MILITANT GROUPS AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE 2013 ECOWAS COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

GILBERT ARHINFUL AIDOO
(10342459)

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JULY 2018
DECLARATION

I, Gilbert Arhinful Aidoo, hereby declare that this thesis is the outcome and true record of my own research work towards the award of the Master of Philosophy (MPhil) Degree in Political Science. Again, I declare that, except for the references to works of other authors duly acknowledged, no part of this work has been presented elsewhere for any degree or other purposes, and I bear the full responsibility for any omissions and shortcomings therein.

................................................. Date: .............................................

Gilbert Arhinful Aidoo

(Candidate)

................................................. Date: .............................................

Dr. Bossman Eric Asare

(Principal Supervisor)

................................................. Date: .............................................

Dr. Nene-Lomotey Kuditchar

(Co-Supervisor)
ABSTRACT
This study examined the extent to which geopolitics has influenced the 2013 ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy’s (ECTS) implementation. The study adopted the qualitative case study research design which enabled the researcher to elicit in-depth information from 12 respondents in face-to-face interviews. The study found that a combination of factors has affected the ECTS’ implementation. These include but are not limited to: (1) the quota system; (2) political tension; (3) socio-cultural and language barrier; (4) the Nigerian factor; and (5) lack of funding. The study also revealed that the nature of politics among ECOWAS member states has greater influence on the overall implementation of the ECTS. Thus, the study recommends that a well-coordinated, resilient and robust collective security scheme in West Africa can be achieved through the commitment of enough resources by the ECOWAS member states whiles ensuring that there is also the strong political will and community spirit towards this endeavour.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my mom, Madam Cecilia Esi Eduwah Annan, Mr. Samuel Arhinful Aidoo [my late father] and all my siblings, especially Rev. Father Edward Kofi Aidoo, for his unflinching and indelible support throughout my education.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am deeply indebted to my supervisors, Dr. Bossman Eric Asare and Dr. Nene-Lomotey Kuditchar. I also thank Mr. Alexander Kaakyire Duku Frempong and Professor Kwame Boafo-Arthur of the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana for their invaluable inputs, mentoring and support. I wish to also sincerely thank all the interviewees who made time out of their busy schedules to speak with me. Finally, I wish to acknowledge a friend and course mate, Mr. Anthony Baah, for his invaluable support over the entire period this research was conducted.
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# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>AAF</th>
<th>Allied Armed Forces of the Community</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>MU</td>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>ANAD</td>
<td>Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Stand-by Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AW</td>
<td>AWB</td>
<td>Afrikaner Weerstands beweging</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>CCDS</td>
<td>Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>CCSS</td>
<td>Committee of Chiefs of Security Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Centre for Democracy and Development</td>
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<td>DS</td>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Commission for Defence and Security/Chiefs of Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>West African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>COPAX</td>
<td>Conseil de Paix et de Securite de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>CSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>CTTCs</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Training Centres</td>
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<td>T</td>
<td>CTTM</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Training Manual</td>
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<td>D</td>
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<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>R</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>BR</td>
<td>EASBRIG</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWARN</td>
<td>ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>ECPF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework</td>
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<td>TS</td>
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<td>Economic Community of West Africa</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>EPF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Peace Fund</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<p>| F | FOMAC | Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Jihad</td>
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<td>GTI</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Index</td>
</tr>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immune Virus</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification</td>
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<td>International Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<td>LIFG</td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARAC</td>
<td>Central African Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCPMR</td>
<td>Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICEMA</td>
<td>Mission de la CEDEAO au Mali (the ECOWAS Mission in Mali)</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Taskforce</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MRU</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Mediation and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>Non-Aggression Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARC</td>
<td>North African Regional Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASBRIG</td>
<td>North African Standby Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEWRM</td>
<td>National Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAGAD</td>
<td>People against Gangsterism and Drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMAD</td>
<td>Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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</table>
R
R2P Responsibility to Protect
RECs Regional Economic Communities
RM Regional Mechanisms
RSD Regional Security Division

S
SADC Southern Africa Development Community
SADCBRIG SADC Brigade
SIPO Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SMC Standing Mediation Committee
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SSF SADC Standby Force

U
UDEAO Customs Union of West African States
UI Union of Islamic Courts
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Education Fund
UN United Nations
UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN ODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States

W
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union
WANEP West African Network for Peace
WAPCCO West African Police Chiefs Committee
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 OVERVIEW OF THE ECOWAS SECURITY SYSTEM

1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a general prelude to the study. It begins with an overview of ECOWAS’ formation, its main aim, and assumption of regional security mandate, as well as a summary of the militant situation in West Africa. The remaining sections outline the research problem, aim and objectives, and significance of the study.

1.1.1 Background to ECOWAS’ Formation
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a 15-member supra-state organization formed in 1975 to promote economic integration, growth and development in West Africa. More importantly, it must be noted, the official launch of the ECOWAS on May 28, 1975, was a climax of several past attempts at regional economic integration traceable to the late 1950s (Frempong, 1999). This latter assertion is exemplified by the April 1959 Conakry Declaration of the Ghana-Guinea Union; the 1959 Council of Accord formed by Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger (Togo joined in 1966); the 1972 Economic Community of West Africa (ECWA) by Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal with the CFA Franc as its official currency; and the Mano River Union (MRU) formed by Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1973 (joined later by Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire) to leverage on the river resources for development (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a).

One version of the integration project in West Africa credits William Tubman of Liberia as the first to have begun a campaign for an all-inclusive economic integration project in the 1960s. In 1964, Tubman urged his West African compatriots to establish a single economic bloc to stimulate regional economic growth and development. His initiative resulted in a rather short-lived economic community arrangement signed by
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1965 (Zagaris, 1987). Another version points to the separate efforts by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Tafewo Balewa of Nigeria in the 1960s (marked largely by rivalry towards each other owing to their opposing positions on the nature such integration should take). While Nkrumah was championing a political union of Africa, Balewa called for a functional regional cooperation. Balewa’s position was based on the idea that economic integration should precede a political union, in a bottom-up approach, commencing at the regional level, and to proceed in phases through functional cooperation and coordination towards a common market (Frempong, 1999; Olatunde, 1980).

The two Anglophone leaders’ rivalry enabled their Francophone counterparts to forge exclusive unity. By 1966, when Nkrumah was overthrown and Balewa deceased, the Anglophone bloc got the chance to unite, but Nigeria’s civil (Biafra) war fought between 1967 and 1970 would cause a further delay. It is not a gainsaying that Nigeria played a pivotal role in realizing the region’s economic integration agenda. Nigeria’s regional leadership reflects its new military leader’s efforts in the 1970s towards the creation of the ECOWAS. After the Biafra war, General Yakubu Gowon renewed the calls for regional cooperation but faced opposition from the Francophone bloc led by Cote d’Ivoire under the influence of France. Even though often blown out of proportion, arguably, there has historically been a raging antagonism between the Anglophone and Francophone blocs (Engel and Jouanjean, 2015; Bossuyt, 2016).

On its part, fearing Nigeria’s domination in any West African integration scheme, France supported Cote d’Ivoire’s hostility towards Nigeria. In a February-March 1971 tour in most of the former French colonies, President Pompidou warned against Nigeria’s domination and urged them to harmonize their efforts to counter balance
the heavy weight of Nigeria. This resulted in the West African Economic Community’s (CEAO) creation in 1973 (Frempong, 1999; Olatunde, 1980). In the words of Engel and Jouanjean (2015), France perceived Nigeria as a major threat to its chasse gardée (preserve), French West Africa, as it made use of Cote d’Ivoire’s economic might and Senegal’s cultural heritage. They observed that France used Cote d’Ivoire to break up Nigeria in the Biafra War (see Bamfo, 2013).

According to Frempong (1999), this would rather ginger, other than frustrate, Nigeria into aggressive diplomacy to approach most countries in the region to canvas for support towards the economic integration agenda. This was followed with Lagos’ liberal dispensation of funds as inducement for support and loyalty. The result was the formation of the joint Nigeria-Togo Commission in 1972 to serve as the nucleus around which a full regional economic community would evolve. This Commission was significant for two main reasons: first, it demystified the widely held mystique that linguistic differences constituted an overarching impediment to trade and economic integration in the region; second, it showed that a relatively small and poor country could engage in economically rewarding partnership with a large and relatively prosperous country. But it must be noted that Togo is not a core Francophone country and so this move did not come as a surprise (Frempong, 1999: 120; ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; Zagaris, 1987).

By 1973, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Liberia had joined the Commission. But for Guinea, the core Francophone neighbours were reluctant to join. It took military takeovers in Benin and Niger before they were joined to the agenda. Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania remained opposed to Gowon’s proposed economic community agenda; and rather reluctantly declared their support for same
at the launch of the ECOWAS in 1975. As Frempong (1999: 121) observed, for fear of being left behind, and Nigeria’s subsequent leadership in the region, they eventually declared their support for the ECOWAS but still kept the CEAO intact (see also ECOWAS Commission, 2015a).

Perhaps, West African states’ major challenge remains the persistent interference from external actors in protecting their geostrategic interests. This was especially glaring during the Cold War era as France, for example, adopted a divide and rule tactic to protect its interests in West Africa by establishing defence pacts, economic and common monetary policy with its former colonies. The *West African Economic and Monetary Union’s (WAEMU)* creation, and the existence and survival of a common monetary union are *the brain-child of France*. The uneasy coexistence of ECOWAS and WAEMU, with partly overlapping mandates and membership, also illustrate the conflicting historical paths masterminded largely by France in West Africa (Vanheukelom, 2017; Frempong, 1999). This reflects the wider geopolitical processes in the region marked by power struggles between the *Francophonese* and the *Agnlophonese* as manifested by the use of WAEMU and similar tools to checkmate Nigeria’s dominance in the region. Staniland (1987) captured France’s bond with its former colonies succinctly:

Considering the nature of this historical (geopolitical) path, including cultural, administrative, legal and socio-economic diversities among the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries, it was difficult, if not impossible, to forge any political union or security alliance in West Africa. Any effective regional integration scheme had to proceed from a functional economic union as the basis for future integration agenda that traversed the sovereignty of member states. Thus, the 1975 founding treaty of the ECOWAS focused solely on creating an economic union as a nucleus for continental common market. So, its regional security scheme was only conceived as a necessity to address the myriads of security dilemmas the region confronts (Vanheukelom, 2017; Caparini, 2015; Aning, 1999; Jaye and Amadi, n.d.).

1.1.2 Overview of Collective Security Scheme in West Africa
The enormity of security complexities in West Africa on economic integration, growth and development was downplayed when ECOWAS was formed in 1975. However, starting from 1978, the various structural hiccups drummed home the need to adopt a robust collective peace and defence scheme in the region. Both inter and intrastate peace and stability was conceived as preconditions for realizing its primary objectives. This began in the form of protocols incorporated into the 1975 treaty to promote peace and defence in the region. However, it is worth noting that Cold War geopolitics among countries in West Africa impeded ECOWAS’ ability to forge any comprehensive and robust collective security scheme. The provisions in the legal instruments were not implemented until the 1990s following the implosion of intractable civil wars in the region (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; ICG, 2016).

The changing post-Cold War trends, the limitations, setbacks and lessons from ECOMOG’s earlier interventions, among others, would force ECOWAS to revise its 1975 treaty. This culminated in adoption of the 1993 revised treaty. Again, in 1999
the Mechanism was adopted as the main legal document to leverage peace and stability in the region. The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was also signed in December 2001 to address the root causes of conflicts in the region and to improve good governance and multiparty democracy. Furthermore, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was approved in January 2008 to provide roadmaps for sustained implementation of these two protocols (Frempong, 1999; ECPF, 2008; Elowson and McDermott, 2010; ECTS, 2013; Adetula, 2015).

Normatively, the current scheme enhances ECOWAS’ reputation as a matured security community in Africa. Again, as some countries struggle to deal with the rising militant crises in the region, many deem ECOWAS’ leadership in the crusade against militancy as crucial. However, it must be noted that the Mechanism and similar instruments only make passing thoughts about the specific issue of militancy. The reason, perhaps, being that militancy did not constitute a major security threat in the region prior to the 21st Century. However, West Africa is currently engulfed in a dramatic surge in activities of both domestic and international militant groups (Ewi, 2012; Haysom, 2014; Caparini, 2015). This would inform the Authority of Heads of State and Government’s adoption of the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy (ECTS) in 2013 to address the militant situation across the region.

Historically, it must be noted, large-scale insecurity problems in West Africa have been dynamic, evolving and self-sustaining; beginning with outbreak of intractable civil wars across the region: in Liberia (1989), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998) and Côte d’Ivoire (2002). This was followed by the unparalleled flow of small arms and light weapons recycled in different conflict zones, armed robbery and trans-border crimes; closely connected to the flawed post-conflict peacebuilding and
reconstruction processes. Currently, the region is overwhelmed by both old and emerging threats due largely to member states fragility and inability to deal with 21st century security problems such as militancy, piracy, arms and drug trafficking, and cybercrimes (Uzoechina, 2014: 1; Jaye and Amadi, n.d.).

1.1.3 Overview of Militancy in West Africa

West Africa’s development path has been hamstrung by myriads of security challenges such as civil and identity conflicts, coup d’états and trans-border crimes. Notwithstanding efforts to address old security problems, countries in the region are currently overwhelmed by new security threats, most notably, upsurge in non-state armed groups who challenge states authority, legitimacy of governments and territorial integrity (Bolaji, 2010; Maiangwa, 2013). Arguably, the presence of militant groups in the region is not so new. Yet the growing manifestation of their activities in recent times constitute a grave source of insecurity and instability in West Africa (Yoroms, 2007; in Nkwi, 2015: 80; Onuaha and Ezirim, 2013). Several geographical, environmental, political, economic and religious factors make the emergence and survival of militant and other criminal networks more likely in West Africa (Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014; ECTS, 2013).

The presence of militant groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Tuareg rebels, Ansar Dine in Mali, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, amidst political instability, acute poverty and lack of livelihood opportunities to escape same, as well as bad governance, marginalization, injustices and chronic corruption are serious threats to [human] security in the region (Onuaha and Ezirim; 2013: 1). For Salihu (2015), these militant groups are a major source of threats and constitute the arc of instability in West Africa. Geographically, the proximity of West Africa to the vast Sahel region, the porous borders coupled with low capacity of law enforcement
agencies make militant groups’ activities in the region more pronounced. Currently, militancy constitutes a major source of threats to peace, security and stability in the region. Again, militancy is deeply engrained structurally in the region. Moreover, the activities of militant groups have adverse spill-overs on neighbouring countries and larger implications for regional security and stability. Currently, militancy constitutes a serious humanitarian concern and thus requires urgent attention (Onuaha and Ezirim, 2013; ECTS, 2013; Adigbuo, 2014; Haysom, 2014; Caparini, 2015).

One worrying trend of the situation in West Africa is the use of women and children, including girls to attack soft targets. Militant groups in the region have resorted to the use of improvised explosive devices (IED) strapped to specially women’s body for suicide bombing missions. For example, the Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point and Yale University Report indicated that out of 434 suicide missions carried out by Boko Haram over the period 2011 and June 2017, 277 were executed by females. Also, according to UNICEF, about 84 suicide missions were executed by children in 2017 alone (CDD, 2017a). Boko Haram has increased child suicide bombers tenfold, one in every five suicide bombers used is a child (UN OCHA in CDD, 2016b: 3; Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014; ECTS, 2013).

The situation has caused many casualties, severe humanitarian crisis, and destructions to physical infrastructure in the region. For example, an April 2016 North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Report showed that over 20,000 casualties were caused by Boko Haram insurgency and counter insurgency military operations in Nigeria alone. Again, over 23 million and four million people in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions respectively are affected by acute food crisis (UN OCHA; cited in CDD, 2016b: 3). Furthermore, majority of people in the affected communities are either
internally displaced or have become refugees in neighbouring countries. Available evidence indicated that the Malian crisis alone has caused displacement of over 200,000 civilians. Again, 135,000 Malian refugees are currently under the shelters of Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger (CDD, 2015; CDD, 2016a). Moreover, refugees and IDP camps are also faced with serious threats to human security. For instance, an estimated 512 cases of HIV infections, including two children were recorded in the IDP camps in the Borno State of Nigeria alone. Infrastructure-wise, an estimation of over one billion dollars, according to the Governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, is required to rebuild affected communities in the area (CDD, 2015: xi; CDD, 2016a: 4; CDD, 2016b; CDD, 2018; Caparini, 2015).

The militant crisis in the region has long been treated as internal security challenge that does not warrant regional intervention, with exception of the Malian situation. For instance, Nigeria has rejected proposals by ECOWAS to assist its operations against the Boko Haram insurgency. The resort to formation of joint taskforces among affected neighbouring countries also run into serious operational challenges, including coordination problems (Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014; CDD, 2018). More so, in most of the affected communities, civilian taskforces and non-state armed vigilante groups are formed to fight militants owing to governments’ failure to protect them with its attendant evils. Moreover, several initiatives are underway by the region’s development patrons such as the United States, France, European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) aimed at salvaging the militant crisis in the region. But these initiatives are often disjointed, poorly coordinated, overly militarized, and failed to appreciate and address the root causes of the situation in West Africa (Caparini, 2015; CDD, 2015; Haysom, 2014; ECTS, 2013).
Thus, the ECTS has the potential to address these gaps (CDD, 2015; Birikorang, 2015). It was signed on February 28, 2013 to serve as common operational framework to encourage the harmonization of member states’ efforts and resources to pre-empt and eradicate the militant menace from the region. Ordinarily, owing to their social contracts, states bear the prime responsibility of insuring the safety of their nationals. Nonetheless, due to the enormity, resilience, and international reach of militants, coupled with weak institutional capacities of states in the region, a more sustained coordinated efforts led by ECOWAS with tacit support from the international community, remains the most viable option for addressing the militant menace (ECTS, 2013; CDD, 2015). The ECTS provides the necessary normative toolkits for addressing the militant menace in the region. But, over half a decade years after its approval, the document still remains a ‘good intentions on paper’. Available evidence shows that the 2013 ECTS largely risks non-implementation by member states (CDD, 2018). Again, any systematic assessment of efforts made towards its sustained implementation is largely lacking. This provides the basis for the current case study.

1.2 Research Problem
To what extent or in what ways, if any has the political posture of ECOWAS member states stalled or enhanced implementation of the 2013 ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy? Arguably, West African countries have reputable record in collective security missions. ECOWAS has also been forthcoming with the relevant normative instruments to address any form of vulnerabilities and insecurity problems across the region. Nonetheless, ECOWAS initiatives often risk non-implementation. It is not uncommon for the countries in West Africa to make sound political declarations and in the end fail to commit the needed resources for their implementation (Aning and Atuobi, 2011). The divisive regional politics among states in West Africa also
undermine any effective collective security undertakings in the region (CDD, 2018; ECOWAS Commission, 2016). It is against this backdrop that the current case study is sanctioned to examine the extent to which ECOWAS member states’ political posturing has affected the 2013 ECTS’ implementation.

1.3 Aim and Objectives
The main aim of this study is to examine the extent of influence geopolitics in West Africa has on the 2013 ECTS’ implementation.

The specific objectives are as follows:

1. Examine the path of ECOWAS’ security system evolution since 1978;
2. Examine the main factors that accounted for this evolutionary path;
3. Examine the extent to which political posturing of ECOWAS member states affects the 2013 ECTS’ implementation.

1.4 Significance of the study
The findings of the study can provide important lessons for policy-decisions with regards to the 2013 ECTS’ implementation. It may also enable [sub-] regional blocs in Africa to proactively implement sustainable collective security measures to stem the roots of [human] insecurity and political instability across the African continent.

1.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the general overview of the study. It captured a brief background to ECOWAS’ formation, objectives and overview of its security mandate. It also outlined the militant menace in the region, statement of the research problem, the purpose and objectives, and significance of the current case study.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 REGIONAL PEACE AND DEFENCE SCHEMES IN AFRICA

2.1 Introduction
This chapter constitutes a review of the relevant literature on major issues the study explores. The review is conducted under the following thematic areas: the notion of institution, institutional reforms and innovations; the concept of militancy; regional concentration of militant groups in Africa, the notion of international organizations, and [sub-] regional schemes for addressing the militant menace in Africa.

2.2 Institution, Institutional Reform and Innovation
What are institutions? Institutions are inevitable and comprise the substance of social life of every society. Przeworski (2004: 527) contends that institutions matter in social life since they influence norms, beliefs, and actions and shape outcomes. They structure human interactions and actions in terms of both manifest and latent rules. The importance of institutions is widely conceived and their usage in the social sciences has a long history e.g. Giambattista Vico used the term in his ‘Scienza Nuova’ as far back as 1725 (Hodgson, 2006).

Nonetheless, no consensual definition of institution exists. Academics and analysts alike define it to suit their arguments and purposes. Hodgson (2006: 2) defines “institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions”. Rousseau observes, rules create power relations in society and are sometimes self-enforcing (Przeworski, 2004: 530). Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006: 866) refer to institutions as “humanly devised schemes, standards, and rules that prescribe and proscribe the actions of social actors in order to make social life predictable and meaningful”. Thus, institutions are broadly conceived of as values,
norms, rules and structures that constrain and enable behaviour of individual actors (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008: 3; Yifu Lin, 1989).

Inferring from the definitions afore, institutions are forms of social structures that involve codifiable and normative rules of engagement. Their rules are in principle codified to make them visible to prevent breaches and enable critical scrutiny (Hodgson, 2006: 4). Again, as social structures and rules of human conducts, institutions are human creations; the rules of the game that set constraints on human behaviour (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008: 3). As such, institutions work because their rules are embedded in shared habits of thought and behaviour (Hodgson, 2006: 7; Yifu Lin, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).

In order to perform their roles, institutions are characterized by relative stability and permanence (Ruttan, 2006). In other words, institutions typically contain in-built mechanisms that enable them function effectively (Chang, 2011). As institutions structure and define behaviours, “roles, and relationships among members of a community, they order the activities and interactions of a collective, and thus are relatively stable, inert, and generally resistant to change” (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015: 726). Acemoglu and Robins (2008) conceive the persistence of institutions as resulting from the *de facto and or de jure power structures* inherent in every society that resist change. However, the relative stability and permanence feature may present significant difficulties to any meaningful efforts to reform dysfunctional institutions that might have outlived their purposes in society [emphasis added].

The prior discussions point to the fact that institutions are relatively permanent with in-built mechanisms that insure their persistence and resistance to change. Nevertheless, institutions do change over time. Available evidence suggests that the
environment, changes in technology and developments in the international system among others may cause major changes to institutional structures (Acemoglu and Robins, 2008). According to Hughes (1936), even though institutions are distinctive social establishment that are relatively permanent, they change over time under certain circumstances (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015: 726). When institutions are rendered dysfunctional, they are either reformed or [re] innovated in order to create more functional ones that meet current developments. Chang (2011) observes that traditions are not immutable; cultures and institutions themselves do change over time (see also Miletkov and Wintoki, 2008:2-5).

The opportunities in reforms regardless, scholars contest the nature reforms should take. There is on one extreme, those who believe institutions can easily be reformed voluntarily where there is the political will; and on the other extreme are those with defeatist’s view (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015; Chang, 2011; Yifu Lin, 1989). The latter view represents the orthodox account of institutional reform dominated by what Coelho, Ratnoo and Dellepiane refer to as punctuated equilibrium - the idea that long periods of institutional inertia are abruptly interrupted by far-reaching changes in the face of exogenous shocks e.g. intense economic or political crises (Chang, 2011; Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006).

Chang (2011) observed, while the defeatist view is problematic, the extreme voluntarists view is also too simplistic. Again, the argument that institutional arrangements inherited by a country determines the course of its history unless there is a momentous external shock is problematic. Examples abound in history where big institutional changes were engineered by deliberate actions of internal actors and absolutely not determined by the existing institutional structures. It may be true that a
country’s institutions are given, yet deliberate choices still matter (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015). Besides the extreme views discussed afore, other views gaining traction in the literature reveal a more complex and subtler picture of incremental and endogenous patterns of institutional reforms. These include layering, drift, and conversion (Coelho, Ratnoo and Dellepiane, n.d.; Alter, Helter and McAllister, 2013).

Institutional layering includes introducing new rules together with existing ones. Here, old institutions are, however dysfunctional in their present forms, seldom dismantled completely; they are mostly amended, revised and upgraded. But, layering usually comes at the cost of institutional incoherence due to vested political interests. Yet it may increase the feasibility of institutional reform (Coelho, Ratnoo and Dellepiane, n.d.; Alter, Helter and McAllister, 2013). On the other hand, institutional drift borders on the changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the wider economic and political environment in which institutional contracts are embedded (Ibid). The premise is that a substantive renegotiation of existing institutions may be concealed by stability on the surface. Change through drift may occur without explicit political manoeuvring, as individuals seek ways to accommodate changing economic and political conditions. Significantly, it may occur through the accumulated effect of non-decisions. Yet institutional conversion (reforms engineered by changes in societal ideas, beliefs or technical know-how) involves redirecting resources of existing institutions to meet new ends and perform new functions (Ibid).

Changes in ideas or beliefs (and technology) have become major drive for the institutional reform conundrum. Ideas shape the way individuals define their interests and preferences, and mould their views about how institutions work, including how policies connect to outcomes (Ibid). A belief cascade may trigger paradigm shifts and
rapid institutional transformations when society faces a severe dilemma. But incremental changes in beliefs, through policy and social learning, may also shape institutions on a more gradual basis and still lead to institutional reform. The key to comprehending the process of change is knowing the intentions of the actors endorsing it and their grasp of the issues therein (North 1995; Coelho, Ratnoo and Dellepiane, n.d.; Helter and McAllister, 2013). Ideas may limit institutional design, but they can also open exciting opportunities. Dominant ideas about how an institution works, and how it should work, constrain choices by defining the range of perceived legitimate change. In this sense, ideas are a powerful source of path dependency, setting up the boundaries of institutional selection. But new ideas about innovative policies that enlarge the domain of policy initiatives deemed politically feasible, can also unlock reforms otherwise trapped by an iron grip of vested interests (Ibid).

Arguably, it is not every reform that constitutes an innovation. What types of reform, therefore, represents an innovation? The remainder of this section deals with these two contending issues. Raffaelli and Glynn (2015: 15) suggest that institutional reform and innovation do “occur in existing institutions as they adapt to address new opportunities, changed environments, or new cultural sensibilities”. For Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006: 866) institutional reform is a form of change that brings about “a difference in form, quality, or state over time in an institution”. However, where the change is a novelty or unprecedented and signify a drastic departure from the past, it is deemed innovative (Ibid). Raffaelli and Glynn (2015) proposed a more radical form of institutional innovation: “the generative process of collective action via which institutions are created”. The authors make room for middle ground concerning institutional persistence and change. They aim not only to account for institution-building efforts and the “rise of new institutional forms, but also apply the notion of
institutional innovation to [changes] in existing institutional forms. Thus, they account for changes in the constitutive elements of institutions - normative, regulative, and cognitive factors - that induce change in existing institutions”. Institutional innovation, they argue, represents any “change that neither destroys the [good] old order nor brokers a new one, but instead creates interstitial spaces that can serve as a locus for innovation” (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015: 726).

Again, based on Scott’s (1987) “four explanatory variants of institutionalization (instilling values; creating reality and social order; embedding cultural elements; and outlining particularistic logics, belief systems, and practices), they came up with a model that conceives institutional innovation not only as novel and useful but also legitimate” (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015: 734). They argue that institutional innovation should be a “novel, useful, and legitimate change that disrupts, to varying degrees, the cognitive, normative, or regulative mainstays of an organizational field”. They view institutional innovation as similar to other forms of innovation in that “innovation is a new idea: it represents novelty that is useful in terms of solving problems or achieving goals of adopting organizations” (Ibid).

They contend that “novelty and usefulness are defined by their relevance to the adopting organization. So long as the idea is perceived as new to the people involved, it is an innovation, and yet may appear to others as an imitation of something already existing elsewhere. Moreover, novelty should be perceived by the relevant audiences - employees, consumers, or analysts - as legitimate, credible, and appropriate” (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015: 734). Usefulness of an innovation borders on its usability by the relevant actors and potency for achieving the desired end. Legitimacy on the other hand, borders on the grasp and acceptance of a change such that all relevant
stakeholders endorse or authorize it. To legitimize an innovation, organizations seek to conform to prevailing practices to demonstrate their social fitness. In other words, institutional innovation should be characterized as normative or value-laden and not purely as technical; they are not only socially constructed and embedded in cultural understandings, but also use appropriate cultural elements as resources; and are characterized by the logics they embody and put to practice (Ibid).

Husain (2015: 10) posits that innovation is about ideas. To him, “innovation is understood as a process of generating, putting into use and spreading new ideas that work; the new ways of doing things, or new combinations of existing knowledge and resources”. But this formulation is problematic because of the stress on relative conception of newness. Innovation does not exist in a vacuum, and many novel ideas are in circulation at any given moment both within the research community and governments. But such formulations highlight the importance of putting ideas into practice. Ideas must be seen to work or increase public value. Broadly speaking, observes North (2005), “the importance of innovation is in enlarging society’s pool of knowledge, or artefactual structure and the underlying adaptive efficiency of polities. Simply put, innovation borders on the question of developing and circulating ideas to manage and cope with a changing world” (Husain, 2015: 15). Innovation should be understood as a discursive phenomenon as much as a process of institutional development is concerned. Its importance lies in what it does, or allows one to do, but not what it represents. Contemporarily, any idea of newness in innovation is a problematic concept. Kingdon (1984) contends that “various policy ideas are in circulation at any one time, and that there is nothing new under the sun; and serve as limitations to a search for origins in policy. Thus, newness may not be the most important criterion for judging a reform as innovative” (Ibid). In an era of globalized
communications, the easy flow of ideas should be expected. For Bao and Sun (2011) innovation involves the “production of useful artefacts, and a process of knowledge accumulation that is more essential than just the substance of a reform in a given place at any given time. Such innovations have the potential to contribute to systemic gains, despite being discontinued in their place of origin” (Husain, 2015: 25).

The researcher’s perusal of the literature on institutions brings to the fore the fact that institutions must necessarily be acceptable to society as legitimate. Again, they assume power distribution mandate among the individual members of society. They create and must necessarily account for the power relations in society so as to address issues regarding vested interests. Institutions are also living social structures which must necessarily undergo transformations to meet changing trends (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015; Husain, 2015; Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006).

2.3 Conceptualization of Militancy
Militancy poses both conceptual and methodological challenges. There are myriads of meanings ascribed to it and is often loaded with political and emotional insinuations. As Arafat (1974) observed in a speech at the UN: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Conte, 2010: 7). The term broadly refers to a set of acts deemed wrong, evil, illegitimate, illegal, and criminal; and is mostly employed as a blanket term to label a variety of violent conducts. Militant acts occur both in conflict and peace-times and are adopted by states and non-state actors alike. They are criminalized in both domestic and international laws (Conte, 2010).

Their characterisation, however, depends largely on who beholds them and actually change over time. Illustratively, Nelson Mandela was branded the most wanted militant globally by the US whiles he was fighting against racial oppressions under
the apartheid regime; but he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize when the regime crumbled. This indicates the political, subjective and controversial nature of the concept, ‘Militancy’ (Conte, 2010:7; LaFree and Dugan, 2009; Maharaj, 2008). Militancy is conceived differently by many to suit their purposes. Again, while some justify its use, others bastardize same. According to Oberschall (2004: 25) militancy is often used as a violent response by a group to “failed political process engaging political regimes and ethnic and ideological adversaries over fundamental governance issues”. For Femi and Ngozi, militancy is “violent activities of … a group holding an aggressive position in support of a given ideology or political cause”. Such group of persons, they observed, are usually in “a psychologically militant state, and physically in an aggressive posture” (Femi and Ngozi, 2014: 18). Militancy may be justified on grounds of religion, economics, politics or ideology (Conte, 2010; LaFree and Dugan, 2009; Oberschall, 2004; Crenshaw, 1995).

Justifying recourse to violence to an end is a common undertaking as evident in the literature. Governments adopt it but justify and legitimate it on grounds of national security owing to their control over the coercive apparatus of states. Again, as a result of the state-centric global order based on Westphalian conception of sovereignty, states use of terror against their own nationals are often justified and those perpetrators go unpunished. But, non-state group’s orchestration of violence is resisted, de-legitimated and criminalized in both domestic and international laws, however legitimate their course may be (Jalata, 2011; Conte, 2010; Lizardo, 2008).

2.3.1 Justifications and Motivations for Militancy
Academics are opinionated about whether militancy should be considered a crime or a legitimate political and or ideological tool by the powerless. Trotsky perceives militancy as a form of justified violence employed for “self-defence and act of
intimidation by revolutionary forces against an oppressive state” (Corelett, 1996: 30). Boyns and Ballard (2004: 10) argue that historically violence has been employed by social movements in pursuit of political aspirations and are often based on the idea of defending the vulnerable from harm and on the principles of social justice. For Lizardo and Bergesen (2004: 25), militants employ indifferential targeting as such their physical targets are just “tools to manipulate and pressurize an entity against whom the action is ultimately taken, [be it] a government or an international body. Essentially, militancy involves such acts undertaken with the aim of intimidating or creating fear and panic. Acts of militancy are motivated by ideological, political or religious course”. They usually take civilians and public figures to represent their target states (Conte, 2010).

Militants attack the innocent to send messages to their targets: Why? The state-centric international system’s treatment of militants as illegitimate violent-producing actors largely accounts for their indiscriminate massacre of vulnerable targets. Militants confronts the problem of being unlawful initiators of violence against representatives of a state and thus, have throughout history resorted to a generalizing strategy: everybody associated with state actor they target becomes a representative of that actor and therefore a potential target for attack (Lizardo, 2008; Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004). So, the civilian-combatant boundary is often blurred not because of the violent penchant among militants, but due to the peculiar position they occupy in the modern state system. The seeming indiscriminate modus operandi of most militant groups is simply a forced-choice as a result of their peripheral position relative to state actors. On the contrary, many people repudiate militancy altogether - for example, according to Barzilai, militants are criminals, and if they are not treated as such, many people may resort to tougher strategies to gain illegitimate political advantages (Conte, 2010;
Lizardo, 2008). Corelett (1996) explored some philosophical underpinnings of militancy in order to find empirical basis for objecting to any view which regards the menace as a morally justifiable act. He suggests that not all cases of militancy are justifiable. Further, he observes that foundations under which one might begin to judge militant acts, morally speaking, should be set forth.

Be that as it may, under what circumstances will a section of society engage in collective violence? What may motivate and trigger militancy? Oberschall (2004: 12) conceives militancy “as a form of collective action harmonised across four main dimensions: discontent, ideology-feeding grievances, organizational capacity, and political opportunity”. Many people engage in militancy on ideological grounds. Conte (2010) has identified four ideological motivations for militant acts: secession; revolution; regional retribution; and global jihad. The ideologies of most militant groups are *religioulized* in recent times. The use of religious-oriented ideology by militant groups as resource for violence is commonplace. Again, there are more militant groups with ambiguous, utopian and religious ideologies than before (Bergeson and Lizardo, 2004). Oberschall (2004) examines the dynamics of violence escalation and persistence of militancy using the theory of collective action. He suggests that religion, particularly Islam, fuels militant movements by identifying theocracy as the panacea for myriads of problems societies face to rescue members from the corrupt secular westernized socialization. However, mostly these religiously inspired militant actions are informed by political and other grievances.

The struggle for political power and resistance to political oppressions have and continue to inform people to variously engage in barbaric acts. In her analysis of reasons, types and implications of militancy, Crenshaw (1995: 14) observes that,
historically religion was the major motivation for people to engage in violence. She argues that hitherto the French Revolution, religion served as the main justification for militancy. But, contrary to the earlier history of mass religiously-inspired massacre, the French Revolution ushered politics into militancy and nationalism supplanted religious motives. She observed that “the over 12,000 French citizens massacred were suspected of opposing the new regime. The French Revolution proved that violence was both morally right and politically efficacious”. While a regime may use violence to repress perceived enemies of the state, oppressed people may also adopt violent resistance to such oppressions. Thus, Crenshaw argues that militancy occurs both in service to the state, and in the context of violent resistance to the state (Crenshaw 1995; see also della Porta, 2009; Gregg, 2016).

Certainly, militant groups may engage in violent confrontation with state actors to change a repressive and dysfunctional regime. Many groups have resorted to militancy to champion a political course both in the past and in recent times. The colonial struggle and recent Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East are cases in point. For example, as boycotts, peaceful demonstrations and marches failed to materialize, the African National Congress (ANC) and its affiliates adopted armed struggle or militant posture to engineer political reforms and regime change. The idea of such a continuum facilitates shifts in strategy and tactics as would be necessitated by changing circumstances. It also allows parties to reassess their own strategies and tactics over time (Maharaj, 2008; della Porta, 2009).

Many people also point to grievances of group of individuals who feel they are economically marginalized. The argument is that perceived or actual deprivation of a group of what is legitimately due them relative to others, such grievances may explode
over time in the form of arms struggle in demand of their rightful economic dividends (Borum, 2011; Crosett and Spitaletta, 2010). However, empirically, there have been mixed reactions to the economic inequality-deprivation-militancy-nexus. Many suggest “that a combination of a rather poor economic conditions and dysfunctional institutional structures may influence the emergence of militant groups. Where acute poverty is accompanied by low opportunities for individuals to escape same, since the dysfunctional institutions constrain political and economic participation, militancy is more likely” (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011: 11).

More recently, political transitioning and instability have been tipped as major sources of militancy. The fact is that political change may create vacuums that militant groups may capitalize on to execute their political motives. Such vacuums are more attractive as militant groups are less likely challenged by unstable and weak governments, thus, making militancy a less costly venture (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011: 11). Under such circumstance, many find it more attractive to support militant groups since there are few non-violent alternatives on the face of the political instability and transitioning crisis. So, violence rather presents low opportunity costs and high payoffs for success. Unstable or failed states may even serve as training or ideological schools for militant networks where individuals are trained to engage in violence for global jihadist campaigns (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011; Abadie, 2006). For instance, Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) provide an overview of empirical evidence for the determinants of militancy by particularly focusing on the origins and targets of transnational militant groups. They examined the relationship between economic, political, institutional, and other demographic factors and transnational militancy. They found that transnational militancy is more likely to emerge in highly populated, unstable and undemocratic regimes as well as states in political transitions. But they found a rather weak nexus
between poor economic conditions and militancy. They concluded that institutional order trumps the economic factors (see also Abadie, 2006).

Again, many people have blamed globalization for the upsurge in both *domestic and transnational militancy*. Their premise is that “globalization generates a backlash or resistance in the form of militant attacks on national powers amidst the globalization process. Thus, such people see militancy as a defensive, reactionary, solidaristic movement against global forces of cultural and economic change” (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004: 10). For Barber (2001) militancy is fostered by “a *disintegral tribalism* and *reactionary fundamentalism* created by the expansion of *integrative modernization* and *aggressive economic and cultural globalization*” (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004: 10). Globalization refers to time-space compression; to the extent that there is, in the words of Pieterse (2002: 12) “intensive interaction across wider space and in shorter time that hitherto was uncommon: *a shrinking world experience*”. Militancy has existed with humanity for centuries though, modernization trends have caused a change of its scope and reach (Aksoy Ece, 2002: 53). The globalization-technology and militancy nexus are explored further in the subsequent section.

### 2.3.2 The Globalization-Technology-Militancy Nexus

To many, the globalization of resources, techniques and organizational forms have made relatively easy, the struggle between state and non-state actors (Jalata, 2011; Lizardo, 2008). For Cronin (2003) the current spate of militancy is characterized by erratic and unparalleled threats and should not just be reaction to globalization but also facilitated by it (Lizardo, 2008). Conte (2010) suggests that militancy is not a new phenomenon and traces it to the French Revolution. But he suggests that the situation has been strengthened and has entered a new phase in the 21st Century, especially after...
the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States - thanks to the technological and information revolutions (Gupta, 2004).

Many people link the growing concerns of militancy to the advancement in technology in the contemporary globalized world. The unprecedented technology and information advancement have revolutionized the lives of the common man, while empowering non-state actors to attack states and groups globally. For Crenshaw (1995), modernization in general, not globalization per se, creates a set of factors that provide significant stimulus for militancy; chiefly among them, she argues, is the expansion of networks of transportation and communication. These networks, in this era of globalization, are developing at tremendous spate. The logic of the neo-liberal economic order has created avenues for travelling, and transacting businesses across the globe. The technological developments have not only enhanced communication worldwide, it has also created actors that can challenge the world order (Aksoy Ace, 2002; Gupta, 2004; ETCS, 2013; GTI, 2016).

The role of technology in refining militancy in the post-September 11, 2001 world has generated huge debates. For Tom Abate, the very technologies that empower lives have become double-edged swords. Evidently, these life empowering technologies enable small militant networks to rein havoc on a scale never before imagined in the history of humanity. Technology has increased cybercrimes leading to what Gupta (2004) calls cyber-militancy. The computer-literate militants use technology to penetrate the networking of organizations, and scientific and technological infrastructures to cause economic and other damages without being physically present to attack security infrastructure of establishments. Certainly, it is a serious situation as it disrupts information security by aiding people access to process control systems of
cereal manufacturers. This ushers the world into the so-called *Third Wave of Battlefield*: the shift from bullets to bytes warfare (Gupta, 2004).

Others blame the global hegemonic ambition of the United States and its allies for the unwavering attacks by militant groups across developing continents such as Middle East, Africa, and Asia (Jalata, 2011; Gupta, 2004; Lizardo, 2008). For instance, the actions of the United States and its allies in Iraq, Libya and Pakistan have collapsed, and created safe havens for militants in these countries. So, Gupta (2004) observes, globalization per se is not responsible, yet the kind of hegemonic ambition the United States pursues is to blame for the current spate of globalized militancy.

It is noteworthy that militancy continues to exist with humanity and cannot be easily defeated unless globally concerted efforts are taken to attack the menace head-on. Varying efforts are being made at the national, regional and global levels: both militarily and diplomatically to de-escalate the menace. This notwithstanding, a lot more remains to be desired. Common to the conventional approach to militancy is that even though both political and humanitarian concerns are crucial, they are often militarized and usually end up creating more collective damages than they seek to address. Again, many of these operations focus on quick fixes, especially at establishing or restoring democracy with total disregard to the structural causes. Further, there are numerous incidents of extrapolating *one-size-fit-all* solutions from elsewhere to address problems in entirely different socio-political, economic and cultural settings. Thus, a more holistic approach that focuses on prevention and human security and institutional reforms to address the root causes is required (GTI, 2016; Rabasa, 2009; Frey, 2004; Aksoy Ece, 2002).
2.4 Overview of Militancy and Militant Groups in Africa

Africa faces serious insecurity as a result of conflicts. For instance, out of the 73 state-based conflicts fought over the period 2002 and 2011, 29 occurred in Africa. Again, of the 223 non-state conflicts, 165 were fought in Africa in the same period. Available evidence suggests that the numbers and intensity of armed conflicts in Africa have declined, though the surge in militancy constitutes a new source of insecurity (Adetula, 2015: 7/8). Militant networks in Africa constitute substantial threats to security, regional stability and overall development. This manifests in attacks across the continent and associated casualties, property destructions, and increasing internally displaced persons and refugees. The new wave of militancy in Africa involve strategic use of sophisticated weapons by well-trained militants with membership drawn from both within and beyond Africa to attain religious, political, and economic power (Rabasa, 2009; Ploch, 2010; Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014).

This is not to suggest that militancy is a new phenomenon in Africa. Militancy was quite profound across Africa at various stages of the decolonization processes as nationalists adopted it as political tool for self-determination. Since independence, African states continue to face enormous threats from militant groups sponsored by forces both within and outside Africa, organized around collective identities to protect their interests, especially Islamists jihadists who forcefully convert non-Muslims into Islam as part of efforts to build Caliphates (Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014; TATF, 2013; Potgieter, 2008). Islamist militants’ presence in Africa is not so new either. Africa remains a priority area to global jihadists. For instance, Abu Azzam al-Ansari’s (2006) article, Al-Qaeda is moving to Africa, published in the jihadi virtual magazine, Sada al-Jihad or Echo of Jihad, alleges Africa’s role in al Qaeda’s global agenda. He indicated that Africa is of strategic importance to al Qaeda’s operations. He cited weak
states, intra-states conflicts, and corruption as push factors that facilitate the movements, planning, and organization of the mujahedeen (Rabasa, 2009).

These conditions provide the opportunity for militants to cross states’ borders in Africa without surveillance and effortlessly secure huge volumes of weapons and military equipment. Also, poverty and certain common social needs serve as push factors for the mujahedeen to use financial and other welfare services to attract influential operatives, mostly frustrated unemployed and or underemployed youths in Africa. Conflicts in Africa are cunningly exploited by militant groups. Inequalities, marginalisation and suppression of identity groups have intensified political conflicts in many parts of Africa. The rates of both new and renewed conflicts in Africa is blamed on bad governance, economic stagnation, poverty and alienation of the masses. The global jihadists use affiliate local networks as proxy to execute attacks across Africa. There are many indigenous militant groups in Africa affiliated to the jihadists’ agenda. Again, many “missionary groups funded by charities in the Gulf region are propagating radical Salafi interpretation of Islam that while not necessarily violent, are found to influence militants’ agenda” (Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014: 99).

Currently, al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) have established links with, and incorporated, local militants into their jihadi agenda. The global jihadist movements have gained currency to the extent that they may co-opt local struggles. Besides, local groups with deepest affinity to foreign networks have their own parochial interests for carrying out attacks in Africa (Rabasa, 2009; Ploch, 2010; Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014).

It must be noted that militancy affects the entire continent, though it manifests differently across the various regions. Even though there are common conditions that expose the entirety of Africa to militant threats, certain regional-specific geopolitical
dynamics make some regions more prone to militant attacks. Also, within each region, some countries suffer more militant attacks than others; and serve as operation hubs where attacks on neighbouring countries are organized. The regional concentration of militancy in Africa is discussed quite further. The section will focus on militancy in North Africa, East and the Horn of Africa, Central, and Southern Africa.

2.4.1 Militancy in North Africa
All countries in North Africa are vulnerable to militant attacks. The proximity to Middle East and certain common historical, geopolitical and socio-economic dynamics increase the likelihood of militant attacks in North Africa. Most of the countries in the region have become theatres of conflict where militant groups, notably AQIM, al Qaeda and IS and their local affiliates challenge states authority and legitimacy. Militant groups also compete for dominance to [re] assert their influence over the jihadi landscape in North Africa. The geopolitical dynamics in North Africa also affords militants the opportunity to launch significant attacks across the region (CSIS, 2016; Alkhouri, 2017). Militant networks in North Africa have expanded thus increasing the tempo of militant attacks across the region and beyond. For instance, AQIM operated in Algeria, but has expanded its operations to Mali, Tunisia and Libya, making it one of the active al Qaeda sprinter groups in Africa.

Tunisia has housed militants for decades. For example, AQIM’s affiliate in Tunisia, Uqba bin Nafae’ Brigade, has carried out several attacks in the Chaambi Mountains, Kasserine City of Tunisia (Alkhouri, 2017; CSIS, 2016). It must be noted, however, that Tunisia has begun a hopeful path in a post-Arab Spring state building - “which can best be described as a negotiated democratization. Despite mutual suspicions, liberal secularist, nationalist, and Islamist actors have agreed to negotiate a liberal constitution, hold elections, and form coalition governments. But the Tunisian
economy has faltered, resulting in a significant growth of *salafi jihadist violence*, as shown in a March 2015 attack on Tunis’ Bardo museum that claimed 22 lives. Again, the returnees from Syria, pose serious threats to Tunisia” (CSIS, 2016: 23).

Also, Libya has historically served as home to many militants. For instance, the *Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)*, which fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, operated in eastern Libya. In the 1990s, LIFG revolted against Qaddafi but was crushed resulting in the exodus of many members to Afghanistan and Iraq who ended up in the jihad against the United States. Others joined Bin Laden in Pakistan where some of them attained influential positions in al Qaeda. Eventually, many of them got killed or arrested back in Libya, while others were released in 2009 or freed during the 2011 uprising (Chivvis and Liepman, 2013). Libya has become a militant hub and currently has no central authority. It is controlled by separatist groups who fought in the uprising. Many militant groups have taken advantage of the chaotic situation in Libya to launch attacks across the region and other parts of Africa e.g. IS has established its hold in Libya, small branches in Algeria and connected with jihadists in Tunisia. Unlike AQIM, IS operatives engage in open battle and territory seizure. It has added onto the political instability in North Africa by controlling a major territory in Libya. Until it was expelled, IS was the de facto government of Sirte, from where attacks were launched across parts of Libya and North Africa (Alkhouri, 2017; CSIS, 2016; GTI, 2016; Bresslin and Gray, 2013).

Similarly, militant threats and attacks in Egypt is enormous. Since the Sadat regime’s economic reform programme, *al-infitah*, which gradually exposed the Egyptian economy to free market principles in the 1970s, it attracted Jihadists attention. *Al-infitah* was considered flawed and Sadat accused of abandoning *solidarity with the
poor. This resulted in rioting of thousands in Egypt, which coincided with Sadat’s initiated peace talks with Israel. This led to a marred government-Islamist relationship, armed rebellions and ultimate assassination of Sadat in 1973 (Breen, 2013).

The massive crackdown after Sadat’s demise reduced militant threats and attacks in Egypt until Farag Foda’s (a secularist author) assassination in 1992. This attack marked a new phase of Islamist militancy in Egypt and a shift towards amplified violence. A large volume of attacks followed, including assaults and bomb attacks against tourists between 1992 and 1997. This period was climaxed with the Luxor massacre on November 17, 1997 when militants attacked tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut, which resulted in 68 casualties. The attack badly affected Egypt in terms of revenue and its international reputation. But it also caused a backlash against the militant groups as Muslim communities’ support for them drastically declined (Breen, 2013). Again, a general de-radicalization exercise, which saw many militant networks undergo ideological changes, was initiated. The leadership of these groups renounced violence and apologized for previous attacks on civilians. They also started peace talks with government, signed a cease-fire agreement in 1999, and renounced their initial extremist posture. The immediate result was a substantive decline in militant attacks compared to the past. Many academics saw the latter posture of militants as a desire to disengage in the politics of violence (Ibid).

But, on January 2011, the Alexandrian church attack, which coincided with the uprising, marked the start of the current spate of militancy in Egypt. Most of these attacks are concentrated in the Sinai Peninsula. These groups are made up of relatively small cells with far less organized structures. They have also changed their tactics, with perpetrators often using explosives, and suicide bombers. The socio-economic
and political grievances of the Bedouin people, the Palestine-Israeli conflict, and police brutality of prisoners featured prominently in the various theoretical expositions (Breen, 2013; Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, Willcoxon, and Basuni, 2015). The jihadists’ position in the Sinai Peninsula strengthened after Mubarak’s fall as a pool of incarcerated militants either escaped or were released from prison. Again, Morsi regime’s overthrow led to a further surge in Islamist militant attacks. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), an IS affiliate, and 31 sprinter groups merged in the Sinai Peninsula, and have since engaged in a number of scathing attacks in Egypt, including the August 2012 rocket strike on Eilat, Israel, September 2012 Israeli border patrol assault, and attacks on Egyptian security officials. While current militants’ attacks are concentrated in the sparsely populated Sinai Peninsula, there are spill-overs especially across the Nile Valley. Egypt’s economy has felt the brunt of militancy: tourism, a primary driver of the economy, has declined drastically (Ibid).

Algeria is also not immune from the threats of militant attacks. It continues to serve as home to several militants. The current spate of militancy in Algeria is rooted in its domestic challenges and influx of returnees and foreign fighters from the Middle East. Indeed, the impact of the 1990s returnees after the Afghan political crisis on militant revolts in Algeria cannot be overemphasised. The influx of jihadists after the crisis led to the emergence of large militant movements in Algeria (Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014). As Breen (2013) observed, the Afghan returnees in the 1990s marked the genesis of large extremist revolts in Algeria. Most renowned among these groups is the Salafist Group for Preaching and Jihad (GSPC), which rebranded itself into AQIM after pledging allegiance to al Qaeda in 2006. Over the period 2007 and 2010, AQIM operated mainly in Algeria. However, by 2010, the Algerian security forces managed
to crush AQIM operatives in the north and de-escalate the group’s activities in the south (Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014; CSIS, 2016; Breen, 2013; Rabasa, 2009).

Morocco remains the only country in the region that has avoided political upheavals; but it is not entirely immune from revolts, and threats of militant attacks. In 2011, thousands of Moroccans protested for reduced influence of the Monarchy in politics. King Mohammed VI swiftly responded by promising a new constitution to address their concerns. The Moroccan government employs both hard and soft power initiatives to address militant threats: e.g. the military has established three units to deal with militant threats, drug smuggling, and irregular migration. Also, a number of initiatives have been enrolled to address unemployment, poverty, and other potential drivers of radicalization. Even though Morocco is largely free from large-scale militant attacks, it still faces minimal but imminent threats e.g. in May 2012, a dozen suicide bombers attacked a hotel, a club, and a Jewish community centre in Casablanca, resulting in a 33 civilian-casualties with hundreds injured (CIS, 2016).

Morocco’s main challenge with jihadists comes from the influx of returnees from Syria and Iraq. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization estimated 1,500 Moroccans who have joined the Sunni militants in Syria and Iraq (CSIS, 2016). In response to this challenge, the government launched Operation Hadar to increase the military presence in central sites in all large cities - airports and train stations. But this appears distasteful to many nationals over fears of Operation Hadar returning the country into undue surveillance as occurred under King Hassan II. Morocco has also launched a few raids against foreign fighter recruitment cells. Overall, it remains the most stable country in North Africa. Morocco has made significant progress with
regards to political stability, and currently faces minimal threats compared to its neighbours (CSIS, 2016; GTI, 2016; Breen, 2013).

As discussed afore, a combination of factors accounts for North Africa’s extremist history. It has been argued that “structural conditions for militancy are strong where lower levels of economic development, limited opportunities for livelihoods and social advancement, political exclusion and conservative Islamic traditions combine” (CSIS, 2016: 30). These situations are evident in all countries found in North Africa; and are aggravated by political exclusion, conflicts and limited presence of state forces as pertains in Libya, parts of Tunisia, Algeria and Sinai Peninsula of Egypt (CSIS, 2016). Moreover, the uprising in North Africa and Middle East has compounded the situation. First, it has increased porosity of borders due to the collapse of states authorities. Second, it has increased the availability of weapons left unsecured in storage facilities e.g. in Libya. Third and finally, it has also resulted in greater mobility of militants, notably fundamental Islamists committed to global jihad. The Arab Spring which swoop across North Africa and the Gulf region had a spill-over in the form of protests across Africa. The result is mass insurrections and political turmoil in North Africa, and spill-overs across other parts of Africa (Rabasa, 2009).

2.4.2 Militancy in East and Horn of Africa
The East and Horn of Africa is bedevilled with intractable conflicts. All countries in the region have experienced security challenges of a sort. For example, Sudan was engulfed in conflict for over three decades; South Sudan is also riddled with inter-ethnic strife. The region is also confronted with influx of militants, devastating border and pastoralist conflicts, and piracy. The stability and overall development of the region have been jeopardised by conflicts and militancy. The Ethiopian-Eritrean rivalry, and support for separatists in each other’s territory, coupled with failed states
authority have worsened the situation. These conditions in the region are cunningly exploited by militant groups (Lyman and Harberson, n.d.; Rabasa, 2009).

Islamist militants’ presence in East and Horn of Africa goes back to the late 1980s. Sudan, in the past, supported Islamist militants including al Qaeda operatives. Beginning from 1989, al Qaeda established a base in Sudan, as Al Bashir’s military regime protected and supported Islamist militants in the region. Again, the Sudanese government supported the Darfur-based militant group, Janjaweed, to suppress opposition, resulting in over two and a half million people displaced, and 400,000 casualties. This forced the AU to intervene in 2004 with about 7,000 peacekeeping force to help calm down the situation. Failure of the 2004 operation led to a further dispatch of 20,000 joint AU-UN peacekeeping force to Sudan in 2007 (Ploch, 2010; Rabasa, 2009; Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014; Lyman and Harberson, n.d.).

Moreover, the activities of the Somalia-based militant group, al-Shabaab, remain the gravest threat to regional security and stability. Al Shabaab continues to make inroads in the region and recruits new fighters. Between 1992 and 1993, after Mohammed Siad Barre’s government collapsed, al Qaeda operatives begun touring Somalia from their base in Khartoum. From mid-1990s, East and Horn of Africa became the central theatre for al Qaeda operatives. In August 1998, al Qaeda carried out two of its spectacular pre-September 11, 2001 attacks: the bombing of American embassies in Nairobi and Dar al Salaam (Rabasa, 2009).

Weakened by political instability and lack of central authority since the 1990s, a network of local Islamic courts (the Union of Islamic Courts-UIC) emerged in Somalia out of which al Shabaab would emerge. These courts’ leadership propagated varying ideological strands that reflected the diversities of the body politic of Islam,
Somali nationalism, and tribal identity in Somalia (Ploch, 2010; Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014). The situation has further been complicated by the spread of Somalis across five countries in the region (Kenya, Somali Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia). The emergence of a fragmented, but large networks of militant groups affiliated to al Shabaab and al Qaeda (Ploch, 2010) threatens regional stability. Al Shabaab is centralized under a shura (council) made-up of both Somalis and foreigners. Thousands of al Shabaab fighters allegedly come from Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Bangladesh, Chechnya, Pakistan, Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Its emergence is deeply rooted in Somalia’s political and Jihadi history (Rabasa, 2009; Potgieter, 2011; Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014).

The porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, pervasive corruption, and state complicity in militant activities coupled with the over two decades absence of central authority in Somalia, as well as the Ethiopian-Eritrean rivalry afford militants the opportunity to plan large scale attacks across the region. More so, some countries in the region have served at various times as safe havens, staging areas, or transit points for militant groups (CRS, 2017; Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014; Ploch, 2010; Rabasa, 2009).

2.4.3 Militancy in Central Africa
The geopolitics in Central Africa, conflicts and separatist groups’ activities jeopardise the region’s stability, security and overall development. The region’s major challenge results from its borders with countries hosting legions of militant groups such as Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya and Mali. The porous state borders with corrupt and weak security agents enable militants’ easy room to manoeuvre. Again, the former militia of Rwanda, the ex-FAR, and the Ugandan-bred Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are the renowned local militant groups whose activities constitute the main source of
insecurity and instability in the region. It is worth noting that Central Africa has not
witnessed any high-profile militant attacks as experienced by West, East and North
Africa. But the failed states such as the DRC, Burundi, CAR, Cameroon and Chad
serve as reserves for militant funding. The LRA mostly operates in the locales of South
Sudan, CAR, Congo, DRC and Uganda; while ex-FAR and affiliates engage in large
scale militant acts in DRC and compete for control over natural resource reserves
(Ploch, 2010; Fomboh, 2011; Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014; Adetula, 2015).

Another group that engages in destabilizing activities in Central Africa is the M23
militants in DRC, which allegedly enjoys the support of Rwanda and Uganda. Both
countries have denied complicity though, the group’s activities constitute a major
source of tension and insecurity in the region. The M23 militants have further
weakened the authority of DRC (Adetula, 2015; Bureau of Counter Terrorism, 2017).
Countries in the region, especially Chad and Cameroon, are also threatened by spill-
overs from conflicts in CAR, and Nigeria’s Boko Haram insurgency. The
predominantly Muslim Seleka and Christian Baraka militant groups also cause grave
insecurity in CAR and the region at large (Fomboh, 2011; Adetula, 2015). Empirical
evidence supports the assertions that rivalry and complicity of some states protect and
fuel intra-states conflicts and sectarian activities. For example, it is alleged that Sudan
has provided military assistance to the LRA, as pay back for Uganda’s lending of
military support to the southern secessionist group, Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA). Despite Sudan’s denial, the animosity between the two states is entrenched
in quarrels over complicity in rebellion within each other’s territory. Many suggest
that the LRA, without Sudan’s support, could not have access to vital supplies of
ammunitions (Fomboh, 2011, Adetula, 2015; Marshal, 2006).
2.4.4 Militancy in Southern Africa

Southern Africa is by far, the freest region on the continent as far as militant threats and attacks are concerned. The countries in the region’s history of repressive governments and intractable conflicts notwithstanding, recently, the situation has largely been contained with exception of few isolated cases of alleged harbouring of militants by some countries. For example, besides its limited domestic militant groups’ activities, South Africa has been linked to activities of al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and IS militants. An estimated 100 South African nationals have joined IS in Syria. Arguably, South Africa attracts militants because of its superior infrastructure, international connections, and relative freedom of movement. Again, availability and value of its passports, and the alleged complicity of corrupt officials of Department of Home Affairs’ tacit support and leakage of legitimate passports to criminal cartels, make South Africa a station for illegal migrants who are transiting to the United States and Europe (Lyman and Harberson, n.d.; Cachalia and Schoeman, 2017).

That said, some domestic criminal organizations in South Africa deserves attention. South Africa has a history of violent extremism stemming especially from domestic grievances. For example, the history of far-right extremist dates to the 1970s. These are traditional Afrikaner nationalists who aim to establish independent Afrikaner nation-state organized around collective identity such as language, religion, and common Afrikaner history. Crucial to their ideology is the shared Calvinist religion, often mixed with elements of prophecy and notions of divine rights to a ‘Boer’ Republic (Cachalia and Schoeman, 2017; Botha, 2008). Throughout the apartheid regime various far-right militants carried out bomb attacks in South Africa, and this would continue into the post-1994 democratic era. Their targets included black communities, liberal politicians and multicultural institutions. The most renowned
among the far-right groups is the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). In the 1980s, members of the AWB were convicted after plots of militant attacks was uncovered. In the build-up to the 1994 elections the group carried out multiple attacks aimed at destabilising the country and disrupting its first pluralistic elections (Lyman and Harberson, n.d.; Cachalia and Schoeman, 2017).

Despite failure to achieve its goals in the past, the group continued to attack people. Between 1994 and 2002, far-right militants were involved in isolated cases of mosque bombings and attempts to steal weapons and military equipment. The largest attack by AWB occurred in the Worcester bombing in 1996 when members of the Boere Aanvalstroepe, AWB’s offshoot, detonated two bombs that killed three and injured 67 people. In 2002 the far right resurfaced when eight bombs were detonated in Soweto, destroying railway lines and a mosque. In the end 23 suspects were arrested and prosecuted. Investigations by security operatives led to the seizure of 3,000 explosives (Cachalia and Schoeman, 2017; Lyman and Harberson, n.d.).

Another notorious domestic militant group in South Africa (suspected of establishing international linkages) is the People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), formed in 1995 to empower local communities to oppose violent crimes and drug trafficking in Western Cape. Frustrated by the government’s inability to deal with such crimes, the group initially staged peaceful demonstrations aimed at pressuring the government to respond to their concerns. Towards the end of 1996, its approach moved towards vigilantism and assumed increasingly militant posture. The turning point was reached when members of PAGAD openly murdered gang leaders in their homes. The group’s growing militant posture is attributed to Qibla, a militant group formed in the 1980s which was inspired by the Iranian Revolution to implement
similar system of Islamic rule in South Africa. Members of Qibla joined and forced PAGAD founders out of the organisation which resulted in division and struggle for control and leadership (Lyman and Harberson, n.d.; Cachalia and Schoeman, 2017).

By 1996 and 1998, PAGAD had become more violent, with its militant arm, the G-Force, engaged in attacks on restaurants, shopping centres, gay nightclubs and investigative units and judges dealing with cases involving its members. Towards 1999 and 2000, PAGAD’s attacks focused on public spaces and US symbols and interests. The group’s radical views led to confrontations with members of the Muslim communities who criticised their militant rhetoric. Since December 1999, several PAGAD members have been arrested and jailed, including its national coordinator, Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim (Cachalia and Schoeman, 2017).

By far, it must be said, besides political repressions and rioting, Southern Africa is the freest region in the continent from militant attacks. The countries in Southern Africa have focused attention closely on intelligence building and sharing, financial control, coastal security and occasional extradition (Lyman and Harberson, n.d.). Therefore, incidence of large-scale militancy is difficult. However, political repression and violence remains a reasonable source of instability in the region, particularly xenophobic attacks in South Africa (Cachalia and Schoeman, 2017).

2.5 Conceptualization of International Organizations (IOs)

International organizations (IOs) are those organizations whose members are states (national governments) and are usually referred to as ‘intergovernmental organizations’ (IGOs). They come in different variations of forms based on several factors. One form of the variations is based on IOs membership reach. Some have a universal membership reach (UN), while others are regional (ECOWAS). Another
variation of IOs is by function e.g. some IOs are created solely for security alliance (NATO). There are others created to help stabilize the international economy (IMF). Yet, some IOs are created for multidimensional purposes: economics, politics, and security (e.g. EU) (Kaufman, 2013; Burchill, et al., 2005).

Common to all IOs is that their members are nation-states that have joined the organization in the belief that IOs may enable them further their national interests. “Nation-states may be, and often are, members of more than one organization, reflecting the different interests and priorities they have: security, economics, trade, regional, and international” (Kaufman, 2013: 120). Since IOs memberships are strictly limited to nation-states, it raises interesting questions about the balance between state’s commitments to the organization (IOs) and simultaneously guarding its sovereignty. To precisely answer the question of balancing membership to IOs and maintaining sovereignty, there is the need to determine why states join IOs.

There are certain general principles that are common to all IOs and help describe the roles that they play in international politics. The assumption underlying the creation of IOs is that they bring together independent states that adhere to the basic principles and goals of the organization and are willing to support its norms. Each organization also has its own set of rules of engagement, ways to finance itself, a bureaucratic structure of some sort, a voting or decision-making approach among its members, ways to punish recalcitrant members, and membership criteria. Since there is no single means of enforcing international law, IOs often play very important role in ensuring that such laws, international agreements, and policies are enforced and violators punished (Kaufman, 2013; Brown and Kristen, 2005; Ba, 2017; Pease, 2003).
2.5.1 Internal Dynamics of Member States and Nature of IOs

In the section afore, the issue about self-seeking sovereign states’ ability to balance their interests with that of IOs to which they are members was alluded to. To what extent do states reconcile and subsume their competing national interests under IOs to which they are members? According to Kaufman (2013) any state can withdraw its membership [or refuse to honour its obligations] within a supranational unit (IO) at any given time if it feels that participating will not be in its best interest or would undermine its sovereignty. Typical example is the socialist states withdrawal from or refusal to join certain UN specialized institutions like the UNICEF during the cold war period (see Epstein and O’Halloran, 2008).

Realists argue that states are power maximizing actors and so engage in zero-sum game in the anarchic international system. They observe that states hardly cooperate in any controversial issues such as collective security, even though they may partake in few non-controversial issue areas such as trade. But the pluralists believe that states do not necessarily engage in zero-sum game in their interactions. However, few problems constrain cooperation which IOs can provide important solutions to: the free-rider problem, by providing important information about cheaters and serving as regimes to monitor, regulate and sanction recalcitrant members (Kaufman, 2013; Burchill et al, 2005; Brown and Kristen, 2005; Cole, 2005). In other words, realist agree that states can and do cooperate where necessary. Nonetheless, they only engage in collective initiatives involving non-controversial issues and such engagement are necessary conditions for attaining and maintaining great-power status.

They argue that to create and maintain IOs as well as constrain individual member states action, a hegemon is required. The Hegemonic Stability Theory is used to explain this assertion. According to Robert Gilpin (1981; cited in Pease, 2003: 46):
“An international system is established for the same reasons that any political system is created; actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance sets of political, economic or other interests. Because the interests of some of the actors may conflict with those of others, the interests that are most favoured by the social arrangements tend to reflect the relative powers of the actors”.

Thus, for realists, the dynamics of an IO reflect the social arrangements among member states, whereby the interest of the most-powerful are institutionalized (Mearsheimer, 1995; in Pease, 2003). In other words, IOs may foster cooperation in non-controversial issue areas where states have common interests. But they rarely constrain states behaviour regarding issue where interests are diverse and opposed. That is, IOs play little or no role in maintaining international peace and security. Rather, balance-of-power realities dictate possibility of war outbreak. IOs also play intervening role in great-power calculations. They are used by the great-powers to further their interests in the international system. Other non-great-power states may also use IOs to attain their own goals and have a voice within the existing system. But, in terms of constraining superpower behaviour, IOs have little or no influence. States bypass or ignore IOs if their immediate security or important national interests are at stake (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998; Pease, 2003; Ba, 2017).

On the contrary, the pluralists argue that different actors’ engagement in the international system is possible, including individual non-state actors. These actors may directly and easily align their interests with their counterparts in other areas that are not necessarily controlled by the state. Instances of transnational cooperation are also possible among interested governments (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998). Thus, Jon Pevehouse and Russett (2006) argue that “some types of IOs, namely
those with a ‘densely democratic’ membership, engender peaceful relations among their members. The authors highlighted three contributions that IOs in their sample made: IOs helped states enter into, and sustain, credible commitments. By monitoring commitments among states, IOs can reduce the credibility gap that sometimes exists when states are bargaining over a substantive financial or trade agreement. They may also enhance the credibility of international agreements in instances of government turnover” (Kaufman, 2013; Brown and Kristen, 2005).

Another school of thought, Constructivism, proposes a different approach to interstate cooperation and dynamics at the international scene. Constructivism (also social constructivism) is a new approach that sprung to prominence in the 1990s (Kaufman, 2013). It focuses on international issues and questions relating to a larger set of social and political interactions and the ways in which those relationships help a state to frame appropriate responses. Constructivists emphasizes the importance of ideas and the ways in which states socially construct reality and act upon such reality (Kaufman, 2013: 47; Asare, 2011). They argue that states may have multiple identities. They respond to the actions of other states depending, in part, on how it views itself vis-à-vis other states. They contend that such views are dynamic and change over time, depending on the interactions between those states, and the ways in which they perceive themselves vis-à-vis the others. These perceptions are constantly altered as circumstances change. For constructivists, while institutions are relatively stable and set, relationships between states are not fixed (Kaufman, 2013).

Like realists, constructivists perceive states as the principal actors in the international system, but most importantly they focus on their interaction with other actors and structures that also exist within the international system. Thus, they see actors in the
international system as existing within a dynamic environment, which influences and changes them. The behaviour of states, therefore, is shaped by several factors that are *socially constructed*: including the attitudes and beliefs of the decision makers, social norms, and identities (Kaufman, 2013). Moreover, it is characterized by the belief that these various actors do not just respond to this constructed system but alter it through their [inter]actions. Constructivists conceive of an international system that is essentially dynamic (Kaufman, 2013). Constructivists emphasize the structures that influence states as well as the ways in which states and the individuals within them are altered by the structures within which they interact. The various member states of IOs are affected directly by their policies and the organizations’ structures which in turn, are influenced and affected by the decisions of their member states. In other words, the structures of IOs transform and are transformed by the actors interacting within them, not only the states, but the individual human actors (Kaufman, 2013; Brown and Kristen, 2005; Burchill et al, 2005).

### 2.6 [Sub-] Regional Security Schemes in Africa

A typical post-cold war trend that has gained currency in contemporary international politics is the [re] building of regional blocs. The complexity of security issues in the current international system demands greater cooperation and coordination among states within the various regions in Africa. The failure of many national governments to address trans-border crimes such as arms, drugs and human trafficking makes a strong case for states to embrace regional security cooperation. Currently, regional organisations are closely associated with global peace and defence activities (Adetula, 2015). Prior to the formation of UN, the Big Powers debated the nature any collective security arrangement should take: regional or universal. Even though the Universalists won the day, an agreement was reached to allow regional blocs’ formation to help
manage conflicts affected regions. Three main issues, (see UN Charter Articles 51-54), prompted this arrangement: 1) “a regional approach to interstate conflicts held more promise of eliciting collaboration; 2) global rivalries and divisions might impede UN’s ability to timely deal with some types of conflicts; and 3) some countries were not happy with great power intervention in their regions” (Adetula, 2015: 22). This will form the basis for all [sub-] regional security arrangements across the globe.

2.6.1 The African Union (AU)
The African Union (AU) is a progeny of the erstwhile Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was established in 1963 as a continental political union. The OAU was created to strengthen the independence of African states and aid the various colonies in their struggles for independence. It was also charged to maintain peace and security in Africa. But certain claw-back clauses in its Charter made it difficult to honour them: the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference with members’ internal affairs (Kode, 2016; Juma and Mengistu, 2002). In a 1990 Declaration, the OAU Heads of State and Government conceived the conflicts in Africa as impediments to their efforts to addressing the myriads of development problems and pledged their readiness to resolving same. At a 1999 OAU summit in Cairo, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) was adopted in recognition of peace and stability as precondition for development. But the mechanism was arguably built on a flawed principle (Elowson and McDermott, 2010; Kode, 2016; Adetula, 2015).

The OAU basically relinquished peacekeeping responsibility to the UN as the body possessing the rightful authority and resources for global peace and security initiatives. So, all large-scale peacekeeping missions were left to the UN and sub-regional bodies. Be that as it may, the mechanism had three main objectives: 1) to
anticipate and prevent potential conflict situations from developing into full-blown wars; 2) to undertake peace-making and peace-building efforts should full-blown conflicts arise; and 3) to carry out peace-making and peace-building activities in post-conflict periods. Thus, the OAU was directly driven to the centre of conflict management. But a number of challenges dogged its operations: lack of funding, institutional and organizational capacities (Juma and Mengistu, 2002; Kode, 2016). Therefore, on September 9, 1999 African leaders met in Sirte, Libya, to review the OAU Charter to meet the myriad of development challenges confronting the continent. Key among these challenges was the scourge of conflicts. So, via the Sirte Declaration, African leaders resolved to stem conflicts from the continent. Thus, in line with the changes in the region, OAU was rebranded into the AU in 2002 with a Constitutive Act that paid close attention to peace, security and stability, democratic values, popular participation and good governance; and adopted a more interventionist approach (Kode, 2016; Sunday, 2011; Elowson and McDermott, 2010).

2.6.2 The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The mechanism for peace and security maintenance in Africa, as enshrined in the AU Act, is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA consists of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Stand-by Force (ASF), Panel of the Wise (PoW) and the Peace Fund. The design of the APSA gives room for sub-regional actors’ collaboration in conflict management. Its operational strength is merged with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The AU’s Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council (the PSC Protocol) provides the basis and outlines the framework for the APSA’s operation (Abiodun, n.d.; Adetula, 2015). The Protocol was entered into force on December 26, 2003. The PSC was officially established in
2004 as the main organ under the APSA for conflicts prevention, management, and resolution in Africa. It consists of 15 members. The PSC is empowered to recommend to the Assembly, any intervention on behalf of the AU in countries suffering from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Ajayi, 2008; Osadolor, 2011; Kode, 2016). The activities of the PSC are built on collective security and early-warning systemic arrangement for timely and efficient crisis response. It has the power to address virtually all threats to peace and security in Africa. Politically, it can institute sanctions against member states that ride on unconstitutional means to power; monitor and promote democracy, good governance, rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as respect for the sanctity of human life and humanitarian laws. It is also responsible for promoting and developing strong partnership for peace and security with the relevant international and regional bodies. Since its creation, the PSC has made a decent progress with regards to enhancing AU’s capacity in conflict resolution and mediation efforts, albeit some major limitations (Adetula, 2015; Fisher et al., 2010; Kode, 2016).

Again, the APSA features a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The CEWS’ mandate is to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa by gathering and analyzing information needed for timeous prevention of conflicts. The CEWS relies on the RECs/RMs early warning systems to provide the AU commission’s chairperson with timely information to recommend the course of action the PSC must undertake to prevent conflicts or threats of same in Africa (Ibid).

The African Standby Force (ASF) is another key component of the APSA. Article 4 (d) of the AU Act provides for the establishment of a common defence and security policy in Africa. The ASF was established in 2003 to observe, monitor and engage in
peace-support operations; to intervene in domestic affairs of member states where necessary; to engage in preventive deployment exercise; peacebuilding, and post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation operations. It was designed to enable the AU deploy troops swiftly to prevent and or contain conflicts. It consists of five multinational standby brigades, each hosted by one of the five RECs: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). But, in situations where some countries belong to more than one REC, to avoid complications, the AU either created or opted for ASF RMs. In North Africa, the North African Regional Capability (NARC) was created as the RM for North Africa and NASBRIG as its standby brigade. Also, in East Africa, the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and Command were created as the mechanism and standby force irrespectively. In West, Central and Southern Africa, where RECs’ membership covers the entire regions, their structures were upgraded to make room for regional standby forces (Adetula, 2015; Fisher et al, 2010; Elowson and McDermott, 2010).

The AU’s Panel of the Wise (PoW) is another key component of the APSA. It consists of five eminent African personalities from diverse backgrounds. The PoW’s main role is to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. The PoW’s mandate is twofold: to support the PSC and Commission Chairperson in their peace-making efforts, and to act independently on issues that it deems significant to enhance human security in Africa. Operationally, it can act either at the request of the PSC or the Chairperson of the Commission or on its own volition (Frempong, 1999; Fisher et al., 2010; Elowson and McDermott, 2010; Adetula, 2015).
The Protocol, moreover, provided for the establishment of a Special Peace Fund (*the Fund*) to enhance funding of peace and security operations. The Fund is a pool of financial reserve for both the AU and RECs/RMs to draw from in order to undertake emergency operations. The Fund is governed by relevant rules and regulations and financed by AU’s regular budget, and voluntary contributions from states and private organizations both within and outside Africa (Adetula, 2015; Fisher et al. 2010).

The AU’s current security arrangements make it quite sophisticated and more involving in peace and defence operations in Africa. So far, it has carried out a few peacekeeping and defence operations, including the armed violence in Sudan and Somalia; unconstitutional changes in Guinea, Niger, Togo and Mauritania; militancy in Somalia, and Mali; small arms and light weapons; and children and women in armed conflicts. It closely cooperates with the RECs/RMs and the UN on information sharing. But the APSA confronts several challenges, including inadequate funding, blurred relationship with RECs/RMs, and over militarization of peacekeeping operations (Adetula, 2015; Fisher et al., 2010; Elowson and McDermott, 2010).

### 2.6.3 AU and Sub-Regional Blocs’ Interactions

The new security framework under the APSA makes provisions for a close collaboration with the AU and RECs in peace and defence operations. At an AU Summit in Accra on July 2007, a decision was reached to accredit RECs liaison officers to the AU to ensure better coordination. This resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between AU and the RECs in January 2008 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to increase cooperation and collaboration towards the APSA’s operationalization. The MoU is underpinned by the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage. This arrangement enhances Peace and Security cooperation between AU and the RECs. The MoU established the
Coordinating Mechanisms for the Regional Standby Brigades of East and North Africa (Desmidt, Hank and Ndiaye, 2017; Fisher et al., 2010). For effective maintenance and promotion of peace and defence in Africa, the AU, under this MoU, acknowledges the role of RECs in their respective regions. The MoU identifies nine areas of cooperation: the APSA’s operationalization; conflict prevention, management and resolution; humanitarian action and disaster response; post-conflict reconstruction and development; arms control and disarmament; counter-terrorism, and prevention and combat of trans-border crimes; border management; capacity building, training and knowledge sharing; and resource mobilization (Ibid).

2.6.4 AU’s Role in Fighting Militancy in Africa
As aforementioned, AU’s new security mechanism prioritizes prevention and combating of transnational militants and other trans-border crimes in Africa. With regards to the specific issue of militancy, the AU has promulgated some conventions and protocols to provide common position, definition and approach to addressing it: the OAU’s 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted in Algiers, Algeria; the AU Protocol to the OAU Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa adopted in Algiers, Algeria (ECTS, 2013). Several actions have also been taken by the AU to de-escalate the militant situation across Africa, notably the Somalia and Malian missions. Some scholars have also assessed AU’s current role in the crusade against militancy in the continent (Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014). For example, Abugbilla (2017) examined the AU’s attitude towards the militant crisis in Nigeria and observed that the AU has no directional approach towards the Nigerian problem. He however suggested non-militarized approaches, including addressing corruption as the viable long-term
solution to the situation in Nigeria. On his part, Abiodun inquired about AU’s role in
the Malian crisis. He deemed the militant situation in Mali as a devastating one but
argues that the AU has not been forthcoming with the right measures to address it.
The author sought to examine how the AU, RECs, and extra-regional bodies such as
UN and France collaborate in resolving the Malian crisis. He concluded that, the AU
and RECs in Africa mainly play subordinating roles in implementing initiatives
crafted by extra-regional actors (Haysom 2014; Caparini, 2015; Rabasa, 2009).

The failure to lead a continental crusade against militant groups in Africa results from
the several challenges confronting the AU. To begin with, AU-RECs/RMs shared
standby forces confront significant challenges and constitute a major source of
frustration, including delays in troop deployment, poor logistics and inadequate
human and material resources. Secondly, notwithstanding the creation of a Peace
Fund, funding remains a serious challenge to AU’s security activities. Furthermore,
the ASF as a collection of regional based brigade, its capability to timely deploy and
respond to major conflict situations have been questionable. Moreover, even though
the APSA has a humanitarian face, its actual operationalization has been overly
militarized (Caparini, 2015; Adetula, 2015; Haysom, 2014).

2.7 Regional [Economic] Blocs and Militancy in Africa
This section provides brief assessments of the various regional blocs’ role and
capacity in fighting militancy in their respective abodes. Attention will be focused on

2.7.1 The North African Regional Capability (NARC)
To enable North African countries, contribute to the APSA’s regional arrangements,
the North African Regional Capability (NARC) was created through a MoU in 2007.
As a secretariat to liaise NARC member states activities was lacking, Libya voluntarily performed the coordinating role in the interim from 2005 to 2008. But after three years of Libya’s voluntary role, getting a member state to host a regional secretariat of NARC has become a major challenge, considering Libya’s current failed status. It must be noted that NARC was created to fill a regional bloc vacuum in the region. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) has been dormant since its formation in 1989. Revitalizing the AMU has proven problematic due to disagreement among members, chiefly Morocco and Algeria. This necessitated the creation of a sub-regional mechanism to enable North African countries partake in the ASF agenda’s execution (Fisher et al., 2010; Desmidt, Hank and Ndiaye, 2017).

On December 2008, at the second meeting of NARC Ministers of Defence in Tripoli, a recommendation was approved to establish an executive secretariat to be located in Tripoli. Subsequently, the NARC Executive Secretariat and Planning Element were also inaugurated in April, 2009. But NARC has not made any substantial progress and confronts several challenges especially regarding the establishment of appropriate legal frameworks to operationalize its standby force or brigade. The major challenge in the region has to do with cumbersome constitutional and legal regulations of some member states that have delayed ratification of the NARC MoU. Another challenge stems from some NARC members reluctance to sign the founding documents. Further, the disputes over the status of Western Sahara and the crisis in Libya continue to complicate the situation in the region (Desmidt, Hank and Ndiaye, 2017).

It must be said that countries in North Africa continue to resist any attempt at collective security and intelligence-sharing arrangements in addressing the militant menace. For instance, in a conference at Bamako, Mali, in 2003 by intelligence
officers from several African countries, as some members proposed intelligence-sharing and formation of taskforce to fight militants in their respective regions, their North African counterparts rejected these proposals on grounds that each country confronts a distinctive situation. Many points to a lack of trust among respective intelligence services in the region as major impediment to intelligence-sharing. Despite its potential, the status of readiness of NARC’s standby brigade is lagging. Again, although the Brigade Head Quarters to be located in Cairo and two logistic depots in Algiers and Cairo have been approved, they are yet to be operational due to political and bureaucratic constraints in member states. Also, creating, hosting and deploying civilian component have proven very problematic (Ibid).

2.7.2 The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Countries in the East and Horn of Africa are members to several sub-regional economic blocs, which often result in divided loyalties. That said, this section will focus on the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as the main regional bloc with clear security mandate in the region. IGAD is a progeny of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) established in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, joined later by Eritrea in 1993 after independence. Originally, it was created as an early warning mechanism to alert the international community about potential humanitarian crises in the region and to coordinate resources in response to such crises. Therefore, its operation was confined to issues relating to drought, desertification and food security (Rabasa, 2009; Alcaro and Pirozzi, 2014; Fisher et al., 2010).

Nevertheless, incessant conflicts, militancy, political instability and insecurity across the region prompted member states to transform the IGADD into IGAD with expanded mandates in conflict prevention, management and resolution (Adetula,
2015; Fisher et al., 2010). Currently, IGAD prioritizes the maintenance of peace, security and stability. As part of the new arrangements, IGAD deals with conflicts by eliminating threats to security; establishing a mechanism for consultation and cooperation for peaceful settlement of disputes; and to deal with disputes among member states within the sub-region before referring them to other regional or international bodies. Demonstrating unprecedented political commitment, IGAD member states vowed to resolve outstanding security problems and conflicts, and to preserve regional stability (Fisher et al, 2010; Desmidt, Hank and Ndiaye, 2017).

Pursuant to this objective, IGAD adopted a dual-track approach. First, it aims to resolve conflicts that have the potential to polarize the organization, and often creates semi-autonomous ad hoc mechanisms, outside of its Secretariat, to deal with particular security issues. The process that led to the restoration of a transitional government in Somalia in 1999 is an outcome of such mechanism. Second, it acts via consensus among all member states to intervene to address pressing security issues in member states. IGAD pursues several issues under such arrangement ranging from campaign against small arms to diverse range of humanitarian crisis (Juma and Mengistu, 2002).

The IGAD’s peace and security activities are located in two divisions: The Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) division, and the Humanitarian Affairs division. Four critical projects have emerged within the CPMR since 1996. The first, emphasizes capacity building of key actors within the IGAD secretariat and member states - funded by the EU and Swedish government. The second project deals with demobilization and post-conflict reconstruction, including the control of small arms and light weapons trafficking - funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The third project seeks to promote a culture of peace and
tolerance. The fourth is the development of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (Juma and Mengistu, 2002). Since the mid-1990s, IGAD has undertaken several peacekeeping and defence operations in the sub-region either alone, or in partnership with other international bodies both from within and outside Africa. Most notable among these operations are the Sudanese civil war, and its mission in Somalia (Khadiagala, 2008; Lyman and Harberson, n.d.).

Through donor support, IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) was established in January 2000 to systematically anticipate and timely respond to violent conflicts in the region. CEWARN operations involve all major stakeholders: governments, NGOs, and civil society organizations for gathering information on conflicts and conflict prevention. The CEWARN mechanisms, at both regional and national levels, work with civil society organizations. Although East and Horn of Africa are ravaged by interstate, intrastate, and communal conflicts, CEWARN’s approach focuses exclusively on cross-border pastoral conflicts (Khadiagala, 2008). CEWARN is the first comprehensive conflict early warning and response system in Africa to draw on the diverse resources of non-state actors. IGAD has harmonized political and cultural differences. At a ministerial meeting on IDPs in the region on September 2003, the member states sought to intensify efforts to enhance democracy, rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and international [humanitarian] laws to ensure regional stability and security (Ibid).

However, IGAD confronts several challenges that weaken its peace and security maintenance efforts. To begin with, IGAD members are not just divided, a regional hegemon to encourage collective security decisions is also lacking. Again, the CEWARN is limited in coverage and lacks the capacity to monitor conflict indicators
across the region. IGAD resolutions also risk non-enforcement at the national level. Funding remains a major challenge to IGAD. Its activities are almost 100% donor-driven. It has also failed to resolve the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict which ultimately weakens its functions. For example, in the April 2007 Summit in Nairobi, Kenya, Eritrea suspended its membership blaming Ethiopia and the United States’ interference in Somalia for its action. Moreover, IGAD competes with the East African Community (EAC) for membership and attention. Through the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the region forms one of the props under AU’s ASF. There were debates, however, over the institutional home for the EASBRIG given the desire to include a wide number of countries outside the IGAD. The AU envisaged RECs as the anchors of the implementation of regional forces, but in East and Horn of Africa, no regional block incorporates all accepted members of EASBRIG. The East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and IGAD are competing for these functions in the region. But, neither the EAC nor COMESA possesses a mandate or structure directly related to peace and security. So, IGAD was mandated by AU to act as a REC Brigade under the APSA agreements, albeit on an interim basis in 2004 ((Khadiagala, 2008; Fisher et al., 2010).

2.7.3 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

The main regional bloc of Central Africa is the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECCAS was formed in 1983 as an amalgam of the Central African Customs and Economic Union and the defunct Economic Community of the Great Lakes States by 11-member states. Its main objectives include, among other things, to promote economic development, regional cooperation and establish a Common Market. Though it was purely an economic bloc, perennial conflicts in the
region forced ECCAS to establish an Early Warning Mechanism in 1996 (Juma and Mengistu, 2002; Fisher et al., 2010; Fomboh, 2011).

At an ECCAS meeting in Libreville, Gabon in 1997 to discuss the political crisis in DRC, a proposed collective security mechanism to prevent and manage regional conflicts was put forward. The aim was to establish a legal and institutional framework to promote and strengthen peace and security in the region. This resulted in the creation of the COPAX (Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l’Afrique Centrale) in 1999. The protocol establishing COPAX was officially adopted in 2000. Its Standing Orders were adopted in June 2002. COPAX performs a dual security mandate: first, to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Central Africa, and to undertake any action necessary to deal with political conflicts; and second, to promote, preserve and consolidate peace and security in the region (Juma and Mengistu, 2002; Meyer, 2011; Fisher et al., 2010). It has three main technical organs: 1). The Commission for Defence and Security (CDS), made up of Chiefs of Staff and Commanders-in-Chief of Police and Gendarmerie forces. It advises the Conference of Heads of State on security and defence matters and organisation of any joint military operations. 2). The Central African Early Warning System (MARAC): it gathers and evaluates data for the early detection and prevention of conflicts and crises. 3). The Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) - a non-permanent peace-support operation taskforce comprising contingents from member states for regional peacekeeping and peace-support operations (Meyer, 2011; Fisher et al, 2010).

The ECCAS Standby Force, FOMAC (the Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale), was also established in 2006 during the Yaoundé Summit under COPAX’s framework. It comprises national and multidimensional contingents from the member
states responsible for maintaining and undertaking peace, security and humanitarian missions. It can be authorized to deploy by ECCAS, the AU or UN, consistent with the subsidiarity principle that underpins ECCAS’ relationship with the two bodies (Fisher, et al., 2010). But, the FOMAC lacks any legal backing for its operations. The only binding legal framework governing FOMAC is a document known as *Catalo 2010 of the Units*, signed on February 28, 2008 in Libreville, Gabon. Under this arrangement, member states pledged to contribute a force consisting of 4,800 personnel and six airlift carriers. The Planning Element of the FOMAC was also established on July 2006 in Libreville, Gabon. ECCAS opted for a non-permanent Brigade headquarters and has not developed a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) yet. It must be noted that efforts to establish regional peace and security architecture reflects developments at the continental level (Meyer, 2011; Fisher et al., 2010).

In Central Africa, ECCAS is responsible for political and security cooperation. ECCAS lacks a comprehensive policy framework (notwithstanding the signing of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa), for ensuring regional peace and security. However, it played a commendable role in brokering the January 2013 Libreville Peace Agreement. Also, at an ECCAS summit in Chad, pressure was mounted on the new regime in CAR to hold elections within 18 months (Ibid). But several challenges confront ECCAS that hinder effective performance of its security mandates, including poor internal governance and weak finances, and over dependence on external financial assistance. It has failed to stabilise the threatening situation in the region. ECCAS is confronted with serious capacity gaps. A major reason for ECCAS weaknesses is member states pursuit of narrow national interests. This impedes any collective security arrangements. ECCAS members, for instance, do not agree on the relationship between ECCAS, COPAX and the MARAC. Some
states argue that since ECCAS is weak, the security mechanism should be an independent body, while others advocate for one that would exist within ECCAS institutions. The geopolitical and security environment in Central Africa also make it difficult for ECCAS to be institutionalized. Some member states have, instead of addressing it weaknesses, sought membership in alternative regional organizations. For instance, DRC is a member of SADC, and Burundi and Rwanda have also applied to join EAC. Thus, any efforts to revamp ECCAS will require resolving the multiple membership problem as well (Meyer, 2011; Fomboh, 2011; Marshal, 2015).

2.7.4 The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was established in 1996. SADC consists mainly of Troika of the Organ - the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security as the main decision-making arm. Troika of the Organ is supported by the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). Decisions by Troika of the Organ are forwarded to the Summit for final approval (Fisher et al., 2010; Adetula, 2015). The SADC standby force, SADCBRIG, was established in 2007 but remains incapable of any intervention (Fisher et al., 2010).

SADC’s regional collective security arrangement has undergone radical realignment since the demise of apartheid and South Africa joined it. Its treaty provides for the consolidation, defence and maintenance of democracy, peace, security and stability as its core mandates. SADC’s conflict management strategy is undertaken by the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDS), managed on a Troika basis by the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the relevant UN and AU protocols. The OPDS is the central peace and security scheme in the SADC region. Collectively, they are required to prevent, manage and resolve inter and intrastate conflicts by peaceful
means via preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, and mediation. The SADC Protocol stresses strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aggression. Under SIPO, mediation is a strategic activity not open to international partner funding (Adetula, 2015; Fisher et al., 2010).

The OPDS was established in 1996 in the expectation that it would become the institutional framework within which SADC countries would coordinate their political, defence and security policies and activities. However, disagreement among members over the interpretation of certain sections of the charter has inhibited OPDS operations. Yet SADC has recorded some success in political mediation in the Comoros, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the DRC. In the election-related conflicts in Madagascar and Zimbabwe, SADC mediation was guided by its Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (Adetula, 2015). With regards to the specific issue of militancy, SADC member states agreed to establish an anti-terrorism unit in December 2006, in Harare, Zimbabwe, based at the Interpol sub-regional Bureau; responsible for intelligence-sharing on militant groups. Member states will, on regular basis, submit reports to the centre which will be linked with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for timeous and effective course of action to be undertaken against militants in the region. Also, as part of AU’s APSA operationalization, the SADC Standby Force (SSF) was launched on August 17, 2007, in Lusaka, Zambia, with an initial military and police components; and subsequently a civilian component (Adetula, 2015; Fisher et al., 2010).

Southern Africa’s true regional security body has still not been created. Several issues hamper collective peace and security agenda among member states. The first major problem is the border disputes between Malawi and Tanzania. The Article 9 of
SADC’s Treaty provides for a community tribunal to adjudicate interstate disputes. The tribunal is however suspended, and in its absence a mediation process was instituted by the Forum of Former African Heads of State and Government, whose performance has not been very impressive. These poor performance indicators have not inspired much confidence in SADC’s ability to ensure peace and stability in the region. SADC is also deemed biased towards Zimbabwe. Further, SADC faces other constraints, including the absence of effective regional early warning system; lack of political will and courage; weakness of especially the OPDS secretariat, which is subordinate to the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of SADC, and thus cannot control member states; and funding challenges that impede mediation efforts. Moreover, while the SADC standby force is adequate for military operations, it is incapable of managing humanitarian crises (Adetula, 2015; Fisher et al., 2010).

2.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed relevant literature on major thematic issues about the subject-matter under scrutiny. The review unearths a number of major issues regarding militancy in Africa. The threats to peace, security and stability, and overall development by militant networks in Africa is substantial. Several common characteristics of African states make the situation even worst: conflicts, high rates of unemployment, corruption, and bad governance to mention but few. But, some countries and regions in Africa bear the brunt of militancy more than others due to their peculiar historical, socio-cultural, economic and geopolitical factors. The AU and [sub-] regional blocs have also made several security arrangements to address the threats of instability and insecurity across the continent. That notwithstanding, several constraints: geopolitics, funding, etc. continue to impede the operationalization of these respective continental and regional collective security schemes.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 FUNCTIONALISM, ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ECOWAS SECURITY SYSTEM

3.1 Introduction
This chapter covers the theoretical framework and research questions underpinning
the current study. The theory of functionalism is adopted and examined to explain
ECOWAS’ evolution from a simple regional economic bloc into a matured peace and
security community in the West African sub-region.

3.2 Functionalism, Evolution and Dynamism of the ECOWAS
The role ECOWAS plays in West African peace and security is highly contested by
the various paradigms of global politics. Among the core paradigms that explicate the
role of IOs such as ECOWAS in international peace and security are [Neo-] Realism,
[Neo-] Liberalism, and [Neo-] Functionalism (Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordtorm,
2004; Kaufman, 2013). This research adopted and examined pretty further, the
functionalist paradigm as its explanatory model. Functionalism is considered the most
elaborate and earliest attempt to explain IOs development and their normative
implications for international peace and security. It was originated by David Mitrany
(1933; 1966) but has since been massively reformed and employed in case studies by
several academics including Joseph Nye, Ernst Haas, J. P. Sewell, Paul Taylor, A. J.
R Groom, and the World Society theorists such as Christopher Mitchell and Michael
Banks. It provides lively explanations to IOs’ role in international peace and security

Mitrany (1966) and contemporary hard-core functionalists’ argument is premised on
the idea that a working peace system could only be created through a bottom-up
approach by encouraging a kind of cooperation which bypassed issues involving the
controversial realm of formal sovereignty, yet such a functional cooperation involving
soft non-controversial issues such as economic integration would gradually take on a more political character and eventually reduce the sovereignty of states. As Mitrany simply puts; “*form follows function and peace in parts*” (see Brown and Kristen, 2005). For functionalists, effective interstate cooperation would work through specific activities (*functions*) which are currently performed by states but would be performed more effectively by technical organizations. Again, the form such cooperation takes should be determined by the nature of the function in question: some functions can be performed by global institutions, others will be appropriate for regional or even local institutions. Sometimes the exchange of information is all that is required, in other cases power of decision may be vested with functional institutions (Pease, 2003; Brown and Kristen, 2005; Pease, 2003; Kaufmann, 2013).

Functionalists argues Bennett (1991; in Pease, 2003: 61), believe in the efficacy of a gradualist approach towards the creation of IOs with the attainment of political integration and collective security agenda by instalments. IOs are created because they are needed. The increase in transnational ties has led to integration and interdependence which in turn has led many societies to share common problems. Many of these problems can be managed only through international cooperation, necessitating the creation of specialized international agencies with technical expertise (Pease, 2003; Brown and Kristen, 2005). IOs are formed because they demand jurisdiction over pre-existing states. They recognise that state sovereignty is a well-entrenched principle in international relations. But they argue that cooperation in narrow, non-political issues - such as economic integration, may spill-over into larger, more politicised issues - such as peace and security. Cooperation in economic and social spheres leads to confidence building and trust which promotes cooperation in more, highly transformed issues. IOs socialize elites into recognizing that it is in their
states’ interest to join and participate in them [IOs]. When a cooperative behaviour becomes institutionalized, IOs can evolve into supranational organizations, and the authority of the states would be displaced incrementally by supranational institutions (Kaufman, 2013; Brown and Kristen, 2005; Pease, 2003).

Functionalists see collective security to be dependent on mutual gains of member states’ regional cooperation in policy arenas characterised by high levels of functional interdependence which has spill-over effects on more politicized policy contexts (Schimitter and Lefkofrida, 2016). Quoting the pioneering functional theorist, in his work, *A Working Peace System*, David Mitrany (1943) argued that international cooperation is the best way to soften antagonisms at the international scene. He observed further that effective collective peace system should result from a functional cooperation in response to global peace and security challenges. Consequently, he called for the establishment of functional agencies as the foster of international cooperation, mainly in technical and economic areas. He contended that, these functional bodies carry the potential to eventually bring member states governments into a solid network of interlocking cooperative agreements (see Adetula, 2015).

It must be noted that ECOWAS began as a functional economic bloc (albeit initial hostilities and suspicions between and or among member states), to enhance regional trade and economic development. However, ECOWAS has moved on from a simple functional economic bloc into a nascent peace and security community after the Cold War. Its subsequent arrangements in the 1993 Treaty and 1999 Mechanism give it a supranational posture making its security decisions more binding on member states; thus, arrogating to the ECOWAS, aspects of the cherished sovereign powers of countries in the region to ensure political stability, peace and security in West Africa.
This is clearly elaborated under its Vision 2020 document adopted in 2007 (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; Uzoechina, 2014; Elowson and McDermott, 2010).

However, the major criticism against functionalism in this context is that the decision processes involving political and security issues are more often than not driven by sovereign states as exemplified by the important position afforded the ECOWAS Authority instead of its main security organ, the Mediation and Security Council at the ECOWAS Commission. Thus, it can be argued that, the evolution of and decisions regarding ECOWAS’ peace and security reforms and operations have usually taken the form of intergovernmentalism, an intergovernmental bargain among member states (Brown and Kirstein, 2005; Moga, 2009). Also, neo-functionalists contest the ability of functionalism to explain the evolution of ECOWAS’ security system. Their argument is that ECOWAS’ integration resulted from a politically driven process other than the simplistic functionalists’ spill-over postulations where peace and security evolve from more economic and other technical issue areas. They argue that even within Europe, the functionalist model has not worked in any consistent way. The European integration has proceeded by stops and starts rather than as a smooth process of spill-over and the factors that have at different times restarted the process have not followed any obvious pattern. In other words, ECOWAS’ integration has taken place in ways and at speeds determined by the course of events and not in accordance with any particular abstract model (Sweet Stone, 2012; Hamad, 2016).

But it must be noted, intergovernmentalism better explains the mode of governance in the ECOWAS which is quite different from the explications regarding the overall evolution of the peace and security mandates of the ECOWAS and its concomitant mechanisms. Intergovernmentalism, thus, does more justice to the general integration
processes of the ECOWAS other than its security sector evolution. The neo-functionalist’s argument is likewise more fitting in the context of the entire ECOWAS body and other organs such as the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. However, with regards to the evolution of its security systems, functionalism fits well than any other paradigm. As a pure economic bloc, with no security whatsoever provisions, ECOWAS would, beginning from 1978, incorporate legal security instruments into its 1975 Founding Treaty to enable it gradually fashion more sophisticated collective security architecture. Starting with ECOMOG’s ad hoc peacekeeping missions, ECOWAS has now developed fairly strong institutional structures for a well-coordinated collective peace and defence operations across the region, and addresses all kinds of insecurity and instability problems, including militancy.

3.3 Research Questions
The overarching question underpinning this study is, to what extent has geopolitics in West Africa influenced the 2013 ECTS’ implementation?

The specific questions are as follows:

1. What path has ECOWAS’ security system’s evolution taken since 1978?
2. What are the main factors accounting for this evolutionary path?
3. To what extent has member states’ political posturing affected 2013 ECTS’ implementation?

3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter covered the theory and questions underpinning the study. Functionalism was adopted and discussed as the theoretical model to account for the emergence and evolution of ECOWAS’ security system. It largely provides fitting explanations, albeit some notable limitations, to ECOWAS’ peace and defence scheme.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 CASE STUDY RESEARCH

4.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodology: i.e. strategies adopted to conduct this study.

The major issues discussed in this section will include research design, sampling technique, data collection methods and instruments, as well as the rationale, ethics, data analysis technique, justification and limitations of the current case study.

4.2 The Diachronic Research Methodology
A research methodology provides the necessary steps for answering the research questions. It comprises the paradigm, rules, methods, and blueprints for an inquiry to enable systematic analysis, critique, and replication of findings. It is often used interchangeably with research methods, but methods are typically the tools and techniques for data collection and must necessarily derive from and relate to the overall assumptions of the methodology used (William, 2017; Mayring, 2014).

The study adopted a diachronic research methodology to give a chronological and historical account of the evolution of the ECOWAS security sector. The concept, diachronic, connotes a disposition of something across time. A diachronic methodology is historical, and sensitive to evolutionary processes and mutability of an event. It compares the past and present state of a phenomenon. This concept was first used by the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure in 1916. A diachronic methodology is suitable for analysing processes of change over a period of time. As Boas observed, even outstanding cross-cultural similarities such as widespread geometrical decisions are probably developed in a unique manner. Thus, reconstructing the process by which an event has evolved is essential. Diachronic study traces the historical development of a phenomenon from its initial known form
to the context under consideration (Chrisomalis, 2006). A diachronic methodology enables the researcher to trace the historical origin and evolution of ECOWAS’ security system. It is useful for historical, sociological, ethnographical and philosophical studies. It is often contrasted with synchronic methodology, which examines an event within a temporal context. A diachronic approach puts much premium on historical development phases, explores underlying meanings, and puts high premium on tracing the etymology of a phenomenon. A diachronic methodology is crucial for conducting enquiries across time by mapping subject, structures and changes of an event over time (Decker, 2003; Deo, 2015).

4.3 The [Qualitative] Case Study Design
Creswell (2009:3) contends that “research designs are plans and procedures for conducting a research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis”. It constitutes the blueprint underlying an inquiry. He identified three main design types; qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. Qualitative and quantitative studies are distinguished by using: words rather than numbers, or open-ended questions rather than close-ended questions respectively. A quantitative study lays emphasis on numbers, or quantifiable variables; whiles qualitative studies are exploratory and descriptive in nature. But mixed design is an amalgam of features of both (Morgan, 2013; Cresswell, 2009).

This study adopted a qualitative approach to enable a detailed investigation of the phenomenon scrutinized. As social scientists find it extremely difficult to study human behaviour in quantifiable terms, the qualitative design has become the common approach to grasp how things work in their naturalistic settings. Qualitative inquiry enhances the ability to provide complex experiential accounts of individuals about a particular phenomenon (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Cresswell, 2009). A qualitative
design, therefore, allows a researcher to thoroughly explore important issues using flexible methods and approach to gather in-depth data about a phenomenon. It comes in different forms e.g. ethnographic study, and case study. The choice of a qualitative approach is driven largely by the nature of phenomenon explored and purpose the study seeks to achieve.

This study employs the Qualitative Case Study Research Design to enable an in-depth exploration and description of the phenomenon scrutinized (Hancock and Algozzine, 2006). A case study involves a comprehensive examination of a case associated with a general phenomenon in its specific context. A case may include a person, an organization, or a country, and connotes spatially enclosed phenomenon (a unit) observed at a point in time or over a period. It must necessarily comprise the type of phenomenon that can clearly be described or explained. It is an intensive study of a single case or a small unit of cases that can shed light on a larger phenomenon. A case study is spot-on for studying phenomena that are less explored. Case studies are holistic, empirical, interpretive and emphatic (Chevyer, 2013; Yin, 2014).

Case study has several advantages over other research designs. A case study data is often conducted within its natural setting. It enables detailed exploration and description of data, and accounts for the complexities of meaning involved. It can use a variety of evidence: e.g. documentation, artefacts, interviews, and observations in a single study. A case study may use a multiple or single source of information. A single information source provides a holistic overview of the phenomenon; but multiple sources enable a triangulation (Starman, 2013: 36; Neak, Thepa and Boyce, 2006). But, case study research confronts a number of limitations. It lacks rigorous analytical impetus, as it usually uses a small number of cases. Consequently, it provides very
limited grounds for generalization of findings. Also, it often involves long documents or documentation labelling and description processes, thus making it difficult to conduct (Ibid). However, the parameter established, and subjective settings of social research are more important in case study than relying on huge volume of sample (Homel et al., 1993; Yin, 1994; cited in Zainal, 2007).

4.4 Research Population, Sample and Sampling Technique
A research population refers to the entire set of cases from which a sample is drawn (Wilson, 2010). The study targeted security and international relations experts, including academics, analysts, diplomats, and security officials. A total of 12 respondents were purposively sampled from the following organizations - Department of Political Science, University of Ghana (3); Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) (3); West Africa Network for Peace (WANEPE) (2); Ghana Armed Forces Staff and Command College (GAFSCC) (1); and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) (3) (see Appendix 2 for the details). The respondents were engaged in a short face-to-face interview session. Two main justifications for the choice of 12 respondents: first, information power i.e. knowledgeableness of the individuals engaged about the subject-matter, and second, information saturation (the point at which respondents’ answers to questions asked began to converge). (see Hancock and Algozzine, 2006).

4.5 Data Sources and Data Collection Tools
Data for case studies are generated from multiple sources, including documentation, archival records, interviews, participant observation and physical artefacts (Zucker, 2009). The study used both primary and secondary data. The primary data was sourced from official ECOWAS documents (treaties, protocols, conventions etc.). Also, security and international relations experts were engaged in a face-to-face interview
session. The secondary data are derived from relevant published and electronic sources: books, journals articles, and news items.

4.5.1 The [Qualitative] Interview Technique
Interviews are commonly used tools for data collection in qualitative research. They range through a continuum: structured, semi-structured, to unstructured. Qualitative approaches usually use semi-structured and or unstructured interviews because a strictly structured interview may not allow in-depth exploration of a social phenomenon. In-depth qualitative interviews are critical for collecting data regarding histories, perspectives, and experiences about an entity especially where sensitive topics are explored. They enable interviewees describe their experiences with respect to events under consideration. Qualitative interviews come with certain basic common features: they are conversational, often done in face-to-face settings, and involve a theme, topic, biography or narrative hook about what an interviewer seeks to achieve (Hancock and Algozzine, 2006; Edwards and Holland, 2013).

This study used a semi-structured interview technique. According to Hancock, Windridge and Ockleford (2007:16) semi-structured interviews involve “a number of open-ended questions based on [what issues] the researcher [seeks] to cover [such that] the questions posed define the topic under investigation and provides opportunities for both interviewer and interviewees to discuss some topics in more detail”. The choice of semi-structured interview technique is justified in that it enables the interviewer to delve into the core of the phenomenon under scrutiny, and guide interviewees to provide the relevant information required. Semi-structured interviews work well when the interviewer has already identified aspects to address. The interviewer can decide in advance what areas to cover and at the same time be open and receptive to unexpected information from the interviewees. It is relevant on
accounts of time limitation and where an interviewer wants to make sure the major issues are well covered. But semi-structured interviews can be time-consuming, difficult to analyze and generalize, and above all, difficult for reliability and validity testing. However, validity in qualitative study must not be confused with that of quantitative, since it is based on accuracy of information from the standpoint of the participants. The challenge of validity and reliability can be curbed by acceptance of biases, discrepant information, peer debriefing, and external auditing. Reliability can be addressed by setting up a detailed protocol (Creswell, 2009:190).

4.5.2 An Interview Guide (Protocol)
Interview guides have proven to be useful instruments for qualitative interviews. An interview guide consists of a list of questions, topics, and issues a researcher intends to cover in an interview (Kajornboon, n.d.: 3). The questions should be crafted in such a way as to avoid ambiguities. The study used interview guide to aid in the interviewing process. The questions were prepared to cover thematic issues the study explored to obtain the needful information. Again, questions were pre-tested and modified to suit the expertise of each respondent and captured major problems likely to be encountered during the data instrumentation process. Digital voice recorders, diaries and pens were used for easy gathering and safekeeping of data sourced.

4.6 Data Analysis
In qualitative research, the exactitude of texts or wording of statements is crucial and plays significant role in preparation and presentation of findings (Kuckartz, 2013). Again, due to the quantum of data involved, effective and efficient management is critical (Creswell, 2009). A researcher has to plan well about how best to use the information sourced in order to draw reasoned conclusions. The data analysis phase involves summarizing and organising data such that it answers the research questions
(Kothari, 2004). This study utilized the Qualitative Content Analysis technique. It helps to organize and draw meanings from texts to arrive at valid conclusions (Bengtsson, 2016). The concept was in use early enough in the twentieth century but did not appear in formal writing until the 1940s. At its onset, content analysis was predominantly quantitative. However, over time, researchers began to regularly apply qualitatively (see Graneheim and Lundman, 2004; Hashemneshad, 2015). For Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1279) qualitative content analysis is “a … method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identification of themes or patterns”. It enables a researcher to systematically and objectively identify specified characteristics within texts to make replicable and valid inferences. The focus of qualitative content analysis is to attain accurate, credible and trustworthy results (Hancock, 2002; Givens, 2008; Mayring, 2014; Bengtsson, 2016). As part of the analysis, the data sourced were categorized under clear and well-defined themes and sub-themes for effective and efficient use. The interviewees’ conversations were transcribed and content analyzed and interpreted to tease out their actual contextual meanings and juxtaposed against the stated thematic areas. This ensured coherency and chronological flow of thoughts and reasoning. Again, the text data extracted were critically scrutinized in order to avoid distortions of original meanings and biases and to ensure accuracy of the results. Nonetheless, various digressions from the data were distilled, leaving the information that conformed to the study objectives.

4.7 Justifications for the Current (Case) Study
Bryman and Bell (2007) have identified three circumstances under which case study becomes best choice research method: representativeness, extreme case, and information accessibility (Chevyer, 2013). The current case study is justified on
several grounds. First, access to relevant data on the ECOWAS security sector are easy and cheaper. One’s ability to engage the experts whose fine views are pertinent for completing the study is also quite easy. This makes a strong case for data accessibility. Second, ECOWAS represents a best-case scenario for regional blocs in Africa with comprehensive mechanisms and enough experience and competence for peace and defence missions. Third and finally, the region represents a worst-case scenario with regards to non-implementation of security measures and militant attacks, albeit ECOWAS’ current status as a matured security community in Africa (Adetula, 2015; Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014).

4.8 Ethical Considerations
Ethical considerations are pertinent in all inquiries. Creswell (2009) suggests that issues of ethics must be considered prior to, and throughout the study phases. Interviewees were fully informed about the scope and purpose of the study. Respondents’ permission was sought, and interview guides provided in advance before the actual interview sessions. The confidentiality of all respondents were strictly upheld. Moreover, opinions and statements expressed by the interviewees were not suppressed nor quotations and evidence falsified or invented. Extra caution was also taken to avoid narrative appropriation, abuse of intellectual property; and dishonest interpretation of texts to serve any preconceived aim.

4.9 Research Limitations
The major limitation to this study is that the researcher is unable to easily generalize the findings across similar phenomena in other jurisdictions. As characteristic of all case studies, the current study explores the case in point for in-depth understanding of what pertains to ECOWAS and West Africa. The researcher also faced a little challenge in timely reaching the interviewees and thus, affected the scheduled timeline
for completion of the study. But, generally, the current case study offers relevant
lessons for addressing the root causes of insecurity in general, and militancy, across
West Africa and beyond.

4.10 Delimitation (or Organization) of the Study
This study is organized into seven chapters: Chapter One captures the introduction;
Chapter Two consists of the literature review, Chapter Three examines the theoretical
framework; Chapter Four outlines the research methodology; Chapters Five and Six
constitute the analysis and discussion of findings respectively; and finally, Chapter
Seven constitutes the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

4.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented an overview of the research methodology and methods adopted
for the current study. Issues considered include the diachronic research methodology,
qualitative (case study) research design; and sources, tools and methods for data
collection and analysis. Moreover, the research population, sampling technique and
sample size, research ethics, limitations, and organization were duly captured.
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 THE ECOWAS SECURITY SYSTEM, FORTY YEARS ON (1978 - 2018): ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS

5.1 Introduction
This chapter constitutes presentation and analysis of the major findings. The findings draw on data sourced from the face-to-face interviews conducted over a period of four months (February 2018 to May 2018), and documentary evidence sourced from ECOWAS’ official online archives, as well as published works by seasoned academics. The analysis was classified into five main themes (with a number of sub-themes) derived from the research questions and objectives. Also, where necessary, excerpts were cited as illustrations to buttress major issues this study raised.

5.2 The Trajectory of ECOWAS’ Security System Evolution
A combination of factors continues to undermine development efforts in West Africa. Since independence, member states have experienced complex and costly political, economic and security crises with deleterious impacts on the region’s progress. Beginning as a pure economic bloc, ECOWAS would gradually assume regional political and security mandate by default, as in the case of EU’s evolution (Kabia, 2011:1), to address the myriads of security dilemmas the region confronts. This section examines Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics on the emergence, evolution and institutionalization of collective security scheme in West Africa.

5.2.1 Cold War Dynamics and Collective Security in West Africa
When ECOWAS was formed in 1975, the Cold War was still raging. The kind and nature of international politics then defined the approach to security-related matters worldwide. The East-West divide defined the international political economy. The two blocs were engulfed in scramble for allies across the globe to equipoise each other. Each of the two blocs was shaped by and propagating opposing ideologies. The United
States and its Western allies championed [neo] liberal ideals, whiles the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies projected socialism. The global political economy was oriented towards either capitalism or communism. Thus, the world system was divided along these two camps (Field Interview, 2018; Elowson and McDermott, 2010).

Furthermore, there was a proliferation of defence pacts and military bases in the territories of allied countries to deter aggression and protect their national interests. Moreover, the two hegemons engaged in identity politics in various countries and regions across the globe. For example, there were instances where, within a country or region, both the United States and Soviet Union established opposing camps pitched against each other and given supports to overthrow legitimate regimes that did not support them. This kind of identity politics within a country or region fuelled inter- and intrastate conflicts. One interviewee expressed this view succinctly: “While the two hegemons avoided direct arm confrontations, they were brought into proxy wars by either supplying military hardware, funds, or personnel to defend their interests in allied territories” (Field Interview, 2018).

This power display adversely affected the role and effectiveness of the UN to prevent and or manage most of the wars fought in the Cold War era. The veto power-wielding countries used their positions in the Security Council as extension of their ideological warfare. This hampered and often delayed the UN’s attempts to engage in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions as funding and military contributions among others were often withheld by member states depending on what issue was on the front burner and which region or country was affected (see Aning, 1999; Ebo, 2007; Arthur, 2010). This era also witnessed the use of oil as a weapon by the Arab League against the West due to their support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli war which,
in the words of one interviewee resulted in “a quadrupling of oil prices and economic hardships worldwide in the 1970s and 1980s” (Field Interview, 2018).

At the continental level, African countries were rhetorically non-aligned though, they were practically aligned either to the East or West. The imperial powers could also use opposing parties to a regime or ethnic factions to capture power in order to secure their interests. The rift between Patrice Lumumba and Mobutu Sessessekou in the DRC is a quintessential case in point (Frempong, 1999; Aning, 1999; Okolo, 1987).

Again, development assistance to African countries was not based on good governance, democracy or human rights credentials, rather regimes in Africa had to commit to championing the interests of either of the two blocs (see Frempong, 2012). So, in the Cold War era, the craze for allies to wage ideological warfare informed both blocs’ decision to give development assistance. A government’s human rights, good governance or corruption and democratic credentials did not matter at all. What mattered most was for the African leaders to appear promoting either bloc’s interests.

At this era, it must be noted, almost all African countries were under either a one-party civilian rule or a military autocratic regime with damning human rights, and corruption records. At the OAU level, there was a clear desire by the autocratic African leaders to safeguard their regimes’ interests at the expense of the welfare of the citizenry (Field Interview, 2018; Elowson and McDermott, 2010).

As would be expected, the OAU was used to promote regime protection. The OAU Charter’s principle of sovereign equality, non-interference with internal affairs and respect for the independence of member states made it very difficult, if not impossible to intervene to stop violation of minority rights, annihilation of civilians and humanitarian crisis. With regards to the issues of political freedoms, human rights,
rule of law, constitutional democracy and or coup d’ tats, the OAU Charter did not make any reference to them. This, perhaps, is because OAU’s prime aim during its formation in 1963 was to fight for self-determination and protect the interest of regimes in Africa. It is its progeny, AU’s Constitutive Act that made significant changes to meet the emerging realities (Juma and Mengistu, 2002; Kode, 2016). Summarily, the imperial protection of autocratic regimes of the power-drunk African leaders brought about clientelism, nepotism, and corruption. This, coupled with the global economic crunch, resulted in marginalization, repression, coup d’ tats, and identity conflicts. The Rwandese genocidal experience is a quintessential case in point (see Uzoechina, 2014; Ebo, 2007; Frempong, 1999).

At the regional level, West Africa had its own version of the hegemonic struggle, in the form of Anglophone-Francophone divide, most notably between Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Besides, the imperial powers kept their influence in the region alive. For example, in order to keep its interest and influence in its former colonies, France instigated a hostility between the two blocs (Zagaris, 1983; Frempong, 1999). The available evidence suggests that France even went to the extent of supporting rebels against the Nigerian government during the Biafra war and used Nigeria’s French neighbours’ territories to fly material support to the rebels (Ibid). Furthermore, interstate rivalry, especially confrontations over border disputes was commonplace in West Africa. Mercenaries attacks, subversive acts and coup d’ tats were very rampant in the region. Marginalization and ethnic strife were also common among ECOWAS member states. For instance, Portuguese mercenaries attempted to invade Guinea in 1990, and Benin in 1977 (Kabia, 2011: 5; Aning, 1999). In order to amicably overcome these security dilemmas, and avoid full-blown interstate conflicts, security regime arrangements were made by the ECOWAS.
5.2.2 Cold War Security Initiatives in West Africa

As alluded to above, the 1978 Non-Aggression Protocol (NAP) and the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) were adopted and incorporated into the 1975 ECOWAS treaty in order to amiably resolve disputes among member states and address the various security challenges the region was experiencing during the Cold War. These two mechanisms became the legal regime for ECOMOG’s missions in 1990s. Again, they constituted the first collective security scheme in West Africa and marked the origin of ECOWAS’ security scheme (Aning, 1999). The NAP was intended to rid the region of external aggression and to allow for peaceable co-existence and resolution of disputes (NAP Article 5). The PMAD was intended to address the shortcomings and improve upon the provisions in the NAP and expanded the scope of regional peace and security scheme in West Africa. The PMAD was designed to address three main issues: aggression from a non-member state; conflict between member states; and conflict within any member state sustained from the outside. Normatively, it provided the necessary institutional mechanisms to operationalize the provisions therein, including the Defence Council, Defence Committee, and the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). The AAFC was to serve as the standby fore of the community (PMAD Articles 3 and 4; see also Frempong, 1999; Elowson and McDermott, 2010).

However, it is important to note that even though the earlier security regime encouraged peaceful and collective resolution of disputes and conflicts in the region, there were several limitations that it had to confront. First, it focused mainly on external aggression and interstate conflicts to the total neglect of coup d’ tats and purely internal conflicts with larger implications for regional stability. Second, it was a state protection instrument meant to safeguard the leaders’ interests. Third, it did not
consider civil society, humanitarian crisis, and conflict prevention concerns, and failed to clearly outline the requisite measures required in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building. Fourth, the first regime’s provisions were never put to any significant test until the 1990s after the demise of the Cold War. None of the various institutions outlined by the PMAD, including the AAFC was operationalized. These issues were much pronounced in the 1990s following the implosion of intractable civil wars in the region, most notably Liberia (Aning, 1999; Frempong, 1999). It must be said that many attributes this situation to the kind of Cold War politics among countries in the region. First of all, to a very large extent, the Francophonese were suspicious of Nigeria’s regional hegemonic ambition. Again, the Francophonese had a rival security mechanism, the Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matier de Defence (ANAD) signed in 1977 after the Malian-Burkinabé border disputes. Unlike the PMAD, the ANAD was fully operationalized. It was the 1989 Liberian conflict that forced ECOWAS to activate the provisions therein the PMAD, albeit on ad hoc basis (see Kabia, 2011: 3).

5.2.3 Post-Cold War Dynamics and the ECOWAS Security System
The Cold War’s demise significantly changed the fundamentals of the international system and international politics. The new global order made the role of both state and non-state actors very pronounced. The Cold War’s demise in 1989 resulted in the globalization of liberal political and economic ideals. Sovereignty was closely challenged. The nature and sources of conflict and insecurity also changed. In the 1990s, whiles interstate conflict significantly reduced, intrastate conflicts dramatically increased. The implosion of intractable civil conflicts and associated deleterious consequences such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass killing and crime against humanity was gaining traction worldwide. But, the international community’s efforts
to address these concerns were also limited by the principles of non-interference and respect for states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity (Atuobi, 2009; Arthur, 2010).

In order to avoid crimes against humanity, in the course of the last decade of the 20th Century, new approach to international security began to emerge. The concept of security also changed from state security to human security. Following a crass massacre of people across the globe, the UN proposed a new approach to international conflict management in the 1990s. In 1992, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, published his Agenda for Peace report. In this document, among other things, he proposed new approaches to conflict management, including building regional and sub-regional economic communities’ capacity to augment UN’s efforts in resolving regional conflicts. Non-state actors, such as NGOs and civil society organizations also began to play active role in conflict resolution (see Hussein, Gnisic and Wanjiru, 2004; Uzoechina, 2014). Further, the document also paid attention to human security. The concept of human security marked a departure from traditional security approach that focused on state protection to focus on humanitarian concerns. The damning humanitarian crisis in the 1990s associated with intractable civil wars informed the UN to promote multilateral intervention in internal conflicts to safeguard lives. The 1994 UNDP report represents the most comprehensive attempt at a holistic definition of human security. It captured, among other things, economic security, food security, and human rights as some of the key issues that could warrant the international community’s intervention in member states’ internal affairs (Ibid).

But, as the last decade of the 20th Century ended, the beginning of the 21st Century ushered into the international scene, a new source of threats to global security. The skyrocketed globalization of all facets of life and the concomitant advancement in
technology as well as proliferation of sophisticated weapons resulted in the globalization of crimes. This brought about a shadow third force, trans-border non-state armed groups that have kept tormenting civilians and challenging national authorities across the globe. So, for instance, since the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks in the US, there has been a rising insecurity in the international system fomented by radical non-state actors with serious global security implications (see Haysom, 2014; Adetula, 2015; ICG, 2016; GTI, 2016).

As dynamism and nature of conflict started changing, the international community also began to evolve to address these emerging security dilemmas. Some notable efforts to addressing old and new threats to global security, including transnational organized crimes such as militancy were taken since the beginning of the 21st Century. One major step in this direction is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept. The R2P concept aims to addressing the damning incidents of genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and crimes against humanity. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was formed in 2000 to address limitations sovereignty puts on humanitarian intervention. The ICISS’ comprehensive work on the R2P concept was captured in its December 2001 report, which was officially adopted by the UN in 2005 (WANEP, 2006; Atuobi, 2009; Arthur, 2010).

The R2P concept aims to promote a shared-responsibility by sovereign states and the international community. Three major obligations are outlined under the R2P document: 1) the protection responsibility of sovereign states; 2) the responsibility of the international community (e.g. UN and ECOWAS) to build member states’ capacity to enable them to perform their protection duty; and 3) encouraging the international community to intervene collectively when national authorities fail or are
inundated to perform their protection role. The R2P concept discourages states from masquerading under sovereignty to terrorise their citizens. More importantly, it brings internal affairs of individual states under scrutiny by the international community. In 2009, the comprehensive R2P framework was adopted by the UN Secretary-General’s annual report to serve as a guide for worldwide security sector reforms (Ibid).

At the continental level, the Cold War’s demise exposed the weaknesses of regional and national security systems built on imperial protection of loyal countries in Africa. There was an upsurge in intractable civil wars in the continent. As the Big Powers abandoned Africa, and UN failed to timely intervene to calm the situation, several major political and security reforms were subsequently made in Africa in order to meet the changing global trends and security quandary in the continent (see Hussein, Gnisci and Wanjiru, 2004). For example, the OAU began to make concessions to its earlier political and security position especially with regards to sovereignty, intervention and territorial integrity, human rights, rule of law, good governance and democracy. In 1991 the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSDCA) was held in Kampala, Uganda which culminated in the 2006 Solemn Declaration of a Common Defence and Security Policy in Africa as a major security reforms attempt (see Sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2). The AU finalized its general Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform in Africa in April 2012 upon extensive consultations with member states, civil society and security experts. It was formally adopted by the AU’s Assembly in January 2013 (Ebo, 2007; Adetula, 2015).

In West Africa, both exogenous and endogenous factors seriously affected the region both negatively and positively after the Cold War’s demise. In the 1990s, pressure began to mount on all governments in the region, which were either under a one party
civilian autocratic rule or military dictatorship, to return their countries to multiparty democracy (see Frempong, 2012). People also began demanding for accountability, human rights, civil society and press freedom. So, in the 1990s, most, if not all the West African countries began constitutional democracy of a sort. The period saw many hard-core authoritarian regimes crumbled. The various authoritarian regimes had to appreciate the new dawn of desire and drive for multiparty democracy by the masses in the region (Frempong, 1999; 2008; 2012; Elowson and McDermott, 2010).

It must be noted, however, that the initial agitation for multiparty democracy was resisted by the various regimes’ leaderships and sympathisers. Also, the new struggle for multiparty democracy and the flawed foundation on which it was built often resulted in incessant implosion of civil wars across the region. Coup d’ tat and counter coup was also commonplace. There is no gainsaying that multiparty elections still constitute a major source of insecurity and political instability in West Africa. The gush in militant groups in the region can also be attributed to political vigilantism and violence, corruption, marginalization, injustices, and elites capture. The crisis led to the souring of refugees and IDPs across the region. The humanitarian situation within some member states and associated national and regional security among other implications forced ECOWAS to intervene to resolve these conflicts (Ibid).

It is important to note that ECOWAS’ interventions in the 1990s were informed by the refusal of the Big Powers, the delay of the UN, and the OAU’s inability to help resolve the crisis across the region. Therefore, West Africa was let alone to solve its own security problems. This would force ECOWAS to prepare its own intervention under the PMAD, albeit on ad hoc basis. In May 1990, a five-member (Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Togo) Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was formed.
to mediate conflicts in the region and to resolve the Liberian crisis. ECOMOG was also formed in August 1990 to undertake peacekeeping and enforcement missions in West Africa. However, the interventions exposed several legal, political, and military among other concerns in West Africa. First, ECOMOG’s intervention had no legal basis with regards to the intrastate conflicts in the 1990s. Further, any multilateral intervention required the UN Security Council’s approval, but ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia rather got approval after ECOMOG peacekeepers had already intervene. More so, as one of the interviewees observed, “…an invitation from the governments of the affected states was required before any intervention could take place” due to the non-intervention principle [emphasis added] (Field Interview, 2018). The Francophone-Anglophone divide also adversely affected ECOMOG’s operations in the 1990s. While the major Anglophone countries, such as Nigeria supported collective military intervention, the Francophonese rejected same. This explains why earlier discussions to deploy the ECOMOG peacekeeping force to Liberia became so acrimonious. The legal basis for the intervention was challenged and resisted. Finally, ECOMOG’s earlier interventions faced serious coordination problems. Also, alleged human rights abuses, looting, and sexual abuses were perpetrated by ECOMOG peacekeepers (Frempong, 1999; Kabia, 2011; ICG, 2016).

These limitations, setbacks and lessons from ECOMOG’s ad hoc missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau between 1990 and 1999, the fast-changing international system and emerging trends in [West] Africa prompted major reforms and innovations in order to enhance political, economic and security governance in the region. The subsequent reforms, it must be said, were attempts to [w]right the wrongs and perhaps, marks a new dawn of belief in deeper regional integration and
solidarity among member states (Kabia, 2011; Suifon, n.d.; ICG, 2016). Few of these initiatives are outline in the subsequent section.

5.2.4 ECOWAS’ Post-Cold War Security System Reform Initiatives

Post-Cold War dynamics continue to impact on security situations in West Africa. Since the last decade of the 20th Century, the changing international system and events in the region have compelled the ECOWAS leadership to deepen regional integration and strengthen collective security measures in order to overcome the security dilemmas in the region and to enhance economic growth and development (Kabia, 2011). For instance, in July 1993, the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty was revised to meet the emerging realities in the region (1993 Revised Treaty’s Preamble, Paragraph 13). The Revised Treaty provides a strong basis for collective peace and security in the region. It also sought to transform ECOWAS into a supra-state organization with expanded regional security role. The Article 4 (e) encourages member states to affirm and adhere to the maintenance of regional peace, security and stability through good neighbourliness. Article 58 makes provisions for ECOWAS regional security role and empowers it to establish a comprehensive peace and defence system. More so, it provides for the establishment and strengthening of relevant mechanisms to prevent and reduce inter and intrastate conflicts, and trans-border crimes (1993 Revised Treaty, Article 58 (2); Adetula, Berekeab and Jaiyebo, 2016).

As part of the transformation processes, in 2007, the ECOWAS Vision 2020 Document was adopted, which aims to create, by 2020, “…a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance…” (ECOWAS Vision 2020: 1). To this end, the ECOWAS secretariat was transformed into a commission headed by a president, assisted by vice president in 2008. By 2013, the number of Commissioners had increased to 15 to head the various departments within the
ECOWAS Commission. Again, the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) was created to concentrate on all regional political and security decisions. Also, ECOWAS’ legal regime has significantly been improved. Today, laws in the region are made through Supplementary Acts, Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations, and Opinions. Acts are made by the Authority, while the Council of Ministers enacts Regulations and Directives and makes Decisions and Recommendations. Moreover, by virtue of its supranational status, regulations and other decisions of the ECOWAS are directly applicable and enforceable in member states. Currently, under Vision 2020, the region aims to replace ECOWAS of States with ECOWAS of people, prioritise human security over state security, and supranationality over sovereignty (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a: 15).

The adoption in December 1999, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (the Mechanism) marks the first ever landmark security system reform and innovation in the region. It serves as the main legal instrument and institutionalizes peace and defence operations in the region. The Mechanism is anchored on preventive diplomacy and seeks to address vulnerabilities engrained in the region that foment insecurity and instability. It features several administrative and operational structures, including, among other things, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), Defence and Security Commission, and a standby force with both military, police and civilian components. More so, the Mechanism enhances cooperation among member states with regards to early warning, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, cross-border crimes, and trafficking of small arms and narcotics (see Bossuyt, 2016; Elowson and McDermott, 2010). But its operationalization continues to confront several constraints - technical, financial, and logistical (Elowson and McDermott, 2010; Uzoechina, 2014; Adetula, Bereketeab
and Jaiyebo, 2016). Again, beyond declaration of intents, the mechanism did not give reasonable measures on how to address certain political, peace and security issues such as democratic governance, cross-border crimes and militancy. Thus, several reforms and innovations have further been undertaken to address both recurrent and emerging insecurity and instability problems West Africa confronts (Ibid).

In December 2001, a second milestone reform or innovation was undertaken, the promulgation of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security to provide normative substance to the preventive measures stipulated in the Mechanism. It is an improved version of the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles, and it is meant to address those push and pull factors, including governance failures that often trigger political violence in the region. The protocol establishes a set of democratic constitutional principles, including separation of powers, conduct of free fair and transparent participatory elections, civil control of the security forces, civil society and freedom of the mass media, and abhorrence of unconstitutional change of government or maintenance of power. This protocol gives ECOWAS power and authority to sanction member states who undermine the provisions outlined therein (Bossuyt, 2016; Kode, 2016).

Again, in 2006, the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials was signed in Abuja, Nigeria to regulate the transfer of small arms and light weapons in the region. The incessant conflicts in the 1990s resulted in influx of small arms and light weapons across the region recycled in recurring wars or other domestic and trans-border crimes such as militancy. The Convention is an improved version of the 1998 Moratorium on Small Arms and Light
Weapons. As one expert interviewed noted: “... enforcement of provisions in this convention is still relevant because these weapons, if not properly controlled, can easily fall in the hands of militants who will use it against the ordinary person (Field Interview, 2018; see Aning, Birikorang and Jaye, 2010).

To provide a common framework for security sector reforms in the region, in January 2008 the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) adopted the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) to refine and effectively implement provisions in the 1999 Mechanism and 2001 Protocol. The ECPF consists of 15 components and it is anchored on both operational and structural conflict prevention concepts and features human security and the R2P principles (see ECPF Articles 21, 28 and 41; ICG, 2016). Nevertheless, the ECPF largely remains good intentions on paper or advice. Almost a decade after its approval, the ECPF’s usefulness is dogged by [the] non-implementation syndrome of the ECOWAS Community.

Moreover, in 2000, the Inter-Governmental Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) was created to assists respective national units combating money laundering. GIABA is headquartered in Dakar, Senegal. Its mandate was expanded in 2006 to include prevention and combating of militant groups’ funding (see ICG, 2016: 8). With specific regards to militancy, in 2013, following the rising spate of militant threats in the region, the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy was adopted to address the situation. Arguably, ECOWAS’ peace and security system has dramatically evolved from a body of ad hoc institutions in conflict resolution into a robust and matured security community with strong institutional and operational structures, albeit some weaknesses. Normatively, it has the capacity to address all kinds of security problems, including militancy in the West African sub-region.
5.3 Review of Collective Security Schemes in West Africa
This section assessed (comparatively: past and present) the improvement in ECOWAS’ security system vis-à-vis collective peace and defence operations in the region. The analysis is carried out across a few areas: the scope of legal frameworks, institutional structures, democratic standards, good governance, human security and civil society participation, and funding capacity.

5.3.1 Legal Scope or Environment
When ECOMOG intervened in the intrastate wars in the 1990s, the region’s security instrument lacked the legal jurisdiction over the situation. The earlier security regime concentrated on state security and thus, concerned itself with interstate conflicts, and aggression from external parties. Internal security challenges such as civil wars, coup d’états were the preserve of the individual states. They only warrant intervention when credible information available shows that there is an external instigator. The question about legality of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia and subsequent missions undermined its credibility and operational success. For example, ECOMOG’s mission in Liberia was dispatched several weeks before it received the Authority’s approval. However, following the damning humanitarian crisis in the 1990s, lessons from the ECOMOG’s interventions, and subsequent international trends, ECOWAS has expanded the legal scope of its collective security scheme. Currently, there are few regional instruments that can be invoked to intervene in any member state where there is political or security crisis. The 1999 Mechanism serve as the main legal instrument for regional peace and security. Unlike the past regime (NAP and PMAD), currently, ECOWAS’ security system has a broader scope of conflict prevention and management. It addresses inter- and intrastate challenges, cross-border crimes among
others. The 1999 Mechanism, 2008 ECPF, 2001 Democracy and Good Governance protocol, ECTS, etc. offer ECOWAS a broader legal room to operate.

5.3.2 Institutions and Institutionalization of Collective Security
Currently, collective security in West Africa has been institutionalized under the new regime. ECOWAS’ current security system boasts of both administrative and operational institutional structures, organs and defined areas of cooperation among member states. The system allows ECOWAS to formulate and implement end-to-end hostilities management and peacebuilding strategies (ICG, 2016: 5), including observation and early warning system, conflict prevention, mediation and conciliation activities to facilitate conflict management and resolution in the region.

Administratively, the Office of the Commissioner for PAPS is responsible for all peace and security issues and oversee the ECOWARN Centre. The main decision-making organ within the ECOWAS Commission is the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), even though the Authority is the highest and final decision-making body. It operates in similar manner as the UN Security Council. The MSC operates as a supra-state organ, comprising nine members elected by the Authority for a two-year renewable term, with no permanent seats thus, giving both smaller and larger member states equal voices (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a). It operates at three main levels: ambassadorial, ministerial, and Heads of State and Government. The MSC can authorize deployment of political and military missions, operates on principle of consensus building, based on two-thirds majority. Its work is supported by Committee of Ambassadors with dual accreditation to ECOWAS and Nigeria, Defence and Security Commission (DSC) made up of army chiefs of staff and heads of various security services. The DSC meets at least once every quarter to deliberate on security matters. The ECOWAS Commission also provides administrative, operational and
logistical supports. The President of the Commission may recommend to the SMC, appointment and dispatch of research and mediation missions (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; CDD, 2015; ICG, 2016).

Operationally, unlike the past ad hoc operational structures, the current scheme provides several procedural mechanisms for cooperation and coordination. With regards to conflict prevention (both structural and operational) activities, ECOWARN acts as the regional peace and security monitoring observatory, with four local zones. It is mandated to warn against conditions and threats of regional insecurity and instability. ECOWARN has four main operational responsibilities: fact-finding missions, using President of the Commission’s Good Will Offices, authorization of the Council of the Wise to undertake mediation missions, and deployment of the ESF as the last resort. The system has been improved significantly with the creation of National Early Warning and Response Mechanisms which began on pilot bases in 2016 to directly connect both national and local authorities, institutions, and civil society groups to the regional directorate. This system ensures transparency, quicker alerts, and response to political and security matters (De Sousa, 2018; Bossuyt, 2016; ICG, 2016; ECOWAS Commission, 2016).

However, the Early Warning and Response System confronts several challenges owing largely to limited states’ capacities and regional politics. For example, some countries deny relevant actors the necessary intelligence required to prevent conflicts under the pretence of national security breach and information sensitivity. This is borne out of typical ECOWAS member states’ over prioritization of sovereignty and states security over human security issues. This undermines ECOWAS’ authority and ability to act to protect civilians, albeit its supra-state status. Further, capacity issues
militate against building rapid response to prevent credible threats to security and conflicts outbreak (ICG, 2016; Suifon, n.d.; Kabia, 2011).

Council of the Wise (CoW) is another innovative creature of ECOWAS’ current security system. It is built on the African traditional conflict resolution and management model and concepts. It is made up of 15 eminent West Africans one from each country. The CoW undertakes mediation, negotiations and conciliation efforts in conflict prevention, early warning and response, and conflict resolution or peacebuilding efforts (ICG, 2016; Ronnback, 2008; Bossuyt, 2016).

Finally, under the current system, the ad hoc regional standby force, ECOMOG, has been institutionalized as a permanent regional peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement force upon the recommendations of the DSC in 2004. In 2014, ECOMOG was rebranded. So, its name was changed to the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) as a regional brigade under the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF). The ESF comprises military, police, and civilian components. This is a clear move from over militarization of the forces missions to pave way for effective political and diplomatic missions. ECOWAS has since 2010 been trying to build a multidimensional brigade ready for quick deployment within 90 days; and a rapid reaction taskforce of 1,500 troops with the capacity to deploy within 30 days. Currently, there is a permanent army staff in Abuja made up of three battalions under an ECOWAS Brigade Command, with two logistics depots in Mali and Sierra Leone. Strategic, tactical and operational capacities have also been enhanced through regular periodic capacity building workshops and trainings programmes organized in the three designated centres of excellence: Nigerian War College in Abuja; Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana; and the Malian Ecole du
Maintain de la Paix in Bamako (ECOWAS Commission, 2016; ICG, 2016; Adetula, 2015). But it must be said that the good image painted on paper does not reflect the ESF’s actual operational capability. It confronts several challenges - logistical and financial constraints, delay in deployment of troops, over militarization of its operations. Again, the police and civilian components are still underdeveloped. It also lacks the requisite political or diplomatic operational capacity; and continues to encounter a lot of humanitarian disapprobation (Elowson and McDermott, 2010; Haysom, 2014; Caparini, 2015; Olawale, 2015).

5.3.3 Democracy, Good Governance, Civil Society and Human Security

ECOWAS has undertaken a number of reforms and innovations aimed at addressing the recurrence of coup d’e tats and political violence in the region, electoral crisis, corruption and bad governance. The current system allows civil society participation in several issue areas. It has also created a platform, the West African Civil Society Forum, for civil society groups in the region to contribute directly to ECOWAS policy formulations and implementation. For example, WANEP has been engaged by ECOWAS to undertake national early warning and response activities. Again, it features the principle of separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, rule of law, human rights, and zero-tolerance for unconstitutional means to acquire or hold on to power. It also subjects the armed forces in the region under civilian control and authority. More so, a demonstrable effort has been made towards promotion of free fair and transparent elections, and sanctions to recalcitrant members (ICG, 2016; Adetula, Jaiyebo and Bereketeab, 2016). However, available evidence suggests that ECOWAS’ ability or readiness to intervene in any conflict situation is usually influenced by national interests, loyalties, historical ties, and animosity between leadership of various governments (ICG, 2016; Ronnback, 2008; Kabia, 2011).
5.3.4 Funding
Funding remains onerous impediment to ECOWAS’ activities. In the past, Nigeria footed almost the entire bills for ECOMOG’s missions. For example, available evidence suggests that over 90% of contributions to the Emergency Fund, a special levy created by Decision (A/DEC.3/12/90) of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee was made by Nigeria. Again, troop contributing countries had to cater for their contingents’ welfare and salaries (see Kabia, 2011: 9). This contributed towards ECOMOG personnel’s misconducts in the earlier peacekeeping and enforcement missions. To cure this problem, the ECOWAS Peace Fund (EPF) was created by the 1999 Mechanism. The EPF covers three main operational concerns: conflict prevention and early warning, humanitarian assistance, and peace support operations. Sources of funding to the EPF include 5% of the community levy, supports from NGO’s, individuals, donors, and special contributions from patrons. However, competing national interests and priorities have trumped the ability of many member states to apply the levy. So, large chunk of peace and security missions’ funding come from the region’s development patrons (De Souza, 2018; Bossuyt, 2016; ICG, 2016).

The discussions afore show that the ECOWAS security system has come thus far from ad hoc (half-hazard) schemes into a more institutionalized complex structure. This notwithstanding, certain institutional, financial, operational, logistical, diplomatic, political, and military gaps, undermine its ability to meet expectations. For example, even though the non-interference principle has been buried and ECOWAS shows considerable will and ability to address crisis in member states, the results show mix reactions. There are many circumstances where ECOWAS has failed to act timely enough to help address humanitarian crisis due to members’ refusal to accept regional intervention (ICG, 2016 Adetula, Jaiyebo and Bereketeab, 2016).
5.4 The 2013 ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy (ECTS)

This section examines the 2013 ECTS vis-à-vis the militant situation in West Africa. The major components, opportunities and limitations therein the document is outlined here.

5.4.1 An Outline of the 2013 ECTS

The ECTS was adopted by the Authority in February 2013 following the outburst of militant groups especially in Mali and Nigeria, to serve as common operational framework for preventing and combating militancy in West Africa. It aims at giving effect to relevant international, continental, regional and national instruments. It consists of six sections and 38 paragraphs. The main purpose of the strategy is to enhance operational capacities of member states to enable them effectively respond to the militant threats across the region. It provides a common background about vulnerabilities, perspectives, nature, dynamics and root causes of militancy in West Africa (see Section 1, Paragraphs 1-16).

Its main objectives include to, among other things, 1) enhance states’ coordination in intelligence gathering, law enforcement, investigation and prosecution of militants; 2) build national and regional capacities to pre-empt militancy; 3) promote a criminal justice and prosecution systems across the region that feature the rule of law, due process, respect for human rights, and protect civilians in counter insurgency measures; 4) prevent and combat violent religious extremism; 5) harmonise response to militancy, including legislations; and 6) promote regional and international cooperation on militancy-related tasks. The underlying philosophies include among other things, 1) belief in cooperation among member states in the various fields to prevent and combat militants; 2) perceiving militancy as grave threat to peace, security, stability, development and social cohesion in the region; 3) primacy of
The strategy is anchored on three strategic pillars: prevent, pursue, and reconstruct, featuring a few core priority areas of activities. It prioritizes actions to prevent militancy from occurring in the first place. The main priority areas of this pillar include, 1) rejection of militancy in all its forms; 2) elimination of all factors conducive to militancy; 3) enhancing early warning and improving operational intelligence coordination; 4) denying militants the means, space and technical capacity to operate; 5) preventing extremism and radicalization; and 6) promoting democratic governance and protecting human rights. Again, when efforts to prevent attacks fail, the pillar two outlines necessary action plans for pursuing and prosecuting militants operating in the region. It prioritizes efforts to: 1) operationalize relevant regional, continental and international legal instruments; 2) enhance rule of law and cooperation on criminal justice matters; 3) enhance cooperation on border control and surveillance; 4) suppress and criminalize funding of militant activities and money laundering; 5) protect critical infrastructure and diplomatic premises and other foreign interests; 6) enhance ability of member states to develop criminal justice response; 7) strengthen cooperation with civil society and media organizations to prevent and combat militancy; and 8) train and build states’ capacity to prevent and combat militancy. Finally, post-facto insurgency and counter insurgency measures are also outlined to repair damages to both physical infrastructure and social relationships in affected communities under the pillar three. It recognises the damages militancy and counter
insurgency measures do cause, and so it provides the necessary action plans to undertake to address them. These include, 1) protection of rights of victims; 2) support for and reconciliation of affected communities; 3) repairing social contract (through counter insurgency education in schools and universities); 4) and development of counter insurgency strategies for implementation (see Section 3, Paragraphs 20-24).

The ECTS’ overarching implementation responsibility lies with the individual member states. They are supposed to develop their specific strategies tailored to the ECTS’ objectives, and form national counter insurgency units for its execution, evaluation and enhance regional coordination. Again, to enhance coordination of efforts and resources and cooperation for sustained implementation, several instruments (12 of them) are outlined. This comprises actors (state and non-state), institutional arrangements (at the national, regional, continental and international levels) and actions required to operationalize the strategy. Also, provisions are made to ensure regular consultations among the relevant agents, including ministers of foreign affairs, ministers of justice and interior, judges, police and security chiefs, intelligence chiefs, investigators, prosecutors to monitor, evaluate and make recommendations for further review to make it a living document (see Section 4, Paragraph 25-37; Section 6, Paragraph 38; Birikorang, 2015; CDD, 2015).

5.4.2 Opportunities and Limitations of the 2013 ECTS
This strategy is a measure to check militancy in the region via implementation of large-scale plans in the region and beyond. Arguably, the strategy provides a number of innovative opportunities to strengthen both national and regional capabilities to eradicate militancy from the region. But a few limitations and shortfalls may also trump its sustained implementation, few of which are discussed subsequently.
5.4.2.1 Strengths or Opportunities
First, the foresight to adopt a common operational framework in order to enhance coordination of efforts and resources to address the militant situation in the region is both timely and commendable. This is because militants in the region are gaining traction and resilience, pose serious threats of establishing a regional network, and are currently gaining international reach. Thus, it cannot be treated as internal affairs of individual states anymore (Field Interview, 2018; CDD, 2015; Birikorang, 2015).

Second, the ECTS can help avoid a situation where regimes hide behind the fight against militants to harass and intimidate innocent people and abuse their human rights. The fact that it encourages state parties to, through the criminal justice processes, approach all suspected militants in the remit of the rule of law and human rights, indicates that the region has learnt lessons and want to move beyond state protection to human security. This also discourages a situation where regimes, under the pretence of combating militants, harass opposition elements and torture people without evidence and recourse to any laws (Birikorang, 2015).

Third, on the substantive issue of the strategic approach, the fact that the document emphasizes prevention is refreshing and very important. Countries in the region are known for their reactive knee-jerk approach to security situations instead of proactively addressing vulnerability factors and cultural aggravators that increase the propensity of insecurity and instability in the region. Ability to address these issues will enable actors in the region and beyond to coordinate their efforts to pre-empt, contain and eradicate the menace from the region. Most of the experts interviewed expressed this sentiment (Field Interview, 2018; CDD, 2015; Birikorang, 2015).
Fourth, the idea of member states developing their own specific strategies intimates the fact that, although all countries are faced with common threats and have certain common vulnerability factors, the situation may differ significantly with each of them at any material moment. For example, the situation in Mali will not exactly be the same as what pertains to Nigeria, and Nigeria’s threats definitely differ from Ghana’s, and so their priorities will definitely differ in significant magnitudes (CDD, 2018).

Fifth, the call on member states to employ both military and non-military options to fight the menace is very significant and drums home the fact that war on militancy in the region cannot be won by militarized counter insurgency operations alone. Preventing and combating militancy requires more credible intelligence. And so, it is also important to note that this strategy makes room for building capacity of relevant agencies of member states to enhance coordination in the field of intelligence gathering and sharing (ECTS, 2013: Section 3, Pillar 1: 26 & 27).

Sixth, it is also relevant to note that the strategy does actually go beyond preventing and pursuing militants to outline the necessary provisions for addressing post-facto insurgency and counter insurgency challenges. It recognises the need to rebuild affected communities, protect victims of militancy and counter insurgency measures, including security against hunger, diseases, among others. It is worth noting that every effective conflict resolution measure is the one that takes appropriate measures to rebuild and reconstruct affected communities. Effective post-facto measures should address any concerns and underlying factors that possess the potential to cause recurrence of conflicts situation (ECTS, 2013; Field Interviewed, 2018).
Seventh, the provisions made for stakeholder-interactions, including the development patrons, civil society and media organizations, NGOs, etc. to coordinate their efforts to strengthen the implementation of action plans in this strategy is very important and refreshing. It first gives the member states and ECOWAS the opportunity to tap into their resources, logistics, as well as technical expertise and capabilities to strengthen national and regional capacity to prevent and eradicate militancy from the region. Again, it must be noted that the militant situation goes beyond the geographical bounds of West Africa. Thus, there is the need for any initiative in the region to look beyond West Africa in order to ensure a broader multilateral, continental and global approach to countering militancy in [West] Africa (Caparini, 2015; CDD, 2015).

Eighth, focusing on early warning is very essential for preventing and eradicating militant networks. Effective early warning and response systems boost intelligence gathering and sharing to enable swift and timely action against militant threats. Thus, preparations towards national early warning and response systems’ implementation is spot on. This is because it has the potential to address the militant menace by feeding the appropriate security agencies timely information to intercept and prosecute militants across the region (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; CDD, 2018).

Last and finally, to ensure systematic follow-ups, effective monitoring, and enhance coordination of efforts and mobilization of enough resources towards the ECTS’ implementation, ECOWAS is encouraged to assist, complement and strengthen member states’ capacities (CDD, 2015; Birikorang, 2015). Specifically, a Regional Security Division (RSD) is supposed to be established within the Commission. And within the RSD shall exists, a Counter Terrorism Coordination Unit responsible for monitoring the progress made by member states towards the ECTS’ implementation.
Again, the Unit is responsible for performing technical functions to prevent and combat militancy and make recommendations to enhance its implementation. Further, it examines reports to be submitted by member states, compile and submit them for direction at the level of the Authority. More so, the Unit is charged to coordinate the training and other activities of the Counter Terrorism Training Centres (CTTCs) that are to be established in the region by member states, and liaise with national, regional and international actors. This helps to make the ECTS a living document (ECTS, 2013; Birikorang, 2015).

5.4.2.2 Major Limitations
Even though the strategy outlines several areas of national, regional, continental and international cooperation and coordination among various institutions and actors, both state and non-state actors (including civil society and media organizations), a number of gaps in the document may trump its effective operationalization. First, the document failed to clearly spell out how and at what point these actors will interact (modalities of interaction). Again, the strategy is supposed to give effect to several national, regional, and international instruments that are crucial for stemming the militant menace in the region. Nonetheless, the document again fails to give any roadmaps for incorporating them into a common plan for easy implementation under this strategy. According to one interviewee:

If you have a broad-based protocol, the technicalities of how it is implemented becomes an issue. How do you ensure that the counter terrorism strategy in itself considerably relates to the 1999 Protocol…? So, it is not just enough for you to mention but it is also important for you to see how that goes into the entire plan. How does the ECPF, for instance, link into the 1999 protocol and the counter terrorism strategy? Because if you do not have the technical application then it becomes
difficult and problematic (Field Interview, 2018; see Haysom, 2014; Caparini, 2015; ECOWAS Commission, 2015b).

Another problem with the document is that it failed to identify the level of involvement of the local communities. Apart from making just a passing thought about involving local and border communities, nothing is heard about it again in the entire document to know how and where they will fit into the strategy’s operationalization. The findings indicated that so far, the processes and activities underway to operationalize the strategy has not involved even the community leaderships or traditional authorities. With regards to the national early warning and response systems operationalization, the farthest ECOWAS and its member states have come is to build states and civil society organizations’ capacities in the ongoing piloting processes (Field Interview, 2018; ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; 2016; CDD, 2018).

Last but not least, the ECTS’ implementation overly rely on donor good will and supports. One of the experts interviewed had the following to say:

You need the states to contribute the resources for the implementation. If the strategy enjoins ECOWAS to liaise with the patrons –UN, EU, AU, France, US, etc. for the resources and other support … it is questionable. If the US feels today that West Africa is going to be a place where terrorist might use, as they are doing right now in the Sahel, they support a lot of projects because they see it as the corridor of terrorism. For the EU, it sees the region as the route that young people are traveling through to Europe. For France, part of its strong presence in Niger is to have access and control over the mineral for its nuclear project. Thus, they have the strong interest to act. But when that interests die, they will leave. We must find the resources to fund our own projects because those external patrons can decide at any time where to invest their resources. If terrorism become the major issue elsewhere, they will cut funding to Africa. Thus, we must mobilize our
own resources. We need to wean its [ECTS] implementation from western patronage (Field Interviewed, 2018).

5.5 The Strides Made Towards the ECTS’ Implementation
This section examines the preparations underway at both national and regional levels towards the 2013 ECTS’ implementation. Member states are charged to prepare their own national strategies tailored to provisions in the document. They are also supposed to form national taskforces to oversee its implementation. The results showed that most member states had created counter insurgency protocols and taskforces before the document was approved in 2013 (Field Interview, 2018; CDD, 2015). For example, Ghana had adopted and created the Counter Terrorism Protocol in 2008 and a unit within the Ghana Police Service respectively. However, any national strategy tailored to the provisions of the ECTS’ is non-existent. The results showed that with exception of Nigeria who has (launched in 2017) a national strategy in place, the rests have either not formed one at all, at preparatory stages or awaiting approval. Checks in Ghana indicated that its national strategy developed in 2016 has not been approved yet (Field Interview, 2018; see CDD, 2018). Second, since 2015, some affected member states and neighbouring countries in other regions have formed joint taskforces under the framework of the ECTS. These taskforces have, at least since the past two years, been operational and pursuing militants in their respective jurisdictions. They include the G5 Sahel in the Sahel region, and the Joint Multi-National Taskforce in the Lake Chad region (Caparini, 2015; CDD, 2015; 2018). Finally, under the auspices of the ECOWAS Commission, a few training exercise have been organized for the various national taskforces on how to combat militants in their countries. However, these exercises have largely been militarized, with little focus on intelligence gathering exercise. They have also given little attention to preventive measures (Caparini, 2015; CDD, 2018).
At the regional level, under the auspices of the ECOWAS, a number of steps have also been taken towards the ECTS’ implementation. The results showed that a few capacity building conferences, workshops, training and fundraising activities have been underway since 2013. ECOWAS has also been closely involved in the UN and AU peacekeeping missions in Mali to safeguard the situation in that country (ECOWAS Commission, 2015b; 2016). Also, at the Committee of Chiefs of the Security Services (CCSS) level, there have been a few workshops and conferences since 2013 to, among other things, develop the Counter Terrorism Manual and conduct counter insurgency trainings exercises. For example, in June 2013, one counter terrorism training workshop was held in Bamako, Mali; and another one held in July 8-19, 2013 in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire (ECOWAS Commission, 2013). Furthermore, reviews of the ESF and ECPF documents have since 2013 been commissioned to incorporate counter insurgency issues and other emerging realities in the region. As part of the review processes, a specific ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Doctrine was proposed. Again, at the 35th ordinary meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CDS) in Dakar, Senegal in September 2015, they deliberated on, among other things, the review of the ESF’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), and measures to give effect to regional, continental and international frameworks for multilateral operations to contain, combat and avert further militant threats in the region (CDD, 2015; 2018; ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; 2015b; 2016). Moreover, the Commission organised a meeting of the Sub-Committee for Training and Operations of the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) in Niamey to discuss issues about counter terrorism initiatives. Also, the 4th Regional Transnational Organized Crime Training for Law Enforcement Agents in West Africa was organized by the Commission in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire to conduct training on national counter insurgency measures in August
2015 for representatives of all the relevant law enforcement agencies, including the police, judiciary, armed forces. The aim of these initiatives was to build and strengthen the capacities of Law Enforcement Agencies in the region to fight transnational organised crime, including militancy (ECOWAS Commission, 2015a; 2015b; 2016; CDD, 2015; 2018). More so, the Commission has organized several training courses in counter terrorism for some law enforcement agencies in the region since 2015. There has also been a few assessments conducted about the progress made so far in implementing some key legal instruments for preventing and eradicating militancy in the region since 2015. For example, efforts made towards the implementation of the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials both at regional and national levels based on the five-year priority plan (2010-2015) was reviewed in 2016. During the same period, the piloting of the National Early Warning and Response Mechanism (NEWRM) was launched in five-member states. Last but not least, ECOWAS delegation were sent to the Donors’ Conference on the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) against the Boko Haram insurgency in June 2016 (ECOWAS Commission, 2016; CDD, 2017a; 2018).

However, so far, ECOWAS’ role in the ECTS’ implementation has been limited to training conferences, workshops, and courses as well as few attempts to adjust already existing structures and documents. It must also be noted that the Counter Terrorism Coordination Unit, ECOWAS Arrest Warrant and Blacklist of militants and other criminal groups among other institutional structures proposed to be established under the ECTS, none has seen any daylight. Further, ECOWAS has also failed to play any meaningful role in coordinating and harmonizing the various initiatives by national, regional, and extra-regional actors that are under way in some countries in the region such as Mali and Nigeria towards the eradication of the militant menace. Largely, at
both regional and national levels, the implementation processes have been stalled with very minimal preparatory progress made. Therefore, the 2013 ECTS, over five years after its approval, as usual, remains one of the many good intentions on paper that ECOWAS has produced. The next section explores and examines some of the major factors that have stalled the 2013 ECTS’ operationalization.

5.6 Regional Politics and the 2013 ECTS’ [Non-] Implementation

As the evidence suggests, the 2013 ECTS implementation has been undermined by a combination of factors in the region: political, economic, and capacity issues. According to one interviewee: “There are three legs of every collective security mission in West Africa. The first leg is the politics of the intervention itself; the second has to do with the economics; and yet the third borders on capacity issues (Field Interview, 2018). This section examines the extent member states’ political posturing has undermined or otherwise, the 2013 ECTS’ implementation.

West Africa is one of Africa’s most politically dynamic and hostile sub-regions (ICG, 2016). Member states’ political considerations often override community activities, including collective security interventions. Therefore, it is important to reiterate how the complexity of politics in the region, and over politicization of security initiatives by ECOWAS members have affected the ECTS’ implementation. It is worthy of note that complex political processes and disagreements are common to all supra-state organizations but, a careful balancing of power and national interests among members may help to design and implement effective and acceptable policy-decisions (Olawale, 2015). Political considerations continue to undermine ECOWAS’ engagement within the broader context of peace and security in several ways. Available evidence in the extant literature, and information from the primary data showed three main political imperatives that account for the non-implementation syndrome in West Africa: the
quota system, political tension, and socio-cultural and language barriers (Field Interview, 2018; see also Vogt’s (2010; in Olawale, 2015: 24).

To begin with, ECOWAS policy decisions formulation and implementation is based on equal representation and consensus building. Regardless of status, size and contributions towards regional policy interventions, all ECOWAS member states may have equal voice and fair hearing before approval. Before any major policy intervention is adopted, approved and implemented, it goes through a few deliberations, scrutiny and debates. At all stages of ECOWAS interventions, there must be fair representation and consensus building in order to incorporate the diverse perspectives of all member states. Such representation may include member states experts, civil society groups, and institutions. While this ensure fairness and encourage all members regardless of size to be fairly represented, it affects the quality of work done and urgency with which such works ought to be executed in a number of ways. First, in order to formulate and implement major innovative peace and defence policy interventions, there is the need to properly balance experience, capacity (resourcefulness), and equal representation to ensure consensus building. When considerations of representation and capabilities are not well-balanced, depending on the nature of the issue, it may undercut competence and capacity to select seasoned actors whose engagement would go a long way to enhance quality decisions. Second, in order to be fairly represented not just in numbers but also in substance, member states screen a lot of individuals, groups etc. to represent them. However, oftentimes such choices are informed by [historical] loyalty, partisan and ideological orientation, and sometimes ethnic among other identity affiliations with leaders of governing regimes or their parties instead of expertise and experience. This affects the quality of work done (Bossuyt, 2016; Olawale, 2015). Moreover, sometimes because of the
nature of appointment criteria of members to represent individual states at the region level, unhealthy lobbying, rivalry and confrontations among power centres within a state occur. Such competition to elect or appoint representatives may cause undue delays within member states, and consequently the timely preparations towards the formulation and execution of important security initiatives in the region.

For instance, with regards to the ECTS’ implementation, member states are supposed to develop their individual strategies tailored to their specific needs. The national strategies are to be approved and endorsed by their respective governments within the broader context of their national laws vis-à-vis the ECTS’ framework at the regional level. Further, the document ought to undergo a broader technical assessment by MSC before final implementation can commence. Thus, any delay at any stage seriously affects the timeliness of approval, assessment and recommendations for final implementation. It must also be said that changes in government by member states also affect the willingness of member states to act in the first place or may unduly drag implementation of important decisions. New governments have often focused on what they consider more important and in their political calculations, national interest before attending to such regional undertakings began by their predecessors. For instance, in the case of Ghana, since 2016, when the NDC government prepared the national strategy, due to change of government, the document is still pending final approval for the past two years. These and many other issues with regards to the quota system and over politicization of internal member states selection processes of representation, delay policy harmonization and final adoption and implementation of such important policy frameworks. According to one expert interviewed:

The quota system may not in itself be bad, but depending on issues at hand, some states may be better positioned to facilitate decision and
implementation processes on all important peace and security
documents such as the current ECTS scrutinised. This is not to suggest
that some states are not having the necessary expertise, it only means
that depending of the issue in question some members have the best
qualibre of experts to undertake them (Field Interview, 2018).

This confirms Vogt’s (2010; cited in Olawale, 2015: 24) view expressed on the quota
system: “… pull of distribution of capable actors vary across West Africa. But
honestly speaking, majority of highly skilled [peace and security] actors are
concentrated in few countries like Benin, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Nigeria”.

Again, political tension, largely reflecting the historical Anglophone-Francophone
divide, is another major contributory factor to the 2013 ECTS’ stalled implementation.
Depending on the issue, nature, who is most affected by it and how national interests
or nationals or territorial integrity is affected, governments of ECOWAS member
states may commit the necessary resources and energy towards formulation, approval
and final activation of such security documents. It is not uncommon for important
policy decisions to hit a snag in West Africa because of political deadlock often
determined by national interest calculations, historical loyalties, animosity towards
the opposing side, and empathies among other entrenched political positions and
calculations of individual states involved. This have often manifested in sharp
disagreements on contributions to peace operations, including debates, preparations
towards seminars, policy workshops, meetings, and payment of levy among others.

Some of the experts interviewed said their checks showed that currently, most of the
countries who are yet to prepare any national strategy have raised concerns about
certain issues in the final document itself as they argue that it does not reflect any of
their experts contributions especially with regards to the meaning of who a militant
and militant group is (see also ICG, 2016; Caparini, 2015; Kabia, 2011). One of the interviewees had the following to say:

Rivalries among individual states with diverse political culture and external alliances create suspicion and deadlocks among ECOWAS member states. Overcoming political deadlock especially among heavyweights in the region has proven difficult and this adversely affect any regional peace and security undertakings (Field Interview, 2018).

Furthermore, with regards to the issues on peace and security interventions, the results showed that the Francophone and Anglophone blocs are often divided. While most of the Anglophone countries believe and willingly support collective security schemes within the scope of the ECOWAS, but for Guinea, their Francophone counterparts mostly kick against regional intervention. This was very topical in the 1990s, especially following their suspicion of Nigeria’s hegemonic ambition. This, however, it must be said, has considerably waned in the 21st century. Also, most of the countries in West Africa prefer national approach to their internal security problems and usually deem security issues as preserve of the individual sovereign states and thus, do not warrant regional intervention. It must be said, however, that the acrimonious partisan nature of internal politics of member states largely account for this situation as regimes or governments of the day fear portraying any image of weaknesses that may be used by their opponents as political capital against them in subsequent elections. In West Africa, for example in Ghana, partisan calculus often outweighs public interests and thus governments usually guard against doing anything that may weaken their chances of winning next elections (Frempong, 2012; CDD, 2018). Again, regional heavyweights such as Nigeria prefer portraying a position of strength in the region instead of weakness which may be used by rival competitors for regional leadership (Field Interview, 2018; CDD, 2015; 2018).
More so, the paternalistic security relations and most, if not all member states desire for extra-regional support to overcome their security challenges have hugely accounted for the undue delay or non-implementation of the 2013 ECTS. For instance, Nigeria is on record to have been engaging with the United States since 2010 to get them support its military assaults on Boko Haram militants. Mali, the most affected member state by militancy in the region, has not yet developed any national strategy because it has been enjoying several counter insurgency initiatives from France, EU, World Bank, UN, etc. (see Haysom, 2014; Caparini, 2015).

Moreover, a major political undercurrent in the region that have stalled the implementation of the 2013 ECTS is the socio-cultural and language barrier manifest in the three major official languages adopted by ECOWAS - English, French and Portuguese. This reflects the different colonial socio-political, economic and cultural experiences. The situation poses a serious challenges to any policy harmonization exercises, including logistical presentations, issuing statements and communications, translating and transmitting intelligence (early warning), and drafting policies, among others that ought to be acceptable to all members (ICG, 2016; Bossuyt, 2016).

Another important factor that have often affected security calculations of member states and commitment to regional peace and defence interventions in general and the execution of the 2013 ECTS is the non-securitization of the public and treatment of every national and regional security initiatives as some kind of sacrosanct and sensitive subjects in West Africa. All regimes or governments in the region guard jealously against their territorial integrity, sovereignty and keep all security initiatives with external parties hidden from the public. Again, no reasonable education and awareness is created among the public about importance of some of these initiatives.
and how their effective implementation can enhance national and human security. This lack of awareness creation and education alienate the masses (public) and the ruling elites from committing the limited national resources to execute regional initiatives such as the 2013 ECTS (Field Interview, 2018; see ICG, 2016).

Apart from afore discussed issues, there are other serious political undercurrents in the region that is seriously affecting the ECTS’ implementation. These include, among other things, the Nigerian factor, democratization processes, Nation building and, in the words of De Souza (2018), lack of community spirit among member states. Since independence, Nigeria has remained the most important and active actor within the ECOWAS sub-region. The funding of ECOWAS’ protocols formulations, approval, and activation largely lie with Nigeria. It is the largest contributor in terms of resources, including troops, and assume leadership role in the region as the de facto hegemon. During the earlier ECOMOG missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria’s contribution accounted for over 90%. The then military regime leader could simply issue an executive fiat, dip his hands in the booming oil cash and still escape accountability issues. Thus, it was pretty simple and easy to dispatch supports for ECOWAS missions. However, currently, Nigeria is democratizing, its economy keeps declining, and is also affected by serious internal nation-building problems. As a democracy, at least any decision to dispatch national resources must be checked and approved by the people’s representatives. At least, the processes of approval alone may delay any efforts for months before it gets through. One of the interviewees made this observation:

… the question of who is going to provide resources is there, the difference between Liberia when ECOMOG went there, you know, Nigeria footing the bill, this time round, ECOWAS will have problem because the present leadership of Nigeria will not be allowed to just call
for troop mobilization unlike the past where Abacha could just use military fiat to get the money to sponsor ECOWAS, because [now Nigeria is a] democracy (Field Interviewed, 2018).

Again, following its economic challenges and other internal issues such as the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria spends billions on addressing many pressing internal security and other development issues. These conditions have currently forced Nigeria to be more inward-looking (see Bossuyt, 2016: 20; ICG, 2016). As noted by one interviewee: Lately, several domestic issues, including the democratization processes and accountability checks, Boko Haram insurgency, and economic challenges have made Nigeria become largely inward-looking towards regional initiatives compared to the past especially in the 1990s (Field Interview, 2018).

Notwithstanding the issues raised above, there are other important issues other than politics in the region that have also been militating against the 2013 ECTS’s smooth implementation. The next section briefly addresses some of these issues.

5.7 Other Factors Affecting the 2013 ECTS’ [non-] Implementation

This section discussed some of the major factors (both within the region and beyond), apart from regional politics, that affect the operationalization of the 2013 ECTS. To begin with, funding remains a major factor militating against ECOWAS security initiatives’ implementation. ECOWAS is made up poor and fragile states. Almost all countries in the region are least developed and they are hugely indebted to external commercial organizations. For example, 12 out of the 15-member states are among the poorest with low life expectancy, high infant mortality rate, high illiteracy rate, low per capita incomes and acute poverty (see UNDP, 2009; in Kabia 2011: 10).

Again, bad governance, corruption and lack of accountability continue to worsen the economic situation in the region. All ECOWAS member states depend on donor supports for survival. Between 15% and 50% of their budgets are derived from
external support. Thus, in dealing with their numerous domestic challenges, they have little or no option to support ECOWAS security initiatives (see ICG, 2016; Bossuyt, 2016; Olawale, 2015). This also affects ECOWAS budget as most of them have failed to honour their financial obligations to the Community. Therefore, the faith of this strategy’s implementation is leveraged on external support. However, since 2013, very little external support has come through with regards to the ECTS’ operationalization. Many donors have expressed doubts about ECOWAS and member states’ ability to prevent and combat militants in the region alone. Again, instead of supporting local regional interventions, most of them have intervened in their own terms (Field Interview, 2018; Caparini, 2015; Frey, 2004).

Moreover, with regards to ECOWAS, capacity gaps and bureaucracy were also identified as another serious impediment to regional security initiatives implementation. For example, out of the 26 professional positions vacant at the PAPS, only about seven are filled. Again, two out of nine recommended support staff positions have yet been filled (Olawale, 2015: 25). This coupled with complex administrative processes results in poor communication, ad hoc and half-hazard crisis response measures, poor coordination and misalignment between military, political, and diplomatic peace and security initiatives (Bossuyt, 2016; ICG, 2016).

Last and finally, the results showed that the upsurge in militancy in West Africa is caused by a combination of factors some of which may transcend the region to encompass negative spill-overs from neighbouring regions internal [geo]political, and security among other dynamics. So, any attempt to resolve same must go beyond the West African sub-region. For example, the fragility of post-Gadhafi-Libya has had serious security ramifications on Mali and neighbouring West African states.
According to Caparini (2015), in 2013, following the Malian crisis, ECOWAS proposed military assaults on the militants in the North but was seriously contested by Algeria and Mauritania over fears of sending the militants [back] into their territories. Thus, he observed that any effective solution to the problem and any effective counter insurgency initiative’s execution must involve the various key non-member states in neighbouring regions such as Algeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Mauritania. One of the respondents rightly expressed this sentiment:

You see, one of the challenges that ECOWAS is facing with the counter terrorism strategy’s implementation is that the consequences of terrorism are not just in West Africa. We also have issues beyond it. So, you see, the issue of the fluidity of the situation in the region and adjoining regions goes beyond what ECOWAS can manage. So, ECOWAS does not have the control of the management of the entire process of implementing the counter terrorism initiatives alone because other states are also involved which go beyond ECOWAS to deal with the militant issue (Field Interviewed, 2018).

5.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter captured the analysis and presentation of findings from the current study. The results showed that the ECOWAS has dramatically evolved to institutionalize collective security schemes in the region. This path has been gradual and come largely as responses to both regional, continental and global challenges and opportunities. Currently, ECOWAS’ security scheme addresses all manner of instability and insecurity conditions in the region, albeit with some major limitations and setbacks. With regards to the 2013 ECTS’ implementation, the results showed that the processes have been largely delayed by political considerations of ECOWAS member states. This notwithstanding, other major factors both within and beyond the region continue to impede its operationalization.
CHAPTER SIX

6.0 FACTORS AFFECTING COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

6.1 Introduction
This chapter constitutes discussions of the major findings. Various inferences from the findings as captured in the previous chapter are distilled and discussed in this chapter vis-à-vis the existing literature. The study’s main aim was to examine the extent of influence geopolitics in West Africa has on 2013 ECTS’ implementation. It is pertinent to note that ECOWAS is a supra-state body with sovereign states as its members and thus, effectiveness of its activities is dependent on their political willingness to commit the needful resources for their sustained implementation. Again, ECOWAS performs its security roles via international laws and other legal instruments. The discussion in this section focused on nature and dynamics of national, regional and international factors that enhance or undermine collective peace and defence initiatives and interventions in West Africa.

6.2 National Level
As a supra-state organization, the political dynamics of ECOWAS reflects the nature and domestic characteristics of the member states. The dynamics of power, balance of forces, individual personalities, and calculations of heads of state and government affect ECOWAS’ role in undertaking any major security initiatives in the region (ICG, 2016). As Ebo (2007) rightly noted, international organizations (IOs) are direct reflections and products of their constituent member states, and thus, manifest the trends, contradictions, challenges and opportunities within them. Whether or not a state will be more involved in community of nations security-wise depends on a number of issues. The military capability, ideological variations, power struggle, status and composition, geographical location, historical factors, and economic
performance among others may explain the extent of involvement in collective
security operations (Ronnback, 2008; Ebo, 2007; Uzoechina, 2014). In West Africa,
issues such as pan-Africanism, geographical proximity and historical factors largely
influence the success of regional peace and defence alliances. However, their weak
economies, fragility of political and security institutions, ideological variations and
power struggle continue to weaken any collective security missions in the region. For
example, hegemonic struggle, rivalries among member states along ideological and
historical (colonial) experiences continue to militate against consensus building in
regional security matters (Elowson and McDermott, 2010: 43; Bossuyt, 2016: 20).
Heads of state and government of member states actions with regards to collective
security are largely informed by national interest calculus, loyalties and historical ties.
As shown in the results, since the 1990s, members’ decision to contribute troops and
other resources to resolve any conflict in the region and whether or not it will support
any major interventionist mission at all have often been informed largely by historical
political, economic and socio-cultural ties, economic and security interests, power
relations or relationship between governments of empathy and animosity between
heads of states. Thus, there have usually been selective ability to take collective action
in the region. (Refer to ICG’s 2016 report on regional politics and member states’ role
in the Ivorian, Guinea-Bissau, Burkinabe and Malian Crisis).

6.3 Regional Level
The ability to sustainably implement important collective security initiatives depend
on certain matrix: intentions and developments within a region, actions of external
actors, and the nature of overall economic and political development of member states.
At the regional level, there are major issues that were found to facilitate or undermine
collective security in West Africa. First, certain geographical characteristics and
nature of conflicts or insecurity in the region facilitate regional security alliances. For example, the closeness, fragility and porous nature of member states of ECOWAS easily causes spill-over of any conflict or insecurity problem. Thus, any issues in a neighbouring country becomes the problem of the rest as they are likely to be affected by the situation either directly or indirectly sooner than later. This is in line with Burry Buzan’s concept of security complex: “… a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are closely connected that their national security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed in isolation of the rests” (Ronnback, 2008: 7; Uzoechina, 2014). For example, the Malian crisis has had serious implication for its neighbours such as Burkina Faso, Niger, and Cote d’Ivoire’s internal security. These countries have on many occasions experienced spill-over attacks from militant groups in Mali and or overflow of refugees into their territories. This and many aspects of the Malian situation informed ECOWAS’ earlier security attempts to provide common regional solution to the challenge (Field Interview, 2018; Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014; ECOWAS Commission, 2015a).

On the contrary, certain geopolitical factors have continued to obstruct effective collective security missions in the region. First, before adopting any binding documents (legally and financially), it must pass through numerous rounds of lengthy debates, reviews, and final checks in order for all members or a majority of them to accept such decisions. Also, security issues are considered the preserve of sovereign states and thus they try to keep ECOWAS away from intervening, its current supranational status notwithstanding. Usually, member states’ political considerations and prioritization of sovereignty over supranationality and states security over human security adversely affect collective security undertakings in the region (see Bossuyt, 2016; ICG, 2016; Kabia, 2011; Elowson and McDermott, 2010). Moreover,
linguistics, administrative and other differences among the countries in the region militate against collective action security-wise. The countries in West Africa are divided along colonial experiences into Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone blocs (Zagaris, 1987; Frempong, 1999). Politics of collective intervention has often come along these lines especially along the Anglophone and Francophone divide. Arguably, in the past, the Anglophone countries have often been supportive of collective intervention to resolve internal challenges of member states that come with regional implications as compared to their Francophone counterparts. Even though the region’s politics along this divide has significantly waned, it still influences loyalties and approach to regional security (see Haysom, 2014; Uzoechina, 2014; Caparini, 2015; ICG, 2016). One of the interviewees expressed this concern:

…the first leg of [collective security] in the region is the politics of intervention itself within the region. What is it are we talking about the politics? Take Liberia as a case study, when ECOWAS went in there, most Anglophone countries went for intervention. With exception of Guinea, the Francophone countries resented intervention. Taylor had the support of the Francophone countries. So that created a tension between the Francophonese and Anglophonese… (Field Interview, 2018; see also Aning and Atuobi, 2011: 15).

Another factor that currently affect collective security in the region is the democratization of almost all countries in the region. Unlike the past where civilian autocratic leaders and military dictators could just order the release of funds to support peacekeeping operations in the region (e.g. Nigeria under Abacha); currently, any decision to support collective missions of ECOWAS must pass through a number of checks - at least it must secure parliamentary approval. Again, the leaders are forced to account to the public on their stewardship. This, including mass media exposes,
civil society organizations’ scrutinization of governments’ activities and contracts delay implementation of regional security initiatives (De Souza, 2018).

Another key factor worth considering is the question of capacity of the ECOWAS and its member states to harness the necessary internal resources for effective and sustainable execution of any security intervention other than over-dependence on the international community and development patrons. According to one expert interviewed:

   It is difficult to have something like the ESF running. You need the resources and is not just about the human resources. But how do you quickly deploy people? When there is a crisis somewhere, must to fly the troops and you have to fly the equipment. Do we have the logistical capability to do that? There are few of the countries which could do that, maybe Nigeria (Field Interview, 2018).

But unfortunately, Nigeria is currently confronted with numerous political, economic and security dilemmas that have trumped its leadership role in operationalizing important regional security initiatives like the current strategy under scrutiny.

Moreover, lack of commitment by ECOWAS member states to effectively implement collective security initiatives remains a major factor thwarting the region’s efforts towards building a robust collective security scheme. Member states usually have the willingness to publicly sign security instruments and other regional initiatives in a grand [celebrative] style but they often fail to provide the requisite resources and other commitment for the effective implementation of same (Field Interview, 2018). Usually, such key initiatives end up in their archival shelves. For example, according to Aning and Atuobi “While there is abundant political will to sign documents and take decisions, the actions of leaders in the region reflect a glaring lack of commitment to adhere to those decisions” (Aning Atuobi, 2011: 18).
As discussed in chapter five, ECOWAS has currently attained a supranational status and thus, its legal instruments, and decisions are directly binding on member states. But, as Aning and Atuobi (2011: 18) observed, ECOWAS “still lacks the capacity to enforce sub-regional decisions at the national level”. This hugely compound and inhibit effective, successful and sustainable collective efforts towards the effective management of the various insecurity and instability problems, including militancy, in the region. It must be noted that the 1999 Mechanism, and similar ECOWAS security instruments feature the R2P concept which encourage international organizations like ECOWAS to intervene to address humanitarian crisis situations in member states, many countries in West Africa consider especially the militant crisis as internal problems that do not warrant ECOWAS’ intervention (see CDD, 2015; Elowson and McDermott, 2010; Uzoechina, 2014). Usually, when regional support is solicited by individual member states, their problem might have grown out of hand. Also, ECOWAS has often shown that it lacks the muscles to intervene in member states without invitation to protect suffering civilians from humanitarian crisis, except when there is an unconstitutional overthrown of democratic regimes or illegitimate hold to power, as it occurred in the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire (Field Interview, 2018; ICG, 2016; Ronnback, 2008; Frempong, 1999).

6.4 International Level
What is happening at the international scene, in other regions and or nation-states across the world affect what ECOWAS does. ECOWAS’ regional security mandate at any material moment is affected by the laws, instruments, etc. of the AU and UN. As a regional economic bloc and international organization, ECOWAS’ activities come directly under the umbrella of both the AU and the UN and as such must operate within the confines of the larger legal frameworks of both the continental and
international bodies respectively. Thus, the decisions, frameworks and actions of the
two IOs at any material moment may limit what ECOWAS can do and does. For
example, during the Liberian Civil War, ECOWAS’ decision to intervene was
challenged because of the OAU Charter’s non-intervention principle. In the case of
the UN, any international especially multilateral intervention must seek approval of
the UN Security Council before such mission can be executed. Therefore, failure of
the UN Security Council to approve ECOWAS’ proposed mission will jeopardise
collective security in West Africa. For example, in 2013, following the upsurge of the
militant crisis in Mali, ECOWAS proposed a military intervention to salvage the
situation, but when the UN Security Council disapproved it, the MICEMA mission of
ECOWAS came to a not. In the latter example, the AU was rather chosen over
ECOWAS by the UN to intervene (Field Interview, 2018; Caparini, 2015).

Another major constraint to collective security in West Africa is the desire by member
states to keep patrimonial relationships with extra-regional actors such as France,
Britain, China and US. Due to the capacity problems ECOWAS and its member states
face, they depend mainly on their patrons for funding, and logistical among other
supports before undertaking any meaningful regional peace and defence missions.
Thus, policy initiatives to solve African problems are dictated by these patrons, which
are mostly geared towards championing their [the patrons] interests. There a few
security initiatives, including military bases and defence pacts, which are geared
toward resolving the insecurity and instability problems in the region but end up been
non-aligned, disjointed and irresponsible to addressing the actual root causes of the
situation in the region. Development patrons of the ECOWAS and its member states
often intervene in their own terms and bypass what ECOWAS is either doing or
planning to do. There are a lot of initiatives currently underway especially in Mali and
Nigeria by the United States, EU, France, UN, and World Bank, to mention but few, that are not harmonized with any ECOWAS regional initiatives (see Haysom, 2014; Caparini, 2015). Therefore, it must be noted, in many cases, they end up rather throwing money into disjointed and ineffective initiatives to tackle the same problem. Of course, some member states also prefer going to their patrons like France, EU and United States for help instead of relying on regional solution. For example, Mali, at the initial stage of the crisis preferred to invite France into its territory to help resolve the crisis than relying on regional collective approach under the ECOWAS. Again, even though Nigeria has refused any regional approach to its Boko Haram insurgency, among others, it keeps calling on the United States for assistance to enable it addresses the militant menace (CDD, 2015; 2018; Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014).

6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the discussions of the major research findings. The discussions were focused on the contributory factors facilitating and or undermining collective peace and security initiatives in West Africa. The issues covered include national, regional and international economic, socio-cultural and political among other factors.
CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0 ECOWAS’ SECURITY SYSTEM TODAY: ACHIEVEMENTS, LIMITATIONS, SETBACKS AND [FUTURE] LESSONS

7.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes the entire study. It consists of summary and conclusions drawn from the major findings, as well as some recommendations for further action.

7.2 Summary of Findings
The Findings showed that ECOWAS’ evolution into security regionalism resulted from the recurrence of military coups, incessant interstate rivalries, intrastate conflicts, and threats of political instability and humanitarian crisis across the West African sub-region (Roper, 1998; in Suifon, n.d.; Olawale, 2015). Since independence, with exception of Senegal and Cape Verde who have avoided any coups phenomena, all ECOWAS member states have experienced several coups. Again, many countries in the region have been engulfed in several prolonged and recurrent civil wars. Currently, armed rebellion by non-state groups constitute another version of insecurity and instability in West Africa. ECOWAS’ interventions to address these conditions of insecurity became both the test case and raison d’etre for the emergence, evolution and institutionalization of collective security system in West Africa. Since 1978, security cooperation has significantly been improved in the region. Member states of ECOWAS’ embracement of robust collective security scheme is an indication of the fact that peace, security, and political stability is a precursor for deeper economic integration, growth, and development (Kabia, 2011; Bossuyt, 2016; ICG, 2016).

With specific regards to the 2013 ECTS document, it was found that a lot of important toolkits for undermining militant threats and attacks in the region are provided therein. The provisions in the document are largely refreshing, innovative and spot on for addressing the increasing militant threats across the region, albeit some limitations.
However, in terms of implementation, the results showed that very negligible progress has been made owing to a combination of factors, political, economic, and capacity gaps including, among other things, Nigeria’s reduced leadership role, and the relatively young democratization processes across the region. It must be noted, the ultimate innovativeness of every initiative lies in how it is sustainably implemented to enable the adopting organization or community achieve the intended aim or desired end for which it was enrolled in the first place (Raffaelli and Glynn, 2015; Husain, 2015). As discussed in sections 5.6 and 5.7 above, the combined effect of both the kind of politics among member states, gaps in funding, military and administrative capacities, and extra-regional factors have stalled the implementation of the 2013 ECTS (Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014; CDD, 2015; 2016; 2018).

7.3 Conclusions
This study examined the extent regional politics among member states in West Africa has delayed the 2013 ECTS’ implementation. The study commenced with an examination of the overall evolution of the ECOWAS security system and collective peace and defence institutionalization in West Africa. It then proceeded to examine the processes and progress made (at both national and regional levels), and the main factors undermining or enhancing the ECTS’ implementation. The findings showed that ECOWAS has been confronting myriads of serious security dilemmas since its inception. These problems are caused by a set of national, regional and international factors. The resilience and innovativeness of ECOWAS to resolve these security dilemmas resulted in the emergence of its security sector in the Cold War era, strengthening and ultimate maturity of security regionalism in West Africa over the past four decades. The current security regime of ECOWAS focuses more attention on prevention of the structural, operational and governance issues that cause all sorts
of insecurity and instability in the region, albeit some limitations, challenges and setbacks (ICG, 2016; Bossuyt, 2016; Olawale, 2015; Caparini, 2015).

On the 2013 ECTS, the results showed that it was mainly outlined to collectively enable ECOWAS member states address the militant situation in the West African sub-region. However, several challenges have stalled its effective and sustainable implementation. For the past half a decade years after its approval, no significant efforts, measures and mechanisms have been laid out to implement the substantive provisions in the document. ECOWAS, as well as member states have not made any concrete efforts towards the document’s operationalization. The study found that whiles other issues such as capacity gaps affect its implementation, the extent of geopolitics in West Africa on the ECTS’ sustained implementation is quite pronounced (Caparini, 2015; Bossuyt, 2016; ICG, 2016).

### 7.4 Recommendations

First, concerted efforts should be made to undertake a periodic review in order to update all legal and other security documents in the region to meet the current trends. For instance, with regards to the ECTS, because militants are dynamic, and often try to exploit national and regional vulnerabilities, there is the need to constantly review the document to ensure that it has up-to-date provisions that can meet current conditions in the region in order to address the root causes.

Second, the leadership of ECOWAS should have the will-power and political commitment to execute the ECTS and similar security initiatives to help undermine the insecurity problems in the region. For the effective implementation of the strategy and similar security instruments at both regional and national levels, member states should endeavour to commit enough resources and show enough community spirit.
towards this endeavour. Also, member states must strive to bury their historical and other differences in order to harmonize their efforts and enough resources to sustainably execute the ECTS and similar documents that have the potency of de-escalating, if not totally eradicating the root causes of insecurity in the region. Again, neighbouring non-ECOWAS member states such as Algeria, Chad, and Mauritania, and extra-regional actors such as France, should be partnered in any major trans-border security measures and counter insurgency initiatives since insecurity in the region has become more international in reach (Caparini, 2015; Haysom, 2014).

Third, local communities and traditional authorities should be involved in a formalized early warning systemic arrangement. As parts of the fight against militancy and other criminal networks in the region, there has been a general recognition of the role local communities and traditional authorities can play in effectively implementing sustainable peace and security measures. However, little or no formalized efforts have been made to involve the local communities and traditional authorities in the operationalization of the early warning and response systems. Involving local communities and their leaders, not necessarily by providing them with weapons, but hooking them unto a more streamlined information and intelligence sharing arrangements will go a long way to enhance national, regional and human security in the West African sub-region.

Fourth, there must be efforts both at the national and regional levels to conscientize the masses about militancy and other insecurity problems and appropriate measures to take when they are confronted with. The mass media, civic education fora, and the formal education curricula (at all levels) should be involved. The securitization or conscientization of the public on major security problems may provide quick
informant early warning signals to deter and or timely address situations that foment troubles. According to one expert interviewed:

One of the major challenges of this thing is that it does not involve the securitization of the people. It doesn’t make them more security conscious…. Any effective counter insurgency measures should focus on educating the public or the masses who are the first contact and easy targets of the militants … in the region. Where people are conscientize to raise alarm where they see suspicious movements of persons, they will be better positioned to report to the appropriate security agencies for action in most timely manner (Field Interview, 2018).

Fifth, as experience has taught us, the region should endeavour to reduce, if not wean itself totally, from the overdependence on development patrons to avoid any abrupt cut of funding to support important security initiatives’ implementation. The ECOWAS member states must endeavour to reduce the wastage in their systems and fill the loopholes to avoid financial and revenue leakages in order to internally generate and mobilize enough resources for sustainable implementation of any innovative local initiatives (see Aning and Atuobi, 2011; ICG, 2016).

Sixth, efforts to prevent and pursue militants and other cross-border crimes in West Africa should be more intelligence driven, involving local [border] communities and must also put in place, site mappings of different national locations that are obvious or likely targets of militant attacks (and other crimes), including hotels, airport, churches, statehouses, and stadia among others to deter terrorists form launching scathing attacks on innocent civilians (Field Interview, 2018; see also CDD, 2018; Caparini, 2015). Finally, a further and broader study must be conducted to examine the exact relationship between geopolitics and 2013 ECTS’ [non-] implementation.
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APPENDIXES

Appendix One (Interview Guide / Protocol)
The questions on this guide are to assist the researcher gather the relevant information to enable him complete his mandatory thesis on the topic: MILITANT GROUPS AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE 2013 ECOWAS COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY (ECTS) towards an award of a Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) Degree in Political Science (International Relations Option) from the University of Ghana, Legon. All answers provided by the interviewee as part of this interview will strictly be used for the said purpose and treated as highly confidential. Thank you for your kind acceptance, honourable cooperation and invaluable contributions.

1. What are the main political and security challenges West Africa still confront?
2. What path has the evolution of ECOWAS’ security sector taken since 1978?
3. What factors (regional, continental and international) influenced the evolutionary path of ECOWAS’ security system?
4. What is your comment on the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy and?
5. How different is this Strategy from similar initiatives in the past?
6. What is the progress made so far with regards to preparations and processes towards its operationalization?
7. What are the main factors affecting its implementation?
8. To what extent has geopolitics stalled/undermined or enhanced its effective implementation?
# Appendix Two (Interviewees’ Background / Details)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>DATE, VENUE &amp; TIME OF INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Alexander Kaakyire Duku Frempong (Mr.)</td>
<td>Department of Political Science, University of Ghana</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>21/02/2018 Lecturer’s Office 09:30 - 10:15am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwame Boafo-Arthur (Prof.)</td>
<td>Department of Political Science, University of Ghana</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>15/03/2018 Lecturer’s Office 14:00 - 14:30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seidu Mahama Alidu (Dr.)</td>
<td>Department of Political Science, University of Ghana</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>31/05/2018 Jean Nelson Aka Hall Tutor’s Office 10:00 - 10:45am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimire Antwi-Danso (Dr.)</td>
<td>Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College</td>
<td>Director / Dean, Academic Affairs</td>
<td>29/05/2018 Director/ Dean’s Office 08:00 - 8:35am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Ahorsu (Dr.)</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD)</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow</td>
<td>04/04/2018 Interviewee’s Office 12:30 - 1:15pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliana Appiah-Hornu (Dr.)</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD)</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>22/03/2018 Interviewee’s Office 10:00 - 10:25am</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philip Attuquayefio (Dr.)</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD)</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow</td>
<td>24/05/2018 Interviewee’s Office 14:30 - 15:20PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwaku Danso (Dr.)</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPRTC)</td>
<td>Senior Research Associate</td>
<td>17/04/2018 Interviewee’s Office 13:30 - 14:00pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Jaye (Dr.)</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPRTC)</td>
<td>Senior Research Associate</td>
<td>17/04/2018 Interviewee’s Office 14:30 - 15:35pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mustapha Abdalla (Mr.)</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPRTC)</td>
<td>Research Associate</td>
<td>23/04/2018 Interviewee’s Office 09:30 - 10:04am</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ifeanyi Okechukwu (Mr.)</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peace (WANEPE) – Ghana</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator, Early Warning</td>
<td>23/05/2018 Interviewee’s Office 10:15 - 10:55am</td>
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<td>Edward Kingston Jombla (Mr.)</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peace (WANEPE) – Ghana</td>
<td>Regional Conflict Analyst</td>
<td>23/05/2018 Interviewee’s Office 11:00 - 11:35</td>
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