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Mr. Liu, just for the record I would like to ask you first if you would indicate what your position was when the Congo became independent and subsequently, when the UN operations took place there?

Yes, I was at that time an officer in the trusteeship Department. When the Secretary-General's office was preparing a mission to the Congo, the mission of the personal representative of the Secretary-General, Ralph Bunche, Bunche called me and asked me to accompany him. So I was transferred then to Bunche's office and then after that I remained in that office. So at the time of the Congo operation I was still officially with the Trusteeship Department but I assumed the function of special assistant to Ralph Bunche.

And you accompanied Mr. Bunche then to the Congo before independence, right? Was the purpose to make a kind of survey?

That's right. When Belgian government announced its decision to grant independence to the Congo, and that was in January 1960, Dag Hammarskjold was surprised and worried because he knew that the Congo was not ready for independence and he saw many problems because of this
lack of preparation. So he decided to send his most trusted collaborator, Ralph Bunche, as his personal representative for the independence ceremony. And he asked Bunche to set up after independence a large bureau of technical assistance in order to help the new Congolese government.

JSS

At that point did Mr. Bunche and you already have contact with the new leaders of the Congo, or not?

Liu

Some contact, yea. We arrived in Leopoldville on the 25th of August. On that day there was still no Congolese government. The Congolese representatives were elected, but there was a split among the leadership, mainly between the two main leaders - Kasavubu and Lumumba. So there were intense negotiations during these days in order to reach an agreement. Finally the agreement was reached on the 26th of August whereby Kasavubu would be made President of the republic and Lumumba would assume the post of Prime Minister. When this was done, Bunche was in contact with Bomboko who was slated to be foreign minister and Thomas Kanza who was to be appointed as the minister for UN affairs. During this period of 5 days, between Bunche’s arrival and the Congo independence, we were mainly in contact with the Belgian authorities - namely the Belgian ambassador, who had a special position, he was to be a member of the Congolese cabinet under the treaty which was to be concluded between the
Congo and Belgium, the treaty of assistance and of friendship and cooperation. During this period we were mainly in contact with Bomboko and Kanza, we saw Kasavubu and Lumumba only briefly during the ceremony. But we were later to see them much more, after independence day. What was the attitude of the Belgian ambassador at that point - he was going to be a member of the cabinet, was he looking forward to UN assistance also?

Oh yes, oh yes. The Belgian government and the Belgian ambassador in particular, Ambassador Borch? was looking forward to cooperating with the UN because they also knew that the new Congo government would need a lot of assistance. Belgium under the treaty of friendship was giving a lot of assistance in terms of personnel, technicians, experts, and money - financial aid - but they wanted the UN the help also.

So at that point there was a congenial relationship. I believe that you had made a stop in Brussels before...

That's right, before arriving in Leopoldville we stopped for half a day in Brussels where we saw the two Belgian ministers in charge of the Congo and we discussed at some length with them about the Congolese problem. Perhaps here I could mention an episode which is quite interesting. Mr. Raymond Chevenne, who was the minister for economic affairs concerning the Congo, gave to us the six main problems which the Congo government must face.
JSS  This was in Brussels?
Liu  That's right, in Brussels. One was of course the new Congolese army which would be led by a Belgian general; another one is the financial aid, I think the Belgian government was going to give them at the beginning an aid of 2 billion Belgian francs. Then we noted that for the sixth question he mentioned use of the Flemish language, together with the French language in the radio stations and we thought that very strange - that this should be considered as one of the major problems for the new Congo government.

JSS  In a sense that was transferring the Belgian problem to the Congo - that's interesting. But that never happened.
Liu  That never happened.
JSS  Did anyone in the Congo speak Flemish?
Liu  No but they hated the Flemish, much more than the Vallons, the French-speaking Belgians.
JSS  Why?
Liu  I don't know why. Probably they were more active, they were more Flemish businessmen in the Congo.
JSS  With independence, I assume that Ralph Bunche and you had rather direct contact with the new leaders of the government.
Liu  That's right. In fact two days after independence a long meeting was arranged between Bunche and Lumumba during which Lumumba immediately raised the question of
technical assistance. In particular, Belgium at that time proposed a big project for the Angar Dam because there is a big waterfall south of Leopoldville, there was a project of building a dam and a huge hydroelectric power plant, an aluminum plant. The plan was given to Lumumba but he had some misgivings, he didn’t want Belgium to take too much control of this, and he wanted the UN to advise him. And we discussed many other problems. Now here, during that meeting which was extremely important, we realized for the first time, that Lumumba was perhaps not quite ready for the important function, the very important function, of Prime Minister. We were sitting at the conference table in his office, a huge office with a long table. He was the end of the table, Bunche was sitting next to him on the left side, and I was sitting next to Bunche. Suddenly the telephone rang, the telephone was on his desk about 20 yards behind. He said, "Excusez-moi, excusez." He would get up, go to the telephone and they would say, "Qui est là?" (Who’s there?) And then he’d say, "Oh no, my femme n’est pas ici. Telephonez plus tard." (My wife is not here, please call later.) Then he would come to us, and apologize, and resume the conversation. And that happened twice during that very important discussion.

One other time, much later, after the mutiny and when relations with the Belgian representatives soured,
we suddenly received an urgent message from Lumumba asking Bunche to go to his office for a very urgent meeting. So Bunche and I rushed to his office and there he announced to us (and we were sitting the same way at the table) he announced that the Congo government has decided to sever diplomatic relations with the Belgians because of the mutiny, because of the harsh treatment of the Congo government. That was a very serious decision because of the huge assistance the Belgian government was giving the Congo government. But the discussion was not on the economic or military matters, it was on the passport because Lumumba had decided to go to Europe and the United States and he needed a passport. Now that diplomatic relations had been severed, the Congo government will have to issue its own passports, and then they were discussing about the form of the passport, the logo of the Congo government which the government must choose, and in fact, he said that perhaps we should have the lion - the lion is the symbol of power and independence. But then Gizenga, who was called to join us, said, "Oh no, no, no we can’t have the lion because the Belgians have the lion." You know, all this seemed to come rather surprisingly and showed that the Congolese leaders were really not ready for independence.

JSS Did you have any similar meetings with Kasavubu?

Liu With Kasavubu, yes. We had the meeting later on, later
on you see when we went to Katanga. We tried to arrange for the deployment of UN troops in Katanga. So Bunche met Tshombe first, during the very first trip that was on the 4th of August 1960, and Dag Hammarskjold met Tshombe later, eight days later, when he himself went there in order to bring about the introduction of the UN troops in Katanga. Now Tshombe gives a different impression. He also was not ready for leadership but he was smoother in his approach. He smiled, he says "no", but he says "no" in smiling whereas Lumumba will say "no" with a very stern face. But like Lumumba he was not ready for the important function of leader in an independent country.

What about Kasavubu?

Kasavubu was, again, different. He doesn't say much, in fact he was like a Buddha, in fact he looked like a Buddha, they even say that he was half Chinese. You know there were some Chinese workers for the railroad which went there early in the century and rumors had it that Kasavubu had some Chinese blood. Anyway, he doesn't talk much so it's very difficult to say whether he knows much but doesn't want to say anything, or he doesn't know anything and therefore he remains silent.

And the other member of the team, so to speak, was Gizenga? What was he like?

Well we didn't see much of Gizenga because he was really following Lumumba. He was a deputy prime minister, but
was really deputy to Lumumba. We understood that he was much more, more to the left than Lumumba himself.

And Thomas Kanza who was, as you have said, the minister for the UN liaison, he was associated with Lumumba or with Kasavubu?

Now, Thomas Kanza and Bomkoko were the only two university graduates of the government. He and Bomkoko were more knowledgeable about political affairs. That was our impression. Kanza immediately came to us, he stayed with us quite often. He was a Lumumbist, in fact he has always been a supporter of Lumumba and he remained faithful to Lumumba after the split of Lumumba with Kasavubu.

Now, things developed very quickly in the Congo at this point, the rift came very quickly between Kasavubu and Lumumba, really. Had you anticipated this? Had you had any indication in advance that the combination was not going to work?

Oh yes. From the very beginning. First the agreement reached on the 26 of August was reached after many long and difficult discussions. It was an uneasy alliance, they were never close together. Very soon when we had our first problem with Lumumba, Kasavubu took a different stand and he has, several times, criticized the position of Lumumba and when Lumumba requested the withdrawal of the UN troops (because he did that at one time) Kasavubu
strongly denounced the decision as irresponsible. So they were never close and they split very fast. That last split, when Kasavubu decided to dismiss Lumumba and Lumumba in turn dismissed Kasavubu, it was an almost inevitable outcome of a very long feud.

JSS
And how soon was it evident was it that some of the Western countries were supporting Kasavubu?

Liu
Oh yes, there’s no doubt about it. Their sympathy went to Kasavubu.

JSS
And that was clear from the beginning?

Liu
That was clear from the beginning. In fact, there was an incident on Independence Day, during the independence ceremony which, of course, Bunche and I attended. We saw the ceremony was attended on the day by Kasavubu, the President, and Lumumba, the prime minister, and the King of Belgium, Baudouin, who came for this occasion. So Kasavubu first made a speech, a very conciliatory speech, thanking Belgium for its help and for its decision to grant Congo independence and then Lumumba rose and he made a harsh speech, fierce. He started with the history of the Congo; he recalled the very cruel way Leopold, the father of Baudouin, had treated the Congolese. They were cutting their arms sometimes when they didn’t pay the tax, and so on. A very harsh speech. At one time the Belgian king, Baudouin, was about to leave the chair, we saw that very clearly, and then his advisor would talk to
him in the ear and finally he resumed the chair. So there was a lot going on during that ceremony which showed very clearly the sympathies, the views, of the main players.

JSS

Now I believe the American ambassador in Leopoldville at that point was a man named Clare Timberlake and did the American and the British ambassadors, along with the Belgian ambassador, seek to influence the UN operations so to speak, or for that matter, was it evident they were seeking in some way to direct the policy of the new government?

Liu

They certainly tried to influence Bunche, but Bunche being Bunche was not someone you could influence very easily. He was adamantly for the UN, his integrity is steely. They certainly tried to influence but without much success and their sympathy as I said would go to Kasavubu rather than to Lumumba.

JSS

Now in these early days Dag Hammarskjold was still in New York, Ralph Bunch was in Leopoldville, was their communication quite close in these days, so that Hammarskjold knew exactly what was taking place?

Liu

Oh yes, yes. Bunche reported very regularly, first by cable and later on the communication took place through telephone. Very often. In fact - again, if I may recall an episode which is quite interesting - one of the first problems we had took place before independence when Kanza
told us that they have to choose a new name for the Congo, the former Belgian Congo. They wanted to call it the Republic of the Congo but there was a problem because the neighbor north of the Congo River (which became independent a few months before) had already chosen the name of the Republic of Congo, so they had to choose something else, but they don’t know what. Bunche said, "Of course, you’re absolutely right. Perhaps it’s better to choose something which would avoid confusion." This discussion went on for one day, one day and a half, but then the next day in the evening Kanza came to us, saying that they decided to have the Republic of Congo, even though it could lead to some confusion. But they liked the name. So Bunche cabled Hammarskjold. It was not an important matter but Bunche always reported on anything, even the least important things, to Hammarskjold. That was on Friday. Then the next day Bunche asked me to check downstairs, whether there was any cable from New York. I went downstairs, and the hotel said, "No, no cable." In the afternoon, Bunche asked me again to check. Again, the answer was negative. Then Sunday morning Bunche said, "Well, there must be a cable, go and check." I went to the hotel concierge. He said, "No, no, absolutely not," and Bunche said, "Why don’t you go to the post office and check." It was a Sunday but there was a service there, a cable service. I went there. The
man in charge was a Belgian. He said, "No, no we didn’t have anything for the UN." Then, just at that time, just when I was about to leave, a Congolese messenger came. He said, "Ah there was something, it’s called ‘UNations’." Now three days ago I went to the post office to register, to put our cable address which was always "Unations". So we choose "Unations, Leopoldville". That was duly registered. So the Congolese messenger said, "Oh yes, there was a cable addressed to Unations but you told me to send it to Palais des Nations, there was a confusion with Palais des Nations, Unations. So the cable went there." So we finally retrieved the cable. The cable just answered Ralph Bunche’s first message saying, "Well, it’s regrettable to have now the name, the same name, for two countries." That was all, but still it shows that Bunche and Hammarskjold always informed each other, on various matters, the very important and the less important ones. And they always answer the cable.

JSS

So this actually is the reason that the Congo, Leopoldville was known as that for a while, as opposed to the Congo, Brazzaville.

Liu

Yes, what was decided at headquarters was to put "Congo, Brazzaville," "Congo, Leopoldville" between brackets.

JSS

Now a fairly large number of troops began to arrive very quickly after the security Council passed its first
resolution authorizing the formation of ONUC and Ralph Bunche was technically the commander of the whole operation, is that right, in the beginning?

Yes, well perhaps I should go back a little because as you recall, the mutiny took place on the 4th of July. On the 5th of July - it took place in Thysville, a location south of Leopoldville - on the 5th of July it spread to Leopoldville so we had the first impact. During the night from the 5th to the 6th, the Belgian ambassador came to see Bunche and said that he had very disturbing news, the mutiny was spreading. The Congolese soldiers were attacking Belgian officers, and even worse, he's got the news that two Belgian women had been raped. He was receiving many calls from Belgian residents, asking him to call the troops, the Belgian troops, out of the camps, there were two military camps which the Congo ceded to Belgium. In those camps you have quite a number of Belgian soldiers, and the Belgian ambassador under the treaty of friendship and cooperation, had the right to call these troops to help maintain law and order. So he said, he's under great pressure to call his troops and he was considering doing it. Bunche immediately asked him whether he had an agreement of the Congolese government. The Belgian ambassador said that he had been talking to Lumumba and seeking his agreement but Lumumba adamantly refused. Bunche thereby said that in case you shouldn't
call the Belgian troops because you could only make the situation worse. You might protect some Belgian residents in the big city, but there were many Belgians in the country and their fate would be much worse, they would be more jeopardized with the Belgian intervention. The Belgian ambassador agreed. From then on, that’s the 6th of July, until the 10th of July, Bunche and Hammarskjold worked very closely together to get a group of UN military observers and experts to be assigned to the Congolese government in order to control the army and help maintain law and order. In order to get this, the Secretary-General would need an official request from the Congo government and he thought that if he had the request and if the request is worded as a technical assistance of a military nature rather that military assistance, he could take action on his own initiative without going to the Security Council. So that is what we were working on. Finally on the 10th of July Bunche persuaded Kasavubu and Lumumba to send jointly an official request. Unfortunately, one day later, the Belgian government decided to send Belgian troops into the Congo...

JSS

Without the permission of Lumumba?

Liu

Without the permission of Lumumba. Once this is done of course we have a wholly new situation. So Hammarskjold received on the 10th a request for technical assistance
of military nature and he was working on it, he was in contact with the Tunisian government notable to get a sizable number of Tunisian officers, and also Moroccan officers, and officers from other French-speaking countries. Once the Belgian government decided on a military intervention, this was on the 11th, the Belgian troops arrived in Luluabourg and Elizabethville and shortly after the arrival of the Belgian troops in Elizabethville, Tshombe - no doubt, with the help of the Belgian troops - proclaimed the cessation of Katanga.

With this, as I said, a wholly new situation, Kasavubu and Lumumba on the 12th of July sent another request, but this time protesting the invasion of Belgian troops and requesting UN military assistance in order to bring about the withdrawal of Belgian troops and to help the Congolese government to maintain law and order. So once this happened, Hammarskjold had to take action on the second request, discard the first request, and bring the matter to the Security Council which he did, invoking Article 99 for the first time in UN history.

JSS

Yes, I wanted to ask about that. Of course you were in the Congo at that point and not in New York, but from your knowledge, why was it necessary for Dag Hammarskjold to invoke Article 99? Why was no other country prepared to raise the matter in the Council?

Liu

I believe that the Security Council could convene without
Article 99, but I think Dag Hammarskjold wanted to stress the importance of this problem. He attached a lot of importance to this problem because as you know 1960 was the decolonization year. It was this year that the decolonization process started in full force, and he felt that what happened to the Congo would be extremely important - because of the timing, because the Congo had a unique strategic position and because also the Congo had very great natural resources. And therefore he wanted to do something in order to settle the problem in the Congo.

JSS
So in a sense you're suggesting that Hammarskjold did it in a way to emphasize the importance.

Liu
Yes, yes, yes. And also I think there was a real importance from the viewpoint of the maintenance of international peace and security because the Congo was so important that any other power vacuum could lead to the intervention of the two superpowers. In fact, as you know, the two superpowers were very closely involved in these events in the Congo.

JSS
Yes, and was that apparent in Leopoldville? I've mentioned the American ambassador and the Belgian ambassador - I'm wondering about the Russian ambassador, was he active at all at this point?

Liu
Yes, he was active. We didn't see him but he was active. He was close to Lumumba and Gizenga.
So unlike the American and Belgian and other Western ambassadors, the Soviet ambassador did not deal very much with the UN representatives.

No, not at the time.

The Secretary-General then came to the Congo shortly after this, after the Security Council resolution and could you describe the situation when he arrived in the Congo for the first time?

When he arrived the situation was already tense. At the very beginning, during the first days of independence the relationship between the UN and the Congo was excellent. It was a honeymoon. When the Security Council passed the resolution and when the first UN troops - and the first troops were the Tunisians - arrived there less than 36 hours after the adoption of the Security resolution, the relations became even better. We were immediately deployed in Leopoldville and then suddenly, the situation became quiet. There were before the arrival a lot of incidents and quite a number of casualties and when the UN arrived, everything became quiet and the Congo government welcomed the UN without any misgivings, wholeheartedly. And then we immediately started to work on the withdrawal of the Belgian troops - in fact the resolution contained two main points. It requested the Belgian government to withdraw its troops as soon as possible, then it authorized the Secretary-General to
give military assistance to the Congo government to facilitate the withdrawal of the Belgian troops and to help the government to maintain law and order. The UN plans were to bring about the withdrawal of the Belgian troops by negotiations, that is the usual practice. We are not an enforcement action, we are a peace-keeping force. So immediately Bunche initiated negotiations with the Belgian ambassador in Leopoldville.

The Belgian government's position, which was stated very clearly during the Security Council debate, is that the Belgian government had no aggressive attention at all against the Congo, what they wanted was to protect Belgian nationals, and therefore if the UN force can accomplish that role, they would withdraw immediately. So in the negotiation it was agreed that the UN was deployed in the various areas as soon as possible, and when they arrived, the Belgian troops would leave. And that would start with Leopoldville. In Leopoldville an agreement was reached, the troops arrived on the evening of the 15th of July, the Belgian troops started to withdraw on the 17th, and they completed the withdrawal on the 23rd. And the same procedure was followed everywhere else, so by the end of July, all the Belgian troops were withdrawn from the Congo except Katanga.

Now when we went, when Bunche got the agreement with the Belgians and saw Lumumba, he thought that Lumumba
would congratulate him, that Lumumba would be very pleased. But not at all - Lumumba’s reply was bitter. He told Bunche, "You don’t have to negotiate with the Belgians, you have to throw them out - and immediately." Naturally Bunche tried to explain what a peace-keeping operation was but we realized that Lumumba had not a clue of what the UN was, what it could or could not do. He thought that since the Security Council was giving him military assistance, was sending UN troops to help his government, the troops must be at his order and do what he wants. And that was the basic misunderstanding. So from then on the relationship became tense, and as the Belgian troops took some time to withdraw, he became more and more impatient.

JSS

So Mr. Bunche had made arrangements with the Belgians for the withdrawal of the Belgian forces. Mr. Lumumba was not happy, but as you were saying, the Belgian forces did for the most part withdraw, is that correct?

Liu

That’s right. According to the agreement reached between Belgian ambassador and Ralph Bunche the Belgian troops withdrew by stages. As soon as the UN troops arrived in a locality they would withdraw, and that process continued until the end of July when all Belgian troops had been withdrawn except from Katanga. Then we hit the crisis. The Belgians refused to withdraw further. They say that, "Well we will withdraw if you arrive in Katanga
first. Secondly, we cannot withdraw immediately because the Katangese authorities beg us to stay." On the other hand, Lumumba was taking the stand that the UN should go to Katanga by force if necessary, and not only go by force but go with the Congolese. So there we are caught between two very different positions. Thereupon Hammarskjold decided to go to the Congo himself and direct the operation of introducing UN troops to Katanga because he thought that that was a must. He thought that the UN could not interfere in an internal problem, which was the secession, but what the UN could do was to eliminate the Belgian interference and once the external influence had been eliminated, then the Congolese could achieve a national reconciliation. That was the way he believed the Katangese secession should be resolved. So at the beginning of August he arrived in Leopoldville, and after detailed discussion with Bunche decided to send Bunche there as a vanguard for the later arrival of the UN troops. Bunche’s mission was to get from Tshombe an agreement to let the UN troops deploy in Katanga. Secondly to advise the Secretary-General whether the UN troops should be sent right away or at a somewhat later date. So on the 4th of August, Bunche went to Katanga and I accompanied him. We saw a show of force in Katanga. Tshombe was deploying his gendarmes everywhere and he told Bunche in very adamant terms that if the UN
should send troops to Katanga there would be fight and a bloodbath. Bunche also saw the regional chiefs, the tribal chiefs, in Katanga and the Belgian authorities and after thinking over for the whole night, he decided to recommend to Hammarskjöld to delay the arrival of the UN troops. So he went immediately back to Leopoldville and Hammarskjöld decided to return to New York to get from the Security Council a stronger mandate and then come back to achieve the deployment of UN troops in Katanga.

So around the 11th of August, having secured a stronger security resolution he was back in Leopoldville. This time he decided to go to Katanga himself. On the 12th of August he went to Katanga with a group of his advisors, including myself, and his plane was followed (his plane was a DC-6) by two DC-4’s full of Swedish soldiers, 200 Swedish soldiers in all. His plan was to explain to Tshombe that he came with his personal guard; then he would leave the Swedish soldiers there who would be joined by other UN troops after that.

When we arrived in Elizabethville, at the airport of Elizabethville, that was about 1:00 p.m., the airport was full of soldiers, oil drums were placed on the runway, guns were pointing at the UN plane, and Tshombe from the tower said, "You could come, Mr. Secretary-General, alone, without your troops you would be welcome. But you cannot come with your troops." Hammarskjöld immediately
replied that he would come with his troops or not at all and during that conversation, with the guns pointing at our plane (which lasted about 15 minutes, we were circling the airport) finally Tshombe yielded and said, "Alright, you can come with your Swedish soldiers." Then we landed. At the airport Hammarskjold was greeted by Tshombe and we proceeded slowly towards the airport terminal, but just on our way (and I'm sure that was a trick of Tshombe) there was an honor guard with the Katangese flag and as Hammarskjold arrived near the honor guard the music struck and everyone stopped - and he had to stop - and he saluted, in a way, the flag. He was criticized for that, but Hammarskjold explained later that by courtesy he had to stop before the honor guard and that his gesture had no political meaning.

I wanted to ask - while Hammarskjold was in Leopoldville before going on to Katanga, had he had any discussions with the Congolese government about his proposal to go to Katanga?

Yes, he didn't see Lumumba himself, but Lumumba was informed that he was going to Katanga in order to achieve the deployment of UN troops there and the withdrawal of Belgian Soldiers. Lumumba immediately wanted Hammarskjold to take a Congolese military unit with him. Hammarskjold refused. Then Lumumba said, "At least take some of my ministers with you," and Hammarskjold refused.
Hammarskjold explained that the UN force was there to help maintain peace but it cannot interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo, or support one party against another in their internal struggle. And his plan was to achieve, to eliminate the Belgian influence, so as to pave the way for negotiations between the Congolese leaders for the peaceful resolution of the Katangese secession. Lumumba of course rejected his stand and he strongly protested against the action of the Secretary-General - that is against the decision of the Secretary-General - to go to Katanga alone without the Congolese. And actually the Secretary-General was able to leave the Swedish troops there, so in a sense this was the beginning of the deployment of UN forces in Katanga...

Absolutely. The plan devised by the Secretary-General was implemented satisfactorily from the UN viewpoint. When Hammarskjold left Elizabethville he left behind not only the 200 Swedish soldiers as a vanguard of the UN contingent in Katanga, but also a political representative of the UN, who was Mr. Ian Berendson. But when Dag Hammarskjold returned to Leopoldville the reaction of Lumumba at least was extremely negative, is that correct?

Extremely negative, violently negative. There was an exchange of letters between Hammarskjold and Lumumba and Hammarskjold decided to go back to New York to redress
the clarification of the mandate from the Security Council.

JSS And it was at this point that the Soviet representative in New York also became extremely negative toward the efforts of the UN, is that correct?

Liu Yes, in fact they had been already negative when the feud started about deployment of the UN soldiers in the rest of the Congo. They adopted a position in favor of Lumumba, that is, we should throw the Belgians out.

JSS By this time, how many UN forces were in the Congo - quite a few, I assume?

Liu Oh yes, nearly 20,000, we were nearly at the peak at that time.

JSS So in fact, with the deployment of the troops, at least some troops, in Katanga the country was really covered then for the first time...

Liu That's right, it was covered, but the secession problem was not resolved because although the Belgian forces - invading forces - had left, some Belgian military advisors remained with Tshombe.

JSS Mr. Liu, you were with the Secretary-General in this rather critical mission. Could you give your impressions of Hammarskjold's feelings, his attitudes at this point. Was he influenced at all by a sense of disillusionment with Lumumba, that you couldn't work with him? Was his attitude toward the Belgians extremely negative at this
point, how was his general attitude?

Well his attitude was that he has to implement the Security Council resolution, that was a single-minded attitude. Now Lumumba being opposed to his plan, naturally was a negative factor. Their relationship was not good, but he tried, Hammarskjold tried, very hard all the time to improve that relationship because he knew that he had to work with the Prime Minister of the Congo and that objective never left his mind. With the Belgian government, he adopted the attitude that the Belgian government must withdraw their troops from the whole of the Congo, including Katanga, and then the Belgian government should cease all help to Tshombe and as long as that was not accomplished, he would fight for it. Since Belgium still left some military advisors and probably through the Union Minière was giving financial help to the Tshombe secessionist setup, he would continue to be in a conflictual situation with the Belgian government.

And he had conversations then with Tshombe during this visit to Elizabethville, what were these conversations like?

The conversations with Tshombe were on the deployment of the UN troops. He assured Tshombe that the UN was impartial and that their goal was to help the Congolese government to maintain law and order, and that the
secession must end because this is a negative element in the pursuit of law and order in the Congo. And I believe that he maintained this position to the end. In fact before he left for Elizabethville on the 12th of August, he sent a memo, both to Lumumba and Tshombe, on the policy of the UN which was the UN will do everything possible to achieve the withdrawal of Belgian forces and will help the Congo in maintaining law and order, and therefore in helping to the extent possible in the national reconciliation effort (which according to him is the only way to resolve the secession in Katanga).

JSS Which is a question which was with him the rest of his life...

Liu That’s right, in fact he died trying to achieve his objective.

JSS So Mr. Liu, if we can continue now. I believe that it was just about at this point that Mr. Bunché returned to New York and was replaced as the Secretary-General’s representative in the Congo, temporarily I believe, by Andrew Cordier, is that right?

Liu Yes, Bunché was returning to New York on or about the 27th of August. I think he returned to New York because he had a number of important commitments there and also because he was in poor health. The Secretary-General decided to replace him by Ambassador Dayal of India, but Dayal was not available as yet and Dayal would be
available around the 5th of September, so in the intervening time they needed an acting special representative and Dag Hammarskjold decided to appoint Andrew Cordier to that Post.

JSS
Now by that time had an agreement been reached by the Congolese government on the status of the UN forces?

Liu
Oh well, at the very beginning we had an outline of the agreement (the status of forces agreement) signed. That was done just a few days after the arrival of the first troops. It was signed by Ralph Bunche for the UN and by Gizenga who was the Vice Prime Minister and Bomboko the Foreign Minister.

JSS
So that that had been arranged...

Liu
That's right. It was the outline of an agreement and it was decided a fuller agreement would be concluded later on. So I think that question was settled.

JSS
Could you describe what you recall as the situation in the Congo at this point when Cordier arrived?

Liu
Well the situation was quite tense. The relationship between the UN and the Congolese government as led by Lumumba was tense, was not good. There were a number of incidents, I mentioned earlier the incident at the airport when a Canadian logistic staff was beaten up, roughed up, by Congolese soldiers. And we had a number of these incidents. During the months of July, around the 20th of July, Lumumba sent the ANC, that is the Armeé
Nationale Congolaise to Kasai to put down a kind of uprising by the Balubas. There was a massacre of more that 1,000 civilians in the village which Dag Hammarskjold qualified as genocide. So the situation is quite tense. On this Bunche left and Andrew Cordier arrived to take over, temporarily, the direction of ONUC.

JSS And you mentioned that the Congolese army had been sent to the Kasai. Most of the troops that were loyal to Lumumba, then, were outside of Leopoldville, at that time?

Liu Yes, they were fighting against the Kasai, there were also some troops in North Katanga.

JSS Now at this point the UN staff in Leopoldville, presumably in contact with the Secretary-General, considered one of its major responsibilities to be the maintenance of some kind of public order.

Liu Well yes, that was very much in the mandate of the UN. We were to assist the government in maintaining law and order. And we did, with the troops and also with an important body of policemen, civilian police, from Ghana.

JSS Who functioned as civilian peace-keepers, then?

Liu That's right. They were policemen, you see, and they were working in cooperation with Congolese police.

JSS And was it at this point then that the question arose about the airport in Leopoldville?

Liu Not yet, not yet. That came when the constitutional
crisis started. That crisis broke out on the 5th of September. In the afternoon of that day around 6:00 President Kasavubu went to the radio station of Leopoldville and broadcast a statement during which he said that the government was ineffective, was not fulfilling its responsibility and therefore he decided to dismiss Prime Minister Lumumba in accordance with an article of the Loi Fundamentale, the Basic law, which serves as the constitution for the new Republic of the Congo. Then two hours later we heard on the radio station a statement by Lumumba who said that he rejected the decision of Kasavubu as illegal and he, in turn, dismissed the President. And then these two statements set off what we called the constitutional crisis. Lumumba on the same day made two other speeches on the radio - very violent ones - calling the population of Leopoldville to rise and to fight with the government against the subversive elements. And at the same time there was a lot of unrest in Leopoldville because there were pro-Lumumba and pro-Kasavubu elements fighting against each other.

JSS
And if I could go back just a minute, before Mr. Kasavubu made his announcement on the radio, had he consulted with the UN representatives there in Leopoldville?

Liu
Yes, well he saw Cordier; he was not telling Cordier that he was going to dismiss Lumumba and so on but he was
going to do something in order to put things right, as he said and Cordier cautioned him to act very prudently and not to go beyond the constitutional law, the *Loi Fundamentale*.

JSS

Was there a general feeling among the UN people there at this point that actually it would be easier for the UN to achieve its mandate of restoring some kind of order and civility if Lumumba were no longer around?

Liu

I guess so, I guess so. There is a sense, a certain feeling, that if Lumumba could change his policy or someone more amenable to more cooperation with the UN were taking over it would be better, but that was only a thought some dealing with ONUC you see.

JSS

Did the President Kasavubu make any suggestion with regard to the airport or the radio station before taking any action?

Liu

No, no. After the beginning of the constitutional crisis we didn’t see any leaders for the time being. We received many calls for protection, and so on, and we told them we would do whatever we could to help. On the other hand our personnel, our force, was limited and naturally we couldn’t give special protection to everyone. Now during that same night, among rumors and information of unrest and rioting, within the UN Cordier met with his principal advisors. I recall there was a very tense meeting - were were about 20. In addition to
Cordier we had Linnér who was a special representative. The deputy force commander, General Kattani of Morocco, the chief of staff of the UN force, General Yasu of Ethiopia, we had General Rikhye who, as I said before, was the military advisor of the Secretary-General who was sent to the Congo to help. I was there - there were quite a number of people. And we were discussing how we could help maintain law and order and ensure the protection of the civilian population and in particular, of the political leaders, and it was a very hard decision. You see when we discuss, as we do now in the serenity of the room in Bronxville or in New York when everything is alright, there is no problem, things look different. But here we were amid pandemonium, you see. There were constantly telephone calls asking for our help, informing us of incidents, of fighting, and we thought, "We have to do something about it." The danger of a bloodbath was very real. So at that time we thought it was difficult to remember who made the suggestion before - we thought that we should close the airport to prevent Congolese armies stranded outside Leopoldville to come in Leopoldville to fight against the pro-Lumumba or pro-Kasavubu elements of the army. We should also do something about the very inflammatory statements being broadcast from the radio station, and we thought the best way to do it is to close it. And finally, after lots of
hesitation, Andrew Cordier decided both to close the airport and the radio station. In hindsight, it was a mistake, but at that time in Leopoldville we thought that was the only way to prevent the bloodbath in Leopoldville.

JSS
And was there an immediate reaction from the various diplomatic representatives at that point?

Liu
Yes, the next day. A number of African diplomatic representatives - I think diplomats from Ghana, Guinea, Tunisia, who came and said that they were against this decision.

JSS
And I presume Mr. Lumumba was very unhappy?

Liu
Yes of course he was very unhappy.

JSS
And did he make his unhappiness known, or were relations already broken between...

Liu
Relations were already bad but they became worse.

JSS
And in effect at this point, in the view of the UN representatives there was not a constitutional government, is that correct?

Liu
There was no constitutional government, no, no. The situation was very confused, very confused. So the President was not operative, the Prime Minister was also not operative, the Parliament theoretically was still there but they couldn’t meet, you see. So the situation was very confused. On the other hand, when I say the relationship between the UN and the Prime Minister became
worse, that was true, and yet on the other hand Lumumba asked protection from the UN as did the President Kasavubu and many other political leaders.

JSS And this protection was in fact given to Lumumba?

Liu That’s right. We decided – or Cordier decided – to give special protection to Kasavubu and Lumumba because they were very special, not only because of their high positions but also because we considered these two leaders were essential for the UN effort which we were going to start to achieve national reconciliation.

JSS And these then were the only two who were given protection?

Liu Well, what we did is this. We said The UN force is too small to give special protection to all political leaders so what we did is, I received all the calls from them. We told them that we would take their addresses, where they are, and we will ask the UN patrols – and we are going to increase the patrols – to go near their places and give a check from time to time. This is the protection we gave to the normal political leaders, and we make two exceptions and those were the guards which were put at the disposal, or for the protection of Kasavubu and Lumumba.

JSS And at this point had you come into contact yet with Mr. Mobutu?

Liu In fact, Mr. Mobutu came to see us and he was very
worried, he was scared even, and he wanted to go back to his village and we told him, "No, you should stay here and you are the Army, you are the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army must be impartial and keep an impartial and neutral position during the crisis. But you are very important because the Army in this case would be a sort of guarantee of the state." And then he agreed to stay. At that point that was the only thing we told him. But I got the information later on that after seeing us he went to see Lumumba because he was a protégé of Lumumba, he became Secretary of State in Lumumba's government, for information. He went to Lumumba but Lumumba didn't see him; Lumumba was too busy and he waited, waited for a long time and finally he left. Then he went to see Kasavubu. Kasavubu received him immediately, was very friendly to him. I think these two meetings shaped his policy later on.

**JSS**

But at this point you didn't recognize him as the person who was going to lead a coup...

**Liu**

Oh not at all, I think he was the person who wanted to leave, he wanted to go back to his village.

**JSS**

In this connection I wanted to ask, what were the major sources of information for the UN staff there concerning political developments within the Congolese community?

**Liu**

Well our major sources were the two ministers with whom we had close relations, that's Bomboko and Ianza. They
informed us of what's happened and they told us of the positions of the various governments. Naturally we saw Kasavubu and Lumumba and we discussed with them and we advised restraint.

JSS
But you did not have any information flowing to you from the diplomatic missions, for example?

Liu
Yes, yes, well we were also in close contact with various ambassadors, particularly Ambassador Timberlake of the United States and Ambassador Scott of the UK.

JSS
How would you characterize Ambassador Timberlake, by the way?

Liu
Well I knew him, I did not know him too well you see, I knew him because I attended the meetings he had with Dr. Bunche, with Cordier. He of course followed US policy and therefore he was in favor of Kasavubu and rather hostile to Lumumba.

JSS
Was there any effort made on his part or on the part of the Belgians or others to influence the UN to be more supportive of Kasavubu, or was this simply a natural course of events?

Liu
No, I don't think so. I think after the outbreak of the constitutional crisis they didn't give any advice there.

JSS
So we come now to the situation where Mr. Lumumba is in his house being protected by UN guards and he decides to leave. What was your position in the UN on that, that there was no responsibility to keep him there, or what...
Yes, when we agreed to give him a measure of protection, like assigning a small unit of UN soldiers, the mandate of the UN force was to be stationed around his residence. We were to prevent any attack from outside against the residence with purpose of harming the Prime Minister. But they were also instructed not to restrict in any way the freedom of movement of the Prime Minister because it was important that the Prime Minister was not the prisoner of the UN, we were there only to protect him. Now soon after the arrival of the UN soldiers around the residence of the Prime Minister, Kasavubu with his now ally Mobutu, sent a group of Congolese soldiers to arrest Lumumba and then when they were prevented from doing so by the UN soldiers they surrounded the UN soldiers. So around the residence we have two rings - residence, then the first ring of UN soldiers and then a second ring of Congolese soldiers. But it's not tight, some people came and went from the residence outside - in fact Lumumba went outside his residence on several occasions. But on one occasion he went to the Congolese army camp in order to rally the Congolese soldiers who wanted to kill him because of the recent massacre of their tribesman in Kasai. Lumumba was saved only by the Ghanaian soldiers who were at the camp. In fact there was a very tense meeting, the special representative, now Ambassador Dayal and myself went there and we saw him and Lumumba was very
mad at the Ghanaians because the Ghanaians didn’t want him to leave.

Because they were afraid for his safety?

Because they were afraid for his safety, and he was mad at Colonel Ankwa who was the commander of the Ghanaian contingent who later became the President of Ghana. Colonel Ankwa was trying to protect him and he was being criticized by Lumumba. Anyway, after a rather long talk, Lumumba agreed to leave and to return to his residence and the UN protection.

Going back just for a minute, at this point, Ambassador Dayal has replaced Mr. Cordier as the special representative?

Yes.

But before that when Mr. Cordier took the decision to close the airport and shut down the radio, was there consultation with New York, close consultation with New York?

Well there were constant exchanges of cables. In the cables nothing was said but Cordier told me that he had a special code with the Secretary-General and that he was reporting regularly to the Secretary-General and he said that the decision had the endorsement of Dag Hammarskjold. But that is very difficult to prove because we don’t have any cables raising this question since everything seemingly was in secret code which no
one knew except Hammarskjöld and Cordier.

JSS And what was Dayal’s attitude when he got there and took over under these circumstances?

Liu Oh he was extremely unhappy, he was mad at the circumstances. He said that if he had known the problems of the Congo and the relationship between the UN and the Congolese government he would not have accepted the job.

JSS And basically he did not approve of what Mr. Cordier had done?

Liu No, no.

JSS By this time, if we go back to New York for a moment now, the situation in New York was also extremely difficult, very difficult to get any agreement out through the Council I think, or even the General Assembly.Were there repercussions among the staff in the Congo from the political dissension in New York because of the fact the Secretary-General couldn’t really get guidance from the Security Council?

Liu I think we were a little bit lost, actually, but we have our chief who is the Secretary-General; therefore we relied on him. The Secretary-General of course was very unhappy about the decision concerning the airport and the radio station, but, Hammarskjöld being Hammarskjöld, never accused publicly Cordier because he accepted the responsibility.

JSS And at this point, I think again in New York a committee
was formed (at I suppose the Secretary-General's suggestion) composed of the representatives of the troops' donor countries. Was this a useful undertaking as far as the field operations were concerned, the fact there was at least somebody that the Secretary-General could work with and get some guidance from.

Oh yes, it's very useful, in fact - you're referring to the Advisory Committee on the Congo. In fact, the ACC has a precedent: when Hammarskjold created UNEF I, the first UN Emergency Force, which was the first UN peacekeeping force, he had established an ACC composed of representatives of contributing countries. In this case, as soon as the UN force was back in the Congo, he had a similar ACC and that committee met quite often to advise the Secretary-General on what to do. It was a very useful organization because it shared responsibility with the Secretary-General for this extremely complex and important operation.

And in the Congo itself by this time a number of Soviet transport plans had arrived and other equipment. Was the UN able in any way to influence the way this equipment was utilized?

No, no. As I said earlier, when Dag Hammarskjold set up the assistance, the civilian assistance operation, his idea was that all assistance must be channeled through the UN but when the split developed between the UN and
Lumumba, Lumumba requested Soviet help. The Soviets sent some help, not all the help requested by Lumumba but they sent a large number of trucks. They were used by Lumumba. We were not able to influence the use of those vehicles.

JSS
Now, there were still at this point Belgian forces in Katanga, is that right?

Liu
Yes, now Belgian troops were leaving faster - we are in September now?

JSS
Right, right.

Liu
No, no, all the Belgian troops left, even Katanga, but the Belgian government assigned a number of Belgian military officers as military advisors for Tshombe. So there are a number of military advisors, there were no Belgian troops...

JSS
No troops as such, because Mr. Dayal at one point I believe in November issued a report criticizing the continued presence of Belgian technicians and advisors. They were in Katanga, right?

Liu
They were advisors in Katanga, but the Belgian technicians were coming back to Leopoldville and I think the criticism of Dayal included those also.

JSS
Now I judge that Mr. Dayal was viewed with some suspicion by some of the Western missions in the Congo?

Liu
Yes, definitely, particularly by the US and UK embassies.

JSS
Why was that?
Liu: Well I really don’t know but I believe that Dayal as an Indian diplomat and statesman and his stand was rather in favor of the Lumumba group although later on his relations with Lumumba would deteriorate. When he came I think that his stand was very similar to the stand adopted by the Indian government, I think this might be a reason.

JSS: Which was in fact sympathetic to Lumumba.

Liu: It was sympathetic to Lumumba, and in fact Dayal wanted to be impartial but I think his sympathy went to the Lumumba side of the government.

JSS: Now we’ve reached the point I think in November when Lumumba left his house. And didn’t come back. Was there an appreciation on the part of the UN staff that this was a serious development?

Liu: Yes, oh yes. A very serious development. I was at that time in New York, back in New York. When this happened we received a very urgent cable and we were all worried. The UN in Leopoldville was worried and the UN in New York was extremely worried. It was at that point that Dag Hammarskjold suggested the establishment of a UN Conciliation Commission composed of the African and Asian representatives of troop-contributing countries.

JSS: You think that was inspired then by Lumumba’s departure...

Liu: Yes, the arrest of Lumumba, the detention of Lumumba.
JSS Now could you comment a little bit on the whereabouts of the UN forces at this point? The UN guards were aware when Lumumba left but did you know where he was going, which direction he went in?

Liu Yes, well he left very early one morning. We were aware that he was leaving but as I said, the UN soldiers were not to restrict his freedom of movement in any way. We didn’t know where he was leaving - only later did we learn that he was proceeding towards Stanleyville where his followers (including Gizenga, the Deputy Prime Minister in his government) had established a provisional government. So he was going there apparently to take over the new de facto government.

JSS Was there also the question of the death of his daughter at this point?

Liu Oh yes, yes, absolutely. His daughter had died, and one of the reasons he gave was to attend the funeral of the daughter. Now he was arrested somewhere in the Kasai near Port Francqui. I understand that when he went into a village he was making a speech, and then he was discovered, and there were a strong ANC, pro-Mobutu group who went there and arrested him.

JSS And how soon were you aware in Leopoldville that this arrest had taken place?

Liu Oh just one or two days later.

JSS And then he ended up in Elizabethville....

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No, in Thysville. In Thysville there is a big ANC camp and he was detained in Thysville.

Right. Were there UN soldiers there who saw his arrival?

I'm not sure. But we know that he was detained in Thysville and I know that in particular because I was the secretary to the Conciliation Commission which was sent to achieve conciliation but also with the immediate goal to try to see Lumumba and try to get him liberated.

What was the real purpose of the Conciliation Commission? Was it conciliation between the two factions, that is between...

But more than two factions - it was to achieve a national conciliation. Now at that time the Congo was divided into four de facto governments - you have the Tshombe secessionists in Elizabethville in Katanga, we had another secession in Kasai led by Kalonji; as I said earlier, the Lumumbists with Gizenga had a de facto government in Stanleyville, and finally in Leopoldville we have the Kasavubu-Mobutu group. By that time Mobutu has already established a College des Commissaires, a College of Commissioners; he had decided to take over and he had appointed a government composed of university graduates - that was called the College of Commissioners.

So you have four de facto governments at that time. The aim of the conciliation Commission is to conciliate the various leaders and help reestablish the national unity.
government in Leopoldville.

JSS  And you tried to see Lumumba at that point?

Liu  As soon as we arrived in Leopoldville at the very beginning of 1961 we went to see President Kasavubu and we told him in no uncertain terms that he must see Lumumba.

JSS  But this did not succeed.

Liu  No, well Kasavubu hedged, he said, well he’d do whatever he could to arrange a meeting. But it was very difficult, there were many problems. He needed some time. So we told him almost every day, every day we urged him to arrange the meeting but he never did. He always hedged and said some problem had to be resolved before he could arrange for a meeting. And then finally we learned that Lumumba escaped from his camp and, as you know, later on it was found that he was murdered in Katanga.

JSS  Did you also try to see Tshombe at this point?

Liu  Well, it was the Commission’s aim to seek all the leaders. While we were in Leopoldville we saw naturally Kasavubu because he was still the President, and as you know, the General Assembly recognized the delegation sent by Kasavubu as the legitimate delegation. Kasavubu was the President, he was the only political leader generally recognized. We saw Kasavubu and we saw a number of other leaders, including Adoula. Adoula, who was a senator,
was one of the best; he was reasonable, he was intelligent, and he very much wanted to save the Congo and we gave him a lot of time and attention.

JSS

Now it was just about this time if I'm not mistaken that the administration changed in Washington, that President Kennedy became the president and Adlai Stevenson became the Permanent Representative. Did you in the Congo, or for that matter in New York, detect fairly soon a change in the US policy towards the Congo?

Liu

Yes, yes. There was no doubt that we detected a change for the better and also more help for the UN operation in the Congo.

JSS

So that it was a more positive attitude... but still strong support, well at this point was it for Kasavubu or for Mobutu?

Liu

They were for Kasavubu. Of course there is a good reason because Kasavubu is the President recognized by the General Assembly. But that certainly the sympathy went to them.

JSS

And on the question of Katanga, was a difference in attitude seen there, or was the American attitude already in favor of the reintegration of the Congo?

Liu

Yes, a change here too. But the US was never for the secession, the policy was also against the secession; but there was a degree in the support given to the UN in its effort to fight secession. Certainly after Kennedy took
over we received much more support, moral and material. Now for a more general question. As you mentioned earlier, the UN civilian operation played a very important part in the administration of the Congo at this time after they departure of many Belgians. How effective was that, how effective did you think the UN performance was?

I think it was quite effective, particularly in light of the very difficult situation prevailing there. At that everything collapsed, ministries were not functioning, electricity, the water companies were not functioning, the essential services were badly neglected. So when we went in we sent in technicians for the most important organizations and bodies. We appointed a very distinguished economist, financier, from Switzerland, Victor Umbricht to be the chief economic advisor. He was appointed by the Congolese government as the head of the monetary council which is a kind of central bank he therefore was directing the economy of the Congo and the monetary council. In fact, thanks to his efforts the Congolese currency had its value during the first phase of the UN operation. Then we had advisors in every main ministry to advise the ministers and we had technicians for the electricity company, the water company, the transport, inaudible in fact, everywhere. And this was essential to keep the country from collapsing.
JSS
The UN did well then, in your opinion.

Liu
I believe that it was essential, you see, we enabled the country to continue.

JSS
Now, I'd like to move because the tape is almost over to one really final question. This had to do with the Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s determination to see Tshombe, presumably in pursuit of the same objective as the Conciliation Commission, that it should somehow bring an end to the secession...

Liu
Yes, well Hammarskjold’s plan, well he said that I’m here to help the Congo. The Un force can do much directly to facilitate or bring about a withdrawal of the Belgian troops. But the UN cannot deal with the secession, the problem of secession because it’s an internal question. But the Un can help in two ways. Since the secession was brought about with the help of Belgium - Belgian advisors, the Belgian military, after all secession was declared on the very day when the Belgian troops invaded the Congo and Katanga - by eliminating the Belgian influence, military and political, I prepare the ground for national conciliation and then we can push the national conciliation - that is, get Tshombe to reconcile, to change his position toward the government.

JSS
In January 1961 you were back in the Congo, is that correct, with the Conciliation Commission?

Liu
That's right, in fact at that time our objective was to
see Lumumba and find a way to have him liberated.

Because you didn’t know exactly where he was, at that point?

Well we knew at the beginning that he was in the Thysville army camp - we knew that. In fact in our many meetings with President Kasavubu we wanted Kasavubu to arrange for a meeting between Lumumba and the Conciliation Commission - either in Leopoldville or at the Thysville camp.

I see. Now at this point, given the situation with Lumumba, a number of countries had threatened to withdraw their forces, is that correct?

Yes, and they did it mainly after the death of Lumumba.

And did this seriously weaken the UN operation?

Well at the beginning it did because the strength the force was brought down dramatically, but Hammarskjold got new troops, mainly from India.

Financial problems began about the same time also, is that correct?

That’s right, yes.

So that on the whole it was a discouraging time in terms of the operation?

Yes, it was very discouraging time because immediately after Lumumba when our force was brought down dramatically, the situation in the Congo got worse. In fact there was a very real danger of a flareup of the
civil war between the four de facto governments that existed in the Congo. So much so that the Security Council passed a resolution in which for the first time it authorized the UN force to use force in order to prevent civil war.

JSS Could you describe a bit the function of the Conciliation Commission as it was deployed in the Congo?

Liu Well the Conciliation Commission has as mandate to see all the leaders of the Congo, including Katanga actually, and to facilitate their reconciliation with as aim the establishment of a national reconciliation and national unity government.

JSS And this is why you were interested in trying to see Mr. Lumumba at this point?

Liu Yes, we have always thought that in order to achieve the conciliation among the Congolese leaders we must achieve conciliation between the two main leaders of the time, that is Kasavubu and Lumumba. In order to achieve that conciliation we must get Lumumba liberated.

JSS But this failed, you were unable to see Lumumba...

Liu We were unable, Kasavubu hedged, gave all kinds of pretexts every time we saw him, and finally we learned - first, that he was transferred to Katanga and later on, that he died there.

JSS They's one thing I want to be clear about. When the Commission arrived it was known that Lumumba was at this
Thysville camp, right? And were they UN forces there, or not?

Liu

Nearby, but not too near the camp, you see.

JSS

So they were not in the immediate vicinity..

Liu

No. You know, we had at the peak about 20,000 soldiers and that's not too many soldiers for a big country like the Congo, so our deployment was rather thin.

JSS

So, just to return a moment, while Lumumba was still in Leopoldville, he was afforded some protection by the UN forces.

Liu

That's right. We sent two military units, one to protect the residence of Lumumba and the other to protect the residence of Kasavubu.

JSS

But in Thysville, this was not the case, he was not receiving UN protection at that point...

Liu

No, he was a prisoner, he was a detainee - we had some soldiers nearby but we couldn't protect him, no, we had no control, we had no access to him.

JSS

So there was nothing you could do, nothing that the UN forces could do, when he was taken from there to Elizabethville.

Liu

No, what the UN could do and what the UN did was to try to get Lumumba protected, and later on if possible liberated through negotiation, and you have three series of negotiations going on. Hammarskjold at Headquarters was negotiating with the delegations, the special
representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Dayal, was negotiating with Kasavubu and Mobutu, and the Conciliation Commission had a third set of negotiations, also with Kasavubu and Mobutu mainly in Leopoldville at that time.

Meanwhile in New York the situation had become more critical because of the increasingly hostile attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Secretary-General.

That’s right, and immediately after the death of Lumumba the Soviet Union demanded the dismissal of Hammarskjold and refused to have any dealings with the Secretary-General.

Could you describe then the situation as you perceived it at that point on the spot in the Congo?

Well at that time there was a real danger of a flareup of a civil war, and in fact there was quite a lot of fighting here and there. So the UN policy was to prevent the civil war and this time there was a resolution of the Security Council authorizing it to use force. Naturally still, authorization or no authorization, we must be very careful because you can use force, really, if you have enough force to use and you have always to be careful once you use force, you know how to start but you never know how to stop.

Now it was at this point I believe that Dag Hammarskjold decided to make changes in his immediate staff, both in
New York and also in the Congo, partly because of criticism of the over-representation of Americans. Can you say anything about the new person who was assigned in the Congo was Mr. Khiary and in New York Cordier's job was changed - what was the atmosphere at this point, how was this interpreted by you and by others dealing with the Congo?

Well, first at Headquarters, Hammarskjold did decide to remove Cordier from his cabinet. Cordier was given the new function of Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs. Cordier had been dealing with the General Assembly anyway for a long time so that was really not a new function for him. But he left the cabinet in order to concentrate on the General Assembly affairs. The post of chef de cabinet was given to Narasimhan immediately. That was a change. Bunche remained the same. Dag Hammarskjold would not change Ralph Bunche for any reason. Now in the Congo, the special representative was still Ambassador Dayal, but Dayal had expressed a desire to withdraw, to retire, because he said that he could no longer carry out his functions because of the bad relationship between him and Kasavubu. So later on, soon Dag Hammarskjold appointed Mekki Abbas as special representative and when Mekki Abbas left at his request, the post was given to Linnér, but with a new title. Instead of special representative his title was Officer-
in-Charge in the Congo. I believe that this was done because Hammarskjold wanted to lower the responsibility of the post. Then when Linnér was switched from Chief of Civilian Operations to the post of Officer-in-Charge, Khiary was appointed as Chief of Civilian Operations, therefore the number two to Linnér.

JSS
Now at this point just to bring your personal participation into perspective, did you return to New York or did you stay in the Congo?

Liu
No, I returned to New York with the Conciliation Commission and then I stayed in Bunche’s office. I was officially transferred to his office. I stayed in that office and dealt with the Congo operations from New York.

JSS
I wanted to ask you in this connection, and the changes in the Congo and in New York to a certain extent, was the same close liaison and communication maintained as in the case earlier or was there less satisfactory communication between Leopoldville and headquarters in New York?

Liu
Well I think the relationship in theory was the same. We were dealing with the Congo from New York in the same way, but of course the personality of the chief of mission is important. Certainly there is less close relationship between Linnér and the Secretary-General than between Bunche and Dayal with the Secretary-General.

JSS
Would you say then that a point was arriving where the Secretary-General did not have the close rapport, with
the UN representative in Leopoldville and also in the Congo because this is the point where Mr. Cruise O'Brien was designated for the Katanga.

Liu

Yes, yes, that's correct. But again, it's not a question of posts, it's rather a question of persons. I think Linnér and Conor Cruise O'Brien were not the right persons for the job so therefore there were some problems, difficulties.

JSS

Do you think this affected the UN operations?

Liu

Yes, it did affect the operations and in fact it caused the death of Hammarskjold. There was at that time a very deep misunderstanding and I think it was this misunderstanding which led to the fighting in Katanga in August-September, 1961 which led the Secretary-General to agree to see Tshombe. He would not have seen Tshombe otherwise but he thought that there was a misunderstanding which had to be clarified and he was willing to take the extraordinary step of seeing Tshombe in the Ndola, that is outside the territory of the Congo, because of this misunderstanding and because he thought that the fighting had to be stopped anyhow.

JSS

Now were you with the Secretary-General at that point in the Congo.

Liu

No, I was at headquarters and when the Secretary-General decided to go to the Congo to resolve the problem he took Wieschoff with him who was his advisor for African
affairs. And Bunche and I remained at Headquarters.

You were in fairly close contact with the Secretary-General as he reached Leopoldville because he was reporting back, I believe.

Yes, yes, constant contact, very close contact. In fact, just before arriving in Leopoldville he sent a cable to Bunche in which he expressed sadness over what happened in the Congo and we had the impressions that he learned at that time that something had gone wrong in the Congo, that his instructions had not been carried out. In fact that he had been betrayed by the leadership of ONYC in the Congo. That was an impression, he never said that, but Bunche told me that cable was very strange. He was a bit bitter and he said he was rushing to Leopoldville in order to go deeper into this problem. I believe what happens is, you know the fighting which started in August, 1961 was started by the UN, in fact. Khiary went to Elizabethville with some warrant for the arrest of the Congolese leaders, we never knew that.

With the Katangese....

With Kantangese leaders, we never knew that. Khiary had that from the Congo government warrant arrest, therefore he went there determined to use force and then fighting started. As you know, Conor Cruise O’Brien wrote a book later on and in his book he thought that Dag Hammarskjold had ordered the use of force which led to the start of
this new round of fighting and then he tried to carry out that mandate and then after the fighting, when Dag Hammarskjöld denied that he had given such order Conor Cruise O’Brien believed that he was betrayed. He thought that Dag Hammarskjöld changed his mind because of the events in Katanga. But Dag Hammarskjöld I’m quite sure never changed his mind because he never gave this order. That order was given by Linnér, or rather by Khiary acting on behalf of Linnér.

JSS
But it is your impression that Conor Cruise O’Brien felt that the order had been given by somebody?

Liu
Yes, he was convinced, I think, that Dag Hammarskjöld himself gave the order and changed the policy after the fighting went the wrong way.

JSS
Now you and Bunche in New York, what was your impression from that distance (New York) of the steps that Conor Cruise O’Brien was taking in Katanga? I assume there was fairly continuous reporting from Elizabethville.

Liu
Yes, well Hammarskjöld was appalled by what happened; that’s why he decided to go to the Congo to look into the matter. As I said, I believe that on the way, even before he reached Leopoldville, he received some information which led him to believe that the UN was at fault, that some mandate was given without his authorization. That is my distinct impression.

JSS
And then the next event really was the death of
Hammarskjold.

Liu

That's right. After arriving in Leopoldville, he decided to meet with Tshombe in Ndola in order to discuss these problems and arrange for a ceasefire. And as you know his plane crashed just before he arrived in Ndola.

JSS

Now I want to stop at this point to ask you some rather general questions, Mr. Liu, about your conclusions, if I can put it that way, relative to the overall UN operation in the Congo and its ultimate result. There were of course after the death of Hammarskjold further disturbances and it was a while before the Katanga secession ceased. But one can say I think that this was in fact a turning point. After that it came to a climax, a denouement, in the Congo. How would you assess the whole operation that you were so close to from the beginning to the end?

Liu

Well, the UN operation in the Congo was certainly the largest, the most difficult, the most controversial operation in UN history. But I believe that in the end it was a great success. We have to remember that in the beginning when the crisis started, the Congo was in a terrible state - it was total chaos. The country had collapsed and if nothing was done, there would be a power vacuum which could very well lead to a major world crisis involving the direct intervention of the two superpowers. So the situation was extremely serious. We went there,
we had many problems, including the death of Lumumba and the death of the Secretary-General. But in the end we achieved the main purposes - the Belgian troops were withdrawn, the mercenaries were withdrawn. When the UN left the Congo in June 1964, there was a national reconciliation of all Congolese leaders; the national unity government was set up in Leopoldville, the capital - the secession had ended without the bloodbath. The essential services have been maintained, and perhaps most important of all, we have avoided a direct military confrontation between the two superpowers on the problem of the Congo. So it was a great success - but the operation was criticized and I think the main traumatic event was the death of Lumumba. To this day some Africans still blame the UN for the death of Lumumba and the Soviet Union as you know broke its relations completely with the Secretary-General. But I think the criticisms leveled against Dag Hammarskjold were unfair because when the constitutional crisis broke out we did everything possible to protect Lumumba. We sent a unit especially to protect him, and when he left, he left on his own will, he wanted to go, we could not stop him, he was not our prisoner, and he was caught. After he was caught Dag Hammarskjold did everything possible, made every effort, first, to insure that he be treated humanely and secondly, to try to secure his release. We
couldn't do it because mainly of the negative attitude of Kasavubu and Mobutu. We did everything possible, short, of course, of using force.

**JSS**

What would you say the weaknesses were on the side of the UN, weaknesses which perhaps have some lessons in it for the future?

**Liu**

Well, I believe that the UN was not ready at that time for an operation as involved, as complex as the Congo. 20,000 troops - that is the largest force ever in UN history - were not enough to maintain law and order. And the main problem, the main problem which the UN couldn't remedy was the lack of preparation for the independence of the Congo - the Congo was not ready for independence, there was not enough administrators, military officers, engineers, doctors. At the time of independence there were only 17 university graduates for the whole of the Congo.

**JSS**

Let me go to the military side for just a moment. You say there were more than 20,000 troops which is a very large force for the UN. In some cases the troops were not well disciplined, I believe, or at least did not know exactly how troops should conduct themselves under these circumstances. My question is, would it have been helpful if these troops had some advance training in peace-keeping?

**Liu**

Oh, certainly, certainly, you're absolutely right. I
believe that the training of UN troops is a major question even now. I believe a UN force could be more efficient if the troops were better trained, there is also the question of logistics. You see, we didn’t have enough logistic facilities. So all these things could be remedied in time and I believe in the UN now some thought is given to the necessity of training troops, of having earmarked troops, and having of course adequate logistic and financial support.

JSS
Now if I may I would like to go back for a minute because there is one area that we have left uncovered, which is of interest. In addition to Katanga there was for a while a separate administration in Stanleyville where Mr. Gizenga was, but that was not considered a secession, I believe. Can you comment on this, how was that quasi government looked on by the UN?

Liu
Gizenga’s government was a de facto government based in Stanleyville. They wanted to be the government of the whole of the Congo, not to have the Oriental Province secede from the Congo.

JSS
So it was an alternative government, then.

Liu
It was an alternative government, it was a civilian struggle. They were fighting for the political power with the de facto government in Leopoldville and in Kasai. It’s not a formal secession. In Kasai is half and half, but they never declared official secession,
that is taking part of the territory of the national
territory of the Congo.

How did the UN representative deal with the Gizenga
regime in Stanleyville if at all? Or did you have no
contact?

No, no, we had some contact because we have some troops
there. And also during this various series of
conciliation efforts we, of course, tried to get all the
leaders together.

At that point I suppose there was actually no
constitutional government to recognize?

That's right, from the 5th of September on there were no
constitutional governments, there were four de facto
governments. The aim of the UN was to facilitate the
national reconciliation of the leaders and the
establishment of a national unity government. That has
to be done with the reopening of the parliament and that
objective was achieved in October 1961. In October 1961
all the leaders agreed to reopen parliament under UN
protection. We got all the leaders except Katanga,
Katanga leaders at the last moment refused to come. So
we had the parliament, we open with all the leaders, all
the representatives except the Katangese. They
unanimously approved a new government headed by Prime
Minister Adoula. With this we considered the
constitutional crisis as settled. From then on the aim
of the UN was to end the secession of Katanga through negotiation and through the elimination of foreign influence. And this led to a series of fighting and finally to an agreement by Tshombe to come back.

Now that leads me to the second question I wanted to catch up on. Mr. Adoula was named Prime Minister at that point and I know that there was major contact between the UN representatives and Adoula. What was the relationship with Mr. Mobutu at this point because he was still very much in the picture.

Yes, but he, he was very much in the picture but officially he was the head of the Congolese army and as the head of the Congolese army, of course, he was under Adoula’s control. The control was very loose but we didn’t go into that. But anyway after the establishment, the election of the Adoula government, our position was quite simple. We deal with Adoula.

And only with Mobutu on military matters, if at all?

Yes, if at all.

And that posed no problems?

No, no, at that time it was Adoula you see.

And did that last then throughout the whole period of ONUC, that is until 1964? The dealings were with Adoula and not with Mobutu?

That’s right, in fact it was Adoula who encouraged us to take those various actions in Katanga and I said at one
point that in August 1961 Khiary exceeded the mandate given by the Secretary-General since he accepted from Adoula some warrants for arrest of Katangese leaders.

JSS
Was there a sense that Mobutu was already actually in control?

Liu
No, I don’t think so, I think so long as Adoula was Prime Minister he was in fairly firm control of Mobutu, Mobutu was under him. There was no problem.

JSS
So that this was a period of consolidation and it was a real consolidation of governmental power in the Congo.

Liu
Yes, yes. In fact immediately after the establishment of the Adoula government, U Thant, then the Secretary-General, sent a letter which promised all help from the UN to go through Adoula.

JSS
Now, I said this was the last question - but one more question because you mentioned that U Thant had become the Secretary-General and the rest of the Congo story was during his tenure as Secretary-General. Was the communication, the rapport, close between U Thant and the representatives in the Congo?

Liu
Oh yes, quite close, quite close. There was no problem.

JSS
U Thant was in effect following through the same policy that Dag Hammarskjold had sought to follow.

Liu
Oh yes, I think so, I have no doubt about it. It was Dag Hammarskjold’s policy; he was just following it and carrying it through.
JSS  So there was no real break then in terms of the UN's policy and the UN's implementation of policy with the change from Hammarskjold to U Thant?

Liu  That's my firm belief, and I believe that if Hammarskjold had remained he would have done exactly the same thing - that is, try to resolve the secession of Katanga through negotiations and conciliation.

JSS  And Ralph Bunche remained an important figure in New York during this period also?

Liu  Absolutely.

JSS  So that U Thant was relying on Ralph Bunche very much the way Hammarskjold did.

Liu  Oh yes, absolutely. Policy in the Congo was directed by Ralph Bunche.

JSS  And you continued to be with Ralph Bunche so you were able to observe the relationship between U Thant and Ralph Bunche?

Liu  Oh yes, it was a very close relationship.

JSS  Very good, thank you very much.
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