THE MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION: A CATALYST FOR PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA?

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LEGON    JULY 2016
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of original research undertaken by me under the supervision of Dr. Afua B. Yakohene and that no part of it has been submitted elsewhere for any other purpose. Further, references to the work of other persons or bodies have been duly acknowledged.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to God Almighty, my parents Mr. and Mrs. Baffoe-Ashun and my ministry, for their unflinching support and encouragement over the period.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my profound gratitude to the Almighty God for giving me the wisdom and guidance to undertake this research. I would also like to express my sincerest gratitude to my parents, my siblings and friends for their prayers and support throughout the academic year.

Special thanks go to all lecturers, staff and librarians at LEADIAD, who through their tireless efforts made our academic year worthwhile and enjoyable. I am particularly grateful to my supervisor Dr. Afua Yakohene for her guidance and supervision at all stages of the dissertation and for seeing it through to a successful completion.

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Lastly, I remain grateful to all friends and loved ones for their varied support and encouragement throughout this work. I remain forever grateful.
### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDEG</td>
<td>African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</td>
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<td>ACPCC</td>
<td>African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGA</td>
<td>African Governance Architecture</td>
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<td>APPER</td>
<td>Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOCC</td>
<td>Economic, Social, and Cultural Council</td>
</tr>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAL</td>
<td>Final Act of Lagos</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSGIC</td>
<td>Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIAG</td>
<td>Ibrahim Index of African Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IREEP</td>
<td>Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>International Trade Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LBS</td>
<td>London Business School</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIF</td>
<td>Mo Ibrahim Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
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SOEs  State Owned Enterprises
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNECA  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCAP  United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
USA  United States of America
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USG  United States Government
WB  World Bank
WTO  World Trade Organization
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ABSTRACT

Over the last decade, the concept of good governance has been highly canvassed for across the world. For Africa in particular, the concept has been viewed as a panacea for its increasing challenges in governance and sustainable economic development. This has necessitated development partners such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to spell out a set of principles to guide their objectives in member countries. To a large extent, these external influences have not been entirely without challenges. The 21st century Africa has instituted mechanisms and initiatives that seek to drive its own governance crusade across the world. Further, other private individuals like Dr Mo Ibrahim of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF) have sought to use his wealth and expertise to help Africa rise from the doldrums of bad governance. The MIF seeks to ensure good and accountable governance and transparent leadership across the fifty-four (54) states of Africa through its initiatives: the Ibrahim Index of African Governance; the Ibrahim Prize; the Ibrahim Forum and the Ibrahim Fellowship.

Using a qualitative research methodology, unstructured interviews, observation techniques and other secondary sources of data the research has gained insights on the perceptions of some people about the Foundation. The findings affirm the hypothesis that the MIF is a catalyst for promoting good governance in Africa.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.0 Background to Research Problem

The parlance of governance as an imperative in the role of state has been defined by Kaufman et al\(^1\) as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.” The 1995 Commission on Global Governance defines governance as, “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”. It can be deduced that, for governance to be played out, there is the need for an institution that manages and exercises authority. According to Bevir (2008),\(^2\) the concept of governance can be derived from diverse disciplines which rely on different assumptions. The concept of governance is believed to have received much awareness during the 1980s and 1990s public sector reforms.\(^3\) However, governance is often thought of to have existed prior to these reforms.

In the context of Africa, governance has been viewed as a necessary parameter and variable assessed, especially for donor agencies in extending both bilateral and multilateral aid and support to the continent.\(^4\) This condition is due to the fact that Africa has had situations of bad governance in terms of the nature of rule, failure to protect human rights, inclination to hold onto power, corruption and unconstitutional reforms.\(^5\) These have been disastrous for the economies of Africa and have unequivocally given need to improved governance termed: good governance.

According to Hyden,\(^6\) governance is “good” when it allocates and manages resources to respond to collective problems, in other words, when a state efficiently provides public goods.
of necessary quality to its citizens. It is for this reason that the former United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Kofi Annan considers good governance as ‘the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.’ Unlike governance, good governance highlights the need for efficiency in exercising state duties. The promotion of good governance has become indispensable as it ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in the society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources.

Good governance though promulgated across the world, appears to be more prosecuted on the African continent due to major economic mismanagement and hardships that the continent suffers. Unfortunately, this concept has remained elusive in most African countries as opposed to the envisaged development in the post-colonial Africa. It has been identified that elements such as poor leadership, endemic corruption, lack of political will and states tardiness in implementing democracy has caused the snail paced realisation of the concept.

Fortunately for Africa, the era of globalization has brought an upsurge of non-state actors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Transparency International Index, and African Governance Institute, leading the crusade and calling for the need to promote good governance that will harness development. According to Attina, indeed the proliferation of these institutions and organisations create a formal expression of the extent to which international politics has become more institutionalised. This further suggests that, the presence of states and non-state actors tackling new and uprising topical issues of democracy, climate change and even globalisation is essential in the formulation of political strategies to address problems of the global system. Likewise, the 21st century Africa has seen the promotion of the tenets of good governance through mechanisms and foundations such as the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the African Union, as a framework of the implementation of NEPAD, and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

Although all these institutions and initiatives exist, there seems to be a growing euphoria across the continent about the viability of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. In response to how Africa could improve governance, the private African foundation (Mo Ibrahim Foundation) seeks to ensure quality governance, transparent leadership and overall peace and security on the African continent. According to the foundation, governance is the provision of the political, social and economic goods that any citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that any state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.

The Foundation considers its primary objective of putting governance at the centre of any conversation on African development. It therefore categorises its objective under four key initiatives namely the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, Ibrahim Forum and the Ibrahim Leadership Fellowship. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is an annual statistical assessment of the quality of governance in every African country. The Index as adopted by the foundation aims to fill the gaps left by existing governance indices by providing a comprehensive, objective and quantifiable method of measuring governance quality in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ibrahim Index evaluates good governance on the basis of four basic categories of these core political goods: Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and human rights, Sustainable economic opportunity and Human development. Its data are obtained from multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, think tanks such as Freedom House and United Nations agencies, as well as African data providers (African Development Bank, Institute for
Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP) and The Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD Ghana). These sources provide a range of data types, including Expert Assessments, Official Data and Opinion Surveys.

Other initiatives like the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, celebrates excellence in African leadership. This incentive is a prize award rewarded to a former Executive Head of State or Government by an independent Prize Committee for exhibiting great leadership during his or her tenure in office.

Ibrahim Forum on the other hand is an annual high-level discussion which takes place in a selected African country and convened around one specific issue of critical importance to Africa which demands committed leadership and sound governance. Unlike other fora, which may tackle other global issues, the Ibrahim forum tackles specifically issues of governance and leadership in Africa.

The Ibrahim Leadership Fellowship is a selective programme designed to mentor future African leaders by current leaders of key multilateral institutions. As a governance indicator, prominent persons such as the late Nelson Mandela and Kofi Annan the former UN Secretary-General, have lauded the initiatives, partly because of the incentives it provides to make the concept of governance attractive and its mission of putting governance at the centre of every conversation in Africa. In spite of this, countries like Malawi and Rwanda have not failed to express mixed feelings on their ratings on the 2015 IIAG and what governance appears to be in their countries. The foundation has highlighted the importance and role institutions should play in ensuring that existing governments meet their goal of improving
development in their economy and making the concept good governance more visible and attainable.

Nonetheless, it appears the foundations has shown great efforts in playing ‘the devil’s advocate’ by pushing for what governments should do in curbing the menace that today stalls governance on the African continent.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

The importance of good governance in the development of the world and Africa in particular cannot be over emphasized. Development agencies have been supporting most African countries in the promotion of good governance in Africa through the implementation of programmes and initiatives such as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPs), Compact by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, among others.

According to Adedeji, the implementation of these programmes and initiatives could not achieve their intended objectives due to the fact that the pools of conditionality were problematic for Africans. This prompted African leaders such as Thabo Mbeki, Abdoulaye Wade and others to propose and initiate an African review system that will push Africa to meet its own standards and lead the crusade of good governance on the continent; hence the establishment of African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). As a voluntary African initiative which assesses African leaders in the areas of economic, political and administrative governance, the operations of APRM have increasingly been fraught with challenges such as inadequate funding and lack of political will by leaders to accede to the APRM review process.
Despite the inability of the APRM to function as it should, other private individuals have taken the initiative to further pursue the good governance agenda on the African continent. Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese-born telecommunications executive, established the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2006. Since its establishment, the Mo Ibrahim foundation has supported good governance in Africa through its four cardinal initiatives: IIAG, Ibrahim Prize, Ibrahim Fellowship and Ibrahim Forum. The Index like other African proposed indicators is used to assess the performance of African countries under four categories: Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human Right, Sustainable Economic Opportunity and Human development. The IIAG of the MIF uses a collective ranking system to assess, rank and award its Ibrahim Prize. So far 5 former heads of states namely: President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, President Festus Mogae of Botswana, President Pedro De Verona Rodrigues of Cape Verde and President Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia have received the Ibrahim Awards on Excellence in Leadership for the promotion of good governance in their respective countries. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that on four different occasions (2009, 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2015), the foundation was not able to select any former Head of State as deserving of the award.

Therefore the inability of the IIAG to provide a complicit ranking system to assess countries thereafter awarding a prize winner proves that the promotion of good governance goes beyond democratic institutions, advocacy and progressive human right institutions and issues. Other critics are of the view that the general welfare of the citizenry forms an integral component of good governance which many indices fail to capture or give accurate measure. More are also of the view that the constant upgrade of the IIAG to encompass other factors that were hitherto may have not analysed makes the IIAG a credible tool to use be governments and other state agencies. It is therefore imperative that research is undertaken to
determine the IIAG’s efforts, trajectory, success and challenges in MIF’s quest to promote good governance in Africa.

1.2 Research Questions
In addressing the above research problem, the study attempts to provide responses to the following questions:

- How effective is the IIAG to assess and rate good governance?
- How responsive are states to the initiatives of the Ibrahim Foundation?
- What are the constraints facing the foundation in promoting good governance?

1.3 Research Objectives
This dissertation seeks:

- To examine the effectiveness of the IIAG to assess and rate on good governance.
- To identify how responsive states are to the initiatives of the Ibrahim Foundation.
- To ascertain the challenges confronting the foundation in ensuring good governance in Africa.

1.4 Scope of the Study
The study is aimed at analysing the promotion of governance in Africa with particular focus on the IIAG. Though, the four cardinal initiatives of the MIF lie at the heart of this research, much focus on the IIAG four political goods that is Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human Right, Sustainable Economic Opportunity and Human development. It will pay attention to some countries’ ranking and whether their rankings speak of the reality of good governance in all the four thematic areas of the index in Sub-Saharan Africa and its potential of being an awardee.
1.5 Rationale of the Study

Research works have been done in the area of governance and good governance and its relation to sustainable development, socio-economic development, human rights and democracy. However, the effectiveness of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation in the promotion of good governance has been limited in empirical research. This study intends to bridge that gap in the literature and serve as a reference point for further research.

1.6 Clarification of Key Concepts

For the purpose of this study, the following concepts have been operationally defined as follows:

- Governance: The traditions and institutions by which country exercises authority to manage its affairs at all levels.\(^{29}\)
- Good governance: is among other things participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law.\(^{30}\)
- Institutions: not comprising of organisations only but the set ups that serve as checks and balances for a long-term goal.
- Africa: one of the continents of the world with fifty-four recognised sovereign states of diverse cultures and languages
- The West: Development partners and donor countries that aid Africa to meet certain developmental criteria.

1.7 Hypothesis

The hypothesis guiding this study is that, the IIAG is contributing to good political governance in Africa.
1.8 Conceptual Framework

The study is conducted within the framework of Developing and Evaluating Governance Indexes by Rachel Gisselquist. The framework describes the proliferation of composite governance indicators used in both research and policy making. These indicators are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in developed and developing countries.\(^{31}\) According to the author, the purpose of such indicators is to capture multiple facts or dimensions of complex concepts in a way that facilitates evaluation and comparison. The author purports that these are useful tools to analyse and assess governance.

Consequently, the framework suggests that, a review of the fundamentals of these indices should be based on a social science methodology. These fundamental principles include: concept formation, content validity, reliability, replicability, robustness and relevance of the measure to underlying research questions.\(^{32}\) It adds that, most governance indicators skip these concept specifications and define governance by how it is operationalized within their organisation. Though one of such defaulters is the IIAG, which offers an exceptionally broad definition:

Governance … is considered from the viewpoint of the citizen. The definition is intentionally broad so as to capture all of the political, social and economic goods and services that any citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that any state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens. The IIAG is unique in that it assesses governance by measuring outputs and outcomes. This definition of governance does not focus on de jure measurements, but rather aims to capture attainments or results, reflecting the actual status of governance performance in a given context – be it national, regional or continental.\(^{33}\)

The author reiterates that, such definition appears to be clear and specific in the sense that, they refer back to detailed lists of categorises, sub-categories and indicators. Governance indicators like the IIAG do not provide a standalone guide to the attainment of good governance and its reforms within African countries. They are structured with a set of good
governance practices which relates to performing well for the assigned goals and objectives, promoting values for the organisation, making well informed and transparent decisions such as enhancing fora, focusing on capacity building and management of existing challenges effectively. As a result of this, Mitra\textsuperscript{34} describes the IIAG as one of the best-known measures of governance for Africa, as ‘a well-established index that has become a reference point for governments and NGOs.’

Once the existing principles of concept formation, validity, reliability, etc and the afore suggested practices in the framework are achieved, it will further improve the strategy of the Ibrahim Foundation so as to help in the smooth operation and efficient management of the MIF objectives. The developed system which would be a merge of the principles and practices will lead to a mass recognition of the organisation and its activities or initiatives, efficiency of objective realisation, and confrontation of less or fewer challenges it may encounter at present. This would enhance the efficiency and overall performance of the institutional management which is crucial to the continuous development of MIF.

On the other hand, major critiques have highlighted how extant literature accepts that indices may be useful but raise particular concerns about particular measures. One set of criticisms focuses on the validity of particular governance measures, arguing that they do not match the common understanding of governance. Kaufmann and Kraay\textsuperscript{35}, for instance, draw a distinction between governance outcomes and development outcomes and criticize the IIAG as an ‘extreme example’ of mixing both together, which they consider problematic because it ‘risks making the links from governance to development tautological’. Debates have also focused on whether governance should be conceptualized and measured in terms of inputs, process, or outcomes\textsuperscript{36} and objective data or perceptions.\textsuperscript{37} Other critics relatedly highlight
the failure of existing measures of governance to separate out the effect of government action from that of other contextual factors, such as poverty.\textsuperscript{38}

Thus, the proposed governance indicator framework when implemented in the MIF would improve its credibility, increase recognition by other African states and accelerate the process of harnessing the tenets of good governance in Africa.

1.9 Literature Review

1.9.1 The Concept of Governance and the Ideology behind Good Governance

The general concept of governance as a pattern of rule or as the activity of ruling has a long lineage in the English language.\textsuperscript{39} Much of current interest in governance derives from its specific use in relation to changes in the state since the late twentieth century. These changes date from the neoliberal reforms of the public sector in the 1980s. The neoliberals believe that the post-war state cannot be sustained any longer especially in a world that is now characterized by highly mobile capital.\textsuperscript{40} They suggest in particular that the state should concentrate on making policy decisions rather than on delivery of services. The neoliberal concept of governance as a minimal state conveys a preference of less government.

Unfortunately, Kumar et al, contend that good governance appears to mirror a neo-liberal state and a western ideology of how the affairs of states should be managed just like the manner in which governance is conducted. In their work ‘Good Governance, Democratic Societies and Globalization’\textsuperscript{41} Kumar agrees that good governance is defined within an open economy and a liberal postulate. He posits that this notion of good governance is usually in relation to the conditionalities attached to aid which Third World countries are usually not ready for. Kumar et al intimate that, prescriptions that come with the concept fails to
encompass the fact that Third World countries have different socio-economic development rates and different types of government systems.\textsuperscript{42}

To some extent the author argues that, the function of neo-liberal institutions has become questionable as some view it as a symbol of re-colonization by the West.\textsuperscript{43} They stressed that what may be deemed as good, sound governance may not be the same elsewhere. Evidently, “in more utilitarian western culture, great store may be placed on the efficiency whiles elsewhere the desire for harmony and consensus may override this value.”\textsuperscript{44}

According to Guhan,\textsuperscript{45} “an open liberal democracy is non-negotiable bedrock of what good governance must mean.” This is because there seems to be a discrepancy in the word to symbolize two major issues of aid agencies “economic reform” and “structural adjustment.” Translating these two definitions, means a reinvention of a government rather than help existing government reshape its operations.

Moving beyond these ideological perspectives, Guhan explains that there is a link between globalization, good governance and democratic states. They assert that the context of globalization has aided in spreading the gospel of good governance and that requires more democratic states to accomplish. They also highlight governance in the societal context, administrative reforms and corporate governance. Kumar et al opine that these three have a bearing on each other since administrative reforms provide a mechanism for good governance at the macro level which is in turn related to good governance at the corporate level.\textsuperscript{46} However their thesis clearly shows that the idea of good governance has for some time been limited to what aid agencies tend to promote.
1.9.2 The Impact of Globalization & the Rise of Non-State Actors in Governance

*Armstrong et al* in their work ‘*Civil society and International Governance*’ also touch a bit on how globalization is impacting international governance. They assert that globalization has wielded non-sates actors with much (more) power than it is supposed to have\(^47\). Putting a case in point, they affirm that globalization has invariably made it difficult for states to evenly distribute development resource in the economy since they are made to cut down on most investments due to their commitments or associations with non-state actors especially with financial institutions. Armstrong et al detail that the consequence of globalization has made structures and processes which occur within states, no longer a viable factor or determinant of political, social, economic dynamics that shape the modern world.

Considering the rise of non-state actors and the issue of governance, *Armstrong et al* argue that current distortion of major economies of the world largely has to do with the paradigm shift in the predictability of the global system.\(^48\) The authors indicate that, with states lurching from one crisis to the other; which could be identified as the reliving of another cold war system and the nearly ungovernable nature of African countries to the unconventional tactics of war, all boil down to one key issue; \(^49\) a failure in management, or better, a crisis in governance.

In order to explain this view, they first create a discretionary view of what stands as governance and what government stands for. They posit that governance does not rely on the laurels of government, although governments tend to promote governance. Citing James Rosenau, he explains that governance may even take place without the presence of a government. In this case certain institutions would have been given the mandate to perform this function regardless.\(^50\) Current trending issues of states have emerged from the
environment, health, peace, migration among others. Nevertheless, as these issues emerged, Armstrong indicates that many different kinds of non-state actors, ranging from transnational cooperation to multilateral cooperation have sprung up to tackle these developments. They argue that, in international relations the notion of the international governance being attributed to state actors and interstate relations is gradually giving way to global governance where the activities of states and non-state actors and intergovernmental organizations are taking precedence.

They explain that organizations such as the civil society have a key role to play in global governance. These civil societies are defined as those aspects of social life that are directly outside the control of a state, created by a private individual or a volunteer group. This role is crucial because they publicly expose areas in which the elements of governance such as transparency and accountability are not forthcoming. In their literature they appeal to leaders to publish results of findings through all forms of communiqués regarding areas where compliance has not been achieved. Since the operations of a private body are not subject to any governments rule, most civil societies prefer to retain the independence and freedom to criticize government. However, this does not make them immune from criticism. Their literature is however silent on whether the NGOs and non-state actors are able to meet their target in promoting global governance.

1.9.3 Good Governance in the 21st Century

The 21st century good governance appears to be more concerned with developing countries than the developed countries. A comprehensive work on the topic is tackled in the Ahrens et al book on *Good Governance in the 21st Century: Conflict, Institutional change and Development in the Era of Globalization.* Assessing countries like China, India and other
East Asian countries, they stress that the aspect of good governance has been a key ingredient for economic development. They call on nations to gird up their structures to ensure the sustainability of promoting the above concept. In their work, they point out that bottlenecks in institutions tend to make the goal of good governance unrealistic. According to Ahrens et al the best practice of good governance can better be implemented by government within a society. They therefore ignite governments to assume their roles for which they have lacked capacity for long.

Agreeing with Samuel Huntington’s view on the clash of civilizations intertwined with the issue of globalization, Werner Ruf further describes how these two areas are creating new dimensions in international relations and widening a more unpredictable state of the international system; thus, making the goal of good governance far from the reach of society. They intimate that in dealing with good governance, one cannot do away with the nature and form conflict has taken in the world. Also, major institutional reform in the economy that has evolved in the 21st century was all in the aim of harnessing the concept of good governance.

Just like Armstrong, Ahrens stresses the need to take advantage of the opportunity created by globalization and use it for the betterment of society when it comes to implementing good governance. They however recommend that there is the need to use the presence of global actors who include NGOs and international organizations who are already involved in the monitoring and implementation of global standards of governance to shape local governance. Although they recommend it, their work however does not take into account emerging actors who have been established to purposefully drive the concept of good governance within the
individual states. They rather push for governments to ‘take the bull by the horn’ and promote the concept of good governance.

1.9.4 Good Governance in Africa

Although the gospel of good governance has received a wide recognition across the globe, authors like Appiah et al provide a trajectory to this concept and its lack of functionality in the African setting in their work ‘Professionalism and Good Governance in Africa’. In their work, Appiah for instance, using Ghana as his case study, dates back to the colonial period of how structures and institutions inherited from the colonial rule were British-inclined, to the extent that some African leaders like Nkrumah moved for a wave of Africanization or localization. This intervention experienced not only in Ghana but other West African countries as well as Eastern African countries after independence was to convert institutions, especially civil service sectors, to become more local-friendly, thus employing more of the locals and reducing the number of expats.

However, this did not suffice in curtailing the deficiencies in the public sector and old management styles. This rather brought stringent bureaucratic reforms in the operations of public offices. This, according to Appiah et al, made the theory of professionalism, that is “a situation where state believed that education and technology produced a specialized group of workers in a given field that was not accessible to everybody in the society,” hard to reach. Mallaya for instance stresses that a study on African administration processes and professionalism in particular will unravel areas that Africans have dire state problems. They assert that due to the lack of professionalism exhibited by most workers in the public sector of how work is done only for remunerational benefits rather than the passion for the job, creates institutional challenges. This they explained created a dent in institutions resulting in
bad governance extinguishing the continent. They reveal that targets set at the end of the day were not met since the job may only be seen as a means to an end and not an end in itself.\textsuperscript{62} Appiah et al opine that, it is for this reason why major global financial institutions, as well as aid donors, have resorted to a reform in management limiting the intake of professionals and ensuring that, the few work to attain the goal of the public sector. Once stakeholders attack this problem from the grassroots, ensuring the elements and dimensions of good governance is easier than expected. They are also witness to the fact that current reforms toward good governance in the public sector have not been easy to deal with.\textsuperscript{63} This is due to the unstable nature of the economy, changes in political leadership overnight and the rise and fall of commodity prices.

They appear to make the assumption that, the concept of good governance is unattainable if public institutions and structures are not strengthened.\textsuperscript{64} One element they point out is that, what the UNDP terms as good governance appears to overlap with the recommendations set by these institutions that seek to spearhead the goal, especially financial institutions. A case in point is the UNDP’s notion that, for good governance to be realised, citizens must be empowered to participate in meaningful ways in decision-making processes that includes the creation of jobs, whereas the notion of good governance to the IMF, for instance, deals with privatization and reducing the number of working hands to ensure efficiency with limited hands.

This gives the impression that although there are institutions in place to serve as checks and balances for states, their mode of implementation far outweigh the capability of the state.
1.9.5 Institutions and Governance

Dwivedi’s article on ‘International Organizations and Global Governance’ is one of such literature that enumerates uprisings non-state actors in the field of international relations that have gradually won over the realist debate that states are the only dominant actors in the international system. He contends that post-Cold War contemporary organizations are wielding power more than envisaged.

Nonetheless today’s global governance requires a carefully crafted coordination among states and non-state actors. Unfortunately, he intimates that, to an extent, state sovereignty and lack of political will continues to inhibit the long term prospects of organizations for creating effective structures of global governance. He stressed that although international organizations seem to be increasingly active in governance at all levels; their capability is limited to the output or feedback received from states.

In addressing achievements of international organizations, he agreed that although international organizations like the UN, WTO, and others had done quite well in mitigating conflicts and trade disputes, they were still limited in their role. He advised that IOs must take into account current trends in IR and adopt strategies that will militate against the bottlenecks that impede their processes. He further outlined that since the concept of global governance is a long-term goal and thus cannot be achieved within a twinkle of an eye; there is the need for a conscious deliberate effort made by IOs. Also IOs must take into account the national interest of states and be able to evolve when the dynamics change.

1.10 Limitations and Delimitations

There are limitations and delimitations to this study. Considering the time frame under which this research was conducted, the research thought it prudent to limit the scope of the research
to the IIAG. Thus, the scope of this study is limited to research the four political goods of the IIAG and, therefore, results should not be applied to similar contexts. Respondent pool and the participants were limited to former ambassadors, public servants, academicians. An additional limitation to the study proved to be the data collection process. Since information obtained during the interview was largely dependent on the interviewee and what he or she was willing to share, the nature of their information was limited to their own perspective and life experiences.

1.11 Methodology

Primary and Secondary Sources

Activities associated with the collection of data were intended to facilitate the collection of information relevant to the research questions. Apart from existing literature that was used to support this research, the researcher recognized that some identifiable parts of the research could be well-understood by conducting interviews. The main data collection tool employed was through interviews as it suited the loosely structured, emergent theme deductive to gathering data. Mason describes the processes of qualitative interviewing as referring to in-depth, semi-structured or loosely structured forms of interviewing. Miles and Huberman also made a case for an approach that could involve either a tight, pre-structured qualitative design or a loose, emergent one. Taking these approaches into account, the survey instrument used qualitative interviewing and was designed to achieve a balance between tight structure and loosely emergent approaches. The research interview questions started out as broad but became more specific to clarify the study.

On a practical level, the primary data source involved conducting pre-arranged interviews of faculties within the political and governance domain in the Political Science Department and
the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy at the University of Ghana, the Ghana Armed Forces and Staff College and the Kofi Annan International Peace-keeping and Training Centre, at Teshie in Accra. The interviews, together with observation and existing literature, provided a consistent and objective snapshot of the current status of governance and its advocating institutions of the concept. The two secondary sources employed were participation and observation and analysing documents and other relevant materials. Participation and observation was employed as a result of the researcher being a participant at the Mo Ibrahim Governance Week Celebration in Accra, Ghana and analysing documentation and other material included an extensive amount of material provided on online databases and print.

In-depth interviews in this qualitative research were regarded to be valuable in part due to their ability to contribute to structure whilst retaining the power of flexibility. This flexibility can be beneficial to gain insight into phenomena. For the purposes of this research, they allowed direct conversation with the participants to get a ‘behind the scenes’ look at what was occurring. An interpretative approach used within this research project often sees people as the primary data source and seeks their perceptions as to what they see as the ‘insider view’, with interviews commonly used. In this way, interviews can be considered as a controlled ‘conversation’. Secondary data sources were used as they are increasingly considered important in qualitative research data. The role of secondary data was essentially used to supplement the primary data as it provided a new perspective on existing primary data and formed a base for comparison.

The sampling procedure used in the study was described using the purposive sampling suggested by Patton. Purposive sampling was used to identify and select rich information
cases for the most effective use of limited resources. This involved identifying and selecting individuals or groups of individuals that were especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest in this case governance and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Purposive sampling was also employed based on the availability, willingness to participate and participants’ ability to communicate experiences in an articulate, expressive and reflective manner in order to describe the context of the study under a common framework. These participants and stakeholders ranged from Professor Baffour Agyeman-Dua, Director of the John Kufuor Foundation, Accra; Mr Abdoulaie Janceh, a board member of the Ibrahim Foundation; director of CDD Ghana Prof. Gyimah Boadi to the director of Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) Mrs Jean Mensah; Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso (GAFSC), Dr Kwesi Anning (KAIPTC), Prof Kwaku Osei-Hwedie (KAIPTC), Dr Alidu Seidu (University of Ghana), Prof John Akokpari (University of Capetown, South Africa), Ambassador D. K. Osei, Ambassador K Baah-Duodu, Mr. Seth Oteng (Youth Bridge Foundation) and Dr. Ransford Gyampo (Institute of Economic Affairs).

**Data Analysis and Interpretation**

The analysis of qualitative research involves aiming to uncover and understand the bigger picture - by using the data to describe the phenomenon and what this means.

Qualitative data analysis is the non-numerical assessment of observations made through participant observation, content analysis, in-depth interviews, and other qualitative research techniques. The research adopted a qualitative content analysis tool to analyse the content of some primary and secondary data to support the hypothesis that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation is a catalyst for promoting good governance in Africa.
Content analysis is ‘...a procedure for the categorisation of verbal or behavioural data, for purposes of classification, summarisation and tabulation.’ The aim of context analysis is to make sense of the data collected and to highlight the important messages, features or findings.75

Literature relevant to the study that were analysed included text materials in print, audio materials that were obtained and converted into text, field notes from observation as a participant in the Mo Ibrahim Foundation governance weekend in Accra and open-ended interview responses.

Following the research questions, interview questions were analysed based on the efficiency of the foundation, the reception it had received from African States and the challenges that had fraught its objective of promoting good governance in Africa. These were put into categories, which were carefully founded and revised within the process of analysis and text interpretation. Prior to the interview, the objectives and confidentially aspects of the interview were described to the interviewees. The process of transcribing the interviews involved writing out verbatim each and every conversation by using the interview template and writing the responses against each question. This process produced over 5,000 words of very rich data for analysis through a qualitative data coding and analysis process. The opinions and experiences gathered in print, person and on the web interface was used to infer that the hypothesis was valid.

The range of documentation and material which included information found in the literature, research conducted on the internet, and various reports were also analysed based on the successes and the challenges the Foundation had experienced. Documents were analysed
using a more interpretive analysis that was concerned with the response as well as what may have been inferred or implied. This contributed significantly to reflective thinking and assisted in the generation of concepts and linked ideas that proved to be very helpful.

1.12 Validity and Reliability of the Research

The validity of data refers to the truth that it tells about the subject or phenomenon being studied. A valid statement provides a true measurement, description and / or explanation of what it is claiming to measure or describe. This study adopts a type of validity identified by Bryman in Social Research Methods that is the internal validity. This refers to causality and whether a conclusion of the research or theory developed is a true reflection of the causes. In this case, whether the four cardinal initiatives of the MIF in promoting governance were the cause for Ghana’s fairness in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Documents (in audio and in print) as well as interviews and observations were selected on a validated process. The selection of tertiary and governance agencies for enquiry and collection of data was to ensure reliability and validity of the data due to participants’ occupation and position in these governance agencies. The researcher also looked out for consistency in the retrieval of information through the observation and interviews.

1.13 Ethical Considerations

Ethics may be defined as methods, procedures, or perspective for deciding how to act and for analysing complex problems and issues. Ethics in research help to promote the aims of research, such as knowledge, truth, and avoidance of error. For example, prohibitions against
fabricating, falsifying, or misrepresenting research data promote the truth and minimize error.\textsuperscript{77}

On the grounds of ethical considerations, the study employed informed consent to ascertain information and gain trust from the participants of this research.\textsuperscript{78} It was important that those participating in the research understood its aims and objectives and that informed consent was given, before this research was conducted. Essentially, research participants were fully informed about the procedures and risks involved in the context of classified information divulged. However, participants gave their consent to participate.

Ethical standards also require that researchers do not put participants in a situation where they might be at risk of harm as a result of their participation. Harm can be defined as both physical and psychological.\textsuperscript{79} Two standards were applied in order to help protect the privacy of research participants. Some participants were guaranteed of confidentiality and anonymity. They were assured that identifying information will not be made available to anyone who was not directly involved in this study.

\textbf{1.13 Arrangement of Chapters}

In order to ensure coherence and focus, the chapters have been arranged as follows:

- Chapter one: Research Design
- Chapter two: Overview of Governance in Africa: From Governance to Good Governance
- Chapter three: Assessing the Initiatives, of The Mo Ibrahim Foundation
- Chapter four: Summary of findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.
Endnotes

3 Ibid. P 3
5 Ibid. P 33
10 Kpundeh, op. cit., p. 34
11 Ibid. P 345
14 Ibid.
16 Ibid
17 Farrington, op. cit., p. 250.
19 Ibid., p. 2.
20 Ibid. p. 3
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Foundation, op. cit.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Foundation, Press Releases.
29 Kaufmann, op. cit.
30 UNDP, op. cit., p. 2.
32 Ibid.
39 Bevir, op. cit., p. 14
40 Ibid. P 15
42 Ibid., p 11.
43 Ibid., p 17.
44 Ibid., p 17.
46 Ibid., p 37.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 4.
57 Ibid., p. 8.
58 Ibid., p. 17.
60 Ibid., p. 19.
61 Ibid., p. 20.
62 Ibid., p. 88.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. 89.
66 Ibid
71 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: FROM GOVERNANCE TO GOOD GOVERNANCE

2.0 Introduction

Apart from being a concept, the term governance can also be considered as a practise of how duties are administered. Administering badly, without a sense of direction and failing to meet the needs of the people may lead to a situation of bad governance. After independence, African governance has not been smooth sailing and has suffered the fate of bad governance. For years, Africa’s development partners have proposed the good governance conditionality as a panacea to the resolution of the challenges confronting Africa.

This chapter will analyse the gradual transition from governance to good governance in some African states. It will also provide an overview of good governance by analysing how external governance promoting initiatives/ institutions sought to drive the agenda of good governance in Africa as against African indigenous governance promoting initiatives/ institutions.

2.1 From Governance to Good Governance

The transition of governance varies from country to country especially during the pre-colonial and post-colonial era. The practice of governance is believed to have existed in non-colonised states such as Ethiopia and Liberia. Unfortunately, Liberia and Ethiopia have largely been neglected. Why? A careful study of their histories highlighted both the opportunities and constraints of political independence in the globalizing world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The trials and tribulations of these independent nations in
Africa in many ways foretold the struggles of their neighbours after independence, which left many of the goals of nationalist leaders unmet decades after independence. The era of colonialism was highly authoritarian, with power concentrated in the hands of Europeans who controlled the indigenous population. The understanding of governance was seen as “a process whereby elements in society wield power, authority and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life...”

Governance during that era was for the purpose of political/strategic, economic and cultural gains. The political motivation was centred on the political rivalry among European states for dominance in the international system of the eighteenth century. These colonial powers believed that colonial possessions conferred prestige and status and made them more dominant in the global arena. In terms of economic governance, African countries such as Ghana saw their raw materials such as gold, cocoa and bauxite, been transported to feed the industries of their colonial masters and in turn imported manufactured goods from these industries. Also, acquisition of a colony provided a large reservoir of manpower to be drawn upon in time of war. The cultural benefit was deeply rooted in the ethnocentrism and cultural arrogance of the European people, who regarded anyone different as being culturally inferior; therefore, making their culture superior over the native African’s culture. Instances were that, the mode of instruction was usually in the language of the colonial master.

Further, the 1960s saw over thirty (30) new states emerging from colonial rules to becoming independent states. As colonial leaders withdrew from most of their colonies, they handed over all institutions that were under their administration to indigenes of their colonies. Historical antecedents reveal that, the nature of institutions inherited by the post-independence governments from their colonial masters could be the cause of bad governance.
in Africa. This was due to the autocratic nature of institutions inherited. This argument follows from the popular sociological idea that children learn from their parents; which presupposes that a child coming from a violent home is likely to be violent. To overcome the challenge of the colonial period, post-independence governments folded up all former institutions inherited from colonial leadership. Institutions had to be re-oriented after independence in order to follow national interests\textsuperscript{7} of new leaders. Governance was thus perceived as changes in the nature and role of a state.\textsuperscript{8} In the 1980s particularly, the term was used to classify the reforms that took place in the public sector\textsuperscript{9} though it existed prior to these reforms in the 80s and 90s.\textsuperscript{10}

It is argued that an enormous expansion of most institutions took place until the grave economic decline at the end of 1970s leading to a full-scale development crisis. This is when reforms such as civil services reforms programmes of initiatives were launched. At the launch of these initiatives, leaders dismissed the lack of commitment from citizens as a possible inhibiting factor to a successful development.\textsuperscript{11} In Ghana, for instance, the issue of attitudinal change during these reforms assumed that the instruments of Performance Contracts, Brochures on Work Ethic etc., would in themselves result in better performance. Unfortunately, they did not.\textsuperscript{12}

Succeeding governments reformed the various aspects of governance like the economic, political, administrative and systemic governance. John Wiseman and Chris Clapham\textsuperscript{13} contend that the process of giving independence to Africa was too hasty and lacked the requisite training needed for administration. The chances of African’s inadequate preparation to take over the mantle of administration were that, they were going to mismanage the economy. This was primarily the root cause of bad governance in Africa.\textsuperscript{14} Sadly
governments were unable to establish a predictable framework of law and government for development. Priorities were inconsistent with development, resulting in misallocation of resources. According to Anderson, the 1998 reforms were narrowly based and non-transparent in decision making. Most countries in Africa were experiencing grave economic problems, while others appeared to be making progress towards ensuring better living conditions for their people. The grapple of state funds, the drift of extending tenures of office, and the revision of state laws to satisfy the idiosyncrasies of some African leaders, ignited a shift in paradigm from merely governance to a step by step and ordered move towards Good Governance.

2.2 Good Governance
Before adopting the concept as a best way to manage most economies, several attempts were made to define good governance especially by multilateral development institutions (International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD, 1999). For example, the World Bank defined good governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”. On the other hand, the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) defined good governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”. Other definitions from the African Development Bank described governance as a process referring to the way in which power is exercised in the management affairs of a nation. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) states that governance can be seen as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. From the above definitions, it can be deduced that good governance entails the judicious utilization of resources for the benefit of all members in society.
2.3 Elements of good governance

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) noted that good governance has eight major characteristics or elements. These are: participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law.\textsuperscript{17} The practice of good governance assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.

2.3.1 Participation

Kpundeh\textsuperscript{18} affirms that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people. In order to ensure good governance, he posits that there is a need for “…effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people.”\textsuperscript{19} After all, the people are the very beneficiaries to who development should and must be accrued. UNESCAP also added that participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. It is important to point out that representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decision making. Participation needs to be informed and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand.

2.3.2 Accountability

Furthermore, accountability is a key requirement of good governance. The public sector, private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their
institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to who varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or institution. In general an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law. Therefore it can be summed that “In any society, holding citizens responsible for their actions, in public service and the private sector is significant to ensure some level of accountability.” A number of political scientists participating in a workshop in Namibia pointed out that with regard to public officials, there’s the need for a mechanism to hold leaders responsible. To that end, they noted that public accountability systems must include periodic competition and a clear cut set of rules and expectations.

2.3.4 Transparency
UNESCAP states that transparency means decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media. Therefore, states must create a public arena where there would be room for arguments and discussions based on what is good for the entire society. Transparent decisions serve as a safeguard against corruption, waste and the abuse of the executive authority.

2.3.5 Equity and inclusiveness
Again, a society’s wellbeing depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups,
but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their wellbeing. Thus all men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their wellbeing.23

2.3.6 Rule of Law

UNESCAP argue that Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force. Hence legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights.24

2.3.7 Responsiveness

Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe. Hence, institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders.25

2.3.8 Effectiveness and efficiency

Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment. Thus processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources.26

2.4 Africa’s Approach to Good Governance

In order to properly and adequate implement the tenets of good governance, African leaders realised there was the need to search for policies that were aimed at good governance and that
will lead to development in Africa. This led to the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action for
the Economic Development of Africa (LPA), the Final Act of Lagos (1980) and Africa’s
Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER). However, these policies
were not implemented as noted by Adebayo Adedeji.

According to Adedeji:27

“All of these were opposed, undermined and jettisoned by the Bretton Woods
institutions and Africans were thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental
right to make decisions about their future. This denial would have been ameliorated if
the African leaders had shown the commitment to carry out their own development
agenda. But given their excessive external dependence, their narrow political base and
their perennial failure to put their money where their mouth is, the implementation of
these plans has suffered from benign neglect.”28

Instead, African leaders embraced an implementation of an exogenous initiative of what
spells out what African governance should be and highly supported by donors countries and
financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. These development partners have
emphasized questions of organizational structure, financial and human resource needs, and
basic administrative competence appropriate to the performance of the development
function.29

In the 21st Century, there is growing interest in issues related to democracy and good
governance around the world. This is a reflection of the increasing acceptance of the fact that
democracy and good governance are not a luxury, but a fundamental requirement to achieve
sustainable development.30 In his state visit to Ghana in July 2009, President Barack Obama
remarkably praised the turnaround in the political economies of Africa. His main reason for
this historic advancement revealed that "development depends on good governance.31 That is
the ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, in Africa. It is the change that
can unlock Africa's potential."32 From being a ‘Hopeless Continent’ to being acclaimed a
‘Hopeful Continent’33, the promotion of good governance has effected this change.
Consequently, there has been a clash between developments partner’s notion and implementation of good governance and Africa’s proposed initiative of attaining good governance. In both ways, its impact whether positive or negative, has been severely felt.

2.5 External Governance Promoting Initiatives/ Institutions

Initially ‘governance’ in the developmental discourse adopted by Western governments, and international financial institutions referred to the management of a state’s affairs or the practical exercise of power and authority to conduct public affairs.\(^{34}\)

The emergence of good governance in the development debate at the end of the 1980s marks nothing less than a shift in paradigm from ‘getting the market right’ to ‘getting the institutions right’.\(^{35}\) Huge interest in Africa by international development institutions was intended at improving development and drawing Africa towards a more westernised economy by the latter. However, their conditionalities and bilateral arrangements coerced Africa to go the way these institutions deemed fit.\(^{36}\)

In fact, good governance became a pre-requisite for securing loans from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), bi-lateral and multi-lateral institutions as well as the West. Hence, according to the World Bank,\(^ {37}\) one of the imperative ingredients of economic growth and development in Africa is good governance.\(^{38}\) The SAPs proposed by the Bretton Woods institutions, was perceived as the surest way Africa could attain the tenets of good governance. The SAPs were introduced as a debt management programme for 3\textsuperscript{rd} World countries as a result of their heavy indebtedness.\(^{39}\)
In 1980, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was adopted with the aim of increasing Africa’s self-sufficiency by a decreased reliance on raw material extraction and industrialization, global equity in trade relations and an increase in development aid from the international community. The LPA however was stillborn as the release of the Elliot Bergs’ Commission Report in 1981 eventually led to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) by the Bretton Woods institutions.

2.5.1 The IMF and World Bank Promotion of Good Governance

The key components of good governance, according to the World Bank, include effectiveness and efficiency in public sector management, accountability and responsiveness of public officials to the citizenry, rule of law and public access to information and transparency.\textsuperscript{40}

In the late 1980s, most African leaders sought the World Bank to find ways to emancipate Africa from the doldrums of stagnation and decay of most economies. The main pretext for World Bank’s intervention was to "help solve" the debt crisis that hit African countries in the late 1970s. The remedy they proposed was known as stabilization and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). The SAPs though alleged as immensely implemented on the African continent, degenerated grievous consequences under its basic principles: Liberalization; Privatization; Exchange Rate reforms and Public Sector Reforms. The nature of the programme targeted more public institutions and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The aim was to "accelerate development" through institutional reforms. They believed that once institutions were reshaped and reformed the government will be able to attain its development agenda and therefore attain the tenets of good governance.
The SAPs had the capacity of removing immediate resource constraints in third world countries, yet was not sustainable enough to help the African governance state survive. The World Bank, evaluating the progress of structural reform measures, conceded the programs did not generate the desired results, saying these measures only laid a foundation for economic recovery.41

The SAP, however, could not attain its intended objectives as citizens bore the brunt of unemployment, high cost of living, defunct industries and a myriad of socio-economic issues. The SAPs contributed to worsening the external debt and exacerbating the overall economic and social crisis in most African countries. According to Dembele,42 from Senegal to Zambia, from Mali to Tanzania, from Cote d'Ivoire to Uganda, the entire sectors of the domestic industry were wiped out, with devastating consequences. Not only has the industrial sector contribution to domestic gross product (GDP) continued to fall, but also the industrial workforce continued to shrink dramatically. In Senegal, more than one third of industrial workers lost their jobs in the 1980s.43

‘The trend was accentuated in the 1990s, following sweeping trade liberalization policies and privatization imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, especially after the 50% devaluation of the CFA Franc, in 1994. In Ghana, the industrial workforce declined from 78,700 in 1987 to 28,000 in 1993. In Zambia, in the textile sector alone, more than 75% of workers lost their jobs in less than a decade, as a result of the complete dismantling of that sector by the Chiluba presidency. In other countries, such as Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo, Zambia, Tanzania, etc. similar trends were observed’.44

2.5.2 The European Union Promotion of Good Governance

The European Union (EU), on the other hand, has also been instrumental in Africa, and its policies on good governance in African countries are no exception. Since the mid-1990s in the Lome IV Agreement and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), the EU has increasingly institutionalized support for good governance as a key principle of EU–Africa
relations. The EU has introduced specific instruments to promote good governance, ranging from positive and negative conditionality to financial, technical assistance and political dialogue. The extent to which these instruments have been effective in promoting good governance reforms, however, is controversial.\(^{45}\)

The EU’s approach to the promotion of good governance reforms in sub-Saharan Africa has been deemed as a one-size-fits-all approach. In countries such as Ethiopia and Angola, the EU pursued similar approaches in both countries by focusing on strengthening the effectiveness of state institutions while increasingly asking for reforms that target their democratic quality.\(^{46}\) The EU’s implementation success is explained through Africa’s aid dependency on the Euro Bonds and the lack of substantial economic interests of the EU on the continent, which enables the EU to make full use of its toolbox.\(^{47}\) The EU breaks away from the World Bank definition of good governance. The EU emphasises effectiveness and efficient management and performance of political administration and the regulative framework of the state.

In addition to providing assistance, the EU has used political dialogue and some elements of conditionality to implement its approach. During political dialogue meetings launched with the Angolan Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004, the EU addressed the need to hold elections, introduce constitutional reforms and improve the human rights situation of the country. Non-state actors were not included in the political dialogue.\(^{48}\) Since then the EU has not only assisted elections but continues to support the capacities of democratic institutions, including parliaments, and Human Rights Commissions. Along with other donors, the EU has contributed to the democratic institutions programme jointly managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ethiopian government.\(^{49}\) EU assistance
also targets institution building in the justice sector, such as a training centre for legal professionals.\textsuperscript{50}

The EU has continued to address problems in the human rights violation and democratic reforms in the context of its political dialogue with the Ethiopian government.\textsuperscript{51} In pushing its good governance agenda, the EU has increasingly relied on the transnational channel.

\textit{2.5.3 Donor Countries Promotion of Good Governance}

As the international political environment underwent rapid changes following the failure of IMF and the World Bank’s structural adjustment polices, and the collapse of the Cold War structure from the latter half of the 1980s to the early-1990s, the concept of good governance began to gather momentum worldwide, along with democratization in Africa. The United States of America (USA) for instance, has stated emphatically in its United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to Africa that U.S. policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa – particularly pillar one – is to “strengthen democratic institutions.”\textsuperscript{52} Good governance for the West is gradually shifting from effective democratic institutions and involvement of the private sector, to a more profound interest on the promotion of human rights of all persons regardless of gender, sex or race.\textsuperscript{53}

It seems decisions taken are geared towards achieving donor countries principles and values more than what could be considered as favourable to implement by the recipient country. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for instance, has its core mandate of ensuring that recipient countries meet the threshold of practising good governance. According to the MCC, good governance entails respect for citizen’s civil rights, fighting corruption and promoting the rule of law.
The U.S. MCC for example requires aid recipients to meet a range of good governance and other indicators before qualifying for assistance. How governments treat their own minority citizen groups can be deemed a fair indicator on that front. USAID operates in many countries that do not benefit even from MCC’s threshold assistance programs; it may have reason to put United States Government (USG) assistance programs to productive work for marginalized communities in those countries. Implementing partners are required to take actions that would undercut the principles of equality and inclusiveness that underlie US government policy. The mission of most donor agencies from the US, unlike those from Asia such as China and Japan, is to monitor whether the commitments attached are being observed in practice, and as a result, contracts are only renewed with any implementing partner that respects these principles in the delivery of US government assistance.\textsuperscript{54}

It is worth noting that external influence in the governance architecture worked to an extent that it changed the trend and made a few African leaders accountable. They helped open up African countries for civil society participation. Also, they managed to open up states for popular elections even though there are still more issues with elections\textsuperscript{55}. Unfortunately, that enthusiasm and energy that was brought in from external source is gradually waning. This could be attributed to donor fatigue, and other pressing emerging issues like terrorism which is gradually shifting the emphasis from development and governance issues in Africa.

Not wanting to leave a gap, external sources like the USAID, while decelerating, have proved African home institutions could be more sustainable. This has led to the rise in New Africanism, which implies that the African continent should be able to lead its crusade in driving its own governance agenda; therefore the establishment of African indigenous governance promoting initiatives.
2.6 African Indigenous Governance Promotion Initiatives/ Institutions

The discourse on ‘governance’ in Africa is largely considered ‘conditionality’ to benefit from loans and other financial assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions.  

2.6.1 The African Union’s Promotion of Good Governance

According to the African Union’s Constitutive Act, the objectives of the AU are inter alia to ‘promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance’ (Article 3 (g)). Hence, one of the major principles of the AU is ‘respect for democratic principles, human rights, and rule of law and good governance’ (Article 4 (m)). There is clearly a close relationship between democracy, human rights, rule of law, and good governance. The issues of democracy and support for good governance feature prominently on AU’s agenda as the panacea to the numerous African conflict situations and other developmental challenges.

According to a report released by the Centre for Conflict Resolution and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 2012, between 1960 and 1990, no single ruling party in Africa lost power. Nevertheless, between 1989 and 1998, the number of multiparty political systems in Africa increased from 5 to 35. After 2002, ruling parties were voted out of power in Benin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.

The quality of democracy in many of these countries arguably declined from 2005, in particular with the curtailing of political rights during elections. Furthermore, the number of civil wars decreased since the creation of the AU from eight in 2002 to four in 2012 due to the AU’s Peace and Security Council’s increasing focus on conflicts. Between 2003 and
April 2013, the 11 coups d’état which took place in Africa saw the suspension of Mauritania, Guinea, Niger, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Central African Republic as member states of the AU.  

Virtually all AU instruments aimed at promoting democracy and good governance include instruments such as, the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (ACPCC), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Again, to boost the participation of civil society in its work, the AU established the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in 2004, and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) a year later. PAP was established as a mechanism for civil society to promote democratic governance in Africa. Its purpose, as set out in article 17 of the AU Constitutive Act, is “to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration of the continent.”

Furthermore, the AU also established the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Established under the leadership of the AU Commission, the AGA is the overall political and institutional framework for the promotion of democracy, governance and human rights in Africa. The AGA is aimed at strengthening coordination among the AU organs and other institutions mandated to promote democracy, governance, and human rights as a measure of enhancing their capacity and optimise their impact. These organs and institutions operate at the international, regional, sub-regional and local levels. To enhance the AGA’s activities, the African Governance Platform was launched in 2012 in Lusaka by the Department of Political Affairs of the AU to coordinate the AGA. The role of the Platform is to facilitate information flow, exchanges, dialogue, synergies and joint action between the various
African governance actors. The Platform functions as an interactive and non-decision-making mechanism.\textsuperscript{64}

AU observer missions are now sent as a matter of routine to cover elections in all member states, in accordance with the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. In effect, elections held throughout sub-Saharan Africa in 2011 signalled a growing commitment to democratic rule. Judging from the drastic fall in conflicts and coups, and the increasing number of successful elections in the region in the past decade, it can be inferred that the AU has added value to Africa’s political performance through its innovative institutions within its decade of existence. However, most scholars in academia look on the AU with much derision. They base their argument on the fact that the AU though proposes laudable initiatives, it largely relies on funding from development partners to finance its projects. Therefore there seems to be a lack of a home-grown institution, devoid of support from the West, couching policies that are commensurate and within the reach of most states and realistic of the plight of African countries.

2.6.2 NEPAD’s Promotion of Good Governance

To promote its governance and development agenda, the 2001 OAU Summit in Lusaka adopted the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) framework, as an economic initiative that would form the blue print for Africa’s socio-economic development especially taking into account developmental challenges of the 21st century. NEPAD was initiated out of two development initiatives namely the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the OMEGA Plan. The aim of MAP was to establish the fundamentals of good governance including peace and security, stability, democratic rule, respect for human rights, rule of law and accountability.\textsuperscript{65} The OMEGA Plan aims at laying a
solid infrastructure base including good roads, railways, ports, ICT for Africa’s development. The two ideas which were merged into NEPAD seek the prosperity and well-being of African through a number of programmes and projects in six thematic areas. These were Agriculture and Food Security; Climate Change and Natural Resource Management; Regional Integration and Infrastructure; Human Development; Economic and Corporate Governance; Cross-cutting Issues, including Gender, Capacity Development and ICT.

Though NEPAD has achieved many remarkable successes like adopting the APRM, and the NEPAD e-Schools initiative; many have argued that much cannot be said of it. They incited that the programme which was meant to be a programme of action is gradually falling into technical jargons and little of its impact felt. Landsberg explains that the above impact failure can be attributed to the structure of NEPAD, which is in itself described as being ‘top-down’ and elite-driven. This is due to the fact that the initial draft of NEPAD was presented to the members of the G8 before it was seen by any sector of African civil society, and Greenpeace notes that this exclusion of civil society “severely diminishes the legitimacy” of the programme, a criticism that has been taken up by many other groups. Smith further argues that NEPAD programmes to a large extent have been based on neo-liberal postulates rather than the genuine concerns of the African continent, following the principles and practices of the Washington Consensus which has “damaged Africa over the last several decades,” leading to a “sense of betrayal” amongst the civil society organisations.

For most critics, perhaps the biggest failures of NEPAD to date is the issue that despite publicly promoting the ideals of good governance and democracy, it “fails to take them sufficiently seriously such that obvious violations—e.g., of elections in Congo-Brazzaville, Madagascar, Zambia and Zimbabwe—are publicly criticised and punished.” According to
Morbi, instead of NEPAD concerning itself with Western ideals of Democratisation and Liberal forms of governance, NEPAD should dis-associate itself from politics entirely in order to function as an effective development programme. However, the debate begs to question whether Africa should be allowed to follow similar paths to those taken throughout history, eventually arriving at liberal democracy as a last stage?

2.6.3 The African Peer Review Mechanism’s Promotion of Good Governance (APRM)

By the dawn of the 21st century, African leaders realised the need to go deep in search for a mechanism or a new governance regime that will ensure development. This subsequently gave way to the establishment of the APRM as a framework for the implementation of NEPAD. Its objective was to ensure that the policies and practices of participating States conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.

APRM is without a doubt, one of the boldest ideas that African leaders have come up with in the recent past. It is the most innovative and challenging experiment in African governance landscape today. The APRM unlike the Western forms of initiatives is not measured on a yardstick of conditionality. Accession to the APRM is subject to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and the depositing of the signed document at the NEPAD Secretariat. Participation in the APRM process, which is notified to the Chairperson of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), entails an understanding to be subject to periodic peer review, as well as to facilitate such review, and be guided by agreed parameters for good political, economic, and corporate governance. The
governments of the AU member states who are participating in the APRM are themselves responsible for the funding of the review of their countries.79

As of January 2013, a number of African countries had joined the APRM. The voluntary mechanism has sought to address democratic deficits and to oversee important tax and electoral reforms. So far, about 17 countries have undergone the review process.80 In particular, the APRM has initiated dialogue among private, government stakeholders and civil society actors on areas for improvement and challenges such as corruption, capital flight, and tax avoidance. The mechanism has further overseen progress on governance, tax, and electoral reform, and has usefully focused political attention on important events that have challenged African governments – for example, xenophobic violence in South Africa in 2008; and the violence that accompanied national elections in Kenya in 2007/2008.81

Unfortunately, African leaders have not exhibited much commitment towards the review process as envisioned. Therefore the operations of the Mechanism have been affected by unavailability of funds and lack of political will.

2.7 Sustainability of Governance Promoting Initiatives

The sustainability of governance promoting initiatives reveals that, in the case of the external initiatives, although they offer short term relief by closing the loopholes in the African economies, development scholars have since agreed that these political and economic conditionalities have had dismal effects on large pockets of poor African societies. Ho-Won Jeong82 argues:

Structural adjustment has a negative impact on economic and social situations that most poor countries face. The neoclassic macroeconomic policies do not take into account social objectives and exclude many forms of protection for the poor. The logic of market economic theory does not incorporate concerns with human welfare.83
Worsening is the fact that African initiatives on the other hand lack the capacity and the political will to operate as an autonomous initiative without relying on support from the West. This is because in the case of initiatives such as the APRM, Yarik Turianskyi and Steven Gruzd disclose that the enthusiasm and political will for the APRM have steadily declined. Fewer new members are joining, existing members are not paying their fees, heads of states skip meetings and when media coverage does happen, it is usually negative.\textsuperscript{84} Anning\textsuperscript{85} intimates that if African initiatives are proposed in such a way that it take into consideration the variables of the various economies of the African states, its implementation will hardly rely on funds from donor agencies and development partners. Reasons being that, though the NEPAD, APRM and others are laudable, their mode of implementation hardly represents the African continent since it requires huge amount of funds to do so.

Additionally, stringent conditionality on the part of external initiatives prevents the initiative from being effective, because a government becomes more accountable to donors than to preferences of its citizens. This concurrently weakens recipient ownership of the reform process and suppresses its national interest. Thandike Mkandawire\textsuperscript{86} illustrates the dismantling of African ownership in SAPs:

In the preparation of the 1989 report, the World Bank did the then unusual thing of consulting African scholars and commissioning them to prepare background papers, apparently at the insistence of Africans within the Bank… The approach to good governance and economic policy that finally became dominant differed radically from that of the African contributors who were strongly opposed to adjustment policies because not only were they deflationary and thus not developmental, but also because they were externally imposed, weakened the state, and undermined many of the post-colonial ‘social contracts’. For the African contributors, good governance related to the larger issues of state – society relations and not just to the technocratic transparency-accountability mode that it eventually assumed in the international financial institutions.\textsuperscript{87}

Likewise, since most of African promoting initiatives are usually not binding, they lack accountability and ownership within the various African states. Yarik Turianskyi divulges
that the majority of Africa’s population has never even heard about the APRM not to talk about supporting it. This is however, worrying given its impact and potential in most countries like Ghana, Rwanda and Kenya.

Furthermore, donor funding, conditionalities and failure to meet set deadlines created imbalances which upset the government’s own planned implementation schedule. These programmes lack an effective machinery to ensure evaluation and follow-up actions. Donor deadlines, time-tables and funding arrangements created imbalances. According to Dr. Alidu Seidu of the Political Science department of the University of Ghana, it is about time the African continent maps out its strength and tries to develop strategies that will favour its own home-grown policies. He however stressed that it is not enough to propose initiatives that will not be financed by the continent itself. It calls for the need to be self-sufficient, wean the continent off the West.

He attests that, if the African initiatives appear in a way that considers what exactly Africa needs in order to develop rather that what has been established by other proponents and scholars of governance, Africa will be more self-reliant and take centre stage in managing its own affairs. The sustainability of African home-grown governance promotion initiatives are questionable in terms of their feasibility on the African continent, whether they will be self-sustaining or rely on foreign assistance in order to operate or whether or not they can stand the test of time.
2.8 Challenges of Good Governance Transition

2.8.1 The Strong-man Personality in Africa

African politics is highly personality profiled rather than programs, especially under single-party systems. There is a tradition of the strong man in Africa, who has tended to encourage personality cults by having their portraits prominently displayed and encouraging the use of slogans: "The idea of the president as the father of the nation, the big man, or being above the law is the prevailing political culture in Africa." This unfortunately impedes on the progress of initiatives once the personality is no longer in control of the state. In Zaire for example, because Mobutu centralised everything under himself, the institutions could not function when he left. This placed the country in a state of economic stagnation. Aryetey in ‘The Policy of Africa’s Economic Stagnation’ reveals that Mobutu remained in power as a strategic ally of the West. At the end of the Cold War, support from the West for his country gradually subsided. The strong man syndrome fosters authoritarianism which is coupled with corruption and bad governance. The idea of the strong man personality also portrays how weak institutions are in Africa. Most public institutions do not have the autonomy required for them to perform adequately and efficiently. Everything is approved by the president and once the president is not available everything is at a standstill and initiatives are not taken. Consequently, this makes African economies more fragile and prone to failure.

2.8.2 The Preponderance of Corruption

Despite auspicious shifts towards good governance in the last two decades, corruption remains a serious barrier to development in many African countries. Corruption by its nature, is an abuse to all internationally acknowledged human rights. According to Wani, “it creates a vicious circle where human rights awareness is constantly paired with and undermined by harsh realities of poor economic and political performance.” Corruption is
both the cause and the consequence of accountability failures, human rights abuses, transparency deficits and ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Corruption is a huge disservice to all members of a state regardless of their position. For this reason, the role of civil society and vigilant individuals cannot be over emphasized. Experts estimate that African states lose as much as $148 billion annually to corruption, amounting to approximately one quarter of GDP. Corruption in many sub-Saharan African countries has been entrenched for decades, often through systems of patronage and nepotism. Scholars may be right in attributing Africa’s lack of good governance to foreign interference and the attributed aid flows. Owing to the fact that, donors can sometimes unwittingly play a role in perpetuating the detrimental cycle of corruption through support to corrupt governments based on strategic interests, failure to regulate multinational corporations and permitting the shelter of stolen assets in banks and offshore financial centres in developed countries. The value of stolen assets held by banks in developed countries is estimated at $20 billion to $40 billion per year - a figure equivalent to 20-40% of flows of development assistance.93

2.8.3 Bad leadership

The non-attainments of good governance can be attributed to bad leadership. Most scholars have argued that for good governance to be achieved there’s the need for good and effective leadership.94 Bad leadership corrupts safety of human rights, the rule of law and transparency. The 21st century African leader will amend constitutions and laws to suit his/her idiosyncrasies. In recent times the African leaders are flouting the very systems they are supposed to work with. For instance in South Africa, embezzlements of state funds to renovate and revamp personal property have been the order of the day. In the aftermath of the cold war there is not much overt support for regimes form the West. However there still remains some government which have been protective of bad leadership in recent times.
China has been one such example who protected Omar Al Bashir who was persecuting his own people in Darfur. Addressing the challenge will require careful and adequate operational parameters that guide the duties of the leader. Those notwithstanding a careful supervision of their public officials and civil servants who work to see the initiatives of the leader come into fruition.

2.8.4 Poverty and Illiteracy

Poverty and illiteracy debilitates societies and undermines good governance. The elements of good governance can hardly work in conditions where the people are poor and ignorant. In most African states, the poor and illiterate may be influenced to sell their votes for a cake of soap.\textsuperscript{95} Due to the high level of illiteracy in Africa, many politicians resort to such symbols in manipulating the electorate order to express their views.

As Acheampong once said, "One man one vote is meaningless unless accompanied by one man with bread".\textsuperscript{96} Poverty and ignorance do not provide a fertile ground for advocacy and the promotion of rights.\textsuperscript{97} This further affects the elements of responsiveness, equity and inclusiveness that good governance seeks to attain. The people are either too concerned with the practical details of where the next meal would come from, or are steeped in apathy. This works against the emergence of a robust and pro-active civil society that would work for the consolidation of democracy. Anderson\textsuperscript{98} states that:

\begin{quote}
During presidential campaigns in some rural areas in Benin, the issue of exploitation was further advanced where there are about 60–70 percent illiteracy, the campaign speeches by politicians, when translated to local languages were often violations of conscience. This is because they provide only threads of information while deviously attacking the opposition party. In the transition to good governance, "the challenge is to break down the idea of the president being above the law and to stop looking at the other person who thinks differently as one's enemy."\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}
2.9 Conclusion

As it stands, there are more questions than answers whether African institutions are able to
 drive the good governance agenda as opposed to external governance ‘drivers’. However, in
spite of all these questions, there is still a lot that can be done to improve existing initiatives.
Chapter three of this study seeks to ascertain and analyse what other private autonomous
initiatives such as the Mo Ibrahim Foundation could bring on board to promote good
governance and the challenges that are inhibiting it from its objectives.
Endnotes

2 Ibid.
4 Ayee, op. cit.
5 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 4.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 225.
16 Ibid., p. 118.
19 Ibid., p. 34.
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22 ESCAP, UN, op. cit.
24 Ibid., p. 5.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 6.
38 Ibid.
39 Briscoe, I. Debt crises, political change and the state in the developing world. 2006
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CHAPTER THREE

ASSESSING THE INITIATIVES OF THE MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION

3.0 Introduction

From the previous chapter, the study has given a general overview of the transition from governance to good governance on the continent. It also highlighted the role external parameters have played on the continent in their quest to increase development and promote the ‘western style’ of good governance. However nascent external influence looked, to a large extent they have not been able to achieve their desired results due to its lack of incorporation in the African setting. Thus, inspiring African leaders to develop home-grown solutions to help Africa rise and lead its development crusade. Worsening the situation still, is the inability of these African solutions and initiatives to militate against Africa’s incessant problems. It is for some these reasons that a private individual, who considers himself a stakeholder in what happens to ‘mother Africa’, has taken the pain to fund an institution that will turn the tale of governance around.

This chapter will assess the initiatives of the Mo Ibrahim foundation and examine how effective each initiative has fared in the promotion of good governance; its contribution and challenges that impede its objective.

3.1 The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF)

Prior to the establishment of the MIF, several programmes and projects such as the SAPs, HIPC, the MCA Compact among others, have played critical roles in the promotion of good governance in Africa. Though critical in the development discourse in Africa, African leaders
have made efforts to initiate home-grown policies and institutions that will aid in this agenda. As part of efforts to promote good governance in Africa, MIF was established in 2006 with the focus on promoting and supporting good governance and exceptional leadership on the African continent. The MIF is a non-grant making organisation which focuses on defining, assessing and enhancing governance and leadership in Africa through four main initiatives.¹ The MIF observes that Africa has made considerable progress in governance. The Foundation, however, notes that there are several challenges confronting the continent in spite of the progress made in governance over the last decade. Some of the challenges in the view of the Foundation includes but not limited to poor political and human rights issues.² These challenges confronting Africa pose serious threat to the sustainable development of the continent, thus the establishment of the foundation to contribute to the promotion of good governance in Africa.

3.2 MIF Definition of Governance

MIF defines governance as “the provision of the political, social and economic goods that any citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that any state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens”.³ In the opinion of Farrington, “good governance has become a more demanding concept in the sense that more conditions must be met – more institutions and processes must be in place – before the label of ‘good governance’ can be applied.”⁴

Like Francis Fukuyama,⁵ the Ibrahim Foundation believes that good governance is measurable since it is can be described as a basket of public goods that governments are required to deliver to the people. Besides, at the 2015 Governance weekend in Accra, Dr Mo Ibrahim⁶ posited that in the basket of good governance are: rule of law, human development,
education and health, human rights, sustainable development, participation, and transparency. He observed that these ingredients sum up what good governance entails. The elements he enlists, proves that there is not much of a difference in the elements of good governance whether enlisted by the World Bank or the UNDP, all that matters is that the elements are rightly and equally provided for to each citizen.

Since its inception, the MIF has been hailed by prominent persons such as the late Nelson Mandela (erstwhile president of South Africa) and Kofi Annan (former UN Secretary-General), partly because of the incentives it provides to make the concept of governance attractive and because of its mission of stimulating public debate on the need to require quality governance from African leaders. Just as Kofi Annan puts it, “the mission of the Ibrahim foundation is so important that, thanks to the Dr Ibrahim’s vision, the foundation can contribute to the growing movement to build honest and enlightened African leadership.” Nelson Mandela adds that the foundation’s existence is “to develop criteria for good governance, stimulate public debate, challenge the continent and set up a global trade mark that has never existed in the history of the world.”

The foundation recognises that at its inception, governments were quite suspicious of its activities since nobody likes to be judged nor scored. Noticing that the foundation is not out there to neither seek regime change, shape a country nor even praise a country, states have opened up to Foundation’s initiatives and supported the endeavours of the research teams. Dr Ibrahim has stressed that the foundation’s goal is also to demystify governance such that the ordinary man on the street may understand and see the need to seek accountability from his/her government other than flaunt the language of governance around in its intellectual
sense. It is for this reason that the foundation primarily seeks to ‘put governance at the core of any conversation on African’s development’.11

3.3 Funding Source

The Foundation is funded by Dr. Mo Ibrahim and it is headquartered in London. Though seated in London, it must be noted that it is an African foundation, set up with African money.12 The Foundation’s founder Dr Mo Ibrahim13 is also the Chair of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. From a Sudanese background, Dr Ibrahim has a distinguished business career in a world leading cellular consulting and software provider, Celtel International. This is one of Africa’s leading mobile telephone companies which pioneered mobile services in Africa. In 1989, he founded Mobile Systems International (MSI). He is also Founding Chairman of Satya Capital Limited, a private equity fund focused on Africa. Dr. Ibrahim has received numerous honorary degrees and fellowships from a range of academic institutions including Birmingham University and the recipient of a number of awards including The GSM Association’s Chairman’s Award for Lifetime Achievement (2007).14

3.4 The initiatives

The MIF has four cardinal initiatives and these are: Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, Ibrahim Forum and Ibrahim Leadership Fellowship. The next section of this research will provide an overview of these initiatives and how they contribute to good governance in Africa.

3.5 The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is an annual statistical assessment of the quality of governance in every African country.15 The IIAG consists of over ninety-three
(93) indicators made of fourteen (14) sub-categories, four categories and the overall measurement of governance. The indicators are made of official data, expert assessments and citizen surveys. Data is thus provided by over thirty (30) independent global data institutions. It has been noted that the indicators represent the most comprehensive collection of data on governance in Africa.\textsuperscript{16}

It’s a score sheet which enables Civil Societies and Governments to have an objective discussion based on comprehensive data and information. Farrington\textsuperscript{17} explained that existing indices for measuring governance such as those of the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, Freedom House and Transparency International, and others have lapses in their implementation. These lapses stem from the fact that they rely on data collected based on perceptions, focuses on individual elements of government such as security, corruption and political participation, and are unable to rank countries.\textsuperscript{18} The IIAG aims at filling the gaps left by existing governance indices by making accessible a comprehensive, objective and quantifiable method of measuring governance quality in sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{19} Created at the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, the IIAG started off by evaluating forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries according to fifty seven variables.\textsuperscript{20}

Currently, the Ibrahim Index evaluates good governance on the basis of four basic categories other than what is generally proffered by existing indices. These categories are namely Safety and Rule of Law\textsuperscript{21}, Participation and human rights,\textsuperscript{22} Sustainable economic opportunity\textsuperscript{23} and Human development.\textsuperscript{24} To better appreciate what defines each category, the foundation spells out the following sub categories under its main body.
Safety and Rule of Law

The Safety & Rule of Law category captures the extent to which all individuals are protected from both internal and external threats to the peace. The degree to which society is safe and secure is assessed alongside the existence of a robust legal system and transparent, effective and accessible institutions, within all branches of the state. The results of Africa’s second best performing category are overshadowed by a negative average trajectory, driven by opposite trends within the four components of Safety & Rule of Law. Whilst Rule of Law and Personal Safety show some improvement, there have been deteriorations in National Security and, to a lesser extent, in Accountability.25
Participation and Human Rights

The Participation & Human Rights category captures the relationship between government and citizen. It measures, on the one hand, the extent to which individuals can participate in, and take ownership of, the political process and, on the other hand, the state’s achievement in guaranteeing the political and social rights of all citizens. Participation & Human Rights shows a positive trend in recent years. This is particularly the case in Participation, the most improved sub-category of the IIAG, and Gender. However, faltering results in Rights threaten overall progress.26

Sustainable Economic Opportunity

The Sustainable Economic Opportunity category captures whether the state provides the conditions necessary for the pursuit of economic opportunities that contribute to a prosperous and equitable society. It measures the delivery of sound economic policies and the provision of a sustainable economic environment that is conducive to investment and the operation of a business. The Sustainable Economic Opportunity category exhibits both the continent’s lowest average category score and the largest category performance deterioration since 2011. Infrastructure is the only sub-category within Sustainable Economic Opportunity to have registered an improvement over the past four years.

Human Development

The Human Development category captures the success of the state in securing the well-being of all of its citizens. It measures the extent to which the government provides citizens with social protection, comprehensive education provision and a healthy life. Human Development is the best performing governance category in the IIAG, whilst also being the most improved since 2011. It is the only category within the IIAG in which every underlying
sub-category shows average improvement. However, the indicators of Welfare do not show the consistency or strength of improvement seen elsewhere within Human Development. These sub-categories have their sub-sub-categories that sum up to ninety-three (93) indicators.

The Foundation obtains its data from thirty-three (33) external data institutions some of which are multilateral development banks such as the World Bank, think tanks such as Freedom House and UN agencies, as well as African data providers African Development Bank, Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP), Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) Ghana among others. These sources provide a range of data types, including Expert Assessments, Official Data and Opinion Surveys. Each year the IIAG is refined to ensure that it is the most robust and accurate reflection of governance performance in Africa.

The purpose of this Index is not necessarily to rate the various countries but to diagnose African states of the ills that confront Africa’s development. With this goal in mind, it serves as a diagnostic tool for civil society, donors and governments so that performance can be enhanced and the lives and outcomes of Africans can be strengthened. Improving African governance is the goal for the foundation. Rotberg opines that the Index was designed to bring the importance of governance to light. In the 1960s, West African countries such as Ghana had higher GDPs per capita than countries in Asia like Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and South Korea. The rise of these Asian Tigers as against countries like Ghana can be attributed to an application of reasonable levels of good governance- the supply of quantities of political goods to citizens that countries such as Ghana had not yet grasped. Ghana although fell back under military juntas, has picked up gradually to better its
governance than other West African countries.33 From the first index report that was published by the index in 2007 revealed that Ghana fared comparatively well in relation to other West African countries by placing 8th in the overall governance. Since then Ghana has made improved consistent strides to place 7th in the 2015 Index of African Governance.

**Merits of the IIAG**

The IIAG is updated on an annual basis and is believed to provide the mosy accurate data available on the African continent. Per the definition of good governance by the foundation, the IIAG has been categorised in 4 distinct features and rated in terms of their accessibility and attainability by all African countries.

One of the reasons/attributes that makes the IIAG a credible data source is that in assessing a country’s performance in a year it goes beyond the overall governance rating and takes into account the country’s performance across different governance dimension encompassed by the categories, sub-categories and indicators of the IIAG. For instance, Ethiopia’s score in 2015 had an impressive improvement of +13.9 in Human Development which has been consistent since 2006. However there has been deterioration in sustainable economic opportunity over the past days driven by its decline in the sub-category Business Environment decline by -16.4 points.

Also one is able to appreciate the IIAG by not limiting analysis to the ranking and scores but also examining the trends that could have caused a country’s improvement or deterioration. That makes accountability checking or fact checking for most countries more reliable. This could also be ascertained by looking at the net improvement or deterioration.
Mo Ibrahim remarks that the results of the 2015 IIAG for instance challenged their perceptions in the narrative of African governance. He indicated that though Africa is progressing, the story in inter alia complex and doesn’t fit the stereotype. He cautions that even if the picture looks good, one must be vigilant and not get complacent.

Also the IIAG incorporates findings from over 36 separate research institutions. According to Jendey’s Frazer, CEO of 50 Ventures LLC, a global policy leader, the IIAG gives a complex picture of governance progress and challenges rather than relying on crisis-driven headline news.

3.6 Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership

Another key initiative of the MIF is the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. The Prize is given to relentless, hardworking and excellent leaders in Africa. The duty of an African leader is not without obstacles and challenges. According to Dr Ibrahim

An African leader is faced with major challenges of, how to move his people out of poverty, how to deal with issues of education for young people, conflict, health issues, water, and electricity. The success of an African leader is crucial to the lives of the millions of people he governs.

This is the premise for which the Ibrahim Prize was established to support African leaders. It highlights exceptional role models for the continent by ensuring that Africa continues to benefit from the experience and expertise these exceptional leaders when they leave national office.

Specifically, the prize award is given to former Executive Head of State or Government for the life thereafter for exhibiting great leadership during once tenure as the leader of his or her country. The prize is given based on the recommendations of an independent Prize
Committee\textsuperscript{34} composed of eminent personalities, including two Nobel Peace Prize Laureates. The Prize Committee members include; Salim Ahmed Salim (Chair), former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and former Prime Minister of Tanzania; Martti Ahtisaari, former president of Finland and Nobel Laureate; Aicha Bah Diallo, Former Minister of Education in Guinea and Director of Basic Education at UNESCO; Graca Machel, Chancellor of the University of Cape Town and former Minister of Education in Mozambique; Mary Robinson, Former President of Ireland and former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency and Nobel Laureate.\textsuperscript{35}

To be awarded the Prize, the individual needs to meet the following criteria:

a. Former African executive head of state or government,

b. Left office in the last three years

c. Democratically elected

d. Served his/her constitutionally mandated term

e. Demonstrated exceptional leadership

The Ibrahim Prize is the largest annually awarded prize in the world, consisting of US$5 million over ten years and US$200,000 per year for life thereafter.\textsuperscript{36} Initially, the prize was based on countries that ranked high in the index and how they achieved the various categories during their tenure of office.\textsuperscript{37} With time it was realised that though the index was necessary, it was not a sufficient bar over which leader were expected to hurdle.\textsuperscript{38} For Dr Ibrahim, Africa lacked good leadership and so it was more important for Africa to strengthen its leadership qualities than any other thing as leadership mattered more. Whether the prize will transform poor performing of African leaders into good leaders and avoid the future Mobutu
Sese Sekou is not yet known. It is impossible to demonstrate the value of the prize in terms of improving leadership quality until the current generation of new leader leave office.

Since it was commemorated in 2007 it has found deserving leaders and have awarded them accordingly. Ibrahim Laureates include President Joaquim Chissano\(^3\) of Mozambique (2007), received the inaugural Ibrahim Prize for his achievements in bringing peace, reconciliation, stable democracy and economic progress to Mozambique following the civil war.

President Festus Mogae of Botswana\(^4\) in 2008 was awarded the second Ibrahim Prize for his role in maintaining and consolidating Botswana’s stability and prosperity in the face of an HIV/AIDS pandemic which threatened the future of his country and people. In 2011, President Pedro Pires of Cape Verde\(^4\) was awarded the 2011 Ibrahim Prize for his role in transforming Cape Verde into a model of democracy, stability and increased prosperity. President Hifikipunye Pohamba (2014), President Pohamba was awarded the 2014 Ibrahim Prize for his role in forging national cohesion and reconciliation at a key stage of Namibia’s consolidation of democracy and economic development.

President Nelson Mandela of South Africa (2007) received an honorary award and recognised throughout the world as one of the most exceptional leaders of our time. During a life of personal sacrifice, Mandela dedicated himself to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, and served as that country’s first President. Despite the countless number of people who have been honoured with the award, Prize Committee may choose not to award the Prize if after careful consideration no suitable leader is found. This was the case in 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2015.
This has demonstrated the need for leaders to aspire to do their best not purposely to win the award but to change the rhetoric of not finding a deserving African leader for the Ibrahim Prize Award.

The Prize is by far the most innovative initiative that is taken seriously by African leaders. Ibrahim says that his foundation strives to “convince retiring presidents not to go… and to sit by the swimming pool, but to have them engage in civil society and to really play the role.”

3.7 Ibrahim Forum

As rightly stated by the late Nelson Mandela, the foundation has stimulated debate especially through the Ibrahim Forum. This is an annual high-level discussion forum tackling issues of critical importance to Africa. Held annually since 2010, the Forum convenes prominent African leaders, ranging from high-level African stakeholders (political and business leaders) belonging to various public and private constituencies, as well as selected non-African partners such as major international development partners to identify specific policy challenges and priorities for action. Unlike other fora that meet to discuss global issues, the Ibrahim forum stimulates discussion on issues pertaining to the African continent that needs critical attention. The Ibrahim Forum aims to tackle specific issues that are of critical importance to Africa, and require both committed leadership and governance. It aims to go beyond stating issues and renewing commitments by defining pragmatic strategies, operational action points and shared responsibilities. In order to facilitate this and to focus energies on a constructive debate, the Foundation publishes a ‘Facts & Figures’ report for each Forum. The report compiles the best and most recent data and analysis relevant to the issues to be addressed.
A detailed, data-driven analysis of each issue is compiled by the Foundation in advance of the Forum as the basis for an informed and constructive debate. Previous Forums in the past have dealt with issues such as African Regional Economic Integration in 2010, African Agriculture in 2011, African Youth (2012), Africa Ahead: The Next 50 years (2013), Regional Integration: Uniting to Compete (2014) and African Urban Dynamics (2015).

The reports present an overview of the sheer geopolitical challenge; how this translates into the required delivery of goods and services; the impact on people’s lives; and the significance of governance and leadership in the solution. At the 2015 forum, it was estimated that urban population will grow by almost 900 million by 2050. The forum also explored trends and dynamics of Africa’s evolving urban landscape. It also brought to light facts about urban employment that estimates 61% of urban employment opportunities in Africa fall within the informal sector. The forum exposed countries like Ghana precisely Agbogbloshie a suburb of the capital Accra that had become the world’s largest e-waste hub. Though not the first to point out this malice in Ghana, the forum indicated that, this could cause serious health implications through the release of toxic dioxins into the atmosphere. Despite being a lucrative venture for scrap dealers, the forum urged the government of Ghana to take a critical look into the matter since it possess more threat to health and the environment.

3.7 Ibrahim Fellowship

It is worth noting that the foundation does not only seek to glorify past leaders but also to empower the youth to be able to lead the course once incumbent leaders have left office. Established in 2010, the Ibrahim Leadership Fellowships formed a selective programme designed to identify and support future African leaders by current leaders of key multilateral institutions. Investing in the future of young people in Africa is key to improving the
continent’s governance. The Foundation highlights areas in which dramatic impact can be demonstrated when young Africans are given the opportunities they deserve to build their own and their countries’ futures.51

From a focus on the education of women in Sudan to support for historically marginalised Nubian people in Egypt, the Foundation is committed to showcasing the best talent from the African continent, particularly amongst those groups who are often denied the opportunity to contribute to their society’s development.52

The fellows are selected under an eligibility criteria that requires a fellow to be a national of an African country; must have between 7-10 years of relevant work experience; a Master’s Degree, be under the age of 40, or 45 for women with children.53 Fellows are usually hosted at the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the World Trade Organization (WTO) which has been replaced with the International Trade Centre (ITC) since 2014. Current partnerships are with London Business School (LBS), School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and the University of Birmingham.

It is worth noting that the MIF has managed to build the capacity of individual students into scholars. In 2013, Ghana’s Rebecca Teiko Sabah who was studying law at the Ghana School of Law was honoured with an award of studying at the UNECA. Yvonne Apea Mensah, the head of Africa Political Division at the Commonwealth Secretariat in 2012 had the opportunity to fellowship with AfDB. This initiative has proven that educating an individual empowers that individual with the capacity to make a lot of difference to the continent since the secret to development is knowledge.
It is imperative to note that though the four may have their distinctive features, they are interlinked to bring out the worth of good governance. Without index, leadership may not be well informed to make constructive debate at the forum. Once these leaders leave power, who is going to fill their position if the continent fails to educate the youth on the quality of governance? Like Dr Mo rightly put “leadership is about making choices, defining priorities, and taking risks. Governance is about properly documenting and effectively implementing these choices.” The Foundation contends that development cannot be achieved without good governance and good governance cannot be achieved without good leaders.

3.8 Discussion of Findings

3.8.1 Effectiveness of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation,

The discussion of findings will be analysed under the umbrella of the research questions raised. These include the effectiveness of the foundation, responsiveness and the challenges confronting the foundation. The research will ascertain these questions by assessing the objective of the MIF, the four cardinal initiatives and the foundation in its generic form under each umbrella of the research questions. These three variables have been selected due to the fact that, the MIF lacks concept specification for its operations. However, the study deems it fit to assess the objective to ascertain in what ways objectives have been met to promote the fundamentals of good governance. The initiatives will also be analysed under each of the research question to determine whether these alone could suffice in the promotion of good governance. The foundation in its generic form- who recognises it and of what impact would the recognition accelerates the promotion of good governance in Africa.
3.8.1.1 Effectiveness of the MIF objective, initiatives and foundation

As discussed in the previous sections, the MIF was established with a focus on the critical importance of leadership and governance in Africa. It does so through the provision of tools to support progress in leadership and governance on the continent. The Foundation aims to promote meaningful change on the continent. It focuses on defining, assessing and enhancing governance and leadership in Africa.

In ascertaining the effectiveness in obtaining its objective of the foundation in putting governance at the heart of every conversation in Africa, one can undeniably concur that the foundation is effectively making strides in doing so. A clear cut example is heralding its governance weekend in an African country of its choice. This activity brings to light the aspects of the initiatives such as the forum to encourage and promote purpose driven debate on the continent. Although political analyst and security expert Dr. Antwi-Danso indicates that the foundation may not be as effective as it ought to be in achieving the said objective. His argument is based on the fact that the approach for assessing leadership and governance in Africa is not participatory. As he puts it:

Governance is meant to be a bottom up approach which makes citizens at the grassroots feel inclusive in the whole process. However, the foundation’s approach is quite elitist where only the few educated, knowledgeable and well vexed in the issues get to contribute to the debate.

Contributing to the discussions, Dr. Kwesi Anning of the Kofi Annan International Peace-keeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC) adds that the foundation has not being successful in achieving its objective. He states:

Taking the award into consideration, although it is one of the most innovative ideas, it fails to harness the effectiveness of the foundation in militating against bad governance as the awards go to people who are well paid and can already afford such wealth. Adding up to their wealth may not necessarily improve any public initiative that past leaders may be engaged in.
In his view, such funds and awards should go in support of dilapidated economies and changing the lives of the people. Despite the verity this opinion carries, it will be prudent to note that these same monies, should they be issued in support for ‘diplapidated’ economies will still go to these same leaders who will have the exclusive right to effect and implement developmental projects. The tendency to implement such projects will call for discipline and good political will of the leader; a characteristic that is fast dwindling in the African leader. This is why the foundation highlights on the indispensable aspect of leadership to promote good and accountable governance.

Since:

“Good governance is meaningless if the frameworks and mechanisms we have are not used to transform people’s lives”.57

The initiatives are by far the most innovative governance promoting initiatives that has been produced on the African continent. The publication of the IIAG gives policy advisors and government something to look up to on how well their governments have performed. Ambassador D. K. Osei58 admits that the foundation’s initiatives have been effective since its inception. As he puts it:

The Ibrahim Index has international recognition and respectability that makes it useful and worthwhile. This is because the organisations that assess and produce data on the various countries are neutral and therefore produce credible and useful results which are renewed annually.

This goes to support the October 5, 2009 press conference held by the Foundation which states that:

In keeping with the Foundation’s commitment to ensure that the index is continually improved over time and can be used by civil society, this project has been strengthened in significant ways this year. The 2009 Ibrahim Index includes new indicators more regularly updated, and therefore more immediately reflective of current reality. The index has also been extended this year to consider the entire continent, not just the sub-Saharan region.59
This is an indication that the MIF tries to improve on its initiatives to inculcate all new emerging aspects of governance that deserve adequate attention and immediate action. This renewal and constant upgrading, to a large extent can be alluded to the criticisms obtained in performing its objectives. The fellowship on the other hand has built stronger capacities in the African Youth. Ransford Gyampo\(^6\) adds that the MIF initiatives are good and encourage good governance. He indicates that, notwithstanding the challenges confronting the Foundation, the Fellowship is helping in capacity building of future leaders for Africa.

It’s good the Foundation is building capacity because these fellows will become enlightened about the whole idea of governance and good governance and impact knowledge in our society.\(^6\)

For countries like Ghana, despite being ranked among the top ten in the overall governance catalogue and in three of the four IIAG categories, Ghana’s trajectories in some governance components are negative. In line with trends seen at the continental level, Ghana has deteriorated, in similar magnitude, in Safety & Rule of Law and Sustainable Economic Opportunity since 2011. Kwaku Osei-Hwedie\(^2\) testifies that, this could be attributed to the malfunctioning of judicial processes in the country. Thanks to the undercover and investigative journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas of Tiger Eye production, one can testify that this data is true and credible. Even though the country has improved in Participation & Human Rights and Human Development over the past four years, these trends are juxtaposed by deteriorations in some of these two categories’ underlying sub-categories.

Africa lacks major data and evidence to be able to hold governments into accounts therefore, the index for example has become a weapon for academia, citizens and policy advisers to hold their governments into account. The concrete evidence becomes the basis that one can constructively criticise the government. The IIAG is a huge service to Africa in terms of producing the data that can be used to influence policy.\(^3\)
The foundation in itself has been effective since it has also improved the quality of persons. Leaders do not have to be worried about the generation that takes after them because these upcoming leaders have benefitted from the immense knowledge and experience of proficient African leaders. According to Alidu Seidu, the foundation has built the capacity of individual students into scholars; these educated individuals have the capacity of making a lot of difference on the continent.

Although many have raised questions on the fact that the foundation is a private institution that seeks to make profit and a good name for itself, Antwi-Danso contends that private foundations like the MIF are more positive and potent in influencing public opinion than the state institution and government bodies, because the states can be lethargic and uncaring sometimes, however a private institution such as MIF would want to see profit not necessarily in terms of monetary gain but in terms of success. This assertion presents the MIF as a good reward, with a good philosophy and without any bias to it. Compared to the likes of the APRM which is being embattled by the unavailability of funds, the MIF is more independent, rigours, neutral and very demanding when it comes to assessing good governance on the continent. Unlike the APRM that requires a voluntary accession, the MIF can obtain data on individual countries whether states recognise it or not. This aspect of the foundation expedites its action of attaining all stated objectives at all cost.

In the same way, advocates of the foundation argue that this top-down approach to development has “successfully used private sector resources to reform the public sector of Africa.” Adding, “As more African leaders are heeding the call to bring accountability to their administrations, Ibrahim foundation have proven invaluable in the process.”
However, it may be prudent to add that though the foundation has been criticised of using a top-down approach to perform its functions, to a large extent, it inculcates a bottom up approach in its annual governance weekend it organises in selected African countries. Activities lined up for the governance weekend are meant to gather the masses to know of the activities of the Mo Ibrahim foundation and to make the notion of governance attractive and get everyone involved to play a role. That is why in the 2015 annual governance weekend held in Accra, like all the others, included not only the forum and awards ceremony but a concert and football gala that got the masses to participate. This rightly leads the study into the next line of discussion: responsiveness.

3.8.2 Responsiveness received by the MIF

Over time, the feedback and some research into the Foundation has shown to an extent how states, individuals and corporate bodies have received the Foundation and its activities. On the aspect of its objectives, many African leaders such as the erstwhile United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and Nelson Mandela have sided with the foundation in stimulating good and accountable governance on the face of the African continent.

Initiatives such as the Prize awarded to past leader has received an immerse recognition from the media across the world. Most states and leaders have become more concerned about the Prize especially in situations where no leader is honoured with it. Some have thought that the prize is so mouth-watering that every leader will want to get it. For many, it’s a life time grantee for economic security and success. However, for academics, researchers, policy advisers, and the civil society organisations, there are far too many causes in Africa in more
urgent need of monetary assistance, than what could legitimately be seen as the “pampering” of former heads of state.$^{68}$

On the part of Gyampo,$^{69}$ he observed that the inability of some past leaders to receive the prize award indicate that little progress is being made under good governance in Africa. In his view little or no attention is paid to both the MIF index and the prize award. As he rightly indicated:

The fact that for some time now no African leader has been awarded shows that governance is stalling or stagnating and so African leaders need to step up their game. Also looking at the rankings for some time, if nobody has qualified for the prize then it means that it is not really doing what it is expected to do. It is not encouraging anyone and it shows the extent to which people do not care much about what the Foundation stands for.$^{70}$

To buttress his point on the stagnation of good governance, in Africa he cited Ghana as an example, saying:

Ghana’s rankings have stalled. However the index has not encouraged Ghana to do anything different. The fact that for several years Ghana is still at the 7th position does not encourage Ghana to do better.$^{71}$

Though Gyampo’s assertion that ‘….looking at the rankings if for some time nobody has qualified for the prize then it means that it is not really doing what it is expected to do,’ hitherto, that may not be that case. A critical look at countries in the sub-region for instance reveal a deficiency in leadership, a situation that cannot be overlooked should the full recognition of initiatives like MIF should be guaranteed. There are distinct lapses in the leadership style of our leaders. Therefore in as much as the Foundation may go beyond to entrench its initiatives, it also behoves on African leaders to take steps to effect change in their political economies.

Even so, the fellowship which is one of its kinds has reached in particular organisations within the African continent and not within most educational sectors such as the tertiary
institutions. According to Seidu, the fellowship should be publicised more in tertiary institutions to encourage more of the youth to further the disciplines they have been enrolled in. He also added that MIF should go out of its way to sensitize African leaders about the existence of the Foundation and the benefits of the Foundation to African states and the society at large. Thus:

They ought to make themselves known to the African population. They should embark on a publicity drive and sensitize people on what it takes to govern well and this will make them more relevant.\textsuperscript{72}

Unarguably, there’s not much premium put on anything African whether initiative, programme or knowledge. It is sad to note that most people will prefer to be ranked by Global Index or indicators like Democracy Index or Standards and Poor rather than an African ‘apparatus’. A situation due to the fact that there’s more value placed on western indicators than African. In line with that, Ambassador Baah-Duodu\textsuperscript{73} attests to the fact that some of the propositions from donor countries and development partners gradually help in the governance of states. Most of them give the loans and grants under conditions of democracy in Africa. What is wrong about that is that they want to see the democracy they know, but not helping to realize the African kind of democracy, which is a big mistake. Other than that agencies and partners like the Accounting for International Development (AfID), USAID are all helping in shaping democracy and helping a lot of institutions in Ghana. For example, parliament would not have been parliament but for organisations like Friedrich Ebert foundation. An awareness of democracy and participation is going on gradually; the worsening factor is that they measure these countries on west postulates.

In view of the foundation’s recognition, Seth Oteng\textsuperscript{74} of the Youth Bridge Foundation claims leaders on the African continent pay little or no emphasis on the important role of the MIF. Why? To him the leaders only react or respond to the initiatives of the foundation when they
are commended. However, when the MIF ‘chastises’ the African leaders through its rankings no attention is given to the findings and the recommendations of the foundation. He states:

Leaders are responsive to the foundation when it favours them and will readily turn a blind eye to the foundation when it does not.\(^{75}\)

This is not surprising as most people have viewed the foundation as a profit making organisation, therefore how can one be bored with someone who thinks he’s making something relevant. According to Seidu,\(^{76}\) this usually happens especially when states are low in their ranking

States may not have openly expressed their interest in the foundation and its initiatives. Nonetheless, some have consulted the Foundation at the back door to ascertain how they can improve their economies. However, other critics presume that the parameters set are such that leaders ordinarily do not care since they lose nothing by not getting the prize award. Who cares if nobody wins, and who cares if everybody wins.\(^{77}\) Like many other scholars though MIF has a very good philosophy, people are sceptical about their elitist approach,\(^{78}\) which is a challenge the foundation may have to deal with in stimulating good governance in Africa.

3.9 Challenges of the MIF

The Foundation although up to its task of contributing to the advancement of good governance in Africa has not sailed smoothly. Critics have been at their best in slashing down the efforts of the foundation for what it seeks to do. In 2013, some political analyst in Rwanda reported that the Index was not reflective of what governance meant in their countries. Stating that a country like Rwanda was performing poor in terms of participation, however in consonance with the ranking there was a derivation. Though perceived as the most robust of the Foundation’s initiatives, measuring various aspects of governance and
using a number of data sources to try and make the statistics more reliable seems to be a major challenge for the Foundation since African statistics are notoriously scarce and inaccurate.

Also, the skewed perception about the foundation prevents some leaders from burying their pride and tapping from the rich resource and data of the foundation. In most instances leaders have shirk their primary responsibility under the pretext that they are doing better than the foundation ranks them to be. They fail to view the foundation as a diagnostic tool; they would rather prefer to view it as a profit making institution. Since there is not much value and respect placed on anything African whether initiative or knowledge, recommendation fall on deaf ears and shrug under the carpet since they are non-binding.

Other scholars in academia have argued that it does not quite make sense that African leaders who were voted into power and swore allegiance to the state have to be rewarded for their service. According to Cameron Duodu 79

To award them a prize because they have obeyed their own constitution and not prolonged their stay in office – which, in the final analysis, forms the bare bones of the motivation for the prize – is to be inordinately indulgent towards them.

While Mo Ibrahim denies that the $5 million Prize operates as a pension fund for retiring heads of state, he admits that pensions are so small for former heads of state in Africa that some, like Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, cannot even afford to rent an apartment in their own capital cities. 80

Unfortunately, there’s a basic disrespect for the African scholarship. Africans themselves do not see any competence or capability in an individual who takes the pain to upgrade him or herself. Preferably African institutions would rather resort to external assistance should they
require any assistance since they think that is more promising. It is no surprise that the number of western institutions for Ibrahim Fellowship far outweigh African educational institutions. Why? Because once these fellows are marinated with the ingredients of western postulate, they will taste better when served on an African dish.

Anning\textsuperscript{81} agrees that the real challenge is how to finally revise the narrative, the places, the interest of the African within the centre of its lived experiences and its processes. That way the African is able to better appreciate its continent for what it is worth. That way Africa is able to engage the rest of the world. Perhaps, if only the challenges that constantly fraught the attainment of good governance diminish, States will better appreciate the work of the MIF.

Seth Oteng\textsuperscript{82}, also observed that because of pride exhibited by many heads of state, they fail to tap into the rich data of the Foundation to correct the malfunctions of their states. Therefore although the foundation may produce the IIAG, its recommendations and red flags may be overlooked leaving little impact made by the foundation.

\textbf{3.10 Conclusion}

It can be deduced from the above discussions that, the foundation is making some progress in the promotion of good governance in Africa. For example, the Fellowship has helped in the capacity building of many young African leaders. However, as it emerged from the interviews and the review of literature of the Foundation, it is very obvious that little attention is paid to the foundation by heads of states. There is lack of commitment to adhere to the tenets of good governance being promoted by the Foundation. Therefore African leaders need to pay attention to the Foundations activities and benefits. As noted by Gyampo, African leaders must step up their game when it comes to good governance.
It was also noted that there is little information on the Foundation and a lot of people do not
know about its activities and benefits in the promotion of good governance in Africa. Hence
information dissemination on the Foundation and its activities is a key to its success.
Endnotes

2 Ibid.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This concluding chapter provides a summary of the research findings draws conclusions from the study and proffers recommendations.

4.1 Summary of Findings

The purpose of this study is to determine the effectiveness of Mo Ibrahim foundation in promoting good governance in Africa. The study uses the qualitative research methods which include: purposive sampling, semi-structured interviews, and systematic and concurrent data collection and data analysis procedures. Purposive sampling method used to select few and relevant participants for the study due to the peculiar nature of the study.

The objectives of the study are ‘to examine the effectiveness of the Ibrahim initiatives on good governance, identify how responsive states are to the initiatives of the Ibrahim Foundation and to ascertain the challenges confronting the Foundation in ensuring good governance in Africa.’ To achieve these objectives both primary and secondary sources of data were used to highlight the activities of the foundation and how effective it has been in attaining its objective. At the end of the research the following research findings were made:

The research reveals that the concept of good governance evades a very specific definition. However, the elements used to ascribe good governance are the same regardless of the institution or organisation that defines the term. A critical look at the concept of good governance reveals a supply and a demand dimension. The supply side encapsulates the
responsibility on government to provide the basic needs, services and infrastructure that the
people need to be able to have a secured and decent life. The demand side has to do with
institutions put in place by states and from individuals who live within the state to demand
accountability from government to perform the functions at the supply side.

Good governance as a practice in Africa became more prevalent when public sector reforms
began in the 1980s; a situation which was further heightened when Africa’s development
partners took over in engraving it in various African states through the enactment of policies
and initiatives like the SAPs.

The study also reveals that, development partners solutions over the last two decades have
been well entrenched in Africa to militate against bad governance. Granting that their support
has been in terms of aid, human resource and policy advice, it has not proved sustainable
since the effects of these on ordinary citizen has proved to be damaging. The contending
argument is thus aid breeds corruption. Also the reporting mechanism after taking the aid
does not take into account how far it has worked but rather it becomes a score sheet to prove
that it has been delivered.

Subsequently, post-independence leaders who have developed policies and mechanisms have
failed to also define what the African problem is before seeking external assistance.
Therefore initiatives are couched in a civilising rhetoric, highly dependent on western
postulate and seeking to please the metropolis. That aside, the African type of governance has
not been well defined in many literatures to be well appreciated on how these mechanisms
such as the MIF initiatives fulfil its objectives.
Despite the efforts put in place to achieve good governance, poor leadership, wide illiteracy base of African citizens, willingness to participate, corruption and understanding the role of the citizen have been some of the major challenges confronting our attainment of good governance. These challenges have blurred the objectives of most initiatives and made operations questionable. Unfortunately too, most public institutions in Africa are particularly not well developed and structured in terms of human resource, technical expertise and other necessary funding to tackle these challenges that confront the attainment of good governance. The impasse is that society turns to be too dependent on personalities as opposed to institutions. The results prove that institution fall at a standstill once the personality is no longer available. The fragility of these institutions becomes a contradictory factor to good governance.

The existence of the MIF on the other hand brings a realisation that there’s a deficit of governance. In spite of the foundation’s initiatives, the award is the most celebrated, well known and recognised by states. Dr. Ibrahim affirmed that the objective was to have a debate about governance, which we are having right now. Certainly without the Prize, many would not have talked about it. The award further tells about how philanthropic Mo Ibrahim is, to be able to devote his money and time for Africa. This is quite unusual and unheard off that an African will devote such amount of money to help Africa.

The research was guided by the hypothesis that “the Mo Ibrahim Foundation is a catalyst for promoting good governance in Africa.” Both primary data collected and secondary data used and analysed validates the hypothesis and prove that the MIF is effectively contributing towards the promotion of good governance in Africa. The analysis done prove that in terms of its initiatives, it demonstrates that good governance is meaningless with monitoring the
performance of leaders who have been elected by citizens to serve. It further proves that incentivising leaders who have served their constitutional term and improved sustainable development in their countries will help advocate for better leadership on the continent; especially since leadership has been one of the topmost challenges in most African countries. Both primary and secondary sources prove that the foundation seeks to implement its own strategies through informed debate and discussions on the state of governance in Africa and how it can be improved upon. Furthermore, MIF canopies its initiatives by ensuring that the youth is trained and well-groomed through the sharing of best practices and knowledge in order to lead the crusade once existing leaders are out of power.

The study was conducted within the framework of Developing and Evaluating Governance Indexes by Rachel Gisselquist. The framework described the proliferation of composite governance indicators used in both research and policy making. The framework suggested that, a review of the fundamentals of these indices should be based on a social science methodology. These fundamental principles include: concept formation, content validity, reliability, replicability, robustness and relevance of the measure to underlying research questions. It adds that, most governance indicators skip these concept specifications and define governance by how it is operationalized within their organisation.

In terms of its impact to the society, the framework drew a distinction between institutions and organisations. The theory explained that organisations include the political bodies, economic bodies, social bodies and educational bodies who are bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. However, what organisations come to attain or achieve and how they tend to evolve is largely and fundamentally influenced by institutions and an institutional framework. The framework concluded by inferring from the activities of the MIF
and the response it gets from the various states it seeks to rank, reward, discuss and upgrade its scholarship. From the theory used, the researcher concluded that the problem statement of ascertaining the effectiveness of the foundation in promoting good governance on the continent was answered.

The literature used to support and divulge the purpose of the study indicates that the concept of governance is usually couched in neo-liberal and western postulates of how the affairs of states should be managed. Explaining that, without consonance on a unique definition for the concept; what may be seen as good for one may not be good for the other. The literature agrees with assertion that with the impact of globalization many non-state actors had become more powerful than states and have become the bedrock for most states. Yet, it reveals that good governance in the 21st Century can better be implemented by government within a society rather than any other institution. In furtherance to this, the literature called on governments to take charge of their responsibilities since they have lacked capacity for long. From data gathered the research acknowledged that in terms of success, the IIAG has proven to be the most comprehensive assessment of governance performance on the continent. That notwithstanding, the prize has also been recognised by far as the world’s largest award prize worth $5 million over a ten year period. The initiatives of MIF have precipitated significant debate on leadership and governance in Africa and the criteria by which governance is assessed. As a matter of fact, the foundation has been very instrumental in many African countries like Ghana and Zimbabwe as it brought together African leaders from all sectors to press for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe.

Although the MIF has tried to remain buoyant over the past decade, there has not been much good news from the MIF to announce the next prize winner. The independent prize
committee has found it hard to find any former leader who measures up to their strict standard. Thus, could this be attributed to failure of the foundation?

4.2. Conclusion

Both external and home-grown initiatives have done and are still doing their best to promote good and accountable governance in Africa. Ultimately however, it is most important that though these two parameters have tried to change the sequel of good governance without much success; The MIF has drawn attention from commentators in Africa and abroad who have subsequently engaged in a dialogue about good governance in Africa. In many ways, though it has proven with the annual ranking it publishes that Africa can do better; much concentration is centred on the Prize than any other initiative. Perhaps in order to make its initiatives people friendly and create an immerse awareness for its activities; it is about time it took the forum and the scholarship to another level where the ordinary citizen on the street gets to share in the debate.

Though most critics may view the MIF is a wrong prescription for good governance in Africa, Critics cannot contend against debate about good governance, which is a necessity. The study concludes that, The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s home-grown approach and positive outlook to good governance has contributed to the debate and led the promotion of good governance in Africa.

4.3 Recommendations

Based on the research findings, the research proposes the following recommendation:

Incentivizing African heads of State for exhibiting exceptional leadership by giving monetary tokens raises more ethical questions about the foundation. One of the recommendations of
this research is that, the MIF needs to revise its activities and make it more people centred, where the incentives go to re-orienting people’s attention to good governance. This will enhance the people’s knowledge of good governance. Once people know of what good governance entails, they will demand better accounts of their governments. Inclusion of the study of good governance in early party of the educational system will also help inculcate in the youth the principles of good governance. Citizens will be better informed to demand good governance from their leaders.

Secondly, if the prize is to be maintained, there needs be a wider focus to make the prize award more appetizing since nothing makes it impulsive now. Some leaders may equally be stealing the same or more than what he’s rewarding to deserving African leaders. Therefore, what to do with the prize must be clearly spelt out and not dependent on the decision of the recipient.

Similarly, other private stakeholders may want to take a cue from what Dr. Ibrahim is doing so that in the next ten to twenty years, Africa will be able to boast of more influential indices, provide enough data and enforce people to examine critically the data in order to hold their governments accountable.

Also in order for the Foundation to be effective, it may be appropriate to set up subverted organisations in at least the various regions on the continent that will verify data sources and ensure credible sources of data. This is due to the fact that, people are sometimes sceptical of the ranking and have been concerned with its data partner like Corruption Index who rely on perception and hearsays to produce its data.
Finally, the scholarship could be more viable by assessing the autonomy of state institutions and reward them of these scholarships. This will ensure the quality of public and civil servant within the various countries. Consequently, it will strengthen public institution and validate their autonomy. The foundation should also be so neutral that the process should not include a sitting government seeking to influence the process. If the panel is up to task, by the time President X is out of power the decision on the next recipient should have been taken.
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