YUN TAPE
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JSS Professor Apter, I want first to express appreciation for your willingness to participate in this Yale oral history project on the United Nations. And, if I might, I would like first to ask you to indicate your connection with the Congo. What were you doing in the Congo during the period of the crisis there in the '60s.

DA I had made several trips to the Congo under various auspices, mainly to interview people. My first interest was to contrast the slow pace of evolution towards political autonomy in the Congo as compared with countries I had been working with and in which I was interested, mainly Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire namely. I also spent some time in Kenya and Tanzania. My first field work had been in Ghana, (originally Gold Coast). I was interested in the problem of the transition from dependence to independence via mass nationalist movements in which the procedure in effect was to channel nationalism and the mobilization of support into increasingly enlarged and more representative bodies, by means of voting and electoral methods. The expansion of the franchise, and the transformation of legislative bodies from nonrepresentative to increasingly representative, and then essentially 

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parliamentary bodies with cabinet responsibility, parliamentary accountability, and effective internal self government marked the last step before power was finally transferred. And that was one way or another the procedure in virtually all British African countries within the commonwealth framework. Something very different, perhaps less effectively, was followed in French Africa. But in both cases the process was accompanied by the clear recognition that crucial to success was the of people with diverse interests, on the one hand, and education and especially the expansion of higher education. One of the things that struck me in the Congo was the attempt to prevent nationalism by holding back on any kind of higher education. Indeed education was minimized, although the Belgian authorities did vary the extent of educational reform according to different provinces on the theory that you had to raise up the level of a whole group of people within a province or ethnic group rather not piecemeal. But there was very little progress. There were hardly any skilled or trained people, very few doctors, and so on. So one of my more particular interests was to see who were the Congolese nationalist leaders. I wanted to meet and interview them before independence, comparing them with their counterparts in French speaking and English speaking Africa. I also tried to assess how this educational lack, the fundamental unavailability of Africans skilled enough to
participate in effective political and administrative life, was likely to affect what was likely to happen.

My last visit was for about eight weeks. I was there up until the day of independence. I then slipped over the border between the Katanga and Uganda because I expected pretty much of a blood bath.

JSS So in this period then you were there before independence. Were you able to meet a number of the nationalist leaders?

DA Yes, I met—I’m a little hazy about names at this point—I met Lumumba several times and interviewed him. I met Tshombe and I met Kasavubu, and several others from the central area. I never met Gazinga whom I wanted very much to meet but who had been more or less sealed off in eastern Congo.

JSS Could you give me your impressions, to begin with, with Mr. Lumumba at that period before he became Prime Minister?

DA Yes, I was surprised by him. I knew something about his background of course, he had been a postal clerk and so on, but I expected somehow a more accomplished personality. If he was a diamond it was certainly in the rough, and I wasn’t really prepared also for how limited he seemed to be. He was explosive. His language came out in short explosive bursts. He spoke in slogans. He seemed more or less uncomprehending of the questions asked him. He paid no attention to them until some word triggered a response that he wanted to make. So it was impossible to have the kind of
normal conversation you would expect in interviewing with political leaders. It was as if there was something mechanical about him as a personality, and physically too. He sort of twitched with intensity and nervousness. Combined with an explosive quality, an inability to sit still, I found him surprising. I never experienced that in dealing with any other serious political figure. He also seemed to be ill at ease — he wasn’t totally familiar with the surroundings. So I would say he was a person lacking in what might be called the social skills of politics. Nevertheless he had a certain ferocity in the way he spoke, and a determination. If what came out were slogans the slogans themselves were perfectly comprehensible. One had the feeling that this was an ideologue without a real ideology. Pieces of an ideology had been programmed into him and perhaps he thought in such terms, at least when he was dealing in French with somebody from outside his own general environment. I remember I was amazed by him. I wouldn’t call our discussion a real interview. I was quite fascinated by him as a personality and wondered what he would be like when he had to actually deal with concrete problems. I couldn’t imagine him actually sitting down and having the patience to think through something as distinct from being a kind of immediately reactive political leader.

JSS That was exactly my next question. In talking to him did
you get any sense that he had any understanding of the role that lay ahead for him in this new country?

DA It's hard to say. It wasn't a real interview, even though it went on for some time. I guess my recollection is that it brings up a statement people used to make in Uganda when I would ask politicians longer questions. They would say "you don't cut up a cow until you kill it." I have the feeling that he wasn't thinking very far ahead. His immediate universe consisted of enemies including the Belgians. In fact he had enemies everywhere in the Congo. His essential quality was an ability to attract people to him by his dynamic, nervous, tense personality. He looks, thin, angular, quick, angry, bristly. But he also caught everybody off guard. He would catch them out. There was a certain unpredictability about him. I would say that his preoccupation wasn't really with what would happen afterwards, except in some very general, not terribly comprehending, way. I don't even suppose he had a good conception of what the whole country was like.

JSS And going on from the future Prime Minister to the future President, Mr. Kasavubu, what was your impression of him?

DA A totally different personality. Physically they were entirely different. Where Lumumba was tense and nervous, as I recall quite tall, very thin, angular face, Kasavubu was short, heavy, placid. One had the sense he was very wise, very patient. He was someone who had come up from the
inside of African ethnic politics with a very sure sense of what the ingredients were, at least in terms of the Congo. He was more parochial in the sense of ethnic politics but more conventional as a politician than Lumumba. Of course ethnic divisions were not only very very strong and regionally differentiated for administrative purposes. As already suggested under the Belgian some ethnic groups had been pushed ahead much faster than others so that you had a larger component of educated people in one group than you would with another. This introduced into an already generally inward looking set of communities the kind of resistance and hostility between ethnic groups which resulted in explosive conflict of independence. As I say this was part of our original design to keep a kind of balance within communities rather than between them, rather than simply divide and rule. It would be too easy to call it just a divide and conquer kind of tactic. But it was part of a long term Belgian strategy of preventing unrest by providing multiple programs in medical facilities, education, housing, road infrastructure in a way favoring one province and one ethnic group against another. So with Kasavubu, one had the sense of his easy ___ within his own ethnic group, which included what was then Leopoldville. He was totally in command of the situation and was a chief. And the sense of hostility toward the Belgians or other foreigners did not come through in case of Kasavubu the way
it did with Lumumba?

DA No, not at all. My feeling was that he knew how to work with them and he could take them or leave them, he wasn't intimidated by them. He was his own person.

JSS Did you meet Mobutu at that point?

DA No, I never met Mobutu.

JSS Because he was more or less in the background still, then, in the Army. Going on then to a remarkable figure, I think. How would you characterize him?

DA Well, Tshombe, I didn't have much chance to talk to him. I heard him give a speech and I was introduced to him afterwards and had a bit of a chat with him. Tshombe was the best politician in the practical sense of the term. Although with his own group he was just as local as any of the others, he was very polished as a speaker. He was small, a bit rotund - not quite as Buddha-like as Kasavubu. He was quite charming, easy to talk to. He was probably the most Europeanized. He knew how to deal with Union Miniere. He knew how to deal with and liked Europeans. He got along well with the Katangese administration. One had the sense of his social and political accomplishment, although, by the time I met him, he was already regarded as a reactionary by virtually all the other political leaders. Nevertheless he was self assured, a cosmopolitan man of the world, even though that world, in fact, was rooted in Katanga which was where I met
him. Of course at the time Katanga was full of Europeans. It was in that sense very Europeanized. There was some of the best academic research facilities in the country. There was a sense in which, although far from the center, it was a center of its own.

JSS Now going in at this point and talking to a good many of the people in Katanga and the rest of the Congo you were approaching it in an analytical prospective so to speak, as to the administrative capacity and administrative procedures. Would you have assessed the country as ready for transition to independence at that point? Or did you find it totally unprepared?

DA Well, I fully expected it to be a shambles and said so at the time. That's why I left. I expected it to explode. There are many other political leaders whom I interviewed and whose names I have forgotten. I would have to go back over my notes. But I found them concerned for their own skins, their connections to ethnic groups in different provinces, and few with a broad perspective. An exception I remember who later went to St. Antony's College at Oxford when I was there was Thomas Kanza. He was very bright and sophisticated but there were not many others. No, I thought the country was in no way ready for independence. While the Belgians did not pull a De Gaulle-in-Guinea kind of thing (where at independence virtually everything was pulled out — the country including all kinds of equipment. But their
strategy was to speed up the transition so fast that they would in effect inherit the post-independence pieces. In a sense that is exactly what happened. Other than that they made no real preparatory effort. I think everybody with any sense of responsibility threw up ___ hands. Most Belgians were really very anxious. Everyone anticipated a disaster. But the ___ was also anxious to avoid responsibility for that. By not in any way impeding the transition in effect they let the chips fall where they may.

I did talk to some senior government officials including the Governor General of Ruanda and they all, almost to a man, deplored the Brussels policy. They found it extremely irresponsible. All expected a bloodbath.

JSS So that going into it as the United Nations did it could have been anticipated that there was going to be grave difficulties?

DA Yes, in fact I think I wrote that for Africa Report or something like that while I was still there in anticipation of what happened.

JSS And the level of education was deplorable as I understand it. Did you find that to be true throughout your contacts?

DA Yes, one did find, of course, a few African medical technicians, school teachers, etc. But these too were Belgians. They were still there and had to do their jobs. There was also a certain competence. I didn’t find general incompetence. Rather there was a very low level of
Africanization in these required positions of competence. Where Africans were in place they seemed to be reasonably proficient. Sometimes more proficient than their English speaking or French speaking African counterparts. I think where there was primary education was done reasonably well.

JSS Did you meet the man who became the Interior Minister of Katanga, Mr. Munongo?

DA Yes, as I had dinner with him following drinks first on the veranda of his very nice house. I was in the company of a well known anthropologist, Jacques Macquet, author of The Premis of Inequality in Rowanda. It was through him that I was taken on this trip to interview people. The way I met Godefroid Munongo was rather amusing. We were driving in a big American car and as we entered his territory the car got absolutely mired in the mud. Of course we were on our way to see him.

JSS Was this before or after independence?

DA This was before. Chief Munongo simply ordered a large group of men to come and they literally lifted the car out of the mud. We were then invited in for a very gracious, and I would say, totally cynical conversation. As I remember the conversation, I had this feeling, since I was fairly young, that Godefroid Munongo was just simply amused by us. But he had high regard for Jaques Macquet. There were several Belgian administrators around, but Munongo was very much at
the center of things. He and the administrators had a kind
of joking relationship. He was very relaxed. There was no
concern with what today is called "otherness." All part of
the same organization. Each had his part to play.

JSS He also, I believe, was the chief of a tribe.

DA Oh yes, it was his followers who pulled us out of the mud.

JSS He has been portrayed in some of the writings on the Katanga
as a very cruel person, a very cruel man, capable of all
sorts of crimes. Did you get any inkling of that?

DA Not really. I would have said that he had an enormous sense
of power and that he would do anything necessary, or
anything within his power that he regarded to be necessary.
He gave the impression of being exceptionally autonomous as
a personality. He was very much the center piece. I
wouldn't say that the administrators felt inferior to him,
but I had the feeling that he could have treated them as if
they were small boys if he had chosen to do it. He was
quite affable and correct and had a great sense of humor, a
sardonic sense of humor. I certainly had the feeling that
he was accustomed to the exercise of power, and very much
his own man. More than that I really couldn't say.

JSS And on the conservative side?

DA Oh yes, I would say more than conservative, reacting in the
real sense of the term. He didn't think the local
politicians were worth a damn. He had absolute contempt for
them. He had respect for what he considered himself to be
part of the Belgian administration. He really couldn't understand, indeed, I don't think he believed, that the Belgians were paying much real attention to these people who were nothing more than 'trouble makers'.

**JSS** There have been suggestions later that he was directly involved in the final murder of Lumumba. In your connections did you hear anything about that?

**DA** Yes. I heard that not very long after the murder of Lumumba from several people. The person who should know about that was with us on that occasion, Edouard Bustin. Bustin was making a study of the transition. He had good sources of information, both on the Belgian side and on African side.

**JSS** And they indicated that to their knowledge that Munongo was directly involved in . . .

**DA** Yes, the information that I got, and I think Conor Cruise O'Brien may have told me this, that Munongo's men, working either with or under some kind of connection to both the Belgian police and the CIA, tipped off Munongo that Lumumbo was going to be in his area. For all I know it was probably the same men who pulled our car out of the mud who went to work on him. I did hear one story that Munongo himself, participated in the actual killing. But whether this is true or not I have no idea. I wouldn't be surprised.

**JSS** He was probably capable of doing it. Were there other persons who made a particular impression on you in this period before the independence?

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There was a very interesting lawyer whose name was Reuben, who had decided that he was going to stay on. He seemed to be respected in a circle of middle of the road African nationalists. I had dinner with Reubens in his area absolutely superb South African Dutch style white washed house, very beautiful, very large. I think he believed he could become a kind of senior politician advisor, a man of good will, who could become more than an intermediary but would accept the responsibility of elective office as a Zairian. I understand he didn’t last very long. He had a lot of wisdom, had a lot of understanding about the different kinds of nationalism which in the context of the time some people put down as kind of simple-minded tribalism. He recognized that there was a great deal more to it than that. Sometimes what was going or was a kind of ethnic class struggle between the groups which had been held back and others which had been advanced. There were particularly important differences between those in rural areas and those who had become much more industrialized. In Katanga with a large mining population, this was the beginning of an industrial labor force. In general people’s attitudes were much more complicated than it appeared. For example Flemish miners in the Katanga whose reputation was that they were the most violently anti-African, because they were miners developed a kind of solidarity with African miners. This inclined them to be more close and intimate
with Africans at every level, in terms of social life, as well as economic activities. Another thing that was startling was the extreme segregation. From Leopoldville all the way down to Elizabethville, la cite Africaine, was another world and Europeans weren't unsafe going in there but they did not, in fact, penetrate that world. Urban life was insulated against Europeans.

JSS You mentioned Conor Cruise O'Brien who later became the United Nations Representative in Elizabethville. Did you know him before he went to the Congo, or did you know him after that?

DA It is hard to remember. I think I knew him after that. Yes, after that.

JSS Could you give your impression of Conor Cruise O'Brien? As you no doubt know, his stay in Elizabethville was somewhat controversial and different things have been written, including things that he has written. How would you characterize Conor Cruise O'Brien?

DA I think Conor is mad, brilliant, extraordinarily brilliant, a person of many disguises, and guises. He writes under several names. If I may be excused of putting it this way, he is wonderfully Irish. He comes from a nationalist "royal family," as does his wife, and they summarize between the two of them all the complexities and ambiguities of being the universal intellectual, highly sophisticated, and also deeply rooted in the Irish nationalist circumstances through
which he tended to interpret African independence.

JSS Did you have opportunities to discuss the developments in the Congo, in particularly in the Katanga, with him later?

DA Yes, but not terribly much because by the time I got to know him he was Vice Chancellor of the University of Ghana and having his own battles with Kwame Nkrumah who wanted to make it more of an ideological rather than an intellectual place. At this point Conor Cruise O'Brien appeared very much in the role of the traditional English academic defending academic freedom. This was very different from the role he played in the Congo. I think he is a supreme manipulator, although I think he is very determined to manipulate on the side of "virtue." He also, as a brilliant intellectual, decided what indeed constituted virtue. Some people might call that opportunism, but I don’t think he felt that this was correct. He was a radical and a liberal in the real sense of the term, but not an ideologue.

JSS A radical liberalist would you say?

DA Yes, a radical liberal. Rad-lib I think they used to call it in the old days. Very idiosyncratic, impatient with any kind of bureaucracy, very hard on the people who worked with him, who could neither keep up with his intellectual leaps, his inconsistencies as a personality etc. Of course he drank an enormous amount. He seemed to believe that the more he drank the sharper he got and that unfortunately wasn’t always the case. He fought with almost everybody, as
I recall, but he had a thing about Lumumba. He rather liked Lumumba, or I think he liked the idea of Lumumba, that there would be somebody who would come to represent the center, a kind of radical center. No other figure was able to shake off localism and ethnicity the way Lumumba could. Lumumba just didn’t care about that. Lumumba may have had a small tribal following but that wasn’t the basis of his support and I think that’s what appealed to Conor Cruise O’Brien.

JSS Yes, in his writings he has portrayed Lumumba in that sense and has more than suggested that the murder of Lumumba was arranged by the CIA and that in this Dag Hammarskjold had a certain role. My question here is in your conversations later, did any of this antipathy to Dag Hammarskjold come out?

DA Yes, I think he thought that Dag Hammarskjold was a stuffed shirt. Conor really didn’t have a great respect for the United Nations. There were very few people who did as I recall. While he was the representative of the United Nations, his experiences only confirmed him in his prejudices. Dag Hammarskjold seemed to him to be the personification of the pious inept manipulative pro-Western deceitful figure, who because he was Swedish, seemed always to escape the kind of judgments and evaluations that he deserved.

JSS Conor Cruise O’Brien certainly did his part to make that evaluation. Those are the questions that I had. Were there
any other thoughts that come to you that you would like to record concerning the impressions you gained at that stage of the Congo?

DA Just a few things. One was the sense of the terrible backwardness of the country not only in the Congo, but also in Ruwanda and Burundi,

JSS Which were also Belgian administered.

DA Yes, and upcountry one had the feeling of people really up against it. There was an extraordinary degree of overpopulation. There was renewed conflict between Watutsi and the Bahatu. And even a ___ a Governor General of Ruwanda indicated that there had been virtually no preparation for Africanization at the level of local administration, including medical not to speak of just ordinary local government. Indeed there seemed to be no preparation whatsoever for the change that was about to take place. The minute you got away from places like Elizabethville, or even within Elizabethville itself, there was virtually no preparation for self government. What there was the dickering and bargaining amongst different African politicians and senior administrators. There was one in particular whose name I’ve forgotten who was a very famous and a brilliant Belgian who, knew perfectly well what was going to happen. He simply tried to put the best face on it he could. This man, I think, was second in command of the process from Leopoldville. I had met him on a number of
occasions and talked with him. He just accepted what had now become inevitable as high policy, but took the position that what the Belgians were doing in terms of Africa was not a question of ideology about colonialism or anticolonialism, but a human phenomenon that would produce a terrible disaster. I think everybody knew right throughout the system. Everybody had a foretaste of doom, except on the American side. The American side, (I remember talking to Helen Kitchen about this), just assumed that independence comes the way babies are born. It all happens naturally. To be sure there might be some trauma associated with the birth. But all would be handled in due course. There was no concern that conflicts, ferocious ones, were incipient. (At the time there were very few American scholars working in Zaire.)

JSS It is interesting that Hammarskjold seems to have anticipated real trouble there and had sent Ralph Bunche, you no doubt know he was there for the independence but also to stay on beyond independence which he did actually and met with the cabinet in its first meeting.

DA I might just add on one other note which doesn’t have anything particularly to do with the Congo. I knew Sir Andrew Cohen quite well, knew him in Uganda, and we became friends. I knew him when he was no longer governor of Uganda but had become the representative to the United Nations, I think, Trusteeship Council. So I used to go to
the UN quite regularly which meant I got some sense of the interior workings of UN delegations. (The British would get certain things done through the Indian delegation.) One sat in on some of the trade-offs and bargains being struck. Sir Andrew Cohen was a sort of Fabian socialist and had strong views and convictions about African nationalism. He felt that it was positive rather than negative, unlike many of his counterparts in the Colonial Office. During Cohen’s period as Ambassador to the Trusteeship Council I would go there quite regularly and sat with the British delegation. There was no one like Cohen on the Belgian side. Later when I had an association with the Kennedy administration vis-a-vis the formation of African policy, so was interesting to compare the attitudes of different countries toward post-independence policies.

JSS That does raise one other question. Kennedy became President right in the middle of the Congo crisis and there was, I really believe, a distinct substantive change in U.S. policy toward the Congo. Were you in a position to advise the Kennedy administration on Africa and in particular on the Congo?

DA Well, yes, and no. I was part of the five man task force that George Ball set up. We were responsible for drafting the initial Kennedy policy for Africa.

JSS Before the inauguration?

DA Before the inauguration. I think the other members of that
committee were Ruth Sloan, James Coleman, Vernon McKay, and someone from the American Metals Climax, whose name I've forgotten. He was supposedly the spokesman for Central African affairs and the Congo. But he didn't know very much about the Congo per se but was very shrewd about copper and what was going on in the Katanga. And at the time, as I recall, the two main preoccupations were with Central African Federation and Guinea-Ghana-Mali, i.e. the group of the left, how far left it would go. Of course I remember best discussing about what should be the American role toward Ghana if the move to the left continued, especially in terms of the Volta development scheme. My view was not to react too much and certainly not in a way that would play into the hands of the extreme left in Ghana. At the time, of course the 'left' produced a certain degree of paranoia. On the ground "the left" tended to disappear very rapidly. And a good deal of what was called African Socialism was simply state capitalism with people plundering the state quite happily from the inside. On the whole that advice was taken. Then I became a member of the African Advisory Council or something like that. It met periodically. There was a particularly bright Assistant Secretary of State under Soapy Williams would periodically ask about specific things. Perhaps the most important issue was the Volta scheme. The Volta scheme was gave extraordinarily favorable terms to the Kaiser Corporation.
The original aluminum company that was supposed to go into it was Canadian, Alcoa, but they withdrew. Once they withdrew the Ghanaians panicked a bit since the _____ was to be their main developmental centerpiece after independence, a token of their entry into what could be regarded as the developmental world as distinct from the world of nationalism. (In fact that is the way that Nkrumah presented it through K. A. Gbedmah, his Minister of Finance to the United States and ____ least through the person of Adlai Stevenson, whom I originally met in Gbedemah’s house in Accra and then got to know again in Chicago. (I was teaching in the University of Chicago in those days.)

JSS That was in his lawyer capacity?

DA No, as a political figure. He may have given legal advice.

JSS It’s possible.

DA But he was at that point a world figure. The Volta scheme was as you know quite a remarkable scheme. It included the Akosombo dam to generate sufficient hydro-electricity for processing bauxite which Ghana had a great abundance. A huge new harbor was to be built at Tema which I remember originally as a fishing village some thirty miles or so from Accra. It created the largest man-made lake in the world. For irrigation purposes the plan was to flood the Accra plains which were alternatively very dry or very wet. The whole plan fired the imagination of Nkrumah. The conservative opposition to Nkrumah opposed it on the grounds
that this was an imperialist plot Nkrumah didn’t take kindly to this sort of opposition. So there was a kind of natural reaching out between the Kennedy administration people, the Kaiser Corporation, the British who were supposed to finance the dam, and Nkrumah himself, and the Convention People’s Party. All of these things were taken as positive illustrations of pragmatism, and that radicalism shouldn’t be taken too seriously. At the same time, Nkrumah was doing something which was indeed quite radical. One of the reasons he wanted all this development was to strengthen his position, and enable him to prepare for his "second coming." The first was his return from exile and taking over the country. The second was to assume the ____ liberator of all of Africa. He had for this purpose established what he called ministers’ plenipotentiary for trade union organizations, women’s organizations, all the voluntary organizations which he now took over by the Party and Ghana government. These ambassadors plenipotentiary were halfway between being officials of the government and representatives of private or voluntary associations (which were no longer voluntary.) These became his instruments for penetrating Africa. He began to rely on Soviet trained regimental guards where previously the army had been under British officers (who brought the Ghanaian forces to the Congo I might add). When General Alexander was fired all began to change. He also brought in groups of Chinese under
Huang Hua, the first Chinese ambassador to Ghana, (who had been Edgar Snow's translator) and who eventually became the foreign minister of China. Huang Hua helped to organize two terrorist training camps. Then Americans got wind of these goings on at the same time that companies like Pillsbury were encountering official opposition from the Ghana government which opposed their investing in a cereals growing and processing project. Many other smaller companies were also trying to invest. They came up against the kind of resistance that many American investors found with the Chinese. It was just impossible to get anywhere. More than the rhetoric of Nkrumah began to move to the left. So on the one hand he carried on these very successful and amicable relationships with Frank Knight of what was called Valco, the aluminum company, both the rhetoric and the actual practice of the Ghana government was increasingly troublesome in the United States. Both Chinese and Soviet influence was increasing rather rapidly. At the same time Mali, then perhaps the most Stalinist country in West Africa and Guinea heavily pro-communist, made over Beach other __ essentially. This looked bad. I remember being called in to consult on whether or not the United States should pull out of the Volta scheme and I advised at that time no, because I thought we'd want to come back at a later point and it would be very difficult. The Volta Project was an important hold over the Ghanaians which we would lose if we
pulled out. The irony of the situation was that the original rationale of the scheme was to use the bauxite reserves in Ghana. But these were never used. It was found to be too expensive to mine them and transport them from where they were to the smelter. So they used bauxite from Guinea instead.

JSS There is one Ghanaian who had a rather important role in the Congo whose name is Gardiner. I wonder did you know him?

DA Yes, I knew him very well. A very interesting man. He was originally an extramurals lecturer in Nigeria. That's where I first met him. An extramurals lecturer teaches university extension courses. He was a person with a great sense of personal propriety and dignity. He was bitterly opposed to Nkrumah. He thought that Nkrumah was a cheat and a fool. However, eventually Gardiner became Chief Establishment Secretary in Guana and in charge of the first Africanization program. He was highly regarded and worked well with the British to make the transition. Once that transition was reasonably complete and Gardiner had Africanized the civil service, it became quite apparent that he had peopled the civil service with those who would be resistent to politicization. Exactly what Nkrumah did not want. At that point Gardner became very vulnerable. He was fired, and was under a cloud for a while. Eventually he headed up the UNDP.

JSS That's right, he became a UN employee.
DA When he was young, when I first knew him he was treated in a dismissive way both by the British and by other more political successful Africans. He had an extraordinary degree of pride, was extremely intelligent and close mouthed, a very quiet person, I think he also had a lot of real rage bottled up inside and political ambition which he mastered very well. He was too intelligent and too controlled and got on too well with Europeans for Nkrumah just to get rid of him. But Nkrumah got him out of the country and kept him out.

JSS Thank you very much.

DA You're welcome.
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UNITED NATIONS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
ORAL HISTORY AGREEMENT

I, David After (Interviewee) hereby agree to participate in the United Nations Oral History Project, sponsored by the Yale University Institution for Social and Policy Studies, and consent to the recording by magnetic audio tape of (an) interview with James S. Silterlin (Interviewer) on Feb. 27, 1971 (Date) at Yale University, New Haven (City), CT. (State).

It is my understanding that a typed transcript will be made of such tape(s) and returned to me for any necessary corrections. I hereby agree that if for any reason I have not returned the transcript with my corrections to the Institution for Social and Policy Studies within three months of the time it was sent to me, the Project Staff may edit the transcript and make it available for research and other use as provided here below.

In the understanding that the tape(s) and transcript(s) will be preserved at the United Nations and made available for historical, scholarly and (as deemed appropriate by the United Nations) public information purposes, and that copies will be placed on deposit at Yale University for research and study, I hereby grant, assign, and transfer legal titles and all literary rights in the tape(s) and transcript(s) to the United Nations. However, it is agreed that neither the United Nations nor Yale University will publish or authorize publication of the transcript(s) or any part thereof during my lifetime without my written permission.

Signed

(Interviewee)

2/27/1971
(Date)

(Interviewer)

2/27/1971
(Date)

(For the Institution of Social and Policy Studies)

(Date)