THE LINKAGES BETWEEN POVERTY PRODUCTION, CORRUPTION AND SECURITIZATION IN NIGERIA

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Gladys Adjeley Anum, hereby declare that this work is the result of my own research under the supervision of Prof. Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua and has not been presented anywhere else for any academic award in this or any other university. All references used in this work have been fully acknowledged.

____________________  ____________________
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(STUDENT)  (SUPERVISOR)

____________________  ____________________
DATE  DATE
DEDICATION

To all those struggling in life because of the corrupt actions of political and corporate officials.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I give God thanks for the guidance, grace and strength to start this academic course and complete it successfully.

I am also grateful to my supervisor, a champion of excellence – Dr Kwadwo Appiagye-Atua – who diligently read through my work and made corrections (even to the minutest detail) to ensure I did a good job. His confidence in me, encouragement, communication style and availability was remarkable.

To my dearest King - a man of character; the gentle academician - who showed immense care and encouraged me all through the period, I say, ‘God bless you!’ You will do exploits!’

To friends and loved ones who contributed in diverse ways, I appreciate you all.

God bless!
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Copenhagen School</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Redemption Council</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>PwC</td>
<td>PricewaterhouseCoopers</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
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<td>NNPC</td>
<td>Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>WDC</td>
<td>Western Development Community</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<td>IMN</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Nigeria</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>Nigerian Army</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Program</td>
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<td>MEND</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Presidential Amnesty Program</td>
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<td>NDAP</td>
<td>Niger Delta Amnesty Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>Niger Delta Avengers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMPADEC</td>
<td>Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission</td>
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<td>SDN</td>
<td>Stakeholder Democracy Network</td>
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<td>EFCC</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Crimes Commission</td>
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<td>FCPA</td>
<td>Foreign Corrupt Practices Act</td>
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<td>NCHD-P</td>
<td>National Conversation on the Humanitarian Development-Peace</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>Food for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPRM</td>
<td>Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>Special Anti-Robbery Squad</td>
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<td>IPOB</td>
<td>Indigenous People of Biafra</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>GEEP</td>
<td>Government Enterprise Empowerment Programme</td>
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ABSTRACT

‘Poverty production’ is a rising notion in poverty research which addresses the roles of actors and the activities they engage in that end in poverty or make contributions to poverty formation. Corruption does not fail to be one of those obvious factors known to aggravate poverty among citizens. The scope of the study focused on Nigeria in West Africa, a country with immense wealth from its rare natural resource – oil – yet reportedly taken over India as the country with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty, according to the World Poverty Clock and the Brookings Institute. Nigeria has been known to score very low on the global corruption index. The study narrowly looked at the insurgence in the region of the Niger Delta and how the unrest has been driven by hidden faces of both local and international figures in government positions and corporations seriously facilitating the production of more poverty through corruption and securitization of affairs. The objectives of this study were to investigate the linkages between poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria, examine how these linkages are (deliberately) fueled by government officials, corporate bodies (both local and international) and other actors within the society and finally to explore prospects in dealing with corruption to curb poverty production, corruption and subsequently the securitization of those issues through the adoption of a human security approach. In Nigeria, the problems of corruption and poverty exist. Many people may look at them as two separate national challenges, but this research has shown that there is a strong causal relationship between the two i.e. the extreme levels of corruption produces poverty and vice versa. A reduction in corruption at all levels in the private and public sectors could help reduce the levels of poverty in Nigeria and more importantly the spate at which local authorities and international corporations produce poverty directly and otherwise.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

From the early 1960s, poverty has been considered mainly as a black problem and thus reflected in academic research, popular culture and government policy.¹ Unfortunately, therefore, poverty is one of the stigmas African countries are associated with. The graphic images of people living in poverty is visible in many parts of the Africa, including Nigeria, the largest country on the continent.

On the other hand, in structural terms, poverty is not considered as the outcome of human capital deficiencies nor as the result of racial forces, but as a social canker that pertains to the availability of economic and common resources.² The World Bank reports that “[p]overty is an outcome not only of economic processes – it is an outcome of interacting economic, social, and political forces”.³ The Bank also proposes that it is “an outcome of the accountability and responsiveness of state institutions”.⁴

From the perspective that fundamental veracities remain “external to, and coercive over” persons, poverty can be considered as an array of classes into which people are grouped through one process or another.¹ Therefore the amount of poverty in any given society or locality is a result of its political economy.⁵ In other words, governments have significant roles to play in the production or alleviation of poverty.

Economists define poverty in the context of specific income levels (between $1 and $2 a day) or per capita income (total population divided by GDP). Others have disputed these definitions and cited them as not elaborate enough to capture the phenomenon of poverty. The World Bank
provides a wider definition that brands poverty as multidimensional: low income, suppression of opinion and helplessness (feeling discrimination, lacking wealth-creation possibilities, exploitation by state institutions, and lacking status under the law), vulnerability (to health or income loss, crime and violence, natural disaster, and education curtailment), and low levels of education and health.³ Per this standard, more people than can be imagined live in poverty, not only in Nigeria’s rural areas but many parts of the urban as well. Again, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) asserts that “poverty has many faces. It is much more than low income. It also reflects poor health and education, deprivation in knowledge and communication, inability to exercise human and political rights and absence of dignity, confidence and self-respect”.⁶

In 1899, Charles Booth, one of the earliest UK researchers who worked on poverty, defined as poor ‘households with weekly income of 18 shillings to 21 shillings’. A household with a weekly income lesser than 18 shillings was considered as very poor. According to Booth, poor people experienced hardships in making ends meet but managed to survive somehow, whereas very poor people lived in a perpetual state of unsatisfaction and unfulfilment.

One of the most influential critics of the subsistence approach (adopted by Booth) to poverty was Peter Townsend, the British sociologist. He defines poverty as follows:

*Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies in which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities.*⁷
Townsend points out that to be qualified as ‘poor’, one’s lack of resources must be so significant that full participation in social life is prohibited; that it is not sufficient merely to earn less than others. The relative lack of resources must be so evident as to inhibit full partaking in social life.\textsuperscript{8}

Poverty, according to the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, [is] \textit{the failure of rudimentary abilities to reach certain marginally tolerable levels.} The resources necessary for these functionings can range from such elementary physical ones as good nourishment, suitable clothes to wear and good shelter, avoiding preventable illnesses, etc., to more complicated societal achievements such as participating in communal life and the ability to present oneself without shame, and so on.\textsuperscript{9}

It is apparent that the measures of poverty used in the West and relatively developed parts of the world are far disparate from Africa. In Africa, one would be considered not poor if the person has sufficient money to cater for himself/herself and possibly a few other family members. Many Africans face extreme poverty which deprives them of a basic good meal within the day, a fact likely to sound unbelievable in the ears of those categorized as ‘relatively poor’ in other parts of the world. Unlike in previous decades, the current century has immense global wealth unparalleled in history. There exists large areas in South America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia where nonexistence of natural resources or limited access to international markets for fair competition in the international economy exist.\textsuperscript{10} Stark deprivation is nonetheless a way of life for entire populations. More than 2.5 billion humans hold to survival on less than $1 or $2 a day. Whereas the foremost beneficiaries of globalizations experience tremendous developments in education, health and living standards, over 40% of the world’s populace face the threat of annihilation from severe poverty.\textsuperscript{11} This percentage of the world’s poor population increases yearly. Meanwhile, whereas the above definitions and parameters are a good mark to determine the level of one’s poverty, they do not deviate from the single fact that poverty is simply lack!
‘Poverty production’ is a rising notion in poverty research which addresses the roles of actors and the activities they engage in that end in poverty or make contributions to poverty formation. Aside the assertion that poverty production forces have to be known, poverty production is grounded on the following different elements: that it occurs at all stages of society; that it could be unintended (indirect) or direct; that its effect should be highlighted; and, appropriate solutions to poverty found through activism and other avenues once the actors, their actions and the impact of those actions are underscored.\textsuperscript{12} Exposure to/ knowledge of these elements may be a starting point to awaken people to the damaging effects of their actions and inactions that generate poverty, intentionally or otherwise.

Corruption does not fail to be one of those obvious factors known to aggravate poverty among the citizens who may find themselves at the lower end of society’s ladder of affluence. Corruption is a phenomenon with many faces. It is characterised by a range of economic, political, administrative, social and cultural factors, both domestic and international in nature. Corruption is not an innate form of behaviour, but rather a symptom of wider dynamics. It results from interactions, opportunities, strengths and weaknesses in socio-political systems. It opens up and closes down spaces for individuals, groups, organizations and institutions that populate civil society, the state, the public sector and the private sector. It is, above all, the result of dynamic relationships between multiple actors.\textsuperscript{13} Corruption as a cause of poverty is quite a daunting task to trace because it may have a lengthy line of culprits who may simultaneously be part of parallel networks of poverty reduction. However, corruption is not the only mechanism responsible for producing poverty. Equal blame for poverty production in the less industrialized world can be apportioned to the negative commodity prices, debt burden, dumping, subsidization of western farmers with government aid, tariffs, high export standards and other obstructions to trade.\textsuperscript{14}
Citizens of most countries charge their governments to handle such economic issues in favour of the country. Poverty production, whether perpetuated by a non-state actor or the government, places an obligation on the government to forestall it. This research will focus on corruption as a producer of poverty.

There is a rich literature around the so-called “resource curse”. Ample evidence from across the developing world shows countries rich in natural resources also tend to be highly corrupt and poorly governed, in part because of the dynamics and incentives extractive resources tend to generate for the ruling elites. The abundance of resources and minerals (such as oil, diamonds, gold), has been a (if not the) leading factor in undermining accountability, disarticulating the link between state and society and enabling those who rule to command vast patronage networks while remaining indifferent towards the population at large. Among other things, the fact that the state does not depend on its people to raise revenue helps generate a widespread perception that public services are a favour from the State rather than a right that can be demanded, and it therefore profoundly undermines vertical accountability processes.

There is evidence to suggest one set of actors is particularly important for the developmental impact of natural resources: the private sector. As several analysts have argued, foreign corporations often face perverse incentives to engage in corrupt behaviour, including, for example, the bribing of officials for contracts. In addition, “oil firms and other international corporations are major practitioners in promoting tax avoidance and evasion”, and their practices have helped reinforce corruption patterns and behaviour in-country.

Nigeria has been known to score very low on the global corruption index (ranked 136th out of 176 countries) just before Guinea and at par with Lebanon and Myanmar. In Nigeria, the constant reports of corruption underline the difficulty of attaining two key promises of President Muhamadu
Buhari’s 2015 campaign: tackling pervasive corruption and crushing the Boko Haram insurgency that has claimed over 20,000 lives and evacuated thousands and thousands. Yet, one of the factors accounting for Boko Haram’s surge in popularity among the youth at the time of its inception is their focus on denouncing the police and state corruption which heightened public outrage because of increased poverty. Their merciless and crude ways of violence caused about 186 million people of Nigeria to continually be on guard almost every time even in the performance of mundane activities thereby occasioning international awakening and putting Nigeria and its neighbours on high security alert.

It could be justified that the high alert of security in guarding against any further attacks has progressed to create a state of securitization which is in subtle ways fueling deeper corruption and severe poverty among some citizens, significantly in the Northern parts of the country where poor civilians could even perish at the hands of government militia who should be protecting them.

In Nigeria (and some parts of Africa), poverty is framed as an existential and imminent threat which should be dealt with immediately, whatever the cost, for the continued survival and peaceful co-existence of the society. The Nigerian government is then securitizing development, and justifying the emboldened role of the state in social life, the increase in power and stature of the ruling elite and government, the resource mobilization drive of the state and retreats on previously agreed rules and declared political aims. Ironically, the underlying reason has always been that if not eradicated, poverty, and lack of good governance and democracy, will lead to civil strife and disintegration.

Special attention will be paid to the Niger Delta, the southern part of Nigeria with concentrations of oil and gas reserves but marked by deprivation and underdevelopment. Communities have come into conflict with oil companies, with each other, and with the security forces over a range of issues
including payments, land acquisition, and environmental damage. Armed groups have waged systematic campaigns against the government and oil companies to have their demands met, and unemployed youth have often taken advantage of the situation by engaging in criminality – violence, kidnappings, killings, terrorism and fostering insecurity.\textsuperscript{25}

The Copenhagen School (CS) of Security Studies has conceptualized security as a technique of social construction of threats which consists of securitizing actor (mostly political elite) who proclaims certain matters as pressing and posing a threat to the existence of a particular referent body that, once acknowledged by the referent body, legalizes the use of bizarre means for nullification of the threat. Thus, an issue becomes securitized and excluded from the normal confines of democratic political agenda and rather placed on the “panic politics” agenda.\textsuperscript{26}

Securitization is “essentially an inter-subjective process”.\textsuperscript{27} It is the path of the continuing dialogues between securitizing actor (in this case the government, maybe), who puts the matter on the agenda, and the citizens i.e. audience, who have an option of either accepting or rejecting the given agenda. Securitization cannot be imposed; only the audience’s acceptance validates the use of extreme processes, which encompass breaching of systematic political measures, all in order to nullify the threat.\textsuperscript{28} Currently, Nigeria appears to be in such state. Politically, identifying poverty production is unlikely to be smooth. The agents of poverty production, because of gains they make from such production might also not be disposed towards accountability and the complications that might be provoked by an exposure of their activities,\textsuperscript{29} reinforcing the banes of securitization and poverty so the cycle is repeated.
1.2 Operational definitions

**Poverty:** “A condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It is dependent not only on income or earnings but also on accessibility to services”.30

**Poverty production:** “An enduring phenomenon that follows a repetitive pattern where certain actors engage in activities that ensure that poverty increases or is sustained, and where the victims or poor people are so limited that they have just few or no opportunities to change the situation”.31

**Securitization:** “The intersubjective establishment of an existential threat, which demands urgent and immediate attention, as well as the use of extraordinary measures to counter this threat”.32

**Corruption:** “Perception across a spectrum of illegal payments and dealings such as bribes, embezzlement, and money laundering among others”.33

**Human Security:** “The safety of people from both violent and non-violent threats”.34

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

Despite appreciation for the rich culture, language and general uniqueness of the Nigerian people, the mark of corruption does not seem to easily go away from the country. Nigeria writhes in poverty. And that poverty is not for want of assistance from the international community.35 From the time of independence in 1960, Nigeria has acquired $400 billion (£257 billion) in aid - six times what the US invested into restructuring the entire of Western Europe after the second World War.36 Whether the country is ruled by civilians or military men, who always proclaim their fervent desire to deal with corruption, there is categorically no difference. It is probable that since 1960, an estimated $380 billion (£245 billion) of state funds have been stolen - nearly the complete sum Nigeria has received in overseas aid.37 Surprisingly, all the aid received from international donors
and the production of oil have not manifested in any improvement in the lives of millions of Nigerians. The situation is now placed on each government’s priority list, making it one of extreme concern – a case of securitization.

1.4 Objectives of the study

This study aims to:

1. Investigate the linkages between poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria.

2. Examine how these linkages are (deliberately) fueled by government officials, corporate bodies (both local and international) and other actors within the society.

3. Explore prospects in dealing with corruption to curb poverty production, corruption and subsequently the securitization of those issues through the adoption of a human security approach.

1.5 Research questions

1. What are the linkages between poverty production, corruption and securitization (of human security) in Nigeria?

2. How are these linkages reinforced by governments and high-ranking officials of multinational firms?

3. How can corruption be contained to curb poverty production and securitization of both phenomena i.e. poverty and human security?
1.6 Scope of the study

This research focuses on corruption in Nigeria as a factor contributing to poverty production among the masses and animated, maintained and justified through a securitization agenda. The spotlight is put on the Niger Delta, one of the resource-rich places in Nigeria but mightily underdeveloped with poor infrastructure and no sign of wealth at par with the value of the oil and gas drilled daily by government and international corporations allowed to do business there. The area has also been noted for instability and high insecurity because of the actions of militant groups on oil rigs, workers of these international corporations and the ordinary civilians who live close to these areas. Similarly, Boko Haram, another militant group is also considered. Their actions gained momentum with the increasing and unbearable government/state corruption and have since spread fear and terror not only within the borders of Nigeria, but even other African countries.

1.7 Rationale for the study

The central idea in any piece of work is to educate and provide information on the topic of research for the general public. Though much has been written on poverty – causes, effects, control, etc. – not much has been done in the area of its ‘production’ – to find out the root causes and how they multiply. Not much has also been done to link the three concepts i.e. poverty production, securitization and corruption to find out how one leads to the other or how certain parameters make them prevalent and powerful enough to harm the country. This research work is therefore significant/useful to the International community, Federal, State/ Local Government Administrators, Corporate officials and future researchers. Especially in Nigeria, known for its high level of corruption, there is evidence that governments and high-placed officials deliberately engage in acts of corruption that in turn create more poverty among the many masses and later
interfere in the normal day-to-day activities of the ordinary Nigerian. The reduced sense of security and the overhyping of insurgent groups who take advantage of the situation promote the securitization of these issues in the country. It is important, therefore, to bring to light the means of poverty production among Nigerian officials so its citizens, institutions, neighbours and the entire international community can be informed and help to end the situation.

In that light, this study’s examination of Nigeria also contributes to the literature on the global governance of corruption, of growing importance within International Relations.

To the government and policy-makers, it identifies and reveals their failures and challenges in wrongly handling the miseries of poverty and corruption, how more corruption and poverty reproduce more corruption and poverty and how the deliberate securitization of the issues fuel the seemingly perpetual cycle. It however affords them the opportunity of designing and implementing a holistic approach, procedures and strategies, and better ways of tackling these hydra-headed jeopardies of poverty production, corruption and their securitization thereof.

To students and further researchers, while it serves as an addition to the stock of knowledge, it also serves as a basis for further research especially in the field of securitization of issues such as poverty and corruption, an area which has not seen much research or academic writings on it.

1.8 Theoretical framework

1.8.1 Securitization

The study of the linkages between poverty production, securitization and corruption will employ the theory of securitization proposed by the Copenhagen School of security studies generally led by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and other more loosely associated researchers. Another theory, Constructivism, will also be considered.
Security has historically been presented from a state-centric, positivist perspective, with a state seeking maximization of its power and principal benefits in an insecure and chaotic international system of competition.\textsuperscript{38} This school of thought implied the state had a mandate to use extraordinary measures to deal with threats in the face of insecurity.\textsuperscript{39} After all, no state would wish to lose control over its own citizens and resources; there would always be need to protect sovereignty and avoid any form of insecurity in any aspect of the state’s existence.

Following the publication of Buzan’s book in 1993, \textit{People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations}, the social aspects of security were emphasized, describing it as a verbal assertion of existential menace, accompanied by a need to establish emergency measures to counter the threat, consequently justifying measures beyond the typical bounds of political routine.\textsuperscript{40}

In 1995, Ole Wæver invented the term \textit{securitization} in response to the realist and neorealist theories of security in International Relations and to the general traditional studies on the discipline. These constrained the concept of threats only to militaristic dangers oftentimes between states.\textsuperscript{41} For Wæver, Buzan and others, it was not satisfactory to analyze an apparently objective threat. For them, what counted was “the study of (1) the \textit{process} by which certain actors, such as the Executive or Press present before the public the existence of supposed threats (military or not) as an excuse for deploying certain emergency measures; and (2) the \textit{results} of this process – such as greater resources, an increase in the number of police, increased security checkpoints, more armaments, etc.\textsuperscript{42} They failed to identify how low these effects practically go in affecting the lives of ordinary citizens, in this context, Nigerians, in negative ways that further warrant state insecurity.
As Wæver (1995) argues, nothing is a security problem by itself, rather an issue only becomes one of security if someone labels it as such. Subsequently, the CS argues that the meaning of security in modern-day global politics is ultimately created through the speeches and representations made by relevant political actors. This is largely based on the supposition that it is mostly political leaders who are the focal point of every state and have the largest audience to address all manner of issues at every point in time. A securitization move will thus be considered as successful only when the referent body accepts the case of the securitizing actor through a blend of force and persuasion.

The Nigerian government has successfully gone through the various stages of securitization explained above to the very last. The threat of military insurgency and the high levels of corruption have been securitized all through. In addition, the expected effects of enhanced poverty are not to be questioned, but contained in a spirit of seeking more aid to counter the self-inflicted menace. Securitization goes further by attributing security threats to what securitization actors or leaders say it is. These steps, according to the above scholars, will help in addressing a phenomenon or issue that will otherwise aggravate to become a threat to either a region or the international community as a whole.

Securitization theory has been criticized on ethical/moral and observational grounds. On ethical/moral grounds, Claudia Aradau argues that, there is absence of a moral justification of securitization within the analytical framework of the theory. She also argues that there is a disregard for the political consequences when applying Securitization theory in security studies. In other words, she argues whether all states will have the political will to support a securitization move or speech without some relenting in efforts or contribution towards addressing a global challenge considered as a security issue. And this has been demonstrated on countless occasions
where just one or only a few states express support to another state in dire situations, even mostly when those few states are likely to gain from offering such support.

The other approach to the research under consideration is that of Constructivism. Constructivism is a social approach (sometimes called a process-based ontology) to studying international relations.\textsuperscript{45} Often juxtaposed against the rational choice approach, Constructivism focuses on the role of ideas and the appropriateness of action. International politics is understood to be socially constituted and the approach seeks to better understand how ideas influence international actors’ actions.\textsuperscript{46} A core element, however, is the deconstruction of world politics into agency and structure. Agents are actors with the will and capacity to cause structural change, and most constructivist scholarship assumes agents to be purposeful and self-reflexive. These agents may be states or non-governmental actors, who are broadly rational and seek to effect changes in the international system so that it broadly reflects their own interests (in this case the Nigerian government and other relevant actors like corporations within the state).

Of course, agents do not operate in a vacuum. As Steele notes, “Most constructivist approaches assume to varying degrees that the world is held together by social ideas and intersubjective understandings, which constitute, and are constituted by social identities.”\textsuperscript{45} When norms, i.e. “standards of appropriate behavior of actors with a given identity” emerge, agents’ behavior may be constrained or new agents may even be constituted.\textsuperscript{47} Research into international norms, then, built onto the premise that actors’ interests could not be viewed as a given, and the path that new norms emerge and eventually come to influence states’ behavior, became an important aspect of the constructivist research agenda.
Finnemore and Sikkink posit a three-stage norm life-cycle: norm emergence, cascade, and internalization. The norm of the securitization (of poverty and corruption) has gone through these stages as well.

At the norm emergence stage are norm entrepreneurs, with strong notions of “appropriate or desirable behavior”. Motivations of the entrepreneurs vary, but they “call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.” How issues are framed may be particularly important, as the norm-to-be then must “compete with other norms and perceptions of interest.” If there are competing frames strengthened by different powerful actors in disagreement, norm emergence can be hindered, as shown for instance by Grillot. Norms are more likely to resonate if they are more broadly aligned with others already in existence.

Poverty production seems to have been the norm in Nigeria. Since it was recognized and probably encouraged by various governments for decades, its roots have been fully entrenched so that holding political office or any high position in any sector of Nigeria’s economy is associated with corruption, with the proceeds thereof serving only one’s interest.

On the global stage, norm activists need an “organizational platform from which they promote their norms.” An important organizational feature is expertise, which carries influence of networks of professionals able to advocate for or against a norm within their organization (Ibid). This has been done successfully by many governments and other influential figures who benefit from poverty production in the Nigerian state. Powerful states have been persuaded to accede to threats of terrorism and its effects and lured into providing much assistance to curb it.

For a norm to continue on to the cascade, “it must become institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organizations,” and this in turn depends on “persuading a critical mass of states.” In most cases, the tipping point cannot be reached until at least one third of the states
adopt the norm with special importance assigned to “critical states” and embrace of the norm. Here, most of the northern states in Nigeria have more than enough people who personify the poverty its government cries for aid to eliminate. In a country where the literacy level is 56.90%, corrupt men and women among the already few elites are definitely going to champion this cause (i.e. exaggeration of poverty, corruption and insecurity) for selfish gains.

A critical distinction between the norm emergence and cascade stages is the mechanism of norm promotion. During a norm’s emergence, issues are raised and framed in ways that lead policymakers to adopt the norm, through either persuasion or mobilization of domestic support groups. In contrast, during the cascade stage, the dominant mechanism of norm promotion is socialization through pressure from norm adherents towards other states, and through diplomatic praise or censure as well as material sanctions or incentives. A desperate leader who is bent on claiming praise for his efforts at fighting poverty or corruption or insecurity within his country but knows how much money he will make for his personal satisfaction may even consider negotiation. This process is supported by “networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organizations [acting] as agents of socialization”.47 Existing identities of states then are the main reason for their responding to the process of socialization, as they attribute the norm to be appropriate for their identity as a (e.g. liberal or European) state. Further, elites might adhere to the norm because they seek legitimation and esteem internationally and locally.

Internalization is the last stage of the norm cycle in which compliance becomes unquestioned. Once a norm is internalized by highly professionalized state bureaucracies and international organizations, the framework leads to the expectation that “policy increasingly [reflects] the normative biases of the professions that staff decision-making agencies.” Further convergence results from “iterated behavior and habit” within these agencies. Compliance with the norm
becomes virtually automatic. Compliance, therefore, with government orders including curfews, military interventions in civil disputes, shutting down of schools and denial of access to public entities gradually seem normal as time progresses.

Notwithstanding the above criticism leveled against the Securitization and Constructivism theories, they will be considered as ideal theoretical frameworks for the study because they fit appropriately into the topic by helping to understand and appreciate how securitization of homegrown deficiencies in state structures can affect or pose a potential threat to a region or the international community as a whole. The international community’s response to a global challenge such as the securitization of corruption in Nigeria or West Africa and its effects, coupled with deliberate poverty production will go a long way to ensure an end to the menace or its continuance.

Summarily, the Copenhagen school of securitization postulates that securitization cannot occur without the consent of the referent object. The securitizing actor i.e. government of Nigeria has continually been successful in employing pretentious drastic measures to curb trivial issues faced by the oil-rich nation, convincing its own citizens and the international community that the domestic issues affecting the country are bigger and demand foreign intervention in the form of foreign aid. Constructivism completes this impression by explaining how Nigerians and the international community see the threat of poverty and corruption by deliberate government attempts to portray them as securitization-deserving issues. State-run media and institutions cannot help but carry along the agenda of government to solicit support and sympathy from citizens and donors.
1.8.2 Poverty

Bearing in mind the fact that the standards of poverty relatively differ based on which country is under consideration, the section below will consider poverty among developed countries and those less developed.

1.8.2.1 Theories of Poverty on Developed Countries

The “three regime” theory of social welfare policy formation in the developed world propounded by Esping-Andersen affords a framework for understanding contemporary theories of poverty in developed nations. The framework differentiates between corporatist, liberal (i.e., laissez-faire) and social democratic models of welfare, reflecting how social rights and duties are balanced when social welfare provisions are distributed. Under these categories, Canada, the United States, Australia and the UK are viewed as more “liberal” and market-oriented states with less generous benefits, while Denmark, Sweden and Norway are more generous and socially democratic states. The corporatist states like German, France, and Italy balance generosity with responsibility and have welfare rights that are also tied with earnings as well as social position.53

The above categories replicate public views about the origins of poverty in the developed world. For example, whereas, social democrats see poverty as a systemic problem and normal result of a market-economy and welfare assistance as a right of citizenship, more market-oriented states tend to relate poverty with individual or personal deficiencies. Rank and others further develop the Social versus Individual blame approach to poverty by recognizing American poverty theory and studies as concentrating chiefly on individual characteristics. Those studies showed that the peculiar characteristics of individuals ascribed to “cause” poverty range from “the lack of an industrious work ethic or virtuous morality, to low levels of education or competitive market
skills”\(^5\). This may be applicable to Africa as well, where education is a key factor in determining one’s general success in life. Those who are not fortunate enough to get good education may be left behind with nothing to their names. Divergent to American poverty researchers, European poverty theorists are focusing on concepts of social marginalization to expound on poverty in industrialized countries.\(^5\)

1.8.2.2 Theories of Poverty on Developing Countries

In the developing world, most measurements and poverty levels are based on purchasing power parity (e.g., the World Bank’s $1 a day for absolute poverty and $2 a day for relative poverty). This is in sharp contrast to the extant literature on poverty that focus on social inequality and poverty in the United States, Australia and Europe. In other words, cash in the hands of an African means a more comfortable life. In developing countries, the standardization of poverty measurements is premised on often controversial and ever-changing definitions of poverty. The immense body of literature on poverty among developing nations stresses on the causes and consequences of poverty in the context of income or economic poverty. Nevertheless, there are models that are even more intricate.

George Ayittey is one of the outstanding economists considered for his works on the poverty narrative among developing nations. He introduced a theory of poverty primarily founded on the outlook of the poor themselves, especially in Africa, which suggests that economic liberation is the solution to Africa’s economic development now and in the future. While economic liberation was first hindered by colonial powers and now by elite autocracies on the continent, Ayittey suggests that village economics and local agriculture provide enterprise and social decision-making structures fundamental for fruitful cultivation of resources and distribution for both local
and international markets. He further maintains that Africans need the freedom to mature economically devoid of any interference of overseas pressure or foreign indirect control. He mentions that “civil wars, collapsed infrastructure, famine, devastated agriculture and political repression have sapped African strength and stalled the continent’s progress.” Much attention to fixing internal problems right from the head of the ruling government of the day to the least state and private organizations in the country (without paving way for any foreign interference) can go a long way to bring solution to many of a country’s problems… the tough but rewarding way. Although the implementation of such a grand policy is tough to achieve, his theory of economic liberation simply buttresses the assertion that some African leaders, with full knowledge of what needs to be done to propel their countries - and eventually the continent - forward, are reluctant to take the harsh road of self-reliance. Ayittey’s theory is well in line with a popular slogan of one General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong of the National Redemption Council (NRC) government of Ghana in the 1970s that ‘eat what you grow and grow what you eat’ under his ‘Operation Feed Yourself’ initiative. By this also, each country i.e. those that adopt the path of development, will be mandated to look within itself for all the natural resources and raw materials which can be processed into finished goods. Agriculture will be a basic sector that the government should focus on, and success in that field will progressively build all other sectors. Therefore, applying the theory of economic liberation vis-a-vis poverty production in Nigeria means that the government has deliberately ignored what needs to be done to liberate the country from poverty. Much reliance on aid has also stalled any needed effort to build the economy from within. And these same restraints increase the interference of foreign powers who may dictate indirectly how the country should be run. In addition, corrupt officials misapply the funds brought in by these foreign partners and the purpose for which those funds are donated are not achieved. The high levels of corruption,
which exacerbate poverty among the people, revolves around government’s securitization to highlight the problems.

1.8.3 Corruption

Modernization theory has been identified as one of the theories in corruption. Modernization theory posits that corruption is old and necessitated by the pressures of modern day life. To fight the notion that Africa is poor and stagnant, corrupt officials amass wealth for themselves to enable them, perhaps, to match the standards of living of their international compatriots. Interestingly, the most well-known definition of corruption as the use of public funds for private gains is in order because that is what happens among political and corporate elites entrusted with resources for development, in this case Nigeria. For instance, Adefulu posits that “the process of economic and political development in modernizing societies tends to breed inequality, political instability and corruption which may be defined simply in terms of the use of public powers to achieve private goals”. 57

After the Bandung Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1995, modernization theorists began to explain the causes of corruption and the incidence of corrupt practices in pre-colonial Africa as reflected in patrimonialism, neo patrimonialism, patro-clientelism and prebendalism. One significant feature common to all these practices is grounded on the fact that corruption in Africa and other developing countries in other continents is one of the painful costs of fusing contemporary political structure and processes with indigenous socio-political structures built on old traditions, false obligations and values. 58

Sklar is quite articulate when he writes that ‘the prevalence of corruption in Africa is simply the result of deviation from standard norms by public officials, and which also highlights the lack of
active governmental institutions that check these public servants to dissociate their public offices from private ones, thus pressuring them to desist from grafting institutional roles with fulfilling personal obligations’.59

Western sociologists have looked at Africa as part of the ex-colonial world from a locus of superficial superiority. This is a continuation from where sociologists such as Comte and Talcott Parsons left off from the mid-fifties. There had always been differences in the levels of economic development, but an unexpected baggage of cultural arrogance further worsened this divide by creating an implied and universal notion that the West symbolized the apex of all human advancement. The goal of any well-meaning social researcher was therefore to investigate and discover the flaws and incompetencies in other worlds.

Because of that defective agenda, a set of polarities was introduced between the West (industrialized, modern) and the Third World (emergent, traditional). Third World cultures were communal, inward looking, ascriptive, stagnant and distrustful, whilst western societies were maximizing, meritocratic, diffuse, rational and progressive. These divergences defined the glasses through which corruption was seen. Corruption had become a problem because Third world countries were trying to conform to modernization. The West was considered upright because life was progressive there; Africa was considered depraved because poverty seemed to be everywhere.

Riding on the back of the modernization theory, Huntingdon relates corruption to systematic and modern political relations, not only as a result of misinterpretations and decay of tradition. In the context of the modernization theory, his analysis of corruption as an integral and even advantageous part of social modernization is worthy of distinction. Corruption can be likened to an informal political reform without public tensions that successfully reduces the likelihood of a massive revolution that people are not prepared for. It merges the old way of doing things to new
methods and emerging technologies to encourage newer inventions. For Huntingdon, corruption is not a deviation from modernization.\textsuperscript{60} Huntingdon’s position on corruption, in the context of modernization theory, resonates with the views of those who say that ‘corruption is as old as Adam’, and probably here to stay.

1.9 Literature review

Most literature on poverty production, corruption and securitization exist separately. Very few scholars have tried to relate these phenomena with one other. This review will, therefore, look at the relevant literature on the three subjects and connect them while filling any gaps.

1.9.1 Poverty production

Gans writes that applying functional analysis to poverty might yield some advantages; to ask whether there are positive functions that justify the existence.\textsuperscript{61} Merton defined functions as "those observed consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system; and dysfunctions, those observed consequences that lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system". In discussions on the functions of poverty, he identified functions for different groups; specifically, interest groups, socio-economic classes, and other populations such as those with comparable values or similar ranks.\textsuperscript{62} His definitional approach was founded on the fact that every social system comprises groups or masses of people with different interests and beliefs. He outlined eleven functions of poverty and added that in a modern heterogeneous society, some phenomena (such as poverty) are functional or dysfunctional and the outcome could be advantageous to some groups and disadvantageous to others. His work is beneficial because it states some practical reasons why influential people in society will deliberately encourage segregation, even if
unconsciously, so there is an upper class and a lower one. He, however, fails to mention how governments dwell on the dysfunctions of poverty to disrupt the normal way of life of citizens by escalating the issue to international awareness in a bid to win some pittance in the form of aid.

In their work, ‘Poverty, Corruption and the Nigerian State: The path not followed’, Enor and Chime found that the words “poverty” and “corruption” both appear paradoxically in Nigeria, a country which possesses strategic natural resources enviable to some advanced industrial economies.\(^{63}\) That assertion justifies the claim that poverty production in Nigeria is a very deliberate act by those who stand to gain from its increase. Poverty amidst wealth reveals the capitalist methods of production and the accompanying class division at the end of the day. Though the Nigerian economy is more tuned towards capitalism, governments have tried to share the national wealth but failed on almost every occasion either deliberately or by chance, but with no regrets.

In their paper, the two authors adopt the Marxist political economy tool to analyze and argue that poverty and corruption in Nigeria are artificial; thus, sincere initiatives directed at alleviation of poverty and corruption must rise above usual rhetoric and media posturing to quitting obsolete chains of production that prolongs poverty and corruption and suppresses the pillars of development. Also, since ‘poverty and corruption mitigation has always been championed by the suffering masses (the most affected population), it will be ironical to expect the leader of a capitalist syndicate to do away with corruption and lessen poverty in a nation which upholds primitive ammasing’.\(^{64}\) Their paper does well to reveal how different government regimes willfully create a so-called enabling environment for all to acquire wealth and prosper (through capitalist strategies) but also stifle growth by encouraging anti-growth policies and activities e.g. failure to prosecute highly placed state and corporate officials accused of embezzling federal funds, money
laundering and other forms of corruption. However, they did not address how the man-made banes of poverty-production and corruption are compounded to high levels of securitization.

Considering the motives, targets and methods employed by militant groups in the Niger Delta region, in addition to the resurgence of threatening attacks in the region after a notable era of relative peace, Awofeso and Ogunne try to establish compelling arguments on why the Niger Delta crisis (because of its oil reserves) can further be understood from the perspective of ‘terrorism’. They consider terrorism largely because the eventual employment of violent means in bringing home the demands of armed groups is nothing short of an instrumental technique of political manipulation.65 Most of these groups have consistently decried the high levels of corruption in government and demanded a fair share of the national cake. The lack of change and a positive response from government gives them more impetus to adopt their brutal strategies in an attempt to meet their own surviving demands. The same reason is given for the increased violence of Boko Haram in many parts of the large country. It is no surprise also that some political leaders have been long suspected of financing the various notorious insurgent groups, funding their activities and being fully aware of their operations, all for selfish gains which accrue to them and their associates. The Niger Delta crisis is all because of one thing - oil - and how residents expect proceeds to reflect in their standard of living. In addressing how the insurgency has been elevated to terrorism, Awofeso and Ogunne failed to address the genesis of the crisis - how the government has exploited the people and the resource through corruption, leaving them with nothing but poverty. They also fail to emphasize the cost of the crisis reflected through high human insecurity.
1.9.2 Securitization

The CS managed to clearly define ‘what security is’.

Its analysis included the military, but importantly expanded the study of security to cover the economic, environmental, social and political terms also.

The school has offered a pioneering and captivating approach to the study of security. Apparently, Steve Smith has admits that “The CS is one of the most interesting developments in the contemporary study of security”. Nevertheless, the immense value the CS study of securitization has added to the analysis and conceptualization of security has not been spared from widespread criticism. The School has been down marked for failure to include normative inferences that are easily traced within the theory. For example, Michael Williams, accuses the School for being “politically irresponsible and lacking any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity and emergency”. While a number of the criticisms are unsubstantiated, others raise essential queries as regards the normative difficulties of speaking and writing about security.

The Copenhagen School has a definite goal stated as follows:

“Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aim to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and, not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is successful)”.32

Regarding the ‘global war on terror’, Anderson and Fisher note that despite differing interpretations to the politics of western aid, there appears to be consensus on two related issues: first, that ‘securitization’ has had an unwanted and adverse effect on important development areas, such as human rights, social development and governance reform, and; second, that western actors have devised and promoted the security agenda of the global war on terror by forcing a securitized
approach on weak and defenseless states in the South. In their piece, *Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa*, the two authors counter both arguments by throwing the spotlight on the role of African governments that have zealously incorporated the securitization agenda in national policies and promoting it. The highlight on government’s participation has been documented in other literature as well e.g. Rita Abrahamsen’s *Blair’s Africa: the politics of securitization and fear*. In as much as western powers have their interests in channeling aid to address securitization issues in other parts of the world, they cannot and do not succeed without the consent of corrupt officials in high positions.

Consequently, intolerant states are emerging and developing rapidly in Africa with support from western governments who permit them to prioritize security and raise it to securitization levels if that will serve their futile purpose. They mentioned furthermore that through their eagerness to personalize the security agenda, African governments have played a mindful role in securitizing their affiliation with foreign donors. Securitization is now a set of policy imperatives that some African governments are actively pursuing and no more a concept that the West has imposed on Africa. For that reason, African governments cease to be victims of securitization, but often its promoters and beneficiaries. Nigeria has not proven any different to this. Their work focused mostly on authoritarian states, viewing them as the only states guilty of securitizing issues for gain. This research will fill the gap of not considering a democratic or liberal state such as Nigeria.

**1.9.3 Corruption**

After a chain of high profile corruption scandals in Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari launched an anti-corruption campaign after taking office in May, 2015. The frequency and
magnitude of the scandals underscored the unimaginable size of the problem. PwC analyzed the situation in their report of 2016.

To do this, they focused on the effects corruption has had on the economy across time, estimated Nigeria’s ‘foregone output’ if corruption had decreased in the past 15 years and did same for if corruption should decrease in the next 15 years. PwC simulated lower corruption scenarios using levels of benchmark countries.33

In their work, they explored how anti-corruption strategies affect individual behaviours and which policies are more likely to be immediately impactful in Nigeria without trying to identify the primary causes or sources of corruption. That is a gap this research hopes to fill.

In their work, *Corruption and Poverty in Nigeria*, ActionAid found that at almost all levels of governance i.e. national, state and local government levels, public funds have been mishandled by those entrusted with the public purse for the deployment of funds for welfare and development. It also revealed that from the highest levels of government, there is little or no political motivation to reduce corruption.72

A review of the literature points to two schools of thought on the link between corruption and poverty. The first holds that corruption is not a primary antecedent of poverty. The second perspective on the other hand holds the view that the two concepts have an indirect relationship. In other words, corruption does not produce poverty but rather has direct consequences on governance and economic factors - intermediaries that in turn produce poverty.73 From these perspectives, Chetwynd et al came out with two models: the economic model and the political or governance model.

The economic model states that corruption affects poverty by first impacting economic growth dynamics and income fairness, which in turn influences the levels of poverty. The political or
governance model argues that corruption impacts poverty by reducing governance capacity.\textsuperscript{74} Corruption goes a long way to diminish the institutional competence of government to render superior public services; divert public investment away from major public needs into capital projects; lower compliance with safety and health standards; and increase financial burdens on government. With corruption as the basis, the above factors are in turn responsible for producing poverty.\textsuperscript{75} Whereas the economic model seems to align more with the objectives of this research, the political model cannot be overlooked in considering how the sequential effects of corruption affects effective governance. Though insightful, they fail to mention the perpetrators of corruption and its consequence of poverty. They also make no mention of the root causes of corruption, which escalates to poverty production and securitization.

1.10 Research Methodology and Sources of Data

This section presents a discussion of the research methodology for this study. It also explains the research design, data collection and methods of analysis used for this study.

1.10.1 Study Design

A research design refers to the overall strategy that you choose to integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical way, thereby, ensuring you will effectively address the research problem; it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data.\textsuperscript{76} The research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables you to effectively address the research problem logically and as unambiguously as possible.\textsuperscript{77} The study employs qualitative research design to investigate the research problem in an attempt to increase understanding of why things exist as they pertain in Nigerian society. The goal of
qualitative research is to have detailed appreciation of human behavior or phenomena and the motives that govern such behaviour. The main feature of this qualitative way of research is that its outcome is immeasurable and unquantifiable. Its elementary advantage, which also adds to its basic difference with quantitative research, lies in the fact that it gives a holistic narrative of a research theme without restricting the research scope and the quality of any participant’s response.\textsuperscript{78}

Under this design, the case study approach will be adopted as the most suitable among the various types of qualitative analysis.

A case study is an in-depth study of a particular research problem rather than a sweeping statistical survey or comprehensive comparative inquiry. It is often used to narrow down a very broad field of research into one or a few easily researchable examples. Overall, the case study approach was chosen because of the following advantages it possesses:

- A case study will mostly focus on organization, entity, individual, or event.
- Approach excels at bringing us to an understanding of complex issues such as poverty production, corruption and securitization through detailed contextual analysis of a number of events in Nigeria and their relationships.
- A case study design applies a variety of methodologies and relies on a variety of sources to investigate a research problem as this research did.
- Design extends experience and adds strength to what is already known through previous research about the Nigerian government and some Corporations.
- Social scientists, in particular, make wide use of this research design to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the basis for the application of concepts and theories and the extension of methodologies.
• The design can provide detailed descriptions of specific and rare cases such as this research i.e. finding the linkages between poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria.  

1.10.2 Data Gathering Methods and Analysis

In light of the above, this research fulfilled the following characteristics of the chosen approach:

• Its focus examined the recurrent and longtime phases of poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria defined in the context of their linkages. It examined multiple cases of malfeasance which Nigeria has experienced, and some of which the country continues to experience at the federal and private levels.

• Several pieces of prior academic research exist on the issues of poverty production, corruption and securitization (though mostly separate) hence, this research took the form of a new one to link them but on the existing subjects. The method of collecting data was through secondary sources i.e. information from books, journals, articles, reports and documents from libraries and internet sources on the Nigerian government and corporate entities.

• Data obtained from the sources indicated above was carefully analyzed by reviewing of information therein and explaining the reliability of findings and conclusions on the themes under study (i.e. the linkages among poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria). The assertions made throughout the research were illustrative and consistent with the findings of other scholars and authors who have tackled either one or two of the subjects (on Nigeria) under study.
• The write-up is an in-depth description of the linkages among poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria and some counter measures to curb the effects of make Nigeria a better place.

1.11 Arrangement of Chapters

The study is broken down into four chapters. Introduction in chapter contains the background of the study as well as extensive literature review of past literature directly or indirectly related to the subject under discussion. Chapter two will study research frameworks and theories used in studying the topic in past literature and methodology. Chapter three will follow with the findings and discussion whiles Chapter four summarizes the research with conclusions and recommendations.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid


4 Ibid


15 Ibid


27 Ibid


36 Ibid

37 Ibid


40 Ibid

41 Ibid


48 Ibid

49 Ibid

50 Ibid


59 Ibid


64 Ibid


71 Ibid

72 Ibid.


CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS OF POVERTY PRODUCTION, CORRUPTION AND SECURITIZATION

2.1 Introduction

The concepts of poverty production, corruption and securitization are not so new. However, most literature have treated them as separate subjects and have hardly related them to each other. Later, the theory of human (in)security is put at the fore with all the effects that come with vices such as corruption, poverty and unemployment. This chapter will capture a global picture of the concepts, significance and approaches to poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria.

2.2 The Country Nigeria

Each country in the world is unique. The precise history of each country attracts political corruption in varying degrees. Nigeria is a big country with colossal quantities of rent-providing resources, especially petroleum and its products. The political history of Nigeria reveals an endless and relatively strong competition among elites to control the state and denationalize proceeds from the export of valuable trade commodities. The country's dynamic and unpredictable culture as a fully-fledged rentier state is reflected in its political economy with some groups taking advantage to establish their own cults e.g. the dominance of the self-styled Kaduna mafia.¹

In Nigeria, the difficulties of corruption and poverty are widely known. It is also known how governments have failed many times to put an end to the menace of corruption among state officials as promised in various manifestos. Most governments that have come to power have promised to come to the plight of the poor but failed miserably in the implementation of various
poverty alleviation programmes. The latest blow has been the rise of the Islamist group, Boko Haram, which operates within the country and beyond its borders.

By the early 1980s, Nigeria’s economy had become almost completely dependent on petroleum extraction, after just about four decades of oil production. At that time, petroleum extraction generated 25% of its GDP. As of 2008, this portion had since risen to 60%.

Many analysts and findings have proved Nigeria as a country with remarkably strong growth potential. For over 7 years, reports showed that the economy in Nigeria was developing steadily at averagely 6% per year. It was reported that the Nigerian economy was one of the ten fastest growing economies in the world within the last 10 years.\(^2\) The Government’s agenda in 2013 to reset the economy saw an increase in GDP figures - $509 billion by the close of the year, boosting the country’s efforts as the 26th largest economy in the world and top in Africa. Without surprise, therefore, the said swift rise in the GDP was complemented by other helpful economic improvements. First was a rise in the per capita income of Nigeria from approximately $500 in 1999 to $2,500 at the end of 2013.\(^3\) Further, there was growth in Nigeria’s middle class size. Considering that the middle class of Nigeria nearly disappeared in the late 90s, this progress was substantial.\(^4\)

Despite this growth in the GDP, poverty, inequality and unemployment continued to expand.\(^5\) The percentage of poor people - going by the World Bank’s standards is represented in figure 1 below
Judging from the figure represented above, it is indicative that, Nigerians living below the average poverty line was 69% in 2010 representing 112.47 million of the population.

Nigeria has become fit to be described as a paradox of lack amidst plenty. The upsurge of insecurity in the country has also not abated but assumed an unsafe height which even threatens the collective existence of the country as one geographical entity.

There is a huge tendency that whatever happens to oil production can have immense effects on the Nigerian economy at large. More so, the activities of armed groups in the Niger Delta region is still a growing concern for the Nigerian economy. Alongside spiraling levels of poverty, there exists a high rate of different categories of corruption. Mega corruption has grown to abnormal levels in the last two decades, tagging and rating Nigeria as the most corrupt country in the world by various assessment standards.
2.2.1 Poverty in Nigeria

According to the World Bank, the major indicators of poverty are: lack of adequate food, shelter, education and health, susceptibilities to illness, lack of freedom of action and choice, economic dislocation, ill-treatment by public agencies, and marginalization from important decision-making processes and resources in the community. It was noted that poverty “is the result of economic, political and social processes that interact with each other and frequently reinforce each other in ways that exacerbate the deprivation in which people live”. Without doubt, much more people reflect these indicators in Nigeria than one could measure. In Nigeria, poverty remains widespread despite several anti-poverty initiatives by consecutive governments.

2.3 Poverty Production

Much emphasis on causes and symptoms of poverty has filled the literature. Only a few notable researchers like the Norwegian poverty researcher, Else Øyen, has done extensive work on the root and underlying actions and inactions of various powers that generate the poverty and its branch causes, which are widely known. Øyen observes that poverty research has always included causes and effects of poverty. Thus, she suggests the concept of poverty production as a means of organizing the range of causes.

In her research, a poverty producing process being has been defined as:

“an enduring phenomenon, (b) that follows a repetitive pattern, (c) where certain actors behave in such a way that poverty increases or is sustained, and (d) where the victims/poor people are placed within a structure that gives few or no opportunities to change the situation”

The poverty production approach throws more light on those agents who create and those actions which preserve poverty. Eventually, the researcher is compelled to be rather very concrete than
trying to blame the causes of poverty on such general occurrences as illiteracy, personal greed, evil forces, etc.\(^\text{10}\)

Often, these have been the answers generally given when anyone is asked what the causes of poverty are because they seem easy to point to. It takes more work to prove that deliberate poverty production by the same people accused of greed and moral decay, who operate a system of paternalism, capitalism, and run multi-national corporations simply expand poverty for further gains to themselves.

In finding the actors causing and benefiting from poverty, Øyen proposes to use human rights language and to differentiate between first-, second- and third-order perpetrators.\(^\text{10}\) She demonstrates this with an African mining corporation offering challenging operational and living conditions to their workers as an example:

From this approach, the first-line perpetrator is the executive management or committee of the industry that instructs the workers; the second-line perpetrators are the board members of the company; and the third-line perpetrators are the shareholders who insistently demand that their investments yield the highest possible returns. A government that holds back from engaging the mining industry on behalf of its citizens for better conditions may be removed from the direct line of perpetrators but is still part of the poverty producing process. Øyen stresses that poverty production occurs on all levels of society.\(^\text{10}\)

The level of intentionality of respective poverty producing actors can also be used to distinguish between the various forms of poverty production. Øyen differentiates between direct (or intended) poverty production and unintentional poverty production.\(^\text{10}\) Whereas the different-level perpetrators are either deliberate or undeliberate in their actions, almost all of them are likely to deny willful production of poverty.
From her findings, unintentional poverty production outweighs direct poverty production in that the former is the unintended by-product of activities targeting the attainment of some other goal. Examples include the building of public spaces and social institutions to serve the interests of the non-poor population without considering the adverse effects it may have on the population of the majority poor. Hence, Nigerian leaders amass wealth for themselves and their families so they can give their children the best of education while securing a comfortable pension. In doing this, stacks of cash meant for projects in rural areas are quickly diverted. The effect: continued deprivation and poverty among the ordinary folks.

Thus, direct poverty production includes all those circumstances in which the relevant actors willfully and purposely produce poverty in order to advance their own welfares. Øyen tags authoritarians and elites whose authority is built on unschooled and deprived people who cannot mobilize opposition as an example.¹⁰

2.4 What is corruption?

People tend to agree on the reprehensiveness of ‘corruption’ but disagree on the rules that define whether someone is corrupt. In view of that, a person is ethically judged in a negative way as soon as he or she is labeled 'corrupt'. Just as 'integrity' is a (ethically) positive label, corruption is a morally loaded term. Similarly, because our views about ethics are different in many aspects, to be corrupt is likewise a debatable label.¹²

Corruption reveals itself in different ways and in different sectors of society. It has therefore been defined in different ways and qualified by several adjectives such as ‘political’, ‘bureaucratic’, ‘administrative’, ‘economic’, ‘moral or ethical’ and ‘financial’. It can be defined in terms of the
quantum of money or degree of financial impact involved and the status of the perpetrators as ‘petty’ or ‘grand’ corruption.\textsuperscript{13}

The Dictionary of Social Sciences (1964) gives a fairly upfront but all-inclusive definition of corruption: “the use of ... power for ... profit, preferment, or prestige, or for the benefit of a group or class, in a way that constitutes a breach of law or of standards of high moral conduct”.\textsuperscript{14}

Nye defines it as:

… a behaviour, which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private relationships (family, close private circle), pecuniary or status gain: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private relationship. This includes such behaviour as misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses); bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); and nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of astrictive relationship rather than merit).\textsuperscript{15}

Corruption is defined and perceived across a spectrum of unlawful payments and dealings such as embezzlement, bribes and money laundering. Because corruption is illegal, measuring its vastness is impossible by merely adding the amounts of payments that have proven to be corruption-related in court.

PwC used Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as a proxy for corruption. The dataset defines corruption as the ‘abuse of public office for private gain’. The index categorizes corruption into three parts:

**Petty corruption**: ‘Routine abuse of delegated power by junior- and intermediate-level public officials in their dealings with ordinary citizens seeking access simple public goods and services’.

**Grand corruption**: ‘Acts committed at high governmental levels that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good’.
**Political corruption**: ‘Manipulation of rules of procedure, policies and institutions in the distribution of resources and sponsoring by political decision makers, who exploit their position to sustain their power, position and wealth’.

The Global Corruption Barometer is an illustrative survey of more than 110,500 homes in over 105 countries. PwC employed the CPI for its analysis. The CPI is frequently used in literature and makes it easier for evaluation and sensitivity analysis. It revealed that people’s opinions on Nigeria differ by institutions – from Businesses, Judiciary, Military, Political parties, Police, Parliament and Legislature (in increasing order) from 2 (low) to 5 (highest).

The CPI measures corruption perception across rich and poor citizens, big and small businesses, local media, country experts and international organizations. To ensure the scores range from 0 to 10, they are integrated across surveys and standardized across countries every year. Nonetheless, the index is only based on perceptions and does not actually reflect the amounts of corruption in countries. Dissimilar to amounts (which can be fixed) of corruption, perceptions are subjective and may change drastically by external influences such as media attention and sudden expositions of bribery, fraud, embezzlement, etc. The CPI mainly focuses on corruption from the viewpoint of business welfare in general. It therefore lacks exhaustive evidence on which areas or types or degrees of corruption is dominant. Figure 2 below presents the self-perpetuating cycle of corruption, poverty and securitization:
Figure 2: The self-perpetuating cycle of corruption, poverty and securitization

Although corruption may appear to be so prevalent in Nigeria, it is important not to forget the fact that there are key figures in high places who are not only empowered and benefit from corruption but who are unwavering in their resolution to ensure that efforts to curb and possibly eliminate corruption do not succeed. A number of sectors were identified:

- In one of the latest scandals involving the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the national official audit revealed that about $19 billion of oil revenues disappeared through corruption and oil theft in 2014 alone. Per some estimates, approximately $400 billion has vanished in familiar fashion since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, making oil industry crime the second largest industry in the country, right after the oil industry itself. Estimates are that about 200,000 barrels are stolen everyday by a sophisticated web of local businessmen, corrupt officials at strategic entry and exit points of Ports and borders, and former warlords.\(^\text{16}\)

- In Nigeria, it is widely perceived that both government and oil company representatives are complicit in bunkering activities. Bunkering is the theft of crude oil directly from
pipelines, flow stations, and export facilities. Some powerful figures are purported to oversee groups of well-armed young men who typically execute the pipeline sabotage.\textsuperscript{17}

- Aside receiving bribes, government officials do benefit from processes that favour corporations in which they have a financial interest. For instance, high-ranking political leaders reportedly manipulated bids to Intels Nigeria Limited’s advantage, a big logistics company, for their personal gain. Alternatively, officials give preference to companies owned by their associates, and then seek compensation through other business contracts or political favours.\textsuperscript{18}

- In 2009 five banks were discovered to be involved in unethical banking practices ranging from having large volumes of toxic assets, cronyism, insider dealings, terrible corporate governance practices, etc. This led to dissolution of the affected banks’ management boards and injection of ₦620bln to revitalize the banks. Prior to this, Allstates Trust Bank was sanctioned in 2004 for engaging in large-scale illicit transactions.\textsuperscript{19,20}

- It is amazing that Nigerian banks “failed” to notice the conmen responsible for arguably the largest international fraud of $242 million which was perpetrated by Nigerians, given the large lodgment from “customers” who are obviously not capable to own such fund; neither were they irked to note that a civil servant (Aliyu Ibrahim) deposited $7.7mln between 1998 and 2005.\textsuperscript{21}

- The Nigeria Labour Congress has asked the wife of the former President, Mrs. Patience Jonathan, to explain how she made the $31 million found in some accounts recently frozen by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.\textsuperscript{22}

From the examples above, it is evident that officials in the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary, civil servants/public officers, politicians, the law enforcement agencies, political parties, and the
private sector belong to the worst sectors filled with people deemed to be highly corrupt. They are regarded as ‘highly liquid sectors’ with volumes of cash transactions exchanging hands.

### 2.5 The Concept of Securitization

The high levels of poverty in many parts of Africa is notable. Many African countries are still reliant on aid for survival. Because of the high level of poverty in the Northern and North-Eastern parts of Kenya, for example, a large proportion of that population hangs on to relief aid supplied by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and the government.²³ This scenario is not different from what happens in many other parts of Africa. Simultaneously, the high poverty level and stress-free access to illicit weapons have submerged the region in a spiral of conflict, which has imposed heavy destruction to the region’s natural resources, economy and infrastructure. The region writhes in abnormal levels of human insecurity and poor infrastructure, which have affected the general well-being of the people. There is acute food and human insecurity, low levels of gender development because of the low levels of education. Access to health facilities and clean water and school enrollment rates are critically below the national levels. Poverty levels are ridiculously high, and so are child mortality rates. Moreover, education facilities and proper sanitation are either inadequate or nonexistent.²⁴ The above example in Kenya is one out of many African countries where conflict has robbed residents of development and created stark poverty which continually demands aid from the international community but which unfortunately does not always reach the needy. Inability to improve such situations drives most governments to escalate to securitization.

Many scholars have used the securitization concept as outlined by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde in accepting whatever phenomenon springs up as a ‘speech act’ by usually Western policy-makers.
In their analysis, an event or space (‘Africa’ or ‘ungoverned spaces’) is presented as an ‘existential threat’ to a referent body (Western states and populations), thereby legitimizing an ‘extraordinary’ response outside the normally accepted realm of political activity.\textsuperscript{25} Others have also made important critiques on the concept of securitization within an African context. All the leaders have to do is to keep emphasizing how corruption is being a bane affecting governance and other national projects and how limited resources are to implement projects to improve livelihood and how the West and Europe should help alleviate the situation and help human security. Perhaps, the indirect threats of immigration into these western countries, is one of the motivations that force them to provide aid to control the situation i.e. make the economy better so citizens can stay and prosper.

There are concerns, however, of donors using aid as bargaining chips to gain access to invaluable national resources. The other side of the story also looks at national policy makers who willingly offer these resources to imperialists for what they will gain personally from such moves. Such is the situation in Nigeria: aid received from donors have not come without strings attached; the oil-rich country has had to trade more oil for more aid to solve problems created by a few elites occupying high places of power.

Duffield presents securitization more generally than the Copenhagen scholars. His presentation, taking a global development perspective, highlighted securitization as part of a broader western enterprise to control the lives and activities of those in the emerging world.\textsuperscript{26,27} Woods simply sees securitization as the ‘hijacking’ of aid and growth policy by defence and security actors to the benefit of western states.\textsuperscript{28} In contrast, most Western security researchers have accepted securitization as a valid, if not always overt, policy direction in pursuit of a patron’s military and national security agenda.\textsuperscript{29,30,31} The low level of commitment on the part of western donors to
definite social and economic expansion goals in their relations with foreign aid recipients is well known. Donors are often willing to trade social development and governance goals for predetermined rewards in the security arena, even if doing so involves the relegation of civil society organizations and apolitical actors. This tendency has particular significance in the case of dictatorial regimes, themselves already profoundly devoted to militarism and rendering a high devotion to security policy. Such regimes are sure what the outcome of their affiliation with donors should be, whereas the donors themselves may remain unclear what goals they want to achieve and how these should be prioritized. Authoritarian regimes thus negotiate with donors from a position of strength, not feebleness. Whereas Eritrea and South Sudan already show comparable propensities, Jones, Soares de Oliveira and Verhoeven counted Angola among the illiberal state-builders, all of which can be classified as ‘post-liberation’ regimes. In addition, as might rationally be argued, their transition towards a more liberal, less militaristic mode of governance is merely a question of time: transitions after emancipation tussles are seldom trouble-free. However, it is now becoming more evident that other African states, including those in which democratic institutions and participatory politics appear to be well established, are embracing identical strategies in their dealings with donors. Then-Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan’s response to the menace of Boko Haram points out warnings of this tendency while, perhaps most surprisingly, since the invasion of southern Somalia in 2011, Kenya’s politics has undergone a dramatic securitization. Goodluck Jonathan was accused by the opposition as being slack about the Boko Haram menace. He was seen as not doing enough to rid the country of the terrorist group. Although Nigeria received more international attention by the ascendancy of the group’s actions, not much came out of it to help the security situation in the most affected parts of the country.
There is information, however, that the UN has done so much for Nigeria to control and possibly disband the group via military interventions. It was in view of this that the United Kingdom donated 5 million worth of Great Britain Pounds to the government to equip the military with logistics and technical armaments which the Defence Ministry claimed was needed to oust the group totally. Elsewhere, UN commitment to Security Sector Reform (SSR) produced tangible effects. Between 2007 and 2013, the number of UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, including provisions for SSR rose from 3 to 13, and the number of SSR personnel employed by the UN rose from 0 to 150. By 2012, the UN Peacebuilding Fund had supported SSR-related projects in ten countries worldwide, making up roughly $44 million, or 19 percent of its total $228 million spending. SSR has been a key peacebuilding priority for the UN Peacebuilding Fund in countries such as Guinea, Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Central African Republic.

Civil wars and intrastate conflicts led the African Union (AU) to adopt a Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, acknowledging the need for a sustainable security policy (CMD-PSCDCAU, 2006) which laid the groundwork for its adoption of a common Framework on Security Sector Reform in 2013. The question is therefore asked whether the rest of Africa, its leaders, and even more importantly the AU, cannot deal with the situation in Nigeria. Whereas this framework echoes the human security agenda, it puts more emphasis on political independence of states in which SSR programs are conducted than the Western Development Community (WDC) did, for instance, at the UN discussions on SSR. It is tough to measure the degree of African commitment to SSR. As one expert on SSR put it, “African leaders have become exceptionally adept at adopting the language that they think the development community wants to hear”.

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One observer notes that western countries overtly tie aid disbursements to a country’s endorsement of the SSR model, for instance in Mali. This would suggest that fragile states would, in the face of threats to their short-term security interests, follow the rationale of traditional state-centric security models. The true test of commitment will happen when African countries become less dependent upon western assistance and opt to continue or set aside SSR initiatives. This does not look likely anytime soon.

2.5.1 How Africa’s Securitization is Changing Things

The securitization of development in Africa, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has been one of the most obvious aspects of the emerging securitization trend. Some argue that Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has been cleverly linked to securitization, though there is a lack of an explicit interpretation.

After the September 11th 2001 (or 9/11) attacks, the physical expanse dividing Africa and United States was no longer adequate to guarantee the latter of its security. Guerilla bombings in parts of East Africa and the advent of Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb further escalated concerns among Western powers. American and European strategists noted that fragile African states and porous borders helped the migration of terrorists who threatened their securities on the continent and beyond. They reasoned that terrorists used “ungoverned spaces” as training grounds and as transit routes to hunt for Western targets. The situation in Libya is, perhaps, a perfect demonstration of this assertion.

President George W. Bush declared that the fight against poverty is not an end on its own but rather intended to give hope to the poor in order to end terrorism. In his address at the 2002 UN conference, he added that the fight demands boosting aid and building aptitude to secure
Africa. In other words, there is a correlation between insecurity and poverty, and security is hinged on the development of African countries to eradicate the threat of terrorism. This realization by some African countries, like Nigeria, is what some officials of government have held onto as bargaining chips to further their own interest. It has been mentioned earlier that the threat of immigration into the west and the fear of the disadvantages accompanying such large movements is what compels some developed countries to come to the aid of ‘economically ailing and insecure’ countries.

Likewise, the UK’s development policies toward Africa are custom-made to reduce human misery emanating from the continent’s underdevelopment and political maladministration. The envisioned result is removal of the intrinsic security threat that originates from such misery. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair once mentioned that intervening in Africa to prevent suffering would alleviate a “scar” on the conscience of the entire world. Debatably, Africa’s securitization can then again be seen as less of a matter of morality than a means of addressing perceived threats to the British way of life and Britain’s security.

Another way of viewing Africa’s securitization is to see the “war on terror” as offering an answer to the continent’s development issues if the funds are managed well. In response to the securitization trend, African countries have shifted their objectives to expand their appetite for aid, ranking terrorism over other threats. Kenya, for example, was pressured by the United States to fight against terrorism in exchange for aid. Nigeria has not been any different. Even in its case, the deeply embedded roots of corruption were also one target set by the US for Buhari’s government to get rid of. Africa’s securitization has now led to a change in diplomatic maneuvers, consolidating government strength toward the development of security frontier. In Kenya, then-President Daniel arap Moi joined the United States in the fight against extremism, and former
President Mwai Kibaki reiterated the country’s support in combatting terrorism, apparently to attract economic and military assistance. When all the dust had settled well, the United States was rewarded with rare access to enter Kenya’s military facilities.\(^{46}\) In Nigeria, it has been oil. That is why Shell, one of the biggest international oil companies in the country, continues to adopt aggressive means in negotiating business with successive governments. Shell has been accused severally of being involved in corruption scandals with some of Nigeria’s top government officials and corporate moguls. Also, in 2007, the US Department of Justice probed more than twelve service companies (including industry titans Transocean and Schlumberger) for purportedly bribing Nigerian customs executives via a third-party company.\(^{47}\) FCPA investigations reveal evidence of long-suspected practices: top jobs in customs and at the ports are usually perceived as enormously lucrative for the officials who hold them.\(^{48}\)

The activities of insurgent groups at one time or another have led to the death of thousands of Nigerians, and the loss of properties and homes. In response to this, the Nigerian government utilized its security forces to bring the situation under control. This phase represented the militarized use of force. The fight against insurgent groups was securitized. One result of this securitization was corruption occasioned by the huge financial outlay that was channeled to the military and other security agencies to fight the insurgency.\(^{49}\) Another impact was the rampant human rights violations perpetrated by the soldiers on the ground. Okolie & Ugwueze contend that the cause of insecurity in Nigeria may be attributed to ‘agony, poverty, malnutrition, malnourishment, alienation and suffocation’.\(^{50}\)

Consequently, the government and the military are not in a rush to end the insurgency.\(^{51}\) Thus, spanning several administrations, the Nigerian government has repeatedly ignored the various acts
of arbitrary executions, detentions and torture carried out by various security forces in a bid to protect the security of the country in the fight against insurgency.\textsuperscript{52}

The Nigerian Army is equally responsible for numerous other serious atrocities, including the gruesome acts of extra-judicial killings perpetrated on 12 to 14 December 2015 in Zaria, Kaduna State of Nigeria, which claimed the lives of about 350 members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN).\textsuperscript{53,54} A number of panels immediately were set up to investigate the incidents. These include the Nigerian Senate, the Kaduna State Judicial Commission and the National Human Rights Commission. A report by the Kaduna State Judicial Commission held that ‘[t]here appeared to be a disproportionate use of force by the Nigerian Army to deal with the situation, hence the Nigerian Army used excessive force’. Yet, to date no member of the Nigerian Army has been held responsible for the atrocities committed.\textsuperscript{52}

2.6 Poverty and Development

The creation of poverty can be culture-specific. The degree and features of poverty is dependent on the cultural context in which poverty is fashioned and defined, how people experience poverty, and the prospects the culture and organizational set-up allows for getting out of poverty.\textsuperscript{55} In Africa, especially, people’s experience of poverty is in its crudest form. Sad images are portrayed of women and children in unbearable conditions with no end in sight. The systems in Nigeria have unconsciously succeeded in creating a chasm between the north and the south. Even in a place like Ghana, despite efforts by successive governments, the levels of development in the south does not match the north. This divide has enhanced the activities of Boko Haram in the north where development is not as advanced as the south.
One of several goals of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) was to improve the situation of poor people through a trickle-down effect by improving the economic wellbeing of poor countries. Today, there is widespread suspicion about the helpful effects of the SAPs. Laying those suspicions to rest, the SAPs spurred a fantastic volume of economic and semi-economic research; its terminology and goals infiltrated other fields and disciplines including politics. In 2001, the World Bank proposed a more refined approach to the discourse of poverty and the strategies crucial to reduce poverty through its *World Development Report: Attacking Poverty*. Though economic growth is still the primary target in the attack against poverty, other approaches such as public administration and service delivery, and pro-poor improvement in legal institutions were stressed. Again, the need to reduce the susceptibility of the poor towards economy-, weather- and health-related risks was also mentioned. Despite these reports, not much has been done in Nigeria where the poverty rate keeps soaring.

The UN Millennium Development Goals (now UN Sustainable Development Goals), introduced new strategies after all manner of poverty-reducing tests were commenced and compared across countries. However, for 'best practice' results, analysts failed to consider variations in the cultural contexts of the participating countries. All pro-poor plans were made within a context of coherence, as if all and sundry were in favour of poverty-reducing measures. This is where some critics of poverty-reducing proponents have raised concerns that may work in the West may not necessarily work in Africa considering the variances in culture, governance and many other structures.

During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of emerging regimes from civil war and military guerilla organizations, from Ndjamen to Kigali, have devoted strength to their state-building around a set of militarized and authoritarian practices. They readily adopted and crucially adapted to the foreign
agenda of securitization. The successful governments have habitually used military avenues to settle difficulties at their borders, oftentimes resorting to cruel suppression of internal opposition. Despite these authoritarian inclinations, zealous Western powers still defend training, arming and supporting the military and security services of these states. 33
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid


9 Ibid


17 Ibid


38 Ibid


CHAPTER 3
SECURITIZATION OF POVERTY, CORRUPTION HUMAN SECURITY IN THE NIGER DELTA

3.1 Introduction
This section will focus on the Niger Delta, its oil resources and the crimes committed in and around that area by militants who base their actions as a reaction to the neglect suffered at the hands of the Nigerian Federal Government. This chapter will delve into how the insurgency of the area has aggravated corruption and produced poverty in that region and the possibility of a spillover into neighbouring countries. It will also discuss the effects of the insurgency on human and national security and how constant attacks have led to securitization of the region with government officials and institutions taking advantage of the crisis to amass wealth for themselves.

3.2 The Niger Delta
Nigeria has become the biggest producer of petroleum in West Africa. About 2 million barrels (320,000 m³) of oil are extracted from the Niger Delta a day. Projections concluded that 38 billion barrels of crude oil are still located under the Delta as of the early months of 2012. A number of multinational corporations assisted Nigeria with essential technical and monetary resources needed to extract oil in as early as the 1950s. It is also held that since the dawn of oil exploration some years ago, the region has become the leading source of income for the country, making up over 90% of its export earnings since 1975. Oil and natural gas extraction, together, comprise "97 per cent of Nigeria's foreign exchange revenues".
The Delta region alone accounts for more than 23% of Nigeria's entire population with a steadily increasing population approximated above 30 million people in 2005. According to the Niger Delta Development Commission, the population density is also among the uppermost in the world, with 265 people per square kilometer. This population is growing at a speedy 3% per year and the oil capital, Port Harcourt, and other major towns are expanding quickly. Urbanization and poverty in Nigeria are growing, and national corruption is assumed a fact. In the end, the resulting picture created is one in which urbanization is not accompanied by economic growth to deliver jobs.\(^5\)

Figures from the Federal government of Nigeria indicated that there were more than 87,000 oil spills between 1970 and 2000.\(^6\) A recent assessment by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) estimates that it would take more than 25 years to restore the habitat of the Delta i.e. including full restoration of fishing grounds, creeks, mangroves and swamps. The UNEP report found that pollution of soil, sediment and swampland was extensive, citing one location near a National Petroleum Company pipeline “where an 8 cm layer of refined oil was observed floating on the groundwater which serves the community wells”.\(^7\)

The partial distribution of oil wealth and the severe environmental crisis suffered by those who live near affected areas have been the basis and key provoking factors for various demonstrations by environment activists and inter-ethnic clashes in the region, including insurgent activity by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) - a militant group allegedly responsible for thousands of deaths and kidnappings and the sabotage of oil infrastructure that cost the Nigerian state billions of dollars in lost revenue.\(^8\)

The Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria has claimed the lives of many citizens, foreigners, military and para-military workers, and destroyed properties amounting to millions of US Dollars.\(^9\) This violence surrounding the Delta did not exist before, not even when oil was discovered anew. Rather
the perceived (or actual) injustice and corruption in the administration of oil proceeds has instigated the indigenes who inhabit the areas of the oil wells. Hence in his exposition, Kwaja also recognizes fragility of the state institutions in terms of their capacity to handle corruption cases, rising inequality between the rich and poor, diversity, environmental degradation, contestations over land, gross violation of human rights among others, as the fundamental causes of vicious conflicts in Nigeria since the transition to democracy in 1999.10

### 3.3 The Insurgency

In the Westphalian prerogative, security was seen as a contract between sovereign states. At the local level, however, instances existed in which the state was not able or willing to defend its citizens. Threats consisted of gross violations of human rights by the state itself and not necessarily militaristic from other states. Some of the threats included underdevelopment the state was apathetic to.11 A human security approach endeavored to change customary philosophies of security to focus on human beings. With this notion, when the threat to security is more likely with people within the state, then it is important the government of the day pays close attention, since internal conflicts can sometimes lead to more drastic consequences, including breakdown of the economy and political structures and eventual collapse of the state. Militant activities can greatly hurt the economy.

For any states, therefore, national security has two sides – internal and external. States can be just as systematically disrupted and ruined by internal challenges (political discrimination at either sub-state or national level, economic failure and violation of human rights) as they can be by external powers. Hence, national security was no longer guaranteed by military control, but lay in favorable political, social and economic conditions, the protection of human rights and the promotion of
human development. The repeated secession attempts by Katanga during the 1960s that happened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a good example of domestic rebellion; likewise, foreign invasion (by Rwanda and Uganda in 1998); and predatory governance (under Mobuto Seso Seko) – all three of which have combined to undermine national security.¹²

The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria explicitly states “The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”. Without luck, government has struggled to uphold this constitutional mandate to provide a safe and secure atmosphere for lives, properties and the conduct of commercial and economic activities. Disturbing levels of insecurity in Nigeria has escalated terrorist attacks and the general crime rate in different locations of the country, leaving unpleasant consequences for national economic growth.⁹

Following a wave of attacks by indigenes against oil pipelines in the Niger Delta, Nigerian President Buhari pledged to meet with and hold talks with local leaders to address their grievances.⁷ With a hope of crushing a violent insurgency targeted at the oil industry and the federal government, the presidency implemented an absolute amnesty in 2009 to offer a new beginning to militants whose demands for sustainable socioeconomic development, environmental justice and resource control had resulted in massive regional disruption.¹³ The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) or the Niger Delta Amnesty Program (NDAP) was introduced by then-President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua as a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program in response to the swelling violence throughout the preceding decade, which intensified after the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa, an Ogoni environmental rights’ activist by a military tribunal in 1995. The pardon remains in effect even though it was originally designed to last only half a decade.
About a year and half before the 2009 amnesty deal, world petroleum prices exceeded $145 per barrel. Meanwhile, the insurgency crippled Nigeria’s production capacity by 900,000 barrels per day (i.e. about 30% in 2007). This intensely affected the national treasury negatively.\textsuperscript{14}

Shortly after this, a previously unknown group calling itself the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) also announced its presence on the scene with a string of attacks targeting pipelines, power stations and platforms operated by Shell, Chevron and ENI, reducing Nigeria’s oil output to a 20-year low in the process. Thus, output fell by more than 50%, to about 1.1 million barrels a day, while electricity production lost was estimated at more than 1,000 megawatts. The deteriorating situation has only been exacerbated by the announcement of a 70% cut to the amnesty program in the latest budget. The frustration on the part of the government in seeing no fruits to its labour probably resulted in this cut. Despite claims to being peaceful movements dedicated to achieving independence via democratic means, the government in Abuja has likened many of the militant groups to Boko Haram, cracking down hard on protests and arresting leaders.\textsuperscript{7} Those who are able to escape the federal army’s crackdown go back to plan more attacks on infrastructure and other human lives.

3.3.1 How the Nigerian Government Has Fueled the Insurgence and Corruption

Shell British Petroleum or BP (which evolved from the Royal Niger Company) in collaboration with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), discovered oil in 1956 in Oloibiri, a small village in present-day Bayelsa State and frantically explored and exploited crude oil. One major cause of global warming, according to the World Wide Fund for Nature, is gas flaring. Excessive gas flaring by Shell and other oil companies has caused indescribable havoc and hardship evident in poor agricultural produce. In its quarterly report of 1993, Oil Mineral
Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) confirmed that Niger Delta ecology has been badly damaged from oil exploration and exploitation. In the report, the hardships inflicted on the Gbaran people in Bayelsa State were highlighted as road constructions went on. Shell had awarded the contract to Wilbros Engineering Limited, but the construction of roads for the oil field blocked natural drainages and resulted in the damage of several fishponds. No Environmental Assessment Impact was carried out before these exercises’.\textsuperscript{15} Meanwhile, at the Yenogoa High Court, several law suits have been filed against Shell.\textsuperscript{16} Despite strategies to address the daunting challenge of insecurity in Nigeria, the desired positive results have not been achieved. This has forced the government on several occasions to appeal for foreign aid from countries such as Israel, the USA and EU countries to curtail the rising heights of poverty, corruption and their associated consequences i.e. terrorism and insecurity.\textsuperscript{17} Upon receipt of foreign assistance, the Federal Government makes distributions to the various states, including the Niger Delta states, through their governors. These funds have made little or no impact because the governors divert these funds for their private use, dumping them in American and European banks, especially Swiss. It was no news, therefore, when the Swiss Attorney General accused Eni, the Italian energy group, and Shell of paying millions of dollars in bribes (as much as $800 million to a former energy minister in the oil-rich African nation) - money that ended up in Switzerland.\textsuperscript{18} Again, on 17\textsuperscript{th} March, 2018, Swiss officials announced that they would give Nigeria $380m (£260m) that was found to be embezzled by Sani Abacha, former military dictator, and kept in European bank accounts.\textsuperscript{19} Sadly, because most of these officials are there as the eyes of the federal government, much trust in them has not stirred the federal government to intensify efforts at probing and trying those accused of corruption and money laundering.
State corruption is still widely thought to be worst in the country. Efforts to monitor the conduct of state officials regarding their conduct in office has been met with indifference. International NGOs are not given much attention after a few days of media stir. The expected action and results of these findings have not gone a long way to lead to the prosecution of any state official, at least, not when in power.\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, exposés of outrageous graft and misuse of funds, as revealed by local NGOs such as the Rivers-based Social Action or the STAND project, have been met with government inaction. The oil companies themselves, as characteristic of corporations, possess immense power with which they can influence any world government. Shell especially asserts enormous influence in Nigeria and sponsors political candidates in Nigeria, among other things.\textsuperscript{21} Meanwhile, a research by Osagie et al saw respondents revealing the causes of conflicts as the large scale corruption in the nation’s political system, the struggle for land ownership and government’s approach in handling conflict.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, a UN-led survey which asked citizens what they disliked most about the region revealed poor governance, poor leadership and corruption as the top answers. All the main drivers of conflict previously listed have poor leadership practices more or less at their core.\textsuperscript{23} A careful look at the Niger Delta conflict accurately see governance as the core of the problem and the very place to pursue immediate solutions. Service delivery across the region is abysmal and deeply compromised by patronage and corruption. In the last decade alone, Nigeria has drawn around $200 billion in oil revenues from the Delta, aside more than $400 billion since independence. The main parties responsible for providing public services are state governments with substantial budgets for the Delta, compared to national budgets of other developing countries.\textsuperscript{24} Yearly budgets in the four main oil-producing states of Delta, Bayelsa, Akwa-Ibom and Rivers total $7 billion, roughly Ghana’s national budget.\textsuperscript{25} However, there is consensus that almost 51 percent of the Niger Delta’s people still survive on $2 or less a day.\textsuperscript{26}
One therefore wonders where the allocated budget funds end up. As one report by Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN) remarked, “the Akwa Ibom State budget for 2010 is 289 billion naira ($1.93 billion). A 10 percent reduction in corruption and inefficiency losses could deliver almost $200 million in direct gains to the people of this state alone.” Even a moderate change in that part of the economy from the status quo of corruption would have so much effect.23

The civil society of Niger Delta will continue to suffer with nominally elected leaders whose primarily concern is how to reward the political bosses and links that availed their positions in office if the current trend of marginalization and corruption against inhabitants does not change quickly. In that case, the prevailing culture of impunity will automatically translate into a low threat of prosecution for misconduct whiles in office. Seven of the Delta’s nine then-sitting governors were accused of grand corruption by Nigeria’s top anticorruption body, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2006. They included George Olabode, a then-powerful figure in the ruling party. Out of the five that were eventually arrested or charged, only one was convicted.27

Another of the accused, James Ibori, former Delta State governor, is now being relentlessly pursued by British officials to face charges of money laundering. A number of close allies have been convicted already, and Ibori himself may soon be tried in the United Kingdom. Even in feeble democracies the consequences of such public waste and theft is vividly felt in elections. Examples include Ghana and the Philippines, where those caught in the most disgraceful scandals have suffered at the polls. Nigeria, on the other hand, is yet to record when a politician actually lost his ballot spot based on accusations for corruption. Similarly, there are many Niger Delta politicians
who remain at large but in power, despite their terrible records of human rights abuses and violence.\textsuperscript{23}

Another impact is the rampant human rights violations being perpetrated by the soldiers on the ground. Consequently, the government and the military are not in a rush to end the insurgency.\textsuperscript{28} Hence, regrettably, there seems to be only minimal headway, if at all, to end the violence because of government’s own conflicting tactics and fraud. Some observers assert that state officials deliberately sponsor militants for their own personal gain. There are also claims that substantial amounts of money are stolen from security and defence allocations by security chiefs, government officials and contractors supplying military hardware.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, spanning several administrations the Nigerian government has repeatedly ignored the various acts of arbitrary executions, detentions and torture carried out by various security forces in a bid to protect the security of the country in the fight against insurgency.\textsuperscript{30}

The Nigerian Army is equally responsible for numerous other serious atrocities, including the gruesome acts of extra-judicial killings perpetrated on 12 to 14 December 2015 in Zaria, Kaduna State of Nigeria, which claimed the lives of about 350 members belonging to the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN).\textsuperscript{31,32} A number of panels immediately were set up to investigate the incidents. These included the Nigerian Senate, and the Kaduna State Judicial Commission, and the National Human Rights Commission. A report by the Kaduna State Judicial Commission held that ‘[t]here appeared to be a disproportionate use of force by the Nigerian Army to deal with the situation; hence the Nigerian Army used excessive force’. Yet, to date no member of the Nigerian Army has been held responsible for the atrocities committed.\textsuperscript{30}
3.4 The Human and National Security Aspects of the Insurgency

The Critical Security Studies School, which sees security as a socially constructed concept in this instance, can be justified in its conclusion that the state itself and its armed forces are a potential source of insecurity, rather than a guarantor of security.33

Almost a decade ago, the UNDP pointed out rightly that “for most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event”. For these people, security is about safety and protection “from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards”.34

Jinadu hints that “the problem of peace and security in Africa is bound up with the nature and character of the modern state and its role and position in national and international society”.35 The extensive concept of security espoused in this context puts the state up for the role of championing the “enabling environment for self-realization and for the enjoyment and sustenance of self-development and self-actualization”.36

How is human security then defined? A number of definitions have been presented. Two main aspects of the concept are identified by the UNDP. Firstly, it means “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression”. And on the other hand, “it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life”.37

For the Human Security Commission, human security is defined by its objectives: to safeguard the vital core of human lives in ways and means that augment human free will and fulfillment.

*Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – those that are the essence of life. It means shielding people from critically severe and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using procedures that build on people’s strengths and desires. It means creating social, economic, environmental, political, military, cultural and*
military systems that collectively give people the building blocks of livelihood, survival and dignity.\textsuperscript{37}

For the Canadians, the most important concern of human security is the protection of people “from both violent and non-violent threats”.\textsuperscript{38} Basically, the human security approach is focused on the individual and the community, and centers on threats and conditions that are not normally seen as threats to the state but to peoples’ security.\textsuperscript{37} However, other parts of the concept inevitably quiz the state as an actual or potential source of deprivations and tyranny, a probable producer of poverty or an aide to the ‘menace’ that creates the threat situations of human insecurity.

For the average person, the issues that define security relate tangibly to mundane activities in which survival and a fulfilling life are established. Nigeria is no different; where the people of the north, by virtue of the constant attacks they faced from Boko Haram and other insurgents, lived in constant fear for decades. Insecurity in most of those states continues to recycle the poverty from unproductivity and fear and almost constant state of emergency. The underdevelopment of both persons and place in the parts of Delta regions of the Niger River seems to see no end in sight: there is only one secondary school for every 14,678 children, only 49 percent have access to potable drinking water, and one child in five dies before age five.\textsuperscript{23}

According to David Easton, the political system is liable to interferences from its environment and the environment is in turn influenced by the events that happen in the political system. Hence, the national security of any country will be threatened if a region is continuously bereft with unrest and insecurity.\textsuperscript{39} How various governments have exploited this situation have been elaborated in previous chapters. Depending on the perspective from which one looks at the situation, the overseas donors of aid are either striving to eliminate the intense poverty in Nigeria or reinforcing the corruption of the state by leaders who are supposed to be transparent and accountable. One
may never be able to tell the motive behind current and past forms of aid poured into the coffers
of Nigeria: whether to prolong the securitized state so Western oil and energy needs are met as the
fights go on or to shut the mouths of government officials who are also comfortable with saving
wealth for themselves at the expense of those whose blood are shed for defending a resource that
is supposed to be a blessing to all.

Political, economic and social crisis exist which have found direct and indirect avenues to turn into
issues of national security. Securitization of militant attacks in the regions of the Delta is no
exception. Today, some African states seem comfortable with the “shell” of the territorial state
where national security is aligned to that of the ruling élite – “governing” to the benefit of their
own welfare and progress, with little or no human security measures for the governed. In various
terms, such states are characterized as intermediate states, frail quasi-states, or, in severe
circumstances, as predatory – in those situations where the regime can literally kill off the state
and still feed off the carcass to ensure its own existence. This was Liberia’s situation under Charles
Taylor. In such occurrences, sometimes, the international legal system works advantageously in
favour of political thugs, warlords and criminals camouflaged as state leaders and occupying
positions on international platforms on equal terms with leaders who were democratically
elected.12

Despite undermining development due to the crisis of the region because of tension between
militants and government forces regarding the Niger Delta, it is still an important region in Nigeria.
However, unrest in the Niger Delta presents serious problems not only to that region but also the
national security of Nigeria and possibly surrounding states.40 These challenges as they are
reported the Delta area include kidnapping, bombings of oil facilities and bunkering. The NDA
has claimed responsibilities for most of the recent attacks in Niger Delta. The group has been overt
in its futuristic motives of crippling the Nigerian economy by dealing consequent attacks on the region. The fear of this group succeeding in its long term ambition and plan should be worrisome to the current government and subsequent ones. Being an oil-dependent state, Nigeria has suffered severely in recent years i.e. between 2010 and 2017 when oil prices slumped down to about $27.67, the lowest since 2003. The gradual rise in oil prices over the past two years is helping to spur Nigeria’s economic recovery but according to the IMF, although progress is being made, “more needs to be done to reduce unemployment and address poverty”.41

3.5 International Influence

Clearly, economic policy and political transitions in Africa are shaped by peripheral international forces which operate during key decision-making times among African governing élites. For example, African policy choices, ideological orientation and domestic priorities were impacted when the word changed from a bipolar one to being unipolar. This is far from the meaning that African leaders are helpless; it simply means that their degree of influence over local and foreign affairs changes over time because of internal and external forces. It also means that the schemes chosen by African élites to maintain support for themselves adjust to peculiar constraints that they encounter.

In many parts of Africa, the political liberalization processes of the late 1980s and early1990s not only “opened opportunities for people” but also “new fault lines”.37 Some researchers have sought to explain these fault lines through religious, gender, ethnic, racial or class lines in the context of the critical scarcities that have accompanied the introduction of SAPs. The impact of IMF and the World Bank adjustment plans and neo-liberal developments in Africa have been so massive the policies have tendered to almost destabilize the foundations of Africa as a nation-state after
colonialism, presenting African states as weak and building alienation towards it by its own citizens.\textsuperscript{42,43,44,45}

As structural adjustment became an integral part of the dynamic of crisis in Africa and progressively complicated the economic problems of the continent, drastic decrease in living standards and mass starvation followed.

The UK Financial Times Newspaper recently captured that:

\begin{quote}
“Nigeria, is a prime example of oil-fueled failure. Since the 1960s it has earned perhaps $300bn from oil but has little to show for it. It has acquired an unenviable legacy of military dictatorship, a towering foreign debt and an enduring reputation for corruption …. Most of its people have stayed poor, receiving little in public services or benefits other than access to subsidized fuel products. … African oil producers provide no examples of good governance.”
\end{quote}

These examples have aggravated external conditionality and meddling in the domestic affairs of most African countries.

Beyond this, there are reasons to believe that the environment of poverty created in the implementation of SAPs in Africa has worsened people’s insecurity by cruelly venting national suppression on those who demonstrate against their increasing despair. Yet unfortunately, the environment of scarcity has the potential to and indeed directly heightened rivalry among leading elites for diminishing national resources. These and other similar situations have often triggered violent clashes among religious, communal and ethnic groups who are easily mobilized to support their ‘leaders’.\textsuperscript{46} It was the same feeling experienced by many of the leaders of Boko Haram and other insurgent groups; being left behind, deprivation and marginalization that led to most of the northern Nigerian youth falling into a trap of violence to make ends meet out of the more
vulnerable in society. Such situations suggest a relationship between the “economic genocide” unlocked by SAPs and globalization, and ethnic and communal violence in Africa.\textsuperscript{47}

It is undoubtful that rich nations are not noticing the happenings in the Niger Delta: envoys from Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and France – countries of origin of the oil multinationals and corporations operating in Nigeria – paid a visit to the region in 2004 to meet politicians, corporate officials, NGOs and others.\textsuperscript{48} Not much has changed from such similar meetings to tangibly impact the daily lives of those who live in that region because little enthusiasm has been shown for persuading the Nigerian government to implement political and social reforms and fight the human rights and other abuses that the citizens of the country complain about.\textsuperscript{49}

According to Joseph, “Once again, following the lead of the United States, global security is defined, especially since the incidents of September 11, 2001, as security from acts of terrorism. In the same way that relations with African countries before 1989 were determined by East-West rivalries, they will now be greatly influenced by the global struggle against terrorist groups and governments considered to be directly or indirectly assisting such groups. African oil producers, including Nigeria, figure centrally in this new strategy as industrialized countries seek to reduce their dependence on Middle East oil”.\textsuperscript{50} Indirectly, the West has made it a motive to rely on African oil, hoping to use this means to avert possible attacks on themselves. The plan is to subtly concentrate ‘aid’ on defence and offer military assistance to combat ‘terrorism’ and extremists. These perpetrators of terrorism and extremists, in the context of the oil-producing Niger Delta, are local people objecting environmental pollution by giant oil corporations or demanding a nondiscriminatory share of oil revenue from export proceeds from the Nigerian government.\textsuperscript{46}

Viewed at the state level, the situation to effectively utilize aid received from developed countries and not divert it can seem David and Goliath-like. For the past twenty and more years, most
stakeholders judged clashes in the Niger Delta as a temporary risk to be managed menially. Now, the Nigerian government, stakeholders of the oil industry, and the larger international community are more and more experiencing the weight of consequences accompanying this approach. The United States has indicted some offenders in the Halliburton Bonny liquefied natural gas bribery scandal under its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) who were indicted when the deal was brokered in Nigeria years ago. Operating on its own terms, the Act recognizes and punishes only those who pay bribes but not the recipients of those bribes. Perhaps, because of that, none of the Niger Delta governors and senators, known openly to have sizeable assets in the United States and elsewhere in Europe, have been accused of theft, fraud, or money laundering. In the United Kingdom, the ongoing trial of James Ibori may help change matters somewhat.

Okolie & Ugwueze contend that the cause of insecurity in Nigeria may be attributed to ‘agony, poverty, malnutrition, malnourishment, alienation and suffocation’. In response to the atrocities caused by the insurgents, the Nigerian government utilized its security forces to bring the situation under control – a case of the militarized use of force which securitized the situation. One result of this securitization was corruption occasioned by the huge financial outlay that was channeled to the military and other security agencies to fight the insurgency. On 7th June, 2018, the United States Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Stuart Symington, publicized additional $102 million humanitarian support to those affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East. Symington made this known at a plenary session of the National Conversation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (NCHD-P) Nexus in Abuja. The ambassador explained that the fund would help address the food, shelter and health security needs of inhabitants in the North-East still besieged with the painful aftermaths of the Boko Haram insurgency. “The aid will be administered and overseen predominantly through the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) offices of Food for Peace (FFP), the U.S. State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) and Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). “Our hope is that this new investment in humanitarian assistance will combine with the efforts of your government and people to move Nigeria forward on a path to peace and prosperity,” he said. Hereafter, one would wonder if all these millions would really be channeled to the appropriate causes for which it is being given.

Again, ‘most of the oil companies are Western; Exxon Mobile, Shell, Agip, Chevron, among others. All the techniques and equipment employed in prospecting for oil are exported from the West. The biggest oil consumers are Western. The United States alone buys about 40 percent, followed by Britain, Canada and the rest of Europe. China and Japan are also involved. China is aggressively attempting moves to outspend the United States in securing the most viable oil blocks. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), probably covertly controlled by the West, set the price and quota or quantities against business ethics. Then the oil is priced in dollars to cheapen the price in the international market against oil producers in Africa. Most arms and weapons used to kill protesters calling for fairness and justice are manufactured by the West and sometimes given in exchange for these resources’. When Ken Saro-Wiwa was killed in 1995, America, under Bill Clinton, which could have saved some of the activists if it had imposed economic sanctions on Nigeria refused to do so, but imposed so-called diplomatic sanctions, which allowed oil to continue to flow from Niger Delta to American pumps. Painfully, the problems or reasons for which they fought and were killed remains.

More realistic narratives from African leaders show a remarkable poverty of ideas about a contemporary continent and an inability to think in more visionary ways. But in its Panglossian
versions, African states are portrayed as relentlessly marching towards a bright future, temporarily slowed by violent growing pains caused by internal and external influences. Due to this, Western donors privately skeptical about Africa’s potential for liberal-democratic convergence nonetheless customarily endorse and superficially give grants in favour of capital markets expansion and democracy in Africa (Jones, de Oliveira & Verhoeven, 2013).\textsuperscript{54} Perhaps there will be change in Africa’s poverty levels, corruption and their securitization for better someday.
ENDNOTES


14 Ibid


36 Ibid


Ibid


Ibid


CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This study was carried out within the framework of economic freedom, modernization and securitization theories to explain the concepts of poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria.

These theories were chosen for the three inter-linked subjects because they suit the context of the discussion on the state of Nigeria, regarding its growing levels of corruption and the influence of the international community in tackling the problem, escalating it to a securitization level. The theories identify that Africa is currently where it is chiefly because of continued international influences in its affairs – through aid and funding for various projects – which has led to some government officials losing the distinction between the use of public property for public pursuits and private gains. The unthinkable levels of this behaviour by Nigerian officials has led to insurgent groups rising to disrupt government in its selfish ambition of ignoring the poor in society, enriching only its officials and whoever is favoured to be in their circle of influence. With time, as the miseries of poverty and corruption increased, the government has sought help to tackle it, plunging the country into an almost constant state of insecurity to complete an unprecedented cycle of securitization.

The scope of the study focused on Nigeria in West Africa, a country with immense wealth from its rare natural resource, especially oil, yet reportedly taken over by India as the country with the largest populace living in the most abject forms of poverty, according to the World Poverty Clock and the Brookings Institute.
The study narrowly looked at insurgence in the Niger Delta region and how the unrest has been driven by hidden faces of both local and international figures in state positions and corporations seriously facilitating the production of more poverty through corruption and securitization of affairs.

The objectives of this study were to investigate the linkages between poverty production, corruption and securitization in Nigeria, examine how these linkages are (deliberately) fueled by government officials, corporate bodies (both local and international) and other actors within the society and finally to explore prospects in dealing with corruption to curb poverty production, and subsequently the securitization of those issues through the adoption of a human security approach.

Based on the above, this chapter provides a summary of findings from many relevant literature, draws conclusions based on the research findings and makes recommendations for use.

### 4.2 Summary of Key Findings

The following findings were derived from the study based on data gathered from literature reviews in relation to the problem statement, research questions and study objectives.

- In any given society, the amount of poverty is likely to depend on its government or political economy. Leadership has the mandate to manage resources efficiently so people do not wallow in poverty. In sub-Saharan Africa, South America and Asia, difficulty to transform raw natural resources into finished goods for value addition, coupled with harsh economic and social conditions make it difficult to compete equally on the world stage with other countries in Europe and the West. Advanced countries have seen great
improvements in their economies with passing decades. Poverty has become a way of life for entire populations with almost 3 billion people surviving on less than $1-2 a day.

❖ The concept of ‘poverty production’ is still nascent in poverty research, which deals with the activities people engage in deliberately or otherwise, that produces poverty or serves as a consequence of poverty. Inasmuch as poverty production forces need to be identified, poverty manifests itself in every facet of society. This could be intended and unintended and the impact should be underscored.

❖ Without much argument, corruption is known as one of the obvious causes of poverty production. It is, however, complicated to trace how corruption directly causes poverty, since there may be a lengthy chain of perpetrators who may simultaneously be part of organizations and associations dedicated to poverty reduction. Corruption however cannot be solely accountable for poverty production; there are other causes as well e.g. unfavourable stocks and commodity prices, diminishing natural resources, debt servicing, etc.

❖ Politically, poverty-producing agents who benefit from the plight of others are unlikely to favour measures that warrant transparency in their dealings and how openness in their affairs might alter their business.

❖ It is no secret that Nigeria has continually scored poorly on the global corruption index. During Muhamadu Buhari’s 2015 campaign, he made key promises to tackle corruption in Nigeria and oust Boko Haram, an insurgent group that has wreaked much havoc through bloodshed and displacement of people in Nigeria and beyond.

❖ Many Nigerians live in poverty which unfortunately is not caused by a lack of assistance from the international community. From independence, Nigeria has benefited immensely
from aid and other forms of development assistance from international donors. Yet, even if Nigeria is ruled militarily or by civilians, whether those leaders operate in democracy or autocracy, there is no difference. It is estimated since 1960 that Nigeria’s embezzled states fund could equal the country’s total foreign aid received - about $380 billion (£245 billion).

❖ Ole Wæver in 1995 propounded the term securitization in response to previous studies on security which dealt with only the state. The theory of securitization explained how supposed threats are presented by certain actors (including the Press or Executive) as an excuse for initializing certain extra measures to the citizenry. In Nigeria, securitization of poverty and corruption has led governments to resort to drastic measures which have impacted on the daily lives of citizens – hence greater brutality and increased fear and tension.

❖ Constructivism, another social approach to the research, segregated world politics into agency and structure. Agents are purposeful and rational actors with the will and ability to cause structural changes. These agents may be states or non-governmental actors who seek to effect changes in the international system so that it broadly reflects their own interests (in this case the Nigerian government and other relevant actors like oil corporations within the state).

❖ Nigeria’s political history reveals constant and often intense competition for power which will translate into personal control over the revenues from the export of high-earning commodities, particularly oil and gas. This fight for authority has led to the rise of many insurgent groups within the past decade. With this, the wave of insecurity is on the rise, and a threat to the very existence of Nigeria as one country is not absent. Nigeria is also battling unnerving developmental issues which threaten its socio-economic development
even in the midst of the failing security situation in the country. For instance, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reports that, people living in poverty have been on the rise since the 1980s. e.g. 27.20% in 1980 and 46.30% in 1985. Even though there was a marginal drop in 1992 (42.70%) it shot up again to 65% in 1996 and then 69% in 2010.

❖ The government has been accused many times of simply not doing enough to arrest the increasing percentage of the poverty-stricken population. Whereas the different-level perpetrators of poverty are either deliberate or undeliberate in their actions, almost all of them are likely to deny willful production of poverty. The larger part of poverty production is unintentional i.e. it is a result of an inadvertent activity which is aimed at achieving something else. Hence in looting wealth meant for state projects, government and corporate officials hurt the poor who are supposed to be the original beneficiaries of the interventions/projects.

❖ Nigeria’s ruling elites have seemed untroubled by the country’s persevering weakness and sought no lasting transformation of society or fundamental change in their marginalization in the international system. Attempts by the latest rulers have seen some increase in aid to fight poverty and corruption which the state so desperately needs to eliminate. Yet still, misappropriation of these funds to personal use and have continuously deviated from government’s aims and increased securitization further. Generally in Africa, the Mobutus, Mois and Compaores of the continent consciously reproduce dysfunctionality because this prolongs their grip on power.

❖ There are concerns of donors using aid to gain access to invaluable national resources. The other side of the story also looks at national policy makers who offer these resources willingly in exchange for personal gains. Such is the situation in Nigeria: aid received from
donors have not come without strings attached; the oil-rich country has had to trade more oil for more aid to solve problems created by a few elites occupying high places of power. Goodluck Jonathan, former Nigerian President, was accused of being slack regarding the issue of terrorism posed by Boko Haram. Much aid received during his tenure of office did not result in security improvements in the most affected parts of the country.

❖ Militant groups’ activities have caused thousands of death, displacements and the destruction of properties in Nigeria. The government, however, sought to bring the issue under control by deploying the Nigerian Army. This move securitized the issue. One result of this securitization was corruption occasioned by the huge financial outlay that was channeled to the military and other security agencies to fight the insurgency.

❖ Consequently, the personal benefits accruing to some government officials and the military are too good to encourage intensified efforts to end the insurgency. Thus, despite a number of several administrations, Nigerian governments seem to have intentionally and repeatedly ignored the offences of the army and other government security forces against civilians and those accused of militancy. The justification for the government’s actions is only explained as attempts to protect the entire country from harm.

❖ The Delta region constitutes more than 23% of Nigeria's entire population with a population steadily growing to exceed the 30 million people in 2005. Despite its importance and population density, it has suffered a lot of environmental harms which are estimated to take several decades to undo. The ecological destruction that emanates from the oil industry and the unequal distribution of wealth from oil forms the foundation for the numerous migrations and inter-ethnic clashes in the region.
Following serious attacks on oil infrastructure by insurgent groups in the Niger Delta, The Nigerian President, in order to address their grievances, decided to hold talks with the local leaders of the militant groups. The presidency granted amnesty to all militants so they can be integrated normally into society again. It was believed that the massive regional disruption was a result of their quest to gain control over resources and sustainable socioeconomic development. Unfortunately, dozens of former militants were interdicted for theft and money laundering among other forms of crimes relating to security contracts they had been offered in exchange of peace.

Even then, anti-corruption and anti-poverty efforts by local NGOs has revealed massive misuse of funds for public intervention by government and private entities. These were met with government inaction. Aside that, the oil companies and other corporations themselves have become so powerful that they could influence any government of the day. Some of the findings pointed to political candidates who were sponsored by influential companies such as Shell in Nigeria.

Governance has increasingly been identified to a double-edged sword in the Niger Delta conflict in that, it is both the problem and avenue to seek solution to the problem.

In light of it all, it clear that there is positive link between poverty and government’s political economy. Actions and inactions of government could exacerbate poverty, corruption and eventual securitization of the issues for a repeated cycle. The Nigerian government has demonstrated through significant avenues ways (such as mismanagement of donor funds) it is fueling corruption to produce more poverty and turn around to securitize those same issues.
4.3 Conclusions

Following the above summary, the research reached the following conclusions:

❖ The concepts of poverty production, corruption and securitization have not been studied in detail. Most researchers have worked on both poverty reduction and corruption and how to mitigate it or corruption and the insecurity it generates. However, there has not been much attention on how the three concepts i.e. poverty production, corruption and securitization are linked.

❖ Poverty production can be deliberate or otherwise. The actions and inactions of those who wield power over a vulnerable population are likely to create poverty through corruption and misuse of public funds.

❖ Poverty is defined differently in many parts of the world. In Nigeria (and many parts of Africa), poverty is simply severe lack and want that affects one’s general way of life – food to eat, shelter, clothes to wear, education, etc.

❖ Poverty production and corruption have almost become interwoven in the fabric of Nigeria as a country. Nigeria has suffered much with poverty and corruption for decades. Poverty is rampant in many parts of the country, particularly the north, where insurgency has been fueled by government’s slackness in efforts to fight poverty and corruption. Also, corruption seems be embedded in all sectors of the country; from government entities to private businesses, the judiciary, political parties, police, etc. Rather, the government has securitized these problems and its consequent state of insecurity at alarming levels. Rather than providing security for the citizens, the state is now the instrument destroying the security of the population.
The high waves of poverty and corruption in the state have affected life in the northern parts of Nigeria, specifically, the region of the Niger Delta where almost all of Nigeria’s oil is extracted. The Nigerian government depends largely on oil to run the machinery of government. Export proceeds cater for about 60% of the country’s GDP. This has led to the rise of insurgent groups that use rough and vicious means to make their opinions audible to government. These groups have claimed the lives of many people and destroyed properties without number. Marginalization and the poor handling of environmental waste from extraction of oil have fueled the aggression of these groups. Giant private companies such as Shell and Eni have been accused of causing much damage to the environment. Nevertheless, the government has not shown proactiveness in regulating their business to benefit the entire people of Nigeria.

The government rather deployed the Nigerian Army to bring the situation under control. Meanwhile, reports have revealed how the army has been brutal in its ways against civilians; killing and maiming men, women and children in areas affected by insurgence without being called to order.

Some development partners have also contributed to the current state of securitization in Nigeria. Foreign donors provide aid to fight poverty and corruption and assist the Nigerian Army with funding and other forms of investments to eliminate militant groups such as Boko Haram to restore security. However, the real motives behind aid have been shown to serve the interest of donor states to leverage any unfavorable government policy against their (foreign) companies established in Nigeria. It is also known that foreign governments grant aid to many African countries (Nigeria included) to have access to natural resources.
desperately needed to meet their needs abroad. Selfish government officials receive these grants for personal use at the expense of the vulnerable poor.

- It will take a determined government to turn Nigeria’s fortune round in its fight against poverty and corruption and insecurity. It would yield results if the current anti-corruption institutions are empowered with all necessary resources to be effective in their mandate. There is also need for citizen education on how corruption enhances poverty production and increases insecurity nationally. Civil society groups should also be extra upbeat on and autonomous of all forms of state and international influence.

### 4.4 Recommendations

The Federal government of Nigeria has been accused severally by international organizations such as Amnesty International. In its 2017/2018 annual report, the group highlighted many human rights issues that resulted in the death of thousands in about 12 different states. There have been ambushes and abductions of both police personnel and civilians (women and children included), several killings of oil prospectors and even farmers. The group decried the government’s lack of accountability and favouring its own people i.e. state officials and military leaders accused of crimes under international law are easily cleared. Excessive use of force by Nigerian police in carrying out routine tasks has resulted in several casualties e.g. in September 2015, at least 10 Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members were killed and 12 others wounded by soldiers in Umuahia, Abia State. The military claimed that they were killed when they tried to resist the arrest of leader, Nnamdi Kanu, at his home. In 2005, six police officers were indicted for murdering six
traders in Apo, Abuja. Five Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) policemen were also convicted for extrajudicial executions of two persons in 2009.¹

In addition, the problems of corruption and poverty still exist in Nigeria. Many people may look at them as two separate national challenges, but this research has shown that there is a strong causal relationship between the two i.e. the extreme levels of corruption produces poverty and vice versa. A reduction in corruption at all levels in the private and public sectors could help reduce the levels of poverty in Nigeria and more importantly the spate at which local authorities and international corporations produce poverty directly and otherwise. Unfortunately, it is the same government authorities which have admitted the magnitude of the canker and progressed to securitize the issue, calling for more aid from overseas but mismanaging the funds so the cycle repeats.

Many governments have attempted to solve the menaces of poverty and corruption through various programmes and projects here and there. Similarly, there has been several collaborations with foreign partners with the same objectives. For example, many parastatals have for long been plagued by systemic mismanagement, inefficiency, and corruption hence soon after taking office, President Buhari dissolved the governing boards of almost all parastatals and took direct control of decision making. In February 2016, he dismissed the principals of 26 parastatals and agencies, significantly including the Nigerian National Petroleum Company.² Some promising cross-border work has also emerged in recent years. In particular, former petroleum minister Diezani Alison-Madueke and others were arrested in London in October 2015 following a joint Nigerian-UK investigation and face imminent criminal trial in the UK. Another evidence of effective collaboration between government and international attempts at curbing corruption is at the Nigerian All Judges Conference held in Abuja, where the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assessed Nigeria's track record over the last seven years in important areas, such
as improving the quality of justice, especially for the poor, and strengthening integrity, accountability and independence in the judiciary and found that Nigeria had taken bold steps to remove corrupt justice officials and staff. Nigeria is making strides in improving citizens' access to justice.

Poverty alleviation efforts have seen some fruition through a one-meal programme established for primary school students in 2016 with allocations of 300bn, 33bn and 338.9bn allocated for it in 2016, 2017 and 2018 respectively. Material aid for poor citizens have seen authorities establishing additional pensions in the amount of 5000 Naira for 1 million Nigerians. Again, 57,000 interest-free loans have been provided for more than 3 million people who benefit from the Government Enterprise Empowerment Programme (GEEP) facilities. As reported, the government provided N-Power, one of its organizations created to assist the youth, with 26.4 billion Naira. Reports in March 2017 revealed 162,000 N-Power graduates were successfully registered and received monthly scholarships of 30,000 Naira. The government was obliged to deal with a further 200,000 candidates adopted late last year.

Unsurprisingly, many have called for transparency in government machinery to enhance accountability. The Executive, Legislature and Judicial arms have been under intense pressure to improve their operations and serve the people better with honesty and justice.

Based on the above, the following recommendations are made:

❖ A good number of states experience poverty. Even in well-developed cities within each state, there are suburbs that wallow deep in poverty. However, some places experience more poverty than others e.g. the northern part of Nigeria. It is therefore imperative to
develop policies that capture the underscoring causes of poverty and its rapid spread and adequately respond to such problems i.e. locational targeting.

❖ Relative differences exist in educational attainment between regions and among states. Policies in that regard should be adjusted to cater for deficits in those areas of extreme deprivation.

❖ Preceded by a social contract that strengthens state-citizen relations so the propensity to engage in corruption is reduced, corruption and poverty production should be made a developmental issue. There is need to increase citizen education regarding the fact that that public funds and state assets are not for government officials’ private use but capital for the provision of public goods. Civil society can drive the campaign against the corruption and poverty production at the grassroots level so sensitization and advocacy efforts can be fruitful. The private sector should not be left out.

❖ The federal government should grant all anti-corruption agencies the autonomy to work without any interference from the Executive and other forms of control, local or international influence. It may be important for such agencies to be reformed and streamlined with new and better mechanisms to carry out their mandate. Such bodies should be given all resources and powers needed to handle affairs in an accountable and professional manner.

❖ Further, these agencies should be able to monitor all other state institutions independently and proactively for corruption rather than wait for people to report such incidents.

❖ The 1999 Constitution needs to be reviewed to make it binding for President, Governors, Senators, Chairmen of local government councils and other political office holders to be tried in the court of law for criminal offences committed while in office.
❖ The existing Nigeria’s Code of Conduct Bureau should be stringent with the law requiring the declaration of assets by state officials and promptly arraign those who default before credible courts.

❖ Citizens should lead calls for better transparency and accountability from public and corporate officials e.g. Indigenes in the Niger Delta area should be stern in their demand for accountability from private firms operating in the oil-rich areas because their activities affect them directly.

❖ Since official corruption is a major grievance for the average citizen and an effective recruiting tool for Boko Haram and other militant groups, government must investigate and prosecute not only crimes perpetuated by these groups but also those committed by political leaders and security personnel. A major Boko Haram condition for a ceasefire was the trial and prosecution of the security personnel identified for his involvement in Mohammed Yusuf’s extrajudicial execution in 2009. Human rights groups have repeated this demand and the government needs to respond speedily, as a step toward discouraging impunity.5

❖ It would be extremely beneficial to the entire country if much of funds received from international donors is channeled to fight poverty at the grassroots level rather than invested in arms for the country’s army and police service. Provision of basic amenities in the rural areas i.e. schools, clinics, potable water and market stalls can go a long way to decrease motivation to join the growing number of violent groups. Development partners also have a part to play in curbing corruption, poverty production and securitization of the issues at hand.

❖ International patrons should principally urge the federal government to work with northern traditional, political and religious elites to urgently seek a holistic resolution to the
challenges posed by Boko Haram. In August 2013, at a US-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC) meeting in Abuja, regional security working groups agreed that while security efforts are necessary, defeating Boko Haram “may require a new social compact with Nigerian citizens that encompasses an economic recovery strategy as a complement to the government’s security strategy”. But the U.S. and other international security partners need to keep the pressure on and follow up with support for projects and programs that address the poverty, corruption and impunity that swell insurgent ranks.

❖ International partners should continue to encourage support from other states or institutions with similar ambitions of fighting poverty and corruption to the barest. The UN and associated agencies (such as the UNDP), Transparency International and similar bodies can all play a role.

❖ When granting aid, the highest standards of accountability and transparency should be adhered to. Citizens deserve the right to know the origin of aid and the sectors or beneficiaries the aid is directed at. If possible, more aid should be granted to civil society groups, especially those which have made it an obligation to fight poverty and corruption and eventually lighten the state of securitization initiated by the military’s response to insurgence and violence.
ENDNOTES


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