AN ANALYSIS OF THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE’S ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE 2015 BURKINABÉ CRISIS

BY
OUENAHOUTE EMANE OUELO
(10600955)

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LEGON JUNE 2017
DECLARATION

I, OUENAHOUTE EMANE OUELO hereby state that this thesis is the outcome of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of Dr. Juliana Appiah, and that no part of it has been duplicated from other sources without proper academic acknowledgement. Additionally, this thesis has not been submitted either in part or whole for the award of any other degree.

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EMANE OUENAHOUTE OUELO   DR. JULIANA APPIAH
(STUDENT)            (SUPERVISOR)

Date:…………………………………                                  Date:………………………………
DEDICATION

To the glory of God Almighty

To my lovely parents, my entire family for their inexorable support throughout my academic life.

May God abundantly bless you all!
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people have, in diverse ways, contributed significantly towards the achievement of this work. My utmost thanks go to my Heavenly Father for everything he has been doing in my life.

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May God favor every one of the individuals who have helped me in one way or the other over the span of this work.
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCE</td>
<td>Autorité Supérieure du Control de l’Etat</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASF</td>
<td>Central African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Congres pour la Démocratie et le Progrès</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Council of Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Conseil National de la Démocratie</td>
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<td>CNT</td>
<td>Conseil National de Transition</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>East African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GISAT-BF</td>
<td>International Group for Support and Assistance to the Transition in Burkina Faso</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEClAD</td>
<td>Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFA</td>
<td>Nouvelle Alliance du Faso</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANELM</td>
<td>Planning Elements</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>PoW</td>
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<td>REC</td>
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ABSTRACT

Peace and security remained key issues for Africa as it is for the international community. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was established in 2002 as an effort to offer "African Solution to African problems." Through the creation of the APSA, any threat to peace in any country in Africa, threatened the entire continent and becomes the concern of all African states. The Protocol of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) adopted in 2002, outlines the various components of the APSA. The road towards the achievement of peace and security in Africa is slow, rough and bumpy due to the occurrence of many crisis in African states and Burkina Faso is not an exception. The 2014 popular uprising in Burkina Faso brought a transition for a period of one year. The transitional process was suddenly interrupted by a coup d’état carried out by the Presidential Guard. Thus, there was an intervention of the APSA through the African Union (AU)’s PSC and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to resolve the crisis. The study discusses the APSA’s role in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis. Qualitative methodology was used to conduct the research. The study found that the APSA played a significant role in the resolution of the crisis, however with some challenges. To strengthen the APSA, the study recommends the reformation of the PSC’s membership, the harmonization and coordination between the AU and the RECs, the strengthening of the mediation capacity, and the collaboration between the civil society organizations and the AU PSC.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Muammar Gaddafi, at a summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1999, in Libya, proposed the creation of an African Union (AU). The AU’s goal was to promote the integration of the continent. The AU addresses political, social, and economic problems in Africa. The AU replaced the OAU because of many reasons. One of these reasons was to allow an intervention in the internal affairs of member states. Indeed, this right was prohibited under the statutes of the OAU. Nevertheless, according to the AU’s Constitutive Act (article 4), member states can intervene in a third state even without the will of the respective government in instances of violations against humankind, for example, genocide and atrocities.

In 2000, the AU adopted its Constitutive Act at the Lomé Summit. It was established on 26 May 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The AU was officially launched in 2002, at the 1st Assembly of its Heads of State and Government. The Assembly was held in Durban. The Union currently has 54 members. The advancement of peace, security and stability in Africa is one of the main purposes of the AU.

The decision to establish an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was taken at the creation of the AU. The adoption of the APSA was justified on the basis of collective security. The APSA is conformed to structures, goals, standards and qualities. The APSA aims to promote harmony, security and stability on the African continent.
The APSA is consisted of two interrelated layers. First, it includes five (5) main bodies within the AU. These institutions are, namely, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the Peace Fund. Second, the APSA encompasses the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the two Regional Mechanisms (RMs) that administrate and manage the North African and Eastern African standby forces.

To promote peace, security and stability in Africa, it is the AU that has the primary responsibility. However, on peace and security matters, there is collaboration between the AU and the RECs/RMs. The relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs is indeed a key component of the APSA. There is a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that guides this collaboration.4

The RECs were created before the inauguration of the AU. They are pillars of the AU. They have developed independently. They also have different roles and structures. The AU has recognized eight of the RECs: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).5

Normally, the aim of the RECs is to promote regional economic integration between its members created in 1991.6 However, today, political, peace and security issues are also addressed by the RECs. For instance, in 1999, the ECOWAS adopted a Protocol Relating to
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in Lomé, Togo. Maintaining and consolidating peace, security and stability within the community is one of the aims of this protocol.7

In October 2014, Blaise Compaoré, the former president of Burkina Faso resigned and went into exile in the Ivory Coast. The ousting of the president was due to an uprising of the population, which was a series of demonstrations and riots in many parts of the country. They began when President Blaise Compaoré decided to change the Constitution in order to run for another mandate and extend his 27 years in office. After the ousting of the president, a transitional government was established in order to organise the next legislative and presidential elections within twelve (12) months. On 17 September 2015, a coup d’état against the transitional government was carried out by the presidential guard led by the General (Gen.) Gilbert Diendéré. The military coup was condemned by the United Nations, the AU and the ECOWAS. Thus, there was an intervention of the AU and the ECOWAS in the resolution of the crisis. It is important, however, to know how the APSA was employed in resolving conflicts since its creation, and using the 2015 Burkinabe crisis as a case in point.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The decision to transform the OAU into AU was occasioned by dissatisfaction with the moderate pace of reform of the international order. Additionally, there were cases in which the international community had a tendency to be centered around different parts of the world at the expense of the African continent which had more urgent problems. Believing that the slowness of the international community’s response to conflicts in Africa indicated that it was about time Africa took control of its own destiny, and that threats to peace in any country on
the continent threatened the entire continent, the phrase "African solutions to African problems was born."\(^8\)

In the last forty to fifty years, Africa has in fact witnessed a lot of conflicts. In most cases, the longest-lasting and most destructive of these conflicts are intrastate such as the Rwandan genocide (1994), the second Liberian Civil war (1999-2003), the Kenyan crisis (2007-2008), the second Ivorian civil war (2010-2011), and the Central Africa Republic civil war (2012 to present). Such conflicts assumed various forms such as: states against populace, dominant ethnic group against minorities and religious conflicts among others.\(^9\) Peace and security have been and remain priority issues for the African continent as it is for the wider international communities. And the creation of the APSA in 2002 was an endeavor to provide "African solution to African problems."

The political crisis of 2015 in Burkina Faso saw the intervention of the APSA through the AU PSC and the ECOWAS to find a solution. The coup d’état led by the presidential guard was in fact condemned by these two organizations. In this crisis, the APSA played a leading role in its efforts to address and find a solution to the crisis. This study, therefore, examines the crisis in Burkina Faso, to carefully ascertain the specific role played by the APSA, and determine the extent to which the APSA’s institutions were successful in the resolution of the Burkinabe crisis.

1.3 **Research Questions**

The relevant principal research questions are:

- What is the APSA?
- What is the role of the APSA in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis?
What are the challenges and successes employing the rules of the APSA in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis?

How can the challenges confronting the APSA be mitigated in order to strengthen the architecture?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The general objectives guiding this research are:

- To examine the institutional framework of the APSA
- To analyse the role of the APSA in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis, its achievements and challenges.
- To make appropriate recommendations based on the findings of the study in order to strengthen the APSA.

1.5 The Scope of the Study

The scope covered the year of 2015 and Burkina Faso is used as case study. This choice is due to the fact that in 2015, Burkina Faso went through a political crisis and the APSA intervened in the resolution of the crisis.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The study will contribute to an understanding of how the APSA works in resolving African conflicts in general. Besides, the findings will be useful in knowing if Africans are able to provide "African solutions to African problems." Additionally, the study will contribute to the existing academic knowledge.
1.7 Hypothesis

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) played a significant role in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for the study is collective security. Some proponents of the concept of collective security are Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant, Charles A. Kupchan, Rumki Basu, and Woodrow Wilson. According to Rumki Basu, the concept of collective security can be defined as interstate arrangements, regional or global by which states are devoted to help any member country threatened with armed aggression by any other state. She argued further that the idea of collective security is to discourage aggression with the power of collective force. According to Goodby, collective security is "a policy that commits governments to develop and enforce broadly accepted international rules and to seek to do so through collective action legitimized by representative international organizations."\(^{10}\)

In general, collective security is viewed as a security arrangement. This security arrangement can be regional or global. In the system of collective security, each state accepts that the security of one is the interest of all. Thus, states come together against any threats, and breaches of peace. Security becomes the concern of all nations. "One for all and all for one" is the basic principle of collective security.\(^{11}\)

President Woodrow Wilson of the United States (US), after the First World War, proposed the creation of an universal cooperation to preserve global peace and prevent conflicts.\(^{12}\)
Thus, after the First World War, collective security became the first rule of the new order. The formation of the League of Nations in 1919 was the first effort to set up such a system after the First World War. However, the system completely failed, because, it was not able to prevent another international war. Indeed, the League failed to either prevent the Italian and Japanese aggressions of the 1930s or resolve them. The official demise of the League was marked with the flare-up of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that universal peace can be achieved just through a system of collective security was at no time doubted.

The major powers agreed to create the United Nations (UN), to maintain peace, after the Second World War. The formation of this organization was also based on the concept of Collective Security. Since then, the concept of collective security has gained a worldwide recognition.

Collective Security represents the fact of preserving security through collective actions. It has two important basics: first, security is the principal goal of all the nations. In fact, the security of all the nations is related to the security of each nation. The duty of all the nations is, therefore, to safeguard the security of the victim nation in case of an attack against it. Second, the word "collective" denotes the way by which security must be defended when there is war or aggression against the security of any state.

The basic tenets underlying the concept of collective security are the following: First, all member-states agree on which nation is the aggressor in an armed conflict. Second, all the states are similarly devoted to contain and constrain the aggression, regardless of its cause or source. Then, in proceedings against the aggressor, all the members have an identical
freedom of action and capacity to join. Additionally, the member-states have an equal say when it comes to collective security decisions.\textsuperscript{15}

There have been some criticisms against the concept of collective security by scholars like Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, Roland N. Stromberg who found the concept of collective security flawed. A major weakness according to these authors, of the collective security system is the fact that there is no permanent peace keeping force. For example, in the UN’s system, the constitution of a collective security military force is initiated essentially after an authorization of the Security Council to take military actions against an aggressor. Slowness and difficulty describe the process. The time used to raise force and put it into used is indeed long.\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, according to Realists, collective security is idealistic in nature and scope which make its operationalization difficult. Realists argue that the concept of "collectivity" which means, "all acting for one and all" is essentially idealistic. In fact, they say that all the nations cannot be expected to join a collective security action because all the nations are not dynamic in international relations.\textsuperscript{17} The dependence on powerful states constitute another drawback of collective security. The fact that all the states should have an equal say when it comes to collective security decisions is another basic rule of this conceptual framework. In real situation, collective security decisions and actions are dominated by powerful states.\textsuperscript{18}

Notwithstanding the points of criticism against the concept, it is presently considered as the most promising approach to international peace. The concept of collective security system is outlined in the Chapter VII of the UN Charter titled “Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Security becomes the mutual aim of all the nations. Thus, this aim must be protected with joint efforts of all. It is worth noting that
currently, in various parts of the world like in Africa, the concept of collective security is being operationalized.

Based on the above analysis, one can argue that African leaders through the APSA have shown their determination to achieve peace in Africa. Indeed, African states have decided to act together rather than allowing individual states to face peace and security issues on their own. In fact, any threat to peace in any country on the continent threatens the entire continent and becomes the concern of all African states. The concept is thus apt in explaining the role of the APSA in managing the Burkinabe crisis.

1.9 Literature review
A lot of writings have been done on the APSA and the 2015 political crisis in Burkina. Writing under the rubrics, "The African Union (AU), the Libya Crisis and the notion of African solutions to African problems," Phillip Apuuli Kasaija discusses the role of the AU in the crisis in Libya. He argues that the "marginalisation" of the AU is self-inflicted. He makes the argument that the AU did not take any strong stance when the crisis in Libya broke up. Moreover, according to the author, the AU experienced inward divisions among its members. Additionally, Phillip Apuuli Kasaija argues that the concept of "African solutions to African problems" is problematic because the AU does not have the necessary tools to operationalise it. He gives the example of the African Standby Force which is still in progress and the lack of financial capacity which prevents the organisation from playing a very active and meaningful role in Africa’s crisis. According to the author, the Libya crisis, in particular, has shown that the AU is not a solution to the African problems. He adds that with the Libya crisis the notion of "African solutions to African problems" became doubtful. Thus, at the moment, the AU does not have the essential useful apparatuses in order to truly operationalise the notion.
This article is important to this study as it identifies some challenges of the APSA. This notwithstanding, Kasaija’s work fails to provide solutions to strengthen the APSA. The article also fails to mention the main components of the APSA.

In his "Ten years on and still under construction: the African Peace and Security Architecture", Malte Brossig talks about the creation of the AU. He outlines the concept of non-indifference that the AU has embraced. He also highlights the APSA’s institutional instruments and its challenges. In his work, the author identifies four challenges of the APSA. Firstly, the issues of dispersed ownership constitute the first challenge. Secondly, the unfinished or vague security is also a challenge of the APSA. Thirdly, the policy doctrines is also considered as challenges. And the scarce resources constitutes the fourth challenge of the APSA. He argues that these challenges hinder the AU from attaining its goals. According to the author, in order to attain these goals, there is a need to create decentralized governance structures and an integrative leadership style. He added that the AU needs collective efforts to achieve its objectives. Malte Brossig argues that since 2002, the AU has been intervened in many African conflicts. Nevertheless, after ten years (2002-2012) of being under construction, the peace and security institutions of the Union have achieved not much. Notwithstanding the challenges of the APSA, it is considered as the foremost and recognized African institution for the resolution of conflicts. Malte Brossig’s work is relevant to the study because it provides an overview of the APSA’S components. It also outlines the challenges of the APSA and gives a solution to strengthen the APSA in the conclusion.

Henrietta J.A.N Mensa-Bonsu in "The African Peace and Security Architecture: A guarantor of Peace and Security on the Continent?", defines a guarantor of peace as a body which has both the capacity and capability to ensure peace, even if it means having to enforce it by
military means. She further argues that in addition to both financial and material means, this body must also inspire a certain amount of awe. According to the author, the adoption of the APSA is based on "Collective Security". In her article, the author questions if the APSA can achieve this lofty aim of guarantor of peace and security on the continent? In her work, the author outlines first of all the different institutions within the APSA. Then, she highlights the challenges of the APSA which are the lack of political clout, the design of the APSA, the issues of funding, the structural defects issues (subsidiarity and the AU-RECs relations) and the proliferation of bodies with overlapping mandates. Finally, the author provides a solution to the APSA. In the conclusion of the work, Henrietta J.A.N Mensa-Bonsu believes that the APSA will work, if the AU put itself up on its feet and gives the APSA a chance to function effectively.21 The author’s work is very instructive as it identifies the roles of the key institutions under the APSA, its challenges and provides some recommendations to the APSA. The contribution of this paper is that Henrietta Mensa Bonsu identifies new challenges such as the design of the APSA, the structural defects issues (subsidiarity and the AU-RECs relations) and the proliferation of bodies with overlapping mandates that have not been tackled by the above authors, and which contribute to hinder the APSA from achieving its peace and security objectives. In addition, in this article, the author proposes a solution to the big issue of funding. According to her, the APSA’s funding could be significantly improved if sources from commercial interests could be explored.

Jesper Bjarnesen and Cristiano Lanzano, in "Burkina Faso’s one week coup and its implications for free and fair elections", talk about the general uprising of October 2014, the 2015 transition in Burkina Faso, the 2015 coup d’état and its implications in Burkina Faso. According to the authors, there must be a clear separation with the regime of Blaise
Compaoré. However, a judicious approach is required to deal with the legacy of the former regime. This approach will avoid more polarisation in the country.22

This paper is pertinent to this research because it gives an insight into the 2014 popular uprising and the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso. It also gives a brief of the national as well as the international reactions to the 2015 crisis. However, it lacks to emphasis on the APSA’s role, its achievements and challenges in the resolution of the 2015 crisis in Burkina Faso. This research will take it further.

Under the rubrics "Political Transition in Burkina Faso: the Fall of Blaise Compaoré," Bettina Engels gives an overview of the 2014 popular uprising and the political transition of 2015 in Burkina Faso. Bettina Engels says that the end of Compaoré’s regime was not a surprise. According to her, in regarding the political history and the army’s historical role in the country, one could have foreseen the end of Compaoré. She adds that a legal reappraisal of cases of murder and "disappearances" is an absolute necessity to guarantee that future governments do not use these vicious means when ruling the country.

This paper is important to this research because, it focuses on the 2015 political transition in Burkina which is related to the 2015 coup d’état. However, Bettina Engels fails to talk about the 2015 coup d’état that interrupted the transitional process.23

These various papers are important to this research because they provide an insight into the 2014 popular uprising and the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso. Some also talk about the institutional framework and the challenges that faces the APSA. From these papers, one can appreciate the extent to which these challenges can impact the APSA’s role in the resolution
of African crisis situations like the 2015 Burkinabe crisis. This research takes this further by analysing the APSA’s role in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis.

1.10 Sources of data

Primary and secondary sources were used for this research.

The primary sources included structured interviews with relevant personalities in Burkina Faso:

- M. Kadre Désire Ouédraogo, former Chairperson of ECOWAS Commission
- M. Somda Anselm, former Member of the Transitional Parliament
- Professor Luc Marius Ibriga, President of the "Autorité Supérieure du control de l’Etat (ASCE) ", activist of the Civil Society in Burkina Faso
- M. Antoine Bado, official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso

The following secondary sources were utilized and analyzed:

- Relevant official documents from the APSA
- Official documents from the AU and ECOWAS official website
- Official communiqués and reports on the subject
- Relevant books
- Other secondary sources such as articles from academic journals and e-resources.

1.11 Methodology

In the conduct of this research, a qualitative methodology was used. This methodology consists of examining a problem through information collected from several sources. The sources include primary and secondary materials, which constitute the data relevant to the study.
The choice of the qualitative methodology to conduct this research was informed by the aim to collect descriptive data from questionnaire respondents and literature from books, journal articles, documents, reports and the internet sources. The data gathered form the primary and secondary sources were reviewed and analyzed for relevant information to deduce findings and draw conclusions on the APSA’s role in the resolution of the 2015 crisis.

1.12 Sampling Procedure

Samples in qualitative research are usually purposive. This means participants are designated because they are likely to generate valuable data for the research. A non-probability sampling method known as purposive sampling was utilized to sample participants that are well-informed in the subject. In this sampling procedure, the researcher judges who should take part in the survey. In this research, only people who took part to the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis such as activists of the Civil Society Organizations, representatives of the AU and ECOWAS, and members of the transitional institutions of 2015 in Burkina Faso were to interview. The study ended up with a sample size of 4 out of the 08 expected.

1.12 Data analysis

Content Analysis can be defined as "a research technique for systematically describing written, spoken or visual communication." As far as this research is concerned, the study utilized content analysis which involved the analysis of the data generated from the secondary and primary sources related to the APSA’s role in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis.
1.13 Limitations

The 2015 crisis in Burkina Faso is only over two (2) years old, therefore, only few publications on the APSA’s role in the resolution of the crisis were available. Other limitations worth stating were the time constraints and difficulty in collecting data using planned interviews. To enrich the research, efforts were made to meet some relevant personalities in Burkina Faso such as the former transitional President Michel Kafando, the former Speaker of the transitional Parliament Mounina Cheriff Sy and some political parties’ members. Unfortunately, none of them was available during the stay of the researcher in Burkina Faso.

1.13 Arrangement of chapters

This dissertation is organized into four chapters. Chapter one (1) is the introduction. Chapter two (2) is an overview of the APSA whilst chapter three (3) analyses the APSA’s role in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis, its achievements and challenges. Chapter four (4) focuses on the summary of the findings, the conclusion and the recommendations.
Endnotes

4 See Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, RECs and the RMs.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 The ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Article 3.
14 Dinesh, (2016), op. cit.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
21 Mensa-Bonsu Henrietta., op. cit.
CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

2.0 Introduction
The APSA is a comprehensive framework of peace and security rules, principles, processes, and mechanisms that the AU has adopted at its creation. The APSA is a collectivist security arrangement that makes every member of the AU responsible for the conservation of peace and security on the continent. The APSA is based on norms that bring together shared standards of appropriate behaviour on peace and security. The principle of non-indifference is one of these norms.\(^1\) The APSA can intervene in the internal affairs of the member states of the AU in order to promote and keep peace.\(^2\) The AU uses different forms of interventions, including mediation (Kenya in 2008), rebuke and suspension of AU membership (Côte d’Ivoire in 2011), suspension from participation in AU activities (Mauritania in 2008), economic sanctions (Mali in 2012), and, as a last resort, military intervention (Comoros Islands in 2007).\(^3\) This chapter gives an overview of the APSA. Attention is focused on the key pillars of the APSA, its partners and its opportunities and challenges.

2.1 The Key Pillars of the APSA
In July 2002, the Protocol of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), was adopted in Durban. In December 2003, it entered into force. The different apparatuses of the APSA and their tasks are found in the PSC protocol. To accelerate the operationalization of the architecture, other documents were adopted. The APSA has five (5) main pillars which are the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force the Continental Early Warning System, and the peace fund.
2.1.1 Peace and Security Council (PSC)

The PSC came out of series of discussions to reform the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR). The OAU adopted the MCPMR, in June 1993. It was the organisation’s operational body. The mandate of the MCPMR was to provide decisions on peace and security matters. However, the MCPMR faced a lot of limitations. Indeed, some challenges of the MCPMR were related to the scope, nature and gravity of African conflicts. Additionally, the lack of equipment impeded the Mechanism from achieving its objectives in peace keeping operations. Therefore, it was only the United Nations (UN) that had solely the responsibility to keep peace in Africa. There was thus the need to replace the MCPMR by a new body.

The MCPMR was replaced by the PSC in 2002. The PSC Protocol was signed in 2002. On 26 December 2003, it came into force. On 16 March 2004, the council officially started its work. From 2004 to March 2009, the PSC had held over 180 meetings. It also delivered over 100 communiqués and pronounced sanctions against some African states such as Togo, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Guinea. Additionally, some peace operations were authorised in countries such as the Comoros (three times), Somalia and Sudan. The PSC is a key element of the APSA. It is also the most visible component. The PSC was created to be an early warning instrument for timely and effective response to emergent conflict and crisis situations in Africa. Article 20 of the Constitutive Act together with Article 2 of the PSC Protocol outline the mandate of the Council. A key function of the Council is to conduct early warning and preventive diplomacy. The Council also facilitates peace-making and establishes peace-support operations.
It meets in continuous session. There are fifteen (15) members on the Council. These members are voted by the AU Executive Council. Five (5) are elected for a three-year period whilst the remaining ten (10) are voted for a two-year term. There is no veto on the Council and each member is given one vote each. The principle of equitable regional representation (North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa) and national rotation are the requirements for PSC membership.⁶

However, the PSC has many constraints. One of them is related to the mode of election of its members. There are criteria to elect the members of the PSC, however, this is often not respected. The regions in fact have created their peculiar method for nominating members to the PSC. This becomes a dilemma for the PSC if a member is nominated contrary to the Council rules and regulations, one wonders whether the PSC can refuse the membership of that candidate and what the response of that region whose candidate is rejected by the PSC will be.⁷ The CEWS, the ASF, the POW, and the Peace Fund work with the PSC.⁸

2.1.2  Panel of the Wise (PoW)

There was no panel under the OAU.⁹ The AU has recognised the role played by the elders in Africa’s tradition of conflicts resolution. Thus, it has created the Panel of the Wise. The AU Panel is also a key pillar of the APSA. The Panel was established under the PSC Protocol.¹⁰ Article 11 of the PSC Protocol highlights the Panel’s composition and mandate. Five highly respected African personalities compose the Panel and meet three times a year. It is the AU Assembly that appoints the members of the Panel. Each member comes from one of the AU’s five (5) regional groups. The Panel has the mandate to support and advise the PSC on peace and security matters.¹¹ For this purpose, the panel can use its good offices, mediation,
conciliation, and research in the conduct of their continentally assigned tasks. The panel reflects the commitment to "African Solutions to African Problems."\(^{12}\)

### 2.1.3 Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

The OAU’s Centre for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution performed some early warning roles. The AU CEWS was set up under article 12 of the PSC Protocol in order to help anticipate and prevent conflicts. The CEWS is one of the important components of the APSA. Its basic role is to gather information on likely conflicts or threats to the peace and security in Africa. The CEWS is capable of monitoring, analysing, and providing warning of imminent conflicts on the continent.\(^{13}\) Members of the CEWS meet periodically with the different RECs. They also meet research institutes and civil society organisations.\(^{14}\)

It is worth pointing out that the RECs have also established CEWS that work in collaboration with the AU’s CEWS. However, the gathering of information from open sources constitutes a challenge. This is because the AU does not have political representation within embassies of its Member States. Thus, the organization cannot gather real-time information and intelligence.

The inter-operability between the AU Commission (AUC) and the CEWS and the RECS constitute another challenge. Indeed, the RECs are at different levels of development and implementation. They also utilize varying methods in the gathering and diffusion of information. It is, therefore, necessary to streamline the processes within the sub-regions and the AUC in order to improve the channels for information sharing.\(^{15}\) From the foregoing, one
can affirm that the greatest challenge to the effectiveness of the early warning system in Africa is not technical or financial but political.

2.1.4 African Standby Force (ASF)

The ASF consists of an African Rapid Intervention Force. The force is a vital element of the APSA. The ASF is deployed under authorization of the PSC. Article 13 of the PSC protocol outlines the functions of the Force. Among them are the intervention in a Member State in case of grave circumstances or at the invitation of a Member State to bring back peace and security, observation and monitoring of missions, preventing of a dispute or conflict escalating, and humanitarian assistance. The ASF has the technical support and backing of a Military Staff Committee (MSC). Moreover, the MSC has experts who give their opinions to the PSC before every military decision. Conceived of as a multinational multidimensional force made up of forces of its five regional mechanisms using the existing RECs/RMs, it is designed to be cost-effective for the AU. According to the PSC protocol, the ASF must operate on the principle of subsidiarity. The ASF is to function on three different levels: the continental, sub-regional and national levels. The continental level refers to the AU Commission and its planning elements, the sub-regional refers to the five brigades that is to be readied and stationed in the various sub-regions for deployment and the national refers to troop contributing countries.

The ASF faces a lot of challenges that are technical and political in nature. The ASF is a military venture. It, therefore, entails high levels of cooperation among Africa countries, which is presently missing. In fact, cooperation is essential for the rapid deployment of troops when it is needed.
The technical challenges facing the ASF come from the multidimensional nature of the Force. The ASF is supposed to include troops from 53 different African States with different languages, military doctrines, operational tactics and technical know-how. This causes problems of interoperability. There is, therefore, a need to streamline these varying systems and doctrines for the effectiveness of the ASF.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, the AU is not able to properly equip the ASF to go into combat due to the lack of internally generated funds.

2.1.5 Peace Fund

The Peace Fund was put in place by the AU to ensure a successful peace and security agenda. Under article 21 of the PSC Protocol, the fund is to finance peace support operations. According to the Protocol, the finances must come from the regular AU budget. The assets can also originate from voluntary contributions from Member States, international partners and other sources such as the private sector, civil society and individuals; as well as through fund-raising activities. Only few African states are to be commended because they constitute the major contributors. These are Libya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Algeria. The rest of the continent does not contribute much. Now that a major contributor, Libya, is in crisis, the fund is sure to be adversely affected.\textsuperscript{20}

2.2 The APSA and its Partners

The AU wants to make its peace and security architecture more effective. One of the ways it intends to do this is by focussing on coordination and partnerships as a strategic priority.\textsuperscript{21} In the mission for peace and security, the AU works with the RECs, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN). The AU also works on bilateral agreements with countries like China, Japan, Canada and the United States.
2.2.1 The Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

The AU has recognized eight of the RECs: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). It has prioritised its relationship with them in order to implement the APSA. Indeed, the AU considers the RECs to be essential in the implementation and execution of the APSA and its programs. According to article 16 of the PSC Protocol, "the RECs are part of the overall security architecture of the AU, which has the primary responsibility to enhance security, peace, and stability in Africa." There exists a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the AU and the 8 recognized RECs in 2007. This document defines the relations between them in the area of peace and security. In the agreement, the AU recognized the need of the RECs for the full operationalization of the APSA. The RECs must establish APSA structures that will work in collaboration with the AU’s peace and security institutions. The RECs implement the decisions on peace and security of the APSA. The RECs have a key role in the operationalisation of the APSA. That is why the collaboration between the RECs and the AU is very vital. There is, therefore, a need for a profound cooperation and collaboration between the AU and the RECs to preserve peace and security in Africa. Some pillars of the APSA such as the PoW, the CEWS and the ASF, need the cooperation of the RECs. For instance, the PoW, which has the mandate of mediation, without the support of the RECs will be unsuccessful.
2.2.2 The UN support to the APSA

The APSA receives external support from multilateral (EU, UN) and bilateral donors (China, India, Canada, Japan). The EU for instance, as a major external multilateral donor provides a significant support to the AU through the creation of the African Peace Fund (APF) in 2004 and the African Strategy in 2005. Again, the EU helps to fight terrorism in west Africa through the AU. Although, the EU supports the APSA, this section focuses on the UN support to the APSA.24

The UN has the central obligation to preserve of peace and security in the world under its Charter. Chapter VIII, however, of the Charter recognises the need for the UN to cooperate more closely with the regional arrangements to maintain peace and security. Indeed, in maintaining international peace and security, the regional organisations play the role of partners. The AU peace and security interventions are considered as actions that contribute to the general international community. The AU expects, therefore, to be supported. The relationships between the UN and regional organizations on peace and security matters over the years have been developed. This has been practically demonstrated with the AU.25 Since the creation of the APSA, the UN has always provided its support in terms of personnel, financial and equipment, to many peacekeeping efforts in Africa like in Liberia 2003, Côte d’Ivoire 2004, Burundi 2004, Darfur 2004-2007, and Côte d’Ivoire 2012. In order to promote the UN-AU cooperation, the two organisations signed a joint Declaration in 2006. This joint Declaration focuses on areas such as human rights, institution-building, political, cultural and human development, human resource development and financial management, and peace and security.26 On 19 April 2017, the UN and the AU signed a joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security which is to institutionalise the strategic corporation between the two organizations. Priority areas for cooperation in conflict
management, prevention, mediation, and early warning are also outlined in the joint UN-AU Framework of 2017.  

2.3 Opportunities and Challenges of the APSA

2.3.1 Opportunities of the APSA

The APSA possesses some opportunities that are worth pointing out. The first strength of the APSA is the right of intervention (Non-indifference) given by the AU’s Constitutive Act. This is a strength because prior to the AU, what existed was the principle of Non-interference in Member States’ internal affairs. The principle of Non-interference in Member States’ internal affairs was in fact an inalienable right of Member States. Indeed, after independence, African countries were strong defenders of their territories and then adopted the principle of non-intervention. African countries were firmly against international intervention in internal conflicts. This resentment was expressed by the then OAU Charter. In other words, the then principle of Non-intervention in domestic affairs of Member States constituted a serious limitation that allowed autocratic leaders to violate their civilians’ rights. It was also reflected in the rejection of the "humanity" intervention by Tanzania in Uganda. Today, if a state fails, for whatever reason, to honour the responsibility to protect its civilians, the AU has the right to in this state.

Another strength worth mentioning is the fact that the APSA’s structure is anchored on the region’s security arrangements which perform both as pillars of implementation and agencies for continental security policy. This is a new system of managing security issues on the continent. This new system brings many African security initiatives onto one mutual platform. At the same time, the APSA respects the regional authority and responsibility of the RECs/REMs and also recognises the central role that these regional bodies play in the journey toward a peaceful and secure Africa.
The system of decentralised collective security constitutes also a strength for the APSA. The AU serves as the clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives whilst, the principal responsibility for peace and security remains exactly with the RECs. This limits, therefore, the risk of competition between the different levels of inter-African security cooperation, because the RECs feel ownership in the process of establishing a continental security architecture. Besides, the fact this system increases the stakes of all actors in the process, reduces the chances of failure.

2.3.2 Challenges of the APSA

The above opportunities notwithstanding, there are some challenges that need to be highlighted. The APSA has many challenges among which are the issues of funding, the challenge of term limits, the presence of undemocratic countries on the PSC, the lack of institutional human resource capacity, the lack of proper coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs, and the overlapping memberships and mandates.

2.3.2.1 Issues of funding

The issues of funding constitute the first challenge of the APSA. Indeed, taking responsibility for funding the architecture was recognised at its inception as the primary means by which Africa could take control of its own problems and provide solutions. Finding reliable sources of funding is a big problem that undermines the efforts of the AU and the RECs to attain their peace and security purposes. The capacities of the AU and the RECs to generate their personal resources are essentially feeble. For example, most of the staff of the PSC Secretariat, and the POW are often employed on short-term contract through funding from several partners. The AU does not have any reliable system to fund its conflict management activities. In fact, only a few countries are paying their dues for all the members, thus, the
AU cannot meet its obligations when members are not paying up. The deployed missions of the AU have been fully reliant on external partners. African countries gave just 2% of the AU’s Peace Fund to cover many activities in the field of peace and security between 2008 and 2011. The remaining 98% was donated by the international Community.\textsuperscript{37} The fact that the APSA depends strongly on external donors means that the security priorities are hardly realised.\textsuperscript{38} To strengthen its operational capacity, the APSA should find reliable alternative sources of funding.

\textbf{2.3.2.2 Challenge of term limits}

Members are elected according to the principle of equitable regional representation and national rotation. It is within the regional groups that the national rotation is decided. Again, retiring members of the PSC are qualified for quick re-election. However, it has been noticed that some countries appear to be almost permanent members (Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia and Gabon), of the Council since it was set up. For instance, Nigeria has become a \textit{de facto} permanent member of the PSC. It continues to hold the three-years term of office in the PSC since the inauguration of the PSC in 2004. This can be explained by its power, size, ability, and financial resources. The almost permanent presence of the sub regional powers on the PSC reflects a certain level of hierarchy among African states.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{2.3.2.3 Undemocratic countries on the council}

Some authors have criticised the presence of undemocratic regimes such as Libya and Sudan on the PSC. Indeed, democracy is not a requirement for PSC membership. And there is no law that forbid the presence of a PSC member at the Council when issues about his country are being discussed. That implies that, an undemocratic regime can cause trouble in its country and still be present at the Council in order to block decisions that concern it.\textsuperscript{40}
2.3.2.4 Lack of institutional human resource capacity

Ramsbotham et al. note that the APSA lacks institutional human resource capacity. This is a very important issue that needs to be taken seriously. For instance, the CEWS Situation Room obtains insufficient diplomatic reporting and intelligence. This is because the AU lacks its own network of embassies and political offices for information gathering, suggesting the necessity for more political liaison officers. For instance, institutionally, there is no dedicated help for the ECOWAS Council of the Wise in the ECOWAS Commission along the lines of the Panel’s Secretariat at the African Union Commission (AUC).

2.3.2.5 Lack of proper coordination between the AU and the RECs

There is a lack of proper coordination between the AU and the RECs. Although the Planning Elements (PANELMS) have been put in place to ensure coordination between the AU and the RECs, there is still much to be done to assure proper coordination. Coordination between the AU and the RECs, therefore, should be taken seriously. Whilst the AU coordinates, monitors and devises policies and acts at the political level, the RECs are not intended to implement at regional level decisions taken by the AU. This is, however, where challenges have arisen. In fact, the RECs believe the AU is usurping their power and unnecessary interfering at the sub-regional level. However, the AU also believes the RECs withhold information from it creating tensions and mistrust. This lack of proper coordination can weaken the effectiveness of security governance.

2.3.2.6 Overlapping memberships and mandates

The proliferation of RECs creates difficulties for purposes of operationalising the subsidiary principle. The operations of the Standby Forces constitute a problem. It is difficult to have a clear policy concerning the mandate and coordination of the ASF. There exists a Standby
Force in each region. The ASF is associated with just five of Africa’s RECs. There is also overlapping membership of many states in different RECs. Thus, this brings dual affiliation in regional standby forces. For instance, both Angola and D.R. Congo are members of the Southern Africa Standby Force (SASF) and also of the Central African Standby Force (CASF); whilst Burundi is both a member of CASF and also East African Standby Force (EASF). Obviously, such multiple memberships do not work in favour of proper coordination. Because of the overlapping memberships and mandates, the RECs suffer from capacity and commitment in order to attain the APSA’s objectives. The advancement of the APSA is profoundly reliant on the dedication of the RECs. In fact, the key elements of the APSA (PSC, ASF, CEWS and POW) will be severely weakened without cooperation from the RECs.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to critically give an overview of the APSA. Special attention has been focused on the key pillars of the APSA, its partners, opportunities and challenges. The study notes that Africa, through the AU, sought to establish and promote an effective legal and institutional mechanism for the promotion of unity as well as for the preservation of peace and security in Africa. The study also has found that despite the expectations, enthusiasm and fanfare that have heralded the creation of the APSA, the road towards peace and security has been slow, and rough. The next chapter (3) analyses how the APSA was employed to response to the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso.
Endnotes

2 See the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 and the PSC protocol of 2002
10 African Union (2002), art.11, op. cit.
15 Appiah, Juliana Abena, op. cit., pp.136-138
16 Article 13(1)(2) of the PSC protocol, and article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.
22 PSC Protocol Article 16.
24 Ibid.147
26 Appiah, Juliana Abena, op. cit., p.150.
30 Wheeler, Nicholas J., op. cit.
31 Article 2, Paragraph 1, PSC Protocol.
33 Ibid.
34 Mensa-Bonsu, Henrietta., op. cit., p.67
36 Williams, Paul D. op. cit.
39 Appiah, Juliana Abena, op. cit., p.150.
40 Ibid.
42 Arthur, Peter., op. cit., pp.11-14
44 Mensa-Bonsu, Henrietta., op. cit., pp. 73-74.
CHAPTER THREE
THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE’S ROLE IN THE
RESOLUTION OF THE 2015 BURKINABE CRISIS

3.0 Introduction

Between 2000 and 2015, there were fifteen (15) coups d’état in Africa. Depending on the country, coups can be common or very rare. A coup d’état is qualified as "an event in which existing regimes are abruptly and illegally displaced by the action of relatively small groups." These small groups can be composed of individuals from the police, military, or security forces of the state.

Countries such as Niger, Guinea, Ghana, and Burkina Faso have experienced some coups d’états since their independence. Burkina Faso, previously called "the Upper Volta", was a former colony of the Republic of France. In 1960, it obtained its independence. Since then, the country has experienced seven (7) coup d’états. The last one was in September 2015. This chapter examines the role of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso. Attention is focused on the overview of the crisis, the APSA’s response to the crisis, and the achievements and challenges of the APSA in the resolution of the crisis.

3.1 Overview of the 2015 Political Crisis in Burkina Faso

After the popular uprising of October 2014, there was a political transition in Burkina Faso. The political transition was set up for a duration of one year. It was in reaction to President Blaise Compaoré’s efforts to modify the Constitution that the popular uprising started. From 1983 to 2014, the President spent 27 years in power. In 2014, he decided to modify the Constitution for another term of office. Thus, the political opposition and civil society
organisations (CSOs) mobilised many protest. Consequently, the president was obliged to resign and leave Burkina Faso. Diplomat Michel Kafando became the transitional President two weeks later. The transitional President appointed Isaac Zida, Deputy Commander of the Presidential Guard, Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle (RSP) as Prime Minister. Jointly with the UN, the AU and the ECOWAS created an International Group for Support and Assistance to the Transition in Burkina Faso (GISAT-BF).

With the help of the International Community, the national actors composed of the political parties, the CSOs and the religious leaders a Transitional Charter was drawn. The Charter highlighted a one year process to plan for presidential and legislative elections. The elections were to be held on 11 October 2015. Indeed, the mandate of the transitional institutions was to organise new presidential and legislative elections. In April 2015, the National Transition Council called Conseil National de Transition (CNT) voted a new electoral code. This code prohibited all candidates who had given their support to Compaoré’s proposal of constitutional change in 2014 to allow him to stay in power from taking part in the upcoming presidential elections of 2015. Therefore, this created some disagreements. The Constitutional Council of Burkina Faso approved the electoral code. Some political parties such as the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) and the Nouvelle Alliance du Faso (NAFA) disagreed with the Constitutional Council’s decision. Indeed, they accused the Council of bias. Additionally, they called all the political parties for a boycott of the elections. These political parties took the State of Burkina Faso to the ECOWAS Court of Justice. In its decision, the Court found the new code illegal. According to the Court, the Burkinabe authorities have the right to restrict the participation to the elections, but the electoral code must specify the persons that are banned from taking part in the elections. Nevertheless, a lot of candidates who were close to Compaoré’s regime were excluded from the electoral lists.
On 14 September 2015, the Commission charged with proposing post-uprising reforms concluded that the RSP which was an independent military unit formed by former President Blaise Compaoré was like an army within an army. Thus, the Commission suggested the dismantlement of the RPS. It also added that the RSP’s members should be redeployed.

On 16 September 2015, news emerged that a ministerial meeting was interrupted by the RSP. Additionally, the RSP detained the President, Michel Kafando, the Prime Minister, Yacouba Isaac Zida, and some ministers of the transitional government. Thus, it seized control of the capital ‘Ouagadougou’. On 17 September 2015, the RSP officially declared a coup d’état. It also said that the transitional government was dissolved. Furthermore, the RSP proclaimed the creation of the National Democratic Council (CND) that would replace the transitional government. According to the RSP, the General Gilbert Diendéré was the leader of the new junta. The RSP condemned the new electoral law, which banned all the candidates who supported Blaise Compaoré from participating in the legislative and presidential elections. The RSP, consequently, promised to allow all potential candidates to run for elections that were to take place on 11 November 2015.

In reaction to the situation, a joint Communiqué was issued by the African Union, the United Nations (UN) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on 16 September 2015. In the communiqué, the three organisations strongly condemned the coup d’état. The AU, therefore, quickly suspended Burkina Faso. It also issued sanctions on the coup leaders whilst their Excellencies Boni Yayi, President of Benin, and Macky Sall, President of Senegal and Chairman of ECOWAS decided to use peaceful means through mediation to find a solution to the crisis.
There were many national reactions to the coup in the next days. Some strikes were proclaimed by some trade Unions which were traditionally dynamic for the next days. Additionally, former political opposition parties rapidly rejected the coup. Indeed, they called for mobilisation. Some spontaneous protests were also in the streets of Ouagadougou. A radio station called Radio de la Résistance Citoyenne was even set up. This Radio was set up by the CSOs to invite all Burkinabe to take action against the RSP’s effort to interrupt the transitional process.\textsuperscript{10} Any groups of demonstrators, however, that were formed were quickly dispersed by the RSP’s members.\textsuperscript{11} Eleven (11) people lost their lives, and more than two hundred and fifty (250) were injured.\textsuperscript{12}

In an interview of Jeune Afrique, after the announcement of the coup, Gen. Diendéré said that the RSP took over because it wanted to prevent the country from being destabilized.\textsuperscript{13} Many believe the discontent of the RSP was the main cause of this undemocratic manoeuvre. On the one hand, the RSP was unhappy with the new electoral law of April 2015 that excluded several candidates who buttressed Compaoré’s proposal to run for presidency in the elections that were to happen on 11 October 2015. On the other hand, the RSP also did not accept the proposal of its suppression suggested by the CSOs, some political parties and the Commission of reforms.\textsuperscript{14}

On 17 September 2015, the leader of the National Transition Council (NTC), Moumina Cheriff Sy, declared himself President.\textsuperscript{15} He qualified the coup as a "serious attack on the republic and its institutions". He invited the coup leaders to step down. Thus, he asked the national armed forces to step in and stop the coup. The regular army, therefore, decided to make clear its intention to confront and disarm the Presidential Guard.\textsuperscript{16}
The 2015 coup d’état in Burkina Faso, led by the Presidential Guard, lasted just a week.\(^\text{17}\) In fact, the junta failed to consolidate its authority across the country, because of the national protests, the strong pressure from the regular army, regional leaders, and the international community, to step down. Eventually, the junta surrendered power and President Michel Kafando was reinstated as President of Burkina Faso on 23 September 2015. On 25 September 2015, a government decree disbanded the RSP.\(^\text{18}\)

### 3.2 The APSA’s Response to the Crisis

Since the Lomé Declaration was adopted in 2000, there was a zero tolerance of coups d’états in Africa.\(^\text{19}\) Since then, there were still some coup d’états on the continent. Thus, the AU adopted a number of legal instruments mainly, the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, the 2002 protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (called African Charter) to reinforce the OAU position.\(^\text{20}\) According to these instruments, governments that access power by undemocratic means must be suspended by the AU. Moreover, the AU shall institute appropriate sanctions against the perpetrators of an undemocratic change of government.\(^\text{21}\) Additionally, per the African Charter, the perpetrators of unconstitutional action are barred from contesting elections held to reinstate democracy.\(^\text{22}\) The APSA played a role in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso through the intervention of the AU PSC and the ECOWAS.

#### 3.2.1 The PSC’s response to the crisis

The AU reiterated its "total rejection of undemocratic changes" at the 14\(^{th}\) Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Addis Ababa, in 2010. It affirmed its will to put an absolute end to unconstitutional changes that challenges the enhancement attained in the on-going democratization processes in Africa and constitute a threat to peace and security.\(^\text{23}\)
The AU, since its creation, has always condemned coups d’états which are qualified as unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. Examples include Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Guinea Bissau (2012), Mali (2012), Egypt (2013) and Burkina Faso (2015).

On 4 February 2015, the AU expressed its concern on the situation in Burkina Faso in a press release. In this press release, the Chairperson of the Commission stated the AU’s strong disapproval of any act likely to weaken the transition process. Moreover, she reaffirmed the AU’s support to the transitional institutions.24

In a joint communiqué with the UN and ECOWAS on 16 September 2015, the AU strongly condemned the coup d’état in Burkina Faso. It also qualified the coup as an undemocratic change in power. Thus, the AU pronounced some strong measures on the coup leaders. These sanctions were to crack down on the RSP and send a message that coups would not be tolerated. According to the AU Chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the announcement by the RSP of the ‘dismissal’ of President Michel Kafando and the attempt of replacing him with "new authorities" was "null and void. " The AU also called the coup leaders "terrorists", with all legal implications within the framework of the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its 2004 Protocol.25

According to article 7 (g) of the AU PSC protocol, whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a Member State, the Chairperson of the AU Commission in conjunction with the PSC shall institute sanctions.26 Thus, on the political front, Burkina Faso was suspended from all AU activities by the AU PSC. The AU PSC also decided to impose a travel ban on the coup leaders if the status quo ante was not restored within 96 hours of the 18
September 2015 statement. Moreover, the PSC called for the suspension of all political, economic and military cooperation by the international partners. It also imposed an asset freeze on the coup perpetrators. Additionally, in order to refuse the use of Burkina Faso’s reserves by the coup perpetrators, in the Central Bank of West African States, the Council called for consultations with the West African Economic and Monetary Union.\textsuperscript{27}

In an interview, M. Antoine Bado, an official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, mentioned that the AU PSC, which is the cornerstone of the APSA played a great role in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina. He added that since the creation of the transitional institutions in Burkina Faso, the AU had always given its support to the transition through the creation of the GISAT-BF.\textsuperscript{28} In fact, When the coup was led in 2015, the AU did not change its stand. That is why after deciding that the RSP’s seizure of power in Burkina Faso was a coup, the AU used sanctions immediately to show its support to the transition.

In analysing the AU PSC reaction on the 2015 coup d’état in Burkina Faso, one can effectively agrees with M. Antoine Bado to say that after the 2014 popular uprising, the AU has always given its support to the transition and played a significant role in the resolution of the 2015 crisis. One can also add that the AU took its decisions basically based on the African Charter for not making concessions to the coup leaders and to insist on a return to the \textit{status quo ante}. It is worth noting that in the resolution of the conflict, the AU also focused on joint action with the UN and the ECOWAS expressly in the joint communique of 16 September 2015.\textsuperscript{29}
3.2.2 The ECOWAS’s response to the crisis

There are many crucial factors that contribute to human and state insecurity in West Africa. Some of them are armed conflict, transnational crime and unconstitutional changes in power. The ECOWAS is the main organisation for security cooperation in West African region, and that contributes as a bloc to the overall African Peace and Security Architecture.30

When the ECOWAS was created 42 years ago, it was mainly an economic organisation. It did not have any security mandate. The ECOWAS established its main conflict prevention and management frameworks and tools, when it realised that conflict and insecurity were major impediments to economic development of the region. These legal instruments are precisely, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999 and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001. However, the former emphases generally on conflict management, and the latter focuses on conflict prevention. Together, these two tools constitute the basis for the ECOWAS Conflict and Prevention Framework (2008).31

According to article 16 of the PSC Protocol, the RECs constitute a bloc of the overall APSA. The ECOWAS has been at the front of West African peace and security efforts. Thus, it also played a role in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso. The ECOWAS, as a key component of the APSA, was naturally involved in the resolution of the crisis in Burkina Faso. Their Excellencies, Macky Sall President of the Republic of Senegal and Thomas Yayi Boni President of the Republic of Benin, were sent to Burkina Faso for a mediation in order to bring peace to the country. The negotiations, mediated by the ECOWAS, took place in Ouagadougou from 18 to 20 September 2015.
The former Chairperson of the ECOWAS Commission, M. Kadre Desire Ouédraogo, stated that:

"there were discussions between the ECOWAS and the stakeholders in Burkina Faso after the coup, to find a solution to the crisis. From these discussions came a draft proposal proposed by the ECOWAS. This first agreement proposed by the ECOWAS called for national reconciliation and forgiveness, the release of President Michel Kafando and his ministers, the restoration of the transitional institutions, the removal of the military from the government and the grant of an amnesty to Gen. Gilbert Diendéré and his troops. The ECOWAS also called for an open, inclusive, free and transparent process for the elections." \(^{32}\)

M. Anselm Somda, in an interview stated that:

"the ECOWAS first agreement was eventually rejected by the national actors. In fact, after the publication of the draft agreement, the majority of the population and the CSOs were against it.\(^{33}\)

In an interview with Professor Luc Marius Ibriga, activist of the civil society, he buttressed M. Somda’s argument. In fact, Professor Ibriga mentioned that:

"the political parties jointly with the CSOs published a declaration on 21 September 2015, which showed their disagreement with the proposals that came out of the negotiations led by the ECOWAS. This declaration was titled Déclaration Sur La Proposition D’accord De La Médiation."\(^{34}\)

He added that there were protestations on the streets to show the population’s disagreement about the proposition of an amnesty for the coup makers that was part of the draft agreement’s proposals.\(^{35}\) At the heart of the protests were a lot of CSOs such as the "Balai Citoyen" who called for "popular resistance" against the coup’s leaders. Moreover, all activists were call on by a new radio station, Radio de la Resistance Citoyenne, to take actions against the RSP’s attempt to interrupt the transition process.\(^{36}\)

On 22 September 2015, President Macky Sall, the Chief mediator of the ECOWAS, presented the draft deal at an Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State of the ECOWAS, to solicit their support to get Burkina Faso back on track for its democratic transition process.\(^{37}\)

In the final
communiqué following the meeting of the ECOWAS Heads of State in Abuja on 22 September 2015, the ECOWAS heads of state placed the emphasis on dialogue, national reconciliation and stability in Burkina Faso.38

M. Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, pointed out that:

"the ECOWAS in the final communiqué, condemned the coup d’état based on the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999, asked for the reinstatement of the transitional President and the disarmament of the RSP."39

On 23 September 2015, the ECOWAS designated a committee of high Heads of states led by President John Dramane Mahama to present the final decisions of the ECOWAS to all the Burkinabe stakeholders and witness the reinstatement of the President.40

On 26 September 2015, the AU PSC in its 547-communiqué commended M. Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo the then President of the ECOWAS’s Commission, President Macky Sall of Sénégal, and other Heads of State such as President John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger and President Muhammadu Buhari, President of the Republic of Nigeria, for their support against the coup d’état perpetrated by the members of the RSP.41

According to M. Kadré Désire Ouédraogo, the ECOWAS has supported Burkina Faso since the popular uprising of 2014. He stated that:

"Indeed, the ECOWAS helped the country to have a transitional charter after the popular uprising in 2014 through its membership in the GISAT-BF. The ECOWAS with its mediation capacity also helped to bring peace and security after the coup d’état in 2015. Additionally, the organisation helped to held the elections of 2015. Finally, the ECOWAS helped the country in the presentation of an economic programme (Programme National de Development) for the reconstruction of the country after the popular uprising and the 2015 crisis."42
From the foregoing, it is worth highlighting that the ECOWAS as a bloc of the overall APSA has indeed played a key role in the resolution of the crisis. Thus, one can argue that the ECOWAS’ role has even been more direct than the AU PSC which is the cornerstone of the APSA in its quest for solution to the crisis. Indeed, the ECOWAS handled the crisis by focusing on the use of peaceful means through its mediation efforts whilst the AU PSC did not use any good office to resolve the crisis.

### 3.3 Achievements and challenges of the APSA in the resolution of the crisis

The APSA through the intervention of the PSC and the ECOWAS in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso had some achievements and challenges.

#### 3.3.1 Achievements

The achievements of the APSA in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso are many. Among them are the release of the transitional authorities, the surrender of the RSP, and the reinstatement of the President.

##### 3.3.1.1 Release of the transitional authorities

A major achievement of the APSA was the release of the Transitional President and the members of his government. In fact, the AU PSC made some declarations, condemning strongly the situation in Burkina Faso after the arrest of President Michel Kafando and his cabinet on 16 September 2015 by the RSP. The AU described the arrest of the transitional authorities as a kidnaping and unlawful detention. Its Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma qualified the RSP leaders as "terrorists" that was an infrequent strong language for the AU.\(^{43}\) The AU’s calling the coup leaders "terrorists" supposed that no compromise could have been
accepted between the AU and the RSP. Additionally, treated as terrorists supposed the lack of recognition by the international community of the new junta and its National Democratic Council (NDC). The AU also threatened the coup leaders to release the members of the transitional government and the restoration of the statu quo ante within 96 hours pending sanctions on the coup makers.

According to M. Kadre Desire Ouédraogo, when their Excellencies Macky Sall and Thomas Yayi Boni of ECOWAS initiated the mediation process, they also demanded the release of the transitional authorities who were kidnapped by the new junta. After the declarations of the AUPSC and the mediation process initiated by the ECOWAS, President Michel Kafando and the members of his government who were arrested by the RSP were released. It is worth pointing out that the declarations of the PSC had an important impact on the situation because they put pressure on the coup leaders. Indeed, the AU’s calling of the coup leaders “terrorists” destabilized the coup leaders. This new qualification of the coup leaders, therefore, dissuaded them from attaining their goal. However, one must also recognised the role of the ECOWAS. The ECOWAS, as part of the APSA, and through its mediation efforts also played a crucial role in the release of the Transitional President and his government.

3.3.1.2 Surrender of the RSP

According to Professor Ibriga, the reaction of the international community, the population and the armed forces of Burkina Faso to the coup d’état left the coup perpetrators without any support. He emphasised that the declarations of the AU PSC, the CSOs, political parties, religious authorities, as well as on-going popular mobilisation against the coup, were visibly a large support to the transitional authorities, leaving the RSP alone.
The coup leaders signed a deal with the national army. According to the deal, the RSP soldiers were to go back to their barracks. It also demands the restoration of the transitional president to power. The deal was signed the next day after the national army’s troops arrived in "Ouagadougou". The arrival of the national army soldiers in the capital increased the pressure on the coup perpetrators. Under the terms of the deal, the RSP decided to abandon the decisions they had made in Ouagadougou whereas the army also accepted to remove its troops and assure the safety of the RSP soldiers as well as their families. The agreement was presented to the Mogho Naba, "king" of Burkina Faso's leading Mossi tribe, in front of the media.

According to Professor Luc Marius Ibriga and M. Anselm Somda, it is the AUPSC’s declarations that encouraged the CSOs, the population, the political parties and the armed forces in Burkina Faso to stand against the coup d’État and refused to give any support to the coup leaders. Thus, according to them, the AUPSC as well as the CSOs, the political parties and the population played a key role in the surrender of the new junta.

From the foregoing, one can affirm that the AUPSC played a great role in the surrender of the new junta. Nevertheless, one must also point out the role of the ECOWAS in the capitulation of the RSP. Indeed, at the 22nd Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State organized at Abuja, the ECOWAS has shown in its final communiqué its condemnation of the coup and support to the transition. Finally, it can be argued that it is this lack of support from the population, the national actors, the sub-regional and the continental leaders that led to the surrender of the RSP.
3.3.1.3 Reinstatement of the President

Another achievement of the APSA was the reinstatement of President Michel Kafando. Indeed, the PSC in its communiqué of 18 September 2015, expressly demanded the restoration of the *statu quo ante* which was the reinstatement of the President and his government in power. Additionally, the ECOWAS also asked for the reinstatement of Michel Kafando as President of Burkina Faso in its final communiqué on 22 September 2015. According to the former Chairperson of ECOWAS Commission, "the ECOWAS as a component of the APSA helped to reinstate the president." Indeed, the ECOWAS sent a delegation of Heads of state to witness the reinstatement of the President and his government. This delegation was composed of their Excellencies John Dramani Mahama, President of the Republic of Ghana, Maky Sall, President of the Republic of Senegal, Thomas Boni Yayi President of Benin, Faure Gnassigbe President of Togo, Muhammadu Buhari President of Nigeria and Mahamadou Issoufou President of Niger." On 23 September 2015, President Michel Kafando returned to power.

On 26 September, the PSC welcomed the reinstatement of the interim government and lifted the suspension of Burkina Faso. In its statement, the PSC once again quoted the African Charter as the legal basis for its decision to lift the suspension, especially, its Article 25, which stipulates that "in the political institutions of their states, perpetrators of unconstitutional changes shall not hold any position of responsibility."

From the foregoing, it is obvious that from the declarations of the AU PSC and the final Communiqué of the ECOWAS on 22 September 2015, the AU and the ECOWAS expressly demanded the reinstatement of Michel Kafando. It is, therefore, worth highlighting that the
AU PSC and the ECOWAS played key roles in the restoration of President Michel Kafando as President of the Transition in power.

3.3.1.4 Disarmament of the RSP

M. Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo stated that:

"the ECOWAS in its final communiqué, condemned the coup d’état based on the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of 1999, the reinstatement of the transitional President, and the disarmament of the RSP. In fact, the ECOWAS demanded a peaceful transfer of the RSP’s armament to the national army. It, therefore, decided to send five (5) chiefs of defence staff of the different Heads of states delegated to witness the reinstatement of the President in Burkina Faso. However, before the ECOWAS implemented this decision, news emerged that the national army in Burkina Faso was disarming the RSP. Nonetheless, the ECOWAS followed with attention the process of disarmament of the RSP."\(^5^3\)

In fact, the deal concluded between the national army and the RSP envisaged also the disarmament of the RSP. On 25 September 2015, the RSP was disbanded. On 16 October 2015, the coup leader Gen. Gilbert Diendéré after seeking refuge in the Vatican embassy was sentenced by a military court for treason and crimes against humanity. The process of disarmament of the RSP started on 26 September 2015 and ended on 06 October 2015.

From the foregoing, it can be argued that the disarmament of the RSP represents a success of the national army. However, this success must also be counted among the successes of the APSA through the decision of the ECOWAS after the 22nd Extraordinary Summit to disarm the RSP as a way out of the crisis. One can, therefore, argue that the disarmament of the RSP was a success of the national army of Burkina Faso and the ECOWAS.
3.3.2 Challenges

In its attempt at resolving the 2015 Burkinabe crisis, the APSA met with some challenges. Among them were the lack of coordination between the PSC and the ECOWAS, the lack of special envoy from the AU and the ECOWAS, the issue of subsidiarity, the lack of use of the PoW and the lack of proper use of the AU CEWs.

3.3.2.1 Lack of coordination between the AU PSC and ECOWAS

According to Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, former Chairperson of the ECOWAS Commission, there was a very close coordination between the AU and the ECOWAS during the resolution of the Burkinabe crisis. He added that the ECOWAS was permanently represented at all the PSC meeting as far as the 2014 popular uprising and the 2015 Burkinabe crisis were concerned in order to keep the AU PSC informed of the situation on the ground. M. Ouédraogo points out that at these meeting, the ECOWAS always made some recommendations and let the PSC to decide.  

In analysing the situation in Burkina Faso, however, it is noticeable that there were some points of incoherence between the AU PSC and the ECOWAS. Though both organisations decided to condemn the coup d’état, they did not have the same way of handling it, nor did one differ to the other. First, in lines of the African Charter and the AU Constitutive Act, the AU PSC decided to suspend Burkina Faso from all the AU’s activities whilst the ECOWAS did not suspend Burkina Faso from its activities. Second, to find a way out of the crisis, the ECOWAS emphasised on the use of peaceful means through the mediation whilst the AU PSC from the beginning of the crisis firmly refused any compromise with the coup perpetrators. Again, on 18 September 2015, the AU PSC decided to pronounced sanctions against the coup leaders in order to show its support to the transition whereas no sanctions
were mentioned in the ECOWAS’s final Communiqué that came out of the 22nd Extraordinary Summit of Heads of state.

Despite the emphasis on joint action outlined by the former Chairperson of the ECOWAS, the coordinated effort collapsed quickly as the regional leaders had a different attitude from the AU PSC. Indeed, the ECOWAS draft agreement to solve the crisis suddenly contrasted with the AU’s call for the restoration of the *status quo ante*, without any conditions. It is important to highlight that, this is not the first-time there is lack of coherence between the AU PSC and RECs in Africa. For instance, during the Ivorian crisis of 2011, the ECOWAS issued statements condemning President Gbagbo’s refusal to accept the results of the election, and boycotted the inauguration ceremony. However, the AU Ambassador in Cote d’Ivoire was in full attendance. This situation was repeated during the Mali crisis of 2012. ECOWAS moved swiftly to suspend Mali from its membership, but it took a couple of weeks more before the AU did the same. Such lack of coordination regarding the decisions of the two organisations must be tackled. It is suggested that in the future, the suspension for instance of a member by the AU should operate automatically as a suspension from the REC, and vice versa, so that they can speak with one voice.

**3.3.2.2 Lack of Special Envoy from the AU and the ECOWAS**

There was a clear desire of the AU PSC and the ECOWAS to tackle the problem in Burkina Faso in a coordinated manner during the 2015 crisis. However, no joint special envoy was appointed to coordinate the response, as it was the case in 2014 in Burkina Faso. To address such a crisis, a facilitator could also be appointed that is a member of both the relevant REC and the AU PSC. In the case of Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, the Gambia and Guinea were all on the AU PSC and members of the ECOWAS but none of them was appointed as envoy.
solve the crisis. This may have prevented the dissention between the AU PSC and the ECOWAS if there was a joint envoy from both organisations in Burkina Faso to handle the 2015 crisis.

From the foregoing, one can argued that the lack of joint envoy from the AU PSC and the ECOWAS to resolve the 2015 Burkinabe crisis can be explained by the fact that, in general, the RECs think that the AU is usurping their power in interfering at the sub-regional level. The AU also believes the RECs withhold information from it creating tensions and mistrust. In fact, this lack of special joint envoy from the AU PSC and the ECOWAS does not show the spirit of unity, harmonisation and coordination of the two organisations in their attempts to find "African Solutions to African Problems.

3.3.2.3 Issue of subsidiarity

When dealing with crisis in Africa, the issue of subsidiarity arises always. Subsidiarity is based on the principle that the RECs’ closeness gives them a better understanding of the dynamics of a situation. The principle of subsidiarity makes the AU hostage of the REC, because whether the AU is able to impact upon any situation would be dependent on whether the REC in question is able to undertake the mission concerned with effectiveness. Indeed, this principle of subsidiarity means that the AU’s action is subsidiary to the RECs’ action in the management of conflicts in Africa. In other words, the responsibility is given to the RECs to initiate actions that are necessary to the maintaining of peace and security on the continent. The RECs’ efforts must, therefore, be completed or supported by the continental organisation. In most of the crisis that occurred since 1999 in West African countries, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, the ECOWAS was the first to undertake an intervention before other organisations such as the United Nations (UN). However, the
principle of subsidiarity was not respected in some crisis such as Comoros in 2008 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2011. The real challenge of the use of the principle of subsidiarity is the lack of trust between the AU and the RECs.\textsuperscript{57}

The AU, indeed, thinks that sometimes, there is a risk that proximity could become an obstacle, a source of suspicion and impartiality that will impede the process of resolution of the crisis.\textsuperscript{58} It is, therefore, necessary to find a way to combine proximity and impartiality in the resolution of crisis in Africa. The way the AU PSC dealt with the crisis in Burkina Faso once again put the AU’s notion of subsidiarity of sub-regional bodies to the test. The APSA will eventually have to decide on the issue of subsidiarity, which arises time and time again when managing the crises in Africa.

\textbf{3.3.2.4 The lack of use of the Panel of the Wise (PoW)}

The PoW as one of the main pillars of the APSA was created under the PSC Protocol. The panel is the conflict mediation, reconciliation and resolution pillar. It is to serve as a useful mechanism that supports the activities of the other pillars especially the PSC on peace and security issues. For this purpose, the panel, therefore, can use its good offices for instance in a crisis. The \textit{raison d’être} of the PoW is to be an apparatus for rapid intervention in the early stages of crisis.

In the 2015 Burkinabe crisis, it is worth noting that there was neither an attempt nor an intervention of the PoW to resolve the crisis. In fact, the AU PoW could have been utilized by the AU PSC to undertake mediation like the ECOWAS when the coup was led on 17 September 2015 in order to bring peace and security in Burkina Faso. The PSC issued its declarations without seeking advice from the PoW. It is, therefore, clear that the AU PoW was
not used during the resolution of the crisis. This lack of use of the PoW is a challenge for the overall APSA. The PoW is constituted of five (5) eminent African Personalities and the fact that the panel was not used in the Burkinabe crisis undermines its importance. This lack of use of the PoW does not reflect the commitment of the AU to find "African Solutions to African Problems."

3.3.2.5 The lack of proper use of the AU CEWs

The AU CEWs established by the PSC Protocol is a key component of the APSA. Its key role is to collect information on likely threats to security and peace in Africa. In fact, the CEWs can analyse and provide warning of imminent conflicts on the continent. The AU CEWs works in collaboration with the CEWs established in the RECs. Nevertheless, the gathering of information is a challenge.

According to M. Anselm Somda, after the 2014 popular uprising, there were signs that a crisis could have occurred during the transition. Indeed, after the adoption of the new electoral code, there were protests of some political parties that disagreed with the new electoral law. However, the Constitutional Council of Burkina Faso approved the new electoral code. The candidates who were barred by the new electoral law, therefore, decided to take the State of Burkina Faso to the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The Court criticised the new code in saying that the Burkinabe authorities had the right to restrict the participation to the elections, but the electoral code must specify the persons that are excluded from taking part to the elections. Nevertheless, some candidates were left out of the electoral lists. Additionally, during the transition, there was a crisis between the RSP and the Prime Minister Zida. In fact, the RSP soldiers considered the Prime Minister as a betrayer because he was not against the proposal of dismantlement of the RSP made clearly by the CSOs, some political parties and some
transitional authorities. So, on 28 June 2015, the RSP tried unsuccessfully to arrest the Prime Minister Zida at the airport.\(^{59}\)

The AU CEWs must gather real information and on time in order to play its role of early warning system in Africa. It was, only on 4 February 2015, that the AU expressed its concern on the situation in Burkina Faso in a press release. After that, it was when the RSP carried out the coup d’état that the AU made some declarations in order to resolve the crisis. The AU CEWs should have gathered all information on the ground in order to foresee the looming crisis in Burkina Faso. The ECOWAS as the sub-regional organisation has also a CEWs which is close to Burkina Faso, and that could have worked with the AU CEWs in order to share information on the ground and predict the crisis. One can say that if the CEWs was properly used, the continental organisation could have make recommendations to the transitional authorities or sent envoys in Burkina before the deterioration of the situation. There is, therefore, an immediate necessity to reinforce the AU and the regional organisations’ CEWs in Africa.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter critically analysed the APSA’s role in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso. The study focused on the overview of the crisis, the APSA’s response through the interventions of the AU PSC and the ECOWAS to the crisis, the achievements and challenges of the APSA in the process of resolution of the crisis. The study notes that the UN, the AU and the ECOWAS, unanimously condemned the coup d’état of 2015 in Burkina Faso in a joint communique.\(^{60}\) It also highlights that including the population of Burkina Faso, the civil society organisations and the armed forces, the APSA played a significant role in the
resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso. The next chapter (4) provides a summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations.
Endnotes

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51 Rakotomalala. Karoui, op. cit.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

The study proceeded on the hypothesis that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) played a significant role in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis. On the basis of the hypothesis, the study set out to interrogate the role of the APSA in the resolution of the political crisis of 2015 in Burkina Faso. It sought to find the norms and rules that informed the role of the APSA in the crisis. Indeed, the study examined whether in resolving the crisis, the role of the APSA was decisive or not. The objectives of the study, therefore, were to give an overview of the APSA, and to analyse the APSA’s role in the resolution of the 2015 Burkinabe crisis, its achievements and challenges. This chapter outlines the summary of findings of the research, giving a brief of all discussions in the previous chapters. It also provides a conclusion and suggests some recommendations in order to improve the APSA.

4.1 Summary of Research Findings

- A key finding is the fact that Africa, through the creation of the APSA, sought to establish and promote an effective legal and institutional mechanism for the promotion of unity as well as for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. Notwithstanding this, the APSA faces some challenges that impede the realization of its peace and security agenda.

- The study, furthermore, found that the APSA played a critical role not only after the 2014 popular uprising but also in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina
Burkina Faso through various declarations of support and the creation of the International Group for Support and Assistance to the Transition in Burkina Faso (GISAT-BF) which was jointly chaired by the UN special representative for West Africa, the Chairperson of the ECOWAS Commission and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. Though the PSC and the ECOWAS handled the crisis in different ways, it is worth noting that the APSA, played significant roles. Without the intervention of these organisations, one could imagine the disaster that could have happened in Burkina Faso.

- Key among the findings include the fact that unconstitutional changes of government such as coup d’états are prohibited on the continent. Between 2000, when the AU policy of the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government” was introduced, and 2015, there were 15 coups. This figure indicates progress, reflecting a decrease of 37 percent compared with the incidence of coups in the 1990s. In the case of Burkina Faso, the AU as well as the ECOWAS unanimously condemned the coup d’état thus re-affirmed the position that coups are no longer tolerated in the sub-region.

- The study reveals the timely manner in which the PSC quickly moved to find a solution to the crisis from escalating knowing its consequences for the region and Africa as a whole. It can, therefore, be said that, the timely and firm manner in which the PSC intervened in Burkina really worked. This is because, if the APSA had not intervened, there would have been extreme violence between the soldiers in Burkina Faso which would have had severe effects on neighbouring countries, West Africa and Africa as a whole.
The APSA was created in 2002 to find "African Solutions to African Problems". At the heart of the findings of the research is the fact that Africans are able to find solutions to their own problems. In the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso, the study found that the crisis was solved, especially by Africans themselves through the intervention of the AU PSC, the mediation of the ECOWAS, the people, the civil societies, the political parties and the armed forces and this kept away external powers like France and the United States (USA).

4.2 Conclusion
Since the creation of the AU in 2002, the Union has intervened in a lot of crisis situations in Africa such as Libya (2011), Cote d'Ivoire (2011), Mali (2012), and Burundi (2015). Africa has made considerable efforts towards peace and security issues since the formation of the APSA in 2002. The role of the APSA in the Burkinabe crisis is the proof that the APSA is capable of solving problems on the continent. It is better for African states to solve their own problems and reduce the external actors in continental affairs that undermines the structures and functions of the AU and the regional groupings that seek to enhance the peace and security in Africa. The APSA’s role in the resolution of the 2015 political crisis in Burkina Faso, through the PSC has shown the commitment of the AU to deal with crisis situations on the continent. Nevertheless, commitment alone is not enough for the APSA to address these crisis situations in Africa. The tenets of the APSA must be translated into commitment to ensure the right structures with regard to institutions, personnel, material and financial support are put in place when the need arises without relying on external donors.
4.4 Recommendations

- The study recommends that the AU and the RECs ensure a clear coordination and communication to enhance communication and harmonization between themselves. In fact, there must be a clarification of the relationships between the AU and the RECs. The AU and the RECs must speak with one voice when it comes to deal with crisis situations.

- Another recommendation is that the AU needs to look at innovative ways of replenishing its Peace Fund to lessen the dependence on donor funding and meet effectively security priorities. Indeed, the AU must devise better ways of providing adequate and sustainable funding for its peace initiatives. For instance, the AU can call upon the multinational companies that operate on the continent to contribute in the peace and security operations.

- The AU and the RECs need to reinforce their mediation capacity because the mediation capacity is weak in Africa. For instance, the AU can reinforce the capacity of its mediation by providing better administrative assistance to the PoW. It can also develop an improved database of expert African mediators. Additionally, the AU and the RECs must establish a division of mediation that supports technically, financially and politically a person who is chosen as an envoy to mediate a crisis.

- Another recommendation worth pointing out is the fact that the PSC’s membership needs to be reformulated by the AU. In fact, it should use democracy as a requirement for PSC membership to ensure that Africa’s dictators do not control this crucial
institution. It should also reform its PSC to forbid the almost permanent members of the Council to be re-elected. Additionally, the AU must ensure that there is a rule that forbid the presence of a PSC member at the Council when issues about his country are being discussed in order not to block decisions that concern his country.

- The concept of "African solutions to African problems" is problematic because the AU does not have the necessary tools to operationalise it. That is why strategic guidance and direction should be provided by the AU for the APSA’s operationalisation. The full operationalisation of all the components of the APSA is vital for the APSA to be a full-fledged human security regime.

- To ensure peace, security and stability, the AU must a collaboration between the civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the AU PSC to help complement the efforts of the PSC in promoting and maintaining the peace and stability of Africa. Additionally, the AU PSC must enhance its accountability to African civil society organisations. This will solicit the civil society organisations’ support to improve the continent’s early warning reporting.
Endnotes

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