Table of Contents

I  The Election of Secretaries-General
   --Selection of U Thant  1-6
   --Assessment of Hammarskjold  6
   --UN crisis management  7
   --Leadership in the UN system  8-10

II  The Cuban Missile Crisis
   --Background on the Bay of Pigs at the UN,
     (Adlai Stevenson's reaction)  11-15
   --Kennedy administration's attitude toward the UN  11-15
   --Stevenson's actions in the Security Council  19-24
   --Approach to U Thant  24-25
   --U Thant's letter to Kennedy and Khrushchev  25-26
   --US suggestion of U Thant letter to Castro  27-30
   --Contingency provision for further intervention
      by U Thant  30-31
   --Adlai Stevenson's attitude in the crisis  31-33
   --Negotiations in New York on removal of the missiles  33
   --Assessment of U Thant  36-39
YUN Interview
Ambassador Harlan Cleveland
Cuban Missile Crisis
Interviewed by James Sutterlin
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Arden House, Harriman, NY

JS
Ambassador Cleveland, I first want to thank you again for participating in this Yale University United Nations Oral History Project, and I thought, if we could, we would begin this part of your conversation today on the subject of the election of Secretary General U Thant. You, at that point, I believe, were the head of the International Organization Department in the State Department, is that correct?

HC
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.

JS
Could you describe what happened on the American side after the sudden and unexpected death of Hammarskjold? What thoughts were put together in terms of a replacement?

HC
Well, what I don’t recall is the full slate, I must say. I was awakened in the middle of the night with the news about Hammarskjold, and with a summons to a very early breakfast, not in Adlai’s Waldorf apartment but in another suite in the Towers there where Rusk was. And so we all got together there for -- Adlai Stevenson, Dean Rusk and myself, and I don’t recall who else was present but almost certainly Francis Plimpton and Charlie Yost
were, and maybe somebody else from the State Department, but I can’t remember. And we began immediately to cast about and came out, as I recall, with three people on the slate, one of whom was U Thant. But he was the least preferred on the general theory that he would tend to be very Third Worldish and would cater to the developing country majority and also would tend to be of a Burmese – passive nature, which was the opposite of the Swedish activism that Dag Hammarskjold stood for. I may have the chronology wrong but I believe there was a Finn named Max something . . .

JS

He came later. There was a Finn at this point, and his name was Ralph Inkle, I believe. A Finn, and then the Tunisian Mongi Slim and Frederick Boland of Ireland, they were all candidates.

HC

But it rather rapidly developed but the Soviet list was quite different from ours, except that U Thant turned up on their list, too. And so it was a rather rapid process of elimination as I remember. The basic question, as often in the UN in those days, was whatever the US and Soviet Union could agree on nobody else was going to get in the way of -- because that was such a difficult agreement and the appointment did require Security Council action, therefore you had to have both the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.
This was still in the aftermath of the Soviet proposal for a so called Troika, which I believe, at this point, they had not entirely given up.

That’s right. So it was part of our interest to get a solution that would knock that on the head, finally. I must say that I never thought that that would fly. I thought it was just a ploy, and I think it was essentially just a ploy. I don’t think they (the Soviets) really thought that a three-headed secretariat was going to be approved. One thing; it was sort of unconstitutional under the Charter and so we never, I must say, took it very seriously. There was a lot noise about it -- newspapers, much debate in the editorials -- but looking at it from the inside, it never looked like something on which we had to make policy. We just obviously were against it and therefore it wasn’t going to happen.

Did the US work closely with one or more other countries at this point in trying to decide or determine who would be the next Secretary?

There was a good deal of consultation, which was normal, with the British and French, but I went back to Washington almost immediately. I usually just spent a day or two up there and then I would go back to my desk. So I wasn’t involved in the actual canvassing of delegations. The mission was organized in such a way
that there was somebody responsible for each group -- for keeping in touch with each group, more or less organized by geography -- and those people, of course, all fanned out and took soundings. But my recollection of it is -- your research would reveal how quickly the decision was made -- but my recollection was that the consensus came quite fast.

JS

Well, there was a good bit of back and forth because the Soviets, while giving up the Troika idea, proposed that there should be an interim administration of four Secretaries General. But then, you may recall that quite an argument developed about how many advisors the Secretary General should have because, even on the American side, I believe, according to the records I have here, the US proposed that the new Secretary-General, who would be U Thant, would have a certain number of advisors who would come from the different regions of the world.

HC

There again, my recollection is that we were trying to stalemate the Soviet suggestions for converting the Secretariat into a committee. All of their suggestions had that common characteristic: that it would become a collective executive -- sort of like the EEC -- and our mindset was that that was bad business. We had put a lot of emphasis -- in fact, I made a number of speeches in that period on the subject -- about the UN's "capacity to act." In a way, I was arguing with the conventional
wisdom of the UN experts that, well, after all, the UN is a good thing because it is a place where everybody gets to blow off steam and it’s a good talk place. But I always argued that what was important about the UN was its capacity to act -- not in an independent way, exactly, but in a sort of objective and neutral and non-sovereign way -- and that that was why the things that were working did work. The World Weather Watch, arrangements for civil aviation, arrangements for divvying up the electromagnetic frequency spectrum, and world smallpox eradication (which was started during that period) all seemed to work for us because we empowered an international organization actually to do something. Whereas the organizations that mostly talked had difficulty getting around to doing anything, UNESCO being an outstanding example even in those days. So this "capacity to act" theme ran through much of what we then thought we were doing.

And for that purpose you thought there was a need for a strong single Secretary-General?

Yes. And with a staff that knew how to act. We needed an executive, in other words. Now our problem in thinking about an U Thant was that we were unlikely to find it in him a person who would be willing to take the kind of independent initiative -- to pick up the ball and run with it in the way that Hammarskjold had been willing
to do. But even U Thant was a unitary executive -- U Thant was an improvement over some committee. So that was about where we came out.

If I could just go back for one moment to Hammarskjold’s tenure, Hammarskjold was an activist, certainly, and in the final stage of his career as Secretary-General, I believe, he enjoyed the full support of the United States. But that was not always the case. I wondered, from your perspective as Assistant Secretary of State at that point, was it your sense that Hammarskjold could continue along the path that he was moving or that he, perhaps, had reached the limits of his capacity, given the attitude of the Soviet Union?

I think as far as US support was concerned he certainly could continue. By the time I came into the picture, which of course in his life and tenure was very late (January 1961), his development of the UN’s capacity to act was perceived as clearly in the US interest.

In the Congo, we argued to President Kennedy, (and he kept remembering this at subsequent meetings), that if the UN weren’t in there buffaloing the Russians we would have to be. And the UN was obviously a much better mouse trap than we could otherwise invent. But that theme of empowering the UN -- I used to argue, for example, that the way you would measure the success of crisis management in the UN context, from the US point of view,
would be whether after each crisis the UN was stronger and better set up with a capacity to act for the next crisis, which there was bound to be somewhere in the world. We even tried to get some regular arrangements for earmarking forces and facilities and so forth, that would be made available to the UN on request. The Joint Chiefs of Staff didn’t like that idea very much. But we had very good support for the general policy favoring U.N. peacekeeping, and for the UN being in the picture -- in West New Guinea, later on, and even on the Dominican Republic where Latin Americanists in the Department and the folks in the White House were so appalled at first with our notion that Stevenson and I came up with that there should be a UN person also involved in the Dominican Republic affair -- a UN observer. And also, of course, we argued it was not our jurisdiction -- the OAS should be involved. So I don’t think there was ever any serious thought that we would go for any kind of committee to do peacekeeping; we wanted international organizations with a "capacity to act."

In the end, I think, all U Thant said was that he was going to invite a limited number of persons to serve as his senior advisors, and he specifically listed Ralph Bunche and a Russian named Arkadiev. This, presumably, was quite satisfactory to the American side.

Ralph Bunche was already there . . . had been for years.
Oh, yes, very much, very much . . . he'd been there since Trygve Lie.

So that wasn't an outside advisor.

No

And Arkadiev was just the ranking Soviet in the secretariat.

That's right. So that's actually the way U Thant got out of this particular problem.

It was very Burmese.

But, I had asked the other question because, in fact, I wanted to move ahead and ask you, based on this experience and your rather intimate observation of the operation of the United Nations since then and even before, is this the right way to select a Secretary-General, by negotiations, so to speak, by finding the man or woman who is most acceptable to the most number of countries? Do you see this as a weakness of a system or can you suggest something better?

Well, I think it's inherent in the structure if you decide to have an international organization that is a committee of sovereigns with a staff, you're stuck with the sovereigns on the appointment. Now, in many ways, I've always regarded the Treaty of Rome as a brilliant departure from the committee-of-sovereigns-with-a-staff sort of thing. It was one of Jean Monnet's most interesting inventions. First of all, people are
appointed by their governments, but they can’t be removed except by unanimous consent -- this would never happen. They are political level people, the members of the Commission, typically ex-cabinet members or sometimes sitting cabinet members were appointed. They have a lot of jurisdiction. The Commission has a monopoly of certain subjects that are laid down in the treaty as "European." They have the capacity to consult publicly - - with labor, agriculture, the media and now with a directly elected parliament. Then at the last stage they do have to go to the committee of sovereigns. But the Treaty of Rome had this wonderful gimmick in it that says the committee of sovereigns can’t edit, it can only say yes or no, but it can’t say we don’t like paragraph eight and we’re going to rewrite it this way. So the Commission has the ball and gradually, it took quite a number of years for it to realize that it had the ball, but it really has the ball tucked well under its arm now. In fact, nowadays you hear people in Europe complaining that the European Commission is so strong that it could become a kind of dictatorship.

JS
Whereas in the case of the United Nations you’ve heard no such complaints since Hammarskjold.

HC
Not since Hammarskjold, no. And there are some situations in which, if you have a strong enough person, a committee of sovereigns with a staff can really act
like an executive agent. I think that’s been true of the World Bank and the IMF, by and large, which have had a strong leadership -- strong executive leadership. But it’s not the norm, it has not been the norm at UNESCO or FAO or most of the other agencies. It has been the norm, interestingly enough, in the UN Environmental Programme, maybe because UNEP isn’t a Specialized Agency. The degree of initiative that Mustafa Tolba and his staff have been able to take, on things like the Mediterranean clean up and more recently the Ozone Treaty, more recently, is very impressive. In fact, at this American seminar on the global environment we were attending at Arden House, I wrote a paragraph patting UNEF on the back, which got through by acclamation.

JS

That’s surprising because there’s not such a generally positive assessment of UNEP, I think.

HC

Well, it has got all the problems with the bureaucracy and besides it’s in Nairobi so nobody knows really knows very much about how it works. But, in fact, UNEP has served as catalyst and gadfly and innovator, demonstrating a capacity to act. I go back to that old theme, I still think that that’s the right theme and that that’s the way an international organization ought to be judged.

JS

With U Thant in office, fate brought the US and him together on a number of issues, the outcome of which were
controversial from the US perspective, I think. One of them was Viet Nam which I don't propose to discuss, but the other was Cuba and the Cuban Missile Crisis. I wonder if you would just describe how you saw that situation develop from the perspective of the State Department beginning, really, with the Bay of Pigs because that was an issue at the UN which the US representative had to handle, and there were problems, if I am not mistaken. Could you describe that a little bit? Well, there was a recurring Cuban item on the General Assembly agenda in which, in various ways and with new evidence each time, the Cubans would accuse us of being about to invade them. Such an item was due for debate in the General Assembly on the day the CIA invaded Cuba -- a brilliant piece of timing, we always thought, on the part of the CIA. We were not terribly well briefed. Tracy Barnes came up the week before and I went up with him and Arthur Schlesinger from the White House, and Adlai was briefed and we all talked about it and we didn't like it very much, but on the other hand they hadn't -- they were assuring us that these were really freedom fighters. They didn't tell us anything nearly all the truth about the degree to which the whole thing was a straight CIA operation. So Adlai, I think, was always uncomfortable with it but he wasn't going out in the streets and opposing it or anything. Well, the first
thing that happened before it got thrown in to the UN was that on the day that that Cuban item was starting, Adlai was on the floor of the General Assembly anyway. A pilot flying a plane with Cuban markings landed in a swamp in Florida and announced that he had defected. It later turned out that this was a pilot that had flown to Nicaragua and back, but it made a big splash in the media. So, of course, we wanted to know right away in our Bureau what was going on so we could tell Stevenson what he could say because there he was on the floor of the General Assembly and everybody else was listening to the same radio news programs and reading the same newspapers. So I got hold of the Latin American bureau and the Latin American Bureau got hold of the CIA and they came back with this story that, yes, indeed, there was a defector and so on. And we authorized Stevenson to say that. He said it, then he compounded the error. His alert staff saw the same story coming out of Florida with the pilot's cover story, so they tear the story off the AP ticker and rush it into Stevenson and he says, "Well, I just have confirmation here," then he reads the same cover story over again. In less than twenty-four hours some enterprising reporter scratched the side of the airplane and found US Air Force markings underneath the Cuban markings. So the cover blew off and Adlai was absolutely fit to be tied. He was a rather mild person,
really, and tolerant, but he was just furious that his government could have hung him out to dry that way. And he was very nice about not blaming me for it. I was the proximate authorizer of that mistake, of that lie. So we already had a rather sour taste in our mouth about Cuba, but, although it’s not really part of your inquiry here, to me it’s always been an interesting contrast between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bay of Pigs operation happened in April of the year ’61, which was the year Kennedy came into office. Kennedy had never been an executive. The last executive job that John F. Kennedy had had before he took over as President of the United States was to be head of a PT boat, and he didn’t know. I later asked one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff how it had happened that they had never told the President that from a military point of view, this operation was, in hindsight, obviously for the birds. I just happened to sit next to this man, who has since retired, on an airplane and I got talking to him. He said, "Well, Harlan, you won’t believe this, but we were sitting around -- we were all old enough to be his father -- but he was this charismatic young political hero and we were waiting to speak when we were spoken to, and he never asked us."

I used to teach public administration. My diagnosis is that an executive learns, usually on the hoof rather than by studying, how to be a leader. An
experienced executive learns that the way you "execute"
is mostly by asking questions. People gradually get the
idea from the drift of your questions in which direction
they're going to go. In April of '61, Kennedy didn't
have that feel for the executive function. Eighteen
months later he had it to a tee. He participated
personally in the staff work on the Cuban Missile Crisis
asking skeptical questions all the time.

Could I just interrupt a minute to ask there was, of
course, extensive criticism in the UN of the Bay of Pigs
operation. Did this in any way effect the attitude of
the Kennedy administration toward the UN and toward using
the UN?

Well, I'm not sure it was a big factor. First of all,
within a day of the invasion, Kennedy comes out publicly
and says, "OK, it was a booboo. Let's go on from there."
So the fact that there was criticism of the UN was
obviously not surprising, and nobody felt sort of huffy
about it since we'd obviously done something wrong. And
the President himself had said so. So, no, I don't think
that that was a big factor. A more surprising thing was
that it didn't particularly rub off badly on Stevenson.
His colleagues at the UN sympathized with him and didn't
blame him for lying to them. So then in a way it passed
over, partly because the President stepped up so fast and
coolly. I've often contrasted that with Nixon's handling
of the Watergate burglary. If he had come out the next
day and said, "Hey, burglary? We don't do that kind of
stuff," the whole history would have been different. Do
you want to move to the Missile Crisis?

JS

I'd like to move ahead to the missile crisis if we could,
yes. I just did, though, as we move along to there, want
to get some of your perception of the developing US
attitude toward the United Nations itself. I assume, as
we go later in the story after Kennedy's death, the Viet
Nam situation affected the attitude of the US
administration . . .

HC

Most importantly, it soured Rusk, who was basically very
pro UN and interested in the UN.

JS

Well that's exactly what I wanted to ask, because as we
go into the Cuban Missile Crisis period then you would
say that the attitude of the US remained positive toward
the UN and toward utilization of the UN.

HC

I'd say that the attitude of the Secretary of State was
very much so. That was not particularly true of some of
the other bureaus who still felt they were in the
bilateral diplomacy business, and George Ball was never
a great UN user. But Rusk definitely was, and I always
had very good access to him and he was always very much
interested in what we were doing. So that was one
factor. In the White House, using the UN was not the
sort of thing that would occur naturally. It required a
lot of reminding. In the early days of the Kennedy administration, we had a rather interesting central problem because the new President would pick up the newspaper in the morning, which he read while he was still in bed, and he would see three front-page stories about what he was doing in Washington, and he would see three other stories about what Adlai was doing in NY. The NY Times at that time, more so than now, tended to cover the UN as if it were local politics, so it got good coverage in the NY Times. And I began to get these rumbles from the White House staff. Mac Bundy, would ask was that position we took on the Angola issue that was just on the front page this morning -- was that really cleared with us? And I talked to Rusk about it and Mac Bundy and Arthur Schlesinger, who had been assigned to make sure that Stevenson was happy. (For a couple of weeks he thought he was in charge of UN affairs and then we got that settled.) Finally Mac Bundy and I worked out a scheme whereby at the end of the day, with Rusk agreeing that I could bypass him (and the day ending usually about seven thirty, eight, nine o'clock, ten o'clock, whatever), I would write a one-page memo that said what we had done that day with special emphasis on things that were likely to be covered by the media. And in those days, turning on the television at the end of the working day was not as much how everybody got their
first hard news. Newspapers were still more important. And that memo was put into Kennedy's bedtime reading folder and when he opened the newspaper in the morning and saw what we had been doing in NY he was in a position to say, "Well, I knew that." And with that small, almost gimmicky, procedure the whole problem went away. Kennedy was very conscious all the way through, right until his death, of how important it was to keep Adlai Stevenson happy and in the administration. Adlai was a grumbler, a cheerful grumbler, and a couple of times a week I'd get somebody rushing into my office and closing the door and saying, "You know, my cousin sat next to Adlai Stevenson last night at a party and he said he was going to resign." The first two or three times this happened I went up to George Ball who had worked so closely with Adlai before in his campaign . . . "George, we've got a real problem." George would say, "Pay no attention to it, just keep doing what you're doing, it doesn't mean anything, it's not going to happen." And he was right. But it was very important that Adlai be kept on the reservation. That's why Arthur Schlesinger was assigned to worry about that for the White House. They cleared Illinois judgeships with him. When Jackie went to NY, Adlai was her escort to the theater; they liked each other very much. And Kennedy invited Stevenson down: whenever there was any important meeting, he would
make sure that Stevenson was invited. That, by the way, made my job even more interesting because even if it was not something that the Bureau of International Organization Affairs was handling at all -- say, the Berlin crisis -- Adlai would look to me to brief him before the White House meeting. And so I could go and invade the jurisdiction of all the other bureaus to find out what I needed for my client. This was also important in our relations with the other bureaus because we had a client who usually needed an answer faster than other bureaus' clients did, and it was more important for our client because our client was a cabinet member and a member of the National Security Council. So we tended to have "the power of the first draft."

Now when it did come to the Cuban Missile Crisis, my impression is, and this may be wrong, that it was U Thant who took the initiative in order from his position to try to reduce the level of the crisis and provide a means through which the two sides could come together.

Well that's the way it was supposed to look. But you have to lead up to that through the very beginning of the crisis. At the very beginning of the crisis they called -- there were fourteen people who were called in a consultation and became the Executive Committee, the EXCOM. It's interesting that the National Security Council only meets in times of tranquility, but when you
have a crisis you have a special group of some sort. That’s not exactly what the drafters of the 1947 law [the National Security Act] had in mind.

Most of the arguments among those 14 people (I was not one of them, but Adlai was), had to do with the military options. There was the Air Force wanting, as usual, to do a "surgical strike." The notion of a blockade emerged. After about two days or three, when they brought in a second tier of people, of whom I was one. My somewhat prejudiced version of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that things began to get sensible when they brought in some staff people to do some solid analytical work. But of course as one of the staff people that’s a natural view.

Our staff work did strongly propose that we should handle the politics of the matter in multilateral forums, that we should go to the OAS and that we should go to the UN. And if I can continue this a little bit . . . because I had a, for me, very dramatic crisis in the coordination of that scenario on the day after the President revealed the missiles in a television speech on the Monday evening. On the Monday, according to plan, we had deposited with the OAS a request for an "immediate" meeting by which we meant first thing in the morning and we deposited with the UN a request for an "immediate" meeting by which we didn’t mean the right away because we
wanted some time to present the issue to the OAS first. As you remember, the scheme was to have the blockade be a Hemispheric action before we talked to the rest of the world about it. So on Tuesday morning the Latin American ministers were meeting over in the Pan American building -- Dean Rusk went over personally with Ed Martin who was the Assistant Secretary of Inter-American Affairs -- and by lunchtime they didn't have a consensus, which was not surprising because they only just heard about it the night before. Many of them didn't have instructions yet, and they had to go home at lunch and call up their foreign ministers and so on. A Latin lunch tends to be longer than some lunches and so it wasn't actually until about four o'clock that the OAS meeting reconvened -- maybe a little bit before four. The Security Council had been called for four o'clock. In the chair of the Security Council, by the accident of monthly rotation was Valerian Zorin of the USSR, and the first speaker was obviously going to be Stevenson. Well we had worked on a speech all through the weekend -- Arthur Schlesinger, Tom Wilson, who was my special assistant for writing things for Stevenson to say, and myself. Tom and Arthur had both gone up to NY, also my deputy Joe Sisco, to help, and I stayed back in Washington to coordinate things. I knew the speech was pretty long, about an hour long, and so we had a little leeway with the OAS action.
but not too much. And I told Ed Martin the timing problem. Well, it comes along about 4:45 and still no word from the Pan Am building and Stevenson is coming down to about three or four pages from the end. Finally the phone rings and it's Ed Martin saying, "OK, everybody but Uruguay has agreed." Uruguay, at that time, had nine presidents and they had some difficulty deciding on a policy question. So the Secretary authorized me to go ahead and get it into the speech. I called a number -- my secretary called a number -- of a phone that's right outside the Security Council, and we'd had a girl sitting on that phone all afternoon just to be sure nobody was using it so that we could get at that. And I asked her to go in and get Joe Sisco off the floor. I'm in my office with several members of my staff watching all this on television, of course. I could see Joe Sisco get up from behind Ambassador Stevenson, and go out and take my call. I dictated a paragraph to him, and told him where to put it into the speech. Then I could see him come back, on our TV screen, saw him put a piece of paper down in front of Stevenson. But Stevenson obviously didn't see the piece of paper. He was sitting there with his manuscript held up this way, in full flight of oratory. I was trying to figure out: is there time to get Joe to come out again and tell him to do something. Then the phone rings and my secretary comes in absolutely white as
a sheet -- she was normally a very cool customer -- and she said, "The President's on the phone. I mean personally!" So I pick up the phone and a familiar voice says, "I just heard about the OAS action. Is there any way of getting it into Stevenson's speech before he finishes?" I reviewed my life briefly, wondering what I would have said if we hadn't thought to cover that elementary base, and I finally said, "Well, Mr. President we've done an insert on that and we've put it in front of him, but I don't . . ."

And just as I was saying that, on television I can see Adlai looking around his manuscript, seeing there was an insert and picking it up and starting to read it. The President said, "Oh, I see, he's picking it up and reading it now. Thank you very much Harlan." I wrote this up one time, and I ended that story by saying "The Cuban Missile Crisis wasn't over, but mine was."

So we were very multilateral from the beginning. We had a big fight with the CIA about releasing the photos because they didn't want to show how good their photographic resolution was.

Those are the photos that Adlai Stevenson shared with them.

Yeah. We then made, I think, a very good tactical decision not to use them in the opening speech, to wait until we were challenged, and then roll them out as

22
rebuttal. Zorin absolutely fell like a ripe apple into our hands because he said, in effect, "Who says there are missiles in Cuba?" We had had this message from a business man -- name, I think, was Knox, ... Do you know that part of the story?

JS

No

HC

... who had gone to see Khrushchev in Moscow that very day. Khrushchev had boasted of having nuclear warheads in Cuba. Knox came hightailing over to the U.S. Embassy, and the Embassy shot us a flash message about it, repeated to Stevenson. So we had in our hands a piece of evidence that gave Stevenson confidence to face down Zorin. I wondered later whether that businessman ever realized how important was the part he played. And so Zorin questioned it and Stevenson said, "Oh, would you like to see these missiles?" And then at a signal -- I mean we had this all worked out ahead of time -- doors flew open, easels were rolled in and so forth -- it was a media event of the first water. And I think that the drama of that, including getting the OAS on board and then the drama in the Security Council, worked, as far as anything can work in politics, perfectly, and was very persuasive to everybody, including U Thant.

So, here you have a blockade -- the "quarantine" of Cuba. Khrushchev's ships are heading toward the blockade. The question was what to do about it. We suggested and got
clearance on the idea of getting U Thant to tell
Khrushchev not to challenge the blockade, and also tell
us not to fight about it. Not just to tell Khrushchev
not to. We had a debate about that one. I argued, I
remember very clearly, that the important thing was that
the UN should be telling both sides to cool it, that’s
what the UN does. So we wrote, in fact, a message for U
Thant to send to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It
was already late at night; we got the draft up to
Stevenson, and Stevenson, or Yost, maybe — I’m not clear
on that — actually went over to U Thant’s residence and
went over it with him, and U Thant authorized it to be
sent to both Kennedy and Khrushchev, and that’s the
letter that he was referring to in there.

JS Because he does not give that background in his book.

HC Well he wouldn’t, obviously, I mean, you can’t admit that
one of the litigants is doing your drafting for you. But
he knows it because he got it from our people.

JS So the letter was actually suggested and partly drafted
on the American side.

HC Oh yes, and not even in NY, in my office. And then we
had to wait and see and it did not take very long and I
notice that that’s confirmed here. It took such a short
length of time that Zorin was caught off base by it,
according to U Thant’s story. And in effect it was by
replying to the UN he was able to save a little face by
saying, "Well, we certainly wouldn't turn our boats around because we're afraid of your pickets -- your destroyer pickets -- but the UN asked us to so . . . .

And Khrushchev did reply to U Thant, as I recall, rather quickly.

Rather quickly, and I just looked up that part, I was reading that part. Zorin was beating on his desk and telling U Thant he had to throw the book at us for illegal blockade under international law, and so forth. And U Thant goes down and less than sixty minutes later, it says on that page, he brought a note saying -- no, the deputy Soviet representative comes to him, Zorin didn't do it for face reasons -- with this message in Russian and he reads it to U Thant, and it says that in view of your request we take it very seriously.

Could I just ask at that point, given the American participation from the beginning and U Thant's initiative, it is to me surprising that Khrushchev responded more quickly than the American side. Can you explain that?

Only that it was difficult to persuade all the other people that had to clear it, especially in the White House, that we were guilty of anything. There was still a little bit of resentment, in the White House staff especially, that U Thant's message had been addressed to both sides. I mean how could we -- we're as pure as the
driven snow. Some of the people just didn’t get the politics of it. I kept trying to explain to people that politics at the UN are just as practical as politics in other places. You know, most people (including members of Congress) thought of the UN in sort of an ethereal way and didn’t really think of it as a snake pit of a very complicated and interesting form of politics. Then we also developed a message for U Thant to send to Castro, asking him to accept inspection. This was a little later.

This was after the Russians had agreed.

Well they hadn’t agreed, I mean, there was never an agreement. They just turned their boats around. The agreement came the following February after Vishinsky and McCloy had a long negotiation. I’ll say something in a moment about that, too. We never thought that Castro would agree to inspection. We thought it was important that the question be put and that it not be put by us -- we didn’t have diplomatic relations anyway -- but we could’ve found some way to get the word to him. But U Thant was anxious to get things calmed down and anxious to be helpful. So we got him to -- he actually sent in all three messages, as I recall, to Castro reiterating different proposals for inspection, softening it some. We kept suggesting new gimmicks.

The contact with U Thant on this was Stevenson?
Stevenson, Yost. Yost did a lot of the real scurrying back and forth, and Ralph [Bunche] was still there. And some was gotten through Ralph, too. But the access, especially by Yost, was very good. U Thant trusted him and respected him as the professional's professional that he was. Did you know him?

No, I'd met him but I did not know him.

Absolutely lovely, low key, the ultimate professional and great to work with. A lot of my business with Mission was really done with him. You only had to say it once and he got all the ramifications immediately. He was an old pro. Also he spoke French fluently -- which was a big help -- and he'd been in Europe, he'd been in Asia, and he went to all of the cocktail parties where much of the real negotiation was done.

What we were doing, and quite consciously in fact, was trying to establish a little new piece of international law. It was obviously against international law in general to fly over another sovereign's territory if they didn't want you to. And while you could fly and take pictures diagonally, which is how the U2s did it and how some of those pictures actually got taken, that was awkward and also very expensive. So what we were doing, really, was setting up a situation in which we could say, "Well, in general, invading another person's airspace is bad business. But in extremis and if the UN has asked a
country to accept inspection and they won't accept it, and it's a matter of national security, that makes it legally all right to fly over -- which we then did regularly. After a while that legal question sort of went away when the satellites got up there and we'd get such good pictures from them. And since nobody could shoot the satellites down, it had become sort of a practical international law that flying over some one else's territory is all right once you're in space. As you know, there has never been a legal determination as to where the air stops and space begins. I presided at the only meeting on that subject which may have ever been held, at the end of which we decided that we didn't need to decide this question in order to have a space program.

So, as things worked out after the Missile Crisis, we had, in a sense, our permission, our legal justification for doing the surveillance of the taking out of the missiles. And Castro really couldn't -- in a way he was estopped from saying anything and he was estopped from shooting down an airplane because all hell would have broken loose if he had done that.

Right. If I recall correctly, U Thant made his trip to Cuba and did meet with Castro, and a U2 plane or a similar plane had been shot down just before that and the pilot was being held by Castro.
HC  I think that incident happened before the missiles were revealed.

JS  One was before and I believe

HC  Was there another one after?

JS  I think so. I believe it did affect to a certain extent U Thant’s conversations in Cuba, but again

HC  Didn’t they eventually send that pilot back?

JS  Yes, they did. The point there was that apparently the Soviets had sent instructions that no American plane was to be shot down but that it was actually a Soviet officer and gun which shot the plane down and that particular officer hadn’t gotten the word.

HC  There’s always some son of a bitch that hasn’t gotten the word.

JS  That it was not the Cubans who did it but . . .

HC  What’s conveyed by those two stories -- the message to Khrushchev and three messages to Castro -- is how extremely useful to American foreign policy the UN could be if we were skillful about it. And that was a lesson that I rubbed in at every opportunity with the White House staff.

JS  Now it was at some point here just prior to the climax that it’s now known that President Kennedy sent a letter which apparently reached Adlai Stevenson for delivery to U Thant asking his further intervention in the event that the crisis deteriorated further. Were you aware of that
in the State Department at that time? Are you familiar with this particular __________?

HC Yes. As I recall I learned about it from New York. Our relations were really very good. And if they got something like that . . . the turf problems were not such that they wouldn’t tell me about it and vice versa. When I learned something that they weren’t supposed to know I’d tell them.

JS It’s historically interesting since it would suggest confirmation of what you have been saying and that even in the White House, at that point, they did see a role for the Secretary-General in the most serious of circumstances.

HC Very much so. And I think that the drama in the Security Council plus U Thant’s willingness to carry our mail, as it were, -- those things, I think, deeply affected Kennedy’s thinking and the thinking of the White House staff. They saw that it wasn’t just airy fairy Adlai up there wanting to be sentimental. It was a practical political operation there.

JS Now that brings me to the next question I wanted to ask. An impression grew up that Adlai Stevenson had, in fact, favored a different policy than the one that was followed. Can you give the background of that?

HC Yeah, I can. In one of the meetings of EXCOM, Adlai said, in effect, "Well, we could always take those
missiles out of Turkey because we don't really want them there anyway, do we?" And Kennedy was rather, well, he was sore not at that proposal, he was sore at the fact that they hadn't already been taken out because he thought they had been ordered taken out some time before, but they were still there. My impression is -- I'd have to research this -- but my impression is that Bobby Kennedy had also made that proposal, but some of the hardliners (and Bobby was generally a hardliner) were apparently offended by this idea and somebody talked to Charlie Bartlett about it. Now the fact that Charles Bartlett was something like Kennedy's best friend suggests that it was probably Kennedy himself that talked to Bartlett, whether unthinkingly or not. Or it may have been Bobby, which wouldn't have been unthinkingly but with malice aforethought in his case. And so Bartlett comes out with this in the Saturday Evening Post, I think it was. And all hell broke loose, and Adlai really was going to resign. And I rushed up to NY to talk to him about it. I talked to everybody, I talked to Rusk, I talked to people in the White House, and I said the President just has to countermand this article. And I drafted a letter which was somewhat watered down, but eventually was sent by Kennedy to Stevenson to say that we love you dearly, but not fingering who was responsible for the leak.
Stevenson was really deeply offended by that and, of course, it did reflect the view of people in the White House that, in a pinch, Adlai was likely to be soft on the Russians. And that had already been evidenced by the decision to send John J. McCloy, to negotiate the deal on paper about the Cuban missiles, even though they were already being taken out. The deal on paper, in a way was almost post facto by the time it was finally signed, sealed and delivered. McCloy was very conscious of the difficulty and the embarrassment that it would create for Stevenson for him to be up there. And we worked out an arrangement -- McCloy and I were involved in that -- whereby the assignment was given to the Mission to do this negotiation and McCloy was sent up as an ad hoc member of the Mission. That meant that every telegram that came into Washington on this was signed Stevenson. And that helped. I mean, it was a small thing, but that helped.

JS

Why was the decision made to have these negotiations in NY? It’s another interesting aspect of the UN’s position.

HC

Well, for the same reason that -- and that may well have been Rusk’s proposal, I don’t know, but it would stand to reason. Every year, Rusk would spend two weeks up there doing bilateral diplomacy. He would see fifty or sixty foreign ministers during the general debate. And Rusk
was very sensitive. The first year of the Kennedy Administration I was afraid the two locomotives (the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to the U.N.) I was working for were on a collision course and were going to crash. Because the normal thing is that the Foreign Minister goes and makes the first speech. The first year, 1961, we had Kennedy going up to the U.N. in New York. But he was up there not as the US representative but there as the host. We still had the US speech to give. And so I went up to see Rusk just to say that I thought there was going to be trouble with Stevenson about this. I found that he had already thought about it -- naturally, being a bright fellow. He said, "Look, we've got the world's best known, best loved, and most skillful megaphone up there. It would be absolutely silly for me to go up and make the US speech. Why doesn't Stevenson make the US speech? And I'll then come up a day or two later and start seeing foreign ministers." And that's the way it was for every year that I was there. Kennedy came up again in 1963. LBJ came up almost as soon as he became President. Almost the very first thing he did was, in effect, to introduce himself to the world by coming to the UN with a huge reception, shaking everybody's hand. (Briefing him for those encounters, which I did going up -- I've got a picture of myself talking with LBJ in one of these little
executive jets -- was quite an experience.)

So negotiating about withdrawal of the missiles in a U.N. context was the most natural thing in the world. That was a place you could talk to anybody. We could even talk with the Cubans there. And later on we could even talk with Nicaragua at the U.N. So I think that it was a kind of a natural arrangement and it suited the Soviets, too. It would have been awkward for the Soviets to come and do it in Washington -- it would almost be coming to pay tribute, as it were, on their knees. We couldn't do it in Moscow. I mean, nobody at that point would have wanted a high level representative of the President to be resident in Moscow for what turned out to be three or four months. We could, I suppose, have done it in Geneva or Paris, the way we did later with Averall Harriman going to Paris to talk with the North Vietnamese for the better part of a year. Anyway, it was done that way, but, in fact, McCoy was negotiator. But the symbolism was maintained and McCoy was very careful to maintain the symbolism. He was very good about that. And eventually he had the famous conversation with Vishinsky, sitting on the fence of his own estate, with Vishinsky saying, "Never again." I think historians -- they've already recorded and they will record that that was the beginning of the real arms race, of the real trip up to fifty thousand nuclear weapons on the two sides.
I would like to ask one final question in this regard. I realize that the Vietnamese war had a substantial impact on the impression in Washington of U Thant, but I would like to ask if you would give your final conclusion, so to speak, on the performance of U Thant as the Secretary-General. How would you assess his tenure? Well, I think he was over-impressed with the need to stay in good with the "Group of 77" [the developing-country caucus] and under-impressed with the various kinds of power that the great powers do, after all, have. He was also offended by the idea of a land war in Asia, with white soldiers coming over to fight it. On the other hand, he was a pro. And on the many things which we dealt with him, for the most part, he was willing to be a pro and to be discreet. For several months he held on to the secret of the Rangoon meeting that never happened; he held that until he just had to blow it. But he didn’t blow for weeks and weeks and weeks, and he didn’t blow for a couple of weeks after Stevenson got back from his vacation and told him what the answer had to be, which was no. When he did blow, that was really deeply offensive to Rusk. In my presence Rusk said to U Thant personally on the telephone, "Who do you think you are, a country?" And the fact that LBJ or his spokesman said that there never had been such a proposal -- that was just a misunderstanding as to what was meant by proposal.
They meant no *substantive* proposal, whereas U Thant was only making a procedural proposal. But to U Thant, for whom it would have been wholly inappropriate to make a substantive proposal, he had gone the limit in making a procedural proposal, and even picking Rangoon which was his own country.

There was one other -- and I realize that this happened after you had left the Department to go to NATO -- one other action, though, that U Thant took which had an effect, I think, well I would like to ask you from your somewhat distant posting in Brussels, and that was his decision to authorize the withdrawal of UNEF on Nasser's request.

Well, I followed that rather closely because of professional interest. I thought, at the time -- and even said, I even sent telegrams about it in my capacity as an alumnus, sort of, of UN affairs -- that it was wholly unnecessary, that it was a very bad precedent to withdraw because only one side had asked him to. U Thant undoubtedly said to himself, "Well, only one side is relevant because the other side never agreed to it in the first place -- never agreed to have any soldiers on the Israeli side." So if Nasser didn't want them on the Egyptian side of the border, it really would be unfair not to withdraw them. But I was afraid that that would be such a devastating precedent to the UN's "capacity to
act" as peacekeeper that it was a bad mistake. And that seems to have been the general impression, certainly in the White House -- the Johnson White House was dismayed, I believe, if I'm correct, by that decision.

HC Because again, you see, these things keep recurring, as in the Congo case and others. The problem for the United States, because of its position in the scheme of things, was so often that if the UN didn't act, we would have to act and that would strike all kinds of sparks that wouldn't be sparks if the UN acted. And that was the philosophy that we had at the time of why the UN's capacity to act was in the vital interest of the US. It was a hard sell in Washington, you know, but I kept trying to sell it and, indeed, I made a number of public speeches about it. They were spread all over the State Department Bulletins, because I was trying to get the whole community of people that were interested in the UN to catch this point that the UN isn't just a talk-place. I ask this question rather frequently because I think it's important to try to identify that point where American confidence in the UN as a viable organization in the maintenance of peace and security occurred, and this is one of the places that you can at least postulate is such a point. That leaves aside entirely the question as to whether U Thant really had any choice or what would
have happened if he had, in fact, referred to the General Assembly. Nonetheless, the perception, I think, in a good many places as a result of that action was that the UN is not reliable. Certainly that had an effect on Israel.

Of course the fact we were disappointed late because we went on so long using the voting arrangements we had contrived, and because they turned out so well in our own interest, because of course we had an "automatic majority." Then we began having the same kind of votes except that we were on the minority side. The way I described it at the time was that all of the UN General Assembly votes are the same kind of thing (except for the ones that are unanimous, which were some very important ones like the World Weather Watch). All of the disputed votes are the same: it's the majority telling the minority how it should behave and the minority is voting no. That's what we did to the eleven votes of the Soviet bloc for years. Then the "Group of 77" started doing it to us. They started telling us what we should do, how much we should contribute to them. Those majority votes never included a clause about how the majority should behave. But the interesting thing to me is that the UN, whenever the nations get together on the assumption that they're going to have to do something together -- whether it is the Law of the Sea or world weather or dividing the
radio frequencies or whatever -- they act by "consensus." I find that most audiences that I talk to tend to think that "consensus" means "unanimous consent," and everybody has a veto. So I finally developed a definition of consensus which I'd be interested in your reaction to -- that on any given issue consensus is "the acquiescence of those who care supported by the apathy of those who don't."

JS That's a very good definition. I remember that you wrote an article, I think, for the NY Times Sunday Magazine on consensus.

HC That's right. You have a good memory because that was 1960.
INDEX OF NAMES

Arkadiev, Georgy P. 8
Ball, George 6, 9, 16, 18
Barnes, Tracy 11
Bartlett, Charles 32
Boland, Frederick 2
Bunche, Ralph 8, 27
Bundy, McGeorge 16, 17
Castro, Fidel 27, 29, 30
Hammarskjold, Dag 1, 2, 6, 10
Harriman, Averell 1, 35
Inkle, Ralph 2
Kennedy, Robert 32
Kennedy, President John F. 6, 13-18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 30-32, 34, 35
Khrushchev, Nikita S. 23-26, 30
Knox, FNU 23, 24
Johnson, Lyndon B. 34, 37
Lie, Trygve 8, 13
Martin, Ed 20, 21
McCloy, John J. 27, 33, 35
Monnet, Jean 9
Nasser, Gamal Abdel 37, 38
Nixon, Richard 15

40
Plimpton, Francis          1
Rusk, Dean                1, 15-17, 20, 32-34, 36
Schlesinger, Arthur Jr.   12, 17, 18, 21
Sisco, Joseph            21, 22
Slim, Mongi              2
Stevenson, Adlai          1, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16-19, 21-25, 27, 30-34, 36
Thant, U                 1, 2, 4-8, 11, 19, 24-31, 36, 37, 39
Tolba, Mustafa           10
Vishinsky, Andrei         27, 35
Wilson, Tom              21
Yost, Charles            2, 25, 27, 28
Zorin, Valerian          21, 23-26