AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF ISLAMIC-RELATED TERRORISM ON MUSLIMS IN GHANA

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LEGON              JULY 2017
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of Dr. Philip Attuquayefio and that apart from other works, which are duly acknowledged, no part of it has been submitted anywhere else for any purpose.

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(SUPERVISOR)

DATE:.......................... DATE:..........................
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to God Almighty and my family and friends whose support and efforts made this work a success and a reality.
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<td>AILLS</td>
<td>Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQC</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda Central In Afghanistan</td>
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<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAIR</td>
<td>Council for American Inter-Faith Relations</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPAI</td>
<td>Popular Arab Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIMLJC</td>
<td>World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State in the Levant</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>LECIAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKO</td>
<td>Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUKUB</td>
<td>Maktab al-Khidmatul Mujahideenul-Arab</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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ABSTRACT

The study sought to examine the effects of Islamic-terrorism linkage on Muslims in Ghana. To achieve this objective, the study traced the history of Islamic terrorism by establishing the source and veracity of Islam-terrorism linkage as a phenomenon. Being a descriptive-exploratory research the study adopts a qualitative research methodology – in-depth interview to collect primary data from seven (7) distinguished Muslim academic and professionals purposively sampled for the study. The primary data compliments information from the secondary sources that informs the conclusion arrived by the study, based on several findings. Some of the effects of Islam-terrorism linkage on Muslims in Ghana include pain and disappointment associated with stereotyping, name-calling and suspicion of Muslims, especially if they wear a beard and full-face veils. Also a sense of low esteem and discrimination of Muslim emigrants have been reported among some Muslims in Ghana. The findings are not all adverse as the phenomenon is leading to increased Islamic scholarship, growth in numerical strength of the religion and tolerance to people of other faiths. Among the recommendation the study proffers is a review of the Islamic educational system, entrenchment of inter-faith engagement and deliberate steps to prevent the ongoing marriage between religion and politics.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Problem Statement

According to records, there are over hundred definitions of terrorism and each depends on who has the power to define terrorism and the purpose that such definition is expected to serve. Also, there is the difficulty associated with finding a common foundation to all acts of terror. Even at the United Nations there is the lack of consensus among scholars on what the definition of terrorism should be. Matusitz, for instance, defines terrorism as the use of violence to create fear (i.e., terror, psychic fear) for political, religious, or ideological reasons. Mannick defines terrorism as “the use of violence with the aim of creating fear in a wider audience in order to prevent various parties from doing something or, on the contrary, to coerce them into a certain behavior.”

Although differences in the definitions are based on perception and interest, a number of elements are common to most of the definitions of terrorism. Hoffman identifies them as “violence, psychological impact and fear perpetrated for a political goal, deliberate targeting of non-combatants, non-state actors or sub-national groups.”

Terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. The earliest form of terrorism is attributed to a Jewish sect called the zealots who later inspired the assassins; a Shia Islamic sect. It has manifested in various forms through the middle ages to the modern era, as a tool employed by revolutionary elements, freedom fighters and governments alike. The 21st century has seen the rise in terrorism
all around the globe. In the observation of Audrey Cronin, “modern terrorism” has the following trends: a rise in the incidence of religiously motivated attacks, a decrease in the overall number of attacks, an increase in the lethality per attack, and what seem to be the growing targeting of America and her allies. Terrorism has become the major international security threat in the post-Cold War world order to almost all countries, even in Africa which was initially not identified as a target.

There is consensus among many authors that 21st century terrorism is religious and that forms the fourth wave of modern terrorism. Among the prominent examples of terrorist incidents in the 21st Century is the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon. The attack brought to limelight Al-Qaeda, an Islamic terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden is on record to have formally declared a holy war against America and systems that are supposedly against Muslims, calling for the establishment of a “true” Islamic State under the Sharia. Following this attack, the world has seen a rise in the number of terrorist organizations across the world, including Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram. All these Islamic terrorists’ organizations have declared war against western ideals, claiming to take inspiration from the Quran.

Terrorism should not be associated with only Islam. All the major world religions, including Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Hinduism have adherents that have resorted to terrorism at some stages in history. It is, however, without doubt that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in America and terrorist organizations such Al-Qaeda, ISIS and Boko Haram have shaped 21st
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Although the narrative on terrorism tends to point to various causes and motivations for terrorist action, post 9/11 terrorism appears to be largely influenced by extremist appeals to religion. Authors, including Kepel, Kramer and even Hiro have established linkages between Islam...
and terrorism. Beyond academic analysis, examples of terrorist actions captured in media reports including suicide attacks and assassinations, among others, appear to affirm the link between Islam and terrorism. Within this context there have been reported incidents of adherents of the Islamic religion facing a lot backlash from countries within which they live. In the United States, for instance, President Donald Trump is on record to have recommended a review of immigration laws in respect of Muslims.

Although Ghana has not witnessed an open case of terrorism, the global outlook of Islam means that Muslims in Ghana are connected to Muslims in other parts of the world. With Islam-linked terrorism registering backlashes on Muslims in other parts of the world, there may equally be some effects on Muslims in Ghana. This assumption has however not been subjected to empirical examination. In this regard, this research seeks to find answers by critically analyzing the phenomenon of Islam - terrorism on Muslims in Ghana.

1.3 Research Question

- Is there a linkage between Islam and terrorism in the 21st Century?
- What is the nature of the linkage between Islam and terrorism in the 21st Century?
- What are the effects of the linkages between Islam and terrorism on Muslims in Ghana?

1.4 Research Objectives

- To determine existence of a linkage between Islam and terrorism in the 21st Century.
- To examine the nature of the linkage between Islam and terrorism in the 21st Century.
• To examine the effects of the relationship between Islam and terrorism on Muslims in Ghana.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study is limited to Islam and terrorism in the 21st century. It dwells on the activities of Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and ISIS which have created the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage. The effect of this phenomenon on Muslims in Ghana is the main thrust of the work, drawing on their interconnections with other Muslims around the world.

1.6 Rationale of the Study

In the light of growing Islam-linked terrorism across the world including West Africa and the efforts being made to deal with the threats through anti-terrorism strategies, the debate about the relationship between Islam and terrorism is becoming very important to political leaders and security experts. This research wades into the argument by exploring a critical dimension which very paramount because it affects on daily bases many innocent people far away from where the acts take place. It is also important because of the extent of religious bigotry it has generated at the highest level of political power. The tendency of the situation to strain diplomatic relations should not be underestimated. This study, in essence, adds to existing literature on the ongoing discourse on the relationship between Islam and international terrorism.
1.7 Theoretical Framework

The study was conducted within the framework of transnationalism. The term was popularized in the early 20th century by Randolph Bourne through his work “Transnational America”. In this work, he argues that the First World War has awakened nationalism in Europe and America.

Transnationalism is used in social science for cultural, race, ethnicity and nationalism studies. The focus is now more on the process by which immigrants become ‘trans-migrants’ - a situation where their loyalties and allegiances are not to a specific nation-state.15

Transnationalism as a theory in international relations is described by Vertovec, “as the multiple ties and interactions linking people and institutions, notwithstanding existing international borders.”16 Keohene and Nye, in their work “Transnational Relations and World Politics,” Risse-Kappen in “Bringing Transnational Relations Back” and, Tarrow in “Transnational Politics, Contentions and Institutions in International Politics,” have contributed to the development of the theory of transnationalism in international relations.

As a derivative of the pluralist thought in international relations, transnationalism raises criticisms to the theory of realism which considers the state as a rational actor. To realists the major focus should be on the state and the role of non-state actors is mostly insignificant. Risse-Kappan (1995) argues that transnational non-state actors, including multi-national corporations and activist groups, have become not only important but autonomous that they are able to oppose domestic policy. According to Roseanau (1999), they have coercive powers to ensure compliance with their common interests.17 For instance, immigrants and their kin and relations may even initiate transnational processes that affect states.18 This is the dilemma Germany is
facing in its relations with Turkey as there are over three million Turks in Germany that have maintained ties with activities in their home country.

According to Tarrow, there are three categories of transnationalism. They include transnational social movements, international non-governmental organizations and transnational activist networks.

Accessibility and affordability of communication technology, including the glamour of wealth associated with liberalism and capitalism led by multinational companies and their governments in the West, have become the drivers of transnationalism. With it, have emerged political transformations, new international organizations and international legal regimes that have blurred the boundaries of states and contested the established traditional notions of citizenship and sovereignty.

The theory of transnationalism has several criticisms. Initial criticisms focused on its threat to sovereignty, security, inequality associated with cross border flow of ideas, investment and goods. With increased cross-border migration, the threat of transnationalism to identity, culture, loss of language and religion has taken the centre stage.\(^{19}\) There is a challenge with the definition of transnational actors which makes comparison among the different actors difficult. It is also becoming increasingly difficult to access the actions of non-state actors across borders leading to suspicion from state actors about their real motives.\(^{20}\) This problem is largely seen in the characterization of religious movements who have clandestine militant and political objectives whiles pursing humanitarian schemes.
Transnationalism therefore provides the adequate framework to study the involvement of religion in international relations because of the focus on various kinds of transnational religious actors, mostly religious terrorist networks. Globalization has facilitated the ability of non-state religious actors both benign and malign to spread their messages and link up with likeminded groups across international borders. Ultimately, “transnational communities whose identities are not defined by territorial boundary but by involvement in groups associated with common interest” is created. This form the basis of the theory’s suitability for the study.

1.8 Literature Review

Literature abounds with works on Islam and terrorism. Several arguments have been put forward by scholars on the nature of Islam and its relations with terrorism in Africa and the world. Very limited work has been done, thus far, on the linkage between the phenomenon of Islam and terrorism especially in Africa. A number of these works have been found to be relevant to the study and have been reviewed below.

“Terrorism: Its Past, Present and Future Prospects” is a handy textbook on terrorism, tracing its history from the zealots and assassins to the 21st century. Before making reference to a definition of terrorism, Mannik criticizes a number of definitions of terrorism by the security agencies in United States as misconstruing terrorism as an ideology instead of a tactic.

Dwelling on the current wave of terrorism which is mainly religious, he is emphatic that “the religious wave of terrorism is led by Islamists”. He traces the current surge in Islamist terrorism to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and September 2001.
Mannick uses Al-Qaeda, as a case study, because at the time of writing the article, it was the dominant international Islamic terrorist group. He discusses the characteristics that make the terrorist groups transnational while comparing them to other international advocacy groups like Amnesty International.

Mannick also examines the effectiveness of terrorism as a weapon to achieve political objectives. His observation is very instructive. According to him, “Terrorism has not been such an effective tool of coercion, whether relying on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or not.” This is because for starters, it does not occur that frequently in our daily lives. Therefore, except that it can alter states’ policies, and influence the minds of people, terrorism has not been very effective. Even in America, terrorism as a cause of death is insignificant as compared to other routine incidents. This means that it is possible that the threat of terrorism could be exaggerated by political, security experts and academics.

Mannick then touched on the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In his estimation, it is a short-term solution to reducing terrorism. He points to grievances such as poverty, foreign domination and ideology as causes of terrorism and doubts the choice of military action and democracy as effective tools in the global war against terror. The GWOT appears to be having minimal impact on the attrition rate of terrorist groups and flushing them out of their havens has proven a difficult task. Indeed, the GWOT has helped Al-Qaeda, for example, in its new evolution as a network or movement, spreading to over 70 countries around the world, including western countries and into cyberspace. Mannick predicted that if Al-Qaeda’s survives the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, it would facilitate its extension to Europe and escalate terrorist violence in the
West. With the benefit of hindsight, Mannick has been vindicated. It appears the lessons are not being learnt regarding the way the West is confronting ISIS.

The future of defeating terrorism, according to Mannick, is “grim”. He comes to this conclusion because of the evolution of Islamic terrorists into a movement and the access they have to enormous sources of funding virtually impossible to track. With these prospects, he predicts that Al Qaeda may be able to acquire nuclear weapons and that would give them bargaining powers in the international system. The recommendations provided by Mannick include a change in attitude towards terrorism and a robust anti-terrorism strategy that would stand the evolution of society. These recommendations are underpinned by a realization that terrorism is here to stay. For him terrorism is “a struggle of minds, a struggle of ideas and worldviews” and that “the only hope is the humanity in everyone.”

The literature establishes that changes in beliefs, social order or in major events, regionally or globally, have brought along with it growth in the occurrence of non-state terrorism. This trend is only likely to escalate.

In “Holy Terror, the Implication of a Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative,” Bruce Huffman dwells on religion and terrorism and posits that terrorism originates from religion. He explained that some of the words used in terrorism such as assassin, zealot and thugs are traced to the history of terrorism in Judaism, Islam and Hinduism. Modern Terrorism, in his opinion, may be overshadowed by ethnic-nationalist separatism and ideological terrorism. However, the religious components will always dominate.
Hoffman goes further to differentiate between ‘holy terror’ and ‘secular terror and makes the following comparisons. First, differences in value system lead to justification and legitimization of violence by religious terrorists. Thus, while secular terrorists consider violence as immoral, religious terrorist consider it moral. Second, religious and secular terrorists differ in their constituencies. Secular terrorists defend constituents that sympathized with them but in the case of religious terrorists they are the constituents and they engage in total war for themselves. Finally, the aim of the secular terrorist is described as utilitarian and the act itself is a means to an end, compared to religious terrorists whose aim are both religious and political and the act is an end in itself.

Hoffman then provides a detailed analysis of Jewish terrorism, white supremacist terrorism in the United States and the Sikhs in India. He believes that, the groups mentioned above are still a potential threat to major segments of the population in those countries in their bid to create a ‘pure’ nation for themselves. Huffman is of the view that most of these groups have millenarian hope and it is the major inspiration for their terrorists acts.

The literature warns that the growth of nationalism may become an opportunity for religious and ideological terrorists to prospect for nuclear weapons and place them at the disposal of newly created nations or rogue states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.
There is sharp disagreement between Hoffman and Mannik about the linkage between religion and terrorism. While Hoffman argues that religion is the cause of terrorism and is also the main cause of the severity of the attacks, Mannik disagrees.

Hoffman also agrees that terrorism has become transnational. He adds that its makes it lose its human and institutional command structures to ideological beliefs. He refers to the 21\textsuperscript{st} century terrorists as “part time” terrorists because most of them are at the behest of governments and non-governmental institutions but act as ‘standalone individuals.’ He predicted the year 2000 to be the ‘millenarian year’ of terrorism and that proved true with the September 11 attacks and the consequent surge in Islamic terrorism.

Pervez’s “Terror in the Name of Islam - Unholy War, Not Jihad in Case”\textsuperscript{28} is an apologetic attempt at defending Islam. He believes linking any religion, particularly Islam to terrorism is erroneous. He recounts the global condemnation that Al-Qaeda received following 9/11 and the fatwa released by Muslim Jurists in the United States and endorsed by one hundred and twenty (120) Muslim leaders and institutions across America. Pervez also agrees with Mannick that terrorism is a tactic but not an ideology. In that regard, he suggests that instead of seeing terrorism as an ideology, it should rather be seen as a weapon and tactic to achieving the objectives of an ideology.

He provides Islamic perspectives on terrorism. Contrary to widely views, Islam rejects suicide bombing because of its regard for the sanctity of life, promotion of pluralism of religions and support for the freedom of all persons.\textsuperscript{29} This narrative provides an antithesis to the theses that
Islam is intolerant of other religions and not compatible with democracy. The misrepresentation of Islam and terrorism, according to him, relates to the misunderstanding of the word and practice of jihad and also the improper conceptualization of some terminologies related to the religion. Pervez is categorical that terrorism is not inspired by the Quran but by grievances in the home countries or in other countries among Muslims and that all Islamic terrorists are not practicing Muslims but “atheists.”

Pervez is among scholars who argue that the GWOT seems to target Islam and Muslims, indicating that this is the unspoken perception held by many Muslims. This perception is increasingly being fed by America’s invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq and her relationship with Israel. He notes that this perception generally held by many Muslims is serving as a conduit for the extremists. He further suggests that, the word “extremists” is preferable to “fundamentalists” because this has the tendency of alienating majority mainstream Muslims who are not violent. Like Mannick, Pervez rejects military intervention as a tool in the GWOT and instead, recommends intensifying intelligence work in the global war against terror.

In addition, the constant profiling of international Islamic organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations has been condemned by Pervez. The literature further questions America’s relationship with certain Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia who have poor democratic credentials and describes it as a contradiction to the democratic ideals they preach around the world. He also believes the “Patriot Act” is undemocratic and was discriminately used to arrest 1500 Muslims in America after the September 11 attacks without proof.
Concluding on a similar note as Mannicks, Pervez believes that although terrorism will persist in the future, it cannot derail the achievements of democracy. What is required in his opinion is effective security policies to address terrorism and interventions that address the urgent needs of groups of people that are marginalized.

The review of Pervez’s work leads to the conclusion that terrorism cannot be eliminated by policies framed out of panic and mistrust but a change in attitudes just as Hoffman recommends. However, the literature appears to be a one-sided criticism of America’s defense of its citizens and on the GWOT, almost attempting to ignore the threat that America faces. The literature seems to be an attempt at equalizing the excesses of Islamic terrorist organizations with pockets of violence engaged by Christian militias such as the Anti Balaka rebel group while disregarding the magnitude of the challenge faced by America in the light of the sophistication that globalization has brought to terrorism.

In “Islam, Globalisation and Counter Terrorism,” Praja attempts to reconcile the positive relationship that exist and could exist between the West and Islam. He begins by establishing the links between Islam and the West in terms of intellectual and technological transfer to discount perceptions that the relationship is strained between the two. Praja notes that the anxiety stems from the tragic events of 9/11 and the reassessment of Islam and Muslims by the West out of the fear and paranoia that the incident generated. This has led to a setback in the growing interaction between Islam and the West. In this light, a compelling argument is presented in the literature that the war against terrorism is not against Islam and indeed not new to Islam. This is because, firstly, Islam has herself confronted terrorism from its earliest beginning. He adds that,
religion had to confront terrorism from within. He referred to the activities of the khajirites, assassins and Islamic jihad, among others, in his argument to serve as an example. Secondly, according to him, Islamic law and Sunni tradition condemned Islamic terrorism long before any international consensus was initiated against terrorist.

Praja’s preceding arguments does not mean that he totally rejects a link between religion and terrorism. What he emphasizes is that terrorism may be derived from religious doctrine or motivated by other ideological beliefs. Just as Pervez, he reiterates that the problem is not the Islamic religion but a misunderstanding of the teachings, not by discussants of terrorism alone, but by many Muslims as well. This means that, Praja does not regard Islamic terrorists as atheist as Pervez claims. He sees them as uninformed Muslims including Osama Bin Laden because they have arrogated to themselves the power to issue a fatwa and attack non-combatants, an act forbidden in Islam.

Praja notes that, suicide attack evolved in Islamic terrorism as a response to Israeli attacks on Palestinians. In his opinion, there is only one verse in the Quran that supports suicide and this is the verse most Islamic terrorists groups take inspiration from. He believes the trail of suicide attacks used by the Quassam Brigade in Palestine also served as an inspiration to Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001.

Praja ropes in the influence of globalization in the relationship between Islam and the West. He believes that globalization is rolling back the progress made in the interaction between the West and Islam. Globalization has projected American influence around the world but has also
exposed the excesses in American foreign policy in Islamic countries to other Muslims across the world. It has also exposed the parochial interest pursued by the global hegemon. He reveals that many Muslims characterizes it as imperialism, domination and oppression in the name of democracy. Globalization is, therefore, entrenching anti-Americanism and anti-Europeanism which is invariably linked to capitalism and Judo-Christianity by Muslims. In conclusion, Praja recommends the promotion of a mutual understanding of our similarity and common need for safety. This he believes will come from a continuous study and dialogue with humanity’s common glorious past as well as an appreciation of the different cultures, religion and civilization which will help create the peaceful world that is a common aspiration of all.

Blin’s work “The United States Confronting Terrorism”32 provides a detailed introspection and analysis of the GWOT. The literature argues that just as terrorism is not new to America, both as a victim or perpetrator, the strategies used by America in dealing with terrorism are not new either. According to Blin, America’s confrontation with terrorism began with the 1970 Iranian revolution. A case is made to defend the assertion that the current model of confronting terrorism which is the framework for the GWOT was the successor to the policy of containment of the communist bloc, during the Cold War. The difference, however, is that whereas the earlier version had the objective of promoting democracy, it is unclear what the real intentions of America are after September 11.

Blin details the features of America’s anti-terrorism policy as follows. It first deploys a preemptive attack on enemy stronghold, then identify the adversary and demonizes it. He added that use military force to solve the problem and their penchant for unilateral action if necessary is
also part of the American strategy at dealing with terrorism. In his analysis, the GWOT has a number of problems, including linking the terrorist threat solely to the actions of a state and lack of objectivity in blacklisting states accused of terrorism. He argues that this anti-terrorism strategy has been used by neo-conservatives in the Republican Party to advance their hegemonic agenda. His assertion is that, the controversial invasion of Iraq and US relations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are a clear expose of his theory. This is because they reveal the paradox in the objectives of the policy. Blin believes that the September 11 attacks in the United States was going to occur considering the scale of attacks on American interests outside the country and snippets of intelligence picked prior to the attack. For him, the psychological fear that was heightened by 9/11 was politically manipulated by the White House to project America’s superiority. He, like Pervez, believes politicians in America heightened 9/11 to pursue America’s strategic interests and not just fight terrorism.

“The predicament of Diaspora and Millennial Islam: Reflections on September 11, 2001” examines the reactions of South-Asian Muslims to Islamic terrorism around the globe and the measures taken to confront terrorism. Pnina argues that “response to September 11 in the UK, as in the USA, threatened to precipitate a moral panic about Islam, multiculturalism and the toleration of difference.”

Pnina contests that millennial or utopian ideas are prevalent in some of the Islamic sects. These millennial ideas project an Islamic political hegemony over the whole world and that is what inspires Islamic terrorism and indeed other acts of religious terrorism. He reveals that, these
millennia ideas are not preached to non-Muslims but is a widely held view among many Muslims in the UK.

The literature discusses the features of millennial movements:

First, they occur during moment of change, transition and uncertainty, or, importantly, among persons positioned on the periphery of the centre. Secondly, Utopianist religious movements are simultaneously modern and anti-modern, traditional and anti-traditional. Thirdly, they “stress on the opposition between ‘pure’ and ‘impure’”, a struggle that will be overcome by the ‘chosen people’ which are the pure and through this the world will be renewed and four, it is very rhetoric, critical commenting on world events that can be empowering in its own right. It also travels widely across national boundaries and shared by believers in widely dispersed places.

Pnina observes that there are profound differences among Islamic millennial groups in the UK. Pakistani Muslims are among some of the Muslim groups in Britain that do not make serious attempt at implementing their millennial objective and are therefore not inclined to terrorism because they believe that must happen through voluntary repentance. Other groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda, on the other hand, which has followers in Britain subscribe to an anti-nationalist, pan-Muslim utopian ideology through force.

Notwithstanding the non-violent posture of South Asian Muslims in the UK, 9/11 and other Islamic terrorist acts have jeopardized progress Muslim were making in their demand for public respect and multicultural rights within British society. According to Pnina, “they are now on the path of self-exclusion and progressive alienation from the western societies in which they have voluntarily chosen to settle”35. It has affected their participation in public life, as they are considered irrational and fanatic. He recounts the measures adopted by British authorities against Muslims after the crisis. These measures include the integration of Islamic schools into the communities, dispersing of the Muslim ghettos, citizenship education and loyalty tests etc. He also touches on a host of how other American Muslims non-Pakistani or India descent suffered.
However, he believes a distinction must be made between Diaspora communities and transnational itinerants and political exiles who he argues were perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks. He advises that just as other religions are sensitive to the opinions of relatives and friends on the subcontinent, Muslims in the Diaspora are equally affected by negative reports of religious bigotry. Modern communication technologies have intensified the spread of negative reports about Muslims, making it difficult for them to integrate fully into Western society.

1.9 Sources of Data

This research relied on both primary and secondary sources of data to accomplish its objectives. Relevant academic journal articles, books and internet sources were relied on for the secondary data.

Primary data was collected from seven (7) respondents through an in-depth interview. Qualitative data was solicited from Islamic scholars and professionals from the Department of Religions and Political Science of the University of Ghana. Muslim professionals at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one person from the corporate world. The process of data collection preserved the reliability of the data by recording the responses and transcribing them.

The respondents were interviewed at their own convenience and their consent was obtained to attribute the responses to them in the analysis. Data collected from the primary sources were analyzed by drawing inferences and making deductions to arrive at the generalizations that were used to answer the research questions set for the study.
1.10 Research Methodology

The study is descriptive and explorative in nature. A sample size of seven (7) respondents was chosen for an in-depth interview. The researcher opted for a purposive sampling for the selection of participants for the in-depth interview.

The interview schedule which is the instrument used to collect the primary data ensured that all issues based on the research objectives were presented. The main interview questions related to the prevalence of Islam terrorism linkage in Ghana, the nature and validity of the phenomenon, the causes of Islamic-terrorism and its effects in Ghana.

1.11 Arrangement of Chapters

The work is organized into four chapters. Chapter One constitutes the introduction. Chapter Two presented an overview of Islamic terrorism from its history through to the 21st Century. Chapter Three examined the effects of Islam-terrorism linkage on Muslims in Ghana. Chapter Four comprised of the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
ENDNOTES


4Mannik, Erick., op. cit. p. 160

5 Huffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006


8 Huffman, Bruce,op. cit.


10 Huffman, Bruce,op. cit., p. 5

11 Gilles Kepelis a French political scientist at the Paris Institute for Political Studies. His book Banlieues de Islam published in 1987 was one of the first books on political Islamic ideology. His host of other works provide a possible guide to the frightening phenomenon of militant Islam.

12 Martin Seth Kramer is a Scholar at Shalem College in Jerusalem. In his Book Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America, he attributed the current attacks in the middle east by Islamists to the failure of middle east experts to ask the right questions about Islam from the 1970s.

13 Dilip Hiro is a British Pakistani author, journalist and commentator whose book, Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadist in South Asia written in 2012 he traces the origins of jihadi violence to the teachings of Islam.

14 Michelle A. Stephens “Black Transnationalism and the Politics of National Identity West Indian Intellectuals in Harlem in the Age of War and Revolution”, American Quaterly 50:3 p 592-608


18 Vertovec, Steven, op. cit. 20


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Bruce Huffman, “Holy Terror: The implication of Terrorism Motivated by A Religious Imperative”, ibid


28 Ibid.
30 ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of Islamic terrorism. It provides a detailed analysis of Islamic terrorism from the 7th century to the 21st century. Terrorism can be associated with the foundations and growth of Islam. This is affirmed by Lauren Langman and Douglas Morris. According to them “while terrorism can be cloaked in the teachings of any religion, there are certain unique aspects of Islamic terrorism rooted in its own history and culture.” The work covers a number of Islamic terrorist groups and movements, beginning with the Khijirites and the Assassins, coming right down to al-Qaeda and ISIS. The essence is not to provide a chronicle of all Islamic terrorist groups and their activities but capture the phases of Islamic terrorism and the dominant Islamist terrorist groups that shaped these phases. Who the leaders of those Islamic terrorist groups were, their methods, objectives, and the scale of psychological fear they unleashed on the population has been noted.

2.1 History and Political Culture of Islam

The three universalist religions, Islam, Christianity and Buddhism did not take root without opposition from the existing established political order. Islam was up against Arab polytheists, thus
Judaism and Christianity which were dominant religions at the time. However, Islam’s struggles with other religions or political establishments were nothing compared to the internal strife that emerged out of the search for a successor following the death of the Prophet.

The birth of Islam as it is commonly known, came about through revelations the Prophet, Muhammad received from Angel Gabriel. The contents of the revelations were compiled into the Quran and they are embodied in these five pillars of Islam; the oneness of God, the five daily prayers, alms giving, fasting in the month of Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. Just as it is in most universalist religions, Islam was seen as superior to the existing religions and, therefore, the Prophet felt compelled to convert everyone to the faith. In this regard, the Prophet’s approach at converting others to the faith, at times through war would be understood by some of his followers as sanctioning violence against infidels.

The Prophet’s attempt at converting the Arab tribes in Mecca was met with hostility, prompting his exile to Medina where he was welcomed. Muhammad formed an Islamic community in Medina which he led, combining religious and political authority in the same position. Political Islam would have to adopt all political measures including war, alliance and taxation to build wealth for the young Islamic community and expand the religion including the political power of the Prophet. Most of the territories surrendered to the invading forces of the Prophet fearing the repercussions that were usually presented ahead of an attack. The few that risked and opposed the advance of the Prophet’s forces were visited with violence. Before the death of the Prophet in 623 A.D, all the Arab people of the Arabian Peninsula were annexed to the Islamic community and most of them converted to the faith. Even though there was some semblance of religious
freedom for the monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity, the erosion of previous state boundaries and political entities meant a subjection to the same law or aspects of it, which is Islamic law. Indeed, Christians and Jews were expected to pay a special tribute, not to proselytize and obtain permission before building churches. Most of the actions of the Prophet would later become reference points for interpretations of the Quran in their relationship with non-Muslims or with Muslims.

2.1.2 Intra-Islamic Conflict over Succession

The Prophet’s death “stunned not only the Muslim community but also his closest companions, who were unprepared and had to make a quick succession decision.” The criteria for choosing a successor and interpretation of the messages of the Prophet has turned the religion into a violent and a bloody one. There were two major criteria that emerged for the succession decision, a will from the deceased or the decision of the community (umma). There was one group that believed that the will of the Prophet was communicated on two situations in the witness of many of his companions during his last days on earth pointing to Ali, the cousin and brother in law of the Prophet as the successor. The Prophet’s companions opted for a decision by the community (umma) on the basis that the Prophet died interstate. Abu Bakr, the Uncle of the Prophet was eventually chosen by the companion of the Prophet but that would not let other competitors rest. There was a general belief that the will of God could be determined in the victor of a struggle, so a struggle ensued. Abu Bakr won and was subsequently bestowed with full religious and political powers. This intra-Islamic rivalry over succession led to the assassination of three of the first four caliphs including Ali, the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, at the hands of Khijirites in
one of the most deceptive and cruel ways possible then. These were the first instances of acts of terrorism associated with the religion.

The first Caliph Abu Bakr continued with the expansion of the religion beyond the Arabian Peninsula and this was taken up by the other caliphs Umar and Uthman as well. In 70 years, “Islam annexed northern Arabia, Palestine, Syria, Persia and Armenia; and, to the west, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, the Algerian coast, and Morocco.” This was seen as a confirmation of the power of God and divine legitimization of the religion’s hegemony. As Islam annexed more lands, the descendants of the various caliphs and those of the Prophet who had suffered assassinations but had followings in different quarters of the large Islamic territory formed dynasties with the aim of restoring the religion to its true principles and uniting Islam. There was the Umayyad dynasty founded by Mawuya a descendent of the Prophet that ruled from Syria and was defeated by the Abbasid dynasty formed by a descendent of the prophet’s uncle and rule from Bagdad. The Shiites who were followers of Ali were also based in Iran and the ottoman caliphate which eventually over-runned all the other dynasties, ruled from Constantinople current day Istanbul. The agenda of geopolitical unification of Islam was quite successful under the Ottoman empire but by this time Islam has developed into religious movements with different ideologies which wanted to establish regional influence and protection against other sects. These various movements developed militant groups among them that used terrorism to advance their religious identity and political influence. The strife for regional, political and religious influence is very much still alive among regionally powerful Islamic states including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt.
2.3 Sowing the Seeds of Islamism

Slowly, the strive for power developed an ideological dimension. Two major movements emerged as fallouts from the struggle for succession, the Sunni and the Shiite. The latter were seen as Protestants of the orthodox Sunni community. The Shiites, a word that is coined from the Arabic word meaning supporters of Ali, is the movement that began with the death of Ali, the fourth Caliph who patiently waited and became the caliph by election after the death of Umar. His violent death in the hands of his own supporters, the Khijirites, was as a result of his decision to resort to arbitration rather than war. The Khijirites can be considered as the first Islamic group to resort to terrorism to advance their political agenda. The subsequent murder of Ali’s son Husayn who the Shiites named heir of Ali and the rest of Ali’s family, including a number of supporters at the hands of the Ummayads in the abortive attempt of the Shiites to seize power, provides the founding myth of the Shiite movement.

For the Shiites, Ali was an Imam first before a Caliph. This means the two positions should be separate where the position of an imam should be religious but that of the caliph should be political. Further all imams should descend from Ali or the Prophet. The imams are mandated to overthrow tyrannies, establish justice and to restore “true” Islam. Islamic judges, “trained in the religious sciences and Shiite jurisprudence, slowly emerged as the religious authorities within the Shiite community as well.”

In the first half of the eighth century, these seemingly united ideology was tested at the succession of the sixth Imam from Ali called Ja’far. The choice of his successor became a dispute between two sons, Ismail and Musa and this gave rise to the division of the movement
into two sects, the Twelve Shiites and the Ismailis. “The majority party of Musa ultimately developed into so-called Twelver Shiism (after the twelve Imams in the line of Musa)” while the Ismaili “evolved into a secret society based on its organization, resolve, discipline, and internal cohesion.”\textsuperscript{16} The membership of the Ismaili movement spread across southern Iraq, Syria, and Yemen mostly in the rural parts. Among the Ismaili, a rupture further occurred leading to the emergence of the Mustalis who were more moderate and the Nazaris out of which emerged the Assassins.\textsuperscript{17} As millenarians, the Shiites have always looked forward to the advent of the twelve Imam who they believe is hidden. This has been exploited by many clerics, including the Ayatollahs to stamp their authority on the Shiites.

The major turning point for Shi‘ism in the Middle East came “in 1501 after suffering years of persecution at the hands of the Sunnis.”\textsuperscript{18} At the time, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire was beginning to wane and facing stiff opposition from Europeans and the Crusaders. Ismail Safavi, the spiritual leader of a Shiite Sufi brotherhood, “led a tribal military conquest of Iran and established that country's first Shiite dynasty including taking steps to convert Iran to Shiism.”\textsuperscript{19} The Safavid shahs, “claimed to be the representatives of the Twelve Imam on earth, for the mandate to rule.”\textsuperscript{20} In the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, the shahs created the institution of the cleric (mada‘altaqiiti) which became important in cementing the Shiite clerical authority in social and political spheres of the society. They have been central to anti-imperialism, through the establishment of the modern Iranian state and the 1979 Iranian revolution: an institution and event that would serve as inspiration to both Shiite and Sunni Islamism around the last two decade of the twentieth century into the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.
While the Shiites venerated their imams as a source of spiritual guidance, Sunni movement insisted that “Muslims should conform to the way (sauna) Muhammad lived his life.” These group collected hundreds of thousands of reports (hadith) of Muhammad's words and actions, which they compiled into books called Hadiths. The Sunni became the orthodox Islamic group and expanded under the Abassids of Iraq around the ninth century. The Sunni majority persecuted the Shiites who raised questions about their legitimacy to religious and political authority. The Mongols and the Ottoman Turks who conquered the Islamic world in the 11th and 12th century, from the East associated with Sunni Islam to obtain legitimacy with many however converting into the religion in the process. The Ottoman Turks took over the caliphate, consolidated Sunni Islam and continued with the persecution of Shiites into the 16th and 17th century. Men who knew Islamic law called the Ulama became the centre of Muslim religious life among the Sunnis and were integrated into the political structure all over the Ottoman Empire.

The Sufists, on the other hand, also emerged as a movement in Islam. They are ascetic and have identified with teachings in both Sunni and Shiites adherents who were heavily affected by the infightings emerged also around the same time. They venerated all spiritual instruction and power from all the chain of teachers that stretched back to the Prophet and 'Ali. They believe there are always local recipients of this spiritual charisma they call saints and they should be at the centre of religious authority.

2.4 The Khijirites - Fore-bearers of the Assassins

The Khijirites were supporters of Ali. They were a small section of the men of Kufan; a new military town in Iraq where Ali moved the headquarters of the Caliphate during his tenure.
'Uthman's supporters subverted his reign over Ali’s refusal to revenge 'Uthman's death but rather being conciliatory. Mu'awiya, the governor of Damascus, an Uthman appointee, refused to recognize 'Ali’s claim to leadership and marched an army against him. Mu'awiya later sought for arbitration and 'Ali agreed, ignoring the advice of the Kharijites. The Khijirites abandoned Ali, charging him a sinner and a non-muslim by not stamping out the rebellion to his divinely mandated rule. Three Khijirites inspired by this ideology killed Ali, a pronounced infidel (takfir) in the service of Allah.\textsuperscript{26}

The Khijirites, like any strong religious or ethnocentric ideological terrorist group, made no distinction between religion and politics and were the first to assassinate a political leader, justifying their action on their religious judgment on the sincerity of the caliph's belief. The Quran attached to their swords, they slaughtered a political leader claiming he had lost his legitimacy to the caliphate.

\subsection{2.5 The Assassins}

The Assassins were the militant branch of moderate Nazarís of the Ismaili Shiites. They emerged over two centuries after the Khijirites and would survive for almost two centuries (1090-1275) because of their organized strategy, men and weapons which surpassed any early history terrorist group.\textsuperscript{27} They equalled the Zealots, a 1\textsuperscript{st} century Jewish terrorist group of less than 400 men who took on the whole Roman military machine for 30 years until they ended it all with self-sacrifice in the face of defeat.

The militant group started out to protect the Ismailis who lost the protection of the Fatimid of
Egypt and helped them insinuate the whole of Persia until the Fatamids were deposed. The Ismaili missionary zeal, built on a millenarian, marginal and unorthodox religious fanaticism, served as the mobilizing touch for them. These were highly efficient and effective tools for propaganda and conversion. Just as their successors in the 20th century, the leader’s ability to ensure continues steadfastness of its members, provided the movement a high sense of legitimacy among both intellectual and mystic Muslims. The Assassins, the progenitor of Al-Qaeda established their strongholds in remote and mountainous regions. They believed that through insurgency and guerrilla tactics, they could wear out the enemy. “The sect was feared not only because of its military strength, as reflected by its numerous fortified cities, but especially because of its ability to carry out targeted assassinations.” The assassins killed “several hundred people—including three caliphs, a vizier, and a Christian king.”

2.5.1 Hassan I Sabbah and Early Terrorist History and Strategy

Hasan I Sabbah, “a son of a Twelve Shiite of Yemeni origin who was introduced to the Ismaili faith during his studies in Egypt, provided one of the formidable leadership to the assassins” in a way that shot the group to its position as one of the fiercest early history terrorist group. Hasan chose the fortress of Alamut in “the Elburz Mountains, north of modern Tehran where he managed a stable centralized regime in Alamut, capable of overseeing a complex organization.”

He had missions in the mountainous regions of Quhistan, Fars and Khuzistan, near the border between Afghanistan Iran and Syria. “From such strategic bridgeheads, he sent off armies who prepared the way for missionaries and assassins to sustain psychological fear, infiltrating most of the zones under Seljuk rule.” Through missionary activities and social supports led by the
Nazaris, the assassins obtained the support of “leaders in Aleppo and Damascus and were able to use those two urban bases as headquarters.”

He had an impeccable organizational structure with a strong sense of division of labour. There were teachers, fighters, and “those who knew of the Mysteries (batiniya).” Hassan-i-Sabbah declared himself custodian of the “hidden Truth and denounced all other Muslim emirs as hypocrites who could either killed or kidnap and held for ransom.”

2.5.2 The Strategy and Weapons of Terror Adopted by the Assassins

‘The Assassins’ were not the first secret society to use assassination as a strategy of terror. They did not need the media to heighten the terror that was struck in the heart of the people because their attacks took place at public gatherings and places of worship. They handpicked personalities with the kind of pedigree, that their death would shatter the confidence of their followers and other leaders. Most of their assassination attempts, especially under the leadership of Hassan were against leaders of the Fatimad caliphate of Egypt who imprisoned Hassan during his stay in Egypt, the Suljek caliphate of Syria and the Orthodox Sunnis who opposed the Ismailis and even attempted defeating them at Alamut if not for the surrounding community of Ismailis. Even though the assassins were intermittently neutralized in Syria the series of assassination including the assassination of Nizam al-Mulk by one of Hasan’s agents, a certain Bu Tahir Arrani, on October 16, 1092, during the month of Ramadan, made them one of the most feared terrorist organizations in the prehistory of terrorism. It is considered by Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin as one of the greatest terrorist attacks of all time, and its contemporary could be that of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand or the attacks of September 11,
Nizam al-Mulk was considered the invincible political advisor of the Suljek Turks who was a pioneer of political strategy and credited with establishing the University of Bagdad. The assassination of this unrivalled figure in the Muslim world of the eleventh century brought about the decisive chapters in the history of terrorism.

The dagger was their trademark weapon for assassination and with that there was no need to claim responsibility for their attack. Their choice of their assassinations sites, mosques or in markets, were also needed to make using the dagger and swords easily. An assailant who would have been chosen and trained for the task must execute the task at all cost even if it means disguising oneself to win the trust of the victim before the assailant strikes. The assailant must courageously identify with the act by remaining at the spot of the assassination, to be apprehended and killed. It was meant to prove how invincible the assassins are in the face of their position of weakness so the psychological fear that is invoked, through a process of attrition would weaken the resolve of their enemy.

It was under Hasan that the Ismailis ignited the tactics of subversion by which they waged terror campaigns against urban populations. It became possible through some of the networks they have established among the leaders in Damascus and Aleppo. Ridwan, a Suljek overlord, was one such network the Assassins had. They extended their targets beyond the religious and political leaders to pierce the veil of protection the population enjoyed from the Suljeks. They conquered parts of the Suljek rule, including Shahdiz, near Isfahan, securing more castles as strategic points to compound the military and psychological blow the Suljeks suffer.
The paradigm of the Assassins demonstrates the extent to which an organization, enjoying popular regional support, can integrate itself into the social life of a community. Just as many terrorist groups are propelled by social upheavals such as exploitation, imperialism and injustice, the assassins exploited disputes of succession which was itself a chaos, to struck terror by its unlimited range of deadly assaults. Tremors of their terror was felt in Europe at the comfort of their castles by some heads of state who had been “involved in the Crusades even though there was no evidence to suggest that the Assassins ever attempted such attacks.” It is precisely the irrational fear any “modern terrorist group are anxious to inspire, knowing that constitutes their strength.”

In the closing stages of the twelfth century, Hasan had died and the front of the assassins weakened. The Syrian faction of the Assassins that were severely constrained however found its a new leader in Rashid al-Din. He was a prodigee of Hassan in Alamut, sent to the region on missions. The Assassins, in their first assassination attempts, “disguised themselves as Sufis and threw themselves, daggers in hand, on the ruler of Homs as he said his prayers.” As in Persia, the success of the assault led to the perpetration of others.

Rashid al-Din became so successful, overshadowing the central power of Alamut, who even sought unsuccessfully to have him assassinated for proving uncontrollable. “The political reign of Rashid al-Din however coincided with the rise to power of a great leader and unifier of Islam:” Saladin, the 12th century unifier of the Islamic world and the “Mongols, were the toughest adversaries the Assassins faced in the twelfth century. In one single blow, they would be swept from the face of the Earth by the Mongols.”
The Assassins believed there was fulfilment in the ultimate sacrifice and as a result, most of them were ready to die in the course of committing their crimes. They had “faith in millenarianism that allowed them to sacrifice themselves willingly in the course of a mission.”48 Those entrusted with assassinations, the “devotees”—Fedayeem, formed an elite corps within the sect. Over the centuries, such volunteers for death would become an important part of Islamic terrorism.

The example of Islam practiced by the assassins, allows an understanding into the “logic of violence in the modern context of the major contemporary universalist ideologies and the ability to make comparisons between it and modern terrorist organizations.”49 Their strategies were going to inform the terrorists’ activities of the anarchists who invented modern terrorism.

2.6 State Terrorism in Medieval Islam

State terrorism has been very useful in maintaining a culture of silence in states with authoritarian regimes all through history. This kind of terrorism was also extended to other states during war. The United States adopted this strategy as a weapon of terror during World War Two in order to force the Japanese government to surrender. Before the great revolutionary movements of the eighteenth through to the twentieth centuries, where terror was exalted above all in times of war, the Mongols were one of the notable nomad warrior societies in the use of terrorism as a measure of statecraft in war.
2.6.1 Muslim Mongols and State Terrorism

The Mongols, like most nomad warriors, were in a position of disadvantage in terms of their numbers. They concentrated their forces in an attack, exploiting the element of surprise to overwhelm their adversaries. In order not to jeopardize their next attack, they either left in their trail a huge psychological impact on the populations through immense scourge or total destruction of their enemy to prevent a comeback. As one of the best organized, most terrifying, and destructive nomad society, their regime lasted for two hundred years, encompassing the entire Eurasian continent.  

The Mongol conquest of the Islamic world came right in time to calm the Muslim world that has disintegrated into so many movements and dynasties. Saladin had attempted to unify the Muslim world amidst the rise of Islamic terrorism and regional struggle for power. The Mongol tribesmen from Central Asia swept through Iran, crippled the Assassins, and then ravaged Baghdad in a way that resembles ISIS’s devastating attack on Mosul. The Mongols had been vicious in their conquests of Syria and Persia, killing the inhabitants of towns that did not immediately surrender. The inhabitants of Baghdad were visited with such a destruction and the caliph executed because the caliph refused to surrender. The psychological fear and devastation the Mongols caused in the Islamic world was nothing compared to the crusaders.

Frank puts in a more explicit way that portrays the system and severity of their terror. “The Mongols left no fine buildings, no artefacts. Their genius was for killing. They could fill the sky with a cloud of arrows while riding at full gallop…. conquering large parts of the world but the only trace was one of ruined cities, burnt libraries and house-high pyramids of human skulls.”
In addition, they used some of their victims as human shields and defiled their conscience and dignity through rape. By this, they were engaged in destroying the faith of their victims, leaving them with no purpose to remobilize and passion to fight. The description of the Mongol destruction resembles that of ISIS in Mosul.

The Mongols under Genghis Khan were militarily superior to every other army of its time. Genghis was succeeded by Tamerlane who reorganized the military by incorporating Islamic law into warfare. As a Turk Muslim, he did not abandon his Mongol roots and culture. Terror was then institutionalized as a war strategy and was refined to an unprecedented degree. The systematic attacks in urban areas were a vital element of Tamerlane’s terror arsenal. Tamerlane observed the practice of the Prophet who spared a besieged city that surrenders at the first warning but if not were punished by the massacre of civilians, often in frightful circumstances. Tamerlane’s trademark was not daggers since blood was venerated by the Mongols but the strangling of victims and stomping on their backs to break. A pyramid of decapitated heads was erected afterwards. For instance, in 1387 in the city of Isfahan with about half a million inhabitants about 100,000 to 200,000 were massacred and some fifty pyramids were built, each comprised of thousands of heads.

The Mongols were subdued by the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century and created a novel Islamic empire after conquering much of the old Islamic heart-land in addition to most part of Islamic North Africa. Their leaders took over the caliph adopting Anatolia (today's Turkey) as capital. The Ottomans engaged in an imperial expansion extending the wealthy Islamic empire they have
built to much of Eastern Europe. The Islamic world got to one of its highest point of civilization around this time and got leaders of Western Europe nervous. Even though the Ottomans had to engage the Europeans in some battles from time to time before the final defeat of the Ottomans in world war two, the era of the Ottoman empire can be considered as ‘pax- Islam’. There are no record of radical or militant İslamism.

2.7 The Rise of Sunni Islamism

Radical Islamism in the era of modern terrorism is very much associated with the Sunni movement. They can be traced to the divergent schools that emerged in the Sunni orthodox community around the 8th and 9th centuries in relation to interpretations of the Quran. The Hanafite School, inspired by Abu Hanifa, took an open and syllogistic reasoning to interpreting Islamic practices. The Malikite School, inspired by Malik ben Anas, emphasized inherited Islamic customs and traditions while the Shafiite School, inspired by Al Shafi, “based itself on the consensus of the Muslim community.”55 The Hanbali School, inspired by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal “was stricter and puritanical to the foundations of Islam. They do not accept innovations.”56

Out of the Hanibal School came a number of radicalized Sunni fundamentalist ideologies that serves as a source of inspiration to modern day Islamists. These include the teachings of Ibn Taimiya; out of which came the Salafists and that of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab.
2.7.1 Ibn Tamiya and Origin of Salafism

Ibn Tamiya held a fundamentalist view of Islam that is based “on strict conformity with the example set by the Salaf,” or “ancient ones” of Medina. This is what would give rise to Salafism (salafiya) in the 18th century.

Ibn Tamiya expounded on hannibalism to raise activism in the 13th and early part of the 14 century against the Crusades in the Holy Land and Muslim Mongols, who he believed had defiled the Caliphate and the Holy Land. Ibn Tamiya had denounced other forms of Islam as heretical and idolatrous including Sufi practices of the adoration of saints and pilgrimages to tombs. His teachings were rejected by the Ulama in Syria and he was hanged, except that his simplistic sermons was well received by the marginalized just as it turned out to be with the Salafists centuries later.

Arguing in a fashion similar to the Kharijites, Ibn Taymiyya contended that the Muslim Mongol rulers could be attacked. These arguments proved useful for justifying military campaigns against Mongol rulers and attempted assassinations by some of his followers. The extent of his influence on Islamism was not recognized until the 20th century.

2.7.2 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab and Wahhabism

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab, also espoused a brand of Sunni fundamentalism in the 18th century just after the order of Ibn Tamiya. His puritanist teachings which were inspired by Ibn Tamiya, encouraged a return to an Islam “purified of all its dross and restored to its original strictness.” Heretical Muslims also faced excommunication (takfir) and religious innovations
especially was condemned by the Wahhabis. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab resented the moral corruption in the Ottoman Caliphate especially their associations with European powers to quell insurrections in the margins of their empire. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab entered into an alliance with the Saud family and with their followers, Muwahhidun (Unitarians), they did not just capture and control much of the Arabian Peninsula but threatened the whole Ottoman empire, especially the Shiites. The threat of Wahhabis expansion would be thwarted by the Egyptians and the Ottomans; however, they had succeeded in wrestling Ridayh from the Ottomans after World War I to establish the Saudi Kingdom in the early part of the 20th century.\textsuperscript{59}

\section*{2.8 The Evolution and Spread of Wahhabism and Salafism}

Saudi Arabia became the custodian of Sunni Islamism just as Iran spearheaded Shiism. Serving as the protector of the two most holy sites in Islam, pilgrims all over the world were exposed to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia.

Salafism began to emerge in the nineteenth century as Islamic scholars expounded on the thoughts of Ibn Tamiya in response to imperialism. It is a liberal, Protestant-type movement in Sunni Islam that sought to purify Islam from outside cultural influences and from allegiance to any of the traditional schools of Islamic law.\textsuperscript{60} Jamal Eddin al-Afghani of Persia (1839–1897) and Muhammad Abduh of Egypt (1849–1905) would become influential figures. Works of others like Rashid Rida (1865–1935), a Syrian and disciple of Muhammed Abduh expounded Salafism to cover anti-western and anti-modernism.
Salafism and Wahhabism gave birth to the informal network of Sunni Muslims from the early 20th century called the Jihadi Movement (al-haraka al-jihadiyya) who have, among others, these common characteristics. They have unquestionable loyalty for their spiritual leaders, they label other Muslims as apostates and infidels, they believe in total disassociation from non-Muslims or apostates and to establish a community with sharia law ruled by a Caliph. They broadened their definition of defensive jihad to offensive jihad along making it the "sixth pillar of Islam." Muslims who are killed collateral or sacrifice themselves in suicide attacks become martyrs. Wahhabism and Salafism found its greatest expression and audience in South Asia and Africa.

2.8.1 Wahhabism in South Asia

Wahhabism came through South Asia through Sayyid Ahmad in the early 1820s. A native of Bareilly in northern India, Sayyid's pilgrimage to Mecca brought him into contact with the Wahhabi movement that had taken control of the Arabian Peninsula by force from the Ottoman Turks at the time. Incensed about the presence of the British imperialists in the region, the Wahhabi opposition to western influence in Muslim lands inspired Sayyid, moving him to travel throughout India and Afghanistan to whip up sentiments against the British and their Sikh partners in South Asia.

Out of Sayyid's work came the Deobandi movement that represented Islamic resistance to the West in the region since in the 1870s. The Deobandi movement spread Wahhabism through-out the region through their madrassas which would be turned into training camps for raising radicals and experts in guerrilla warfare for seperatists and nationalist groups.
By the late 1970s, the region would become a hotbed for Islamism considering its geography, demography and tribal nature in addition to superpower rivery and contending interests that played out on the streets in this region.

2.8.2 Evolution of Salafism and Wahhabism to Jihadism in Africa

In Africa, Salafism and Wahhabism had already taken root in Egypt from the 19th century. Salafism in Egypt would find its concrete expression in the 20th century in Egypt and other parts of the middle East through the Muslim Brotherhood founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna- a Sufist who came into contact with Salafism at the al-Azhar University.\(^{61}\)

Hassan al Banna, unlike other Salafists and Wahhbit before him, did not support any form of nationalist ideology arguing that it is westernist but rather called for the revitalization of the umma. Abu Ala Maududi (1906–1980) a journalist born in British India to a family of Sufist also made the same call for an “Islamic revolution” against any form of ungodly rule, including democracy. Maududi also founded Jamaat-i-Islami (meaning Islamic group), which was similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. The two movements promoted the concept of jahiliya, meaning refusal to compromise in any way with impious Muslim regimes which would then have been declared unbelievers (takfir).\(^{62}\)

The movements operated as a social movement at least officially so did not call for an armed struggle but they were sowing the seeds of jihadism. The Brotherhood spread to many Muslim countries through its social programmes and Maududi’s theories in Pakistan would blend with Wahabism to give rise to the Pakistani Deobandi madrassas which in turn gave rise to the
Taliban generation in the late 1980s. The Muslim Brotherhood operated a secret militant organization under Salah Ashmawi - al-Banna’s friend’s leadership which was the first attempt to internationalize Islamic radicalism, particularly against Zionism.\textsuperscript{63}

In the early 1930s, Haj Amin al-Husseini the grand Mufti of Jerusalem decided to resist the displacement of Palestinians through the creation of the Jewish Homeland with the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. This anti-Jewish struggle was called jihad by the imams and they galvanized the people, making specific reference to Ibn Taimiya and Ibn Wahab, and the fight against the Crusaders. There were isolated killings and assassinations, particularly the killing of the Jordanian King at the Alasqa Mosque.\textsuperscript{64}

The Muslim Brotherhood participated in the anti-Jewish 1936 Palestinian uprising, and the 1948 war with the Arab forces. In Egypt, the secret organization engaged the British forces in the Suez Canal apart from being complicit in political violence against King Farouk’s regime, “the 1948 murders of an Egyptian judge, two British officers, and the Egyptian Prime Minister. A crackdown on the Brotherhood led to Al-Banna’s assassination.”\textsuperscript{65}

After Hassan al Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood was going to move from its radicalised Islamism to activist Islamism through the works of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). He advocated arm struggle as a religious requirement in the fight against a political leadership that had lost its Muslim roots and Muslims. He was murdered for his subversive tendencies.\textsuperscript{66} Notwithstanding this “Egyptian model of the Muslim Brotherhood was trying to establish other branches of contemporary Islamic radicalism.”\textsuperscript{67}
Some of the fundamentalist groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood include “Saleh Sirriya’s Organization for Islamic Liberation, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman’s Islamic Group, Gamaat al-Islamiya, and Mustafa Shukri’s Muslim Society (Jamaat al-Muslimin).” These groups brought religion into the public space through violent protests. They piqued the interest of all sections of the society especially rural folks and unemployed while engaging in a grand scheme of extortion that targeted businessmen and wealthy farmers and robbed members of the Coptic community. They ensured the ascension of Anwar Sadat of the Muslim Brotherhood who was minded to impose Sharia law. However, in the 1977 Camp David peace accords, Sadat joined to make peace with Israel. He was declared an apostate ruler, a fatwa was issued accordingly by Omar Abdel Rahman’s Islamic Group (Gamaat al-Islamiya), leading to his assassination in the hands of Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farraj, Khalid Islambouli of the al-Jihad alIslami (The Islamic Jihad).

The Islamic Jihad was founded by the young ideologue Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farraj-former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, in 1979. The group had members drawn from the military and among professionals who were going to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan. Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Jihad al-Islami (The Islamic Jihad) became associated with al-Qaeda in the 1990s after his adventures in Afghanistan where he came into contact with Osama Bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam’s network of the mujahideen.

Apart from these prominent leaders of Islamic jihadist groups who were members of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, the Brotherhood’s branches in Syria, Jordan and Palestine have been known for their revolutionary activities around the world and their association with the global jihad led by al-Qaeda.

2.9 Revival of Shiite Radicalism and the Iranian Revolution

Shiite activism re-emerged during Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, as Muslim leaders denounced the idea that a parliamentary government was a secular threat to Islam. However, the establishment of the democratic regime prevailed and even more, the society became very much secularized and modernized under the Qajar dynasty and Reza Shah Pahlavi regime that took over power from the Qajar’s.\(^{71}\)

The clerics, prominent among them Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Abu'l-Qasim Kashani, were very outspoken against the government and the intellectual community’s position on the clerics. The Feda'iyan-e Islam, formed by a young Samarian, Sayyed Mojtaba Navvab-Safavi, in 1945 would associate with the clerics and become the first Shiite Islamic group to employ terrorism as a primary method of political activism. They gained considerable notoriety for their terrorist acts and high-profile assassinations during the 1940s and 1950s including the assassination of Iran's Prime Minister, Ali Razmara.\(^{72}\)

In the mid twentieth century, a radical school of thought emerged within Shiism, under the authority of Ali Shariati (1933–1977), which incorporated key tenets of anti-imperialist revolutionary ideology. Ali acquired the ideology during his studies in France. The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO). The MKO, or People's Mojahedin, which began in 1965 as a
revolutionary guerrilla movement is one of the most important groups inspired by the Islamic ideology of Shariati. This group was inspired by the liberation movements and antiimperialist thought of the third world. Like the Feda'iyan-e Islam, MKO used targeted assassinations and terrorism as their method of activism, murdering several American servicemen and civilian contractors in the 1970s and they became popular with the people. The authorities responded by clamping down on the MKO, and this invoked the revolution in 1979.

The revolution cleared the way for the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who around this time had become influential among the cleric for his outspokenness to become the leader of Iran and impose his model of religious theocracy which gave religious leaders political power. He defined it as “governance by jurists” (vilayat-i-faqih).

Khomeini’s regime “inspired and assisted” Shi’a terrorist groups in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lebanon, mostly through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah (the “Party of God”). Just as the Muslim Mongols, terrorism had a new “able and active state sponsor”, throughout the 1990s.

2.10 From the Rise of International Jihadism to Al-Qaeda

1979 was definitive for jihadism. The 1979 Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was going to be both inspiration and training ground for jihadism. Many Muslim secular leaders, including Sadat, emptied their prisons and encouraged the fundamentalists and jihadist elements to volunteer for the war.
The Afghan mujahideen were assisted by the United States, logistical support from Pakistan, and financial contributions from Saudi Arabia. The partners cooperated to defeat or contain their common enemy, Russia and Iran which were believed to be supporting insurgencies at their backyards. Saudi Arabia had begun to experience its first taste of terrorism. Pakistan also wished to secure its borders from the tribal insurrections boiling on its borders with Afghanistan and also fight against Russia, the ally of their arch rivals India.75

The World Islamic League and the Wahhabi foundations provided the vehicle for the mobilization of money and volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Middle East, the Maghrib and a handful form East Asia and America. Abdallah Azzam (1941–1979), a hard-core Jordanian fundamentalist who became a jihadist coming into contact with the Brotherhood in Egypt was chosen to coordinate the network of the mujahideen. He founded the Maktab alKhidmatulMujahideenul-Arab (MUKUB) in 1984, a group he believe was going to champion the cause of International jihad after the war in other parts of the world, including Bosnia, Chechnya, Georgia and even Chad.76

The war had equipped fledging jihadist elements, including Osama bin Laden; Egypt’s Muhammad Atef and Ayman al-Zawahiri; Saudi Arabia’s Ibn Khattab; Jordan’s Muhammad al-Maqdisi; and the Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf. Ten years later, all of them would receive extensive international press coverage for jihadist activities in their home countries.
Following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, internal security in Afghanistan had broken down and tribal leaders had the field day to protect their territories. The sons of Afghan refugees and other students of the Deobandi madrassas were trained by the Pakistani intelligence services, with the tacit approval of the Saudi and U.S. authorities, to create a new Muslim army and restore internal security in Afghanistan. 77

2.11 Al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad

Al-Qaeda is a Salafist Islamic terrorist group that succeeded in globalizing Islamic jihadist terrorism, cooperating with existing terrorist networks of the mujahedeen, the Brotherhood jihadist groups, the Deobandi groups and other jihadist groups from the late 20th century and is at the forefront of 21st century terrorism until the recent rise of ISIS.

2.11.1 Origin of al-Qaeda

Abdallah Azzam’s wish was to maintain the army of volunteers who fought in the afghan jihad in 1988, at the first signs of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He thought they would serve as a vanguard of the ulmma in capturing the Muslim world that they believed was in the hands of infidels, therefore coining the name al-Qaeda al-sulbah (the solid base). However, Azzam’s violent death in Peshawar in 1989 and the takeover by Bin Laden shifted the focus of the group more towards targeting America. Bin Laden turned al-Qaeda to the most formidable Islamic terrorist group of the late twentieth and early 21st century since the assassins.

Hailing from a rich religious family in Yemen, studying in Egypt and traversing many continents, Bin Laden formed strong networks which all added up to his personal acumen and
religious credentials that made him revered in Muslim communities across Africa, Asia and Europe. In his study at the Akbar University, he was influenced by Sayyid Qultb and the Islamic brotherhood. His passion for jihadism got stirred up and he enlisted for the mujahidin during the soviet invasion of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{79}

Bin laden was also known for his wealth and how generously the funds were devoted to the Islamic cause around the world. Some of his wealth were inherited from his father’s rich construction empire in the Saudi kingdom and his own contracts in Sudan following his exile from Saudi Arabia for inciting opposition to the royal family. Apparently, bin Laden had with Azzam’s approval, discreetly transferred considerable sums of money into safe havens through Islamic banks and non-governmental organizations from the funds that poured in from all quarters during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. These were the reserves that were going to ensure al Qaeda’s future financial autonomy.\textsuperscript{80}

In Saudi Arabia, he did not only oppose the practices of the royal family but also the presence of half a million American-Christian troops on Saudi soil and the occupation of Jerusalem by Israel since 1967, lands that Muslims consider sacred lands. Before bin Laden, anti-westernization and anti-Jewish occupation of Israel was opposed but it was localised. Al-Qaeda, through Bin laden, gave it a global Islamic cause which provided a formidable ideology that unified radical Islamism around the world that is currently led by ISIS.

Hassan Al-Turabi, who was a friend of Bin Laden from Pakistan, had become an eminent official of the Sudanese government and secretary-general of the Popular Arab Islamic Conference
(CPAI). His government and the CPAI welcomed Bin laden in Sudan and help him build a “solid base” for his mujahedeen group. In Sudan, he kept close contact with neighbouring militant Islamist organizations and radicalizing the horn of Africa and the Middle East. \(^8\) Groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib and Al Shabab have links with al-Qaeda.

In 1996, Bin Laden left Sudan because the authorities in the Middle East and the Arabians were beginning to notice his clandestine activities to find safe haven in the harsh climate mountains of Afghanistan where he coordinated the activities of al-Qaeda and its affiliates with bases in Pakistan - in Karachi and Peshawar. The Salafist militants at this point formed alliance with the Taliban who controlled 80% of a heavily divided Afghanistan. The Taliban had imposed Sharia law and needed Bin Laden’s support in financial, administrative and technical matters which they exchanged for a close collaboration with Iran to defeat America. Bin laden became a member of the Taliban’s council of elders and his close associates, including Ayman Al Zawahiri from Egypt, were running the voluntary camps and the madrassa that Taliban opened. Mullah Omar was also welcomed into Qaeda’s highest body, the Majlis al-Shura.\(^8\)

Al-Qaeda operated an organizational structure based on a committee system with units on training and operations, financing, theological issues, communications, propaganda, and so on. The committees were headed by emirs who reported to the Majlis al-Shura commandeered by Bin Laden.

2.11.2 Al-Qaeda Harbinger Attacks Before September 11

The fatwa by bin Laden under the auspices of the World Islamic Front Against Jews and
Crusaders (FIMLJC), which is an alliance of extremist movements, including al-Jihad and the Egyptian Gama\at al-Islamiya, the Followers of the Prophet Movement (Harakat al-Ansar) in Kashmir, the Bangladeshi Jihad Movement (Harakat al-Jihad), the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places (AILLS), and al-Qaeda in February 1998 against Americans and its interests was the first time al-Qaeda unveiled itself as a global terrorist group that needs to be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{83} Since 1993, al-Qaeda had influenced other Islamist militant groups in Egypt, Pakistan, Somalia and Saudi Arabia to attack the United States but did not take responsibility for those attacks, and this is a typical manifestation of Shiite dissimulation by a Sunni Islamist group. He acted as the figure head in all the attacks against the United States installations around the Islamic world, including embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, military bases in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and airlines belonging to America or its allies, as well as an attempted attack on President Bush, Bill Clinton and Pope John Paul.\textsuperscript{84}

Few months into 2001, al-Qaeda and the mujahedeen terrorist groups decided to form a network where the only thing that was to bind them is the common enemy, America, her interests and allies but each terrorist group would effectively be autonomous. Bin Laden would become a defacto leader of the network owing to his experience and resources. The network was supposed to support members in the areas of recruitment and training in camps at Afghanistan, Yemen and the Philippines. They would also help each other obtain necessary gadgets and supplies, secure financial resource even if through organized crime and logistical supports.

There have already been lone attacks by individuals connected to the expansive network of the mujahedeen in Paris in 1995 and 1996. The arrest of four Algerians and Afghanistan veterans in
Frankfurt with weapons and an explosive device of the kind Afghan camps trained volunteers with, to build, including video tapes of the Islamist plans by German police in 2000, brought to light the broad-based plan of al-Qaeda and the mujahedeen to attack Europeans and Americans in their own land. The internet was going to become one of their most important media, having exploited the traditional media to enhance their popularity. For instance, by late 2000, the Encyclopaedia of Jihad was available on various Internet sites set up worldwide through a complex relay system by mujahedeen computer experts.  

By the year 2000, many countries had begun to prioritize the threat of terrorism and the networks of international counter-terrorism efforts were already even in areas previously considered safe. Western countries such as Canada and Australia, and even Islamist states such as Malaysia and Pakistan, finally began to grasp the extent of the Salafist threat. Pakistan was forced to rout out the mujahedeen from Peshawar making them relocate to other Pakistani cities, such as Karachi and even to Afghanistan.  

However, the terrorists were ahead of the counter terrorists institutions penetrating deeply, not only America and Europe but cyberspace. They were successful in recruiting, training and maintaining contacts with western-born individuals inspired to orchestrate lone or group-based attacks in their home countries in the west.

### 2.12 Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001

Many scholars believe that there were enough pointers of an imminent attack against the United States on its own soil, especially after a previously botched attack on the World Trade Centre in
1993. Al Qaeda considered attacking America on its own territory by humiliating America just as it symbolically humiliated Islam, by striking at the institutions of its power both politically, economically and security and using its own equipment against it. This is an ideological concept that resonated with even non-violent Muslims disturbed on one hand about the scale of the havoc while celebrating secretly as victory for all oppressed Muslims. Indeed, there were celebrations in some Islamist countries.  

The plan to hijack the planes and blow the world trade centre, Pentagon and the White house was hatched over a year before it was executed with bin Laden himself in the middle of it. With this attacks, al-Qaeda took upon them the martyr’s fate of the Japanese kamikaze pilots, a sacrifice they believed would trigger a new stage of mass jihad. He had entrusted the various stages of the operation’s implementation to specific cells in Asia, Europe, and North America, chosen for their effectiveness and discretion. On September 11, 2001, the plan was executed and its effect was going to dictate the direction of global terrorism and counter terrorism.

At 8:45 am and 9:05 am, American Airlines Flight 11, en route from Boston to Los Angeles and the United Airlines, Flight 175, whose itinerary was identical, flew into the North and South tower of the World Trade Centre accordingly. At 9:39 a.m, a Los Angeles-bound American Airlines Flight 77 from Washington crashed into the Pentagon. Then at 10 a.m., the United Airlines Flight 93, on a Newark–San Francisco route, which the hijackers held and headed for the White House plummeted to the ground in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 people were killed, including nationals of seventy-nine other countries with material damage estimated at $7 billion.
September 11, 2001 stood out as the deadliest terrorist attack in history, piercing through the veil of invincibility of the United States while testifying of al Qaeda’s strategic skill. Its success was going to be a blueprint for al-Qaeda’s future terrorist activities as well as inspiring other Islamist who suddenly began to look up to al-Qaeda. It was going to lead to so many affiliations with al-Qaeda and the responsibility of almost all terrorist activities around the world was going to be claimed by al-Qaeda.

In the wake of September 11, Ayman al-Zawahiri set three goals for future operations and these can be summarised as, planning attacks that inflict maximum casualties, concentrating on martyrdom operations and choosing targets and weapons used that will achieve this, will be less costly and leave semblance. This has informed the rise in the place of attacks- public places, use of suicide strapped belts and car bombs, artillery weapons, biological and the prospecting for nuclear weapons. The psychological impact of the attack was so great that they wanted it to keep resonating. Al-Qaeda clearly has sophisticated technology but the strategies, ideology and aims had been defined also 1000 years back.

Latching on to the millenarian dreams of most of his supporters and using the GWOT to sustain a sense of persecution by the forces of Satan-America, al-Qaeda claimed that the towers’ collapse as a result of divine intervention not anticipating the extent of collateral damage. He then successfully mystified himself by receiving protection from Pakistan while making it look like he escape the swoop on Afghanistan by miracle. The secrecy and misrepresentations were all meant to inspire the followers who had scattered with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled
with the Pakistan’s close relations with the United States and found safe havens in the tribal regions of Pakistan, Georgia, Turkey, Syria, the Gulf States, Malaysia, and Indonesia. He even made it clear that he was fully prepared to be identified, hunted down, and eventually eliminated in the offer of the ultimate sacrifice.⁹⁰

3.13 Al Qaeda Franchises Its Activities after 2002

The September 11 attacks were solely an undertaking of al-Qaeda and not a collaborated effort of the mujahedeen network. Al-Qaeda had a standing among the mujahedeen groups but with the September attacks, they branded themselves in a way that made them the leader of global terrorism in the 21st century. The increasing surveillance by international security services on their operations, finance and on organized crimes in general meant many of them needed cover. The mujahedeen network in Europe and America transformed into sleeper cells turning group missions into individual missions. Al-Qaeda provided the cover with its image and some funding for regional terrorist groups that began to affiliate with Al-Qaeda since 2002.

In Africa, the Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), initially the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), affiliated itself with Osama bin Laden in 2007 for greater financial support and name recognition. The Mali based Islamist Ançar Dine (Defenders of the Religion) formed by Iyad Ghaly, a prominent leader from the Tuareg rebellion of 1990-1995 also associated with al-Qaeda. Islamist Ançar Dine which was created in late 2011 goal of fighting for the establishment of an Islamic State in Mali claiming that the traditional Muslim piety of the area was not authentically Islamic.⁹¹
Separately, AQIM has provided funding and training to members of the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram as well. However, it is important to note that as a result of the proliferation of these groups the core al-Qaeda leadership within Afghanistan/Pakistan known as al-Qaeda Central (AQC) has had difficulty in maintaining an active influence in the jihadist world.

2.14 ISIS and Global Jihad in the 21st Century

ISIS is currently spearheading the global jihadist terrorism in the 21st century from late 2014. It originated from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as a result of the invasion of Iraq after September 11, the vacuum created from the incompetence of the newly organized Iraqi Military and Sunni alienation by the Al Maliki government including the 2011 Arab springs in Syria and inability of al-Qaeda to form a caliphate contrary to what many of its affiliates and recruits hoped for.92

ISIS controls a good part of the Sunni territories in Iraq and Syria, with a population estimated at roughly between six million and nine million people. They have a system of governance base on sharia providing some social services to the inhabitants. A sectarian army of more than 30,000 combatants have also been formed from the amalgamation of local armed insurgencies, including Sunni and Baathist militants in Iraq and Syria and foreign recruits.93

2.14.1 Origin of ISIS

Signs of ISIS began to emerge in 2006 when al-Qaeda Iraq renamed itself Islamic State of Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed the leadership of AQI in 2010 at a time that there was a breakdown in relationship between the leadership of the Sunni Community and the AQI. He reorganized AQI’s military apparatus, into a professional fighting force capable of waging urban...
and conventional warfare with the expertise of veterans from the Iraqi military.\textsuperscript{94} During the Syrian uprising, Islamic State in Iraq announced a mergence with Jabhat al-Nursa, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria without the consent of the new leader of al-Qaeda, with Zawahiri Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/ the Levant (ISIL) was the name of the new organization.

The rift that ensued between Baghdadi and Zawahiri formally led to the disaffiliation of al-Qaeda and ISIS on February 3rd, 2014. ISIS announced the caliphate with its new name Islamic State (IS). They demanded Muslims everywhere give bay’ah (allegiance) to the Caliphate and its leader, Baghdadi. Choosing the name Caliph Ibrahim II, essentially legitimising his caliphate after Caliph Ibrahim I who ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1640-1648.\textsuperscript{95}

Despite its inexperience, ISIS was favourable to new jihadist recruits and sponsors. Apart from the looting of money from banks and businessmen in Mosul, they have receive funding from donors in countries like Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. ISIS has become more financially independent making $8 million monthly so no longer needed the interference by AQC that is not forthcoming with support and major attack since the London bombing in 2005. ISIS is currently one of the richest terrorist organizations in the world, ever.

\textbf{2.14.2 The Nature and Current Operations of ISIS}

Although ISIS is an extension of the global jihadist movement in its ideology and worldview, it was more localised in its objectives, Baghdadi, like AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi before him were Salafists who saw the Shias as their localised enemies. ISIS took advantage of the sectarian clashes between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims in Iraq and Syria to nourish their
strategy to benefit from support and cover the regional cold war waged between Sunni led Saudi Arabia and Iran led Shiites. The formal entrance of the United States into the Syrian war against ISIS in August 2014, and Russia’s entrance, together with other Western powers at the end of 2015, turned the Americans, Europeans and Russians as targets as well.

Soon, ISIS has taken over as the global Islamic franchiser with affiliates all over the world. It has eight affiliate groups worldwide, found in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, North Africa, Afghanistan and Nigeria, The Libyan arm in Surt, a port city on the Mediterranean has about three thousand fighters where some lieutenants of ISIS are based to serve as a rear-guard base for the organization if defeated in Syria and Iraq. Apart from its combat terrorist in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has carried out deadly operations against the Egyptian and Tunisian tourist industry, security forces and foreign targets. They have taken responsibility for the crash of a Russian passenger jet in Sinai in October 2015 that killed all 224 people on board.

The group also carried out massive operations through lone individuals in Paris, Belgium, Germany and Sweden and recently in London. There have been a number of incidents involving people who declare allegiance to ISIS in the US as well. In the frontiers of Lebanon and Jordan too, there are indications of their presence following a number of attacks associated with them.

ISIS has gained notoriety with the ferociousness of the attack that is not equaled by al-Qaeda. They video their horrendous acts, including crucifying and chopping limbs of civilians, executing soldiers and Christians, among others. With access to sophisticated technology and weapon they have seized from the Iraqi military or bought, they have been able to withstand the Iraqi and
Syrian army, including the free Syrian army force both supported by the United States, NATO and Russia. Their strategy of indiscriminate use of violence and takfir, or excommunication of other Muslims is reminiscent of other Islamic terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{96}

ISIS is a centralized group with coherent top-down leadership. Their leadership is drawn from rural and middle class people. With a robust social media presence for propaganda, recruitment and donations, IS releases periodic reports and audio messages on its progress in multiple languages, including Arabic, English, German, French and Russian.\textsuperscript{97} They do not only rely on rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and small arms but have advanced weaponry made by the United States seized from the Iraq military.

2.15 Conclusion

It is undeniable that terrorism in general has gone through several phases since the Khijirites and the assassins. The assassins came back in the form of al-Qaeda and state sponsored terrorism under the Muslim Mongols seems to have resurfaced in another form now led by Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Islamic terrorism may go through phases and turns in relation to name changes, affiliations and even ideological movements but they have the same energy against westernization and social injustice. It is not clear the anti-terrorism strategy of America and NATO is going to change under President Donald Trump, but whether ISIS is going to be defeated or not, the nature of Islamic terrorism in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is likely to see some changes going forward as the century is still young.
ENDNOTES


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4Ibid., p. 32.


6 Marquardt, Erich and Heffelfinger, Christopher (ed) op. cit. p.76

7Ibid., p. 78.

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9Migaux, Philippe, op. cit., p.265

10Ibid., p. 264.

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12 Marquardt, Erich and Heffelfinger, Christopher (ed) op. cit. pp. 76-78

13 Ibid

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15Migaux, Philippe, op. cit. p. 61-62

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18 Marquardt, Erich and Heffelfinger, Christopher (ed) op. cit., p. 82-83

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20 Ibid.

21Migaux, Philippe, op. cit. p. 81

22 Marquardt, Erich and Heffelfinger, Christopher (ed) op. cit. pp. 34 - 38

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CHAPTER THREE

EFFECTS OF ISLAMIC-RELATED TERRORISM ON MUSLIMS IN GHANA

3.0 Introduction

This chapter explores the issue of Islamic-related terrorism and its effects on Muslims in Ghana. The chapter first establishes the basis for Islam-terrorism linkage and demonstrates the extent to which the perception is entrenched in western society and discourse. It also examines the validity of the perception on one hand and efforts in defense of the Islamic faith on the other. With the theory of transnationalism in perspective and information obtained from both primary and secondary data, the study reaches a conclusion that the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage is a fallout of a clash of civilizations. This clash of civilization in the opinion of the study is being caused by competing interests and identities. The effects of Islam-terrorism linkage in the West and how that is snowballing to Ghana is analysed in the latter part of the chapter.

3.1 Islamic Terrorism Linkage

Islam-terrorism linkage is a phenomenon that has grown out of the perception that Islam is violent and cannot co-exist with other religions, political systems and cultures peacefully. Whereas no definition of the phenomenon has been found in the review for the study, this is the understanding conveyed by scholars, especially Alex Schimdt in the use of the term.

A 2015 Pew survey had put the phenomenon to test in America and the report indicates that “Americans tend to see Islam as ‘more violent’ than other religions,” and that “since 2001, one-quarter or more of the population has expressed support for specific measures like religious profiling, special IDs, surveillance, and internment.”\(^1\)
The phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage just as the concept of Islamophobia began in the West (Europe and America). To start with, Islam is regarded as a foreign religion by a western society dominated by Christians. This is because except in the Balkans, particularly Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia, where the Muslim population are indigenes of Europe, the rest of the Muslims in the West are migrants. And among traditional Christians in the West, Islam is touted as the ‘religion of the sword’ something that could have possibly slipped into western dialogue and discourse.

However, if not for the resurgence of Islamic terrorism Islam was integrating into the fabric of western society at a very fast pace. However, terrorist attacks associated with Islamic militants against western installations outside America and Europe got people to dig out the link westerners made between Islam and violence.

After the September 11 attacks, the link between Islam and violence became one of the topical issues in anti-terrorism discussions and focal points of analysis. Pervez is more poignant when he says “The terrible and tragic events of September 11 have opened a Pandora’s box of questions about Islam.”

3.2 Reasons for the Islam-Terrorism Linkage

Islam-terrorism linkage have been largely rooted in the rate and ferocity of terrorist attacks associated with Islamic militants. Since September 11, 2001, Islam became associated with militants killing fellow non-combatant Muslims and innocent non-Muslims, especially through suicide attacks. Their unconventional methods of violence and the place of the violence have
been identical. After the attack, a known Islamic group proudly claims responsibility for the attack while threatening the victims to expect more until their objectives have been achieved. The reasons for most of these attacks have been re-hatched time and again. Worse still, the Islamic militants have defended these heinous acts with passages of the Holy Scripture.

The use of religious rhetoric by the Islamic militants, the ideology of some of the Islamic movements and their clandestine militant operations unearthed through intelligence has contributed to shaping the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage. A case in point is the Muslim Brotherhood’s motto which states that “Allah is our goal, the messenger [Prophet] is our model, the Qur'an is our constitution, jihad is our means, and martyrdom in the way of Allah is our aspiration.”

Acts of violence perpetrated by Islamic groups, according to many Islamic scholars and leaders, are done by radical elements of the religion. They point to the overwhelming condemnation from Muslim leaders in America following some of the major Islamists attacks, including September 11. The condemnation was done through a fatwa by American Muslim jurists and endorsed by “One Twenty (120) U.S. Muslim groups, leaders, and institutions.” In the light of the sensitivity of the debate on religious pluralism and national integration, many western analysts had been reluctant in tagging such acts with the teachings of Islam. They prefer to see Islamic militants as perverts of Islam as their Islamic advisors and some scholars postulate.

On the other hand, the ease with which the tenets of the religion itself can be used to radicalize young people or converts is what is most disturbing to western analysts, security experts and
politicians. Most Islamist militants are young, educated and relatively privileged. The madrassas, Islamic universities and mosques which are supposed to be public places are used as breeding grounds for infesting young intellectual minds with radical Islamic ideologies and maintaining terror cells. Most of these young and potentially dangerous Islamic radicals, who have been indoctrinated with millennial rhetoric of Islamic hegemony and demonization of America, Israel and the West, have also become a problem for Islamic leaders also.⁷

Even the Global War on Terrorism launched in 2001 was branded a war against Islam by some Muslims and Islamists when there was the overwhelming evidence that Islamic militants were being shielded by the Taliban government and host governments were not willing to flush them out.⁹ There have been excesses with the military approach adopted in the GWOT. But that does not mean that the ‘world policeman’ which is the United States should sit aloof for terrorism to fester around the world. Western leaders, including George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Barack Obama, among others, have continuously reiterated that “the war against terrorism has nothing to do with Islam but against evil.”¹⁰

The phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage keeps growing with every attack on non-Muslims, especially on non-combatants on European and American soil. Recently, the Kouachi brothers, in January of 2015, attacked the offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, ISIS and Boko Haram’s strings of throat slitting murder of their hostages and circulating it on the internet cannot be understood by any ‘civilized’ person.¹¹ Some of the reasons given by these Islamist were that the Prophet of Islam was blasphemed, that God was insulted, that there was desecration of the holy land and there was oppression of Muslims in the secular or Christian western. What is mind
boggling for many in the West is the way these groups are growing in number, including some of their own children who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause of the Islamists.

The perception of insecurity the phenomenon of Islamic-terrorism has generated has led to the resurgence of nationalism across the West. It has led to the formation of new political parties or a change in the agenda of right-wing or centre-right political parties. Migration, integration, indigenous peoples’ rights, religious rights and security have become very topical issues that have determined the results of elections in the United States, Netherlands, France and Britain. The impact of Islamic terrorism is also seen in the growth of right-wing extremism across the West especially with the influx of Syrian and North African migrants into the West, most of whom are Muslims.

3.3 How Rooted Islamic-Terrorism is in the West

The current President of America, Donald Trump, then Republican candidate, called for “total and complete shutdown” for Muslim immigrant sought to do this with two executive orders. The barrage of comments from high profile American politicians in 2016 alone compiled by the Council on American-Islamic Relations include “Islam is not consistent with the U.S. Constitution”, “Obama’s administration suppressed our Judeo-Christian values while praising Islam”, “Muslims have been taught to be ready to rise up and kill and to be two-faced to deceive people of other faiths”, “there are at least 109 (chapters of the Quran) that advocate violence and death towards infidels”, “offending Muslims is the duty of any civilized person”, “there is no difference between radical Muslims and everyday Muslims because they are all programmed by
their faith to attack and destroy Christians”.\(^\text{12}\) These comments were among others made by representatives of Congress in 15 states in 2016, including presidential candidates.

A Dutch international public speaker hosted on Capitol Hill openly said that he hated Islam and called the Quran a “fascist book” that should be banned. He referred to the Prophet Mohammed as “the devil,” and “proposed a tax on Islamic head scarves (hijab) worn by Muslim women.”\(^\text{13}\) Most of these comments may have attracted immense criticism from a section of the public in the West but they are not just little talks. They are a national pulse of the sentiments rooted in the fabric of the public that will continue to resurrect with any militant Islamist attack on non-Muslims.

In academic circles, the debate around Islamic-terrorism has been led by Laquer Walter, Pipes Daniel, Gilles Kepel, Roy Oliver and Martin Krammer. The main thrust of their argument has been that the fundamental teachings of Islam encourage intolerant views towards nonbelievers and that Islam is inherently prone to violence on account of intolerance. Laquer (2003) in particular argues that violence is hailed in Islam if it is carried out against nonbelievers (infidels) and there is no place for them in the Islamic faith.\(^\text{14}\) Likewise, Pipes (2003) is of the view that, the obligation of jihad on Muslims is personal, and the very nature of jihad as expressed in the religion makes Muslims prone to violence.\(^\text{15}\)

Pape, Pervez and a host of other scholars, including Dr. Alidu Seidu from the Political Science Department of the University of Ghana have defended Islam. They refute the arguments of the “pro Islam-terrorism linkage” scholars claiming that they are often centered on the superficiality
of language and baseless religious rhetoric. According to these “anti-Islam terrorism linkage” scholars, their arguments would amount to an over simplification of the bigger issue. The militants, in the assertions of the “anti-Islam-terrorism linkage” scholars, just use Quranic references and Islamic historical accounts as ideological tools to recruit young militants and galvanize the support of Muslims around the world by capitalizing on their plights. They argue that just as can be found in every other religion- where there are unfaithful people whose ungodly acts are tagged to fundamentalists, Islam is not any different. Indeed, the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage for many of these Islamic scholars does not exist at all. According to Dr. Rabiatu from the Religions department of the University of Ghana, Islam is a peaceful religion and therefore it is impossible for anyone to link the religion to terrorism.

It is evident from the arguments of these scholars that there are Muslims committing acts of violence in the name or advancement of the Islamic religion. They also admit that it is a challenge to national security and needs to be tackled. This is what is accounting for a zeroing of the argument on the identity of Muslims who engage in terrorism in many countries in the West. Some Islamic scholars such as Pervez outrightly denounce them as non-Muslims who are being supported from the West. They believe the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage has become a cottage industry with strong media support which is profiting from heightening a non-existent fear for Islam in the west. However, a large majority of scholars believe that the perpetrators are Muslims, sometimes very devoted Muslims who have been radicalized. They have therefore called for a differentiation between violent and non-violent Muslims and that should be factored into security policies and strategies. Rahaman an Islamic scholar has even gone ahead to insist on the reformation of Islam.
3.4 Violent and, Near violent, Non Violent, and Not violent Muslims

In a speech by the British Prime Minister at Munich in 2011, he attributed Islamic related terrorist attacks not to Islam but “the existence of an ideology,” “Islamist extremism”. He added, “We need to be clear: Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same thing.”20 In the same speech, Tony Blair referred alternatively to “radical Islam”, “politically view of Islam”, “Sunni and Shia extremism”, “religious extremism” and the “Islamist ideology” to depict a violent form of Islam. He admitted that “one of the frustrating things about this debate is the inadequacy of the terminology and the tendency of misinterpretation, so that you can appear to elide those who support the Islamist ideology with all Muslims.”21

Disassociating acts perpetrated by Muslims from Islam by differentiating Muslims and nonviolent Muslims has been very difficult at least for westerners.22 The challenge was due to inadequate information that many people in the West have about Islam. The pseudo-Christian westerner presumes Islamic practices such as ablution, veiling, ritual slaughtering, among others, as ‘outmoded’. More so, the religion seems to have created a wall between itself and other religions. Indeed, some Muslims would not permit a non-believer to fellowship in the Mosque. This was certainly going to make it difficult for the general populace to differentiate between groups of Muslims and recognize those who had tendencies to be violent and those that were non-violent. However, with globalization and access to information, in addition to the rise in Islamic terrorism, it is now evident to many people that Islam, like other religions, is diverse and not mystic. A lot of westerners are embracing the religion and its membership is growing.
Aside all the benefits with having an open and interactive religion, the ability of a religious movement to accommodate heretics and infidels is the most important criterion to determine how violent or non-violent a religion is. This is very important in an environment of religious diversity and multiculturalism. This is the requirements used by the West to identify Muslims who tolerate religious pluralism in the Arab world as moderates. A speech by David Cameron clearly spells out the requirements of a non-violent Muslim. They “must believe in universal human rights including the right for women and people of other faiths; believe in equality of all before the law; believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government and encourage integration or separatism.”

These qualities expected of moderate Muslims are universally accepted. They are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and they are not ambiguous to Muslims. The difficulty for some Muslims is that, sometimes the application of these requirements is fraught with interference from the West and demand a loose interpretation (or simply ignorance) of “much of the canons of Islam in the interest of living in the modern world.” It usually means extending legitimacy to certain ‘abominable acts’ such as homosexuality, prostitution, adultery, blasphemy and abortion.

To these Muslims, a non-legalization of the above mentioned ‘abominable acts’ does not mean they are fundamentalists or extremists. It just means they are committed Muslims. It does not also mean an abuse of the rights of people or a preference for sharia in their opinion. They do not consider a return to the roots of Islam and a need to have a single interpretation of the Quran. But to western analysts, a return to the roots of Islam means giving credence to political and military
action in the practice of the Islamic faith. This is seen as fundamentalism and sometimes extremism by most analysts in the West. That opinion is not shared by all analysts and the contentions around what it means to be fundamentalists or extreme continues.

Alex Schimid and many Islamic scholars consider the western conception of Islamic fundamentalism as flawed. Schimid believes that not all ‘so called’ fundamentalist Muslims are violent in their political behavior. In addition, some of them, including Dr. Alidu Seidu consider fundamentalism or extremism as concepts created by the West to link Muslims to terrorist activities in order to further their foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. This assertion is contrary to the perception of many Europeans and Americans who see them as near violent or secretly violent. The perception of ‘near-violenceness’ of fundamentalists is based on its “strong relationship to out-group hostility, and its likelihood to provide a nourishing environment for radicalization.”

The sharp disagreements about the predisposition of fundamentalists mean that there is the need for consensus to separate extremists or fundamentalists into violent or near violent extremism and non-violent extremism to ensure that it would be possible to work with the nonviolent Muslims. That recognition and suggestion has been received with mixed reactions because along with the brand of fundamentalism comes with a rejection for westernization.

Many Muslims that could be considered as moderate or nonviolent extremists are silent on sharia and discount military jihad. Their militant use of jihad and martyrdom connotes a personal internal battle and the urgency to propagate Islam peacefully by all possible means even beyond
one’s ability. Muslims who accept sharia and jihad as the sixth pillar in Islam believe, including their anti-western and anti-infidel stands, that “Islam must inform every dimension of human existence, including politics and law.” These kinds of Muslims are those that can essentially be considered as violent extremists and generally called “Islamists”.

The above characterization of Moderate Muslims and extreme or violent Muslims is shared by many Muslims in Ghana. The Tijaniya and Al-Sunni alike believe that Muslims who subscribe to the violent form of jihad to establish an Islamic state in order to impose sharia and qualify jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam - a personal responsibility for all Muslims as extremists. Some of the widely recognized contemporary violent Islamic movements include Jammat-ud Dawa, Al Muhajiroun and Hizbut Tahrir, Taliban and Al Qaeda and currently ISIS. They even see the modern state as a major hindrance that should be removed

In a probability of Nine out of Ten, most of the violent Islamic movements – also called ‘khilafat’ movements are Sunni Salafists and Wahhbists. The ‘quietist’ groups may not be expressed in their ambitions or strategies but that is merely pragmatic, tactical and/or temporal considerations not a principled political philosophy not to be violent in the face of violent opposition. A former Dutch Deputy National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism believes that even if they are not violent their “variety of Salafism was the first step towards acceptance of jihadist Salafism.”
3.5 Transnationalism, Confrontation Between Identity and Loyalty

Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ situated within the theory of transnationalism provides an adequate explanation for the phenomenon of Islamic-related terrorism and how that could possibly have effects on Muslims around the world including Ghana. Both the West and the Islamic world seemed to be faced with an existential problem. While the west is concerned about the threat of Islamic related terrorism to its security, freedom, race, Christian and democratic ideals, the Islamic world is also of the view that their way of life, survival and identity is also under attack.

The evidence that Islam is seen by the West as an existential threat can be seen in the reaction of France, Germany, Belgium, the UK and Netherlands on the issue of Muslim migrants and identity of women, including the wearing of the niqab, hijab and Burqa. There is the belief that some of these controversial Islamic practices are being assimilated in Western societies and they would end up changing the society. Reference is even made to Islam invading the West with their growing numbers. The continual hesitation of some Muslims to fully integrate into Western culture is very worrying to some analysts. For westerners, since the emphasis is not to force them to change their religion, it makes them speculate that they have a hidden agenda to infest the west with their culture, one that they believe is intolerant and erode the ideals of freedom. 36

Their fear is further heightened by the way extremist Islamist groups have evidently become “a transnational network and are succeeding at creating home-grown lonely terrorists acts outside their native countries.” 37 With all these anxieties lingering, it is impossible to bear it when Muslim migrants maintain loyalty with their home countries and culture than to that of their host
countries. With the possibility of such Muslims getting into very high and powerful positions in their host countries, there is fear that they could influence legislations and policies. The prospects of sharia law being introduced in the West have even speculated. This has precipitated the panic about Islam, and ordinary westerners believe the breakdown of their ‘civilized social life’ itself is imminent.

Unfortunately, the suspicion of Westerners about the real intention of Muslims who come to the West is also borne by Muslims as well. In a 2008 study by the Science Centre in Berlin to determine the extent of Islamic fundamentalism in five countries, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden in a survey of 9,000 Muslims it was found that 54 percent of Muslims were not only fundamentalists but believe that the West is seeking to destroy Islam. This opinion also exists in other parts of the Islamic world. The view is that the values of the Islamic culture are mutually exclusive to western values.\(^{38}\)

Muslims equate the hegemony of the United States over the Middle East to the Crusaders occupation of the Islamic world and the exploitation of resources by the West in the Islamic world is not read through the lenses of aggressive capitalism but is often seen as the occupation and humiliation of the Islamic world.\(^{39}\) This is true among the diaspora communities as well. For instance, at the time the West portrayed Bin Laden as evil, 80% of Pakistanis saw Bin Laden as a courageous mujahedeen fighting against the evil force - the West.\(^{40}\)

The Islamic diaspora in the West and other Muslims outside the Middle East are constantly agitated about the fate of their families and ‘brethren’ in the Middle East who are threatened by
civil war with the supposed ‘engineers’ of these wars sitting close to them. This is a new ‘cold war’ between the two cultures led by non-state actors and this is underway from Indonesia to Palestine and from the gulf to the Mediterranean.

3.6 Effects of Islamic Linked Terrorism on Muslims in the West

Islamophobia is the immediate effect of Islam-terrorism linkage. A shorthand definition of islamophobia by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia states that it is the “dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, a fear or dislike of all or most Muslims”. In spite of the ambiguity surrounding the definition, operationalization and misapplication of Islam-terrorism and its derivative social construct – Islamophobia, these phenomena is impacting upon real people in their everyday lives. The consequences associated with these phenomena are bound to continue into the foreseeable future. Since 2001, Muslims in the West have experienced all kinds of hate crimes manifested in the form of discrimination from state institutions, organized right wing groups and irate individuals.

3.6.1 Religious Profiling, Stereotyping and Estrangement of Muslims

The public uproar and condemnation of the September 11 attacks was followed with a swift political and legislative response in America and Europe. A number of anti-terrorism and antiimmigration legislations were passed in the West that seemed to target Muslims, throwing a shadow of suspicion on all Muslims. It led to the profiling of Muslims and Arab men, constant surveillance and increased police activity in their communities. There was the spontaneous wrongful rounding up of suspicious Muslims, administrative detentions and mistaken killings of people of Islamic identity. Various Muslim/Islamic groups were tagged as terrorist organizations,
their operations were restricted and some of their members were deported. This alienated the Muslim communities and put them on “the path of self - destructive exclusion from the western societies.”

Muslims in the diaspora have increasingly withdrawn from positive engagement with their Western neighbors, and have lost faith in the capacity of their host country to recognize what they perceive to be their deepest moral commitments and aspiration.

3.6.2 Religious Hate Crimes, Physical and Material damage

In the wake of the September 11 attack, the kind of hate crimes experienced by Muslims have been unprecedented. In most western countries, independent commissions and interfaith monitoring systems have been put in place and their annual reports on the consequences of Islamophobia have documented acts of physical and verbal abuse on people and Islamic institutions. Without mentioning specific incidents, the records show arson attacks on mosques, bombing of Muslim schools, attack on Islamic cemeteries and subjections to verbal and physical abuse. In Denmark, for instance, a Muslim woman was allegedly thrown out of a moving taxi for being nothing more than ‘Muslim’. In parts of Europe, the rise of anti-Islamic graffiti, vandalism, threats and acts of aggression against Muslims and Islamic symbols have significantly increased.

The results of a British poll in July 2005 about Islamophobic violence on Muslims shows that “14% had experienced verbal abuse; 3% reported physical violence; 5% said they had been stopped and searched by police; 32% felt they had been the object of hostility; and 42% felt they had been the object of suspicion.” Similar monitoring systems exist in the United States
managed by CAIR and in the EU by the EUMC and the results all point to a growing attack on Muslims.

The incessant attack on Muslims has aroused reprisal attacks on individuals and western installations, including embassies, violent protests, burning of the flags of certain western countries in Islamic countries. It may have engendered further terrorist attacks from the Islamists and further hardened some fundamentalists.

3.6.3 Discrimination- Employment, Housing, Education and Health

Discrimination against Muslims has been very pronounced in the area of immigration, dressing and surveillance. However, the disadvantages Muslims face in the area of employment, housing, education and health is quite documented but not widely recognized.

In employment, discrimination against Muslims has been measured in unemployment rates, Muslims in unskilled or semi-skilled sectors of the economy as compared to non-Muslims and the number of Muslims denied promotion. Unemployment rates among Muslims runs at twice the national average in France and Germany but in the Netherlands between two and a half to three times the national average for people who are Muslims or are supposedly Muslims. In Belgium, the unemployment rate is “five times the level of national unemployment rate of 7%.” European Union Monitoring on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and ILO studies provide other dimensions including Muslim dominating jobs that need lower qualifications and having been “over represented in low-paying sectors of the economy as a group”. Their chances to receiving a positive reply have been found to be five times less than other applicants. Most of the Muslims
applicants for a job denied a positive reply are also more likely to cite “religion as a reason for being refused a promotion.”

According to Tufyal Choudhury, “The impact of poor labour market participation can be felt in other areas of life such as income, housing and health”. In many European countries, the average income of many Islamic households is below the national average, making the cluster in deprived urban communities. The extent of the discrimination in housing can even “take the form of a refusal to rent or sell, the imposition of extra conditions to secure housing, and the application of discriminatory criteria in the allocation of social housing”. The figures on housing and income certainly correspond with the rate of prevalence of diseases in their neighbourhoods. For instance, Data from the 2001 census on the UK reveals that “Muslims reported the highest rates of illness of all faith groups.”

Muslims have also complained about discrimination when institutional authorisation is needed to engage in religious ceremonies including:

- securing sites for mosques or religious burial grounds,
- the right to slaughter animals in line with religious laws,
- the wearing of headscarves by women,
- state funding of Muslim schools,
- and the recognition of Islam as an ‘official religion’.

Evidence is adduced as to the non-existence of similar barriers to other religious groups such as Christians, Jews, Hindus and Sikhs.

3.7 The Context of Islamic-related terrorism in Ghana

The phenomenon of Islam-related terrorism in Ghana cannot be divorced from the numerous occurrences of violence where Muslims are involved. In local crime and violence mapping of
flash points in Ghana, it is commonly known areas that are violent prone such as Muslim
dominated slums locally called ‘Zongos’. Thus, linking young Muslim slum dwellers to violence
in Ghana has existed before the September 11 attacks. Islamic associated violence in Ghana is
therefore not informed by Islamic fundamentalism. This is because Muslims and Christians have
lived peacefully and have even inter-married.

However, the September 11 attacks is still vivid on the minds of the general Ghanaian public not
just because some Ghanaians were victims but because the contagion of sympathy and outrage
evoked by the pictures on TV. The goring scenes cannot be lost on Ghanaians, especially with a
continuous occurrence of these acts Nigeria and other surrounding Francophone countries.
Ghana has not witnessed any act of terror even though at the height of the terrorist attacks
involving Boko Haram and the Maghreb Islamists in Nigeria and Mali respectively, an alert was
raised on the preparedness of the country for a possible attack, especially in the wake of the
attack in Cote d‘Ivoire. A sense of general security alertness has been raised by these incidents in
Ghana.

The local media interest in the issue, including the intricate connections that exist between Ghana
and Nigeria in trade, religious and educational matters led to the rise in the consciousness of the
public about the reality of an Islamists terror threat. Also, the many discussions, research and
articles being written in Ghana or West Africa about Islamic terrorism are heightening awareness
about the link being made between Islam and terrorism by Westerners. The concept of Islamic-
related terrorism has easily resonated among the heavily religious and Christian dominated
population when the possibility of an Islamic attack is staring at them. Since the objective is not
to explore the level of prevalence of the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage in Ghana, the study moves on to examine the possible consequences of the phenomenon among Muslims.

3.8 Effects of Islam-Terrorism linkage on Muslims in Ghana

Few studies have been conducted on ‘Islamic terrorism’ in Ghana. These studies centre on the perception of Islamic fundamentalism and violence, religious militancy, possibility of occurrence of a terrorist threat in Ghana and how to prevent it. Some of the studies expand the scope of their study to cover the whole of the West African sub-region. The phenomenon of Islamic-related terrorism has not been studied, much less its effects on Muslims in Ghana or even in Africa. This point needs to be made to show why this section of the work relied solely on primary data for the analysis of the effects of Islam-terrorism linkage on Muslims in Ghana.

It is also important to note that during the interviews, the researcher observed that the mention of the concept Islamic-terrorism alone evoked the displeasure of many educated Muslims in Ghana. They would immediately respond that they do not see a link between Islam and terrorism even if some Muslims have been involved in terrorism in the name of the religion.\textsuperscript{53} However, they do not also dismiss the prevalence of the phenomenon in Ghana.

3.8.1 Contributions of Islamic-related terrorism to the Progress of Muslims in Ghana

“There is nothing good about terrorism” according to Dr. Rabiatu Ammah and Mr. Mohammed Senusi Kamara.\textsuperscript{54} The opinion is not shared by Dr. Alidu Seidu. Dr. Seidu believes terrorism can be the continuation of foreign policy by other means. It can also be used to adduce a certain
policy reaction from the stronger enemy for the benefit of the weaker opponent who engaged in the terrorism.

In the view of Dr. Alidu Siedu and Amb. Inusah Seidu Rasheed, Islamic-related terrorism could be contributing to the growth of Islam in the West and in many parts of Africa, including Ghana. The general interest Islamic studies in the phenomenon has invoked around the world and in Ghana has worked to strengthen the conviction of many ignorant and nominal Muslims whiles leading many non-Muslims to the faith. He cites people whose names should be withheld as former sceptics and critiques of Islam but who have been converted in their studies around ‘Islamic terrorism’.

It has also led to increased publication by Islamic scholars that has exposed the evils of the West and their double standards. It has not only raised pan-African and pan-Islamic sentiments but has also contributed to enhancing a sense of nationalism and independent mindedness among the youth. This has brought a sense of solidarity in the Islamic community in Ghana.

It has impacted the Islamic educational system, the Makaranta. Their activities are being streamlined by the Islamic leadership so that they do not serve as places for the spread of radical teachings. The imams have taken the opportunity to discourage young Muslims from engaging in radicalism and have rather promoted a sense of fundamentalism which has enhanced their devotion to the faith. It is not clear how the growing anti-western consciousness that has been fused into the growing Islamic fundamentalism among young Muslims would make them susceptible to the Wahabists establishing their presence in Ghana in the Brong Ahafo region.
3.8.2 Stereotyping and Suspicion of Muslims in Ghana

Because there has not been any physical attack in Ghana, the disadvantage of Islam-terrorism linkage on Muslims in Ghana is at its minimal stage in the country. There has not been any attempt to measure the extent of islamophobia, including its attendant discriminations like in the West. Indeed, that may not be needed in the immediate future because all the interviewees for the study have not experienced any discrimination on accounts of being a Muslim. According to Mr. Mohammed Sanusi Kamara “the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage has not significantly changed the behaviour of Ghanaians towards fellow compatriots who are Muslims.”

Incidents of inter-religion clashes involving Muslims against other religious groups are minimal when compared to intra-religious clashes. The closest one occurred in 2016 between the traditional leaders of Tafo and Muslim youth over a piece of land. The Muslim youth claimed to be fighting a jihad but that is not out of extremist tendencies. Inter-religious clashes and intra-Islamic clashes in Ghana has nothing to do with Islam-terrorism linkage. The only intra-Islamic clashes in Ghana exist between the two major Islamic sects, the Sunni and Shias and the growing segregation among offshoots of these movements in Ghana. This conflict is as old as the religion. The level of co-existence and trust between Muslims and members of other faiths is burgeoning.

The only major disadvantage the study observed is in the area of religious stereotyping and suspicion. Muslims in Ghana are going through a feeling of stereotyping with the international propaganda on Islam and terrorism linkage. According to the interviewees, no Muslim is insulated from the suspicion that they are violent and potential terrorists. The only thing needed is a little allegation of a criminal act impugned to them and no matter how descent or honourable
they appear, they could be characterized as violent. They bemoaned the negative reputation the activities of radical Muslims on the International front is giving all Muslims including Ghanaian Muslims.60

3.8.3 Discomfort and Feeling of Pain Among Muslims in Ghana

A direct effect of stereotyping on some Muslims is low self-esteem. This is mostly true for Muslim children who are schooling in Christian affiliated schools across the country. Indeed, the question about the right for Muslim girls to wear the vail in public or Christian affiliated schools still remain unresolved. They believe they are being persecuted for standing for their faith and this could either strengthen the faith of some or make them timid.

Some Muslims including Anas Abdul-Rahaman and Amb. Inusah Seidu Rasheed confirms they have a feeling of discomfort as Muslims in Ghana. For Dr. Alidu Siedu, his sense of discomfort emanates from the shear ignorance displayed by people including academics who with all the access to information make utterances that portray their level of ignorance. Dr. Siedu added that Muslims are knowledgeable about other religions but do not judge them for the non-adherence to their religion or make generalization about the religion. He is however worried about the generalization people draw to the religion for the acts of the few Muslims, whose numbers are negligible. He goes ahead to add that acts of terror associated with rightwing extremism is nothing compared with acts of violence by Muslims. But if it is not out of a deliberate act to target the religion, he does not understand why Islam should be blame for the activities of a few hundreds of Muslims when there are over a billion Muslims around the world.
Most Ghanaians watch with disdain the dress codes or appearances of some Muslims especially at public places or crowded places because of the world’s experience with Islamic linked terrorism. People with beards are mostly seen as terrorists, as well as people dressed in full veils especially in the burqa and the hijab. Some of them have been stigmatized and verbally assaulted; calling them names like Osama Bin laden, Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Islamic covering and appearance which Muslims have not complained about is seen as subjugation even though the wearing of long dresses and veil is not unknown to African or European culture. The only twist to some of these things is that sometimes, their continual usage turns them into fashion even among non-Muslim. But that does not totally erase the misconception attached to these appearances especially with the wearing of long beards. According to Jude Burkson, a non-Muslims graduate student at the University of Ghana interviewed for the study because he like wearing a bear affirmed that even non-Muslims who wear long beard go through such stigmatization.

The perpetuation of Islam-terrorism linkage is provoking anti-western sentiments among young intellectual Muslims around the world who have been exposed to radical teachings on the internet. The radicals have become very sophisticated in exposing western excesses and hypocrisy in their foreign policies. Irate Muslim youth in Ghana who are incensed with the West have developed a personal hatred for America and are gradually being convinced to join the war in Syria under the guise of fighting for their religion. Some Ghanaian Islamic students have already been brainwashed to join the ISIS.
3.8.4 Discrimination against Muslims in Ghana

Due to the misconceptions arising from the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage, some genuine Muslims according to Anas Abdul-Rahaman have been denied visas, jobs, accommodation and free rides in Ghana. Some Muslims through the interviewees are reported to have been denied Visas because of the stigma attached to them. It is creating identity problems since Muslims are taking Christian or local names, hoping that would assist them to be able to obtain visa to Europe and America.64

Although it is not yet evident, Dr. Alidu Siedu believes that, the growing stereotyping and prejudice of the religion will gradually kill the trust the makes it possible for all religions in Ghana to coexist peacefully. This is because as they are continually marginalized and treated with disdain they are pushed to also respond in a similar way.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the summary of findings of the research, based on which it draws conclusions and finally proffers recommendations.

4.1 Summary of Findings

First and foremost, it emerged in the study that the term ‘Islam-terrorism linkage’ is a misnomer to many Muslims, including Islamic scholars and professionals. The main reason gathered in the study shows that they believe Islam is a religion of peace and should not be linked to terrorism”.

However, the study also found out from historical accounts that, the views of many Muslims on the matter are skewed not because of the sentiments they have towards the religion but because of their misunderstanding with the changing nomenclature of terrorism.

It emerged from the historical review of terrorism in the second chapter of the study that terrorism has been evolving and in most of its evolutions, it has been associated with the Abrahamic religions including Islam. It confirms the widely held scholarly view that terrorism was not invented by the ‘Islamists’ of the centuries. It was invented by the Jews in responds to Palestinian and Roman domination thousands of years back, then copied by the Islamists of the medieval era and has been reinvented in so many ways by the Islamists but the principles and strategies are similar.
The study also showed that Islamic leaders of the various Islamic sects adopted terrorism as an extension of their political domination by other means. All their strategies of unconventional warfare including arson, assassination, guerilla and suicide attacks had the objective of sowing psychological fear in the stronger opponent for a political advantage – the essence of every act of terror.

The study further found out that the latest association of terrorism to Islam began in the late 1980s with the growth of fundamentalism and extremism inspired by the Iranian revolution and the activities of the super powers especially the United States in the middle east which is partly blamed for the plight of Muslims in that part of the world. The supposed ‘westernization’ of the oppressive regimes in the Islamic world was also found to be a factor.

The nature of Modern Islamic related terrorism as found by the study shows that, it has been organized around Islamists movements where weapons and strategies have become easily accessible and sophisticated. They have become globally networked through technology, created sleeper cells in the West and have undertaken home grown attacks mainly under the banner of al-Qaeda and its protégée ISIS. The study observed that the reason why ISIS has captured the attention of the world and sidelined al-Qaeda is their combination of both unconventional and conventional army strategies and weapons including their ferocious and savage attacks which has surpassed any Islamist terrorist group in history.

In the observation of the study, the prevailing notion linking Islam to terrorism comes from the extent of havoc and shock from September 11 attacks. The attack unleashed a psychological fear
about Islam, and this has come to be known as Islamophobia. In addition to the September 11 attacks the study found out that, the schadenfreude and sympathy Islamic related attacks generally raises around the Islamic world, the deliberate isolation of the Islamic world from the GWOT while turning back to present it as a war on Islam is among the reasons for the development of the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage. Those, including western perception about certain teachings of Islam especially martyrdom and jihad has grounded the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage in the West.

The study then established the extent to which the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage is very pervasive in the West. Evidence from the comments of political leaders, security advisors, legislators and acclaimed individuals in Europe and America including data from polls from ordinary citizens provided the basis for this observation. The study observed that the linkage of Islam to terrorism is not just a media or political construction and misinformation. This view the study observed is held among many educated Muslims as well. It is more than a ‘small street talk’ but a phenomenon rooted in the consciousness and sensitivities of ordinary conservative people in the West.

The extent of the prevalence is evident in the cocktail of legislative and executive instruments including security arrangement targeting Muslims in the West. Levels of these are tracked annually in Europe and America by interfaith groups and independent commissions. The religious profiling that has affected immigration; police surveillance and brutality, citizen
vigilantism, including discriminations in West are all enough pointers to the heightened public sensitivities associated with the phenomenon of Islam and terrorism linkage.

The kind of anti-terrorism strategies being deployed to confront Islamic terrorism in the estimation of some of the studies reviewed are just a window dressing of the issue and would not totally eliminate it. It has further emerged in the reviews that there may be probably no solution to the phenomenon.

A possible explanation the study provides for the complicated phenomenon of Islam terrorism linkage and its consequences is in Transnationalism, particularly migration, integration, multiculturalism and struggle between identity and loyalty. The study agreed with other scholars who see it as a clash of civilization. The antagonistic positions of both sides, the Islamic world and the West on the matter point to a possible fear about an existential problem. That is, Islam changing the West and the West out to destroy Islam. The question of who is an European or an American, how should they be identified and where is the loyalty of migrants who have been integrated into western society but create a sub-culture that seem to deploy their western identity for their own interests is very thorny.

It is not clear the extent to which the Islamic terrorism linkage is pervasive in Ghana from the study but from the interviews conducted with a number of highly placed Muslims, all seven respondents confirmed the existence of the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage in Ghana.
The finding of the effects of Islam-terrorism linkage in Ghana is completely based on the responses received from the interviewees. On the positive aside, the phenomenon has added a number of advancement to Muslims personally and the religion as a whole in Ghana. By igniting the search for knowledge among individual Muslims and Imams about the faith and international issues, the phenomenon has resulted in raising a well-informed Muslim population. This has helped them to develop a general indifference to stigma and stereotyping. The wearing of the scarfs and beard is rather on the rise, assimilating non-Muslims to the practice. For the religion in Ghana, there is an assertion from one of the respondents that it is enhancing numerical growth through the conversions of critics and promoting solidarity in the religion.

However, there is also a feeling of pain, disgust and disappointment among Muslims not only with the stereotyping of Muslims but with the shear ignorance displayed by people about Islam. Some of the respondents thought it has brought the religion into disrepute. A level of discrimination is already emerging against Ghanaian Muslim emigrants and unknown people who look ‘strange’ especially if they appear in full face veil. This may be leading to a growing sense of fundamentalism and extremism among young Muslims who have developed a personal sense of hatred for the West.

4.2 Conclusion

The study confirms that terrorism can be associated with Islam from the death of the Prophet. Also the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage and its effect is prevalent in Ghana. The effects are not that immense as in the West but that is dependent on the activities of Islamists in the West Africa and particularly the occurrence of a terrorist act in Ghana. As long as the state
would not be separated from the religion in Islam, and the appetite for establishing Islamic state is rife, radicals would capitalize on that to engage in terrorism in the name of the religion. So will the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage perpetuate. The Phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage is largely the ‘feel factor’ of security and should a terrorist attack occur in Ghana, the sense of Islamophobia that it will escalate can only be addressed with education and a cooperation among various religious leaders.

4.3 Recommendations

The study makes a number of recommendations. Some of them taken directly from the Muslims interviewed. The suggestion from some of the respondents to the interview points to a review of the Islamic education system, the translation of the Koran into local Ghanaian languages and the reformation of Islam. One of the respondents confirm that an attempt at translating the Koran into the local languages is already underway but it is not effective because it is believed that the continuous translation of the Koran leads to the watering down of some of its essential truths. The transformation of the Islamic education system, should include the language of instruction, the flexibility of the religion to allow criticisms and a careful regulation of the educational system. The current challenges with the interpretation and understanding of the Koran is what makes it endearing for radicals to deploy it and use for their personal and political interests.

The religion itself in the opinion of some of the Muslims interviewed and in some of the literature reviewed need to go through some reformation. It seems too conservative, and will lose out on its continuous fight against modernization. According to Rahaman, as the world is
advancing with more technological improvement the religion must seek to also share in its
evolvement.

With the surge in personal hatred in Muslim youth against the West and the possible rise in
extremism and fundamentalism in Ghana, the study recommends a mapping of extremism and
fundamentalism in Ghana. A further integration of the mapped extremist zones should be made
with the national security agenda of country. It should not be done only for Muslim radicals but
for other religions as they could also be predisposed to violence as well. The allegation that
Wahhbism has been introduced in some part of the Brong Ahafo region should be investigated.

The study also recommends a complete delineation of crimes committed by religious people
from the religion and dealt with professionally. A situation where crime is linked to politics and
the momentum at which religious issues are taking centre stage in politics must be discouraged
immediately. This ideological mix is what has led to the emergence of terrorist groups and is still
relevant today.

The effort at interfaith dialogues that have begun in many forms needs an enhancement with a
policy initiative. It should track media content and speeches with stereotyping, possible hate
speech and stigma. The results should be published annually. Those to be targeted most are
Christian religious leaders, politicians, traditional and opinion leaders. The sentiments harboured
among Christian religious leaders about politically motivated affirmative measures targeting
Muslims including the Inner Cities and Zongo Development Plan and the airlifting of Muslims
pilgrims needs not to be taken for granted. It must be studied carefully.
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### E. INTERVIEWS

Anas Abdul-Rahaman, a Sunni Islamic Scholar and a Teacher at Ideal Collage, Legon, Accra

Burkson Jude, A Graduate Student of Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, Legon, Accra.

Dr. Ammah Rabiatu, A Senior Lecturer in Islamic Jurisprudence at the Study of Religions Department, University of Ghana, Legon.

Dr. Alidu Siedu, A Senior Lecturer at the Political Science Department, University of Ghana, Legon.

Amb. Inusah Seidu Rasheed, Director General, Research Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Accra.

Mohammed Sanusi Kamara, Investment Bank Manager, Prudential Bank Ltd, Accra.

Ziblim Inusah, Director, Research Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Accra.
APPENDIX

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Some of the questions asked during the research are as follows:

Is there a linkage between Islam and terrorism in the 21st century?

What is the nature of the linkage between Islam and terrorism?

Is there any basis for Islam-terrorism linkage?

What is your understanding of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism and moderatism?

How prevalent is the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage in Ghana?

What are the effects of Islam-terrorism linkage on Muslims in Ghana (social, education, and religious)?

What should be done to manage or eradicate the phenomenon of Islam-terrorism linkage in Ghana?