhibits the efforts of private waste companies in waste services delivery. It is in this regard that Aweso (2013) has suggested that there is the need for minimal political interference in the operations of waste companies as this is one of the surest ways of attracting more private participation in the environmental health and sanitation industry in Ghana.

Land title is a key challenge in the delivery of services in the AMA. Botchway et. al. (2014) found that 63.6% of respondents in Kumasi regard the price of land together with the process of acquiring title to the land as very high. The respondents considered the cost of payment at either the Lands Commission or the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) to be overbearing. The study of Botchway et. al. (2014) has been supported by section 3 (2) of the National Building Regulations of 1996 (LI 1630) which states that, “no approval shall be granted to any applicant who does not have a good title to the land, and, for the purposes of this regulation, good title shall be in accordance with a certificate issued by the Chief Registrar of Land Titles or any other agency so authorized”.

Statutory violations and non-conforming land issues are another challenge to the delivery of services. Studies have found that non-conforming land difficulties are largely associated with the customary practices in Ghana. This sector is controlled by chefs and family heads who have no regard for the development plans of the formal land planning agencies. Abusah (2004) reported that the administration of land in Ghana is governed by customary practices and enacted regulations. Under the customary sector, decisions are taken largely by stools or traditional authorities represented by chiefs, clans, families and quarter heads. The president on the other
hand is the sole decision maker vested with the power to delegate matters regarding public or state lands. Whereas the state holds about 13% of the land with different tenure and management systems, the customary sector holds about 80-90% of all lands in Ghana (Abusah 2004). Furthermore, the National Building Regulations of 1996 (LI 1630) has dedicated regulations 84-89 to the interpretations of statutory violations. Terms like air movement, borrowed ventilation, mechanical ventilation, top ventilation and privy accommodation are explained. It further explains in detail the ventilation of habitable rooms, storage rooms, kitchens, bathrooms, etc.

Security is another challenge to the delivery of services. Section 11 of the National Building Regulations of 1996 (LI 1630) mandates District Planning Authorities to appoint qualified building inspectors to oversee and inspect daily work on buildings, erections and installations. This objective can be effectively achieved only when the building inspectors are provided with adequate security to minimize their fears with armed land guards and maximize their daily inspections in the AMA.

5.10 Conclusion

The chapter has shown that actors know and understand their role and interest in waste management and building permit in the AMA. It has also revealed that waste management is a priority not only to the citizens but also the central government because of its debilitating and corrosive consequences on the public health of citizens.

The study further found that service delivery has a mixed consequence on the citizens in the AMA. This is largely because of the availability of collaboration on the permitting functions of agencies and the absence of partnership on the planning functions of formal environmental and physical management and planning agencies in the AMA.
Service delivery weaknesses are largely the result of the simultaneous break down in accountability relationships among policymakers, service providers and citizens and not limited to the constraints including, logistics, security, funding and land title issues in resources.
References


The Finder, Wednesday, April 25, 2018.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter summarises the findings of the study and makes recommendations to addressing the challenges that have been identified to inhibit the effective and efficient delivery of waste management and building permit in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). The hypothesis that was tested in this study is that accountability in the AMA has been strengthened by the delivery of waste management and building permit services. In other words, the larger the role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit services, the more accountability is strengthened in the AMA.

From the study, 84.6 percent of household heads and 60 percent of residential owners understood their role and interests in waste management and building permit. This means that accountability should be seen to expand and improve in the AMA. The proceeding discussions indicate whether or not the understanding of the role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit has enabled them played a larger role and achieved their interests in waste management and building permit thereby strengthening accountability in the AMA.

6.1 Summary of Findings

The study set out to investigate the politics of service delivery in local governance units in Ghana using a comparative study of waste management and building permit in the AMA. Specifically, the study examined how accountability has strengthened the delivery of waste management and building permit services in the AMA. The study has four main objectives, namely; (i) identify the various actors, their role and incentives in the delivery of waste management and building
permit in the AMA; (ii) assess the accountability mechanisms in waste management and building permit in the AMA; (iii) analyze the sectoral differences in waste management and building permit in the AMA and the consequences for service delivery; and (iv) suggest or recommend feasible institutional and policy options for improving and strengthening waste management and building permit in the AMA.

First, the findings revealed that the role of actors in waste management and building permit in the AMA are waste generation, acquisition of land for building, policy formulation, guidelines and backstopping, policy implementation and education, management of human settlements, development control, monitoring and supervision and advisory services. For instance, 84.6 percent of the household heads and 60 percent of residential owners knew and understood their role as waste generators and landlords/landladies respectively. The officials of the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources (MSWR) reported that they formulated policies and programs, gave guidelines and rendered support services to the Environmental Health and Sanitation Department (EHSD) and the Waste Management Department (WMD) of the AMA to carry out the actual policy implementation. The WMD, Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) and the Works Department (Works) identified their role as policy implementers and educators in the AMA. This policy implementation role was made possible through the use of monitoring, supervision and evaluation functions. This strategy enabled officials to report their activities and to relate to their clients. Furthermore, the Works and the TCPD were responsible for planning and managing human settlement and controlling the levels at which physical structures were proliferating. Similarly, the WMD and the TCPD rendered advisory services not only to the public sector but also private individuals and organizations. All these suggested that actors understood their role in waste management and building permit in the AMA.
Second, the actors sought these interests: public health and the continuation and survival of the human population, revenue generation, development of safe structures and conformity of buildings to the approved plans and regulations of the AMA. For example, 92.3 percent of household heads revealed that due to the debilitating environmental and social costs of wastes, there was the need to pay special attention to it.

Third, the TCPD was one of the major revenue sources available to the AMA. Comparatively, the WMD generated only 13.1 percent of the total revenue generated by the TCPD in 2014, 2016 and 2017 financial years.

Fourth, about 53.8 percent of household heads and 40 percent of residential owners saw the delivery of waste management and building permit as having the potential to beautify the Accra Metropolis. It was observed further that 80 percent of the residential owners saw the acquisition of building permit as a tool for the development of safe structures. However, this assertion was incorrect taking into account that 52.1 percent of building permit was issued after the stipulated three (3) months by the TCPD and Works from 2013-2015. Furthermore, 50 percent of residential owners noted that the application, vetting and issuance of building permit were to ensure that physical developments conformed to the approved plans and regulations of the AMA.

From the foregoing findings, it was clear that actors knew and understood their role in waste management and building permit. However, this was not enough to conclude that they would play a larger role in service delivery without the intrinsic motivation to do so. In this connection, respondents were asked whether they were motivated to perform their role in waste management and building permit and the reason(s) for the motivation or otherwise. The findings show that 81.7 percent of actors were not motivated to perform their role in the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. They cited constraints in infrastructure, funding,
equipment and logistics which have inhibited them from playing an engaged role in service delivery in the AMA. This was not surprising considering the fact that the inability to address constraints in service delivery would dominate and overshadow the efforts of actors in carrying out their roles and achieving their interests the way they know best.

Findings on the accountability mechanisms in waste management and building permit were examined through the voice, compact and client power mechanisms. These together formed the long and short routes of accountability relationships (World Bank 2004). The voice mechanism revealed that 69.2 percent of household heads and 70 percent on residential owners complained about ineffective service delivery directly to the service providers. This was a limitation in the voice mechanism as it assumed that citizens exerted control and pressure on policymakers and that policymakers were accountable to citizens. In addition to this was the fact that the same respondents indicated that their complaints were not addressed. Again, 61.5 percent of household heads and 70 percent of residential owners reported that the flow of information was weak, irrelevant and untimely and hence their inability to monitor the activities of service providers. This was made possible partly because the policymakers found it difficult to demand accountability from the service providers whose duty it was to provide timely and relevant information and services to the citizens.

At this point, it was necessary to find out from the respondents how happy they were with service delivery in the AMA. This question sought to examine the state of mind of the respondents as the citizens did not exert pressure and control on the policymakers, lacked information and their grievances were unattended to. Policymakers on the other hand, also lacked the ability to hold service providers accountable, the final medium that citizens’ count on to improve their service delivery. It was interesting to find that, 36.4 percent of household heads,
followed by 27.2 percent of residential owners and 21.2 percent of officials were unhappy with service delivery in the AMA. These percentages amounted to a total of 84.8 percent of respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with the delivery of waste management and building in the AMA.

The compact mechanism revealed that the policymaker was physically and mentally inseparable from the service provider in the delivery of building permit in the AMA. In waste management however, the policymaker has entered into an agreement with the service provider based on performance. Nevertheless, the terms of the agreement were poorly defined as no clear performance targets and objectives were stated including indicators for measuring the quality of performance. This was largely because the policymaker did not have access to adequate information which would have enabled him to clearly delineate the boundaries of the contracts as well as provide answers to the citizens. For this reason, the policymaker found it difficult to exercise the reward and sanction schemes embedded in the agreement.

The client power mechanisms revealed that citizens directly held service providers accountable for the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA. For example, 69.2 percent of household heads and 70 percent of residential owners exerted pressure and control on their service providers. However, because the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA was not in a competitive market environment, citizens had no direct accountability from the service providers. It was rather the responsibility of the policymakers/politicians to ensure that the service providers were accountable to the citizens through the compact mechanism. The limitations in the relationship between the policymakers and the service providers manifested in the inability of the service providers to address the concerns and grievances of the citizens.
In sum, it has been found that actors knew and understood their role and interest in service delivery in the AMA. However, they were demotivated and unhappy to perform their roles and achieve their interests largely because of the break down in the accountability relationships. These accountability failures have dominated the role and interests of actors and often undermined their efforts at providing services in the AMA.

For instance, citizens did not exert control on policymakers because they lacked information and their grievances were not addressed. Policymakers did not hold service providers accountable for service delivery because they did not receive information from the service providers which prevented them from sharing information with the citizens. In addition to this, the reward and sanction schemes embedded in contract agreements were not activated to punish non-performing waste contractors.

The framework of accountability relationships argues that it is only when the voice, compact and client power mechanisms are strengthened that accountability improves and service delivery constraints become minimized (World Bank 2004). This can be achieved when the various actors in the service delivery chain are happy and motivated to perform their roles in order to achieve their interests. In our study, the voice, compact and client power mechanisms seemed weak. This explains why the delivery of waste management and building permit was weak and constraints were unbearable in the AMA. The inability to address these constraints have undermined accountability in the AMA. In addition, 84.8 and 81.7 percent of respondents were unhappy and demotivated respectively to play a larger role and achieve their interests in service delivery because of inadequate infrastructure, equipment, logistics, personnel and funding. These constraints have reduced or minimized the roles of actors and often undermined their efforts at increasing or expanding accountability in the AMA.
Findings of the study revealed six major sectoral differences between waste management and building permit in the AMA. These are, ministries, equipment/logistics, privatization/outsourcing, staffing, scope of services and funding. It was interesting to find that the TCPD was better equipped than the WMD taking into account the available data from officials on equipment and logistics, staffing and funding. With equipment and tools in particular, the WMD had deficits of 350 dustbins and 85 communal containers. Similarly, findings show that the WMD had deficits of 23 supervisors and 17 operators and engineers. Again, 14 supervisors and 6 drivers were aged. In addition to this, the WMD relied fully on subventions from the AMA for its activities. These subventions were irregularly paid and the outstanding ones were not paid at all.

Considering the reasons for the differences, the study found that successive governments had always prioritized waste management as an essential service, yet little had been done in terms of funding and infrastructure to uplift the status of waste storage, collection, transportation and final disposal in the AMA. Therefore, the WMD’s revenue including subventions and internally generated funds (IGFs) were not enough to manage the activities of the Department. The second reason identified for the differences was that the WMD through the Urban Environmental Sanitation Policy (UESP) of 1999 had privatized close to 80% of waste services to the private sector. For instance, private companies like Jekora Ventures, Ako Waste Management Limited and Zoomlion Ghana Limited (ZL), just to name a few, were involved in sanitation and waste management in the AMA. These private agencies perform same or similar roles and functions as that of the WMD and tended to compete for the provision of sanitation and waste services in the AMA. However, the participation of these private contractors had injected more equipment and
tools in the waste sector as companies like ZL had invested over 35 percent of its 2017 budget on equipment and tools.

The differences in the two sectors of waste management and building have a mixed consequence on service delivery in the AMA. On the one hand, the partnership between the WMD and the MSWR has led to the recruitment of over 2000 sanitation brigade to partner environmental health and sanitation officers (EHSOs) to monitor sanitation in the Accra Metropolis. Similarly, the collaboration between the two monitoring and evaluation units, i.e., the Building Inspectorate Division and the Planning Inspectorate Division has strengthened the planning and management of human settlements in the AMA. This notwithstanding, more efforts were needed to improve planning and management in the AMA. On the other hand, there was the lack of coordination in the planning functions of the AMA as departments were working in silos. Hence, the proliferation of unsafe structures and unauthorized developments in the Accra Metropolis. In this connection, the study concludes that with respect to the consequences of the differences on service delivery, the general impression was that not much has been felt in service delivery in the AMA. This was largely attributed to the minimal roles of actors in waste management and building permit which had undermined their efforts at expanding accountability in the AMA.

The study also found several challenges in waste management and building permit in the AMA. These are; the poor attitudes of citizens, financial constraints, inadequate logistics, political interference, land title issues, and inadequate security. However, interactions with senior level officials from the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources revealed that new policies and initiatives have been rolled out and some lessons have also been drawn from other places which when applied will help address most of the challenges facing waste management in the country. One of such initiatives is the recruitment of sanitation officers who are supposed to work with
the environmental health and sanitation officers (EHSOs) in the Assemblies to enforce sanitation by-laws. Another initiative is the implementation of the GHS 400 charges/fines on individuals who openly defecate in the Accra Metropolis. This initiative is a partnership or consortium among the AMA, traditional authorities, civil society and the police in the Accra Metropolis. Again, interactions with senior level officials from the Works and the TCPD revealed that the introduction of the one-stop-shop has been instrumental in the permitting function as it enabled the AMA to receive and issue more than 45 percent of building permits to applicants within the stipulated three (3) months period.

The study has therefore rejected the hypothesis that ‘accountability in the AMA has strengthened the delivery of waste management and building permit”, i.e., the minimal role and interests of actors in waste management and building permit have undermined accountability in the AMA.

6.2 Conclusion

Waste management and building permit are two essential but distinct services that are largely provided or implemented by Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) since the inception of the Fourth Republic in Ghana. For instance, the implementation of the UESP in 1999 has seen the participation of about 20 sanitation and waste management companies in the AMA. These companies have complemented the efforts of the WMD in terms of an expansion in logistics and equipment. The Zoomlion Ghana Limited (ZL) alone injected close to 35 percent of its budget in 2017 on equipment. Besides, the increase in the number of logistics and equipment has the potential to contribute to the improvement in the delivery of sanitation and waste management services in the AMA. On the contrary, the delivery of building permit was provided in-house with partnership from the Works. This is predicated on the Town and Country Planning Ordinance of 1945, Cap 84. This ordinance mandates the TCPD to systematically plan and
manage the development of human settlement in Ghana. In this connection, it is significant that waste management and building permit are effectively provided in order to strengthen accountability in local government units in Ghana.

The study has established that even though service delivery in the AMA has taken root, the delivery of waste management is only a priority on paper in the AMA as the WMD lacked funding, logistics and personnel to effectively perform its role and functions. Similarly, the delay in the issuance of building permit in the AMA was among other things attributed to the multiplicity of functions of formal land management and planning agencies and the inability of the Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) to attend meetings of the Statutory Planning Committee (SPC). These constraints have dominated the role of actors and often undermined their efforts to play a larger role in order to strengthen accountability in the AMA. However, the study identified some positives. The presence of coordination and collaboration between waste agencies (WMD and ZL) and land management and planning agencies (Works and TCPD) has the potential of expanding service delivery in the AMA.

The entire AMA cannot achieve its service delivery targets if the WMD continues to be deprived of the needed financial, personnel and logistical supports. Although the establishment of the MSWR reveals the importance that the government attaches to the delivery of waste management, however, it is the view of this study that it will not make any difference if the necessary support in terms of funding, equipment and logistics will not be given to the WMD in order to fully operate at the 20% capacity that it is expected to operate. Accordingly, it will further demotivate actors and diminish their role and interests which will largely have minimal impacts on accountability in key service delivery in the AMA.
6.3 Recommendations

A number of recommendations can be distilled from the study.

First, if the Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources (MSWR) is to effectively achieve its objectives and targets on sanitation and waste management then there is the need for the Ministry to expand infrastructure and logistics at the local level. This includes landfill sites, communal disposable centers, and office spaces especially for the staff of the WMD.

Second, there is need for the AMA to revisit the subventions allocated to the WMD if good public health, minimal environmental impacts and socio-economic developments are what the AMA seeks to achieve. Furthermore, it is also important that the AMA cedes the collection of dumping fees at the various dumping sites to the WMD as this move will cushion the internal revenue generating capacity of the WMD.

Third, the dissemination of information to actors especially citizens has the potential of expanding the role of actors in monitoring service delivery in the AMA. This may in turn influence the attitudes and behaviours of service providers in delivering effective and efficient waste management and building permit in the AMA.

Fourth, the leadership of the WMD should appeal to government to commit resources for the recruitment, training and deployment of staff to the various levels of the assembly in order to enlarge service delivery and strengthen accountability in the assembly. This will also replace the ageing staff.

Fifth, leadership of the MSWR and the WMD should embark on a strategic advocacy and sensitization campaign using key statesmen and officials to educate citizens on the importance of clean environment to public health and national productivity. This will enable the citizens to
begin to improve their attitudes and behaviours on sanitation and waste management and at least pay for recovery prices of waste collection, transportation and final disposal in the Accra Metropolis.

Sixth, building consultancy firms could be empowered by legislation to undertake the building permit application process on behalf of residential owners and developers. A similar system called the online Building Permits Management Information System (BPMIS) is practiced in Rwanda. Under this system, registered architects and professional engineers make permit applications on behalf of residential owners and as a result building permits are issued within seven days. This process expedites the permitting process as it reduces the human interactions and delays which also reduces corruption and improves accountability in the delivery of building permits.

Seventh, ICT should be introduced which will enable building permits to be processed on time. Its use can help the process in the following ways: (i) application forms can be downloaded from the net, filled and submitted instead of physically approaching the AMA offices to purchase them; (ii) tracking to know the status of applications online; (iii) contacting applicants through e-mails and text messages to inform them about the challenges in their applications, requisition of additional information and the approval or disapproval of their applications; (iv) make payments of statutory fees; and (v) make general enquiries of the application processes.

Eighth, participatory planning approaches should be adopted to enable formal land management and planning agencies to share and access information including site plans and maps of the Accra Metropolis
Ninth, political will is key in the delivery of services. If central governments want to see improvements in the delivery of waste management and building permit then politicians should lead the way and become the agents of change. They should also commit more money and make disbursements to agencies regular to enable them perform their mandates.

Finally, regulations on environmental health and sanitation should be enforced to ensure that citizens comply with them. In addition, a concerted effort between the state and non-state actors is required in order to minimize its negative consequences on the physical, health, environmental and socio-economic developments in the country.
References

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW GUIDES USED TO COLLECT PRIMARY DATA

APPENDIX A (1): INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CLIENTS/CITIZENS

This interview aims at collecting data for a research titled: “The Politics of Service Delivery in Local Governance Units in Ghana: A Comparative Study of Waste Management and Building Permit in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly”. The information you will provide is to complement secondary data on the aforementioned topic. You may choose to decline to answer a question(s) if you do not want to share information on it.

With your kind permission, may we start?

PART A: Citizen/Client’s role and interest in Waste Management.

1. Why are you interested in waste management?
2. What is your role in waste management?
3. Are you motivated to carry out your role in waste management? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
4. How important is your role and interest in waste management?

PART B: Accountability mechanisms in Waste Management.

5. Are you happy with waste management in the AMA? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
6. How do you receive information on waste management in the AMA?
7. To whom, do you make complaint about waste management in the AMA? If you complain, does the situation change?
8. Who do you hold responsible for waste management in the AMA?
9. How do you hold them responsible in waste management in the AMA?

10. Are you willing to pay additional fees in order to see waste management improve?

PART C: Challenges of improving Waste Management and Recommendations to address them.

11. What are the challenges facing the delivery of waste management in the AMA?

12. How can the challenges of waste management be addressed in the AMA?

13. What recommendations can you make to improve the delivery of waste management in the AMA?
APPENDIX A (2): INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CLIENTS/CITIZENS

This interview aims at collecting data for a research titled: “The Politics of Service Delivery in Local Governance Units in Ghana: A Comparative Study of Waste Management and Building Permit in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly”. The information you will provide is to complement secondary data on the aforementioned topic. You may choose to decline to answer a question(s) if you do not want to share information on it.

With your kind permission, may we start?

PART A: Citizen/Client’s role and interest in Building Permit.

1. Why are you interested in building permit?
2. What is your role in building permit?
3. Are you motivated to carry out your role in building permit? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
4. How important is your role and interest in building permit?

PART B: Accountability mechanisms in Building Permit.

5. Are you happy with building permit delivery in the AMA? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
6. How do you receive information on building permit delivery in the AMA?
7. To whom, do you make complaint about building permit in the AMA? If you complain, does the situation change?
8. Who do you hold responsible for building permit delivery in the AMA?
9. How do you hold them responsible in building permit delivery in the AMA?
10. Are you willing to pay additional fees in order to see building permit delivery improve?
PART C: Challenges of improving Building Permit and Recommendations to address them.

11. What are the challenges facing the delivery of building permit in the AMA?

12. How can the challenges of building permit be addressed in the AMA?

13. What recommendations can you make to improve the delivery of building permit in the AMA?
APPENDIX A (3): INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS

This interview intends to collect data for a research titled: “The Politics of Service Delivery in Local Governance Units in Ghana: A Comparative Study of Waste Management and Building Permit in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly”. The information you will provide is to complement existing secondary data on the subject matter under study. You may choose to decline to answer a question(s) if you do not want to share information on it.

With your kind permission, may we start?

PART A: Policy maker/Politician’s role and interest in Waste Management.

1. Why are you interested in waste management?
2. What is your role in waste management?
3. Are you motivated to perform your role in waste management? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
4. How important is your role and interest in waste management?

B: Accountability mechanisms in Waste Management.

5. Are you happy with waste management in the AMA? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
6. What are the differences between policy makers and service providers in the delivery of waste management in the AMA?
7. As a policy maker, how do you hold service providers accountable in waste management in the AMA?
8. Which reward and punishment schemes are available for service providers in the delivery of waste management in the AMA?
9. How do you provide information to citizens so as to monitor the performance of service providers in waste management in the AMA?
PART C: Sectoral differences between Waste Management and Building Permit and its consequences on service delivery.

10. In your view, are there differences between waste management and building permit delivery in the AMA? If yes, what are the differences?

11. How do the differences impact service delivery in the AMA?

12. Are there some lessons to be learnt from the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA?

PART D: Challenges of improving Waste Management and Recommendations to address them.

13. What are the challenges facing the delivery of waste management in the AMA?

14. How can the challenges of waste management be addressed in the AMA?

15. What recommendations can you make to improve the delivery of waste management in the AMA?
APPENDIX A (4): INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS

This interview intends to collect data for a research titled: "The Politics of Service Delivery in Local Governance Units in Ghana: A Comparative Study of Waste Management and Building Permit in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly". The information you will provide is to complement existing secondary data on the subject matter under study. You may choose to decline to answer a question(s) if you do not want to share information on it.

With your kind permission, may we start?

PART A: Service Provider’s role and interest in Waste Management.

1. Why are you interested in waste management?
2. What is your role in waste management?
3. Are you motivated to perform your role in waste management? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
4. How important is your role and interest in waste management?

B: Accountability mechanisms in Waste Management.

5. In what ways do officials report their operations in waste management in the AMA?
6. Are you happy with waste management in the AMA? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
7. How important is the delivery of waste management in the AMA?
8. What reward and sanction schemes are available in the Assembly for the delivery of waste management?
9. Are citizens given feedback with respect to waste management in the AMA? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
10. How do citizens rate the delivery of waste management in the AMA?
PART C: Sectoral differences between Waste Management and Building Permit and its consequences on service delivery.

11. Are there differences between waste management and building permit in the AMA? If yes, what are the differences?

12. How do the differences impact service delivery in the AMA?

13. Are there lessons to be learnt from the delivery of waste management and building permit in the AMA?

PART D: Challenges of improving Waste Management and Recommendations to address them.

14. What are the challenges facing the delivery of waste management in the AMA?

15. How can the challenges of waste management be addressed in the AMA?

16. What recommendations can you make to improve the delivery of waste management in the AMA?
APPENDIX A (5): INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS

This interview intends to collect data for a research titled: “The Politics of Service Delivery in Local Governance Units in Ghana: A Comparative Study of Waste Management and Building Permit in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly”. The information you will provide is to complement existing secondary data on the subject matter under study. You may choose to decline to answer a question(s) if you do not want to share information on it.

With your kind permission, may we start?

PART A: Service Provider’s role and interest in Building Permit.

1. Why are you interested in building permit?
2. What is your role in building permit?
3. Are you motivated to perform your role in building permit? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
4. How important is your role and interest in building permit?

B: Accountability mechanisms in Building Permit.

5. In what ways do officials report their operations in building permit in the AMA?
6. Are you happy with building permit delivery in the AMA? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
7. How important is the delivery of building permit in the AMA?
8. What reward and sanction schemes are available in the Assembly for the delivery of building permit?
9. Are citizens given feedback with respect to building permit delivery in the AMA? If yes, how; if no, give reasons?
10. How do citizens rate the delivery of building permit in the Assembly?
PART C: Sectoral differences between Building Permit and Waste Management and its consequences on service delivery.

11. Are there differences between building permit and waste management in the AMA? If yes, what are the differences?

12. How do the differences impact service delivery in the AMA?

13. Are there lessons to be learnt from the delivery of building permit and waste management in the AMA?

PART D: Challenges of improving Building Permit and Recommendations to address them.

14. What are the challenges facing the delivery of building permit in the AMA?

15. How can the challenges of building permit be addressed in the AMA?

16. What recommendations can you make to improve the delivery of building permit in the AMA?
APPENDIX B: BIO-DATA

Policymaker and Service Providers (MSWR, WMD, TCPD, WORKS, ZL)

1. What is your designation/position?
2. What is your level of education?
3. How many years have you worked in the waste management/building permit sector?

   Household Heads/House Owners/Community leaders

1. What is your level of education?
2. What work do you do?
3. Are you the house owner/household head?
4. Do you have a permit for your building?
APPENDIX C: MAP OF ACCRA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY

Source: Urban Management Land Information System