James Sutterlin: All of the interested parties in the Cambodian conflict dealt with you as an authoritative mediator on Cambodia even though you had no specific mandate. How do you explain this?

Rafeeuddin Ahmed [RA]: … It was only because I was a special representative of the Secretary-General. A person without some status would not be able to do anything.

JS: One of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar’s great qualities was a willingness to let Rafi Ahmed or Alvaro de Soto really run a particular operation.

RA: Sure. And, you know, I kept him informed regularly after every visit, after every new idea, and so on. And he was always very supportive and he never questioned my actions. But of course, I think after his visit to the region in 1985 he became more aware of the issues, although he also had been, as you know, the representative of Secretary-General Waldheim for a brief period when he was temporarily asked to go to Bangkok, to be there flying the UN flag when there was concern about a possible incursion into Thailand by Vietnamese forces. Waldheim wanted to have some sort of a … not a peacekeeping [force] but some UN presence which could be a deterrent. So, Pérez de Cuéllar was there; so he knew the problem, and he visited also Vietnam from there, Saigon I think. He knew the problem, and then when he went back to visit the area as
Secretary-General in 1985 he got more of a feel for this part of the world. It was in the report [on this visit] that he presented to the General Assembly in that year that kind of brought out the main elements that could serve as the basis for an agreement.

JS: And that was actually worked out before he made the trip, right? I mean the main points of that would have to be part of the comprehensive agreement. Hedi Annabi, in his recollections, said that one of the important aspects of these points was the way the question of genocide was handled or was not handled.

RA: Yes, and that’s one point on which the SG didn’t agree with me - I think that’s the only one I can think of. I wanted to put down a non-return to the “genocidal policies.” I thought using the adjective ‘genocidal’ would perhaps legally… but people argued they didn’t commit genocide, but, rather, a kind of auto-genocide, which is what happened. But *genocidal* could be like genocide, which was the fact. But he [Pérez de Cuéllar] absolutely refused to accept that. So, then we went to the wording on the “recent tragic history of Cambodia…”

JS: Which actually lasted through the whole…

RA: … yes – then it was taken up by everybody.

JS: So, in a sense this was a contribution because this, I judge, was acceptable to the Khmer Rouge.
RA: Yes – well, it was less offensive to them.

JS: I wanted actually to begin, though, by asking about the humanitarian affairs aspect. Sir Robert Jackson was in charge in 1982, I think, of the humanitarian assistance in Cambodia.

RA: Well, he was put in charge of the coordination of the humanitarian assistance to the Kampuchean people, which meant that he also had an overseeing role over the operation in Thailand.

JS: …on the border…

RA: … on the border, for the camps, the Khmers there, and also he launched a massive program inside the border when there was a real threat of famine. I think he averted that famine. But then after a couple of years, once CINPEC was removed, there was not much to do inside the borders. He did have some little things going on inside the border, mostly in the border camps; and he was reappointed at the height of the crisis. Because we had, at that time, if I remember correctly, Ilter Turkman who was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs for Southeast Asia. He has been appointed by Waldheim when there was this huge overflow of boat people, and there was a great deal of concern on the part of Secretary-General that the SOC was secretly involved and so a post was established from extra-budgetary resources and an inter-governmental group was appointed.
JS: That was still under Waldheim?

RA: Yes. And, normally, Itler would have been the person who was dealing with the Cambodian situation and so on, but Mrs. Carter recommended Sir Robert Jackson should be appointed.


RA: Yes. So, the Americans put pressure for somebody especially for Cambodia, and Sir Robert’s name was proposed, was supported by them, I don’t know who originated the idea.

JS: I remember she made a trip there at the time.

RA: Yes. She also came to New York and she was at the residence of the Secretary-General. I was not present, but apparently at that lunch she pressed for Sir Robert. And the idea was that Turkman would be, maybe he would still be involved.

JS: Well, there were problems in the relationship, weren’t there, between Jackson and some of the other agencies?

RA: Well, as you know this has always been a problem when you come to coordination – none of the agencies take it very lightly. They try to assert their own respective roles, and initially there was a problem, but, as you know, the border operation had been started by
the ICRC and UNICEF and then ICRC withdrew and UNICEF remained and then
UNICEF had set up a special operation, which UNDP was asked to take over to manage
the operation. But Sir Robert was the kind of super-czar. Eventually this post was
abolished.

JS: I know, I was involved in that. Some of the telegrams that “Jacko” sent back, that are
in the files, contain complaints about how what was being done in the border camps was
interfering with his work in trying to bring humanitarian assistance within Cambodia.
What was the background to that?

RA: I think he was genuinely concerned that we might be providing assistance to the
Khmer Rouge. It was perceived in Phnom Penh that many of these people that we were
feeding were Khmer Rouge soldiers, or the combatants belonging to Sihanouk or Son
Sen. I’m sure that there was no way to be sure that they were not being fed.

JS: Some of the food was certainly going to…

RA: … going to them. Some of the food was being given to the Thais who were then
responsible for delivering it, and I think that all of us felt that that food was probably
going to the combatants. I think that was one of the things that concerned Sir Robert,
because it made it more difficult for him to have a UNC that was more objective. As it
was, because of the resolutions being adopted in the General Assembly year after year, we
were already perceived as being biased in Hanoi and Phnom Penh, that the UN was
against them, that the UN had supported genocide, and so on.
JS: Yes – because it continued to recognize the Democratic Republic.

RA: Yes. But they did perceive … In 1980 there was this resolution in the General Assembly for an international conference, and there was a provision that the Secretary-General should have consultations. So, then we had sent, at that time, Mr. Essafi. Mr. Essafi had taken over from Turkman and Essafi, went to … that was the first kind of visit relating to Cambodia carried out on behalf of the Secretary-General. This was still in Dr. Waldheim’s time. He visited Laos, and Vietnam, and China, and all the ASEAN countries, and he was, you know, received in Hanoi. When Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar became Secretary-General and he appointed me as his Special Representative, and so Essafi switched jobs, [replacing Ahmed as Chef de Cabinet] he asked me to go to the region as soon as possible. So, I undertook my first visit there on his behalf, and got quite a lecture from the Vietnamese on international law, double standards….

So anyway, this was trying to see whether we could get the UN in the act. The international conference had failed the previous year, because of the boycott by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. So I had discussed with Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar whether it might be useful to probe the possibility of having a more limited conference which would be in between what the Vietnamese had wanted, at the time an international conference had been proposed, they said there should be a regional conference – while the ASEAN said “No, it should be an international conference.” And they [ASEAN] had the votes so they got the resolution, so an international conference took place but without the Vietnamese and their friends. So, I discussed with Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar whether we could explore the possibility of having a conference which would essentially be of the regional countries
but would include Permanent Members, the other four Permanent Members since China would be there as a regional country. Some other countries who might play a more useful, more constructive role and who could help to balance out, like India would also be included, because among the regional countries Vietnam and Laos would be the only two who would be on one side. So to have India which had already recognized the new regime in Cambodia, and Japan - that was the idea, and we explored that.

I must say that I didn’t have a meeting with all the ASEANs together, but individually I met all, I went to all the countries. They all said that they would go along with this idea. When I went to Vietnam they listened to the idea; they didn’t say no, but they didn’t say yes either. Of course Laos they always took their cue from Vietnam so they also didn’t say no. I think the Chinese were the only ones who were kind of sticking to the line of an international conference, although not very strongly. So, I think [they were] basically also saying, “Well, if the ASEANs accepted it….” And then, you know, there used to be a meeting of the Indo-Chinese foreign ministers – later that year they had their meeting, and at that meeting they came out with this idea as their proposal.

JS: … for the smaller, regional meeting.

RA: Yes. This kind of a limited international or regional, whatever you wanted to call it, a limited conference. And that was the kiss of death, as soon as that came out then the ASEANs said “No,” they objected to both forms. That was a rather bitter disappointment, because if they had only let us know quietly, then we could have worked it out and the Paris conference which took place, you know, ten years later, may have
taken place earlier. Maybe it would not have succeeded, but at least there would have been a forum to which they all would have come.

JS: Because the Paris conference was more or less the same format.

RA: Yes – more or less the same form, except that, you know, they had, of course, Australia and a few other countries.

JS: In this connection, it seems to me there is a pattern, that the UN constantly put forward ideas, and papers even, which became part of the actual agreements. This is not recognized in many of the histories that are being written as of now, and it’s one of the important things that I think we can correct here.

RA: Well, I mean, in this 1985 report of the Secretary-General, for the first time you have an outline of the elements which would go into [an agreement], and you look at the agreement and you see that, yes, all of those things which Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar said in 1985 are in that agreement which was finally reached. Also, the paper that we prepared in 1988. I also raised with the Secretary-General, and said, you know, “The time has come now that I have to go to Phnom Penh if we are to maintain our credibility to do something.” I had talked to the legal office about what did they think of my visiting there. They said Hammarskjöld had visited China, and so I said, “Can I get those papers?” So, they gave me the papers and I took a copy to the Secretary-General of the notes which were made of the meeting between Chou En Lai and Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld was explaining to Chou En Lai how he was there, under what mandate, and I underlined that
and I gave that to the Secretary-General. I said, “This is what he said, and I think you can say the same thing if somebody asks, that you have sent me because of this, on the same precedent.” And the Secretary-General read it, and he said, “Yes, OK. You can go.”

JS: Anyhow, on this point, now when you went to Phnom Penh, that was after or before Sihanouk had had the first meeting with, what was his name, the head of the government in Phnom Penh?

RA: With Hun Sen?

JS: Yes – with Hun Sen.

RA: I do not remember.

JS: I think it may have been after; I think that was one of the justifications also, since Sihanouk had met, … But the part about Hammarskjöld is interesting, because that does not come out in the files at all, at least not what I’ve found.

RA: You know, it really is worth reading that. I know I have it somewhere, where it is I don’t know. I kept that copy somewhere.

JS: That’s another question – I cannot find a copy of that paper of 1988. It’s described in some detail in here.
RA: The paper is now missing?

JS: It’s missing. Hedi is trying to find it, he thinks he might have a copy.

RA: Oh good.

JS: But I can’t find it in the files. I’m sure it’s in the files that were sent to Cambodia, but I don’t know where those files are. I don’t know why they were sent to Cambodia in the first place.

RA: I think it was Sadri who wanted all the files to go there. Because the office was dismembered, you see. My office of Special Representative no longer remained, so all the files were sent.

So, that was a very crucial decision taken by the Secretary-General. I’m not sure whether Sihanouk had already met him [Hun Sen]. I didn’t think he had, because I remember then this was a very major question and I don’t remember that argument. I remember the argument of Hammarskjöld.

JS: Which was a good precedent.

RA: Yes. So, that paper was then also given to the Secretary-General, in draft, and approved. He decided that I would go and hand it over to all the parties, give it to Phnom Penh, give it to Hanoi, to Laos, and to the ASEAN countries, and then to Bangkok. Then,
after that I had to go to Geneva for ECOSOC. There, I met with the Secretary-General, and he gave the paper to the Permanent Members.

JS: And that’s the first real contact with the Permanent Members on Cambodia? Because that was one of my questions.

RA: On Cambodia – yes. He gave them all these papers.

JS: Now, that would have been after Gorbachev. What I’m trying to put together was that the Five were beginning to work together at that point, so that…

RA: This is 1988.

JS: 1988. So, it would have been after. Because it began really with Iran-Iraq, which was 1987, actually.

RA: That was the tea that was held at the house.

JS: Exactly. That was what I wanted to get clear.

RA: It was in January…

JS: Well, the actual… because the conference-room meeting that you and I were both present at, I think, was in 1987 in December when the Secretary-General decided that he
would call, at a press conference he was having, that he would call on the five Permanent Members to do something with regard to Iran and Iraq, because it was a dangerous situation in the Gulf at that point, and that was really the beginning of the...

RA: But when he got the five of them together in the residence...

JS: That was the beginning of 1988.

RA: That was January 1988.

JS: That’s right – he had had the press conference before, in December 1987. So, this fits in that sense.

RA: Right – we gave it to all five of them. Meanwhile, the other processes started – the JIB process in Jakarta.

JS: Yes – could I just ask, Sihanouk, when did he enter the picture, I mean, as far as your conversations with the regional countries?

RA: I don’t remember.

JS: The Secretary-General apparently did see him during the 1985 trip.

RA: Yes. But I must have seen him before.
JS: Before that. Possibly in Beijing.

RA: Yes, possibly, but I don’t remember.

JS: The Secretary-General did not feel at ease with Sihanouk, apparently. He didn’t really like him.

RA: No.

JS: What was your impression of Sihanouk?

RA: I really liked him. I mean, I grew quite fond of him. In spite of all his shenanigans, you know, he is a true patriot. He really loved his country, his people. And quite often there was method in his madness.

JS: This is what I wanted to ask: did you have a sense that he knew what he was doing?

RA: Quite often there was. There were occasions where he was being obstreperous or just downright stubborn, you know. But there were also occasions where you could see that maybe he had a point. I remember once meeting him in Kuala Lumpur late in the night [passage unclear]…

JS: What about the son, Prince Ranariddh?
RA: The son was very much in the shadow of his father. I met him in Bangkok, at his house, two or three times, and he was always very deferential, but you would never say he would report to his father. So, he seemed a reasonable person, but he doesn’t have the charisma, the stature, and so on.

JS: I wanted to go to the first Paris meeting, where, rather miraculously, the UN delegation was able to provide papers to the three committees, which they apparently very badly needed. How did you do that so quickly, those papers?

RA: We had been, kind of, you know, working, thinking and working, after the 1988 paper, on what would be done the various aspects of power sharing, and what was being discussed in Paris was more or less the same thing that we had already kind of launched. And, of course, I had people working with me who …

JS: As usual you had a good team?

RA: I had an excellent team. Linda Hanzou, and Hedi Annabi, and Timothy, you know, Dibuama, on the military side, he was the one who was preparing the paper, with Linda, he had to get things done in a way that we had military input but we also had a political network. And so we were able to provide them papers, I think, on every agenda item that they had.
JS: But at that stage, at the first stage of the Paris conference, what was the status exactly of the UN? The Secretary-General went and opened, or gave a speech, but he went as Secretary-General, but separated himself from the General Assembly in some way. What was the background of that? Why was that the case?

RA: Well, you know, the Vietnamese had been opposed to the UN as such, so the French came up with this formula, that the United Nations would be present without official status. But we told them that “No, the Secretary-General will need to have his sign. We had extensive consultations with the French on the convening of the conference. They asked us to fly over to Paris to talk to them; they came to Geneva at one point. So, you know, we discussed the composition and things like that.

JS: But it was a French initiative?

RA: It was a French initiative. And then they decided to introduce the Indonesians. They became the co-sponsors.

JS: Now, I wanted to ask another question – the earlier international conference really got no place. Was there any resentment on the part of those who had been involved, like the Austrians, in the international conference, when in fact the whole situation was taken over?

RA: They didn’t really. I don’t recall them expressing anything, but they must have felt left out. But I don’t recall them expressing any bitterness or anything.
JS: Because in fact, the international conference really led to nothing, right?

RA: [yes.]

JS: In a similar way, I wanted to ask about the Australian initiative, and Gareth Evans, in particular. Their initiative came later, of course, but it was to the effect of really turning over the administration of Cambodia to the United Nations, which I think you had to discourage to a certain extent because it was so broad. How much effect did this Australian initiative have? They sent missions to Cambodia. They sent missions all around.

RA: You know, I think they were not… I mean, everybody certainly gave lip service [to the initiative], but they were not that important. I mean, they produced this famous red book. I remember they rushed it to Jakarta where we were meeting, to the chairmen of a kind of informal meeting, and nobody would mention that book. We didn’t read it. It had no importance.

JS: And then later on, at a later stage, they produced a draft single negotiating text, the Australians did.

RA: Yeah – which, again, did nothing.

JS: It did nothing.
RA: We worked very closely with the Permanent Five and the Commissioner, but most of the drafting was done by us of the Final Agreement.

JS: Yes – I want to get that into the record somehow, and there are meetings of the Cambodian task force [in the Secretariat] of which I have records, where you more or less go over in detail the various papers that were prepared at Headquarters. A lot of the drafting was done at Headquarters, is that correct?

RA: And then some there on the spot, when we met in Paris, we drafted. [unclear]. We would take the advice of the conference…

JS: Now, Pérez de Cuéllar, himself, was not much involved in any of the give and take on these papers, was he? You see, one of my problems, is that the records of the conversations that I do have that he had with, oh, the foreign minister of France, and [so on], he more or less says the same thing each time. I mean, there are certain points that are good that come through, that whatever agreement emerged has to be “effective, clear, and the mandate has to be clear” and so forth and so on, and that’s repeated over and over again. But there’s not much in addition to that. Can you think of other things that can be identified with him, in particular?

RA: In the agreement?
JS: There was at one point, I think, in the final text, there was a point that gave you some concern because it indicated that the Paris Conference itself would draft the implementation procedures, which would be, in fact, what the United Nations was going to do. I think there are a couple of places where the Secretary-General took that up with the French and others, and said “You know, after all, the UN is the one that is going to have to do this, so we should be involved in drafting it.” That’s there.

RA: Yes. And also, that, it has to come to the Security Council. They could not give us directives.

JS: I judge also that the Secretary-General did establish a fairly good personal relationship with, I don’t know how to pronounce his name, Kotac -- that a certain rapport was established there. Was that your impression?

RA: Yes. He liked Ramulo - an old man and a founder of the UN, he liked very much.

JS: But Ramulo was not very much involved, was he?

RA: No, but, you know, he was the Philippine Foreign Minister.

JS: So he attended the meetings?

RA: Yes, and he came here and met with the Secretary-General.
JS: Yes, that I remember. There was a differentiation, though, between the position of the United Nations when the Paris Conference began, and when it ended. By the time it ended, the UN was an official participant.

RA: We were more or less like witnesses, at first

JS: Right, right. The UN was present, but that’s…

RA: Yes. Although we had all the rights – we had insisted on that before going to Paris that if we would go to the Paris conference we would have equal, you know, everything, you see. And we had a veto, also, because everybody had a veto.

JS: Yes – now, was that from the beginning?

RA: Yes.

JS: That was from the beginning. Because it was agreed that it would be by consensus, right, all decisions?

RA: Yes.

JS: So, in that sense the UN – this is rather unique then, in this sense – the UN had this veto right.
RA: Right. So, from the beginning we had insisted on that right.

JS: Now, the other question, and I don’t want to keep you much longer, but the General Assembly several times agreed on resolutions that defined requirements for a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian problem. As far as I can see, they are again very similar to those initial requirements for a comprehensive settlement that the Secretary-General put forward. Was there any competition between the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in this sense? Because they don’t acknowledge the Secretary-General. They don’t say, “This is the Secretary-General’s…”

RA: No, but eventually they take his language.

JS: That’s right. That’s what I mean. They do take the language.

RA: Including the “non-return to…”

JS: The same language as far as I can see. But there’s no acknowledgment that it comes from him.

RA: No.

JS: So, there’s no particular reason for that, it’s just that they preferred to pretend that it was theirs?
RA: Yeah, yeah.

JS: It’s difficult to figure that out, because in a sense then, what emerges from the files is that the Secretary-General is following a General Assembly resolution which, in fact, simply puts in words what he had already put forward.

RA: Yes.

JS: Now, the relationship with the five Permanent Members. There is a good bit in the files on this. Again it doesn’t seem to involve the Secretary-General very much. You met repeatedly with them.

RA: Well, at their first meeting held in Paris they didn’t invite us. From the second meeting onwards, they invited us to come basically just to make a presentation and leave. They didn’t ask questions. And when they met here in New York, they also met with the Secretary-General.

JS: They always reported to the Secretary-General afterward.

RA: Only when we got to the stage of drafting, then we were fully in.

JS: And you actually went… the papers which became part of the final act were really discussed with the five Permanent Members.
RA: Yes, yes. It was, for them, we were working with them. It was their paper that there needed to be an agreement on.

JS: How do you explain the fact that the Five really took over?

RA: Well, I think they felt that unless something was done, the parties would never be able to overcome. And I think there were these forces working there – I think the Chinese wanted, in fact, good relations; the Americans also wanted to engage the Soviet Union. All these changes [took place]. And the Soviets didn’t want to, you know, go on just backing the Vietnamese. They wanted to have better relations with China and the United States.

JS: Did you find that any one of the five tended to take the lead in pushing things forward? The French, Martin, was apparently…

RA: Yes, the French certainly – the Americans.

JS: So, it was a good team?

RA: They were a good team, yes. The Russian, also, was very good, Gorbachev.

JS: I noticed that you met a lot with Gorbachev, in Moscow and other places?
RA: Yes – But one of the things, you see, I was discussing with him was this, and again I talked with the Secretary-General, about making a proposal on these islands, north of the Japanese…

JS: … Ah – the Kuriles?

RA: Yes. So, I raised with him this question on the UN role in trying to settle that problem, and he said, “Well, come back – what ideas do you have?” So, I basically gave him the thing we had developed for the Falklands as an idea, that this could be one way where the Japanese and the Soviet and the UN flags were all flying for a period of time, under a UN administrator with both Japanese and Soviets representatives present. So, basically I resurrected our Falklands team, and he liked it. He said that he would take it up with Sheverndadze, and so on. And, you know, we kept talking about it. And even now they remember, the other day one of the Russians said, “Oh – you gave that idea, see you know, maybe one day it will work!”

So, I had a double thing with him. One was Cambodia, of course. And this other thing was going on at the same time.

JS: That’s not in any of the files.

RA: No, no, that’s not. Except, you know, there was one note that I sent to the Secretary-General at one point, after my meeting with Gorbachev, and I told him, you know, I recommended that he should now tell the Japanese that this is a possibility, get
their opinion. But he never did. He just told me to tell the Japanese, which I did and the Japanese reaction was very cautious.

JS: Naturally. That leads me to one of my last questions. I found, I think, that the first time that the Japanese raised the question of Japanese representation in the UN effort in Cambodia they spoke of the Special Representative post, but also of lower rank. And, they indicated in the same conversation that they were going to provide a good bit of money for the operation.

RA: Right.

JS: So, was there Japanese pressure already in early 1991 for a Japanese as Special Representative?

RA: No. They always – I mean, all of them said that I should be the Special Representative. When Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar visited Japan, I think sometime in 1991, I think there was some exchange where the impression was given that they would like the Special Representative’s post, but then the foreign ministry – I mean, this was a meeting with the Prime Minister…

JS: That’s right, this is the memo that I’ve seen.

RA: And then the Japanese foreign ministry people clarified that there was a mistake.
JS: I think Paul Kavanaugh saw them later and then they said that they were talking about lower ranks.

RA: They were talking about not the top, but maybe the number two or something. There was a misunderstanding. So they were never… they didn’t push it, they didn’t expect it.

JS: Yes. There was some pressure, beginning at the end of 1990, I think, the French, the P5, told the Secretary-General that they would be very glad if he would go ahead and appoint a Special Representative but he didn’t do it.

RA: There was even a resolution of the Security Council asking him to appoint one.

JS: Why was that? And you had conversations with him on the same subject, even the profile of the desirable Special Representative, and I think you indicated that it should be at a very high rank, as equivalent to Director General.

RA: Yes, I thought that because of the fact that it would be a very big operation, and also that he would have to deal with all this, be a super-governor or whatever the post would be, he should have that high stature. That was my recommendation. But, I made the same recommendation to Boutros-Ghali. I think, you know, Pérez de Cuéllar might have agreed to that.

JS: Yes. But then at the end Pérez de Cuéllar didn’t want to preempt the …
RA: He didn’t want to preempt the new Secretary-General. I think if I had accepted, then he may have appointed me.

JS: But you definitely did not want it, I understand?

RA: I did not want it. I also felt that there would be a need at Headquarters for somebody to kind of ‘back-stop’ for this very major operation, and apart from myself and Hedi and Linda and Timothy, there was nobody who knew about it, you see. So, that’s what I told the Secretary-General, I mean, I told Pérez de Cuéllar and I told Boutros-Ghali, that I would probably be better used to back-stop this very major, more than a billion dollar operation. They would need somebody. I think, I was right, now, in retrospect, it would have been better to keep me here, in charge of a steering office, and have Hedi and Linda here to back-stop it. I don’t know if Pérez de Cuéllar accepted my argument but he never said no when I told him the reasons why.

JS: I think he did as a matter of fact.

RA: He did.

JS: But he didn’t want to… well, he couldn’t really [pre-empt Boutros-Ghali].

RA: No, he couldn’t. That was for the new Secretary-General.
JS: I think he was deeply shocked by the changes that were made by the new Secretary-General, and the new Secretary-General did not consult him, which is probably right.

Rafi, finally, is there any one incident that stands out in your mind, really, a crisis, in the whole Cambodian story. I mean, the genocide is interesting, I’ll use that. You had this long, frustrating, business of the Supreme Council, whether it was going to have thirteen members or fourteen members. But that seems not to have been resolved by the UN.

RA: No. Then there was the question of proportional representation.

JS: And Namibia had some influence on that, right? I mean, there was some crossover experience, because the same problem had arisen, and also on some of the military questions.

RA: Yes. Confinement.

JS: There’s some parallelism between Namibia, the Western Sahara, if one dares to speak of it, and Cambodia in this respect. OK. Thank you very, very much. -