AN EXAMINATION OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BREXIT VOTE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

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LEGON JULY 2017
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of original research under the supervision of Dr. Juliana Appiah-Ahuno and that no part of it has been submitted elsewhere for any other purpose. Further references to the work of the other persons or bodies have been duly acknowledged.

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(SUPERVISOR)

DATE:…………………………

DATE:…………………………
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Mr. Felix K. Kwaasi and mother Mrs. Lucy Offei Kwaasi for their love, support and prayers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My profound gratitude first and foremost goes to the Almighty God for the protection, guidance and wisdom granted me during the course of this study and seeing me through its completion successfully.

To my supervisor, may God bless you for all the efforts you put into making this research successful. Mention should also be made of my parents for their financial support. Clearly, without their financial backing and care, I would not have been in the right frame of mind to study. I also want to thank Clinton Asante, Mr. David Cromwell, Ms. Linda Kumi Kwaasi and Mr. Eric Amartey for the times they spent to go over this work.

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Finally, I am grateful to Ms. Clara Owusua-Konadu Jnr for her support and advice during my study. Words are not enough to express my gratitude except to say may God be your blessing.
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Alternative for Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Association of Labour Providers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of south East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAME</td>
<td>British. Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>Brexit</td>
<td>British Exit</td>
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<td>BTP</td>
<td>British Transport Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIPD</td>
<td>Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Danish People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPO</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/ Freedom Party of Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP(s)</td>
<td>Member(s) of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Police Chiefs Council</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARI</td>
<td>Stand Against Racism and Inequality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>Scottish National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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**CHAPTER FOUR**

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ABSTRACT

On the 23rd of June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK), otherwise known as Great Britain and Northern Ireland, held a referendum on their membership of the European Union (EU) after 43 years. The “Leave” Camp won by 52% to 48%, with England and Wales voting strongly for Brexit, while Scotland and Northern Ireland backed staying in the EU. The result of the referendum was only the first step in a complex process of formal withdrawal from the EU. The budding academic literature on Brexit has paid attention to the potential implications of the Brexit vote in the long-term. This work focuses on the immediate implications of the Brexit vote on the EU. To do this, the study employed the Mixed Method approach and guided by the concept of National Interest, specifically assesses the reasons for the outcome of the Brexit vote. The study reveals that the vote to leave was influenced by the fact that British electorates abhorred EU citizen migration into the UK for reasons such as job competition and invasion of foreign cultures. Another pronounced reason this work established was that British parliamentary sovereignty was being curtailed by the EU and its institutions thus the people of the UK wanted to be able to hold their government accountable. The study also examines the implications of the Brexit vote on EU-UK relations through a political and economic lens. After the vote, there was a call for a second Scottish referendum, a surge in reported cases of hate crime, revamp of populist movements within the EU, the fall in EU citizen net migration into the UK and the fall in value of the Pound. The study concludes that the Brexit vote has had some negative impacts on EU-UK relations and European integration as a whole. Brexit has been perceived as the pace setter for some different states inside the EU for future possible departure from the EU. The study recommended that Brexit ought not be viewed as regional integration going downhill, but as a lesson, in the matter of what could be revised inside integration agreements to prevent a contagion effect.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a background to the research problem and unveils the problem statement. It again situates the study within a conceptual framework and clarifies the methodology used in conducting the study.

1.1 Background to the Research Problem

The United Kingdom’s (UK) membership of the European Union (EU) has for some time now been overshadowed by doubts about its allegiance and whether it may one day exit, otherwise known as “Brexit”. “Brexit” is a coined term derived from the amalgamation of two words; British and exit. This refers to the referendum held in the UK on 23rd June, 2016, where British electorates decided on the vote to leave the EU. In January 2013, Britain’s former Prime Minister David Cameron proclaimed that the UK would hold a referendum on EU membership before the end of 2017 if the Conservative Party was re-elected in the UK’s general election in 2015. The European Union Referendum Act 2015 was passed after the election.

The vote resulted in 51.9% in favour of withdrawing, making it the only member state where a referendum resulted in a vote in favour of leaving the EU. Former Prime Minister David Cameron, resigned on 13th July, 2016 as a result. Then Home Secretary Theresa May, became Prime Minister. The UK’s decision to opt out of the EU’s monetary union and Schengen Area, meaning that it used the Pounds Sterling instead of the Euro, and that it did not share open borders with a number of
other European states respectively, meant that a future Brexit was quite imminent. It is worth mentioning that, in 1975 the UK held a referendum in which the electorate was asked whether the UK should remain in the European Economic Community (EEC). The UK had joined the EEC on 1\textsuperscript{st} January, 1973 under the Conservative government of Edward Heath. The general election held in October 1974 was won by the Labour Party, who had made a manifesto commitment to renegotiate Britain’s terms of membership of the EEC and then hold a referendum on whether to remain in the EEC on the new terms. On 5\textsuperscript{th} June, 1975, the UK voted to remain within the EEC which later became the European Union.

Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty must be invoked and this may take perhaps up to two years for negotiations to be concluded before the departure. Article 50 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) requires that any withdrawal agreement contains both a deal for the withdrawal of the member state and a framework for a post-withdrawal relationship with it. That is, any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. Member states with the intention of withdrawing must first serve notice to the European Union Council which in turn negotiates and concludes an agreement that contains the withdrawal arrangement and also takes into consideration the framework for future ties.

UK’s permanent representative to the EU, Tim Barrow delivered the UK’s notice to the president of the EU Council, Donald Tusk, on the 29\textsuperscript{th} March, 2017. This notification prompted the start of a two-year negotiation period between the EU and UK. The negotiation period could be protracted if all member states agreed. After the notification of the EU Council was done, the other twenty-seven leaders of the EU Council adopted guidelines for negotiations with the UK. Those guidelines
may be revised throughout the negotiations. The ministers in the Council approved the opening of discussions. They appointed Michel Barnier as the EU negotiator and adopted negotiation directives. On behalf of the EU members, the commission negotiates with the UK, reporting to the leaders in the EU Council and ministers of the Council. The UK remains a member state until their withdrawal and are expected to abide by the principle of “sincere cooperation”. The UK was allowed to participate in all EU Council meetings except in Brexit discussions. After the end of negotiations, the consent of the EU Parliament is required. The arrangement is then ready to be concluded by the Council. The UK’s membership with the EU ceases when the agreement becomes operative.

1.2 Problem Statement

The UK forms an integral part of the EU both economically and politically. Economically for instance, London has for many years retained the status as the Union’s financial hub. The UK is the second largest economy in the EU and one of the largest net contributors to its Budget1. Politically, the UK, more than any other state, has put top-level political weight behind trade negotiations. The UK has traditionally encouraged other European states not to focus exclusively on China but focus on Japan, Korea and South-East Asia and promoted ties with India. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in November 2015 that, “if there is an entry point for India into the EU, that is the UK”2.

Within the above context, the vote to exit the EU has been perceived as critical to the future of the EU. Some authors and observers in the EU however suggested, on the basis of research evidence that the exit vote, would have very little adverse effect on the EU. The contestation over the likely impact of the Brexit vote forms the research problem of the study.
1.3 Research Questions

In undertaking this study an attempt would be made to answer the following questions as a guide to the study.

- What necessitated the UK’s membership of the EU?
- What are the reasons for the UK’s vote to withdraw?
- What are the implications of the Brexit vote on the EU in relation to the UK?

1.4 Objectives of Study

The general objectives guiding this research are to:

- Examine the reasons for the UK joining the EU.
- Examine the major reasons for the UK’s vote to leave the EU.
- Examine the implications of the Brexit vote on the EU in relation to the UK.

1.5 Rationale

Brexit is a fairly new phenomenon in intellectual discourse hence the rationale of this study is to bridge the gap in knowledge about the implications of the Brexit vote on the EU as a contribution to academia by conducting research. Again, findings will be valuable to students of Integration.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study investigates and limits itself to the immediate happenings prior to and after the 23rd June, 2016 Brexit referendum.
1.7 **Hypothesis**

The hypothesis that undergirds this study is that: the Brexit vote will result in the EU and its citizens facing political and economic challenges.

1.8 **Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual framework for this study is National Interest as it helps obtain the motives for the UK’s membership as well as withdrawal from the EU. The term “National Interest” has been used by scholars and statesmen since the establishment of the nation state to describe goals and aspirations of sovereign states in the international arena. Nuechterlein (1976), is of the view that national interest thrives on the assumption that the leaders of all nation-states are rational actors. That is, states adopt policies which their leaders believe will advance the well-being of the state and its people, whatever the constitutional system. To him, the question of whether the actions of states are financially savvy, shrewd or moral under the circumstances in which they were made must not be asked on the grounds that, decisions are made with some notch of reasoning however wise or absurd they may be perceived by other states, or by opposition groups within the state itself.

This subject matter has been written on by a lot of scholars. Some include Charles Beard, Hans Morgenthau, Joseph Frankel and Donald E. Nuechterlein According to James Rosenau, “The national interest is an instrument of political action and serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies.” To Joseph Frankel, “The national interest constitutes the purpose for national action whether in domestic or foreign policy”. He went on to disaggregate the national
interest into four categories, that is, Aspirational, Operational, Explanatory and Polemical Interests.

Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) perceived that a country’s foreign policy should be motivated by its national interest rather than utopian, moralistic, legalistic, and ideological reasons. He introduced six principles of realist theory but for the purpose of this work, the study dwelled on the second and third principles. Firstly, he postulated that, “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power”. To him, the concept of “Interest defined as Power” makes it possible to evaluate historical actions of leaders. Secondly, Morgenthau posits that, in a world where sovereign nations vie for power, nations’ foreign policies must place survival as the minimum goal, therefore all nations are to first protect their physical, political and cultural identity against intrusions by other states, thus national interest is branded with nation survival. As long as nations existed, Morgenthau asserted, the “national interest is indeed the last word in politics”. Interest, then, is the essence of politics.

Stephen Krasner (1978) also asserts that, for any particular issue to be considered a country's national interest, it must meet three basic ideals. These include the fact that the issue must seek to serve general societal goals. Secondly, the policy should be a long-term policy that will meet the aspirations of posterity, not only for short term benefit. Lastly, the policy must seek to put national security and economic development as its paramount objective.

In its simplest form, it can be described as “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment.” Neuchterlein (1976) groups national interests into defence interests, economic interests, world order interests and ideological interests but for the purpose of this study, the focus will be on the economic and
political interests of the UK. Some national interests are regarded as vital or core interests. These include national security, national sovereignty, citizenship welfare, human security, territorial integrity, national prosperity, and nation survival juxtapose to the ones regarded as secondary interests like peaceful co-existence, sustainable development and good neighbourliness.

A better appreciation of the Brexit vote will mean a better understanding of the interest with which the UK entered the European communities in 1973. The realists emphasise the persistence of conflict in international affairs however co-operation is possible but only when it serves the national interest. This means that the UK joined the EU because of some interests which satisfied the necessity to join and when the current institutional arrangements were not providing those interests, it wanted out of the agreement as seen now.

Despite the realist state of nature portrayed as anarchic and chaotic, basically a “dog-eat-dog world”, realists believe that to achieve security goals, states must co-operate. This makes idealist theories (Idealism) that may explain co-operation among states very crucial in countering National Interest. Traditionally, co-operation would occur when hegemonic powers provide stability and economic well-being of lesser states in the form of market expansion and military protection. Co-operation may arise due to collective welfare objectives or personal interests of the state hence, the essence of co-operation theories is the extent to which the incentives for, or benefits from co-operation can be seen to outweigh the incentives to act unilaterally.

Idealism presupposes that states are one of the many actors in the international system. Actors like inter-governmental institutions are very essential as co-operation manifests when states are
integrated-regionally or sub-regionally. According to Ernst Haas, integration is a “process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting nation-states”. Integration explains how common problems which are beyond the state are solved. These include specific functional sectors like trade, migration, health, environment, telecommunications and investment. Specific functional issues in which are of common interest cannot be addressed unilaterally by a nation-state.\textsuperscript{11} Integration seeks to explain behaviour in a decentralised setting in which states face problems for which solutions beyond the state are required. Successful regional co-operation is likely to improve competition, reduce transaction costs and allow economies of scale. Regional economic co-operation or integration also makes it possible to collectively build integrative infrastructure in transport, communications and energy which would otherwise be too costly for individual, small and fragmented countries to undertake.

1.9 Literature Review

Dr. Gregor Irwin\textsuperscript{12} is one of the few scholars who have written extensively on thematic areas of Brexit and its implications on the European Union. He is of the view that both the break with the EU and the uncertainty associated with it would be bad for businesses and damaging to the UK’s economy. In his article, he seeks to address this by systematically assessing the evidence on the impact of Brexit on both the UK and the rest of Europe. At the heart of this analysis are ten distinct channels of impact. For each he considered in turn the impact on the UK and on the rest of the EU. He also assessed the specific ways in which different member states are exposed through these
channels. He concluded that while the biggest impact of Brexit would be on the UK, there can be little doubt that there will also be a significant impact on the rest of the EU.

He then proceeded to the impact of Brexit through the ten channels; trade within Europe, foreign direct investment, liberalisation and regulation, industrial policy, immigration, financial services, trade policy, international influence, budget and uncertainty. He believes Brexit will impact member states through channels such as international influence. For others, the impact would vary depending on connectedness with the UK, alignment with UK policy objectives, or underlying vulnerability to shocks. He however fails to mention the immediate effects of the Brexit vote on both the EU and the UK. He rather concentrates on the long-term effect which is risky to anticipate even though the very best evidence is available. Unlike the pure sciences where results are based on evidence, social science admits that human behaviour changes at any point, given specific circumstances, hence impossible to predict what the long-term outcome of this phenomenon would be, given that both state and institution are run by human beings who will act along the path of changing circumstances.

Dr. Tim Oliver throws light on how likely Brexit is and explores what it could mean for European integration, Europe’s economics and European security, transatlantic relations and NATO. He brings to light the military contributions of the UK and how Brexit would remove from the EU one of its two military powers capable of operating and thinking on a global scale. According to him, Britain’s military capabilities might be much reduced, but its diplomatic, intelligence, international aid and soft power remain considerable. The paper confirms that the UK has long been one of the pillars of EU efforts at co-operation in security, defence and foreign policy, with
the UK-French defence co-operation being extensive and believes without the UK, France would be left as the only major military power in the EU.

He argues that a domino effect could be set, by which a Brexit makes other EU member states question and abandon their membership or commitment to integration and the fact that UK’s success in a renegotiated relationship will provoke envy elsewhere. Perhaps the most dramatic consequences of a Brexit would be one that put the unity of the EU under pressure. He again argues EU’s unity has come under considerable pressure during the Eurozone and migration crises. He explains how Britain, constituting 14.8% of the EU’s economic area, with 12.5% of its population will affect internal trade, external trade negotiations when it exists. His work is however limited as it fails to explain or give reasons to why Brexit, for a better understanding of the entire phenomenon. It also fails to provide immediate consequences if the vote for Brexit is realised. This, the essay seeks to establish.

Warleigh-Lack A.14, makes readers understand the controversial nature of European Union external policies to member states. By this, he elaborates on the fact that in some policy areas, it is the EU itself rather than member states which are responsible for engaging with third countries and deciding their relationship to the member states as a collective. He adds that other regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) do not have external policies of a kind, but the role of the EU is a very controversial one since it can pose a threat to member states’ sovereignty, such as the extent to which the state relates to the outside world. He aims at explaining why the EU continues to face serious difficulties despite over sixty years of success. He explains why certain important issues are particularly problematic for the Union and
shows how issues of money and sovereignty explain the continued presence of these problems. His work does not however emphatically point out the immediate effects of Brexit.

“Reforming the European Union” examines how political leaders ratified the treaty of Lisbon after multiple revisions of the first treaty was signed. The authors\textsuperscript{15} looked at how political leaders reacted to apparent failures of the process by recreating or changing the rules of the game. The book’s empirical analysis sheds light on strategic agenda setting during the European convention and the choice of ratification instrument, intergovernmental bargaining dynamics and the reaction of the German presidency to the negative referendums in France, the Netherlands and Ireland.

Additionally, the book shows that every three to four years, the EU has tried to assess and reform its institutions from the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 21st century, but with little success. This effort, the book highlights. The authors believe that describing the reform events is a worthwhile enterprise not only for scholars of the EU but for people who want to understand contemporary integration. The book however fails to implicitly state what attracted member states to be a part of the institution and this vacuum my research hopes to fill in respect to the entry of the UK.

Philippe C. Schmitter and Zoe Lefkofridi\textsuperscript{16} in their article explore neo-functionalism as a theoretical framework that helps understand the current European crisis and its imminent ramifications. Their empirical analysis produces a mixed picture: though reality seems to conform with some neo-functionalist expectations, it contradicts some other i.e. how neo-functionalism might employ to predict “spill-backs” rather than “spill-overs.” In this piece, they apply neo-
functionalist theory in an effort to understand the logic of disintegration, and its likely point of departure.

The article explores empirical evidence that could (dis)confirm the above outlined expectations. They examined trends in trade, which was the primary objective of economic integration and can serve as an indicator of interdependence. Again, they examined citizens’ outlooks to disintegration, their perception of their country’s EU membership. They studied indicators of citizens’ economic discomfort. Finally, the article reviewed evidence of respect of EU rules. Their work posits that neo-functionalism explains the process of European disintegration, however viewing the process of disintegration through the lens of National Interest will generate a more nuance understanding of disintegration as my work seeks to portray.

According to Heinen, Nicolaus, et al 17, the influence of mainstream parties is diminishing while that of populist parties are gaining mass support across Europe. In the Eurozone countries, financial and debt crisis, high rate of unemployment, low economic growth, issues concerning immigration and globalization have led to many people losing confidence in mainstream parties and the European Union due to their inability to explain or resolve these issues. The article asserts that populist parties with Eurosceptic ideologies have been successful both nationally and regionally. However, they have indirect influence at the national level and therefore have not been able to influence decisions in the European Parliament.

Heinen, Nicolaus, et al describe the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as the most widespread Eurosceptic party because of its influence in the 2016 referendum that saw the UK
voting to exit the European Union. Its main campaign message is centred on Euroscepticism. Heinen, Nicolaus, et al concluded by discussing reasons why populist parties will not necessarily make it into the government which are; the inability of these parties to form alliances, the anti-establishment nature of populist parties which automatically places them in opposition and thus rules them out of government. This work discusses the nature of populist parties in Europe after the Brexit vote. The data gathered shows that populist movements are strongly concerned with issues concerning National Interests.

1.10 Sources of Data

To answer the research questions and achieve the objectives of the study, the study used both primary and secondary methods of data collection. The secondary sources included journal articles, books, published research, news items (internet) and governments documents (reports) relevant to the study. Such secondary sources focused essentially on thematic areas such as implications of Brexit on the EU, European Populism, Regional Integration and Co-Operation in International Politics. Credible video documentaries from the British Broadcasting Co-operation (BBC) and the Migration Observatory (University of Oxford) were also used.

The source of primary data was the issuing of questionnaires (Survey). A questionnaire (Survey) as a research tool was used in order to have firsthand knowledge and assessment of why electorates voted and also find out occurrences of hate crimes on non-British nationals resident in the UK after the vote. The rationale was to generalise from a sample to a population so that inferences could be deduced. Questionnaires gave respondents adequate time to ponder on their responses without disruption by the interviewer. Very crucial to this study is the fact that they could be e-mailed to
respondents, thus international boundaries were broken. They also permitted obscurity as that increased the rate of response and the likelihood of frankly held views.

The open-ended kind of questionnaire was adopted as an approach as it was perfect to acquire in-depth information and not limit the responses of respondents. The survey was longitudinal, that is, data was collected over a period of time (June 2017-July 2017). By this, e-mails of British electorates and non-British nationals who voted were obtained from family and friends living and schooling in the UK, via WhatsApp. Some questionnaires were also printed and handed out by a representative living in the UK who sent the responses in the form of camera shots. This was done because it was very economical, convenient and provided the data needed. The respondents were mainly workers and students.

1.11 Methodology
For the sake of adequately providing an in-depth understanding of the problem under study, the mixed method was used in the conduct of this study. A study that tends to be more qualitative than quantitative or vice versa yet contains both is described as a mixed method. Creswell (2013) describes it as an approach to inquiry where there is collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, integration of the two forms of data, and using distinct designs that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks. The main assumption of this form of inquiry is that, “the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches provides a more complete understanding of a research problem than either approach alone.” The type of mixed method employed in this study is the Convergent Parallel Mixed Method. With this, the researcher merges quantitative and qualitative data in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research
problem. He typically gathers both forms of data at roughly the same time and then integrates the information in the interpretation of the overall results. Works that employed the use of mixed methods include: *Profiles of Urban, Low SES, African American Girls’ Attitudes Toward Science: A Sequential Explanatory Mixed Methods Study* and *Telling It All: A Story of Women's Social Capital Using a Mixed Methods Approach*.

This method was justified on the basis that collecting diverse types of data best provides a more complete understanding of a research problem than either quantitative or qualitative data alone. The study employed a desk research to obtain findings and then, in some sections of the study, focused on open-ended questionnaires which provided detailed views from participants to help explain, and to check validity and accuracy of the secondary data findings on those sections. This choice was informed by the aim to collect descriptive data from questionnaire respondents and literature from books, journal articles and the internet sources. The data gathered form the primary and secondary sources were reviewed and analysed for relevant information to deduce findings and draw conclusions on the reasons for the outcome of the Brexit vote as well as incidences of hate crimes on non-British citizens after the vote.  

1.12 Sampling Procedure

In administering the questionnaires, a non-probability sampling method known as purposive sampling was used. According to Lawrence Neuman (2013), the researcher judges who should take part in the survey. In this case, British electorates and foreigners resident in the UK (non-British nationals) were to take part in the survey. In purposive sampling, cases selected rarely represent the entire population. Purposive sampling is appropriate to select unique cases that are
especially informative, for instance anyone was qualified to fill the questionnaire on the reasons for the choice of Brexit vote, once the person voted in the referendum. In other words, purposive sampling targets specific groups with exposure to happenings. People were chosen from workplaces, churches and schools. The study ended up with a sample size of twenty-five and correspondingly, eight responses were received from the section on hate crimes.

1.13 Data Analysis and Presentation

Since responses from the questionnaires were open-ended, they were collated and analysed to obtain descriptive statistics such as percentages of responses, and were presented in the form of tables and graphs using Microsoft Excel.

1.14 Limitations

Most importantly, Brexit is just over a year old, therefore, publications on the impact of the Brexit vote were difficult to come by. Also, responses to the questionnaires that were sent by e-mail delayed in arriving. Not all respondents sent their responses. It may be because there was no sense of urgency. A few who delivered late apologised and explained they had very busy schedules and could hardly take time off to answer the questionnaires. Finally, with regards to the questionnaire, the sample population may not be fully representative of British electorates.

1.15 Ethical Considerations

Credit was given to publications that were used as references. Respondents were made to understand that taking part in the survey was voluntary and therefore, they could decline participation without any ramifications. Respondents who consented to take part in the survey were
adequately educated on the need for the survey as well as the purpose of the general study and the
word on anonymity was kept. The respondents upon mailing their responses received an
expression of gratitude. Finally, credit was given to advisors, respondents and support.

1.16 Arrangement of Chapters

The research was organised around four chapters; chapter one constituted the introduction, Chapter
two was an overview of the European integration process and the pronounced reasons for the
outcome of the Brexit vote. Chapter three examined the political and economic implications of the
Brexit vote on the EU in its relationship with the UK, Chapter four constituted summary of
findings, conclusion and recommendations.
Endnotes

19Ibid.
20"See appendix
CHAPTER TWO


2.0 Introduction

In answering the first two research questions, the objectives of this chapter are to identify the interests for which the UK joined the European Project in 1973 and why it opted to withdraw in 2016. After the UK joined, it has been described in its relationship with the EU over the years as an “awkward partner”. The chapter explored the reasons for that label and goes on to link them to the major reasons for the outcome of the Brexit vote. Before these are explored, the chapter firstly provides an account of the EU formation process.

2.1 Formation of The EU and The Basis for The UK’s Membership

“Our community is not a coal and steel producers’ association. It is the beginning of Europe.”

Jean Monnet, 1970.

The EU emanates from a succession of treaties between member states which have progressively expanded in areas of which the nation-states within the EU are integrated. This means there has been an agreement to allow many policy decisions to be made on the supranational scale by all governments instead of decisions made at the individual national governments. Despite the fact that member states are sovereign and independent, they have pooled some of their sovereignty in order to exploit strength and advantages of a bigger size.
The Schuman Declaration proffered the creation of an European Coal and Steel Community on 9th May, 1950, which was born out of the Treaty of Paris on 18th April, 1951. The Treaty came into force in July 1952 and had a validity period of 50 years. As a consequence, the Treaty expired in July 2002. This put in place a common market in coal and steel between the six founding countries (Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, Netherlands, West Germany, France) It was an early post-world war II effort to integrate Western Europe and secure peace between Europe’s victorious and vanquished nations and bring them together as equals, co-operating within common institutions. Led by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the original plan was for the European Coal and Steel Community to expedite co-operation among the members at the time by compelling them to share their coal and steel resources in the aftermath of world war II in the attempt of rebuilding Western Europe.

The six then became signatories to the Treaty of Rome on 25th March, 1957. This was to establish the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and an European Economic Community (EEC). The latter would include building a wider common market covering a whole range of commodities. Customs duties between the six countries were abolished on 1st July, 1968 and common policies, notably on trade and agriculture, were also put in place during the 1960s. Nevertheless, it also expressed political drives for European integration – described at the start of the treaty as creating “an ever-closer union between the peoples of Europe”. In 1967, the EEC, ECSC and EURATOM merged to form a single supranational entity under which were the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament. This followed the first enlargement in 1973 from six to nine members with the new members being Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In 1981, Greece joined, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. This
enlargement of the Community into Southern Europe made it all the more essential to implement regional aid programmes.

The European Commission, under President Jacques Delors, came out with a timetable for completing the European Single Market by 1st January, 1993. This ambitious goal was enshrined in the Single European Act, which was signed in February 1986 and came into force on 1st July, 1987. The Single European Act was signed by the EU governments, providing for the creation of a single market. The internal market is the fundamental foundation and essence of European integration. Article 14 II of the European Community’s Treaty defines the European Internal Market as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured. Since it was not possible to create a common market entirely until 1st January 1970, as it had been stated in the Treaty originally, the EC undertook this second attempt in the Single European Act of 1987.

After the unification of Germany in October 1990 and the adoption of democracy to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as they broke away from Soviet control, there was a dramatic change in European politics. The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991. It was around this period that the EEC member states were negotiating a new treaty, which was adopted by the European Council at Maastricht, in December 1991. By including intergovernmental co-operation to the existing Community scheme, the Maastricht Treaty gave birth to the European Union (EU) which became operative on 1st November 1993. An Economic and Monetary Union, was created with a single currency controlled by an European Central Bank. According to the Europa website, “The Maastricht Treaty represents a key stage in European construction”. By establishing the European
Union, creating an economic and monetary union and by extending European integration to new areas, the Community had acquired a political dimension.

Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, bringing its membership to 15. In 1999, the Euro was officially launched and eleven EU Member States adopted it as their official currency, forming the Eurozone, which was later joined by Greece in 2001. In that same year, The Treaty of Nice introduced reforms to the EU’s institutions to prepare for the enlargement of the Union with the admission of ten new member States. In 2004, Slovenia, Cyprus, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Malta, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and Lithuania joined the union and on 1st January, 2007, Bulgaria and Romania followed, bringing the EU’s membership to twenty-seven. The EU’s membership now included former Soviet-bloc countries, Baltic states that had been part of the Soviet Union, one of the republics of former Yugoslavia and Mediterranean countries. The most recent addition was Croatia on 1st July, 2013.

The EU leaders reached an agreement on the Constitutional Treaty, which brought all the previous EU Treaties together in one document. Member States had two years to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. New rules were proposed in the draft Constitution, signed in October 2004 but was rejected by two national referenda in 2005. The Constitution was therefore replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13th December, 2007 and implemented on 1st December, 2009. It amended but did not replace the prior treaties. It also introduced most of the variations that were contained in the Constitution.
2.2 The UK as an “Awkward” Member of the EU

The UK has constantly been seen as an awkward member in European integration, finding it problematic to marry domestic and European policies together thus is one of the greatest Eurosceptics. The reason could be accredited to the institutional, strategic and traditional, background of Britain. Britain’s history has dramatically influenced how the British elites viewed Britain in the international system. Having colonies in all continents and oceans, not to mention its imperial ties with the commonwealth, made it the greatest empire in world history. With this as the backdrop Britain saw many states as inferior. When Slovenia joined the EU because of her small size and Germany because of redeeming her past image, Britain on the contrary saw EU’s membership as an avenue by other members to limit her dominance in the world.

Another complication arose because Britain joined an already existing membership whose codes could not be easily altered. The UK had to conform to them nonetheless. Britain however was afforded the opportunity to contribute to the EU formation process but refused. For instance, in the 1950s, The Labour Government of Clement Attlee officially declined the offer to take part in negotiations over the creation of the ECSC. Again, in 1957, in the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which led to the creation of the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community, the Conservative Government of Anthony Eden spurned. The conservative government discussed the prospect of joining with the six founding countries but ultimately backed out as they saw the Community’s plans as overly ambitious. After member states’ subscription to the EEC treaty of 1957, the economic fortunes of member states began to experience an upward trend in comparison to that of the United Kingdom as a non-member. The observation of that positive economic trend by the UK, motivated them to consider applying for membership to the EEC. However, at that
time, the existing members had already established the community in tune with their interests and aspirations, at the disadvantage of the latecomer.

The traditional antagonism between the French and British played an important part in the UK’s late entry. Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application to the EEC in 1963 because he believed that the powerful alliance which existed between Britain and America at that time as well as membership of the commonwealth, could hamper the British’s devotion to the success of the EEC. There was another rejection by the French when Harold Wilson was Prime Minister in 1967. Finally, The British were able to join the EEC in 1973 under Prime Minister Edward Heath by the acceptance by French president George Pompidou.

2.3 Pronounced Reasons for the Outcome of the Brexit Vote

After the Brexit referendum and the changing of political leadership by the governing conservative party, Prime Minister Theresa May as the first foreign policy maker of the UK addressed the world on how Brexit should pan out and the reasons for the Brexit vote in a speech she delivered in Lancaster House, London on 17th January, 2017. The Prime Minister in her speech gave reasons that elucidated the decision to leave the European Union.¹ In the speech, she pointed out that it was not because the British culture and history was deeply internationalist, albeit significant, the British people have constantly felt that the UK’s place in the EU came at the price of weakened global bonds, and of a meeker embrace of free trade with the wider world.

Some of the reasons she gave to buttress the reason for the outcome of the Brexit vote included the different political traditions that Britain had. She explained that, dissimilar to other European
nations, Britain did not have a written constitution, however, the canon of Parliamentary Sovereignty was the foundation of her unwritten constitutional arrangement. She further posited that the nation had a recent history of devolved governance and had little history of coalition government. The Prime Minister also mentioned that the public expect to be able to hold their government accountable forthwith, thus, supranational institutions as strong as those created by the EU sat very uneasily in relation to Britain’s political history and way of life.

In her speech, she acknowledged and appreciated the efforts of the former Prime Minister, David Cameron in his negotiation to make the Union work for Britain. She established that those efforts failed because there was not enough flexibility on many important issues for a majority of British voters. She again stated that Brexit is a lesson for all other member states which faced similar problems as Britain did and other governments that have the significantly strong attachment to accountable and democratic government, and believed that such strong internationalist mind set, or a belief that diversity within Europe should be celebrated. She held that in view of the continent’s great strength in diversity, one had to be tactful in dealing with issues of dissenting interests. She suggested that issues could be handled by force or one could simply respect differences, cherish them even, or reform the EU, so that it dealt better with the wonderful diversity of its member states, which was the path chosen by Britain.

The Prime Minister asked that Britain’s decision to exit the EU was never to be seen as a rejection of their shared values nor seen as an attempt to harm the EU itself. For them, it was a vote to re-establish, British self-determination and parliamentary rule, and to end up more global and internationalist in action and in spirit. She further assured Europe of Britain’s commitment to it.
saying, “You will still be welcome in this country as we hope our citizens will be welcome in yours”. She added that, if and when Europe faced a grave threat from its adversaries, Britain’s exceptional intelligence masteries would go on to help keep the European people guarded from terrorist intimidation.

To conclude, the Prime Minister assured Europe that although Britain was leaving the EU, it was not leaving Europe. What Britain sought was “a new and equal partnership–between an independent, self-governing, Global Britain and her friends and allies in the EU, not partial membership of the EU”. Britain did not seek to take on a model already employed by other nations or hold on to bits of membership in leaving.

2.3.1 Reasserting Political Sovereignty

There was much talk of sovereignty in the 23rd June, 2016 referendum with pro-Brexit campaigners singing the hymn of “take back control”. Douglas-Scott S. (2016) reveals that three conceptions of sovereignty regarding Brexit prevail. Firstly, the Parliamentary Sovereignty which suggests that due to whims of the unwritten UK constitution, the Westminster Parliament is recognised as an organ which possesses unrestrained legislative authority. Secondly, he makes mention of Popular Sovereignty as employed in the referendum, where the people are directly involved in decision making and leaders are held accountable. And thirdly External Sovereignty, where a country is recognised as sovereign by the international community. To him, states agree that international agreements curtail sovereignty in practice, nonetheless states are willing to accept these constraints because of the benefits accrued from ceding sovereignty.
With the case of the vote to leave, Morgenthau’s assertions were right as far as the Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech is concerned. The people of Great Britain sought to restore lost power and sovereignty through the vote. The reasons for the Brexit vote are well spelled out based on the rhetoric of an outward-looking, self-controlling, global Britain. It is clear then that the UK wants to broaden its scope of international trade relations, that is Brexit will definitely mean global ties would be re-established. She makes mention of reviving their political sovereignty which will allow the British citizens the opportunity to hold accountable their government, and their government being able to make decisions in their interest.

For a nation whose first and second verses of their national anthem sings praises to their monarch\(^5\), any inhibition of their national sovereignty would not be stomached. It also means that Britain would be able to create and implement her “own laws and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain”. To this end, “British laws would be laws made in Westminster, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. And those laws would be interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg but in the British courts”\(^6\).

Though palpable benefits of UK’s membership of the EU in the area of the customs union had been felt, events occurring in the Union constantly reminded the UK of superiority of EU law over their domestic sovereign law-a development that the UK has always regretted subscribing to the Union. The first cautious statement of the principle of supremacy of EU law was evinced in the case of Van Gend en Loos (case 26/62), where the European Court of Justice (ECJ) made a landmark statement that: “the Community (now Union) constitutes a new legal order in international law, for whose benefit the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within
This statement does not only reinforce the EU’s doctrine of “direct effect” but also a greater impact on the national legal systems of the Member States.\textsuperscript{8}

Further at the domestic level, there has been a plethora of frustrations involving decisions held at the ECJ against the UK. Research by the Vote Leave Referendum Campaign Group established that the UK had been unsuccessful in 101 out of 131 legal actions taken to the ECJ over the last 40 years. The research likewise affirmed that European judges as opposed to British politicians were at the helm of British law.\textsuperscript{9} The European law supersedes all domestic laws of member states. This obviously conflicted with the supremacy of the British parliament with the legal right to pass laws as per the basic principles of the UK’s unwritten Constitution. As pointed out above, the economic decline of Britain and prosperity of other states in the 1950s and 1960s stirred their membership as per their national interest of economic redemption, therefore, the UK did not aspire for political integration, it opted for an intergovernmental structure and not a supranational one. UK’s Prime Minister between 1979 to 1990, Margaret Thatcher, openly expressed her Euroscepticism as she was ardently against the social, economic, and political integration of the UK. This was seen in 1984 when she negotiated a rebate of Britain’s contribution to the European budget and had some money back. She felt Britain was losing her sovereignty by transferring decision making power to Brussels. Some of such decisions currently stand as the inability of the UK government to conclude gainful free trade agreements with third countries because it is tied by the hand of EU trade policy, or the huge amounts it paid to Brussels as membership contribution.
In her 1988 Bruges speech, she stated that, “suppressing nationhood and directing power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be exceedingly damaging and would endanger the objectives that Britain sought to realise.”

The strength of the European continent she believed was due to the fact that “it had France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain”, with each having their exclusive, traditions, identity and customs. She opined that it would be absurd to attempt to fit them into some kind of “identikit European personality”. For Britain, the European project was purely for economic motives, that is, a union to contrive a common market instead of a political union.

2.3.2 The Migration Quandary

Migration to the UK from other EU countries was one of the top issues in the referendum wrangle on whether the UK should stay part of the EU. In a speech delivered on 17th January 2017, Theresa May reiterated that in the last decade, Britain saw record levels of net migration which put pressure on social infrastructure and reduced wages of the working population. This was as a result of the influx of European migrants into the UK. She opined that Britain needed total control of her borders as she barely had a say in migration, being a member of the “borderless EU”. EU enrolment influenced migration-related arrangements in various ways. The most prominent is work and residence rights- EU citizens’ capacity to live and work lawfully in the UK without having to meet the kind of criteria non-EU members meet.

2.3.2.1 Insight on EU Migration into the UK

It is of the essence to get the general tenor of EU migration to the UK as well as the EU citizens resident in the UK. Figure one illustrates that EU migration to the UK increased considerably over
the past 15 years. In 2015, there were just over 3 million people living in the UK who were born in other EU countries. An increase of about 1.9 million since 2003, the year prior to the enlargement of the EU.

Figure 1: Number of EU Citizens Born in the UK (1993-2015)

Regardless of that, a lot of migrants currently residing in the UK come from non-EU countries as depicted in figure two below. Traditionally, countries like Pakistan and India have been the main origin of EU migrants.
Figure 2: Population by Country of Birth and Nationality Report: August 2015

Source: ONS

Figure three illustrates that EU migration made up about half of the estimated number of people settling into the UK.

Figure 3: Immigration of EU and Non-EU citizens in the UK, 2009-2015

The most important country of origin for persons born in EU countries is Poland. About eight hundred thousand people born in Poland lived in the UK in 2015. This was followed by Ireland. About three hundred and ninety thousand people and about two hundred and eighty people born in Ireland and Germany respectively, lived in the UK in 2015. The countries that saw the largest increment in the figure of EU migrants living in the UK over the past few years were Poland and Romania. The number of recent migrants partly reflects the fact that of all the countries that joined the EU since 2004, they were by far the largest populations. Just under forty million and about twenty million people live in Poland and Romania respectively.

However, the EU enlargement was not the only reason for EU migration into the UK. There was the inflow of immigrants from other Southern European countries that were struggling after the economic crisis. Three of the top six countries that drove the growth in the EU migrant population of the UK from 2011 to 2015 were older EU member states; Italy, Spain and Portugal.

Figure 4: Top Six Highest Migration from EU Countries, 2011 to 2015
(Quarterly Weighted Averages, All Ages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>815000</td>
<td>919000</td>
<td>203000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>87000</td>
<td>228000</td>
<td>136000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>63000</td>
<td>137000</td>
<td>74000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12600</td>
<td>17600</td>
<td>50000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>96000</td>
<td>46000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>86000</td>
<td>140000</td>
<td>44000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Migration Observatory Analysis of LFS Data
It is of the essence to know what makes the UK an attractive destination. EU migrants to a great degree are very diversified, made up of workers, family relations and students. Additionally, they come from a variety of economic and social back grounds. About 21% of the migrants come to study, 11% join families and 68% are there for work. In the year ending September 2015, 71% of EU citizens reported that they migrated because of work and 58% had already secured jobs. Statistically, most of the EU migrants reported to come for work so the fact that the UK economy grew in the course of recent years and held a record high level of employment is likely to be an important factor. Figure five below represents the employment rate in the UK.

**Figure 5: UK Employment Rate**

![UK Employment Rate](image)

*Source: ONS, Statistical Bulletin, UK labour market: February 2016*

Lower wages in many new EU countries also make the UK an attractive destination. The unemployment rate in older EU member states like Italy and Spain is also high, particularly, among young people. This is illustrated in figure six and figure seven respectively.
Figure 6: Median Equivalised Net Income

Source: Eurostat Table- One unit of purchasing power standard (PPS) can buy the same amount of goods and services in each country.

Figure 7: EU Unemployment Rate as at 2014

Source: Eurostat Table NB. unadjusted data.
In the run-up to the referendum there was a lot of debate on whether welfare benefits were incentives for EU citizens’ entry into the UK. The fact is, it is very hard to know if this is the case. In theory, it is possible that people factor in the availability of welfare benefits when deciding whether to migrate but the majority of EU migrants were not receiving benefits. There however existed the unspoken belief that EU migrants like Polish citizens took undue advantage of the UK welfare system as part of the reasons for the outcome of the EU exit referendum.

The EU migrants have very high employment rate in the UK (79.8%) as against the British (75%)\(^\text{15}\) so relatively few are qualified for out-of-work benefits like job seekers’ allowance or incapacity benefits. The EU migrants are more likely than British born people to be claiming tax credits which top up their incomes because they are likely to work at low wages and have children.\(^\text{16}\) That means that whilst there may be some people whose decisions are influenced by welfare, it is unlikely that restricting access to benefits will have a dramatic impact on the number of migrants entering the UK.

It is impossible to know for sure what will happen to migration. It is clear that if the UK departs from the EU, it will mean the end of freedom of movement and EU citizens may be subjected to the same criteria as non-EU members in the current dispensation, this could significantly reduce EU migration. Most EU citizens are coming for work, and majority of recently arrived EU citizens are not in jobs that meet the skills criteria that apply to non-EU citizens.\(^\text{17}\)
2.3.3 Survey Analysis

This section presents an analysis of a survey that was conducted by issuing questionnaires via e-mails to electorates of the 23rd June Brexit vote in the UK. The questionnaire was mainly to find out the voting pattern as well as the reasons for voting. The survey also sought to support the reasons established by the secondary sources of data by answering the first research question of the study.

2.3.3.1 Characteristics of Respondents

As stated in chapter one, the study’s primary data was collected through open ended questionnaires involving 25 respondents. The gender distribution is represented below with males consisting 72% and females, 28%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire survey, 2017
The age distribution of the respondents as presented in Figure eight below reveals the following: 28% of the respondents fall within the age group of 18 – 30 years whilst 48% of them fall within the 31-50 age group with 20% within the 51 – 70 age group. 4% fall between 71-90.

**Figure 8: Age Distribution of Respondents**

![Age Distribution Bar Chart]

*Source: Questionnaire survey, 2017*

**Educational Background of the Respondents**

The educational background of the respondents as presented in Figure nine below reveals that, most of the respondents, that is 80% had university education.
Figure 9: Educational Background of the Respondents

Source: Questionnaire survey, 2017

Occupational Characteristics of the Respondents

Twelve of the respondents constituting 48% work as either Civil or Public Servants, whilst another 48% are Tertiary students. One respondent owns a private business, constituting 4%. This is represented below in figure ten.

Figure 10: Occupational Characteristics of Respondents

Source: Questionnaire survey, 2017
2.3.3.2 Responses of Respondents

The responses of the respondents were based on the vote to “remain” or “leave”. This section analyses the relationship between the respondents’ characteristics and their choice of vote (based on occupation and age). Per the survey, eleven voted “remain” while fourteen voted “leave”. This trend is somewhat reflective of the outcome of the Brexit vote- more voted “leave” than “remain”. One person however pointed out that if the chance came by again, that person would have voted “remain”. Figure eleven below represents the Brexit vote decisions.

When asked, the reason for their choice of votes, those who voted to leave were very particular about the competition on the job market -about jobs that were being taken by European immigrants especially from Eastern Europe. None however mentioned anything about the UK regaining its sovereignty as established earlier. Those who voted “remain” sided with the essence of globalisation and co-operation. Their responses surrounded talk on the benefits that the UK stood...
to gain if it remained in the EU. Some mentioned the benefits of the single market and the employment seeking elsewhere in the EU hassle-free.

**Relationship Between Occupation and Choice of Vote**

In the relationship between reason for electorate vote and electorate occupation, eight students, two civil servants and the private business owner voted “remain” while on the other hand four students and ten civil servants voted “leave” as represented in figure twelve students that voted remain seemed to base their decision on the UK not able to survive without the EU and an assent for globalization and cooperation. One student said,

“*no nation in this era of globalisation will do well without some form of integration, I think the UK has made a big mistake*”. 18

Students are more likely to accept European integration because they benefit from it first-hand. Exchange programs facilitated by free movement, the use of laptops, kindle or tablet devices facilitated by free trade, among others. This also confirms the that “elite” were in favour of the UK remaining. Also, universities in the UK are generally multi-cultural or multi-national. This allows Students to appreciate other nationals as they may be in the same class, study groups or dormitories. The four students who voted leave had a common reason for their vote. They agreed that EU nationals were taking their prospective jobs from them. One said,

“I don’t want to struggle with employment after school, the fewer the merrier”. 19

The reasons that the ten civil servants gave for their decision to leave tantamounted to the fact that foreigners were flooding work places and British citizens were unemployed. Three of them subtly
expressed their discontent with the fact that their taxes were used to cater for foreign nationals who were seeking jobs.

**Figure 12: Choice of Vote and The Respondents’ Occupation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Leave</th>
<th>Remain</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil/Public Servants</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire survey, 2017

**Relationship Between Age and Choice of Vote**

Research on the Brexit vote suggests that there was a trend in the relationship between the choice of vote and the age. Some findings stated the older generation voted to leave because they were adamant about the EU and the fact that it placed limits the nations sovereignty. Also because of the influx of EU migrants. On the other hand, the younger generation were receptive to the diversity that the EU brought to the UK. This survey confirms such findings. Six respondents between the ages of eighteen and thirty constituting 85.7% voted “remain”. On the other hand, as the age range increased, the percentage of leave votes also increased: with the age ranges of 18 to 30, 31 to 50, 51 to 70, 71 to 90, the leave vote recorded 14.3%, 58.3%, 100% and 100% respectively.
2.4 Conclusion

The EU is an unprecedented political and economic union between twenty-eight European nations\(^2\) that covers a huge part of the continent. The motive behind the creation of The EU was to rebuild Western Europe after World War II by promoting economic participation; the idea that international trade facilitates cooperation thus in tune with abstention from conflict. The outcome was the European Economic Community, brought forth in 1958, initially increasing economic cooperation between six nations: Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands and France. From that point forward, a single market and a political union has been made and keeps on developing towards its potentiality serving as a model for other regional bodies. The UK since the beginning of its membership of the EU has not been the most coadjuvant of the members because of its late coming and also its historical and constitutional milieu. It has since been seen as a very awkward member and this has resulted in the vote to leave the EU.
These two major issues; political sovereignty and immigration surfaced as the reasons underpinning Britain’s decision to leave the EU. The 23rd June 2016 referendum signified a huge popular upheaval against a future in which British people felt increasingly crowded within their own country. The vote for Brexit was deemed as the nation’s interest, that is, the Brits thought they were losing power as a country because of decisions made in Brussels. They would negotiate their own trade deals and make their own laws, basically reclaiming their sovereignty. It also meant that ceteris paribus, jobs were going to return, the economy would be more buoyant and social welfare handouts would be received by the indigenes rather than the immigrants. The next chapter narrows down to the major implications of the post Brexit vote on both the EU and the UK.
Endnotes

1For entire speech see the government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech delivered by Theresa May on 17/01/17 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech.
2Ibid.
4Ibid.
5See Methodist Hymn Book 879.
6The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech delivered by Theresa May, op. cit.
7http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61962CJ0026#I1
9http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/648899/Britain-loses-most-cases-taken-to-European-Court-EU-referendum-Vote-Leave-Gove
11The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech delivered by Theresa May.
12These criteria are ones that non-EU citizens normally face such as, having a skilled job, a partner in the UK.
14International Passenger Survey 3.08, Citizenship by Main Reason for Migration, 2014.
16Ibid.
18Questionnaire survey 2017.
19Ibid.
20Twenty-seven if UK exits.
CHAPTER THREE

IMPLICATIONS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE BREXIT VOTE ON THE EU IN RELATION TO THE UK

3.0 Introduction

On the premises of the third research question, the research problem and hypothesis, this chapter sought to interrogate how the Brexit vote will result in the EU and its citizens facing political and economic challenges. It therefore surveyed the ramifications of the Brexit vote on the EU in relation to the UK through a political, economic, social and security lens.

3.1 Re-Introduction of a Second Scottish Independence Referendum

The UK’s decision to put a stop to its membership of the EU brought the focus on the constitutional future of Scotland. Surprisingly, but not shockingly, out of the 32 electoral regions of Scotland, not a single one voted to exit the EU. There was a re-introduction for a second Scottish independence referendum as a result of the divergence in opinion amid the English and Scottish electorates in the Brexit vote.¹ Within the UK, Scotland demonstrated the biggest endorsement for the UK remaining.² According to First Minister Nicola Sturgeon,³ the decision of the UK to remove Scotland not only from the EU but also from the single market was clearly against the will of majority of the Scottish people hence the re-introduction for a second referendum. To that effect, Mrs. May opined that the Scottish referendum could take place only after the removal process had been completed.
The Scottish Government moved to hold a second referendum from the UK, First Minister Sturgeon announced, accusing the UK Government's absence of co-operation over Brexit. Nicola Sturgeon made the avowal in a speech on 13th March, 2017 at Bute House, as MPs in Westminster set to give Theresa May the nod to trigger Article 50 and start Brexit discussions. Ms. Sturgeon pointed out that the UK government had not made any attempt to reach an agreement with the government of Scotland over Brexit and even if it did, a good compromise would be "significantly inferior" to the existing conditions. In her declaration at Bute House, Ms. Sturgeon stated, "If Scotland can be overlooked on an issue as essential as the EU and the single market then it is clear that our voice can be ignored at any time and on any issue."\(^4\)

The First Minister added that referendum should be held between Autumn 2018 and Spring 2019 before it was late yet after Brexit terms were known. She said she would appeal to the government of the UK to approve the referendum and that it ought to regard the will of the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish National Party (SNP) won the Scottish Parliamentary elections in May 2016 on a manifesto that explicitly said, “another referendum was an option if Scotland was taken out of the EU against their will”.\(^5\) The initial referendum took place in September 2014 and was won by the Unionist side by 55.3% to 44.7%.

First Minister Nicola Sturgeon and her government had always shown support for UK’s membership with the EU and even set her face against the relevance of David Cameron calling for the referendum\(^6\). Scotland’s ambition to preserve free trade with the EU was flanked with its desire to also maintain free trade with the rest of the UK which in 2015 represented 63% of Scotland’s trade compared with 16% with the rest of the EU. She sought to limit the damage Brexit was capable of causing and at the same time push for Scotland’s independence and membership with
the EU. After the Brexit vote, the First Minister of Scotland was given the nod by parliament to enter into negotiations with the government of the UK, the EU and its member countries to ensure that Scotland’s place in the EU as well as her membership of the single market and all economic benefits that come with it was protected. By Majority votes, Scottish parliamentarians approved plans to request a referendum on Scotland’s independence from the UK, that was supposed to manifest before completion of the Brexit withdrawal process. The parliamentary vote instigated a constitutional scrimmage between London and Edinburgh and illustrated the comprehensive and disruptive political implication of the Brexit vote. Scotland’s vote to remain in the EU showcased a deviation between English and Scottish politics. Even in Northern Ireland and Wales, majority voted to remain in the EU, which perhaps raises the question, how “united” is the United Kingdom?

Figure 14: The divergence in views of the UK’s European future between Scotland and England.

![Map showing the results of the Brexit referendum in different parts of the UK](Figure 14)

Source: BBC
3.1.1 Gray Future for an “Independent Scotland”

Even if Scotland was able to cede away from the UK and became a member of the EU, there were a lot of questions that needed answering. The question of what currency would an independent Scotland use? Some contend Scotland would hold the UK’s opt-out from being required to join the Eurozone. Others say it was programmed necessity for new candidates. The SNP proposed staying with the Sterling until the point that Scots picked by choice, to join the Euro. As the First Minister made clear, Scotland would not use the Euro, towing down the line of Sweden, and at the same time an independent Scotland would not use the Pound. The state of the Scottish economy depends intensely on its future trade relationship. There is no precedence for an European member state parting and making two new sovereign states thus Scotland must make the best of decisions.

3.2 Revamp of the European Populist Movement

According to Smith (2016) the year 2016 may well stand out forever as the West's “mad as hell” moment, diverting international politics onto a spur that neither polls nor authorities could anticipate.9 Reynié (2016) exposes that, while populism has been on the rise since the 1960s, Europe has now gone under rare influence of another conservative frame known as ”heritage populism”, which accentuates the nativist conservation of material and social legacy, and is labelled as unbridled demagoguery, xenophobia, judgment of the elite, and disparaging rhetoric.10 To Inglehart and Norris (2016), this type of populism is said to be fueled by outrage and anxiety of those most impeded by the West's developing monetary imbalance with regards to globalisation and neoliberal severity arrangements and of those lashing back at the quick dynamic social disintegration of conventional standards, benefits and status with regards to multiculturalism and progressivism.11
The outcome of the Brexit vote inspired populist parties within Europe and even the 2016 American elections. Europe is currently experiencing a return to instinctive national sentiment after decades of integration. The surge in terrorism on the European continent, influx of refugees and migrants, economic crisis and job insecurity, cultural globalisation’s disadvantages-cultural overrun- have led to the rise of populist parties who are gaining much approval with their Eurosceptic, anti-globalisation, anti-immigration and Islamophobic sentiments.

The general assessment of mass support for populism is explained under two thesis; The Economic Inequality perspective, which highlights the consequences of electoral behavior as a result of variations in changing the workforce and the social order in industrial economies. By this view, societies are characterised by long-term joblessness, households of low-waged unskilled labour dependent on social welfare hand-outs, residents of public habitation, poorer indigenous populations in areas with concentrations of immigrants. (blamed for stripping affluence, public services and job opportunities from the indigenes.) The other theory; the Cultural Backlash, proposes that the increased support for populist movements can be described as a response against cultural change. In this case, a form of Cultural globalisation known as Cultural Overrun, that is, the complete takeover of native cultures by foreign cultures, is seen to have negative impacts on indigenous culture hence the drive to reinstitute cultural norms and values.

### 3.2.1 What is Populism?

Cas Mudde (2007), posits that the populist viewpoint “is a set of ideas that share three fundamental features: anti-establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism.” It echoes profound scepticism and
antipathy for authorities, whether multinational corporations, elected politicians and government officials.

Secondly, populist tend to lean towards authoritarian leadership that priorities the will of the people through referenda, plebiscites or opinion polls rather than conventional democratic checks and balances that see to the protection of minority rights. To add, populism promotes national interest over international collaboration, mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, closed borders over free movement of people and capital and conservatism over progressivism.\textsuperscript{16}

3.2.2 The Rise of European Populist Movements and the Potential Contagion Effect on EU Member States

The European parliamentary elections in 2014 witnessed a rise in endorsement for populist parties, for example the Danish People’s Party, Italy’s Five Star Alliance, Dutch Party for Freedom, France’s National Front, the United Kingdom Independence Party and the Austrian Freedom Party. A major victory for European populism was showcased in 2016; the outcome of the Brexit vote. Pro-Brexit campaigners described it as the largest popular upheaval against the establishment within the UK in recent history. Brexit gave a boost to populist parties in Europe and even in the USA as seen in the Donald Trump’s victory on the 8\textsuperscript{th} of November, 2016. Within Europe, there was Austria’s second round of the presidential election which was almost won in May 2016 by Hofer, the parliamentary elections in Netherlands where there is dominance of the right-wing Party for Freedom, the 2017 French presidential and parliamentary elections where Marine Le Pen and the National Front put up a good fight and the German parliamentary elections where the right-wing populist Party, Alternative for Germany, led by Frauke Petry is gaining support.
If there is one major concern that the EU, as a body, had over Brexit and the rise of populist movements in Europe, then it was the fear of a total disintegration of the entire Community. As the first sovereign country to vote on a departure from the EU, the UK is paving the way for vehement scrutiny over an establishment that is intensely defective in many regards. Business Insider called Brexit and the migrant crisis two of the greatest dangers to the disintegration of the EU. Some analysts have theorised that if the UK becomes successful, after breaking out, other member states may take a cue from that and join the “leave” bandwagon. This may be bad for the EU which is seen as a model regional body and may downplay the essence of regional integration especially in the wake of globalisation. Though they have inherited the meaty naming composition- Nexit, Auxit and Frexit, - the wished-for referendums differ in interests, what they are inspired by and the procedure it should follow.

In the Netherlands, prominent conservative legislator Geet Wilders was a stand out in a potential “Nexit” situation. Wilders, leader of the anti-migrant and anti-Islam Freedom Party, made Nexit the main issue of his campaign for Prime Minister. However, a survey held found out that a small majority of the Dutch people are against holding a Nexit referendum. His second-place defeat to Mark Rutte in the March 2017 elections was what could be described as a “sweet defeat”. This because his ability to galvanize massive support for his anti-Islam, anti-migration and especially anti-EU sentiments, still gave him a bright future.

In France, “Frexit” could have been another scenario if Marie Le Pen had won the April 2017 elections. The Guardian stated, “Brexit was also about a wider resurgence of what Le Pen called Patriotic Movements across Europe”. Le Pen stated that she would hold a referendum if she
won the French elections in the April 2017. Her defeat to Macron did not dim the lights on a future Frexit referendum as the foundation has been laid for a stronger future campaign.

For the EU, the greatest peril from Italy is from the anti-establishment Five Star Movement, which had candidates appointed as mayors of Turin and Rome and wanted a referendum on withdrawing from the Eurozone. Despite the push for the plebiscite by the comedian and the leader of the Five Star Alliance Movement, Beppe Grillo. Beppe Grillo and his party were not the only force in Italy against the EU. Matteo Salvini, leader of the anti-immigration Northern League tweeted a few days after the Brexit referendum, “Hurrah for the courage of free citizens! Heart, brain and pride defeated lies, threats and blackmail. THANK YOU, UK, now it’s our turn.”

The Far-Right Candidate, Nobert Hofer who lost the second-round re-run after a keenly contested Austrian Presidential election in December 2016 to Alexander Van Der Bellen said that, the country should follow in the UK’s footsteps if Brussels made a move to advance political “centralisation” and failed to intensify efforts on its primary purpose of trade and economic alliance. “Auxit” or “Österreich”-which in German means Austria – was how the Austrian Media labelled the potential referendum. Hofer from the anti-immigration Freedom party of Austria (FPO) was of the view that the principles of EU should be solely on the economic integration of Europe rather than political, and that any effort in that direction must not be accepted.

Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the anti-migration Sweden Democrats, said he hoped that Sweden might be able to renegotiate its relationship with the EU and hold a referendum on membership.
“I see nothing negative about leaving this Supranational; European Union” he said as he continually requested for Sweden to become “sovereign again”.20

In Germany, Beatrix Von Storch, a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and vice chairperson of the right-wing populist party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), glorified Brexit and labelled it, “Great Britain’s Independence Day”. She had beforehand requested for a similar referendum to be held in Germany professing that “Germans should be given a voice”. After the referendum outcome was pronounced, she called for the resignation EU leaders Jean-Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz. Regardless of the growth in support for the AfD, Germans were for remaining in the EU, with around 40% deeming a referendum should take place and under 35% with the choice of voting to leave.

The Brexit vote was extolled by the puissant far-right Danish People’s Party (DPP) referring to it as a “stinging slap on the whole system”.21 The party purported that it wanted a Referendum on reduced restrictive prerequisites of EU membership, not necessarily on the membership itself. Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Centre-Right Prime Minister of Denmark, opposed the call for a referendum.

Against this background, it was clear that most main-stream European politicians expressed their support for remaining in the EU, nonetheless the discourse sparked by Brexit has revealed many of the flaws in the EU as an institution. “Other EU member states following the UK’s example is the topmost concern for the EU right now”, the CNN reported.22

“There is no way of predicting all the political consequences of Brexit,” stated EU President Donald Tusk. Regardless of who leaves the EU next, the entire Brexit situation has been able to
uncover a substantial amount of the EU’s deficiencies, as well as the potential for an EU disintegration later on.

3.3 Hate Crimes and the EU Referendum Result

Hate crime on the EU citizens is viewed through the social, political and security lens. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines hate crime as a “criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity.” Hate crime was introduced into British law in 1998 in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 passed by Tony Blair’s government and at that time, it cited just religious and racial discrimination. The classification was however extended by the Criminal Justice Act to encompass transgender individuality, people of special needs and sexuality.

Hate Crime as defined by the British government is “Any crime that is motivated by hostility on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity.” An Operational Guidance about race hate crime published in 2014 provided by the college of policing states that, “Race hate crime can include any group defined by race, colour, nationality or ethnic or national origin, including countries within the UK, and Gypsy or Irish Travelers.” In the light of this definition, targeted asylum seekers and refugees are included by virtue of their origin or ethnicity. Once more, felonies with xenophobic components (like graffiti targeting particular races) are also registered by the police as hate crimes.
3.3.1 Police Reports of Hate Crime

After the EU referendum, the National Police Chiefs Council (NPPC)\textsuperscript{26} disclosed that the level of reported and recorded hate crime against European migrants had soared. Jon Burnette (2017) establishes that targets also included Muslims, black people and Jews.\textsuperscript{27}

- Within two weeks to the referendum, 31 police forces\textsuperscript{28} in the UK established that 1,546 racially or religiously aggravated offences were recorded, including on the referendum day and in the fortnight immediately after the poll, the figures soared to 2,241.\textsuperscript{29}
- The NPCC released figures which showed an increase by 58\% in the number of incidences in the week after the Brexit referendum.\textsuperscript{30}
- The UK Home Office established that 3,886 hate crimes were recorded by the police in July 2015 and July 2016 saw an increase by 29\%.\textsuperscript{31}
- Two weeks after the result, British Transport Police (BTP) received 119 claims of racist abuse or violence on British railways.\textsuperscript{32}
- 599 racist incidences were reported to Scotland Yard between 24\textsuperscript{th} June and 2\textsuperscript{nd} July, an average of 67 per day, compared to 44 per day prior to the referendum.\textsuperscript{33}
- over 3,000 hate crimes were reported to the police across the UK Between 16\textsuperscript{th} June and 30\textsuperscript{th} June 2016, a 42\% surge on the same period in 2015.\textsuperscript{34}

Figure 15\textsuperscript{35} illustrates the monthly number of racially or religiously heightened felonies logged by the police in the past four years. A rise was seen in these offences recorded in June 2016, followed by a sharper surge in July 2016. There was a decline in the recorded number of offences in August none the less still higher than before the referendum. Whereas January to May 2016 followed a
parallel level of hate crime to 2015, the number of racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by the police in July 2016 saw a 41% increment compared to July 2015.

**Figure 15: Number of racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by police, 2013 to 2016**

![Graph showing the number of racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by police from 2013 to 2016.](source: Police Recorded Crime, UK Home Office)

Figure 16 displays racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by the UK police by day of recording, from May to August 2016 for the thirty-one forces that supplied data to the UK Home Office. A clear growth following the Brexit vote is seen in this chart. There was however a fall in racially or religiously aggravated offences in August, with the number of offences at the end of August at a similar level seen prior to the referendum.
The upsurge prompted a lot of criticism from notable persons. David Cameron condemned the rise in hate crime by describing it as “despicable”. Whilst Theresa May also expressed her denunciation by saying that “hate has no place in the UK” Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Metropolitan Police Chief also expressed disapproval by describing the over 2,300 racist occurrences recorded in only thirty-eight days post referendum as a “horrible spike”. Finally, Home Secretary Amber Rudd, who launched a hate crime strategy not long after the referendum, professed that hate crimes were “utterly unacceptable” and must be “stamped out”.

3.3.2 Media Reports of Hate Crime

The UK media reported the rise in hate crimes in the run to the referendum but this increased in the days following the Brexit vote. Examples of such media headlines after the vote include the following; “Racist incidents feared to be linked to Brexit result” (The Guardian)\(^{38}\), “Brexit: Wave
of hate crime and racial abuse reported following EU referendum” (The Independent)\textsuperscript{39}, “Police on alert as reports of hate crimes increase following EU referendum” (ITV News)\textsuperscript{40}, “Police on hate crime alert over post-Brexit vote racist incidents” (Mail Online)\textsuperscript{41}.

These headlines and more evinced a considerable rise in hate crimes in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. These were however not violent crimes but acts of vandalism or verbal abuse. Some of the acts included xenophobic graffiti at the Hammersmith Polish Social and Cultural Association in West London on 26\textsuperscript{th} June, 2016. Another notable incident was the smashing of the window of a Spanish restaurant, Donde, in South London. Many acts were heard of aside these two because of the use of social media. A Facebook group known as Worrying Signs, a twitter account known as PostRefRacism and a web site, iStreetWatch brought to the public domain the increase in hate crimes. Four days after the Brexit vote, the Worrying Signs group had over 7,500 members signed on and charted numerous hate crimes.\textsuperscript{42} Majority of the incidents logged were verbal insults, mainly racist or xenophobic dialogues overheard in public.

3.3.3 Post- Referendum Incidences

Few years before the Brexit vote, hate crime was prominent. In 2014/15, British police recorded 52,528 hate crimes in England and Wales, up from 44,471 in 2013/14 and from 42,255 in 2012/13\textsuperscript{43}. As stated earlier that most of the hate crime were verbal, however a few serious ones made the headlines. For instance, Arkadiusz Jozwik, a Polish national, was murdered in Harlow, Essex on 31\textsuperscript{st} August, 2016.\textsuperscript{44} Similarly on 21\textsuperscript{st} September, 2016, a Czech was murdered in East London.\textsuperscript{45} The murder was widely reported as hate crime despite the suspect being not charged of said reason. Czech Prime Minister, Bohuslav Sobotka called on Mrs. May to protect EU citizens
in the wake of the attack. He said, “the Czech government finds it unacceptable to see Czechs attacked because of their origin and being treated as second-class citizens”.

The true vision website which was launched in 2011 and funded by the NPCC was purposely designed to educate the public on hate crime and report it anonymously for investigation to be carried out by the police. The NPCC on 27th June, 2016 reported that between 23rd June to 26th June 2016, there was a 57% increase in hate crime reported on the website, that is 85 crimes were reported compared to the 54 reports of a little over four weeks earlier. Reports released by police forces in the UK showed that between 16th and 30th June 2016, 3,192 cases of hate crime were reported to police forces across Northern Ireland, England and Wales, an increase of 915 over the same period the year before. The exact acts of hate crime were not found in the reports but most were against the reporters. Others included public order felonies. On 22nd July, 2016, the NPCC released some data which confirmed that between 1st and 14th July 2016, 3,001 cases of hate crime were reported to the police forces in Ireland, England and Wales. This was a 20% increase on the same period in 2015. The main form of offence during that period was personal violent attacks, also public order offences, and criminal damage.

Following the referendum was the emergence of several campaign groups (some on social media) that recorded incidences of hate crime. The Monitoring Group drew hundreds of people together in London in order to “respond, address and move forward” in a “hostile and racially charged Britain.” Bristol-based Stand Against Racism and Inequality (SARI) discovered that more people came to it for advice. Also, PostRefRacism, Worrying Signs and iStreetWatch, were all founded after the referendum and grounded with the perception that the Brexit vote will lead to an
upsurge in racism. For instance, iStreetWatch recorded an incident which happened in Manchester on the 28th June, 2016 when a group of young boys racially abused a fellow passenger telling him to “get back to Africa”. The problem herein lies in the fact that logged complaints cannot be verified.

3.3.4 Survey Analysis on Incidences of Hate Crime After the Brexit Vote

A section of the questionnaire was mainly to probe into incidences of hate crime on respondents.

**Characteristics of study respondents**

As stated in chapter one, the study’s primary data on this issue was collected through open-ended questionnaires involving eight respondents. The gender distribution is represented below with 3 males consisting 37.5% and 5 females, consisting 62.5%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Questionnaire survey, 2017*

The distribution of the respondents hinged on places of origin as presented in Figure 17 below, reveals the following: five of the respondents were from Africa and two were from Eastern Europe. Only one was Asian. The Eastern Europeans were from Poland and Czech Republic.
As delineated in figure 18, when asked about their experiences of hate crime, four from Africa said they had encountered hate crime prior to the Brexit vote (did not specify the date), whiles only one was a victim of hate crime after the vote. With the Eastern Europeans, the Czech and Polish were both victimised before and after the vote respectively. The Asian from India had never encountered hate crime.

From this it can be deduced from the experiences of the Africans, that race was mainly a factor of hate crime prior to the Brexit vote but after the referendum one experience was recorded. It cannot be told for sure if the reduction in hate crime would reflect in the following years to come because as at when this survey was collated the Brexit vote was about a year and a month old. In the case of the Eastern Europeans, the survey deduced a balanced occurrence (one each) of hate crime before and after the referendum. This trend of Hate crime may be replicated in the coming years as the reports highlighted in the sections above established.
3.3.5 Hate Crime at the Elitist Level: The Gina Miller Case

One case of hate crime that stood out because the perpetrator and victim involved were public figures, was that of Gina Miller’s Facebook attack after successfully disputing the Government over the procedure to leave the EU at the High Court. The Supreme Court hearing revolved around whether ministers could trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty without Parliament's endorsement. Gina Miller, 52, became a key figure in this anti-Brexit development. The clash made her a dubious figure among “Leave” supporters.\(^{56}\)

Miller got public recognition when she contracted the law firm, Mischon de Reva to challenge Article 50 and the British government's power to leave the EU without Parliamentary endorsement. She was the lead petitioner in this notable case against the Government thus rapidly turned her into an abhorred figure among some Pro-Brexiters following the historic High Court verdict on 3rd
November, 2016. It was ruled that the Government could not trigger Article 50 without parliament’s legislation.

This incident did not augur well for some Pro-Brexitters. In this case, Rhodri Colwyn Philipps, the 4th Viscount St Davids who was indicted of malignant comments over remarks he posted about Miller on Facebook. On 7th November, 2016, four days after Miller emerged victorious in the case, he posted on Facebook a rather controversial statement. It read, “£5,000 for the first person to accidentally run over this bloody troublesome first-generation immigrant.” That was not enough as he added that, “If this is what we should expect from immigrants, send them back to their stinking jungles.”

Chief Magistrate Arbuthnot condemned the comment and said they were sinister and Ms. Miller said she felt desecrated. The fact that Miller, her solicitor and even the police who protected her after the numerous threats were abused, proved that people were victims of hate crime not only because of their skin colour, nationality or economic status, but for the mere fact that they were not in support of the Brexit vote. Philips was convicted but miller was dissatisfied that the Crown Prosecution Service charged him under the Malicious Communications Act 1988 which makes provision for the punishment of persons who deliver “letters of distress”. She believed strongly that he should have been charged under the Public Order Act 1986 with “racially aggravated offences” meant to stir violence, harassment, fear or inciting “racial hatred.”

3.3.6 Hate Crimes Legitimatised

The Brexit vote was taken by some as a declaration that the nation was presently “theirs”, as well as that it was theirs “once more”. Along these lines, there was a feeling of history being adjusted
and wrongs (migration, mainly) being corrected. The vote was visualized as sign that legal and cultural “standards” could be reasserted\(^\text{57}\). In this manner, for instance, in one episode a lady strolling with her nine-year-old little girl was drawn closer by a man who racially mishandled her, ripped off her hijab and apparently advised her, “You’re in Britain, live by British laws”. In another, a threat of anti-Muslim brutality was joined by the message that there is just one law in the UK, and that the victim must keep it. What these and different episodes indicated was the way in which the referendum encouraged a thought that an arrangement of institutional standards, which had been subverted by the presence and administration of “diversity”, could now be mended.

In some cases, the racist violence that was legitimised was supported by a prejudice tied to “privilege”. The racist maltreatment of one individual erroneously thought to be a Polish national, who was told “we just endure you because of the income you bring in”, showed a type of bigotry in which individuals were as it were acknowledged in the UK on the premise that they contributed to the economy. In another, a homeless migrant was deliberately selected and battered because he was homeless. Here was the message; outsiders were welcomed only when gainful.

In the opinions of Hobolt, Toly and Worth (2016), the British society have wrongfully accommodated acts of hate crime and Brexit gave it a more legitimised stance, leaving Britain intensely sundered along the lines of age, class, education, regional differences, urbanization, especially race and nationality. Majority of these cases were incidents of verbal harassment rather that violent physical attacks. Noteworthy is the fact that hate crime in the UK soared before the EU referendum. “Brexit means Brexit” was translated for British, Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and migrant societies into “Brexit means racism”, not only on the ground but also
in policy proposals that stemmed from political actors in October 2016. Jon Burnett (2017) cites the examples of expectant women expected to turn in their proof of immigration status before delivery in hospitals, a proposed targeted visa system for EU migrants and the education department demanding to know the nationality of pupils. A nation-state, in this globalised era of the twenty-first century which severs indigenes from migrants would intrinsically relish racism.

3.4 Fall in EU Net Migration into UK

As expatiated in the earlier chapter, the vote to leave was fundamentally against “free movement of workers within the” EU to the UK. The slogan, “take control” was particularly reverberating to immigration policy and border control and of course, UK’s membership with the EU meant that it had the leading obligation to respect free movement of persons (labour), as one on the “foundational freedoms” accompanying membership of the EU. The position that the only way for UK to control immigration was to leave, was very difficult to counter by the “remain” campaigners.

Figures from The Office for National Statistics (ONS) show that there was a drop in net migration to the UK by 15% to 273,000 three months after the referendum. Immigration fell by 4% to 596,000 while emigration rose by a whopping 64% to 323,000 three months after the referendum. According to the ONS, 117,000 EU citizens withdrew from the UK in 2016, which compared to 31,000 in 2015, was not only an increase but the highest recorded estimation since 2009. EU citizens from Poland, Hungary, the Baltics and the Czech Republic who make up the EU8 were amongst the majority to leave.
Work proved to be the main driving force for the near-record levels of immigration for 180,000 EU citizens as at September 2016. 113,000 European citizens secured jobs and 51,000 came job hunting. The Independent reported that the surge in EU migrants leaving the country after the referendum possessed the potential of the British economy losing skilled labour. The number of people who moved into the UK for studying in universities also fell by 19% to 136,000.61

The heightened level of emigration could be connected to EU citizens leaving the country as a result of the highly publicised surge in hate crime after the referendum. Eastern Europeans leaving rose to 39,000. Official figures showed that net immigration from the eight eastern European countries that joined the European Union after 2004 was at a record low in 2016.62

Table 3 illustrates that, overall net migration to the UK in for the year ending December 2016 was estimated to be 248,000, the lowest level for almost three years, and a drop of 25%. The net migration estimate (the difference between immigration and emigration) for the year ending (YE) December 2016 was 248,000, compared with 332,000 of (YE) December 2015 as revealed in table 3. This difference was statistically significant and was the lowest recorded net migration estimate since YE March 2014.
Table 3: Latest changes in migration, UK, year ending December 2015 and year ending December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>YE Dec 2015 (Thousands)</th>
<th>YE Dec 2016 (Thousands)</th>
<th>Difference (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Migration</strong></td>
<td>332</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration</strong></td>
<td>631</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emigration</strong></td>
<td>299</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office for National Statistics, Long-Term International Migration

These migration numbers stress the essence of EU migrants to the labour force of the UK and are a caution of the destruction the reduction could bring. Disturbingly as it seems, the drop-in migration figures are characterized by more EU citizens leaving than arriving. Though impossible to predict if this trend continues when Brexit is in full flight, it would be in order for post-Brexit immigration policies to take into consideration the benefits of EU migrants to the UK economy.

3.4.1 Scarcity of EU Workers in the UK Post Referendum.

With uncertainty after the referendum, many EU nationals returned home or pursued jobs elsewhere. Employers in the UK struggled, to fill jobs in the hospitals and factories after the Brexit vote. According to the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) and The Adecco Group, which surveyed more than 1,000 employers and company owners reported shortages in labour in manufacturing and hospitality sectors among others. As highlighted earlier, figures from the ONS communicated that there was a dwindle in the number of EU nationals arriving compared to the past because of the Brexit vote. At the end of 2016, groups that represented supermarkets
and food manufacturers warned that EU workers who provided skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour were in short supply and without them food prices rose.

Another survey by the London Employment Monitor, reported a 29% drop in professionals’ job hunting. EU professionals were uncertain of the future of the EU’s financial hub and decided to look to other financial centres for jobs. There was a shortage of labour in the UK’s food industry as farmers and processors spared no effort to find enough workers to prepare for the festive season in 2016. The Association of Labour Providers (ALP) who supplied 70% of the seasonal labour used by the UK’s food and drink sector established that there was a decline in responses to advertisements after the Brexit Referendum as EU migrant workers who accounted for 90% of the jobs in the sector withdrew from the UK. This was attributed to the decline in the Pound’s value. The reduction in the value of the pound meant that wages were taken back home at an exchange value of 15% less than it originally was. The fear of rampant hate crimes also discouraged the EU nationals.

3.5 Brexit Vote and The Fall in Pound

After 43 years of EU membership, the UK voted to withdraw from the EU despite several predictions by experts on the likely economic slow in growth for the UK, financial volatility and potential negative impacts on the EU and possibly countries outside the single market. After the Brexit vote, there was an immediate economic effect of the Brexit Vote on both the UK and the EU.

Many business tycoons warned against the negative effect Brexit was going to have on the UK and the EU. Banks threatened to leave London, the financial hub of the EU because there will be
the deprivation of free access to clients and markets of the EU. The BBC reported that after the vote, the pound fell by 15%, lower compared to the dollar and 12% compared to the Euro. It fell further down in October after Prime Minister Theresa May disclosed at the Tory Party conference that the UK would embark on hard Brexit which meant that it would be opting out of the single market. This recorded the lowest level of the sterling in modern history.

This meant that holidays within the EU became more expensive for British citizens as the Pound was able to buy less abroad. Some airport forex bureaus offered less than one Euro for every Pound. But on the other hand, holiday destinations within the UK got cheaper and ironically attracted more EU tourists. The price of imported foods and goods from the EU market also became more expensive. This led to consumer price inflation as was showcased in the battle between Tesco and Unilever over the cost of marmite.

3.6 Conclusion
This chapter sought to address the major consequences of the outcome of the referendum. It began with the re-introduction of a second Scottish referendum by the Scottish government followed by the ascent of populist developments within the European Union, as political implications. Thirdly, it expounded on Hate Crimes on EU natives, as a security and socio-political threat that tormented sections of the UK. The ascent in the emigration of EU natives certainly played out promptly after the vote. the focal Brexit wrangle was about control or take-back of borders. This chapter addressed the outcome of the fall in EU net migration into the UK. Also, the Pound hit a thirty-year record low as financial specialists and organisations were doubtful about the eventual fate of the British economy. The chapter threw more light on the issue.
Endnotes

1 For more on the possibility of a second Scottish referendum see Shepherd and Wedderburn (2016) Brexit Analysis Bulletin Brexit and the Scottish Constitutional Position.


3 Nicola Sturgeon Scotland’s first minister, served faithfully as deputy to Alex Salmond for a decade both in the Scottish National Party(SNP) and in government, then after the failure of the of the September 2014 independence referendum and the resignation of Mr. Salmond she became Scotland’s leader.


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6 Kirsty Hughes (2016) Scotland And Brexit Shockwaves Will Spread Across Eu, Friends of Europe.

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26 covers England, wales and Northern Ireland.


28 Avon and Somerset, Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Cleveland, Devon and Cornwall, Derbyshire, Gloucestershire, Greater Manchester, Gwent, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Humberside, Lancashire, Lincolnshire, Merseyside, Metropolitan Police, Northumbria, North Wales, North Yorkshire, South Wales, South Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands, West Yorkshire and Wiltshire.

29 Katie Forster (2016) Hate crimes soared by 41% after Brexit vote, official figures reveal, The Independent retrieved 11/06/17

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32 Race hate crime on UK railways soared after Brexit vote, figures show’, Guardian, 22 August
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43Hate Crime, England and Wales 2014/15, p.4;  
48http://www.report-it.org.uk/your_police_force
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59The EU8 comprises Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, the poor Eastern European countries who joined the EU during the 2004 expansion. They are differentiated from Malta and Cyprus because of the low-income levels of the latter countries.
60http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/immigration-figures-down-policies-general-election-2017-a7754796.html retrieved 20/06/2017
62http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/25/net-migration-eastern-europe-slow-trickle/
63Note: The estimates given are the sum of the EU, non-EU and British citizenship groupings, 2016 estimates are provisional., Figures are rounded to the nearest thousand. Figures may not sum due to rounding.
CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

Indeed, in this globalised era characterised by border-breaking, regional, sub-regional and even continental integration has proven to be a very successful development strategy for both developed and developing countries. The study was conducted for the purpose of establishing the pronounced reasons for the outcome of the Brexit referendum and examining the immediate political and economic implications of the Brexit Vote on the EU as well as the UK. The conceptual framework that guided this study was National Interest which basically asserts that the primary goal of the state is to guarantee its survival and protect its citizens, therefore as rational actors, states would do what is in their interest to ensure their survival and that of their citizens at the expense of other states or supranational organisations if the need be.

The concept posits that, states would only co-operate if it is in their National Interest, that is with the ambition of making gains, but would withdraw from any agreement once it does not favour their national interest. The study made use of mixed research method which involved administering of open ended questionnaires and desk research as a means for gathering data. The chapter provides a summary of the research findings, draws conclusions and proffers recommendations.
4.1 Summary of Research Findings

On the basis of the information revealed in the course of this research, the following findings were made:

- **Rationale for EU Formation**
  The EU as started with the rationale of economic co-operation among European countries not political integration. It started with the ECSC which was to advance co-operation among six members by way of sharing coal and steel resources after world war II in an attempt to collectively rebuild and integrate Western Europe. After various stages of expansions and economic policy reforms, the economic union has metamorphosed into a political union and serves as a model body for other regional integration ventures.

- **An Obstinate UK in the EU**
  The UK has over the years till date been seen as an awkward member of the EU and this is exhibited in its Eurosceptic policies. Historically, Britain has seen itself to be a domineering force and has reluctantly accepted any force that would limit its superiority. Britain’s late entry into the Union also posed a challenge as rules already established were not parallel with its interest. The UK opted out of the Schengen area and Eurozone and now its withdrawal from the EU.

- **Major Reasons for Outcome of The Brexit Vote**
  Some major reasons have surfaced as to why the decision to leave. EU citizen migration into the UK and the political sovereignty restoration stood out as the core reasons among others for the outcome of the vote. The populace deplored the rate at which EU migrants entered the UK and called for the total control of the British border. They were also of the view that their membership
with the EU placed numerous constraints on domestic parliamentary legislations, of which most went against the interests of the United Kingdom.

**Call for Second Scottish Referendum After the Vote**

The outcome of the referendum brought about calls from the Scottish leadership for a second chance of Scottish self-determination away from the UK. All thirty-two electoral regions of Scotland voted to remain in the EU. The Scottish people were in favour of sustaining ties with the EU and the single market yet were sceptical about severing ties with the UK especially for the purposes of trade.

**Brexit Euphoria Incited a Populism Wave Across Europe**

The call for the EU referendum and the outcome itself empowered populist movements across Europe. These populist parties and their leaders rode on the backs of anti-immigration, anti-globalisation and Islamophobic rhetorics to gain the much-needed backing from citizens with the hope for future EU exits.

- **Rampant Cases of Hate Crime**

Prior to and after the referendum vote, there were media and police reports on the surge in hate crime, on EU nationals especially. There was a sense of racial and religious malevolence against EU nationals and this manifested in the form of xenophobic and racial verbal assaults. Assaults were carried out on public transport and on foreign owned businesses bringing to the realisation that the UK is gradually losing its “cosmopolitan receptiveness”.
Migration Fell After the Brexit Vote.

Migration statistics from the ONS revealed a fall in migration figures after the Brexit vote. This was typified by more EU citizens leaving than arriving into the UK mainly because of the uncertainty the Brexit vote assumed in terms of job security, and also the fear of hate crimes on EU nationals.

EU Workers Leaving Caused a Gap in UK’s Labour Market

The fall in the UK labour market and the fall in Pound posed a threat to the UK economy. The uncertainty in job security among EU migrants drove them out of the UK. The UK after the referendum did seem to be the best work destination for the EU citizens as portrayed in recent years. It was however laid out by Theresa May that, skilled labour from the EU was going to be considered in the Brexit negotiations, hence skilled EU citizens would be welcomed to the UK.

Fall in The Pound

In the wake of the Brexit vote, the Pound dropped a 30-year record low against the Dollar. Investors were uncertain about the UK’s economic future hence, either withdrew or held investments. The fall in pound affected British vacationers and importers.

4.2 Conclusion

After a decade-long debate in the UK about its EU membership, 23rd June, 2016 presented the opportunity for the people of the UK to decide their future with the EU. Jessop (2016), described Brexit as a phenomenon-taking shape, being “so polyvalent a notion and so complex a process that its present meaning is hard to define and its future trajectory hard to discern” Although the vote to
leave the EU was not binding, there was a democratic obligation by the government to give effect to the choice of the people and in that regard, Article 50 of the TEU served as the basis for the withdrawal process. The “vote leave” campaigners vehemently argued that once the UK left the EU, its national sovereignty would be restored via legislative supremacy and border control. They alluded to concerns about high levels of EU migration into the UK and asserted that EU commitments had a toll on the economy of the UK.

Whether Brexit either is seen as a sinking ship or the re-incarnation of a phoenix from its ashes, there is no doubt that the “leave” vote would necessitate a momentous shake up of the UK’s position in the international arena. One thing is unquestionable, highly precarious but very interesting times await us.

4.3 Recommendations

This sub-section proceeds to proffer recommendations regarding regional integration in the light of Brexit:

- As established in the second research finding, the UK was seen as an obstinate member within the EU as it had a historical reputation of being at odds with major EU initiatives and taking independent stances. Thus far, Brexit has been the pace setter for many other states within the EU for possible departures. Brexit should not be seen as future paltriness or a failure for regional integration but as a lesson, as to what could be corrected within co-operation agreements or frameworks to prevent a contagion effect.

- Co-operation in the form of integration needs to be relished because it facilitates national development in both Global South and Global North countries, whether infrastructural,
human or economic. Development through integration obviously comes at a known cost, that is, polling some amount of sovereignty for the common good. Once in agreement, individual governments should be able to accept that some control in sectors that are integrated would be lost, hence succumb to the “rules of engagement” of the regional body.

- To fill in the gap of examining the short-term implications of the Brexit vote by the some of the reviewed literature, this study only pronounces the immediate implications of the Brexit vote. It is however prudent to monitor developments within both the EU’s and UK’s economies within a space of ten years, for future research on the political and economic implications, and better judgement on Brexit.

- As established in the sixth research finding, the Brexit vote caused a surge in reported cases of hate crimes. The government must make quick and unequivocal moves to handle bigoted and anti-migrant feelings and occurrences in order to ensure peace during the withdrawal process and after the withdrawal. It takes more than denouncing hate crime, more efforts must be put in place to combat the menace.

Efforts towards putting into practice the first two recommendations listed above will go a long way to engender fortified integration. Importantly also, the research-related recommendation that follows, if pursued could promote the utility of academic literature of the still-developing- Brexit and integration as a whole.
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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ELECTORATES OF THE 23RD JUNE, 2016 BREXIT REFERENDUM

I am Dereck Kwaasi, a final year master’s student at the Legon Centre For International Affairs and Diplomacy, (LECIAD) University of Ghana. I am writing a dissertation on The Political and Economic Implications of The Brexit Vote on the EU and in my chapters two and three an attempt would be made to ascertain the main influences of the choice of vote among the Brexit referendum electorates (remain or exit) as well as experiences of hate crime after the Brexit vote respectively.

Research Questions

In undertaking this study an attempt would be made to answer the following questions as a guide to the study.

• What necessitated the UK’s membership of the EU?

• What are the reasons for the UK’s vote to withdraw?

• What are the implications of the Brexit vote on the EU in relation to the UK?

Since this survey would be conducted via e-mail, an open-ended approach would be used, that is responses.

I would be grateful if you took some time off your busy schedule to attend to this questionnaire. Confidentiality is assured and the information gathered would be used solely for research purposes. Thank you for your time.
RESPONDENT INFORMATION

(Please fill accordingly)

1) Age
2) Sex
3) Nationality
4) Highest level of education
5) Place of residence
6) Place of voting
7) Occupation

REASON(S) FOR BREXIT VOTE

1) What in your personal opinion attributed to the outcome of the Brexit vote?
2) Did you vote for “remain” or “leave”? (please give reason(s) for your choice of decision in order of necessity)

INCIDENCE OF HATE CRIME

(this section is for non-British electorates who have experienced hate crimes/racial abuse)

1) Have you been a victim of hate crime since the aftermath of the Brexit vote? (If yes, please state when and where it occurred and briefly narrate the incident)