THE CONSOLIDATION OF AFRICA’S CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION: THE CASE OF GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE.

BY

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THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEGREE

LEGON JULY, 2018
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that except for acknowledged references, this work is the result of my own research under the supervision of Dr. Ken Ahorsu. It has not been presented anywhere either in part or in its entirety for the award of a degree.

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DEDICATION

The work is dedicated to the Almighty God for his abundant grace throughout life and the years spent at the University of Ghana, Legon, especially throughout this course.

I also dedicate this work to my family and friends for their support and contribution to the success of this work.

To God be the glory.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge the assistance of everyone who in diverse ways made it possible for me to complete the dissertation.

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However, I am solely responsible for any short coming, whether marginal or substantial which may be associated with this dissertation.
LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ADA - Avoidance of Discrimination Act

AFRC - Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

ASDR - African Security Dialogue and Research

AU  - African Union

BCEAO - La Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest

CDD-Ghana - Ghana Center for Democratic Development

CEI-  Commission ElectoraleIndépendante

CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency

CHRAJ - Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice

CMIS - Case Management Information System

CNDH - Comision Nacional de los Derechos HumanosNational Human Rights Commission

CNDH-CI - Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme de Cote d’Ivoire

CODEO - Coalition of Domestic Election Observers

CPP - Convention People’s Party

CSOs - Civil Society Organizations

DANIDA - Danish International Development Agency

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
FPI  - Front PopulaireIvoirien

GCP  - Ghana Congress Party

GDP  - Gross Domestic Product

ICC  - International Criminal Court

IEA  - Institute of Economic Affairs

IFES  - International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IMF  - International Monetary Fund

INEC  - Independent Electoral Commission

IPAC  - Inter-Party Advisory Committee

IRB  - Immigration and Refugee Board

LGBT  - Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender

MDCEs  - Municipal and District Chief Executives

MPs  - Members of Parliament

NAL  - National Alliance of Liberals

NDC  - National Democratic Congress

NDP  - National Democratic Party

NGOs  - Non-Governmental Organizations

NLC  - National Liberation Council
NLM - National Liberation Movement

NPP - New Patriotic Party

NRC - National Redemption Council

OAU - Organization of African Unity

PDCI - PartiDemocratique de Cote d'Ivoire

PIT - PartiIvoirien des Travailleurs

PNC - People’s National Convention

PNDC - Provisional National Defence Council

PP - Progress Party

RDA - RassemblementDemocratiqueAfricaine

RDR - Rassemblement des Republicains

SAPs - Structural Adjustment Programs

SSA - Sub-Saharan Africa

SMC - Supreme Military Council

UCG - Unconstitutional Change of Government

UDF - Union des Forces Democratiques

UGCC - United Gold Coast Convention

UNDP - United Nation Development Program
UNOCI  - United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

UNSC  - United Nations Security Council

UNHCR  - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAID  - United States Agency for International Development

USSR  - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
# TABLE OF CONTENT

Contents

DECLARATION .............................................................................................................. i
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATION ............................................................................................. iv
TABLE OF CONTENT ................................................................................................. viii
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................. 1

RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Background to the Problem Statement ......................................................... 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................ 2
1.3 Research Questions ...................................................................................... 3
1.4 Objectives of the Study .............................................................................. 3
1.5 Scope of the Study ....................................................................................... 4
1.6 Rationale of the Research .......................................................................... 4
1.7 Hypothesis .................................................................................................... 4
1.8 Theoretical Framework .............................................................................. 4
1.9 Review of Existing Literature ................................................................... 6
   1.9.1 What is Democracy? ........................................................................... 6
   1.9.2 Third Wave Democratization ............................................................ 9
   1.9.3 Democratic Experiments in Africa .................................................. 10
   1.9.4 Democratic Consolidation ............................................................... 11
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.9.5</td>
<td>Conditions Necessary for Democratic Consolidation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9.6</td>
<td>Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9.7</td>
<td>Democracy and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9.8</td>
<td>Democracy in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>Methods and Sources of Data</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>Arrangement of Chapters</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endnotes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHAPTER TWO** ................................................................. 23

OVERVIEW OF AFRICA’S CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION:
GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE .......................................................... 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Democratic Experiments in Africa and the Problem of Unconstitutional Change of Government</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>Undemocratic Rule in Africa</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Contemporary Dispensation in Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Internal Factors Influencing Democratization</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>External Factors Influencing Democratization</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1</td>
<td>The Political Climate in Ghana</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Overview of Democracy in Cote d’Ivoire Since Independence</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire before Independence</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire after Independence</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.3</td>
<td>The Role of the ICC in the Ivorian Crisis</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.4</td>
<td>The Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Endnotes ................................................................................ 39

**CHAPTER THREE** .................................................................. 42
FACTORS PROMOTING AND MILITATING AGAINST DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE

3.0 Introduction .............................................................. 42

3.1 FACTORS THAT HAVE PROMOTED OR MILITATED AGAINST DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE ......................................................... 43

3.1.1 Internal Factors Promoting and Militating Against Democratic Consolidation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire .............................................................................. 43

3.1.2 External Factors that have promoted Democratic Consolidation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire ........................................................................................................ 73

Conclusion .............................................................................. 75

Endnotes .................................................................................. 76

CHAPTER FOUR ........................................................................ 80

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ……… 80

4.1 Summary of Major Findings .................................................. 80

4.2 Conclusion ............................................................................. 81

4.3 Recommendations .................................................................. 82

Endnotes .................................................................................. 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................... 86

APPENDICES ........................................................................ 95
ABSTRACT

The study measured the extent of democratic consolidation through the spectrum of constitutional reforms, elections and the independence of the electoral commission, institutional structures, constitutionalism and rule of law, civil society organisations, freedom of the media, electoral violence, ethnicity and sub-regionalism, socio-economic challenges, corruption, security-sector challenges, and the role of the international community. It did a comparative analysis of the extent to which the above factors either promoted or militated against democratic consolidation in the two countries. It found that Ghana has done better in the consolidation of democracy, given its performance in all the factors that were analysed than Côte d’Ivoire. Ghana’s seeming better consolidation of democracy is largely due to its legal and institutional reforms, free and vibrant media, and the relative peaceful and stable environment within which the contemporary democratic dispensation thrives. Cote d’Ivoire is still faced with serious challenges in consolidating its democratic gains, largely because of the divisive concept of Ivoirité that had sought to create more-equal citizens which has created faultlines of South-North, Christians-Muslims, indigenes-migrants divides the 2010-11 Ivoirian Civil War that has muddied Cote d’Ivoire’s path to democratic consolidation. While the analysis of the data points to Ghana making strides towards the consolidation of its democratic dispensation; the work however identifies the institutionalisation of violence through the flourishing of vigilante groups, ethnocentrism, sub-regionalism, and common corruption that threaten to claw back Ghana’s gains. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire lethargic constitutional and institutional reforms, ethnocentrism, corruption and socio-economic challenges and lack of respect for the rule of law threaten the little gains it has so far made. The study recommends that there should be Constitutional Amendment to address emerging challenges and government and the public should renounce and fight corruption, there should also be capacity building for the judiciary to enhance their performance, security-sector reforms should be carried out to enhance professionalism.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Problem Statement

The debate over the consolidation of democracy in Africa, generally, is one that has generated a lot of discussions in academia, civil society and various interest groups within and outside the continent. This debate has been intensified by the emerging normative consensus at the end of the cold war spearheaded by Western values. The present growth in multi-party democracy in Africa is due to a combination of internal and external factors. External pressure from international organizations such as the United Nations, IMF and the World Bank and their insistence on the concept of constitutional rule as a prerequisite for continued development assistance was a critical factor.1 The call by Africans for greater promotion of human rights, tenets of democracy and other similar policies also played a major role.

Internally, a collection of civil society groups such as students, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations and African statesmen demanded more transparency in governance. In many instances, the elections that were held in Africa only led to a change from military rulers to civilian leaders thereby legitimizing authoritarian regimes. Since 1990, most African states have been practicing democracy. Democracy has spread through the continent but coup d’états still linger on. Problems still dominate the democratic process. For democracy to be consolidated, factors such as promotion of multi-party democracy, establishment of constitutional rule, greater promotion of human rights, and liberalization of the media, among others, must be operating. However, factors such as dictatorship of major ethnic groups, corruption, abuse of incumbency, strong personal rule whereby institutions are not functioning effectively, political violence and so on are in practice. There are also other impediments to the democratic process such as no transparency and accountability, and alienation of the electorates from the political process. For these reasons, people argue that there are challenges with the consolidation of democracy.2 This has triggered the need to study the factors that promote as well as militate against Africa’s contemporary democratic dispensation.

Ghana’s fourth republic started in 1992. It has since held many successful elections. It has also experienced peaceful transfer of power from incumbent to opposition. Ghana, as such, has been
praised for its democratic achievements. Despite these achievements, challenges still linger on; some of which are weakness of structures and institutions that sustain democracy and democratic consolidation, anxieties associated with elections, political or electoral violence and more. Coupled with these is the problem of alienation of the electorates from the political process, weak institutional rule, and corruption, abuse of incumbency.³

Cote d’Ivoire after independence was ruled by Felix Houphouet-Boigny whose rule of the country was largely influenced by the French. After his demise, in 1993, the country’s stable political process was disrupted by several governance challenges until elections in 2000. Cote d’Ivoire became democratically unstable from 2000 as elections were characterized by many unconstitutional and undemocratic practices. Laurent Gbagbo became president in 2000. A civil war began in 2002 as a result of politics of exclusion (the Doctrine of Ivoirité) which excluded Ouattara (representing the Muslim North) from the presidential race in 2000. A peace settlement was agreed in 2005. The civil war prevented the 2005 from being held. Elections were held in 2010 and that resulted in the second civil war. The war broke out when Gbagbo refused to hand over power after losing elections organized under the observation of the international community to Ouattara. The war broke out in 2011 and lasted for four months and two weeks until Gbagbowas arrested by U.N backed French troops. Alassane Ouattara then became the Ivorian president. Since then, the country has returned to democratic rule without any interruptions.

This, however, does not mean Cote d’Ivoire has become the hub of democracy as many challenges still accompany their democratic dispensation. Some of these challenges include strong personal rule, political violence, no transparency and accountability and so on. Multi-party politics in Cote d’Ivoire has also been in the past characterized by politics of exclusion and marginalization. In light of these submissions on the democracy being practiced in Africa, this work seeks to do a comparative study of the consolidation of democracy in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Ghana transitioned from military rule to civilian rule in 1992. Since then, its democratic process has not been disrupted by any form of unconstitutional rule. It has realized many achievements in its democratic process such as constitutional rule, rule of law, respect for human rights and
freedoms, to mention but a few. However, Ghana’s success at democratic practice has to be qualified. It is characterized by problems such as corruption, political violence and anxieties as well as electoral malpractices, ethnocentrism and winner takes all politics causing inhibition of the independence of state institutions which results in insecurity and weak institutions, and the rise of alleged vigilante groups.

Despite these challenges, in terms of scale, Ghana seems to be doing slightly better than Cote d’Ivoire in recent times. Cote d’Ivoire has been mired in one controversy or the other since the death of Houphouet-Boigny. However, since 2011, it seems to be making much progress democratically. Nevertheless, many factors still persist which undermine Cote d’Ivoire’s practice of democracy. These are abuse of incumbency, issues of regional marginalization mainly between the northerners and the southerners, and alleged economic mismanagement.

The unconstitutional and undemocratic practices such as stated above tend to undermine the practice of democracy in these countries hence impeding consolidation. Therefore, in as much as these countries practice democracy, their practice of democracy is problematic as it does not fully reflect the foundations and principles of liberal democracy.

It is therefore prudent to find out what structural differences and similarities or specific issues are undermining or promoting the practice of democracy in these two countries. The research seeks to examine in detail the prospect of consolidation of Africa’s contemporary democratic dispensation with the two countries; Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, as case studies.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What factors have promoted the consolidation of democracy in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire?
2. What factors have militated against consolidation of democracy in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are to:

1. Review the antecedents that led to the adoption of present democratic rule in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.
2. Assess the factors that have promoted democratic consolidation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

3. Examine factors that have militated against democratic consolidation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

4. Based on my findings, give recommendations and solutions for addressing the challenges of democratic consolidation in both countries.

1.5 Scope of the Study
This study focuses on consolidation of democracy in Africa. The two countries used for the study are Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. This study focuses on contemporary democratic dispensation in Africa; that is since 1992 till 2017. These two strategic countries have been chosen for this work on the basis that they are two neighboring countries. Besides, Ghana is an Anglophone country, while Cote d’Ivoire is Francophone.

1.6 Rationale of the Research
The fervency with which Africa and the international community embrace the democratic consolidation is, arguably, waning. Thus, to sustain the process, it is worth studying the challenges and prospects to promote the desire for consolidation. Also, while there are a lot of studies on individual country’s challenges and prospects, there is a dearth of literature on comparative studies. I believe it is therefore important to do a comparative study of this to help policy makers, civil society organizations, and the international community in addressing the challenges associated with democratic consolidation and help countries learn from one another.

1.7 Hypothesis
1. The structural weaknesses of African states are largely undermining democratic consolidation in Africa.

1.8 Conceptual Framework
The work uses the theory of liberal democracy as its framework. Kenneth Bollen defines liberal democracy as “the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule. He added that political liberties exist to the extent that the people of a country have the freedom to express a variety of political opinions in any media and freedom to form or to participate in any political group. Democratic rule exists to the extent that the national
government is accountable to the general population, and each individual is entitled to participate in the government directly or through representatives”. Liberal democracy is therefore “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property”. Major proponents of the liberal democratic theory are Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Christopher Hobson, C.B. Macpherson, T.F Rhoden among others.

Liberal democracy became the most dominant ideology and system of governance after the collapse of the Soviet Union (former USSR) and communism in 1989/1990. Liberal democratic theorists operate on the principle that there must exist a system that builds and safeguards a fair, free and open society, in which is sought balance of the fundamental values of liberty, equality and community, and in which no one shall be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or conformity. Liberal democracy therefore, in principle, protects citizen’s rights and privately-owned instruments of production. Liberal democracy is the most preferred choice for countries that believe in promoting the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens, allowing them to develop themselves in every capacity with little interference from the state, believing in good governance practices while protecting the interest of the state.

There are some who challenge the liberal democratic theory for that matter the concept of liberal democracy and its practice in Africa. Liberal democracy has been critiqued by some theorists basically anti-liberals such as libertarians, for its role in defining and defending the development of the global political order - capitalism. So though capitalism was not historically linked to liberal democracy, in current practice of liberal democracy they are linked. Therefore, one is a citizen in liberal democracy and a consumer in capitalism. To the anti- liberals, this makes the whole system individualists or capitalists controlled and a threat to the ordinary citizen and the state. This is linked to Stephen Holmes argument that the greatest threat to freedom, is the concentration of power. Even Libertarians also agree that some power should be in the hands of the state as without public power, private power wielders would terrorize ordinary people and collective resources. So, Holmes and anti- liberalists argue that concentration of power in the hands of the private person in the name of liberal democracy would endanger the state and the ordinary people. They argue that power must be shared between the state and the individual so
that none wields absolute power. In that respect, what makes liberalism unique is its simultaneous concern with both public and private abuses of concentrated power.

To Lumumba-Kasongo, “the political system that has been adopted in most parts of Africa since the early 1990s is that fragment of liberal democracy known as multi-partyism”. He asserts that “this system of governance as adopted in Africa was produced partially as a part of the state-centric reforms and agenda. To him, there is a widely held conviction that democracy can produce the best social systems, ruling classes, citizenry, and governing systems, among others. Africans therefore have been striving to copy these liberal democratic values of the West but are not able to fully integrate them into the social systems of governance hence claim to be practicing it while actually, they do not as some of the principles of liberal democracy are missing in the African democratic process”.

The concept of liberal democracy is relevant to this study because it addresses the gaps in the governance practices in Africa and challenges authoritarian regimes, which are associated with bad governance practices. Liberal democracy promotes constitutional rule and good governance practices and holds governments accountable for their actions and inactions.

1.9 Review of Existing Literature

1.9.1 What is Democracy?

Democracy as a social science concept defies precise definition. Democracy is the English equivalent of the Greek word demokratia broken down into demo- and kratia; demo- meaning people and kratia meaning rule or power. By default, democracy means rule by the people. Victor Erhenberg states that the Greeks were the first political people in the history of mankind and the first to create states purely as communities of citizens in which the administration and making of policy were the right and duty of the citizens. The Greeks used the word democracy to refer to a constitution that is believed to have developed over time, which was not imposed by a single action by some rather powerful agent. Democracy was the name given to the constitution which had developed or evolved over time. This goes to explain democracy as constitutional rule. Erhenberg again observes that the actual origin of democracy is Athens where a form of democracy was being practiced at the time.
Professor Larsen, according to Erhenberg, states that “the specific and real conception of democracy originated in theory and in practice at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Democracy to Erhenberg and other ancient scholars referenced in his work is a form of state in which the Demos exercise supreme power, that is, government by the people.” They however admit that there is a need for leadership in a democracy, that is, the demand for a popular leader. This is based on the principle of Responsibility, where the popular leader is one who remains responsible to the people which are actually the case in the current form of democracy being practiced.  

According to Mathew Christ’s article, “Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece. The Classical Review”, which is a revision of the book Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, there are contending views on the origin of democracy. One is the Cleisthenic reforms. Another is the view that it evolved through the institutional reforms of Solon; a chief magistrate of Athens in 594 BCE. Raaflaub, one of the authors of Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece however simplifies issues by saying that the question of when democracy came into being in ancient Greece depends on how democracy is defined.  

Plato and Aristotle’s conception of democracy also contribute much to the literature as they act as basis for the contemporary debate on the essence of democracy. Plato suggests a philosopher king who would be the center of government. He makes the claim that the philosopher king is knowledgeable and can address the issues of government with his or her knowledge, as such promoting the rule of a single individual. He does not condemn democracy but purports that it is only the philosopher king who can be trusted to rule intellectually and morally; hence, will make a better ruler. Only those who do not wish for or are ambitious for political power can be trusted with it. Aristotle on the other argues that freedom is the defining principle of democracy. That is in a democracy, everyone is free to do whatever is good for himself or herself. Again, he is of the view that many people governing or ruling is better than leaving power in the hands of a single individual or a small group of people hence the need for democracy. This is how he justifies democracy.

“Any one man [of the many] may be inferior [to a man of excellence], but the city-state is made up of many men. Just as a meal done by many is better than a single and simple one, for this reason a mass (ochlos) can judge many things better than any one man. In addition, that which is many is less likely to be corrupted. So, although an individual’s
judgment can be corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other emotion, it is
difficult for all to become angry and make erroneous judgments simultaneously. If all the
men are good men and good citizens, they are less corruptible than one man. But the
multitude must be free men and do nothing contrary to law, except in cases where the law
necessarily falls short.”

1.9.1.2 Definitions of Democracy

A United States President, President Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) defines democracy as
“government of the people, by the people and for the people”. He places the individual as the key
or principal player in a democracy. The representative represents the interest of the citizen and
the citizen rules through the representative. The representative forwards the concerns of the
individual to parliament and government to be addressed. As such, all policies and programs of
the government are directed towards the welfare of the citizen.

Samuel P. Huntington defines democracy as “the selection of leaders through competitive
elections by the people they govern” He calls this the central procedure for defining
democracy. Huntington’s definition limits democracy basically to elections. He states that the
central procedure for democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the
people they govern. This begs the actual original concept of what democracy is which is rule
by the people. It also narrows down the current or broader conception of democracy. Limiting
democracy to elections is the basis for which some states believe that they are practicing
democracy just by holding elections. Huntington’s definition therefore lacks a comprehensive
outlook. Larry Diamond defines democracy as “free and fair elections plus such familiar
attributes as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, clear rules of law, an independent
judiciary, checks and balances on elected officials and civilian control of the military”.

Dan Snodderly also defines democracy as “a state or community in which all adult members of
society partake in a free and fair electoral process that determines government leadership, have
access to power through their representatives, and enjoy universally recognized freedoms and
liberties.” Snodderly and Diamond give a clear and comprehensive definition of what
democracy is. These definitions encapsulate all aspects or facets of the concept of democracy.
N.M.L Nathan makes a very interesting submission against democracy. He argues that if the principle of democracy is allowing the will of the people to prevail, will it still be called a democracy if

“the people decide to lay down again the government and to revert to an autocracy, which annuls the democracy, then this very decision, which annuls the democracy, must be binding, which is a contradiction of the principle.”

The big question therefore is, what then becomes of the democracy?

1.9.2 Third Wave Democratization

Samuel Huntington’s seminal work on the third wave of democratization in the late 20th Century is one that has gained much attention in the 21st Century. According to Huntington, “a wave of democratization is a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time”. He alludes to the transition of 30 countries from non-democratic to democratic political systems within the period of 1974 to 1990. He argues that, “democracy existed long ago in villages, tribes, city-states but modern democracy of the nation-state and its emergence is associated with the development of the nation-state”. This brought the first wave of democratization in which some states particularly, the Greek city states were practicing a form of democracy. He then makes reference to the second and third wave of democratization. This third wave of democratization is what has hit the African continent in the 1990s and was the basis of this research.

Larry Diamond in his seminal work “Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation” alludes to Samuel Huntington’s ‘third wave’; explaining that democratic transition in the third wave began in the early 1970s in Southern Europe. This transition swept through South America in the late 1970s and then, through Asia and Eastern Europe and finally, through Africa. He states that “the two previous waves Huntington identifies before the third wave are; the first being a long, slow wave from 1828 to 1926, and the second, post-world war II wave from 1943 to 1964. Each of both waves ended with a reverse wave of democratic breakdowns in which some but not all the new democracies collapsed”. Diamond therefore asks the question that will there be a third reverse wave, challenging once again democratic ideas, models, and institutions. This brings to
the fourth wave of democratization as mentioned in Diamond’s conditions for democratic consolidation as mentioned above. He admonishes that democratization is generally a good thing and that democracy is the best form of government and liberal democracy provides comparatively good protection for human rights. According to him, older scholars such as Aristotle and Plato are of a contrary view on the best form of government as they believe that a mixed form of government is better than a pure democracy. These arguments have further generated an argument in the social sciences as to which is the best form of government. Some modern scholars however agree with Plato and Aristotle arguing that a mixed form of government is better than any form of government.

Robert Dahl argues that democracy is very necessary as it “promotes freedom as no feasible alternative can”. He (Dahl) argues that “Democracy is instrumental in three ways: free and fair elections inherently require certain political rights of expression, organization, and opposition, which are unlikely to exist in isolation from broader civil liberties; democracy maximizes the opportunities for self-determination; and democracy facilitates moral autonomy, the ability of each individual citizen to make normative choices and thus to be at the most profound level, self-governing”. The submissions of Diamond and Dahl as to democracy being the best and necessary form of government reaffirms the necessity of democratization and the importance of the consolidation of democracy to avoid democratic breakdown which this research focuses on.

1.9.3 Democratic Experiments in Africa

Contemporary democratization in Africa began in the early 1990s; following the push by some African countries to give room for multi-party politics and change of government. This began mainly in Francophone African countries and spread through the whole of Africa. This does not in any way suggest that Anglophone Africa did not take any steps to initiate the process.

Bratton Michael and Nicholas Van de Walle in their work “Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective” talk about transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule in Benin during the early 1990s. They state that this was only a forerunner to the political changes or wind of democracy that will sweep through the continent presupposing the agenda of the national conference phenomenon. The first half of the 1990s saw widespread political turbulence across the African continent, which can be summarized with reference to a few key political trends. For the first time in the postcolonial era, the trend toward the
centralization of political power at the apex of the state was halted and partially reversed. So, in almost all African countries, autocratic leaders were forced to acknowledge that they could not monopolize and direct the political process and that they would have to divide and redistribute some of the excessive powers they had accumulated. Compared to the earlier postcolonial era, several major innovations occurred in African politics in this particular era of democratic transition. The first of these transitions, according to them, was increased political competition meaning that African citizens came to enjoy a measure of choice in who could govern them which was non-existent before the 1990s. Governments also “adopted new constitutional rules that formally guaranteed basic political liberties, placed limits on tenure and power of chief political executives and allowed multiparty politics.”30 However, they raised doubts about whether opposition parties, labor unions, free press and other civic, religious and professional associations would be capable of ensuring transparency and accountability necessary for democratic governance following certain later developments.31

Almost all African countries now have democratized. The issue however boils down to the question of how many of these African countries have been able to or can consolidate or sustain the democracy they clamoured for during the third wave of democratization. Another issue is if there will be a reversal in this third wave in Africa.

1.9.4 Democratic Consolidation
Consolidation, therefore, is “the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioral and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty”.32 Andreas Schedler states five concepts of democratic consolidation. These are “avoiding democratic breakdown, avoiding democratic erosion, institutionalizing democracy, completing democracy and deepening democracy”.33 These concepts culminate into what democratic consolidation entails. They are principal to democratic consolidation and must not be ignored else consolidation will be merely a fantasy.34

According to Emmanuel Graham, there are two explanations to democratic consolidation. There is the minimalist definition or viewpoint of democratic consolidation and there is the maximalist definition. To the minimalists, democratic consolidation is about change of power or governance from government to opposition. Minimalists such as Samuel Huntington (1991) and Linz (1990)
see democratic consolidation as two-turn-over (Huntington) or ‘two-elections’ test or the ‘transfer of power’ test. To Linz, it is not about winning elections but losing and accepting the results- incumbent going for another round of elections, losing to opposition and accepting the results. The maximalist on the other hand criticized the minimalists for privileging elections over all other facets of democracy. They refer to it as “the fallacy of electoralism”. Maximalists like Beetham (1994) and Diamond (1997, 1999) argue that democracy goes beyond elections and turnover of power.

Beetham, therefore, states that there are many criteria for measuring democratic consolidation of which one is the “two-election” test otherwise known as transfer of power test. The point of the criterion is that, it is not winning office that matters but losing it and accepting the verdict “because it demonstrates that powerful players, and their social backers, are prepared to put respect for the rules of the game above the continuation of their power”. He however criticizes the criterion stating that “the problem with this criterion is that it is perfectly possible to have an electoral system that meets certain minimum democratic standards, but where such a transfer of power simply does not take place, because the electorate goes on voting for the same party (the so-called 'dominant party' model). Such has been Botswana since independence, and such were Japan and Italy for nearly 50 years. Are we to say that these were not consolidated, simply because no transfer of power took place?”

Another criterion used by some writers is a simple longevity or generation test; 20 years of regular competitive elections even without a change of ruling party. He states also that this criterion itself has its challenges. He says “It is well known that, the longer the same party remains in power, the more indistinguishable it becomes from the state apparatus on one side and powerful economic interests on the other; and the more doubtful whether electoral competition takes place on a genuinely level playing field, or that electoral accountability retains much force. Here the question of democratic consolidation cannot be separated from the quality of democracy that is being consolidated.”

Longevity in itself is not a good predictor of how a system will behave in future. For him “Like the concept of stability, the concept of consolidation or sustainability is essentially a predictive or counterfactual concept, about a political system's ability to withstand shocks if subjected to them in the future.” Inadvertently, to maximalists, democratic consolidation goes beyond the
‘transfer of power’ test espoused by Huntington and others. It requires certain other factors such as respect for rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms, accountability and transparency, independence of the judiciary, and more and must meet the conditions for democratic consolidation.

### 1.9.5 Conditions Necessary for Democratic Consolidation

David Beetham in his work “Conditions of Democratic Consolidation” enumerates the facilitating conditions of democratic consolidation. These include: “the process of transition itself; the character of a country's economic system; its received political culture; its type of constitutional arrangements.” With the process of transition itself, the focus is whether, and to what extent, the process of transition to democracy affects the subsequent prospects for its consolidation. He looks at two aspects of transition which are the character of the previous regime, and the actual mode of transition and to this end hypothesizes that the prospects of consolidation are affected by the character of the previous regime.

A second hypothesis is that the mode of transition to democracy affects its subsequent consolidation. For economic systems and its effect on democratic consolidation, he hypothesizes that, a market economy is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of democracy. This hypothesis he adds is expressed as a relationship between capitalism and democracy. Another hypothesis is that the chances of democratic consolidation improve with economic development. For the type of constitutional arrangement, three propositions are made and these are parliamentarianism over presidentialism, where he hypothesizes that presidential systems are less durable than parliamentary one. Another proposition is proportional over plurality presidential system where he hypothesizes that proportional electoral systems are less politically divisive that plurality ones. He finally adds that democratic sustainability is improved by a system of devolved regional government. According to him, aspects of each of these will have a bearing on a country’s prospects for democratic consolidation. He concludes that democratic consolidation is a product of many factors or conditions operating together and no one condition will be enough, but rather all of them operating together can be expected to enhance the prospects for the survival of electoral democracy. Larry Diamond in his work “Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation”, gives the general conditions and circumstances under which democracy can be consolidated. Here, he points out that the focus is on the following conditions.
These are defining and developing democracy, the third wave of democratization, consolidating democracy, life and democracy, political culture and the role of civil society and then, the prospect of a fourth wave of democracy in the world.\(^4\)

### 1.9.6 Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa

In consolidating democracy in Africa after having achieved democracy, how influential are party systems and what purpose do they serve in the polity and in the process of consolidation? In their work “Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa’s Electoral Regimes”, Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright give us the purposes political parties serve in the polity enumerated and described by Dalton and Wattenberg. According to them, the political parties clarify and simplify in the electorate the choices for voters and also educate voters about policies and the government. Again, as organizations, political parties aggregate and articulate the interests of the public. Thirdly, they serve to socialize political leaders into democratic norms and orientations and ‘train’ them to operate in government. Also, parties in government perform numerous functions, including organizing the government, producing legislation, and promoting stability in government. According to Kuenzi and Lambright, political parties are necessary ingredients of democratic governance and the characteristics of party systems affect the extent to which they serve these functions. These party characteristics are legislative volatility, the average age of parties and the effective number of parliamentary parties. The authors make the argument that a large number of parties can pose many ‘governability problems’. They also argue that creating coalition governments can be so difficult, and minimal – winning one party governments have been found to be the most durable type of government. Therefore, if the party composition is too fragmented, producing coherent policy is likely to be challenging. However, some scholars see multiparty systems as improving the quality of democracy. To this end, the existence of a larger number of political parties not only increases the choice of voters but also suggests a multitude of different interests are being represented in the polity. The authors also suggest that parties that are older or have been in the system for long help to facilitate consolidation of democracy. Therefore, the success of older parties suggests that patterns of competition and perhaps representation have been routinized. Hence, the ability of a party to survive over time because they may have captured the support of sectors of the population whose interests they may have effectively represented is paramount. A counter argument to this is the fact that older parties in undemocratic systems may continue to be in power because other parties
may have been suppressed or controlled. That notwithstanding, the authors go ahead to hypothesize that based on the arguments raised earlier, there is a positive relationship between the number of political parties and democracy in Africa.

Again, they hypothesize that those African countries with older political parties tend to be more democratic than those with younger parties. “They therefore conclude that, it is somewhat true that countries with older political parties tend to be more democratic but posit that, at the same time, in countries where older parties predominate, there may not be enough political space for competition to flourish. Again, they admit that there is a positive relationship between the number of parties and democracy in Africa.”

Though Kuenzi and Lambright make strong arguments for the role political parties play, they seem to be oblivious of the fact that political parties are the ones that whip up ethnic sentiments in electorates- a major source of election related violence in Africa. Again, they seem to have ignored the fact that a multiplicity of political parties (numerous political parties) tends to be just a charade as the actual issue on the ground is, only two political parties seem to be dominating the electoral process in almost every democratic system especially where democracy is being consolidated.

Vicky Randal and Lars Svasand however observe that “studies has shown that political parties are regularly perceived to be a weak link in the chain of elements that together make for a democratic state or even to have helped undermine democracy through the irresponsible and self-interested actions of their leaders”. They state that some scholars have made the claim that, Africa’s democracy has been adjudged disappointing and they admit it is true based on the limited representative role they play. This representative role of parties, they argue, overlaps the aggregative function that parties play where they assemble and promote policy platforms for voters to choose between. African parties are noted for promoting personality issues to the merit of individual candidates as their election campaigns, rather than it being a struggle between various policy positions. It is also noted that parties do not provide effective opposition. They (Randall and Svasand) observe that some misconstrue the concept of opposition (thinking it means enemy) whereas some also don’t know the significance of opposition. So, in parliament rather than serving as watchdogs on the government, some opposition parties are rather in bed with the government (carpet crossing) or tend to antagonize the ruling party.
Some arguments they raise for why African parties are weak are; the economic context; that is the link between democracy and economic development. Another is parties and civil society; where they argue that it is the similar interest of groups which make them come together to form civil societies which they can organize into political parties. However, Africa scores poorly with the development of such organizations and so the link between civil society mobilization and the electoral success of new parties challenging the incumbent is missing. The salience of ethnicity is also another factor contributing to the weakness of parties in Africa. “Ethnic identities and divisions where ethno-regional and clientelist interests may represent the most rational strategy for political parties to aggregate social interests and mobilize countervailing power against governments which further contributes to extreme party fragmentation is present”.44

With these arguments raised, political parties are key ingredients in democratic process and they play very vital roles as well. However, political parties especially those in Africa seem not to be effective based on the issues raised above. These issues hinder the democratic process and the process of consolidation.

1.9.7 Democracy and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana

Ghana since 1992 has democratized and has been running smoothly its democratic process though the process is not devoid of challenges. There are however questions raised as to whether or not Ghana has been able to achieve democratic consolidation. The answer lies in the following submissions. Emmanuel Graham et al, write on “The Third Peaceful Transfer of Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana”. The work examines Ghana’s drive towards democratic consolidation and maturity after a third peaceful transfer of political power. Graham et al argue that even though some successes have been chalked by Ghana in the practice of democracy, any attempt to describe Ghana’s democracy as consolidated would mean condoning mediocrity and lowering the bar of democratic consolidation. Their reasons for arguing in this way are taken from the minimalist and maximalist view of democratic consolidation. They attempt to explain that so far, what Ghana has achieved is the minimalist viewpoint of democratic consolidation. This is because in their view, Ghana’s democracy continues to be saddled with monumental flaws that even undermine the integrity of and poses a threat of democratic relapse. From a maximalist perspective according to them, there are some successes in terms of the existence of multi-party system, implementation of electoral reforms, existence of vibrant civil society and
media. These achievements notwithstanding, the study identifies several deficits such as excessive powers of the executive president, ethnic or tribal politics, post-election violence, limited policy influence of civil society among others. The authors argue that Ghana may be called the beacon of democracy in Africa based on the minimalist argument but for that of the maximalist, they argue Ghana has only inched closer to democratic consolidation. This is especially because Ghana’s elections are not devoid of challenges.45

In the work “Ghana’s 2008 Election: Towards a Consolidated Democracy”, Zounmenou makes reference to the second peaceful change of government in Ghana. This election is significant to the writer also because it happened against a background of generalized anxiety and distrust about electoral processes in Africa where elections have often been depicted as sources of tension and threats to national stability. He states that Ghana however proved otherwise helping it to further consolidate its democracy and socio-economic development. This, the author is very optimistic makes Ghana offer a lot of lessons to countries struggling to hold transparent and violence-free elections in Africa. This is because to him, almost all African countries’ electoral and democratic processes have been mired in one controversy or the other making Ghana a role model to them. The paper argues that it is Ghana’s political history and electoral machinery that places Ghana where it is. Ghana’s according to both local and external observers is seen as one of the most promising democratic experiments in Africa. He however is quick to point out that Ghana’s democratic process is not without challenges. These challenges may be “consolidation of economic development, a continued fight against corruption, the equitable distribution of resources, and above all, maintaining the confidence of the people in the institutions of government and in the legitimate political leadership”.46

These authors are not wrong in their submissions. They actually made good observations about Ghana’s democratic process because if we look at the issue from the minimalist perspective, we can say that Ghana has reached the point of democratic consolidation but from the maximalist perspective, Ghana has only inched closer as Graham concludes. From these submissions, we can conclude that Ghana has chalked quite some success in attempting to consolidate its democracy but there is more room for improvement. Ghana has to put in a lot more effort to be able to achieve a consolidated democracy.
1.9.8 Democracy in Cote d’Ivoire

Yves Faure in the article “Democracy and Realism: Reflections on the Case of Cote d’Ivoire” gives an account of how Cote d’Ivoire rediscovered multi-party politics in 1990. This rediscovery came as a result of economic and political pressure on government to give room to multi-party politics and organize multi-party competitive elections. This followed from the 1980 reform made by President Houphouet-Boigny- it was both an electoral reform and political decentralization paving the way for democracy and elections in 1990. The 1990 election in Cote d’Ivoire degenerated into violence as a result the fourth structural adjustment plan which the government had been negotiating with the IMF and the World Bank, since June 1989. Houphouet-Boigny however managed to win the election by working it in his favour coupled with the issue of low voter turn-out or participation.

The author however points out certain observations he made in this particular election. Based on findings, the author came out with a hypothesis that, there exist a strong correlation between the electoral supply (the number of candidates for the election) and the degree of interest displayed by the voters. He also identifies a challenge with the viability of Cote d’Ivoire’s fragile political pluralism which comes from the simplistic and frequently naïve policies of the opposition parties. He states that particularly on economic and social issues, the opposition had very little to offer in the way of real alternatives, hence a party which has no idea of the size of the public debt can hardly hope to contribute to the reduction of that debt. This explains why the opposition lost—because they could not come out with strong and popular policies.47

After the death of President Houphouet-Boigny in 1993, Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic process has not been stable. It has experienced increased political instability and uncertainty.48 Its electoral process has been a politics of exclusion based on regional differences and politicization of ethnicity which is largely evident in ‘the Doctrine of Ivoirite’. Other issues surrounding the process are refusal to relinquish power by a loser incumbent government, flawed elections, corruption and so on. These have contributed to civil unrest and pessimism surrounding elections in Cote d’Ivoire. They have also caused election related violence and two instances of conflict in the country since 2000. So Daddieh posits that, “in a real sense the resurgence of ethnic violence in the context of electoral politics in Cote d’Ivoire reflects the failure of the democratic transition and the unfinished business of political succession”.49
Following the brief civil war in 2002 and 2003 which led to the division of Cote d’Ivoire into a rebel-held north and a government controlled south which necessitated U.N peacekeepers and French soldiers keeping the hostile camps separate, most people were pessimistic and skeptical about the 2010 elections. This pessimism however manifested. Bassett and Straus write on the election related conflict that took place in Cote d’Ivoire in 2010 and the role of the international community and the African regional organizations in restoring peace and calm. The United Nations and France sent troops into Cote d’Ivoire as an intervention measure. This action, newspaper reports and other observers, condemned stating that it was international or foreign interference in African affairs, particularly on the part of France. Ivorian newspapers in support of Gbagbo made the claim that the intervention was a ploy by France to retake its former colony. The authors however concede that the level the conflict had reached with Ouattara taking over about 90 percent of the country and on the verge of taking Abidjan, the international intervention was good as the conflict would have resulted in a terrible humanitarian crisis. This international intervention, the authors observe also raises questions about the role or importance of African regional organizations. However, the authors observe that a more important thing is the role played by the African Union and ECOWAS in the crisis. They state that AU and ECOWAS were resolute in their decision that Ouattara won and that Gbagbo must relinquish power to him. AU and ECOWAS therefore employed their pro-democracy policies and provisions like the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to make Gbagbo relinquish power. The Article 45 of this Protocol was used to threaten Gbagbo to relinquish power or else, they use legitimate power provided by the protocol to remove him which actually was successful. The AU and ECOWAS are lauded by the authors who obviously are pleased with the diplomacy with which the regional organizations addressed the issue. This, the authors state that the regional organizations defended democracy in Africa and will not relent in their effort to see democracy win on the continent.  

Cote d’Ivoire has now returned to democracy under President Ouattara. Based on the arguments raised above, can Cote d’Ivoire consolidate its democracy and what are the prospects of consolidating its democracy? Cote d’Ivoire can consolidate its democracy if it puts in the best efforts and adopts the best practices.
1.10 Methods and Sources of Data

This research used both primary and secondary sources of data collection. For the secondary sources of data, information was gathered from textbooks, journals, articles, and other e-documents from the LECIAD library, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center, the African Studies Library of the University of Ghana, and the University of Ghana Balme Library. Primary data was sought from interviews with leaders of civil society organizations, political parties, democratic institutions, and research staff, practitioners of democracy and governance, among other relevant personalities.

Thus, interviewees for this research were selected through purposive sampling. Personalities interviewed include two former presidents of the Republic of Ghana, two academics from the Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy, an expert from the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, Head of the Ivorian Mission to Ghana and personnel from the Ghana Embassy in Cote d’Ivoire. In all, eight (8) people were interviewed.

The study made use of the qualitative method. Qualitative data analysis was better preferred for the work because it provides depth and detail, ensures openness, simulates people’s individual experiences and attempts to avoid pre-judgments. The rationale therefore was to coherently gather data using semi-structured interview questions to obtain data. The study further employed case studies to understand how both countries have fared in consolidating their democracies.

The interviews were transcribed and meaning was derived from them. The data gathered was analyzed using content analysis.

1.12 Arrangement of Chapters

The study is organized into four chapters. Chapter one constitutes the research design. It includes the topic, background to the problem statement, statement of the problem, rationale, theoretical framework, literature review, methodology.

Chapter Two: An overview of the constitutional history of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

Chapter three examines the consolidation of democracy in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. It takes a look at the factors promoting and militating against the consolidation of Africa’s contemporary democratic dispensation with Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire as case studies.
Chapter four focuses on the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations.

Endnotes

8 Lumumba-Kasongo, op. cit. 7 supra
16 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. vol. 4, University of Oklahoma press, 1993
20 Ibid, 10 supra.
24 ibid, 16 supra
26 ibid, 17 supra
27 ibid, 17 supra
33 ibid, 17 supra
34 ibid, 17 supra
44 ibid
CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF AFRICA’S CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION: GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE

2.0 Introduction
This chapter is an overview of constitutional history of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. It reviews the antecedents that led to the present adoption of democratic rule in both countries. Prior to the 1990s, several factors led to African states making the final move to democracy. These factors are both internal and external. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire were among the countries that adopted contemporary democratic dispensation.

2.1 Democratic Experiments in Africa and the Problem of Unconstitutional Change of Government
Democracy in Africa has been inconsistent throughout its inception in the 1950s towards the end of colonial rule in the region. “As majority of the African states attained independence at the end of the 1950s and 60s, most of them were equipped with liberal democratic constitutions which, to a lesser extent, reflected the essentials of the constitutional systems used by the former colonial powers. These imported constitutional regulations hardly ever worked as they did in their countries of origin.”

Democracy in Africa after independence was characterized by all forms of undemocratic rule including single-party rule, military coup d’états, and many more, and to some extent, a replica of a typical African traditional rule. The constitution handed down to the rulers at the time were either changed, withdrawn or ignored. Unconstitutional and arbitrary rule instead characterized the governance process. It was not until the 1990s that true democracy returned to the region with many African countries clamouring for democracy. Nonetheless, this was not the case in some African countries such as Mauritius and Botswana as from the inception of democratic rule, they have never reverted to undemocratic rule. In West Africa, democracy was nothing to write home about until the ‘National Conference’ held in Benin in 1990. The national conference brought the African particularly those in the sub-region to the realization of a new dawn of democratic rule.
2.1.1 Undemocratic Rule in Africa

During the periods between independence to the third wave of democratization, intermittent coup d’états engulfed the continent. Military juntas are basically authoritarian and are noted to be corrupt in nature. Per the history of military rule in Africa, military juntas do not govern any better than civilians. Decalo notes that “many African armies bear little resemblance to a modern complex organizational model. Instead, they are a coterie of armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething to a variety of corporate, ethic and personal grievances. On direct corollary is that, when the military assumes power, it is frequently not able to provide an efficient, nationally oriented and stable administration.”

African military power over the years was not able to create political order as anticipated and is rather part of the governance problem than the solution. As Luckham noted, “a brutally cynical view would be that there has been only one general pattern. So far neither military nor civilian governments have been able to solve the developmental crisis facing African states.” Again, he notes, “That political intervention in the form of military-led coups, attempted coups and coup plots harm the economic performance of countries experiencing them is close to conventional wisdom.”

However, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced widespread coup d’états in the second half of 20th Century and Ghana had its fair share of four successful coup d’états. Many reasons have been offered for staging coups in Africa. The most common of these is the rent-seeking aim of the coup makers which can only be achieved through control of the state. A military regime can also oust another military regime as in the case of Ghana’s Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Supreme Military Council II (SMCII). Out of Ghana’s eleven both successful and unsuccessful coups, seven of them were against military regimes.

Not only did coup d’états characterize the governance process in Africa. Africa has recorded one party rule as part of its governance processes in the post-colonial era. On countless occasions, African governments have banned the existence and activities of opposition parties and instituted single-party systems. These were mostly instituted by early post-colonial leaders who had sought to be life presidents and, in the process, made policies that suppressed opposition parties.
Countries such as Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, and a host of others have recorded single-party rule after independence.  

2.2 Contemporary Dispensation in Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire

The last decade of the 20th Century recorded widespread turbulence of democracy on the continent. Africans, within this period, challenged authoritarian regimes and pushed for democracy and good governance. This new disposition toward democratization in Africa is, as stated earlier, due to certain internal and external pressures. Internally, the push was a consequence of the decline in the continent’s economic fortune which made people more skeptical and critical of their governments. From without, the new insistence of external aid donors and creditors on good governance provided a window of opportunity to African democrats to push for democratization in their countries. Again, the worldwide democratic revolution and its corresponding summons to protect and promote human rights also generated protests from outside the continent against regimes that do not uphold these values. This new attitude was evident in the remarks of former Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations as he said, "It is not our role to decide who governs any country, but we will use our influence to encourage governments to get their people to make that decision for themselves."  

Some former African heads of state, prominent Africans, and African organizations equally became increasingly resentful of corruption, repression, human rights abuses, and gross economic mismanagement under one-party rule also shared in these thoughts. Prominent among them were the then Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim, and the former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, as well as other international statesmen involved in the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance held in April 1991. Its Memorandum on Common Responsibility in the 1990s states: "Certain democratic requisites are crucial to sustain development. The following are necessary parts of the concept: respect for human rights; constitutional government and the rule of law; transparency in the wielding of power, and accountability of those who exercise power." The memorandum points out that although democracy has to evolve from within a society, there is nevertheless a duty for the international community to support the respect for human rights and the development of democracy. The OAU also shifted its emphasis from decolonization, giving importance then
to economic recovery and good governance. As such, at the 26th OAU summit in 1990, then Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim stated that "Africa could not ignore the global consensus on the value of democracy; but democracy must be home-grown."\textsuperscript{11}

\subsection*{2.2.1 Internal Factors Influencing Democratization}

National conferences were a contributing factor to the current political transition in Africa. According to Kamto M., national conference is "the emergence of civil society and more broadly of the people on the stage of power".\textsuperscript{12} Clarke notes that "a recent political transition in several francophone states have been accomplished largely through the instrument of national conferences at which representatives of diverse social groups have come together in condemning juridically one-party states.\textsuperscript{13} Though national conferences were instituted in many African countries, the Beninese national conference produced the most positive result. As John Clarke notes "In other cases, national conferences have so far been unable to displace some of Francophone Africa’s most reviled dictators."\textsuperscript{14}

Economic challenges are not always prerequisites of democratization; nonetheless, is a link between market economies and political democracies. Economic factors also influence the move to democracy.\textsuperscript{15} Economic hardships have also influenced the push for democracy in Africa. The inability of African countries to recover from this economic slump informed their decision to run to the international financial institutions for assistance. The conditionality given for the assistance was to adopt good governance policies and therefore, democracy.

Social factors have played a tremendous role in the democratic process in Africa. The level of knowledge of people makes the democratic transition easier and attainable. Educated populations understand the concepts and hazards that can be reached, in order to better accommodate the system in the country. Besides, national unity is essential in the achievement of democracy in any state. Although democracy produces discord as people share varying opinion on topical issues of national interest, the end product is a sense of unity in diversity. Notwithstanding this, divisive tendencies like ethnicity, regionalism, political mobilization among others impinge negatively on democracy. Efforts to assuage these setbacks was pursued by Pan African leaders like Nkrumah and Mandela who advanced a sense of nationalism rather than partisan politics and ethnocentrism in the political arena. The existence of efficient institutions of state such as the Judiciary is critical in advancing the course of democracy. Not only do these bodies serve as a
check on each other, but also, in terms of disagreements such as election disputes, the Judiciary as well as civil society can serve as mediating entities to ensure peace which inure to the growth of the country`s democracy.  

2.2.2 External Factors Influencing Democratization
Since 1990 and the inception of the third wave of democratization, foreign aid has often promoted and rewarded democratization. Though tying foreign aid to political reform has not always been successful, it has been effective in facilitating a move from authoritarian regime or one-party state to a multiparty system. Inasmuch as political change has powerful domestic sources as seen above, the international sources are equally influential. This is particularly true in Sub-Saharan Africa due to the large amounts of foreign aid flows to the sub-region. From the early 1960s to the late-1980s which witnessed an era of intense superpower competition, strategic alliance was the most common condition for development assistance. Security imperatives dominated the choice of aid recipients.

In the 1990s, following the demise of communism and the Soviet Union, donors became closely involved in the domestic affairs of weaker states as these states also opened up to aid from the West. The aid donors stipulated in their policy statements that funding allocation would take into account political liberalization. The former European Community to that effect, changed its rules to enable it take into account a country’s political system when determining aid levels. Development agencies therefore earmarked sizeable funds specifically to promote democracy. It was within these periods that democracy began to make strides again on the African continent and in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, so that, many countries began to democratize including Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

Regional institutions have also played a major role in the third wave of democratization. The regional and sub-regional organizations show a great interest in the promotion of democracy. The AU and ECOWAS have promoted as their principal objective democratization and maintenance of democracy of all countries in the region and in the sub-region. Their protocols have been geared towards achieving democratization on the continent and banned all forms of unconstitutional rule and unconstitutional changes of government (UCG).
2.4 Overview of Ghana’s Political and Democratic Experience

Prior to 1990, Ghana has been through several regime changes. Unable to sustain the bit of democracy that began in the late 1950s military dictatorship, single party rule, and civilian rule characterized Ghana’s political system. After the fall of Nkrumah, Ghana’s political process has been mired in military takeovers, suppression of opposition, bad governance practices, all destabilizing Ghana’s political process.

2.4.1 The Political Climate in Ghana

2.4.1.1 Pre-Independence Elections

The introduction of electoral politics in Ghana preceded the country’s independence in March, 1957. The Convention People’s Party (CPP) and United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) contested the 1949 Elections. The CPP won massively with the slogan ‘Self-government now’ as against the UGCC’s ‘Self-government within the shortest possible time’ which seemed unattractive to the people.¹⁹

The next election was held in June, 1954 by which time other parties had emerged. The Ghana Congress Party (GCP) of Busia, a remnant of the UGCC, the Northern People’s Party, the Togoland Congress, and the Anlo Youth Organization contested the elections. Others include the Muslim Association Party, Ghana National Party, and Ghana Action Party. The CPP massively won the election. The CPP at the time had its own challenges which later led to some members defecting and others being expelled from the party and moving to join a new party, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), formed by the chief linguist of the Asantehene, Baffour Osei Akoto. The NLM’s demand for a federal system of government for independent Ghana raised fundamental constitutional questions that had to be decided by another election in two years. Thus, the NLM went to the polls against the CPP. The NLM lost with 31 seats against the CPP’s 71.²⁰

The passage of the 1957 Avoidance of Discrimination Act banned all parties formed along regional, ethnic and religious lines. Some parties were forced to form a coalition giving birth to the United Party (UP). In 1960, there was a plebiscite/election to decide whether Ghana should become a republic and who to be the first president of the republic. In the plebiscite, the ‘Yes’ votes were 88% and the presidential race between Nkrumah (CPP) and J.B Danquah (UP) saw Nkrumah winner with 89% votes.²¹ A referendum in January 1964 to confirm the CPP as the sole
legal party resulted in an outrageous win of 99.9%. These eventually led to a military coup d’état to oust the Nkrumah government in February 1966. The ban on the formation of political parties remained in force until late 1968 when it was lifted. Elections were organized in August 1969.

Busia’s PP won the election with Gbedemah’s NAL coming second and forming the opposition. This election witnessed voting on ethno-regional lines. In the five Akan-speaking regions of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern and Western, the PP won 78 out of the 85 seats. In those five regions, NAL won only four seats. On the other hand, NAL won 14 out of the 16 seats in the Volta Region and the PP only two. This Akan-Ewe rivalry has continued to impact on the country's electoral politics. Due to economic hardships, the government introduced several austerity measures to resolve them which made the government unpopular. This led to the overthrow of the Busia government in January 1972 by the National Redemption Council (NRC) led by Lt. Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. The military junta seized the avenue created by the Busia regime’s incompetence which led to the cut in officer’s allowances. The reasons offered for the coup were economic mismanagement, betrayal of the Ghanaian sovereignty, interference in the economy by western financial institutions, corruption and so on. The Acheampong government was able to roll back many of the austerity measures. This was beneficial in the short term, but the economy worsened in the long term. Among the measures introduced by the junta is the ‘Operation feed yourself’ policy. This policy was prompted by food shortages which led the government to embark on the agricultural policy to increase food crop production. The military regime named its government as National Redemption Council which it later changed to Supreme Military Council.

The Supreme Military Council was overthrown in another coup and was replaced by the Supreme Military Council II led by General Akuffo who was prepared to return the country to civilian rule. As the country prepared for elections in 1979, another coup was staged on June 4th, 1979 by a group of junior officers and other ranks led by Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings who had earlier been convicted for an attempted coup. They accused the SMCII of corruption and non-professional behaviour. The new government named the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) assured Ghanaians that it had come to return the country to civilian rule and as such embarked on a military ‘house cleaning exercise’. Top military officers who had held political
offices previously through military coup were executed. Citizens and foreigners had to explain to an interim committee how the acquired their wealth. After just four months in power, they returned the country to civilian rule on September 24, 1979.\textsuperscript{30} Six political parties contested the elections.\textsuperscript{31} They include; “the People's National Party (PNP), the Popular Front Party (PFP), the United National Convention (UNC), the Action Congress Party (ACP), the Social Democratic Front (SDF) and the Third Force Party (TFP); together with four independent presidential candidates.”\textsuperscript{32}

The elections were indecisive. This resulted in Ghana’s first presidential run-off. The second ballot between Limann and Victor Owusu was won by the former with 62 against 38 percent votes. The Limann government was overthrown on 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1981 by Flt. Lt. J.J Rawlings who had early on handed power to him.\textsuperscript{33}

Rawlings' Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) took charge of the affairs of state for the next eleven years. General elections were not held again until the 1992 elections ushered in the Fourth Republic. Ghana was returned to constitutional rule in 1993 under the same government with a different name, National Democratic Congress (NDC).\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{2.4.1.3 Effect of the Third Wave Democratization in Ghana}

In Ghana, a combination of both domestic political resistance and agitation by citizens, civic groups and organizations and calls for democratization by external bilateral and multilateral agencies and donors, set the stage for the transition to democratic rule. In January 1991, the PNDC administration presented a transition timetable and confirmed in May 1991 that Ghana would be returned to democratic rule. Subsequently, a referendum was held in April 1992 to approve the 1992 Constitution. Against this backdrop, presidential elections were held on 3 November 1992.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{2.4.1.4 Democracy in the Fourth Republic}

The first elections in the fourth republic were held to restore the country to democratic rule. The main contenders in this election were the National Democratic Congress (Progressive Alliance) led by Rawlings and the New Patriotic Party led by Albert Adu Boahen. Other parties represented were the “PNC led by Hilla Limann, the NIP led by Kwabena Darko and the PHP led by Emmanuel Erskine. The election was won by Rawlings with an outcome of 58.4% votes against the NPP's 30.3% votes.”\textsuperscript{36} The parliamentary election was organized on 29\textsuperscript{th} December,
1992 with a voter turn-out of 28.1%. The parties that contested the elections were the NDC, the National Convention Party, Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere including independent candidates. The NDC won the elections, securing 189 seats.\textsuperscript{37} In January 1993, democratic rule was finally restored to Ghana. Mistrusts and doubts about the Interim National Electoral Commission including the violence that characterized the 1992 elections necessitated the formation of the Inter- Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) by the EC. This brought all parties to the negotiation table for aggrieved parties to air their grievances.\textsuperscript{38}

The 1996 general elections were less controversial due to the formation of the IPAC. The 7\textsuperscript{th} December, 1996 presidential election was contested by three political parties. These include the NDC (Progressive Alliance) led by Rawlings, the NPP (Great Alliance) led by Kufuor and the PNC led by Edward Mahama. The outcome of the election was 57.375 for the NDC/ Progressive Alliance as against the NPP/ Great Alliance’s 39.67%. The parliamentary elections were organized on the same day with the NDC winning 133 seats against the NPP’s 60 seats.\textsuperscript{39} The confidence of all the key actors in Ghanaian politics was enhanced through the IPAC initiative which brought about consensus in several areas of the electoral politics.\textsuperscript{40}

2.4.1.4.2 Political Succession (from 2000 till date)

There was however one major political issue that cast long and deep shadows on the political scene during the early part of Rawlings’ second term. It was the issue of whether he would abide by the constitutional term limit and relinquish power in 2000. Frempong notes that, “Rawlings retained the assets of youth, dynamism and popularity, showed unremitting interest in power and influence, and seemingly had a hold on the security agencies.”\textsuperscript{41} The 2000 elections were held in December with the NDC and the NPP as the major contenders. Professor J.E.A Attah-Mills stood on the ticket of the NDC while Mr. John Agyekum Kufuor stood on the ticket of the NPP. The election went into a run-off which was held on 28\textsuperscript{th} December 2000 resulted in 56.90% win for the NPP as against 43.10% for the NDC. In the parliamentary elections, the NPP secured 99 seats while the NDC secured 92 seats out of a total of 200 seats.\textsuperscript{42} This marked the first turn-over for Ghana and signaled the depth of democracy it has come to appreciate. It set Ghana as an example for other West African countries. From this stage, Ghana began its journey to a de-facto two party system. The 2004 elections just like subsequent ones followed similar pattern.
The 2004 election was generally peaceful and retained power in the hands of the NPP. The NPP’s J.A Kufuor secured 52.45% votes in the presidential elections and 128 seats in the parliamentary elections. The NDC’s Attah-Mills also secured 44.64% votes in the presidential election and 94 seats in the parliamentary elections. Other parties that contested the elections were the PNC and the CPP and one independent candidate in the parliamentary elections.\(^{43}\) The 2008 elections saw the second alternation of power from the incumbent NPP to the opposition NDC. It also witnessed another presidential run-off. The NDC’s Attah-Mills emerged victorious by a marginal victory of 50.23% of the vote, while the incumbent NPP’s Nana Addo pulled 49.77%. In the parliamentary elections, the NDC secured 114 seats while the NPP secured 107 seats.\(^{44}\)

Despite the intense contestation for the presidency, Ghana seemed to be diverging from other African nations who had been embroiled in conflicts but managed to consolidate the transition. The 2012 elections also witnessed a fierce competition between the two de-facto parties. The NDC’s John Mahama retained power with 50.63% while the NPP’s Nana Addo lost with 47.81%. In the parliamentary elections, the NDC had 148 seats while the NPP secured 123 seats.\(^{45}\) This election led to the popular ‘2012 Election Petition’ that was a test to the depth and in-grafting of Ghana’s democratic process. NPP unsatisfied with the results sent the case to the Supreme Court for hearing and verdict. The court ruled in favour of the NDC, with the NPP accepting the court ruling.

The 2016 election restored power to the opposition NPP after two unsuccessful attempts.\(^{46}\) For the presidential elections, the NPP represented by Nana Akuffo Addo had 53.80% while the NDC represented by John Mahama had 44.40%. In the parliamentary elections, the NPP won 169 seats while the NDC secured 106 seats.\(^{47}\) This election presented a different dimension in Ghanaian elections. Among the seven candidates who filed for elections was a woman, Nana Konadu Agyemang Rawlings, who defected from the NDC to form the NDP (National Democratic Party). This was the first in the history of Ghana and set another precedence for elections and democratic consolidation in Ghana.\(^{48}\)
2.5 Overview of Democracy in Cote d’Ivoire Since Independence

2.5.1 Cote d’Ivoire before Independence

Cote d’Ivoire was under French colonial rule until the period following the second world war which was characterized by bitter political debates and struggle. The Parti Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire, the Ivoirien branch of the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA), emerged from the Syndical Agricole Africain at the initiative of the cocoa cultivators grouped around Houphouet-Boigny. Between 1945 and 1957, the PDCI was opposed by numerous other parties basically created and funded by the colonial masters to impede the PDCI’s growing influence viewed as a threat to the colonial masters and colonial rule. The PDCI’s affiliation to the RDA and French Communist Party underlined its hostility to the colonial authorities. But after relationship between it and the RDA soured, it began to collaborate with the colonial authorities through which it was able to co-opt some of the rival parties, also forging regional alliances with local notables. Its historical base of wealthy cocoa cultivators providing the PDCI with substantial resources. Its strength, and legitimacy was inherited from its campaigns against colonial repression in the 1940s increased the PDCI’s influence. The PDCI steadily strengthened its electoral support base, sweeping the board, and winning all the seats in the legislature in 1957. After attaining independence in 1960, it had little impact on the then pattern of domestic politics. Wielding political power from 1960 to 1980, the PDCI’s monopoly over the country was institutionalized.  

2.5.2 Cote d’Ivoire after Independence

Cote d’Ivoire is a typical African state with a multi-cultural society. With around sixty ethnic groups, these segments were successfully co-opted and balanced during single-party rule in Cote d’Ivoire from 1960 to 1993. President Houphouet-Boigny’s strong, executive rule pursued astute political strategies that exploited the booming export crop economy to achieve this.

The 1990 multi-party elections had brought to an end, thirty years of stable single-party rule by the PDCI. "This was as a result of an outbreak of violent social unrest which increased domestic calls for political pluralism. The government was constrained in its ability to meet the economic demands of protesters owing to the rigours of a fourth structural adjustment programme." This shift to multi-party democracy took place in the context of deep economic and political crisis caused by the fall in world commodity prices. By 1990, the crisis deepened...
with the halving of cocoa producer prices, effective bankruptcy of the government and widespread public unrest including public sector and security forces strikes which forced government to accept a radical financed restructuring package. As part of the restructuring, government made former IMF and BCEAO technocrat, Allasane Ouattara, prime minister. He was placed in effective charge of the economic program. Following public unrest coupled with speculations over who should replace the current president, Houphouet-Boigny decided to give room for opposition parties to compete elections but at the last minute, he decided to stand for the seventh time on the ticket of the PDCI in 1990. To effectively address the succession question, he revised the Article 11 of the constitution so as to make the speaker of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bedié his automatic successor in the event of his demise in office.\footnote{52}

In the 1990 election, Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), could not defeat Houphouet-Boigny who won 82% votes in a 68% voter turn-out. The result of the elections saw Gbagbo pulling good votes in his region while Houphouet-Boigny also won predominantly from his region. The FPI was not able to attract any significant support outside its home base as the PDCI also made it appear as an ethno-regional party, agitating over particular local grievances.\footnote{53}

This is because during the campaign of the FPI, its attacks were seen to be ‘tribalistic’ as the PDCI was portrayed by the FPI as a cover for domination by the president’s group, the Baoulé. Regional divisions in Cote d’Ivoire were over a number of issues ranging from foreigners invading and struggling over employment and land with the indigenes to allowing foreign Africans to vote in Ivorian elections. These and many other issues led to the two civil wars in Cote d’Ivoire. The opposition to some extent therefore attempted to build a national base for support by arousing an Ivorian Xenophobic Nationalism. Further fights and demonstrations by the FPI and its allies resulted in their arrest and jail on the basis of thoroughly illiberal law, hastily passed by Ouattara and his government. The jailed Gbagbo was however released that year.\footnote{54}

After Houphouet-Boigny’s death, Ouattara’s attempt to form a coalition government with the FPI so as to form a united front against Article 11 failed. With Bedié as the constitutional heir-apparent, after Houphouet-Boigny’s demise, he became the successor. He was entitled to hold office until the expiry of Houphouet-Boigny’s mandate in 1995. The FPI’s attempt to enlist Ouattara in order to hold elections under a transitional government also failed. Bedie’s
legitimacy was thus undermined by the FPI consequently. Another development that emerged at the time was the formation of the Rassemblement des Republicains (RDR) with defectants from the PDCI, led by DjenyKobina. Though the ultimate aim of this party was to get Ouattara back to the political scene, the RDR became an antagonist party to the PDCI, threatening Bedié’s presidency. With this, Bedié adopted the policy of Ivorian nationalism under the slogan of Ivoirité, to disqualify Ouattara from elections. For the first time, the political elite in Cote d’Ivoire gave Ivorian nationality center-stage. The government made it clear that foreigners were no longer going to be allowed to vote, and that, only ‘Ivoirien de souche’ (‘pure-blooded’ Ivoirians) would. It further went on to say that candidates for the presidency and for deputy in the National Assembly should be Ivorians by birth with both parents also Ivoirians by birth. Candidates were also to meet other criteria like: one should have resided in the country five years prior to the elections, neither should they have renounced their Ivorian citizenship nor taken the nationality of another state. Ouattara though could have contested this in court, made a public statement in September 1995 refusing to stand for the elections. In March 1995, the FPI, RDR and UDF (Union des forces Democratiques) formed an alliance led by Gbagbo, to create a strong opposition for the Bedié led PDCI.

Before the 1995 elections, the FPI and the Front sought several reforms in the electoral process such as transparent ballot boxes, local count of votes before being transferred to Abidjan, amendments to electoral lists, among other demands. “The main agency involved in this exercise was in fact the National Institute of Statistics a semi-academic (and highly professional) body which had been responsible for the last Population Census”.

Amidst all these reforms by government, opposition still continued demonstrating on the streets, boycotting registrations, making satirical comments and so on about members or ministers in government. The government banned all street demonstrations that eventually led to the events of Cote d’Ivoire’s ‘Black Monday’- violent clashes between the police and illegal demonstrators leading to the death of three people. “The center point of opposition protest is the electoral code, which alters the previous practice of allowing African residents of non-Ivorian origin (an estimated 40% of the population) to vote. The code also excluded from candidacy a leading rival for the Presidency, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. Ouattara's father was born in Burkina Faso, and he has been resident outside the country since 1994, as Deputy Director of the
International Monetary Fund in Washington, both bars against candidacy in the new electoral code.” The demands of the code was to be met by all candidates and all attempts to get government to repeal it proved futile, hence the violence.

According to Crook, “the three weeks preceding the elections experienced the most violent clashes of all times”. A day before the election, Ivorian newspapers published articles directing supporters to vandalize election materials, and polling stations, stop people from voting, and so on. Thus, from about the 17th of October, pre-electoral violence began in Cote d’Ivoire. Konan Bédié took 96.5% of the vote, and his opponent Wodié, only 3.5%.

Bédié was the president of Cote d’Ivoire until he was overthrown by General Robert Guei in 1999. The coup was staged against the backdrop of corruption and economic mismanagement on the part of the Bédié administration. The military junta organized elections and adopted the concept of Ivoirité to exclude Ouattara, Guei’s greatest contender in the forthcoming election. However, Gbagbo stood against Guei and some other competitors. Gbagbo won the election and Guei having lost the elections decided to annul the result and proclaimed himself winner. This resulted in series of violent incidents between Guei, Gbagbo and Ouattara’s supporters. Amidst the violent conflicts, Guei fled the country leaving Gbagbo, the somewhat legitimate victor to assume leadership of the country.

Thus, after some political musical chairs, Laurent Gbagbo was elected President in October 2000. To the disappointment of many, Gbagbo also adopted the controversial and divisionist concept of Ivoirité. In 2002 Cote d’Ivoire was plunged into violence after an unsuccessful coup d’état by the northern army officers led by Guillaume Soro that effectively divided the country into two. These are the Gbagbo government-controlled south and rebel controlled north. It also reflected Christian-south versus a Muslim-north. After a number of mediations and negotiations held in Lomé (2002) Linas-Marcoussis, France (2003), Accra (2004), and Pretoria (2005) under the guidance of ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations and France, the UN Security Council resolution 1633 stipulated that General Elections be organized by an independent electoral commission under the Ouagadougou Agreement.

After several postponements the elections were held in October, 2010. Gbagbo led the Presidential Elections with 38% but failed to gain 50% of the votes as required by the constitution. In November 2010, the Presidential Elections Run-Off was held between Gbagbo
and Ouattara, the two front-runners in the October 2010 Elections. Ouattara was declared winner by The Independent Electoral Commission; while Gbagbo was declared winner by the defunct National Constitutional Council. The electoral dispute plunged Cote d’Ivoire once again into political violence that recorded over three thousand deaths. The UN Security Council passed Resolutions 1962 (2010) and 1957 (2011) calling on ECOWAS, AU and all its members to use all means possible to protect civilians. On April 11, Gbagbo was seized by pro-Ouattara forces and Ouattara became the president of Cote d’Ivoire.  

2.5.3 The Role of the ICC in the Ivorian Crisis

Cote d’Ivoire signed the Rome Statute on 30 November, 1998 but ratified it only in February 2013. The country nonetheless accepted the jurisdiction of the court in April 2003. The former president, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to step down when the electoral observers such as the United Nations, the international community, the African Union and ECOWAS recognized his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, as winner, elected on November 28, 2010. However, the Constitutional Council, which according to Article 94 of the Ivorian Constitution proclaims the results of Presidential elections, declared that Gbagbo had won. In the midst of this conflict, the International Criminal Court intervened through a committed will at investigating crimes and prosecuting people found guilty of instigating the conflict.

During this conflict, serious violations of human rights were observed and many people died, about 3,000 persons were killed. Atrocities such as, rape, murders, looting, were committed by the forces of both parties and were held mostly in western and southern region of the country generating deportation or forcible transfer of population. The supporters of President Ouattara reinforced by the French army engaged in the final attack against the forces of former President Laurent Gbagbo which resulted in Gbagbo’s arrest on April 11, 2011. On 14 December 2010, President Ouatarra sent a letter to the Office of the prosecutor reaffirming the government’s acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction. On 3 May, 2011, President Ouatarra reiterated his wish to the court to open an investigation.

After his arrest, the former president Laurent Gbagbo on November 2011, was extradited to The Hague, the seat of the International Criminal Court for four counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts and persecutions. He has been charged with being responsible for these crimes as an indirect co-perpetrator. However, no
member of the pro-Ouattara forces has been charged with such crimes. In October 2011, the ICC formally issued an arrest warrant for Gbagbo, charging him with four counts of crimes against humanity allegedly committed between 16 December 2010 and 12 April 2011. His wife, Simone Gbagbo was also indicted by the ICC.\textsuperscript{67}

Ever since, the country has returned to the democratic path with no major incidence. Ouattara seems to be in good control of Cote d’Ivoire and has taken the country through another round of successful and quite peaceful elections, that is, the 2015/2016 elections.

\subsection{2.5.4 The Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire}

The Ivorian civil war according to Abu Bakar Bah “presents unique features with respect to civil wars and the nature of peace processes in West Africa”.\textsuperscript{68} He states that, “it is a conflict largely driven by concrete political and social grievances over citizenship”.\textsuperscript{69} The civil war in Cote d’Ivoire brings to the fore the fluidity of citizenship and the dangers of identity politics in African democracies. It also shows “how issues of citizenship can deteriorate into serious political issues in the struggle for democracy, particularly in Cote d’Ivoire after the death of Houphouet-Boigny in 1993”.\textsuperscript{70} It thus, points to the relationship between citizenship and political conflicts in the region, and the challenges surrounding the social construction of citizenship. Bah stated that the problems of citizenship range from political exclusion to disputes over land ownership in a state, and national integration policies as seen in the events leading to the Ivorian civil war. He defines citizenship as “formal membership in a state based on the principles of \textit{jus san guinis} and \textit{jus soli} and naturalization laws”.\textsuperscript{71} Though these determining factors of citizenship are understood and citizens are seen as equal, in reality, both of these fundamental requirements can be problematic in multi-ethnic states with a legacy of dictatorship. Cote d’Ivoire’s civil war was therefore a product of authoritarian rule, fuzzy citizenship policies and infusion of ethnicity in multi-party politics, which inadvertently led to the Doctrine of Ivoirite- a doctrine which rests on a controversial distinction between indigenous Ivoirians and Ivoirians of immigrant ancestry.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Africa had a form of democracy operating on the continent before the arrival of the Europeans. Western democracy was first introduced on the continent during the struggle for independence. This form of democracy was thus adopted but after the departure of the Europeans, these
democracies generally adopted other regime types. The events leading to the end of the cold war and the subsequent collapse of communism and socialism led to the emergence of the third wave of democratization which swept through the continent. Many African governments at the time, including Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire returned their countries to democratic rule. Ghana, after independence went through several military, autocratic or single-party rule until 1992. Cote d’Ivoire also practiced autocratic, single-party and a military rule. In both countries, the political events of the period after independence have featured significantly in the political atmosphere in the contemporary dispensation. For Ghana however, things seem to have improved significantly regarding democratic rule and electoral politics. In Cote d’Ivoire, not much has changed as the system continues to follow the same pattern from that of the period before the current dispensation though a measure of democratic development has been recorded. The country’s electoral process continues to be mired in several challenges leading to two successive civil wars in the current dispensation.

Endnotes

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4 Ibid, 2 Supra.
5 Ibid, 2 Supra.
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72 Ibid, 68 supra
CHAPTER THREE

FACTORS PROMOTING AND MILITATING AGAINST DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE

3.0 Introduction

Having established the historical antecedent and background in the two countries under study from pre-independence, independence to the present era, this chapter examined the factors that promote and impinge on the democratic consolidation of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

“In a democracy, a balance must be found between competing values; and political actors must cooperate in order to compete. To be effective and stable, there must be belief in the legitimacy of the democracy.” Frempong opined that “democracy is embedded in a complex architecture of norms, and implemented by, an ensemble of institutions including the multi-party system, an independent judiciary, free press, and an electoral system.” As such, the stability of democratic order in any country is ultimately determined by the extent to which such institutions are able to function in a sustainable manner. When asked of their views on the benchmarks of democratic consolidation, Professor Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, and Dr. Boni Yao Gebe, of LECIAD identified factors such as the existence of a constitution and constitutionalism, institutional structures, and an efficient operationalization of the concept of rule of law. The absence of, or deficit in any of the democratic requirements creates challenges that hinder the realization of democratic consolidation.

To discuss the factors that promote and militate against democratic consolidation in both countries, the study examined factors such as constitutional provisions; periodic elections and the role of the electoral commission; the role of civil society; the role of the media; constitutionalism and rule of law; other state institutions; electoral violence; ethnicity and regionalism; socio-economic challenges; corruption; demilitarization and civil-military relations; the role of the international community and international election observation.
3.1 FACTORS THAT HAVE PROMOTED OR MILITATED AGAINST DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GHANA AND COTE D’IVOIRE

3.1.1 Internal Factors Promoting and Militating Against Democratic Consolidation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

3.1.1.1 Constitutional Provisions: The Journey to Democratic Consolidation

“Ghana’s 1992 constitution made several provisions aimed at facilitating democratic elections”\(^4\): Article 21 of the 1992 constitution outlines the rights that give freedoms to citizens, guaranteed by the constitution. Article 55 (5) also made provision for formation and organization of political parties. The political parties law makes it mandatory for the EC to supervise political party elections. The independence of the EC makes the political parties and the electorate have faith in it. Article 55(10) made provision for mass participation in elections and politics in general. Other articles include Article 55(11-13), Article 29 facilitate the electoral process and guard against future disputes. Consequently, the 1992 Constitution in its entirety is what guides the entire democratic process of Ghana. Acts of parliament were also to be established; constitutional commissions that facilitate participation in the political process. These constitutional commissions include “The Electoral Commission, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the National Commission for Civic Education, and the National Media Commission”\(^5\). To ensure their independence, their compositions and functions were entrenched in the constitution.

Similarly, the 2000 Ivorian Constitution made provision for several reforms and democratic principles including the separation and balance of power as in Article 101. As a democracy, Cote d’Ivoire recognizes and made provision for the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. Article 1 expresses the freedoms, fundamental rights and duties of citizens.\(^6\) Individuals are free to exercise their constitutional rights as far as it does not compromise any of the entrenched provisions. The freedoms of association and demonstration, formation and organization of political parties and groups, and the expression of suffrage, right to free and equal access to justice are guaranteed. The 2016 Ivorian Constitution is the new constitution of the country.\(^7\)

The creation of a new executive position of Vice-president, establishment of a bi-cameral Parliament, a National Chamber of Kings and Traditional Chiefs to promote traditional customs
and framework for non-judicial dispute resolution are the novelties of the 2016 Constitution. It also has the concept of Ivoirité expunged. The 2016 Constitution also guarantees the right of democratic opposition. The provision adds that “on matters of national interest, the President may solicit the opinions of opposing political parties” and groups.

Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire through their constitutional provisions lay emphasis on democratic practices and these have guarded the activities of citizens in these countries. Nonetheless, Ghana seemingly places more emphasis on the implementation of the dictates of the constitution than does Cote d’Ivoire, making governance and the democratic process in the latter quite problematic. According to Dr. Boni Yao Gebe, the existence of these constitutional provisions in these countries inure to the longstanding peace enjoyed. Professor Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu explained that in the absence of these constitutional provisions, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire would have been in serious civil and political conflicts similar to the early post-colonial period.

3.1.1.2 Periodic Elections and the Role of the Electoral Commission in Managing Elections

3.1.1.2.1 Elections in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Elections have been the major contributing factor to the consolidation process of Ghana’s democracy. Following the disputes over the 1992 presidential elections in Ghana and subsequent boycott of the parliamentary elections, many reforms were put in place prior to the 1996 elections and the subsequent ones. These have led to an improvement in Ghana’s elections and democratic process. In effect, Ghana’s electoral successes and democratic achievements have made it a paragon of good governance and peaceful coexistence in the West African sub-region which over the past two decades has been better known for a spiral of violent conflict. Dr. Kojo Asante argues that, for the first decade of the fourth republic, Ghana focused a lot more on fixing the credibility of elections. By reforming the electoral process, more transparency was introduced into the country’s body politic. The use of transparent ballot boxes, making voter roll more credible, introducing biometric registration and verification processes, electoral adjudication, the work of the CODEO, the growth of the media in monitoring elections or even calling elections and more have contributed to the credibility of the electoral process. Subsequently, the 1996 elections through to the 2016 elections have proved Ghana’s resilience and commitment to democracy.
Similarly, Cote d’Ivoire has held a number of elections since 1990 that have led to the country’s current electoral successes and its improved democratic credentials. Despite challenges, a number of achievements have been chalked. The country has witnessed 5 consecutive elections and 2 turn-overs or alternation of power. The independent electoral commission in conjunction with some external actors like IFES has been the major player in the electoral achievements of the country. The permission for local, regional and international election monitors and observers has given credibility to Ivorian polls.

Mr. Joseph Asomani and The Ivorian Embassy in Ghana believe that Ivorian elections have helped to improve the democratic status of the country. “Even though voter turnout continues to fall below 50%, it is the means by which leaders are elected to steer the affairs of the country. In that vein, it is right to say the process contributes to democratic consolidation.”14 “Elections are the expression of the democratic process in Cote d’Ivoire” and are based on direct universal suffrage.” As such, everyone gets the chance to vote and this right is not denied under any circumstance.15

A careful analysis of the electoral processes of both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire indicate that elections have been the major factor promoting democratic consolidation. In Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, they have been a major ingredient for the fervency of democracy. Without elections, consolidation would have eluded many African countries including Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Without elections, people cannot have the chance to participate in the governance process and reward performing leaders and remove nonperforming ones.

Though elections have helped to promote democratic consolidation, they have, all the same, become the major causes of violence and civil wars in Africa. They have also created divisive tendencies among people of competing values and interests. They have partially created danger rather than peaceful processes of legitimizing a leader’s hold on power. Multi-party competitive elections and competition for power have raised the hitherto buried ethnic, religious and regional sentiments in Cote d’Ivoire. Also, as a result of multi-party competitive elections, there is that brewing divisive tendency between the Akans and Ewes or the Northern groups in Ghana which could escalate at any time.

Frempong is of the view that “while advances have been made in the competitiveness of elections in Africa, not much improvement has been made in the genuineness or legitimacy of
the elections”.\(^{16}\) “Elections in Africa have often been stage-managed, won before Election Day, rigged or corrupted and electoral verdicts ‘stolen’”.\(^{17}\) Thus, Ninsin argues that “regular elections may not constitute enough grounds for postulating democratic consolidation”.\(^{18}\) Also, in Africa, the contest for power itself is a winner takes all marked by tensions, acrimony and a vicious cycle of political distrust. This contest for power has also ended up creating divisive tendencies particularly along ethnic, religious and party lines and led to pockets of electoral violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire into two successive conflicts. For Ghana, it is perceived that there are better prospects for democratic consolidation than for Cote d’Ivoire, particularly because of the several electoral challenges. Thus, even though Cote d’Ivoire is doing better recently, there is fear that it can easily slide into conflict again.

Though Ghana has chalked some successes at consolidation through its electoral performance, all the seven elections held since 1992 have been plagued with monumental flaws and accusations of electoral malpractices and disputes which have sometimes resulted in protracted court litigations. A more recent example is the 2012 general elections which was marred in several controversies leading to a court case.

For Cote d’Ivoire’s electoral process, it has been continually dogged with several incidents of violence, some resulting in conflict. The 2002 and 2010/2011 conflicts attest to the issues characterizing the elections in Cote d’Ivoire. This has also pointed to the electoral deficits and lack of proper reforms to improve the process.

In comparing both countries, it can be said that though the electoral processes in both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are saddled with many challenges, the problem in Cote d’Ivoire has been more devastating. Comparatively, electoral violence in Ghana has not resulted into any serious violence but slight incidents of violent clashes between political party supporters. Comparatively, Ghana seems to be making more strides in the electoral process than Cote d’Ivoire, more so because of the electoral reforms in Ghana.

3.1.1.2.2 The Electoral Commission

The Electoral Commission of Ghana was inaugurated in January 1993. It is one of the key independent institutions required to be established by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana under Act 451.\(^{19}\) The EC embarked on a comprehensive program of reforming the electoral process and
enhancing credibility. At the time, the most important mechanism for managing distrust of the EC and among the various political parties was the innovative Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) formed in March 1994. The IPAC brought together representatives of the political parties to regular monthly meetings with the EC to discuss and build consensus on contested electoral issues. “The IPAC offered a two-way channel of information for both the EC and the parties. It enabled the EC to discuss all aspects of its programs and activities with the parties, elicit input and address problems, protests, and disagreements whenever they came up.”

IPAC, however had its own challenge but succeeded in achieving compromised solutions to such contested issues as a single day for holding both presidential and parliamentary elections. IPAC thus “became a framework for building trust and confidence among the political class regarding the conduct of elections and provided a platform for deepening trust in the EC”.

The positive dividend showed in the 1996 elections and has continued to manifest. Voter turn-out rose to 73.5% in 1996. The consensus building mechanism was thus, replicated at the regional and district levels.

The presence of party agents at polling stations during elections, the cooperation between EC and political parties, the media and NGOs, including those undertaking independent election monitoring are all steps taken by the EC to sustain the democratic process and winning the trust of electorates and political parties. Its innovative ‘lottery’ method for determining the placement of presidential candidates on the ballot is commendable. In 2008, while the NPP aspirant was number one on the ballot, the NDC aspirant was third. The names of independent candidates then appeared after the political parties in alphabetical order. Aside that, the EC allocated a total of fifty vehicles each to all political parties that fielded parliamentary candidates in more than 10 constituencies to facilitate their movement during the elections and added ten percent more ballot papers to every polling station in the presidential and parliamentary contests to prevent shortages. These actions by the EC clearly indicate its impartiality in discharging its function and its resolve to build the trust and confidence of the electorates and political parties in the system and enhanced its integrity. The collaboration between the EC, IFES, and the Ghana Association of the Blind (GAB) and Action on Disability and Development Ghana (ADD) in 2002 which led to the pilot test of the tactile ballot.
The efficient manner in which it does it had been commended by all and sundry in Ghana and beyond and it is no surprise that the then EC chairman, Dr. AfariGyan and several of his officials have been involved in elections throughout Africa. According to Boafo-Arthur, the EC has within the past decades initiated several changes that have greatly improved and enhanced its role in the electoral process. 

Similarly, Cote d’Ivoire’s elections are managed by an independent electoral body. In Cote d’Ivoire, the Ministry of Interior used to manage elections, but contemporary elections are managed by the independent electoral body. Complaints by political parties and pressure groups about the credibility of the electoral processes and the succession crises after the demise of Houphouet-Boigny led to the institution of the independent electoral body. Accordingly, the independent electoral body adopted transparent ballot boxes, revised the voters register and votes were locally counted and collated before being sent to Abidjan. “The main agency involved in this exercise was the National Institute of Statistics, a semi-academic (and highly professional) body which had been responsible for the country’s last Population Census”. Another significant achievement unusual in Africa which Cote d’Ivoire chalked was a fully computerized national electoral list of nearly four million voters capable of sorting and printing out any required level of analysis in data bases at regional level. The electoral reforms added to the credibility and legitimacy of the 1995 Elections.

Cote d’Ivoire’s current democratic system hinges on Article 32 of the Constitution. The powers and competencies of the ‘Commission Electorale Independante’ (CEI) are defined by Article 32 clause 4 of the constitution, by law no. 2001-632 of 9th October, 2001. This was replaced by Electoral Law No. 2004-642 of 14 December 2004, which amended Law No. 2001-632 of 9 October 2001. The function of the CEI was to draw up lists of voters and organize transparent, democratic elections. The CEI has promoted democratic consolidation in Cote d’Ivoire by performing its mandate and ensuring free and fair elections are organized. Mr. Asomani noted that “The major reforms have to do with the composition of the CEI. In the current composition, the government has a majority representation, political parties have their quota, civil society, religious groups and the erstwhile rebel groups have their representatives on the CEI, something that the opposition is against.” These reforms were intended to address the challenges confronting the country’s electoral process and by extension the democratic process. In a speech
delivered by President Ouattara on Monday 6th August 2018 to mark their national day celebration, he indicated that the government was giving consideration to the request of citizens and pressure groups to make reforms in the composition of the Electoral Commission of Cote d’Ivoire.32

Again, there is an emerging issue of lack of security of tenure for the electoral commissioner which H.E J.J. Rawlings alludes to and believes must be addressed. This comes up after the dismissal of Mrs. Charlotte Osei who was ‘arbitrarily’ dismissed by the Nana Addo administration. H.E J.A. Kufuor noted that the absence of constitutional term limits for electoral commissioners is problematic. This he said discourages those who aspire to such positions. He also expressed concern over the fact that in the event that such a person is bias, it becomes dangerous for the country.

In Cote d’Ivoire, despite the constitutional provisions for the electoral commission’s independence, in practice, the EC is not independent, and its performance and independence fall short of international standards. This is evident in the following quote. “The international community has expressed concern over Côte d’Ivoire’s electoral process, including a 2016 decision by the African Court of Human Rights that found that the nation had “violated its obligation to establish an independent and impartial electoral body.”33

Comparatively, the Electoral Commission of Ghana is more efficient in election management than that CEI. Mr. Joseph Asomani asserted that “In Côte d’Ivoire, the CEI does just half of what the Electoral Commission does in Ghana.” He noted that “It conducts elections and proclaims results. In Cote d’Ivoire, the Constitutional Council certifies the results and declares the final results and gives ruling on all the electoral complaints or contentious issues.”34 It is evident from the submissions that since the inception of the CEI in 2000, major reforms in the electoral process are often directed at the composition of the CEI rather than its mode of operation as can be seen in the case of Ghana. In Ghana, electoral reforms are basically directed at the method of delivering elections and other innovative measures than the composition but in Cote d’Ivoire, it has been the reverse especially after the reforms in 1995.

That notwithstanding, the CEI promotes elections and democratic consolidation in Cote d’Ivoire through the performance of its mandate. Thus, though the CEI may be effective in promoting democratic consolidation, it is not as efficient and effective as that of Ghana.
3.1.1.3 The Role of Civil Society Organizations

The role of the civil society organizations (CSOs) cannot be left out of this discourse as they have made tremendous impact on the democratic process in Ghana. “While some of the domestic civic groups that played a role in exerting pressure on the government during the transition process have metamorphosed into political parties in the current democratic dispensation, a number of them have still maintained their roles as CSOs and have played crucial roles in deepening and sustaining the democratic process.” Frempong argues that “Perhaps, the most innovative contribution to Ghana’s electoral politics have come from civil society organizations (CSOs) in terms of voter education, election observation or monitoring, and other strategies for peaceful elections.”

According to the Ivorian Embassy in Ghana, civil society groups in Cote d’Ivoire work together to promote democratic consolidation.

3.1.1.3.1 Voter Education

“From 1996, civil society groups such as human rights advocacy and policy think tank like the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) have liaised with traditional civil society bodies like the trade unions, business and professional associations to create formidable networks of private institutions that have facilitated democratic development and reduced election-related violence.”

Prior to elections, some of these CSOs organize and broadcast public debates by presidential candidates. The Political Science Department of the University of Ghana also conducts researches and surveys into the outcome of upcoming elections. Since 2001, CDD-Ghana’s Public Forum and IEA’s Town Hall Meeting for parliamentary candidates from 2004 were some of the initiatives introduced to facilitate electoral politics in Ghana. Mr. Joseph Asomani noted that in Cote d’Ivoire, “The civil society plays various roles in the promotion of democracy in the country through various actions, seminars, lectures, and in extreme cases, through demonstrations”.

3.1.1.3.2 Election observation

Although by continental standards the electoral process in Ghana has been fairly smooth when compared to a country like Cote d’Ivoire, internal peace and stability has been fraught with election-related violence. Locally, civil society groups have monitored the electoral process by dispatching election observers to the various polling stations on the day of election to ensure that elections follow the due process. “Though election observation in 1992 was dominated by
international observer missions, domestic poll-watchers have since emerged and become increasingly significant. In 1996, the two organizations that assumed this role were Ghana-Alert, the Network of Domestic Election Observers, a coalition of 23 prominent national religious, professional and human rights organizations.” Additionally, they have promoted the values of various groups, influencing public opinion and public policy, and reporting activities. Other CSOs have focused on ensuring peaceful and orderly elections. The Musicians Association of Ghana organizes musical concerts to promote peaceful elections, while religious bodies pray for electoral peace and non-violence. In Cote d’Ivoire, civil society organizations engage in election observation and monitoring.

CSOs in Cote d’Ivoire however play quite different roles from those in Ghana. The civil society in Cote d’Ivoire performs more of an advisory role to the president or government. In this respect, it can be said that to some extent, the civil society is vibrant and effective in performing its functions. The CSOs ensure social or national cohesion, development, democracy, justice and human rights operate in Cote d’Ivoire.

Mr. Asomani noted that, CSOs in Cote d’Ivoire have become vibrant but not as compared to what pertains in Ghana. He noted that CSOs in Cote d’Ivoire became vibrant since the 1990s when former President Gbagbo was in opposition. More to the point, “Civil society is one of the components of the expression of democracy. It contributes to the economic, social and cultural development of the Nation”. Mr. Adjei asserted that as civil society is able to criticize bad government policies, speaking against bad government policies in Cote d’Ivoire is restricted. The backlash from the Ghanaian media and Civil Society that prevents government from pursuing bad policies is not permitted in Cote d’Ivoire.

3.1.1.4 The Media

Media freedoms and respect for human rights have promoted democracy in both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. In Ghana, the establishment of the National Media Commission in 1993 under Act 449 of the 1992 Constitution has helped to provide a vibrant media in the country. Again, the ‘libel law’ which implicated or incriminated and prosecuted journalists while stifling press freedom and hamstringing freedom of expression of Ghanaians was unanimously repealed by parliament on the 27th of July 2001. Peter Arthur notes that, “the media has been instrumental in safeguarding the country’s democratic principles by performing its watchdog and monitoring
functions”.

Through media reportage, attempts by various groups to buy votes and influence the electorate in the run up to elections and during elections are exposed. It has also acted as a check on government and public office holders particularly by raising issues of transparency and accountability. For instance, in 2003, the government rescinded its decision to sell the Ghana Commercial Bank after much pressure from the airwaves. In addition, the media disseminates information, engages in agenda setting, creates political awareness and has been a vehicle for political and civic education and promotion of fair and peaceful elections.

Media report by ace investigative journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas for instance has helped to expose corrupt practices in the judiciary. The media also telecast happenings and keep citizens abreast with national and international issues. They also provide live coverage of political party congresses, and through phone-in programs, allow direct public access to political office contestants. Through letters and text messages to editors and television programs, the mass media have enabled large sections of the public to voice their feelings on a wide range of political, social and economic issues. “During elections, private FM stations throughout the country successfully employed the advantages of mobile telephony (including SMS texting) to mobilize people to vote, to advocate non-violence, to relay in speedy and efficient manner flashpoints of problems and to announce election results as they come in.”

Dr. Gebe noted that, “A very informed electorate and their active participation in the electoral process is critical for the growth of the country’s democracy. His Excellency John Agyekum Kufuor, Former President of Ghana stated that there is the need for the media to be circumspect in their reportage, and not just run commentaries on issues to gain popularity. Thus, it is expedient for the media to be very meticulous in the playing of this important function. Against this backdrop, the media has been very prominent in promoting and consolidating Ghana’s democracy. In Ghana today, we can boast of a very vibrant media, performing several or all of its functions to promote democracy, good governance and human rights.

Mr. Asomani noted that “The media play important roles in promoting democracy in the country. The level of literacy in the country is low compared to Ghana so few people read the newspapers. However, various political parties own print media houses and readers normally buy newspapers of their political inclination. The airwaves are controlled by government. Unlike Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire has just a few community radio stations and two religious stations (Radio
Albayan for Muslims and Radio Espoir for the Catholics) in the country. Also, the national radio stations, Radio Côte d’Ivoire and Frequence 2 hold discussions on elections, while the two national television stations hold TV discussions to educate the citizenry on their platforms. The media also performs its function as the watchdog over three main organs of government by pointing out irregularities and shortcomings in the management of political power. According to a key informant at the Ivorian Embassy in Ghana, they educate the public on their rights and duties by creating awareness on certain critical governance and democratic issues. In a contrary view, Mr. Asomani indicated that the media does not engage in educating citizens on their rights and duties. The Embassy also noted that since the 1990s, the media in Côte d’Ivoire has become vibrant and effective in the discharge of its mandates. On the contrary, Mr. Asomani, noted that the media in Côte d’Ivoire is not very vibrant. According to him, “The government is very much impervious to criticisms.” He made this assertion in allusion to the opposition’s call for reforms in the Independent Electoral Commission which was publicly aired and taken up by various media houses. He noted that it took the African Union Court’s intervention to get the President accede to the request.

Compared to Ghana, media freedom in Côte d’Ivoire is partly restricted. In the first place, only two television stations operate in the country and are government controlled. Some of the other media houses are also owned by government. The private owned media houses like some print and other forms of electronic media are regulated in the kind of information they disseminate. Apparently, there is a government instituted media censorship committee which censures all media information before it gets into the public domain. The censorship committee does not allow any media house to disseminate any information that is critical of government. This has led to a number of print media houses closing down altogether. Mr. Ebenezer Adjei, a former Foreign Service Officer to the Ghana Embassy in Côte d’Ivoire asserts that as it stands, opposition only gets access to the media when it is time for election campaigns which practically last for two weeks and after that, access is denied. According to him, opposition access to media is limited. Thus, any attempt by any media house to give opposition a voice amounts to it being closed down. Consequently, most of the radio stations focus on broadcasting religious issues rather than objective and critical ones. Basically, they do not have the freedom to discuss political issues like it happens in Ghana.
Also, prior to 2011, the media in Cote d’Ivoire was unduly pressurized or suppressed so that performing its functions became problematic. As such “The many years of political instability and territorial division have made access to balanced information very difficult. Although the situation has changed since 2011, opposition media remain subject to threats and pressures from the government, especially during electoral campaigns.” The constitutional provisions for freedom of expression are only partially respected, as from all indications, journalists remain vulnerable to physical and other abuse by police. The public media is still heavily controlled by government, but there is an abundance of private media which openly criticize the government. The National Communication Council continues to lean harder on opposition newspapers than on pro-government ones, though journalists are no longer subjected to outright abuses. “Côte d’Ivoire was ranked 86 of 180 countries in the Reporters without Borders 2016 Press Freedom Index and was categorized as “partly free” (with a score of 51) in Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index 2016.”

In analyzing these submissions, it is fair to argue that the media in Ghana is more vibrant than that in Cote d’Ivoire. While Ghana has a media that is critical of government, engages in citizen education, provides analytical arguments on the democratic process in the country, observes elections to ensure that the electoral process is free and fair, the media in Cote d’Ivoire is limited. Due to the provision on freedom of expression, Ghanaians including media houses freely air their views on issues, however, though media freedom has been provided for in the Ivorian Constitution, media freedom and generally, freedom of expression is curtailed. This places a limitation on the democratic process which further hinders the realization of democratic consolidation.

3.1.1.5 Other State Institutions and Democratic Consolidation

According to Arthur, theorists of liberal democratic transition and consolidation argue that trust in, and independence of state institutions, is a key element in the process of promoting and consolidating democracy. The traditional governance institutions such as the legislature, executive, and judiciary have contributed to the successes of the democratic process in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. These institutional structures have also posed a threat to the democratic consolidation process of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Apparently, the executive’s manipulation of
the other two organs inadvertently takes a toll on the adequate and efficient performance of the functions of the latter.

3.1.1.5.1 The Executive

The readiness of the Ghanaian executive or government to abide by the constitutional provisions and the will of the people and hand over power after losing elections is a contributing factor to the democratic achievements of the country. The executive’s desire to perpetuate their hold on power is to some extent a thing of the past and has hardly showed up in this current democratic dispensation. Dr. Kojo Asante argues that the culture of alternation in power every 8 years gives the politician the will to wait patiently for the next 8 years after having lost elections. This practice has helped to prevent serious electoral challenges because, with this kind of arrangement, political parties always felt that they had a chance at winning elections. He notes that as long they have the chance to compete and compete fairly, they are less likely to disrupt or undermine that political arrangement.\(^{51}\)

To add to the above, Dr. Gebenoted that “On the part of the executive, both NDC and NPP government, have to a large extent, stayed within the constitutional limits in their relations with the electoral authorities”.\(^{52}\) And that “government itself has been alternating since 1992; that is, the 2 major political parties and the significant roles they play have contributed to how far the country has come. Equally significant is the kind of policies, programs that they have been pursuing. The only thing is that, once in a while we see these political parties becoming too self-centered, more often than not, moving away from what we call the National Interest and pursuing their own interests and there have been a whole lot of criticisms about this, but other than that, they are doing well.”\(^{53}\)

Comparatively, Cote d’Ivoire’s executive arm poses several challenges to the consolidation of the country’s democracy. “Côte d’Ivoire has a long history of complete presidential control of the political process. Political liberalization during the 1990s did not lead to any meaningful political empowerment of the parliament. The victory of opposition candidates in both the presidential elections in 2000 and 2010 did not significantly change the logic of governance, as presidents Gbagbo and Ouattara both shifted decision-making processes to a narrow group of collaborators, marginalizing ministers from allied parties such as the PDCI.”\(^{54}\) Cote d’Ivoire’s executive arm from all indications is characterized by many shortcomings. The government
apparently dominates the democratic process in that it dominates the entire political process of the country. This explains why the Gbagbo and Ouattara governments are able to rule with their supporters and forces rather than the relevant political figures.

Though the executive arm plays some crucial roles in the consolidation of democracy, they seem to pose bigger threats to the process. For the executive is able to control other players in the democratic set-up because of the powers conferred on it by the constitution. It inadvertently makes the executive the central pillar around which everything revolves. This has contributed largely to the challenges faced by these democracies.

3.1.1.5.2 The Legislature /Parliament

The Ghanaian parliament has been very instrumental in the promotion of the country’s democratic process. Dr. Gebe, noted that the role of the parliament of Ghana is very significant in Ghana’s consolidation process. Ghana has a very vibrant parliamentary system where its laws are made to support growth and development. The parliament of Ghana has promoted the democratic process additionally by scrutinizing bills brought before it by the executive before any further action is taken. It also plays the role of aggregating the views of the electorate and constituents.

Nonetheless, the parliament of Ghana seemed to be balancing on the majority and minority of the two major political parties in the country while other parties and independent candidates share the rest. The parliament of Ghana is so politicized that it practically votes on partisan basis; that there is lack of proper scrutiny of bills before they are voted. Again, debates in the house and the pattern of voting on issues are often times polarized on strictly partisan lines, and this makes it difficult for consensus to be arrived at.

In Cote d’Ivoire, the situation is not any different as regards the issues bothering legislative processes. This can be seen in the following quote. “The most recent parliamentary elections (December 2016) reestablished a fully legitimate parliament, but the minor representation of the opposition reduced the possibility that parliament will become an effective institution of governmental oversight within the current legislative term (2016-2021). The elections could thus not reverse the structural annihilation of parliamentary oversight, a situation initially justified by the emergency situation in which the Ivorian state found itself in the post-2002
period.” And continues that, “the president has repeatedly claimed that he wants to establish an accountable government, but whether state actors are subjected to law is a matter of debate.”

Thus, the parliament of Cote d’Ivoire or National Assembly has been politicized to the point that the opposition is basically marginalized. The National Assembly is visibly staffed with members of the incumbent government. In the case of Ghana where there is a free and vibrant opposition, the case of Cote d’Ivoire is completely different. With Bedié getting the National Assembly to pass Ivoirité into law, there is no doubt the National Assembly is being heavily influenced by the executive president and government in its entirety.

Again, Cote d’Ivoire’s situation clearly shows the composition of the country’s parliament; virtually made up of members of the ruling party. Instead of the parliament operating as a separate body or with much autonomy and independence, it is heavily influenced by the executive arm whose orders it takes. That notwithstanding, government decision to run a bi-cameral parliament as stated in the 2016 constitution, though a laudable idea, is an indication of government’s ploy to have more control in the legislature or National Assembly. This contributed partly to the opposition boycott of the referendum to adopt the draft constitution.

3.1.1.5.3 The Judiciary and Justice System

The role of the judiciary is also very crucial. It has treated most of the election-related petitions with much impartiality and managed to resolve the election disputes among the factions. Its role of constitutional interpretation and protecting the rights of citizens helps consolidate democracy. According to Dr. Gebe, “There is a very dynamic judiciary which takes care of the rule of law, the rights, obligations, preferences of the citizenry which are also very useful.” To help with dispensing justice in Ghana, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice was created. The CHRAJ is one of the key institutions that has helped in dispensing justice in Ghana. As part of its mandate, CHRAJ engages in an annual inspection of prisons in the country to ensure that conditions are favorable and conducts workshops for law enforcement officials to educate them on the rights of accused and convicted individuals. “These are all ways by which Ghana has been able to deepen its democratic openings and processes and bringing pressure on government officials and political leaders, through the reinforcement of structures of accountability within core political and constitutionally established institutions.”
The Judiciary in Ghana today is suffering from a credibility crisis.\textsuperscript{59} There are widespread allegations of corruption and malfeasance within the judiciary. This is further worsened by the bribery scandal that rocked the judiciary in 2015 through the works of investigative journalist AnasAremeyawAnas. This has been exacerbated by the perception that they are subject to manipulation by the executive. To some extent, the judiciary has proved to be independent through its actions and utterances but there are still doubts concerning its credibility and independence. Also, to some extent, the CHRAJ has not been able to fully deliver on its mandate. There are persistent issues of abuse of rights of individuals and other related issues evident in the 2015 and 2017 Human Rights Watch Reports.\textsuperscript{60} H. E. J. A. Kufuor notes that “the Judiciary must be looked after strictly because at the end of the day, it is the Supreme Court that actually interprets the constitution. If we do not use the incentive mechanism to strengthen their course, so that they will be objective in their interpretations of the laws and the delivery of the justice system, they continue to be fragile. Hence, it will not help in consolidating democracy.”\textsuperscript{61}

The judiciary in Cote d’Ivoire experiences a far worse situation in the delivery of justice and promotion of the justice system. “The judiciary can only insufficiently balance the hegemony of the executive.”\textsuperscript{62} Formally, the judiciary is institutionally distinct or independent, but its decisions and doctrine have always been subordinated to the government of the day.\textsuperscript{63} Both the constitutional and the regular branch of the Judiciary are vulnerable to Executive interference, lack adequate resources and are riddled with corruption. Inadvertently, separation of powers is absent and “The strongest effective check on government likely remains the extra-constitutional veto players in the security apparatus.”\textsuperscript{64}

The judiciary in both countries are plagued with several issues that have rendered them less reliable. There are several instances of justice being denied or circumvented that trust in the system becomes a difficult. Accordingly, some take the law into their hands instead of involving the concerned authorities. It has resulted in the several instances of electoral conflicts instead of resorting to the courts. At least, Ghana has set the bar higher by resorting to the courts in case of any grievances concerning electoral outcomes, but Cote d’Ivoire is yet to realize this.

H.E J. A. Kufuor summarizes the aspect of the institutional structures by asserting that the institutions or organs of state are functioning but there is still a lot of room to improve upon it. They are running means consolidation is still moving in the right direction and there is serious
effort to try to rid them of the unacceptable tendencies to corruption. Nevertheless, the hybrid mechanism is problematic because as the constitution insists on transparency and accountability, the hybrid system doesn’t guarantee such. Thus, strict separation among the main organs of state is more advisable so that the legislator would see his career as an end in itself, and then go to parliament to hold the executive to account and transparency. But as it is now, with more than 50% of the ministers appointed from the legislature, it tends to be ‘scratch my back, I scratch your back’.

3.1.1.6 Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law

AntwiBoasiako asserts that,“three particular standards are critical for enhancing constitutionalism and the rule of law”. One of them is a behavioral disposition of groups to continually remain part of the country and not attempt to secede. By this, no identifiable group in Ghana has ever made an attempt to secede from the country since the inception of its current republic status. Ghana is ethnically and religiously polarized and this finds its way into its politics. While NPP is leaning towards the Akan group for its support, the NDC leans towards the Ewe group for its traditional support base including the other non-Akan ethnicities. Again, the NPP is believed to be a predominantly Christian party while the NDC is assumed to be predominantly Muslims.

A second is an attitudinal posture in which even when discontented with government’s performance, no other means except democratic and institutionalized procedures are sought to effect changes. As such, though the erstwhile NDC government has been widely touted for institutionalizing corruption, AntwiBoasiako noted that no group of persons in the country have ever attempted extra-legal means of overthrowing the government. “It is worth emphasizing that Ghanaians patiently waited until the electoral process came full circle in December 2016 before showing them the exit through the power of the thumb.”

The third factor is a constitutional paradigm in which the national laws and court systems are regarded as the only avenues for settling disputes between political and civil disputants. It has been ingrained in the Ghanaian civic culture that the settlement of disputes between political parties and civic contenders would be mediated by the courts. This shows how democracy has been deeply imbedded in Ghanaians that they abide by the laws and constitutional provisions to address issues that are bothering them. Two very popular cases to this effect are the 2012
election petition; and the famous case of Abu Ramadan versus the EC concerning the validity of the use of the National Health Insurance Cards as proof for voter registration.”

Adegboye asserts that the failure in the practice of ideal democracy in some African countries can be attributed to bad political leadership. “At the top of this failure of leadership is the scant respect that many African leaders have for constitution and constitutionalism.”

“The ease with which extra terms of office are pursued by certain leaders and the manner in which the illegal or unconstitutional objective is pursued has made the failing particularly objectionable and attributable to failed leadership.”

To some extent, Ghana’s democracy has matured to the point where the political elite are not in any position to manipulate or change the constitution to favour them or extend their term in office. However, they fail in ardently upholding the constitutional provisions. This hinders the consolidation of the democratic process and leads to several governance problems.

The Ivorian Embassy in Ghana and Mr. Asomani agree that all Ivorians abide by the constitutional provisions. As the basic law of the country, the constitution regulates the powers of those in power, defines the type of power and states how the state is organized or run. Thus, the constitution mandates all citizens to abide by its provisions. To that end, rule of law and constitutionalism operate in Cote d’Ivoire. That notwithstanding, there are still issues of lawlessness or unconstitutionalism in Cote d’Ivoire. This is against the backdrop of certain actions of citizens which indicate disregard for the rule of law and constitutionalism. Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic system is established by Article 32 of the constitution. The inability of the incumbent president Gbagbo, to relinquish power after losing elections but attempt to perpetuate his rule, resulted in the country’s 2010/2011 post-election crisis.

Due to the issue of a proper separation of powers and ineffectiveness of the traditional institutions, there is disregard for the rule of law. Dr. Kojo Asante refers to this as lawlessness as he states that lawlessness poses a threat to the country’s democratic consolidation process. In Ghana, the political class and the electorate and citizens abide by the rules governing the state and almost always act within the context of the law though not too religiously as there are recalcitrant ones who also act outside the confines of the law. These have led to perceptions of corruption, mismanagement and other malpractices. Also, the police and other state institutions or public officials at times take the law for granted and act with impunity. In 2017, Human
Rights Report found that, police brutality, corruption, negligence and impunity are on the rise. Also, as at September 2016, Police intelligence and Professional Standards Unit had investigated 33 reports of police brutality. A vivid example is police involvement in the killing of a suspect in Kumasi on May 2016.

Again, in Cote d’Ivoire financial malpractice is committed with impunity; both high profile official and government inclusive mainly due to the absence of auditing.“In the current environment, corrupt officeholders do not face any significant adverse publicity from civil society, the media or opposition parties, and are generally not subject to legal prosecution.”72 Also, when these officeholders and high-ranking officials attract adverse publicity, it is not always the case that they are prosecuted. For instance, in May 2016, the director and deputy director of the Cotton and Cashew Council were fired by the government following an audit. However, petty corrupt acts done by the ordinary Ivorian is more likely to be prosecuted, but the high -profile ones are ignored. For instance, in September 2015, the Ministry of Public Service declared it had identified more than 2,000 workers who had not passed the necessary entry examinations, and who most likely had bribed their way into the position.

Torture, extrajudicial executions, cases of disappearance and lack of police investigation and judicial prosecution; insufficient protection of LGBT and albinos against discrimination; and insufficient enforcement of legal provisions to suppress female genital mutilation were found after the 2002 conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, albeit not prosecuted. Per the report of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’s (UNOCI) Human Rights Division, in July 2016, 7% of alleged perpetrators of rape were state agents, particularly members of the armed forces and teachers. Police raped one student and sexually abused another during university protests in April 2016. Despite the government introducing a law in September 2012 to strengthen the national Human Rights Commission (CNDH-CI), providing for representation by civil society organizations, the CNDH still suffers from a lack of financial resources, human capacity, as well as political will to fully implement its mandate.”73

When asked what the drawbacks or challenges of democratic consolidation are, Professor Henrietta Mensa- Bonsu argued that, “We all need to learn to work with the rules. Sometimes we want results beyond what the rules can give us or outside what the rules can give us. So, we all have to learn to respect the law. We need to improve our law enforcement, we need to improve
People need to have faith in the system and it has to be one that has a strong human rights aspect. She is of the view that when people feel protected by the law, they support it. The democratic state definitely has to have a constitution that delimit the powers of other institutions so that nobody is too powerful because it is in the checks and balances that individual liberty is assured. She also believes that rule of law is very important stating, “You need institutions that work according to law. You need the court to function so that people who are minded to solve their own problem will be willing to leave it to the state.”

Dr. Kojo Asante notes that beyond elections, other aspects of constitutionalism and rule of law become responsiveness of government, accountability, transparency, and so on as all these add up to consolidate democracy.

3.1.1.7 Electoral Violence and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Sisk (1998) notes that “Ideally, elections are supposed to be peaceful processes by which citizens select their representatives, whether as individuals or groups, to represent them at all levels, especially in the political arena”. They are said to be indispensable instruments for ensuring democratic transitions and functioning of democratic societies. Nonetheless, elections in most African countries ironically are a growing threat to democratic consolidation. There have been isolated incidents of violence that have characterized the electoral process in both countries. According to Aning et al., “the greatest source of threat derives from electoral violence, underpinned by hate speech, abusive language, and the use of spirituality in politics.” Again, electoral violence is escalated partially by the perception that elections are a win-or-die affair. As per the thinking of some, opposition is synonymous with hell and as such, all necessary means must be used to win elections.

Electoral violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire occur before, during, and after elections and is characterized by threats, intimidation, physical assault, vandalizing of electoral materials and public or state property, and the resort to sub-state security actors that include political vigilante groups and unemployed youth. This has routinely been used by the political elite as operational or counter strategy to gain electoral advantage. It has also become an accepted part of the political strategy of the largest political parties. Gyimah-Boadi (2009); Whitfield (2009) assert
that, “Often, individuals or groups of party supporters pursuing divergent agenda resort to violence to promote a multiplicity of interests which may include material rewards and occupational or self-improvement goals.” In fact, those who incite violence and use hateful speech have very high chances of obtaining senior political appointments when their parties win power. The practice is very common among the political elite who have the desire to gain political favour or appointment as it is becoming an acceptable norm. They may engage in all sorts of propaganda and blunder to win the favour of the presidential candidate provided their party wins elections.

However, the degree of violence that accompanies elections in Ghana comes nowhere close to the tragedies experienced in the aftermath of elections in a number of African countries including Cote d’Ivoire whose electoral process is almost always characterized by electoral violence. Cases of violence during elections in Ghana have been largely localized and confined. For Cote d’Ivoire, it is widespread.

Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic process has suffered several attempts at being aborted due to the severity of incidents of violence that have characterized the process. On countless occasions, the country has been plunged into electoral violence which have degenerated into conflict or crisis twice in the country’s history. It had reached the point where it attracted the attention of the international community.

The underlying issues that inform and trigger electoral violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and other African countries are not markedly different or unique in any way. These usually include challenges such as zero-sum patterns of political interaction (winner-takes-all), pervasive nepatrimonial arrangements, primordial and ethnic identity politics (tribalism), issues pertaining to the operational conduct of elections and more importantly, the failure of institutional mechanisms to cope with fraught, political dynamics where institutions have failed to function.

A new dynamic to the politics in Ghana relates to ad hoc and situational prophecies made by some religious leaders regarding which presidential candidates will win or lose the upcoming elections. Having been prophesied to win elections, a different manifestation of results can lead to suspicions and trigger violence.81 Also, since the stakes are high in such elections (winner-takes-all), electoral competitors are inspired to do whatever it takes to secure electoral victories, which can trigger incidents of violence.82 Primordial and ethnic identity politics has caused so
much havoc in many countries that are engaged in democracy. Cote d’Ivoire has suffered from some level of ethnic and regional differences. The reversal in Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic process is mainly attributable to ethnic and regional differences which have been laid to rest under the leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny. After his demise however, such differences emerged again and denied the country the opportunity to consolidate its democratic process.

However, John Doe (2014) identifies a number of factors that have triggered the escalation of electoral violence at various periods of the electoral cycle in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire despite the underlying causes. According to him, structural inequalities or unresolved grievances are key underlying triggers of electoral violence in both countries, particularly Cote d’Ivoire. He asserts that, campaign conflicts usually occur in the periods leading to the elections when political parties’ candidates are garnering for electoral support and votes. Again, political rivals seek to disrupt the campaign process of their opponents or prevent supporters of their opponents from participating in the elections. In Ghana for instance, the campaign process has been marked by cases of violence since 1992. It has manifested in various forms of violent clashes between political opponents or preventing aspiring candidates from reaching out to the electorates. A good example was when in 2012, then aspiring presidential candidate Nana Addo Danquah Akuffo Addo was prevented from reaching some areas of the Jomoro district of the Western Region. However, in recent times, the public order act and other police service regulations have been used to reduce the incidence of campaign conflicts in Ghana. In Cote d’Ivoire, campaign conflicts have been often generated by deep seated political rivalry and animosity. Plans to use electronic tabulation of polling station results were dropped in the period leading to the 2010 Elections. According to Human Rights Watch (2015), there were some violent incidents in 2015, primarily before the campaign period, but on a significantly smaller scale than during the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011.83

Thus, at a more fundamental level, violence in Ghana and Ivorian politics as elsewhere on the African continent appears to be the surface expression of more profound structural challenges pertaining to issues such as ethnocentrism, political polarization, exclusionary politics, multiple and competing center of authority (traditional authority against modern authority), youth unemployment and inadequate state capacity. While formal and informal institutions, which are
indispensable for managing these difficulties, continue to develop at a fairly steady pace, they still find it difficult to respond effectively to the challenges being encountered.

3.1.1.8 Ethnicity and Regionalism: A potential Threat to Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire’s Democratic Consolidation

According to Chandra, identity means “any social category in which an individual is eligible to be a member”\(^8^4\). In this sense, individual membership can be linked to state, nation, ethnicity, religion or even society. These identities are used in both positive and negative senses. In the context of Africa, however, instead of using identity positively as a basis for cooperation and transformation, emphasis has been placed on negative identity in which, for example, ethnicity and religion are exploited to pit one social group against the other, resulting in identity crises and conflicts or civil wars. In Africa particularly, it is ethnic identity that is linked to the state and to the conflict-generating effect of negative identity.

From this background, Phinney defines ethnic identity as “an enduring, fundamental aspect of the self that includes a sense of membership in an ethnic group and the attitudes and feelings associated with that membership”\(^8^5\). Phinney refers to “one’s sense of belonging to an ethnic group and the part of a person’s thinking, perceptions, feelings, and behaviour that are due to ethnic group membership”. He notes that the ethnic group that an individual identifies is that in which that individual will claim heritage. Chandra, lays emphasis on cultural and historical inheritance (for example, the names, languages, places of birth, and origins of one’s parents and ancestors), or in the course of one’s lifetime as markers of such an inheritance, for example, last names, or tribal markings. These are often exploited by politicians as well as bureaucrats to give opportunities; political, economic, and social, to one identity or ethnic group over the other, especially in the African context.\(^8^6\)

Linked to the concept of ethnic identity is that of the ethnicization of the state in most African countries, which include concepts such as ethnic group, ethnicity, and ethnicized state. As such, “an ethnic group can be defined as a cluster that regards itself or is regarded by others as a distinct community by virtue of certain distinguishing characteristics”\(^8^7\). Closely linked with ethnic identity is the concept of ethnicity, which represents the consciousness of belonging to a particular ethnic group or feeling of ‘we’ and ‘them’ as a basis
for having a distinct identity. In his contribution to the concept and nature of ethnicity, Van de Goor mentions the primordialist and the instrumentalist schools of thought. Primordialists make reference to the traditional explanation or definition of the concept of ethnicity whereas instrumentalists explain ethnicity for political ends. Implicit in these two schools of thought are positive and negative elements which according to Munyae and Mulinge can be described as integrative and disintegrative ethnicity. They explain that positive or integrative ethnicity relates to the consciousness that exists with the view to preserving the identity of the group and pride in its culture without creating unnecessary tensions, hostilities or conflict with members of other ethnic groups. Negative or disintegrative ethnicity, on the other hand represents the consciousness that has acquired negative connotations and can result in tensions and conflicts between and among ethnic groups.  

In Cote d’Ivoire for instance, the instabilities that ensued after the demise of Houphouet-Boigny, including the 2010 post-electoral crisis, were partly due to disintegrative ethnic spin that characterized the operationalization of the concept of Ivoiritè. This has culminated in several issues including issues of citizenship in Cote d’Ivoire. Also, the issue of citizenship linked to ethnicity was used to disqualify Ouattara from the 2000 presidential elections. These issues have led to the run up to the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. All the atrocities and violence in the 2000 presidential elections were targeted at Ouattara (who is believed not to be a citizen), and his supporters, so that even after General Guei had fled, Gbagbo, the president continued with the atrocities of Guei against Ouattara. The issue of citizenship is salient in many of the civil wars associated with the struggles for democracy in Africa, as illustrated by Mahmood Mamdani’s seminal work on the legacies of colonial rule. By examining the nature of colonial and post-colonial conflicts in Africa, he demonstrates that racial and ethnic discriminations constitute denial of citizenship as was the case in Cote d’Ivoire. He notes that, “this ugly reality is manifested in the bifurcation of people into citizens and subjects”. Dr. Kojo Asante refers to the Ivorian situation as a class system which was created during the period of French assimilation which the country carried over to post-colonial era. According to him, the class division of the labourers of the north and the capitalists of the south was present. This class division was further compounded by ethnicity, citizenship which led to social exclusionary sentiments that were never addressed until it degenerated into conflict. The problems of citizenship include political exclusion, land ownership disputes, and national integration policies.
Many of the conflicts surrounding democracy in Africa are caused by grievances over ethnic marginalization related to the fight for citizenship elsewhere.

In ethnicized states, major positions in government are occupied by a particular ethnic group or by a clique of selected ethnic groups that seek to monopolize socio-economic and political power. For Cote d’Ivoire, this situation is disturbing, considering how the Baoulé ethnic group from which their former president Houphouet-Boigny hails has dominated the political process eventually leading to civil strife in the country. This is the more reason why in Ghana, a lot of Akans have been made to occupy major positions in the Nana Akuffo Addo led NPP administration. The Akan group is the predominant group and is the one that has higher advantage in terms of the distribution of state resources. Thus, the feeling of superiority that has been attached to the group. It is basically the largest ethnic group with about 47% of the total population of Ghana.

Again, on regional basis, the people of the Volta region are pro-NDC while the people from the Ashanti region are pro-NPP. This explains why the NDC performs very well in the Volta region while performing dismally in the Ashanti region while the NPP performs very well in the Ashanti region and dismally in Volta. Again, the Northern regions are noted to be pro- NDC and vote massively for the NDC while those of the other Akan regions mostly vote for the NPP though not always the case, in the sense that when the NDC presidential candidate is Akan, they do vote for the NDC.

“Côte d’Ivoire is a highly ethnic-diverse country with more than 60 indigenous ethnic groups, belonging to five main socio-cultural or ethno-linguistic groups: Akan (32.1%), Voltaic or Gur (15%), Krou (9.8%), Northern Mandé (12.4%) and Southern Mandé (9%).”\(^{92}\) According to a 2015 article by Encyclopedia Britannica, “traditionally, the groups were independent from each other, but, over time, internal migration and extensive intermarriage greatly reduced group identity with a particular cultural tradition in any given locality”.\(^{93}\) Also, all the four groups in Côte d’Ivoire have strong linguistic ties with other groups in its neighbouring countries; Ghana, Togo, Benin and Liberia.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) explained that “Members of ethnic communities from the northern and central parts of the country are generally assumed to be pro-Ouattara. Groups in the West and Centre-west are assumed to be pro-Gbagbo including those of
the southern subgroups.” On ethnicity basis, Former President Gbagbo is from the Bete ethnic group while Alassane Ouattara is from the Dioula ethnic group.” Thus, voting on ethnic basis was massively recorded by the UNCHCR. The PDCI and its southern and Baoule origin has since 2000 lost its glory in Ivorian politics though it is the third most dominant party and ethnic group in Ivory Coast according to the 2015 electoral outcome.

Consequently, their actions led to two Ivorian Civil Wars that drew the attention of the entire international community. Prior to the 2015 general elections, political leaders took advantage of ethnic divisions to get rid of rivals from the race, used the state apparatus to suppress opponents, and incited hatred and fear among Ivorians, who have hitherto, been living in harmony for some time.

Thus, Mbaku concludes that, ‘The failure to manage ethnic diversity and provide institutional structures that enhance peaceful coexistence, national integration and nation-building, remains one of the continent’s most intractable governance problems.”

3.1.1.9 Socio-Economic Challenges as a Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Generally, the economic crisis of the 1980s signaled contemporary democratization in Africa. Following the inability of African governments including Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire’s to address the economic crisis that had engulfed the world, the people began to push for regime change believing it would salvage the situation. Reluctantly, African leaders including those of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire gave a chance for democracy to operate. Economic hardships still persist which are largely detrimental to democratic stability. Economic meltdown in African countries have resulted in some military takeovers on the continent. Persistence of economic hardships in this current dispensation of democracy is a major course for concern.

It has also created challenges to democratic rule in the case of armed robbery, corruption, illegal migration, poverty, unemployment and a host of other challenges. Government’s inability to curb these challenges creates anxiety and disorder and a lack of respect for law and order. According to Ankrah, the greatest challenge perhaps to the Kufuor administration was the management of the economy. High expectations have been further exacerbated by the NPP’s campaign slogan of ‘Positive Change’ and the litany of promises made to the electorate before the first and second
rounds of election. The government thus faced the challenge of fulfilling the electoral promises in the face of a challenging global economic environment.\textsuperscript{97} There is a linkage between the sustenance of democracy and the economic wellbeing of citizens. Huntington further supports these claims “economic development can alter a country’s culture and make it more supportive of democracy.”\textsuperscript{98}

In Cote d’Ivoire, the economic crisis of the 1980s had caused the masses to agitate for democratic governance. This proved positive and introduced democracy. However, this did not solve the economic challenges and democracy crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. Thus, while Ivorians themselves tend to consider their country as the economic powerhouse of francophone West Africa, according to empirical evidence the country is one of the world’s poorest developing countries. It is ranked 172 out of 188 countries on the Human Development Index of 2015. The country exhibits massive social marginalization; that is quantitatively and qualitatively and is clearly structurally ingrained. Gender inequality is a severe problem, and the country has one of the world’s poorest ratings in the United Nations’ Gender Inequality Index; and the poorest among predominantly non-Muslim countries.

The civil war led to a growing informal economy and also an increase in socioeconomic disparity between the South and the North. BTI report 2018 states that: “Although some socioeconomic problems have clearly been linked to the violent conflict and its consequences (the lack of administrative structures, and the precarious functioning of education and health facilities in the north for a couple of years), many barriers, particularly in the education sector, are structurally ingrained.”\textsuperscript{99}

Prof. Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu argues that that both countries need to ‘ratchet up’ their socioeconomic lives so that basic goods and services can be delivered by the state in a way that makes everybody at least happy to be a part of it. “We need to be more inclusive in everything we do so that the fault lines that we inherited at independence don’t continue to open up.”\textsuperscript{100}

Per the stability in Ghana’s democracy, it is evident that the country’s democracy may be maturing but leaves a lot of room for economic development. Cote d’Ivoire on the other hand has fallen aback economically and democratically. As it stands, economic growth is tangential to democratic growth hence, the country needs to improve on its economic growth. Thus, there is
need for both countries to work at developing and sustaining democracies so that their democracies can mature accordingly.

3.1.1.10 Corruption and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Corruption is another key issue that has taken center-stage in the democratic consolidation process in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Dr. Boni Yao Gebeasserts that “this hunger for power also comes along with hunger for material things, hence the issue of corruption. Corruption has pervaded the entire political system. If you listen to the amount of money that Ghanaians whether in leadership or certain important positions have taken for their own self development or aggrandizement, it is deplorable”.101 Various governments in the fourth republic have tried to address the challenge of corruption by coming up with slogans such as ‘Zero Tolerance for Corruption’ and ‘Probity, Integrity and Accountability’. These are slogans that were intended to be used by the Kufuor and Rawlings administrations, respectively, to fight corruption in the country as well as within government.102

Aside that, cases of corruption, ostentatious lifestyle by politicians and their business counterparts tend to create disillusionment within the larger public who wallow in abject poverty and misery and this disillusionment can ultimately result in the disruption of the democratic process. There have been several allegations of corruption levelled against public and government officials; some of which were proven to be true by the courts. In section 4, on corruption and lack of transparency in government, the Ghana 2017 Human Rights Report indicated that there were several allegations of corruption levelled against government officials, yet government did not take any concrete steps to punish the perpetrators or hold anyone accountable.103 Some of the cases include the investigations of the ace investigative journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas which exposed the corruption in the judicial service,104 the Ghana Football Association,105 the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS),106 and so on. These have created some form of mistrust and disappointment of electorates and citizens in both the government and the public offices involved.

Economic hardships coupled with the violence in Cote d’Ivoire are not the only factors that have landed it in its economic reversal. Corruption has also factored greatly in the country’s economic misfortune. Corruption of the presidents and government official cannot be overlooked when
making reference to the economic problems that the country is facing. Once francophone West Africa’s economic powerhouse, corruption and economic mismanagement have landed the country in some level of disarray. After the economic hardships of the country during the economic crisis of the 1980s, all attempts to revive Côte d’Ivoire’s economic standing have failed. It was rather slumped into violence which derailed its hopes of immediate economic recovery. “The violence shattered Côte d'Ivoire's hopes of rapidly regaining its status as francophone West Africa's economic powerhouse and a regional beacon of stability.”

The problem is even worse under the current administration. “There is a long tradition of financial malpractices in the country, encouraged by the absence of auditing, and each new government implicated in a number of new scandals. The fight against corruption has not been the main priority of the government that took power in 2011. In the current environment, corrupt officeholders do not face any significant adverse publicity from civil society, the media or opposition parties, and are generally not subject to legal prosecution. In May 2016, the government fired the director and deputy director of the Cotton and Cashew Council following an audit. The U.S. State Department however finds that high-ranking officials can mostly count on impunity.”

3.1.1.2 Demilitarization and Civil-Military Relations

This is important in assessing the challenges of democratic consolidation due to the role of the military in the democratization process. Following the issues that have surrounded civil-military rule before the third wave of democratization, it is important to consider the proper reintegration of the military into the system. It is also important to pay particular attention to their interests and role in the democratic process. After being returned to the barracks, their interest and role should be how to help protect the system and democratic governance instead of taking particular interest in governance. As such, the military is not expected in any way to want to interfere with governance. The military are encouraged to support the democratic processes of the country by providing security during elections.

Again, previous military activities have partly contributed to the number of arms circulating in the country. Some which may have been hidden in the wake of the struggle for democracy probably are still available and presumably surfacing-up. Two problems are created in essence.
The increase in the number of arms-related cases and acts of impunity carried out by arms-wielding former military personnel.

Again, “failure to disarm the rebels led to election-related violence of 2010. The elections in 2010 were organized without the rebels having been disarmed. Disarmament of rebels, which should have been done in January 2003 when the Linas-Marcoussis agreement was signed, had not been completed”\(^{109}\). Thus, it is reported that when the elections were held in Côte d’Ivoire, the New Forces, a rebel movement led by Guillaume Soro, controlled the north of the country.\(^{110}\) This raises questions of whether the electorate in that region were able to express their choice without threat or fear of reprisals if they voted against the candidate supported by the New Forces. According to Straus (2011), pro-Ouattara forces occupying the north of the country imprisoned and beat up civilians who had voted for Gbagbo. In the west, in areas reputedly aligned to Gbagbo, the UN observed the same kind of problems.

Another act of impunity on the part of the military is the incidence of frequent mutinies. “Concerns about the security situation emerged in January when some elements of the army, demanding better pay and working conditions, mutinied against the government. Dissatisfied soldiers, predominantly former rebels integrated into the national army, took control of the second-largest city, Bouaké.”\(^{111}\) “The strongest veto players continue to come from within the security apparatus, where former rebel commanders and militia members who played a major role in the military victory over Gbagbo have maintained control within the new security apparatus. Thus, the effective power wielded by these veto players can be seen in the stalling of the reconciliation agenda and in the lack of judicial procedures against war crimes committed by loyalist security personnel.”\(^{112}\)

Prof. Henrietta Mensa- Bonsu and Dr. Boni Yao Gebe confirmed this assertion by arguing that trying to satisfy those who belong to the security apparatus is a drawback to Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic consolidation because every now and then, the security elements take the state to ransom and demand some settlements or payments. As, such, this is a major issue for the state to tackle; either than that, Cote d’Ivoire may probably relapse into another conflict.\(^{113}\)

A careful observation of the situation in the two countries shows that the recent conflicts and activities of the military in Cote d’Ivoire seems to be making the country suffer more military influence than can be seen in Ghana in the current democratic dispensation. Ghana
comparatively records considerably low percentage of military influence. It is quite evident that
the activities of the military and security apparatus have become more of playing their
constitutionally mandated role of protecting the citizens and the democratic set-up.

3.1.2 External Factors that have promoted Democratic Consolidation in Ghana and
Cote d’Ivoire

3.1.2.1 The International Community and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana
and Cote D’Ivoire

The role of the international community in the consolidation of democracy in Ghana and Cote
d’Ivoire cannot be overlooked. The international community has been very active and supportive
in the democratic transition and sustainability in particularly Ghana and in Cote d’Ivoire.
Ghana’s successful elections from 1992 to 2000; the transition from PNDC to NDC or from
quasi- military authoritarian rule and a peaceful hand-over of power from one constitutionally
elected government to the other could not have been possible without the massive support of the
development partners, especially the West and its donor agencies. Also, through the help of
certain powerful states such as the United States of America, France, Canada, and the likes in
promoting the democratic process in the two countries, both countries have made some headway
with democratic consolidation, though not at par, they were instrumental in supporting those
initiatives. They also serve as international election observers in these countries. This has
contributed to the credibility of elections in both countries. Particularly in Cote d’Ivoire,
international election observer missions have played very pertinent roles in their electoral
process. According to Dr. Kojo Asante, credit must be given to donor funding of democracy
building right from the support of citizen groups, civil society groups, and also independent
governance institutions that have played a key role in Ghana’s democratic progression. He notes
that a lot of EC’s reforms from 1994 were sponsored by the IFES. “IFES actually had an office
at the EC to support a lot of electoral reforms; new regulations, capacity building and all of that.”

Also, he acknowledged that donors have continued to fund the EC, the NCCE, the Ghana Police,
the Election Security Tax Force idea and the actual development of Ghana.

In 2012, the American Presidency under the leadership of Barack Obama reinforced its
commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa. Among the four pillars of U.S.-Africa
foreign policies, the first was to strengthen democratic institutions. Thus, bold commitments
were made towards the democracy pillar. They reflected President Obama’s declaration in Accra, Ghana, in July 2009 that: “Africa does not need strong men, it needs strong institutions”, “our message to those who would derail the democratic process is clear and unequivocal: the United States will not stand idly by when actors threaten legitimately elected governments or manipulate the fairness and integrity of democratic process”. True to its word, the U.S government has walked the talk of democracy. “It did not “stand idly by” when the “fairness and integrity of democratic processes” were threatened in Cote d’Ivoire”. It moved swiftly into Cote d’Ivoire to restore democracy through collaborative efforts thereby removing Gbagbo.

The administration is noted to have stated that, “The United States will take a strong and consistent stand against actions that undermine democratic institutions or the legitimacy of democratic processes. We will evaluate elections against the highest possible standards of fairness and impartiality” of the will and the welfare of the people. Dr. Gebe confirmed this assertion by indicating that the country has overly depended on external actors or development partners, development aids, institutions to help in the conduct of its elections which is not a good thing because, Ghana has reached a point where it can actually depend on its own resources to run its elections.

Mindful of the economic centrality of Côte d’Ivoire in the region, the international community also swiftly involved itself in resolving the conflicts that have engulfed the country. International mediations were part of the strategies used to restore peace and democracy to Cote d’Ivoire and though they have not necessarily led to speedy resolution of African conflicts, they have been beneficial. When asked if there are external factors that contribute to the consolidation of Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic process, Dr. Gebe, Prof. Mensa- Bonsu and Dr. Asante agree with the fact that definitely, the international community had a role to play in Cote d’Ivoire’s democratic process, some making particular reference to France.

The role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in restoring peace and democracy to Cote d’Ivoire proved to African leaders that the international community will do whatever it takes to promote democracy. As stated earlier, Gbagbo was subsequently arrested and handed over to the ICC which readily prosecuted him and his accomplices for crimes against humanity. The role of the ICC in his trial warned African leaders that they cannot rule and abuse the rights of their people with impunity. For that matter, the ICC’s role served as a deterrent to African leaders.
The Ivorian Judiciary’s independence was compromised by influence from the executive, as evident in its controversial position in the November 2010 electoral crisis and the treatment of war crimes. This led to a breach of trust in its credibility and adjudication of cases. Accordingly, the USAID through the program ‘ProJustice 2013-2018’ has been helping Cote d’Ivoire to rebuild its justice system and judicial branch that was destroyed along with the destructions of the conflict. It has helped the Ministry of Justice to improve the administration of criminal justice through a variety of innovative tools such as the “case management and information system” (CMIS), and capacity building sessions for the judicial and law enforcement personnel. ProJustice is also working to improve access to justice by marginalized people in society, including persons living with disabilities, thus helping to rebuild trust in the justice system which has been undermined by suspicions of corruption. Plans are also underway to try to tackle corruption at large in the USAID’S upcoming accountability activity slated to start in mid-2018. It has also instituted a program dubbed ‘Voice Up!’ which was launched in August 2016. “The project works to empower activists and civil society organizations with the ability, resources and media space to advance meaningful information and advocacy campaigns promoting human rights particularly for LGBT.” There are other similar programs including ‘PRODEF’ intended to promote human rights, a very vital aspect of democracy and good governance, in Cote d’Ivoire.118

These and many more are the initiatives undertaken by the international community in conjunction with the Government of Cote d’Ivoire in promoting human rights, democracy and democratic consolidation in the country. This has impacted positively on the current democratic laurels of Cote d’Ivoire as throughout the reign of the present government, there has not been any current concerns in the country which could distort the peace and progress in democracy that the country is currently enjoying.

**Conclusion**

According to Gyimah-Boadi and Whitfield, in Ghana, there has clearly been considerable improvement in the performance of key institutions of state such as the Electoral Commission, the Judiciary, the security agencies among others which have contributed to the democratic laurels of the country. In addition to these are the increasing consolidation of the rule of law, constitutional provisions and other democratic behavior of citizens.119 All these have contributed
to deepening of the country’s democracy. In Cote d’Ivoire, these factors are also becoming increasingly evident and inadvertently promoting the democratic process. Thus, the country has made some progress although this process has been stalled by several challenges due to the previous conflict situation in the country. Many of these factors that promote democratic consolidation also pose threats to the process. This is in the vain that though they promote consolidation, certain deficits in their performance threaten the process and signal a possible relapse into authoritarianism. These militating factors include elections and the electoral commission, institutional structures, constitutionalism and the rule of law, electoral violence, ethnicity and regionalism, and demilitarization and civil military-rule. These have continually posed threats to the consolidation process with even a more serious threat in Cote d’Ivoire.

Endnotes

2 Frempong, op. cit. 1 supra.
4 Frempong, op. cit. 1 supra
5 Ibid, 1 supra
16Frempong, Op. cit. 1 Supra.
17 Ibid, 1 supra
18 Ibid, 1 supra
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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Summary of Major Findings

The study reviewed the antecedents that led to the adoption of contemporary democratic dispensation in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. It assessed the factors that have promoted and militated against democratic consolidation in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. The chapter also summarizes the findings of the study and conclusions; makes suggestions as recommendations based on the findings and conclusions.

The study found that both internal and external factors accounted for the second wave of democracy on the continent. The collapse of communism and socialism and the triumph of capitalism and democracy were external factors that promoted democracy in Africa, particularly Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. Internally, the abuse of human rights, economic hardships and falling living standards in Africa ignited demonstrations and clamours for democratic change.

The study measured the extent of democratic consolidation through the spectrum of constitutional reforms, elections and the independence of the electoral commission, institutional structures, constitutionalism and rule of law, civil society organisations, freedom of the media, electoral violence, ethnicity and sub-regionalism, socio-economic challenges, corruption, and the role of the international community. The work did a comparative analysis of the extent to which the above factors either promoted or militated against democratic consolidation in the two countries.

The study found that Ghana has done better in the consolidation of democracy, given its performance in all the factors that were analysed than Côte d’Ivoire. Ghana’s seeming better consolidation of democracy is largely due to its legal and institutional reforms, free and vibrant media, and the relative peaceful and stable environment within which the contemporary democratic dispensation thrives. Cote d’Ivoire is still faced with serious challenges in consolidating its democratic gains, largely because of the divisive concept of Ivoirité that had sought to create more-equal citizens which has created faultlines of South-North, Christians-Muslims, and indigenes-migrants divides. These sources of goal incompatibilities finally resulted
in the 2010-11 Ivoirian Civil War that has muddied Cote d’Ivoire’s path to democratic consolidation.

While the analysis of the data points to Ghana making strides towards the consolidation of its democratic dispensation; the work however identifies the institutionalisation of violence through the flourishing of vigilante groups, ethnocentrism, sub-regionalism, and common corruption that threaten to claw back Ghana’s gains. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire lethargic constitutional and institutional reforms, ethnocentrism, corruption and socio-economic challenges and lack of respect for the rule of law threaten the little gains it has so far made.

4.2 Conclusion

Based upon the findings, the work concludes:

❖ That both internal and external factors led to the clamour for democracy giving rise to this current democratic dispensation in both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. These include socio-economic challenges, bad governance, the fall of communism and socialism and rise of capitalism and democracy, the contribution of regional and sub-regional groups and the activities and conditions of donor agencies.

❖ That both internal and external factors further contributed to consolidating democracy in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

❖ That both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have made an appreciable progress towards consolidating their democratic gains despite their structural challenges;

❖ That the democratic consolidation gains made are only sustainable when their structural weaknesses are further redeemed;

❖ That improvement of the economic performance in terms of employment opportunities and raising the living standards of West African citizens is a *sine qua non* to democratic consolidation, and,

❖ That the ownership of contemporary democratic dispensation and its performance in West Africa will always be credited to the individual West African countries; however, the role of West African states’ development partners and their development donor
agencies in promoting democratic consolidation through their resource provision is paramount.

4.3 Recommendations
The following recommendations have been put forward based on the findings of the research:

- Constitutional Amendment: Ghana has undergone a lot of institutional changes and has been praised for it. However, there is clamouring for further constitutional reforms and the same goes for Cote d’Ivoire as it has not done very well in this regard. Its constitutional reforms to aid the democratic process are not ardently abide by. There are issues of meager respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law, excessive control of the other arms of government by the executive, corruption and socio-economic challenges and ethnocentrism and electoral violence that have led to the two civil wars that have grounded the country.

- Effective Anti-Corruption measures: One of the original aims of democratization was that democracy will end corruption, but it has been realized that democracy breeds corruption due to patronage. The perception in the two countries is the politicians are milking the country dry and there are visible large differences in the living standards of politicians and citizens. Since these are the reasons why coup d’états were common in the past, such perceptions may lead to the relapse of the democratic processes of West African countries hence the need for effective anti-corruption measures. Some of these measures include effective prosecution of corrupt individuals, particularly public officials and emphasizing and enforcing assert declaration laws. In like manner, there is the need to establish and empower the office of a special prosecutor as in the case of Ghana and ensure that it is effectively and efficiently carrying out its mandate.

- Capacity Building of Judicial Institutions: the judiciary has a very essential role to play in the elimination of the culture of impunity by punishing crimes. Also, the inequalities in society appear to be reflected in the delivery of justice. The poor are shabbily treated at
the courts and the incumbent politicians are given more attention and favourable judgment than others.

• Security Sector Reforms: the state should try to retrieve arms from the hands of the wrong people and the military and other security agents have to be inculcated with tenets of professionalism. They should be sensitized that they cannot be treated differently from the rest of the population in terms of remuneration and conditions of service. They should know that without peace there cannot be any sustainable development.

• Restructuring and Capacity Building for EMBs and Electoral Reforms: Periodic electoral reforms also help to check shortcomings in the electoral process. This is coupled with the restructuring and reforming of the electoral management body to help deliver impartial election results and increase voters’ trust in electoral outcomes. Giving security of tenure to the commissioner will be a step in the right direction. In Ghana, there is no term limit for the commissioner. This causes a sort of mistrust and lack of confidence in the citizen. As such, countries should device means of selecting the electoral commissioner, so that the appointment overlaps an election. If they are able to live up to standard, and the appointing authority and the people generally are satisfied, they can be given another term, but after two terms, like is done in the presidency, they should be out so that others would aspire to take over. The body must be given autonomy in terms of management and funding in order to deliver effectively. Staff remuneration is also very necessary to retain high caliber personnel and reduce their propensity to corruption.¹

• Wealth Creation: This is necessary to promote democracy and proper decentralization and devolution. This can also help curb the issue of corruption and socio-economic challenges. It is said that “Democracy not underpinned by resources tends to be more theoretical than real.”² Thus, wealth creation can be achieved through public-private participation. In that regard, there should be serious commentaries from academia and intelligentsia to ensure that the public-private partnership which is the notion of the times is realized. In that order, government can generate wealth to empower the proper devolution which will redound to democratization and democratic consolidation.
generally. When wealth is generated, then development can be pursued properly. Wealth creation can also be achieved through economic empowerment such as diversification of the economy, which will help curb corruption and the economic challenges.\(^3\)

- **Job Creation:** Wealth creation must come with job creation so as to lessen or reduce drastically the issue of economic challenges that may signal corruption and uprising in the economy. Availability of jobs decreases the propensity of citizen to engage in corrupt practices or rise against government.

- **Inclusivity:** To effectively address the challenges of Cote d’Ivoire, inclusivity is very important. This will help to realize citizens’ participation in governance, promote human rights and equality, and equity in the distribution of wealth and allocation of resources. This will make citizens feel secured and know that they have a stake in the country.\(^4\)
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3 Ibid, 1 Supra.
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E. INTERVIEWS


APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW GUIDE

This interview is undertaken by Priscie Delase Adenyikor to solicit information on the topic: The Consolidation of Africa’s Contemporary Democratic Dispensation: The Case of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire that is, from the period 1990 till date. This is an academic exercise in honour of a Masters’ degree at LECIAD (University of Ghana).

You are assured of the confidentiality of any information that you may give. Please give me your utmost cooperation and assistance.

Name……………………………………………………………………………………………

Institution………………………………………………………………………………………

Office/ Position……………………………………………………………………………………

Main business: Democratic Consolidation Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

1. In your view, what does consolidation of democracy mean?
   OR
   How would you describe democratic consolidation?

2. What are the necessary factors or benchmarks for a democracy to become consolidated?

3. In your view, to what extent can it be said that Ghana has made progress towards the consolidation of democracy?
4. What are the factors accounting for the progress in democratic consolidation that Ghana has made?

5. Can this progress be attributed to external factors? If yes, which are they?

6. Can this progress be attributed to internal factors? If yes, which are they?

7. What are the factors accounting for the progress in democratic consolidation in Cote d’Ivoire?

8. Is this progress attributable to external factors? If yes, which are these factors?

9. Can this progress be attributed to internal factors? If yes, which are they?

10. What are the prospects of democratic consolidation for the two countries, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire?
11. What are the drawbacks or challenges Ghana is facing in its march or progress towards democratic consolidation?

12. What are the drawbacks or challenges Cote d’Ivoire is facing in its progress towards democratic consolidation?

13. Are the problems Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are facing unique or any different from each other? This is with the notion that the problems of francophone countries may be different from those of anglophone countries.

14. On a more general basis, are the problems or challenges Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are facing unique or different from those of other countries?

15. Any other views on democracy?
INTERVIEW GUIDE

This interview is undertaken by Priscie Delase Adenyikor to solicit information on the topic; The Consolidation of Africa’s Contemporary Democratic Dispensation: The Case of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire that is, from the period 1990 till date. This is an academic exercise in honour of a Masters’ degree at LECIAD (University of Ghana).

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Name……………………………………………………………………………………………
Institution………………………………………………………………………………………
Office/ Position……………………………………………………………………………………

Civil Society Organizations

1. What is/ are the role(s) of the civil society in promoting democracy in Cote d’Ivoire?

2. Do they engage in voter education?

3. Do they engage in election observation or monitoring?

4. How vibrant or effective is the civil society?

5. For how long or since when did they become vibrant?

6. Can you name some of the civil society organizations or groups?
The Media

1. What is the role of the media in promoting democracy in Cote d’Ivoire?

2. What is the role of the media in promoting the electoral process?

3. Do they educate the public on their rights and duties?

4. Do they serve and watchdogs on government or help to keep the government in check?

5. Is the media vibrant and for how long or since when did it become vibrant?

The CEI

1. How effective is the CEI in promoting democracy in Cote d’Ivoire?

2. What are some of the reforms in the CEI that have helped to promote democracy in Cote d’Ivoire?

3. Does the CEI promote democracy or elections in Cote d’Ivoire? How?

The Constitution

1. Does the Ivorian, both the public and those in government respect or abide by the constitutional provision?

Elections

1. Does Ivorian elections help to promote the democratic process? How?
Neopatrimonialism

1. How has neopatrimonialism impacted on or affected democratic consolidation in Cote d’Ivoire?

2. How is political appointment done in Cote d’Ivoire? Especially local government positions. Is it based on neopatrimonialism?

3. Is power overly concentrated in the executive? Does the executive have too much power?

4. Does the executive wield such excessive executive power and thus, can unilaterally create and restructure ministries, departments and agencies? How?