AN ASSESSMENT OF GHANA’S ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE ECOWAS SUB-REGION

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LEGON
JULY 2017
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Dissertation is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of Dr. Amanda Coffie and that no part of the work has been submitted anywhere else for any other purpose.

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2018

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2018
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to God Almighty for the wisdom and strength he has granted me to start and complete this work and to all who encouraged me when the journey got tough.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I give thanks to God Almighty who has granted me life and good health to undertake this work. My appreciation also goes to my parents Mr. Samuel Kofi Addo, Mrs. Juliana Addo and my sister Justine Addo who have supported me through their prayers and encouragement. I am also grateful to my supervisor Dr. Amanda Coffie, for her guidance and advice. My final appreciation goes to my respondents Prof. Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, Mr. Vincent Azumah, Col. Lloyd Atror, and Brig. Gen. Emmanuel Wekem Kotia for their invaluable time and immense contributions.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces of the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAD</td>
<td>Accord de Non-Aggression et d’ Assistance en Matière de Défense</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWARN</td>
<td>ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECPF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITPGG</td>
<td>International Training Program on Peacebuilding and Good Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LECIAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCRCDO</td>
<td>Military Committee for the Restoration of Constitutional and Democratic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Mediation and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Peace Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMAD</td>
<td>Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Protocol on Non-Aggression</td>
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PSC - Peace and Security Council
SMC - Standing Mediation Council
UN - United Nations
UNDESA - United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDPKO - United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
US - United States
WANEP - West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

4.1 Summary of Findings

4.2 Conclusion

4.3 Recommendations

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ABSTRACT

Ghana has been a member of the Economic Community of West African states since it was established in 1975. ECOWAS was originally established to promote economic and social integration among member States expanded its scope to address issues of peace and security in the sub-region due to the prevalence of conflicts in the sub-region. Ghana has contributed to the collective peace and security agenda of ECOWAS through its participation in peacekeeping missions when conflict erupted within the sub-region. The study was conceptualized within the framework of collective security as Ghana is a member of the Community and as such is obligated to contribute to the collective security needs of ECOWAS. The study, however, assessed Ghana’s role in resolving the conflicts in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Togo and Gambia through the use of non-military conflict resolution strategies which included diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation. It further examined how Ghana’s use of these strategies have been consistent with the ECOWAS security protocols. It was realized that the use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation were effective in resolving the conflicts despite some challenges with the methods. In the case of Guinea Bissau and Togo, the non-military strategies helped to resolve the conflicts without escalating tensions. The study identified over-reliance on Heads of State who may not have the requisite expertise as lead mediators as a challenge to the success of mediation. Division among member States was also identified as a challenge to resolving conflicts that erupted in the sub-region. Inadequate post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation measures put in place by Ghana and ECOWAS has resulted in States including Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau relapsing into conflict. The study concluded that Ghana’s use of non-military conflict resolution strategies was consistent with the ECOWAS Mechanism and ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. The study further affirmed that Ghana’s participation in conflict resolution has contributed to ECOWAS’ collective peace and security agenda. As part of the findings, the study recommended that Ghana invests more in establishing peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding centers to produce more experts in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. It also recommended that ECOWAS persuades member states to incorporate peace studies into the academic curricular from basic school to develop peace conscious citizens across the sub-region.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the Study

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975.\(^1\) ECOWAS was formed primarily to promote regional integration and accelerate the economic and social development of member States. Ghana is one of the 15 member-states of ECOWAS and a founding member of the community.\(^2\) ECOWAS is situated within the West African sub-region and geographically consists of 16 States. ECOWAS originally had a membership of 16 states constituting the entire countries within the West African sub-region. The withdrawal of Mauritania in the year 2000 has reduced the membership of the community to 15.\(^3\)

Africa since most of her States gained their independence has been confronted with many conflicts. West African States have had a share of these conflicts. According to Annan, the nature of conflicts within the ECOWAS sub-region has transformed over the years from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. Although conflicts may not always be violent, many of the conflicts that have plagued West Africa have been violent in nature.\(^4\) Conflicts that occur in West Africa are mainly triggered by ethnic disputes, election disputes, religious disputes and disputes over natural resources.\(^5\)

The rampant and incessant occurrence of conflict in West Africa has made it imperative to put in place certain mechanisms to address conflicts and to prevent them from escalating into extreme violence. Despite the early warning and preventive mechanisms employed by ECOWAS to halt the incessant occurrence of conflicts, violent conflicts have still occurred in some ECOWAS
Effective conflict resolution strategies have become imperative to halt the spread of conflicts and to prevent them from degenerating into extreme violence.

Regional peace and security are pivotal instruments for development. States have a better opportunity to develop economically and socially under peaceful and secure environment. ECOWAS as an institution has refocused and channeled more resources and energy to addressing the numerous conflicts that plague the sub-region. This is a prudent step necessary for the bloc to execute its objective of promoting accelerated economic and social development for her members.

Ghana’s continuous commitment to ECOWAS emanates from the country’s 1992 constitution with special emphasis placed on article (40)(iv). In promoting its national interest, it is important to collaborate with other States in the sub-region to ensure there are peace and security to pursue her development objectives. Ghana has thus actively participated and continues to participate in peacebuilding, peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts by ECOWAS.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The concept of conflict resolution is broad and is subject to varied definitions and interpretations. Conflict resolution, on one hand, can be regarded as any process that involves the use of violence or warfare to end a conflict. Alternatively, non-violent methods such as mediation, conciliation, diplomacy, and negotiations can be employed to resolve conflicts.

Ghana’s military contributions towards peacekeeping missions around the world, including Africa as well as in the ECOWAS sub-region is well established in the literature and from accolades and
awards received from peacekeeping beneficiaries as well as the UN. However, Peacekeeping is just an aspect of conflict resolution approaches that Ghana is involved in. Non-military strategies have been adopted to resolve violent and non-violent conflicts.

The decision by states to adopt a particular approach hinges first on national security, before other considerations. The constant assertion by some member states notably Nigeria as the forerunner and bearing most of the cost of promoting peace and security in the sub-region has created the need to research to highlight the contributions of other member States including Ghana towards resolving conflicts and promoting sub-regional peace and security. The literature on Ghana’s role in promoting conflict resolution in the ECOWAS sub-region is limited and is predominantly focused on peacekeeping (military operations) efforts by Ghana. Such limiting focus does not adequately espouse the other conflict resolution methods and strategies Ghana has employed individually and through ECOWAS to help resolve some conflicts in the sub-region.

The current research, therefore, assesses the various methods and strategies Ghana employs in resolving conflicts within the sub-region with focus on non-military strategies. The focus of the research is not to promote or highlight one State over collective sub-regional cooperation. It is to identify the various ways Ghana has contributed to enhancing sub-regional peace and security through the various conflict resolution mechanisms and how it can improve upon the conflict resolution strategies it has adopted to strengthen peace and security within the sub-region. The study highlights Ghana’s contributions as well as challenges encountered as a contributor to ECOWAS’ peace and security agenda.
1.2 Research Questions

The study is guided by the following research questions:

- What is ECOWAS’ approach to conflict resolution in the sub-region?
- What are the non-military strategies adopted by Ghana in resolving conflicts in the sub-region?
- To what extent have the non-military conflict resolution methods contributed to the ECOWAS collective peace and security agenda?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The study aims at achieving the following research objectives:

- To assess ECOWAS’ approach to resolving conflicts in the sub-region.
- To examine the various non-military strategies adopted by Ghana in resolving conflicts in the sub-region.
- To assess the extent to which Ghana’s non-military conflict resolution methods have contributed to the ECOWAS collective peace and security agenda.

1.4 Scope of the Study

The study examines the use of non-military conflict resolution strategies adopted by Ghana to the conflicts that have erupted in the sub-region. The study limits its scope to the conflicts that erupted in Liberia (1989-2003), Cote D’Ivoire (2002-2004), Guinea Bissau (2003-2005), Togo (2005) and Gambia (2016). The study also examines other contributions Ghana has made towards the promotion of sub-regional peace and security. The study selected the Liberian conflict because it was the first major conflict to have erupted in the sub-region after ECOWAS had adopted its first
two security protocols. It, therefore, provides a basis to assess ECOWAS’ first response to a conflict in the sub-region. The 2002 Ivorian conflict was selected because it presents some dynamics to conflict resolution. The conflict erupted as a result of a failed coup d’état which presents a challenge of how ECOWAS can reconcile an incumbent government with insurgents who attempted to topple a government without success. Secondly, Cote d’Ivoire’s State machinery was still functional and had a strong military. This presents an opportunity to examine how conflict resolution strategies will be applied to a conflict in a country where the government still has control over the State. The Guinea Bissau conflict was selected based on its non-violent nature and how ECOWAS responded by predominantly using non-military strategies to resolve the conflict. The conflict in Togo was based on a constitutional breach due to a power vacuum created by the demise of President Gnassingbe Eyadema in 2005. The Togo crisis presented a challenge to ECOWAS as to how to respond to this new challenge and how member States will respond to such a challenge should it reoccur in future in the sub-region. Finally, the 2016 election crisis in Gambian was selected due to its current nature and to examine ECOWAS’ response to election-related disputes more so relating to defiant ‘power drunk’ leaders.

These five conflicts were selected for the study because each conflict possessed its unique challenges and created the opportunity to ascertain how the various conflict resolution mechanisms and strategies were applied in resolving them.

1.5 Rationale of the Study

The study examines the non-military conflict resolution strategies available to ECOWAS and how these strategies adopted by ECOWAS and Ghana have helped in resolving conflicts in the sub-
region. The rationale of the research is to highlight Ghana’s contributions to conflict resolution in the sub-region through the use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation. The study highlights the challenges and benefits associated with the use of non-military strategies to conflict resolution in the sub-region and how they can be developed to address better the conflicts that occur in the sub-region.

The study will provide useful information for the government of Ghana and ECOWAS in reviewing existing conflict resolution policies towards the formulation of new ones. The study will also add up to the existing literature on conflict resolution and provide bases for future research in the area.

1.6 Hypothesis

Ghana’s participation in conflict resolution within the ECOWAS sub-region has contributed to sub-regional peace and security.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

The study is situated within the conceptual framework of collective security. Immanuel Kant, Woodrow Wilson, Clifford A. Kupchan and Charles A. Kupchan are some prominent proponents of the concept of collective security. The modern idea of collective security was born with the advent of the League of Nations after the end of the First World War and subsequently with the establishment of the United Nations. Philosophers of the eighteenth century such as Abbé Saint Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jeremy Bentham made several attempts to devise a scheme for perpetual peace in the world. Immanuel Kant presented this idea in his book “Perpetual Peace”
in which he intimated that “the law of nations will be based on one federation of free states”.  

Kant argues that peace is possible even in the absence of a central authority in the international system. He further posits that a large federation of committed states can promote and maintain world peace without a universal leviathan.

The balance of power was regarded as a system to preserve peace among States in Europe. The European States formed alliances to balance power in Europe. This system was flawed with the eruption of World War I in 1914. The devastating nature of the war left philosophers and major political actors thinking of a new system of promoting and maintaining peace in Europe.

Kupchan et al. define collective security as, “an agreement between states to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and when necessary, band together to stop aggression.”

Goodby also defined collective security as “a policy that commits governments to develop and enforce broadly accepted international rules and to seek to do through collective actions legitimised by international organizations.”

The above definitions, highlight the evolution of the concept of collective security. Traditionally, collective security advances that, States rally together during inter-state conflicts to halt the advancement of an aggressor. This is to protect the sanctity of the international system and guard against illegitimate aggression that seeks to destabilize the region. The classical concept of collective security prohibits States from interfering in the internal affairs of other States even during crises. This is viewed as a violation of State sovereignty.

The gradual shift of international law from State centrism to include issues of human rights, responsibility to protect and the role of regional organizations in ensuring peace and security have changed how the concept of collective security is applied in recent times.
ECOWAS established purposely to address issues of economic integration and development in West Africa has over the past two decades focused much attention on addressing issues of peace and security in the West African Sub-region. This is arguably due to how susceptible the sub-region has become to conflicts. Conflicts within the ECOWAS sub-region are currently more intra-state but the inability of individual States to effectively address these conflicts has placed the “burden” on the community to intervene. ECOWAS’ concept of collective security under the PNA and PMAD were situated within the classical concept of collective security. Article 2 of the PMAD states that “any armed threat or aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire community.” This limited ECOWAS’ conceptualization of collective security to inter-state conflicts.

The continuous threat of intra-state conflicts to the peace and security of the sub-region informed ECOWAS’ decision to adopt the ECOWAS Mechanism in 1999. The Mechanism expanded the scope of collective security to encapsulate intra-state conflicts and call for collective efforts to resolve them when they erupt. ECOWAS’ decision to prosecute the collective security agenda in Cote d’Ivoire during the 2002 crisis received relatively high approval from both ECOWAS members and the international community as compared to the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. ECOWAS since then has gained support in the application of preventive diplomacy and the use of force during intra-state conflicts within the sub-region. Human right violations, humanitarian crisis and the spillover effects of violent intra-state conflicts in the sub-region has partly contributed to the increasing support for the new approach to collective security. Ghana is committed to the ECOWAS’ collective peace and security agenda because of its national
interest and the advancement of peace and security in the sub-region. Furthermore, a volatile region deters investors and both ECOWAS as an organization, and individual States will suffer the economic brunt of underinvestment. Collaborating with other States to advance peace and security through effective conflict resolution mechanisms guarantees the protection and safety of the territorial integrity of all States within the sub-region.

Proponents of realism are the strongest critics of collective security. The realist posits that national interest will always override collective effort to achieve international order more so in an anarchical and state-centric system. States may choose when to participate in a collective action based on their perceived individual interest as against the collective interest of the community. In Julien Freud’s assessment, the implementation of the concept of collective security is dependent on powerful states. Collective security in principle is based on equality of States within the system to arrive at a collective decision. The Powerful States ‘hijack’ the implementation of the concept and determine the mode of operation. This defeats the ideals on which the concept was established. The condemnation of wars of aggression is perceived as a moral standard rather than one that is realistic. Critics justify this with the assertion that, there is no specific or universally accepted definition of “aggression”. It would, therefore, be unfair and unrealistic to condemn states that take the initiative of aggression. Realist paradigm often supports the classic international law principle in which all wars were equally legitimate. German jurist Carl Schmitt is a key proponent of this argument.

Despite the criticisms against collective security, the key question is not whether collective security is flawless but whether it serves as a deterrent against both internal and external aggression.
in the international community. ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization has utilized the concept to avert inter-state conflicts and continues to use collective security to address intra-state conflicts in the sub-region.40

The concept of collective security in principle enjoins States within a region to use collaborative effort to safeguard peace and security within the region. In the quest to achieve this, however, individual States within the region demonstrate varying levels of commitment towards the achievement of the collective security objectives. Some States take lead roles in ensuring sub-regional peace and security; others play peripheral roles while some States exhibit total noncommitment. Ghana’s preparedness to participate in resolving the various conflicts that have erupted within the sub-region is a clear indication of the country’s commitment to the ECOWAS collective security agenda.

Ghana’s decision not to limit its contribution to conflict resolution in the sub-region to the deployment of its military force towards peacekeeping but also employ diplomatic channels including mediation, negotiation, and diplomacy in tandem with the ECOWAS protocols explicitly demonstrates Ghana’s commitment to ECOWAS’ collective security agenda. Ghana’s adoption of purely non-military strategies in resolving the conflict in Togo (2005) and the conflicts in Guinea Bissau (2003-2005) contributed to the peaceful resolution of the conflicts which could have ended up in bloody civil wars that would endanger the peace and security of the sub-region. Ghana’s commitment to the principle of collective security has thus been beneficial. Furthermore, Ghana’s participation in peacekeeping missions as well as her use of non-military conflict resolution strategies within the sub-region has not only promoted sub-regional peace and security but also
facilitated its national peace and security. The study thus adopts the concept of collective security in examining Ghana’s role in conflict resolution in the ECOWAS region.

1.8 Literature Review

The study reviewed journal articles and other scholarly literature on conflict resolution strategies. The literature on ECOWAS’ conflict resolution strategies and the role of individual states were also reviewed. The aim was to identify some gaps in the literature to be addressed by the research. Literature that addresses part of the research questions were relied upon as secondary sources of data to support the research work.

Nancy Annan in her research article titled “Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges, and Prospects” sheds light on the nature and sources of conflicts in West Africa. According to Annan, conflicts that have erupted from the 20th century in West Africa have shifted from inter-state to intra-state. Though she agrees that conflicts may not always be violent, she writes that conflicts in West Africa are violent in nature. She identifies poverty, human right violations, bad governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization and the proliferation of small arms as some immediate causes of violent conflicts in West Africa.

The role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution was appreciated by Annan as she attests that some successes have been chalked by the sub-regional bloc. Her issue of concern, however, is the recurrent nature of conflicts in the sub-region more so conflict that appears to have been successfully resolved. Buttressing her concerns, Annan cites Liberia which plunged back into civil war in 1999 three years after ECOWAS through ECOMOG had successfully brokered a ceasefire
agreement in 1996. She also noted Cote D’Ivoire also relapsed into another civil war in 2010 and 2011 due to election disputes.

The several efforts by ECOWAS to resolve conflicts and advance peace and security in the sub-region have not gone unnoticed. To support this, she cites ECOWAS’ efforts in getting conflicting parties to sign numerous peace agreements including the Linas Marcousis, Accra II and Accra III and the Pretoria Agreement. She, however, highlighted resource constraints and institutional challenges as some challenges confronting the sub-regional body.

In conclusion, she identifies failure to recognize the fundamental causes of conflicts in West Africa as a principal cause of the prevalence of conflicts in the sub-region. She strongly attests that a poor understanding of the fundamental causes of conflicts in West Africa will render conflict resolution efforts futile hence the sub-region will continue to experience sporadic conflicts. She advances the following as solutions to end violent conflicts in West Africa; identifying the causal indicators of conflicts, develop strategies to prevent, manage and completely resolve conflicts, document and disseminate information based on lessons learned from best practices across the sub-region and harnessing indigenous conflict mechanisms.42

The literature is useful to the study as it advances useful information on the nature of the conflicts in West Africa and provides varied conflict resolution mechanisms. The literature is however silent on the role of individual States in promoting conflict resolution in the sub-region. This creates a lacuna for the study address.
Osadolor reviews how ECOWAS has evolved from originally being an economic Community to one that addresses the peace and security needs of the sub-region. His study reviewed the security protocols adopted by ECOWAS since 1978 to 2008. Osadolor posits that the ECOWAS Protocols on Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance on Defense were extensively centered on addressing external threats and aggression and failed to make provisions to address conflicts that erupted internally in member States. He appreciates ECOWAS’ decision to expand its peace and security scope to include intra-state conflicts through the adoption of the ECOWAS Mechanism in 1999. Osadolor equates the ECOWAS Mechanism to a preventive diplomacy document due to emphasizes the Protocol places on conflict prevention.

His literature identifies the principle of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of States espoused by the AU Charter as a major contending issue for the enforcement of ECOWAS peace and security agenda. He attests that ECOWAS capacity to manage change without resort to violence had not been properly developed under the period of his study. He further suggests that the acute division between the Francophone and Anglophone blocs within the Community was an impediment to the prosecution of ECOWAS collective peace and security agenda. In conclusion Osadolor recommended the redefinition of security politics by ECOWAS to reflect the experiences it has acquired from resolving previous conflicts. He also called more cooperation and collaboration between the Francophone and Anglophone blocs within the Community.

The literature is relevant to my study because it examines the various ECOWAS security Protocols and how they were applied during periods of conflicts in the sub-region. The literature did not examine the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and ECOWAS Conflict Prevention
Framework though his literature set-out to review ECOWAS security mechanisms from 1978 to 2008. This leaves a gap in the assessment of ECOWAS security protocols within the stated time frame which this study will address.

Adekeye in his book titled “Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau”, takes a look at ECOWAS’ response to the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. The book traces historic accounts of conflicts that have plagued the sub-region and cited dictatorship rule leading to the creation of one party States, bad governance, and ethnicity as some causes of conflicts in West Africa. The book highlights the efforts by ECOWAS to intervene in these conflicts through the initiatives of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Adekeye bemoans the Francophone-Anglophone wrangling and disunity among the leaders of ECOWAS as major impediments to the peace efforts by ECOMOG particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone. To support this point, he opines that, the wrong interpretation given to Nigeria’s participation in the peacekeeping missions in the afore-mentioned countries did not give the operations the required support to effectively achieve its tasks. Adekeye ascribes the failure of the numerous ECOWAS peace accords to mistrust of ECOWAS leadership by warring factions. The book in its concluding chapters expresses the lessons drawn by ECOWAS from its interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. Adekeye appreciates ECOWAS efforts to establish its own security mechanism to address the security needs of the sub-region as an important step in promoting the development of its member states.

The book however downplayed the contributions of other States like Ghana and Sierra Leone in the peace efforts while overly emphasizing the role of Nigeria in the peacekeeping. This reinforces
the position of some member states of Nigeria’s hegemonic ambitions. The book remains very useful to this study as it gives concise and in-depth insight into ECOWAS’ approach to conflict resolution in the three West African states.

Aning and Atuobi, in their literature titled “The Neglected Economic Dimensions of ECOWAS’ Negotiated Peace Accords in West Africa” examine why many of the peace accords in West Africa have failed. They posit that conflicts in West Africa have economic underpinnings citing Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire as examples. According to Aning and Atuobi, mismanagement of economic resources and looting of natural resources by both governments and belligerent groups erupted and prolonged the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire. After assessing the various peace accords and peace agreements signed during the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire, they conclude that most of the peace accords centered on political and military considerations. They identified the inadequate attention given to economic issues during peace agreements as a significant reason for the failure of peace accords in West Africa. They buttressed this point, by stating that several peace accords signed during the Liberia war from 1989 to 1996 did not prove to be effective in resolving the conflicts permanently. This they believed was partly due to the fact that, the peace agreements failed to take into account governance and the management of economic and natural resources.

After extensively analyzing peace agreements reached during the Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote D’Ivoire conflicts, Aning and Atuobi arrived concluded that many of the peace agreements drafted did not take into consideration economic issues including the illegal exploitation of natural resources to finance conflicts. The ultimate result was that the implementation of peace accords
and the achievement of sustainable peace were challenged. The paper, however, concluded that some peace agreements concluded without the inclusion of economic provisions have been sustainable over the long term.

This literature is useful to the study because it identifies an important reason why the use of peace accords fail in resolve conflicts in West Africa. Ifedeyo examines Nigeria’s lead role in interventions in some West African states. Her research focused on the role Nigeria played in the internal affairs of Liberia and Sierra Leone during their period of crisis through ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). She assessed how Nigeria used its influence as a sub-regional hegemon to steer ECOMOG in resolving the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

According to Ifedeyo, Nigeria’s involvement was beneficial to the success of ECOMOG in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. She, however, cautioned that Nigeria ought to be circumspect about its involvement in the internal affairs of other States. She recommended that Nigeria should consider her internal security challenges while trying to promote sub-regional peace and security. She concludes that Nigeria’s foreign policy should balance its commitment to ensuring external peace and security with the internal security needs and general well-being of its citizens.

The literature emphasized the use of military operations in the form of peacekeeping in resolving the conflicts without much recourse to the use of other non-military strategies. This creates a lacuna for the current research to address. The literature reviewed, also highlights the influence of an individual State within a collective organization of States in resolving conflicts. This is also useful
to my study in examining the significant roles individual states can play under a collective group or organization such as ECOWAS to resolve conflicts that occur in the sub-region.

Dauda et al., recognize the significant role an individual state like Nigeria plays in maintaining regional peace and security in Africa.\footnote{According to them, Nigeria’s enormous contributions to peace-making and peacekeeping operations on the continent (Africa) is enough evidence to support their assertion of Nigeria being a key player in issues of peace and security in Africa. They further mentioned that Nigeria in her quest to resolve conflicts that erupt on the continent and in the sub-region makes great sacrifices. Notably among these sacrifices are the human resource (peace-making and peacekeeping personnel) they commit to these conflict resolution processes. Also, Nigeria also contributes material resources (military hardware) and financial resources to support peace-making and peacekeeping missions.}

The literature, however, raises some concerns about how Nigeria’s contributions are not readily appreciated by some beneficiary States and even other states in the region. It further added that Nigeria’s contributions regarding human resource, material, and financial resources have some impact on the Nigerian economy.\footnote{The Nigerian economy is faced with unemployment, health challenges including malnutrition, poverty, and insecurity. These challenges are sufficient to erupt intra-state conflict in Nigeria.} In conclusion, they recommend that Nigeria should pay attention to their domestic, governance, economic and security needs while they continue to participate in regional and sub-regional peace and security initiatives.\footnote{In conclusion, they recommend that Nigeria should pay attention to their domestic, governance, economic and security needs while they continue to participate in regional and sub-regional peace and security initiatives.}
Though the focus of the literature is to highlight Nigeria’s contribution to Peacekeeping in Africa and West Africa, its failure to recognize the efforts by other states creates bias as individual states cannot single-handedly undertake successful peacekeeping operations. The literature, therefore, affords the current research the opportunity to highlight the contributions of other States specifically Ghana towards promoting peace and security in the sub-region.

Hartmann assesses ECOWAS response to the temporal crisis in the Gambia. In his assessment, he appreciates ECOWAS’ judicious use of threat of force without recourse to the direct physical use of violence in the restoration of democracy in the Gambia. He highlights the initial use of diplomacy by ECOWAS to get Yahya Jammeh then President of Gambia to peacefully hand-over power to president-elect Adama Barrow after losing the general election in 2016. After ECOWAS’ failed attempts to use diplomacy in resolving the issue, the sub-regional body resort to use military force to restore constitutional rule in the Gambia. Yahya Jammeh’s decision to relinquish power to President Adama Barrow through a final negotiation with some sub-regional leaders was informed by the imminent threat posed by ECOWAS troops who had already entered the Gambia. He advances that, the ECOWAS delegations sent to dialogue with Mr. Jammeh were leaders who had ascended power from opposition through democratic means hence did not solidarize with him. The impulse of his assertion is that if “power drunk” leaders were sent to dialogue with Mr. Jammeh, perhaps the outcome could have been different. He concludes by lauding ECOWAS’ initiative, describing it as a good example of an African response to an African problem.

The Literature is useful to the study because it highlights the different approaches employed by ECOWAS to resolve the conflict. It also highlights an important dynamic in conflict resolution
which is, the threat of use of force without the actual use of force. This is an area of conflict resolution that can be reviewed and utilized to resolve similar conflicts that may erupt elsewhere in the future.

1.9 Sources of Data and Data Collection Instrument

Data for the study were gathered from secondary and primary sources. Secondary data were obtained from books, journals, dissertations, official reports, seminar papers and the internet. Primary data was collected using a semi-structured interview guide. The respondents include Professor Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rule of Law and also Director at Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), Mr. Vincent Azumah at the Research Monitoring and Evaluation department of West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Colonel Lloyd Atror Director at Conflict Information and Research, Head Quarters (International Peace Support Operations) Ghana Armed Forces and Brigadier General Emmanuel Wekem Kotia, Deputy Commandant at Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC). A semi-structured interview guide was used to allow the respondents give more detail information on the subject and to ask follow-up questions based on the responses given during the interview. The choice of the resource persons was based on their personal experience and in-depth knowledge on conflict-related issues in the West African sub-region.

1.10 Methodology

The study was conducted using the qualitative research approach, and the design was descriptive. This research method was used because it enables the researcher to gain a deeper understanding
of the specific events or phenomenon under study. It also makes the researcher an integral part of data collection (Neuman, 2007). Purposive sampling technique was used. Purposive sampling was used because the phenomenon under study required in-depth investigations. According to Silverman (2006) is deemed appropriate because it helps the researcher to solicit responses from respondents that the researcher is specifically interested in.

The period for the preparation and presentation of the dissertation was quite short to elicit information from other authorities in the field of study. As a result, personal experiences with regards to Ghana’s role during the mediation and negotiation processes in the conflicts were not adequately highlighted. This, however, does not affect the validity and reliability of the study because the experts contacted were involved in part of the conflict resolution in Liberia and others had useful documents they shared which were included in the study. Subsequent studies on Ghana’s role in conflict resolution in the sub-region should consider interviewing other authorities who played direct roles in the conflict resolution process in the countries involved.

1.11 Organization of the Study

The study is arranged into four chapters. Chapter one is the Introduction, which entails Background to the Study, Statement of the Problem, Research Questions, Objectives of the Study, Scope of the Study, Rationale of the Study, the Hypothesis, Operational Definitions, Conceptual Framework, Literature Review, Sources of Data and Data Collection Instruments, the Methodology and finally the Organization of the Study.
Chapter two reviews ECOWAS’ approach to conflict resolution in the sub-region. It examines the peace and security Protocols adopted by ECOWAS and how the Protocols were implemented during the conflicts in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Gambia. Chapter three begins with a general introduction of Ghana’s participation in peacekeeping operations across the globe. The first part of the chapter examines a catalog of non-military conflict resolution strategies. This is followed an assessment of Ghana’s application of the non-military strategies during the conflicts in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Togo and Gambia and also highlights other contributions Ghana has made towards ECOWAS’ collective peace and security agenda. This is followed by the role of the military in the application of non-military strategies in resolving conflicts, achievements and challenges Ghana has encountered during the resolution of the conflicts and ended with a conclusion. Chapter four constitutes the Summary of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations.
ENDNOTES

5 Ibid., p. 5
6 Ibid p16
7 Osadolor, O., op. cit., p. 88
10 Ibid p3.
17 Ibid., pp. 24-9
22 Ibid., p. 14
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid
26 Annan, N., op. cit., p2
27 (ECOWAS PROTOCOL ON NON-AGGRESSION) article 2
28 (ECOWAS PROTOCOL ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ON DEFENSE) article 2
30 Ibid
31 Osadolor 2011, op. cit.,p95
32 Ibid
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Negretto, G. L., op. cit.
40 Appiah 2014, op. cit.
41 Annan, 2014, op. cit.
42 Ibid.
43 Osadolor 2011, op. cit.
48 Ibid., p. 46
49 Annan 2014, op. cit.
50 Dauda, Muritala, Mohammad, op. cit.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF ECOWAS APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the mechanisms and protocols adopted by ECOWAS to resolve conflicts that have occurred in the sub-region. The first part of the chapter gives a brief overview of the nature of conflicts in ECOWAS and the protocols ECOWAS has adopted to resolve conflicts in the sub-region. The second part reviews the implementation of these mechanisms and protocols to some conflicts that have occurred in the sub-region.

2.1 Nature of Conflicts in the ECOWAS Sub-region

West Africa has experienced a revolution in conflicts over the past two decades. The sub-region since the latter part of the 1980s has been predominantly plagued by intra-state conflicts. The shift from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict can be attributed to the numerous inefficient State mechanisms that have been unable to prevent or manage these conflicts when they erupt.¹ Rahim defines conflict as “an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance within or between social entities.”² According to ECOWAS, conflict is defined as: “contradictions inherent in power relations and which manifest themselves in individual and group interactions with one another and with nature in the pursuit of limited resources or opportunities. Conflict is the motor of transformation and is either positive or negative. It can be creatively transformed to ensure equity, progress, and harmony; or destructively transformed to engender acute insecurity.”³
Though conflicts may not always be violent, conflicts that have erupted in West Africa have often been violent in nature. Annan affirms this in her description of conflicts in West Africa, as a violent expression of differences and frustration towards unmet needs.\(^4\) The extent of violence perpetrated during these conflicts differs from State to State in the Sub-region. Incessant killings, rape, torture, human right abuses and the destruction of individual and state properties are heinous crimes that are visibly evident in conflicts that occur in the sub-region.\(^5\) Countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Cote D’ Ivoire, Niger and in more recent years Burkina Faso, Mali and Gambia are member States of ECOWAS that have been plagued by violent intra-state conflicts.\(^6\) Conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone spanned a decade before concrete resolutions were reached. Cote D’ Ivoire after an outbreak of civil war in 2002, relapsed into another conflict (election dispute) in 2010. This describes the protracted and resurgent nature of conflicts in the ECOWAS sub-region.\(^7\)

The causes of conflicts in the ECOWAS sub-region are intricate in nature. These causes can be categorized under political, economic and socio-cultural factors with some historical underpinnings. Bad governance, external interference, political exclusion and marginalization, human right abuse and corruption are political sources of conflict in ECOWAS.\(^8\) Poverty, natural resources and high rate of unemployment are some economic factors that trigger conflicts in ECOWAS.\(^9\) Religious discrimination and ethnic marginalization are socio-cultural factors that trigger conflicts in ECOWAS.\(^10\) Pre-colonial legacies and the Cold War politics have also triggered and influenced conflicts in the sub-region.\(^11\)
2.2 The Evolution of ECOWAS Protocols on Peace and Security in the Sub-region

ECOWAS was established on May 28, 1975, by West African states purposely to promote economic and social development for its members. Established as an Economic Community, the 1975 ECOWAS treaty had no provision to ensure peace and security in the sub-region. This was not a flaw on the part of ECOWAS as several regional bodies including the European Union had no concrete security policies during their formative years. The rise in conflict and political instability in the sub-region during the later years of the 1970s informed the Community to adopt security mechanisms to deal with the situation. The decision to develop security mechanisms was imperative as economic development could only be achieved under the ambiance of peace, security, and stability.

In 1978, ECOWAS adopted its first security policy under the protocol of Non-Aggression. Three years after, it adopted the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on defense. In 1999, ECOWAS adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security commonly referred to as the ECOWAS Mechanism. ECOWAS adopted the Protocols on Democracy and Good Governance and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework in 2001 and 2008 respectively. These protocols were adopted to address the diverse security needs of the time and to serve as preventive mechanisms against future threats. The aims and objectives of the various protocols are discussed below.

2.3 Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA)

ECOWAS’ first security approach was that of non-state interference in the domestic issues of other States. This decision was informed by the nature of security threats the sub-region was confronted
with. In 1970 there was an invasion of Guinea by some Portuguese mercenaries to overthrow the government. On 16 January 1977, there was another attempted coup on Mathieu Kérékou of Benin by a group of mercenaries led by Bob Denard. Some member States of the Community were believed to have supported the attack on Benin. The rapid occurrence of coups in the late 1970s threatened the peace and security of the sub-region. Some of the coups were purportedly supported and fund by external actors. ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression on 22nd April 1978 to address the issue. Article 1 of the PNA is synonymous with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which prohibits states from the use of threat or force against other States. This provision was adopted to prevent inter-state hostilities that were becoming prevalent in the sub-region.

The Protocol enjoins member States to refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility, and aggression against the territorial integrity of other States in the community. It encourages member States to prevent foreigners on its territory from committing acts of aggression, hostility, and subversion against other States. Member States are encouraged to resort to peaceful means of settling disputes and conflicts. Disputes that cannot be settled peacefully among member States shall be referred to the committee of the Authority. If a dispute is not resolved at the level of the Committee of the Authority, then the dispute shall be referred finally to the Authority. Despite the provisions made in the PNA to promote peace and security and to also resolve conflicts amicably among States, the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression is criticized as lacking the institutional capacity to respond in the event of a breach of the Protocol.
2.4 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD)

The Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD) was adopted as the second sub-regional security related protocol by ECOWAS. ECOWAS leaders in their quest to fill the gap created by the PNA adopted the PMAD. The Protocol was ratified at an ECOWAS summit in 1981 in Freetown, Sierra Leone and became operational in September 1986. In order to achieve this, the Protocol adopted a collective security approach based on mutual defense assistance which will be provided by Member States to other States that come under external attacks or aggression. In furtherance of this, Article 2 of the Protocol states that, “any armed threat, or aggression directed against any member State shall constitute a threat against the entire community.” Mutual Assistance under the Protocol means military assistance offered in the form of personnel, equipment, material or technical support offered by members of the Community to repel external aggression against a member State. The primary focus of the Protocol is on tackling aggression stemming from outside a member State.

The PMAD mandates the establishment of the following institutions; The Authority, Defense Council, the Defense Commission and the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) to facilitate the implementation of the protocol. The protocol further directs member States to end the presence of foreign military bases within their national territories. The implementation of this provision has proven futile as Francophone countries within the community still host French
military bases and activities on their territories due to the strong ties they continue to hold with France.\textsuperscript{31}

According to Article 16 of the Protocol, a member State under threat or aggression from external actors shall write through its Head of State requesting for assistance from the Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS. The Authority shall then take a decision based on the request as to the expediency of the use of military force based upon the request.\textsuperscript{32} The protocol, however, bars the Community forces from intervening in purely internal conflicts of States.\textsuperscript{33} The Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense is criticized for being overly centered on external threats and aggression at the neglect of internal conflicts that saddle member States within the sub-region and thereby threaten the peace and security in the Community.\textsuperscript{34} The creation of the Accord de Non-Aggression et d’ Assistance en Matière de Défense (ANAD) in 1977 by Francophone countries in ECOWAS posed a great challenge to the success of the PMAD. The ANAD was established during a border dispute between Mali and Burkina Faso. The established institutions of ANAD became fully operational in 1981, unlike PMAD. The duality of roles and objectives of the two Protocols also affected the implementation and success of the PMAD.\textsuperscript{35}

\section*{2.5 The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security}

Member states of ECOWAS signed the revised ECOWAS Treaty on the 24\textsuperscript{th} of July 1993.\textsuperscript{36} The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS adopted a comprehensive approach to the Community’s objective of promoting economic and social integration. Issues of sub-regional peace and security also featured prominently in the Revised Treaty as members recognized the nexus between economic development, good governance and peace and security.\textsuperscript{37}
ECOWAS’ drive to minimize conflicts and to enhance the security and stability of the sub-region led member states to adopt Decision A/DEC.11/10/98 relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping, and Security also referred to as the ECOWAS Mechanism on the 31st of October 1999 in Abuja. The ECOWAS Mechanism was signed into Protocol on 10th December 1999 in Lomé, Togo. The ECOWAS Mechanism establishes a comprehensive framework for prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts in the sub-region. It expands its conflict prevention and resolution scope to cover both intra and inter-state conflicts as opposed to the two previous Protocols (PNA and PMAD). The ECOWAS Mechanism, therefore, breaches the gap created by the two already existing Protocols.

The Mechanism establishes the Authority; The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) and The Executive Secretariat as institutions to execute the mandate of the Mechanism. The Authority has powers to establish other institutions to assist the Mechanism function effectively. The ECOWAS Mechanism also developed Early Warning systems that help in the early detection and prevention of conflicts in the sub-region through the activities of ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). It also sets up an Observation and Monitoring Centre that facilitates the gathering and collection of data for the Executive Secretariat. Article 17 of the Mechanism establishes the Defense and Security Commission, The Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as supporting organs of the institution.

The Mechanism, unlike the PNA and PMAD, takes into account the humanitarian crisis that is often associated with violent conflicts in the sub-region and makes provision for humanitarian assistance to member states during conflicts. The Mechanism further recognizes issues of cross-
border crimes and the proliferation of small arms and hence makes provision to address them.\textsuperscript{45}

The mandate of ECOMOG was expanded under the ECOWAS Mechanism to cover humanitarian intervention, conflict prevention, enforcement, and peacebuilding. ECOMOG was renamed as ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) by the ECOWAS Defense and Security Commission in June 2004. The ESF provides military and other paramilitary support for ECOWAS during conflicts in the sub-region.\textsuperscript{46}

The ECOWAS Mechanism makes up for the inadequacies of the PNA and PMAD and thus far provides the most comprehensive framework for dealing with conflicts and insecurity in the sub-region.

\textbf{2.6 The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance}

On the 21\textsuperscript{st} of December 2001, member states of ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance as supplementary Protocol to the ECOWAS Mechanism in Dakar, Senegal.\textsuperscript{47} The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was designed to address both previous and contemporary sources of conflict (in)directly related to governance in the sub-region. The frequency of coups in the sub-region is a major source of instability for the Community. The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance therefore strictly charges governments and leaders of member states to refrain from unconstitutionally ascending power or maintaining power.\textsuperscript{48} The Protocol also calls on member states to strengthen and respect democratic institutions established by member states.\textsuperscript{49} Under the Protocol, member states are to conduct transparent, free and fair elections to elect political leaders into office. Member states can also request for assistance from ECOWAS in the conduct of their elections through ECOWAS observation and monitoring teams.\textsuperscript{50}
The protocol also advocates for female participation in elections and governance. Article 25 of the Protocol obliges member states to work acidulously to alleviate poverty and enhance the socio-economic standards of their citizens. This is against the backdrop that conflicts in the sub-region have some correlation to poverty.

The Protocol frowns on the marginalization of any sought and forbids exclusion and discrimination based on religion, ethnicity or race. All security forces are barred from partisan politics in executing their duties and responsibilities to the state. The Protocol also obliges member states to respect the rule of law and refrain from acts of human right abuse against citizens and non-citizens living within their territories. In general, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance enjoins member States to respect and embrace the tenets of democracy. The Protocol largely seeks to address internal sources of conflict through preventive mechanisms.

### 2.7 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)

The ECPF is a comprehensive framework adopted by ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) to consolidate its effort in preventing conflicts in the sub-region. The framework which extensively hinges on preventive diplomacy was adopted in January 2008. The framework espouses the use of mediation, arbitration and conciliation in intra and inter-state conflicts in the sub-region thereby addressing some limitations of the previous mechanisms.

The ECPF coordinates the various institutions and departments within ECOWAS responsible for maintaining peace and security. This function of the ECPF promotes the efficient use of scarce resources by preventing duplication of roles and responsibilities by the various agencies and
institutions created by previous protocols in the quest to promote peace and security in the sub-region.\textsuperscript{56} It also provides a broader conceptual understanding of preventing conflicts that goes beyond preventing the imminent outbreak of violent conflict to addressing the fundamental causes and sources of conflict and human insecurity in the sub-region.\textsuperscript{57}

Though the framework provides better integration and coordinating processes for the implementation of preventive diplomacy mechanisms, the absence of clearly defined action plans, may likely reduce the ECPF to a high-sounding protocol of ECOWAS that can hardly be implemented.\textsuperscript{58}

2.8 ECOWAS’ Response to the Conflict in Liberia

Violent conflict erupted in Liberian on 24\textsuperscript{th} December 1989. Corruption, bad governance, poverty, ethnic marginalization and exclusion, and struggle for the control of natural resources were underpinning causes for the conflict.\textsuperscript{59} What started off as an internal struggle by the various groups for power and control of the countries natural resources quickly degenerated into extreme violence leading to mass murder, destruction of properties and dislocation of the mass majority of people living within the State.\textsuperscript{60} The government machinery led by President Doe was overwhelmed by the sporadic occurrence of the crisis that almost led to the creation of a failed state.\textsuperscript{61}

During the early period of the conflict, the international community appeared unconcerned as no steps were taken to intervene in the conflicts. The eruption of the First Gulf War may account for the posture taking by the international community towards the flaming conflict in Liberia. By
August 1990, the conflict had created a serious humanitarian crisis that resulted in several hundred thousand Liberians fleeing to neighboring countries to seek refuge. About 225,000 Liberian refugees fled to Guinea, 69,000 to Sierra Leone and 150,000 to Cote d’Ivoire. As the situation continued to degenerate, ECOWAS the sub-regional body had to intervene to prevent further destruction of lives and property as well as curtail the looming spill-over effects for the sub-region.\(^6\)  

The conflict in Liberia posed a serious challenge to the ECOWAS security structures. The two existing ECOWAS Protocols (PNA and PMAD) at the time made no provisions for the sought of conflicts that had erupted in the ECOWAS state. The PNA and PMAD both centered on preventing and resolving inter-states conflicts as opposed to intra-state conflict. The conflicts created division among leaders of ECOWAS as some member States argued that internal conflicts not engineered by external actors were to be handled by the State machinery of the countries involved. The PNA and PMAD, however, made no provision for situations where States did not have well-functioning and capable governments. This expressly exposes the flaws in the PNA and PMAD.\(^6\) Other ECOWAS leaders, however, debunked the argument raised by the other leaders with regards to the “non-interference” principle espoused in the OAU’s Charter and PMAD positing that non-interference does not imply inaction or indifference to mass violation of human rights.\(^6\)  

Some willing ECOWAS States including Ghana and Nigeria proceeded without an existing legal framework to intervene in both conflicts. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was created by the Standing Mediation Council (SMC) in a meeting at Banjul in August 1990 to intervene in the conflict in Liberia. ECOMOG’s operations in the Liberian conflict was
predominantly military. ECOMOG was tasked with restoring normalcy while an interim government was formed within twelve months. The haste with which ECOMOG was established to intervene in the conflict and the unclarity of their responsibility made the realization of their mandate colossal. The acute division between the Francophone and Anglophone member states derailed the efforts of ECOMOG in executing their mandate to apprehend the violence and restore peace within a short time.\textsuperscript{65}

Some critics were of the view that, the ECOWAS intervention was a unilateral operation spearheaded by Nigeria in its quest to assert itself as a sub-regional hegemon. Others also challenged the legality of the operation as ECOWAS had not informed the UN Security Council (UNSC) of their decision to intervene before embarking on such an operation.\textsuperscript{66} Several peace deals were brokered during the conflict by the SMC led by Nigeria and Ghana but these peace agreements were often short-lived and achieved little results partly due to the internal Francophone-Anglophone wrangling by member States.\textsuperscript{67} The Standing Mediation Council and ECOMOG deserve some credits as they managed to curtail the situation and conducted elections in 1997 that saw Charles Taylor emerge as the winner and ascended the seat as President of Liberia.\textsuperscript{68}

2.9 ECOWAS’ Response to the Conflict in Cote d’Ivoire

The Cote d’Ivoire crisis presented ECOWAS with both challenges and opportunities to redeem itself and test the efficiency and efficacy of the two new protocols (The ECOWAS Mechanism and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance) it had adopted after the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Cote d’Ivoire a relatively stable ECOWAS State was ravaged by violent conflict
in September 2002. According to Kofi Annan the UN Secretary General at the time, the war has destroyed the country’s reputation as a bulwark of regional stability.\(^6^9\)

Leaders of ECOWAS held series of crises meetings to find an immediate solution to the Ivorian crisis. This led to the call for an extraordinary ECOWAS summit in Dakar Senegal on December 18, 2002.\(^7^0\) Members at the summit expressed their unflinching and unanimous support for President Laurent Gbagbo and President Gbabgo on his part made some concessions as he agreed to the encampment of some insurgent groups in some parts of the country under the supervision of ECOWAS.\(^7^1\) Though the ECOWAS Mechanism and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance where still in their early stages of implementation, they provided some guidance and direction for the Community to act. The Mechanism was triggered. The Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Defense and Security Committee and the Mediation and Security Council all played their roles as mandated by the Mechanism.\(^7^2\)

ECOWAS was confronted with the challenge of inadequate resources to single-handedly intervene in the conflict both militarily and non-militarily. The Community, therefore, had to rely on external organizations and States to assist part of its operations through the provision of funds and other logistics.\(^7^3\) The ECOWAS mission in Cote d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) was developed as the principal body to assist in addressing the Ivorian crisis. ECOMICI received financial, technical and logistical support from the UNDPKO and other Western states including France, United States of America, United Kingdom and Belgium.\(^7^4\) ECOWAS operations in Cote d’Ivoire thus had popular support from the international community as compared to its operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS collaborated with the United Nations to resolve the Ivorian Crisis. The United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 1479 on 13th May 2003 establishing the United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire to monitor the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. This action was to throw its weight behind the efforts made by ECOWAS.75

France, the former colonial administrator of Cote d’Ivoire, took particular interest in the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire.76 France unilaterally moved 2,500 troops to enforce ceasefire agreements reached between the rebels and government. The French intervention was viewed by some critics as protecting its national interest rather than genuinely seeking peace and calm in the country. This is evident by the numerous French-owned companies and corporations situated in Ivory Coast coupled with a high number of nationals mainly business owner and operators living in there.77

The lack of commitment or inability of some member States to support ECOMICI by contributing troops also created some challenges for the group. Mali did not commit any troops to ECOMOCI because it had many of its nationals residing in Cote d’Ivoire. Nigeria also did not deploy troops to support the operations due to some internal security challenges it had at the time likewise Guinea Bissau. ECOWAS had to fall on Ghana, Togo Benin, Niger and Senegal to constitute the ECOMICI team.78 The dependence on foreign states also affected the operations of ECOMICI in that, when donor States delay or fail to provide the necessary funds, the activities of ECOMICI almost came to a halt. 79

The lessons and experiences ECOWAS gained from its previous interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone shaped its approach to the Ivorian Crisis. Though ECOWAS was faced with some challenges, it had asserted itself as capable of managing its own affairs when provided with the
necessary support. Furthermore, the use of diplomacy was very visible in handling the Ivorian crisis. The various institutions created by the ECOWAS Mechanism also got actively involved in resolving the conflict.

2.10 ECOWAS’ Response to the Burkina Faso Conflict

Burkina Faso was temporarily destabilized by a military coup d’état led by Gen. Gilbert Diendéré. This event occurred on the 17th of September 2015 few months to the country’s general elections. The AU and ECOWAS both took an interest in the situation and hastened to find a solution to the crisis before it degenerated into violence. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) represented the AU while ECOWAS delegated President of Senegal Macky Sall who was ECOWAS Chair at the time and President Thomas Yayi Boni President of Benin to represent the Community.

Though the AU and ECOWAS worked jointly, the two bodies took divergent positions as to how to resolve the conflict. After President Macky Sall and President Boni met with the coup leaders, they requested in their initial proposal that, the military should withdraw from the government, detainees should be released, and there should be the restoration of transitional institutions. Also, they proposed that Diendéré and his men should be granted amnesty. The request for amnesty for Diendéré and his men was contested by the AU and portions of the Burkinabe population. ECOWAS explained that the decision was taken to restore immediate calm and prevent grave violence. The PSC refused to make compromises with Diendéré. The PSC stuck to the Democracy, Elections, and Governance principled enshrined in the AU Charter which Burkina Faso is a signatory to. The debate about role and powers of regional and sub-regional authorities resurfaced again.
ECOWAS called for an open and all-inclusive election to be held, the restoration of the transitional institutions, withdrawal of the military from the government are indications that the sub-regional body is committed to the tenets of democracy which are enshrined in the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. ECOWAS issued its final communiqué on 22 September in Abuja. The final communiqué adopted by the ECOWAS Heads of State emphasized dialogue, and reconciliation rather than applications of sanctions. It also entreated the people of Burkina Faso to place priority on national interest and safeguard the peace and security they have.

Preventive diplomacy which is at the core of the ECPF was effectively applied to the Burkina Faso crisis which helped to avoid an unnecessary bloodbath. The principles enshrined in the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance where also applied in making recommendations to resolve the conflict. Though the initial request for amnesty was not warmly received by the AU and sections of the Burkinabe people, ECOWAS’ efforts to resolve the conflict was commendable.

### 2.11 ECOWAS’ Response to the Gambian Crisis

ECOWAS was confronted with another challenge in December 2016 after President Yahya Jammeh of Gambia refused to step down after losing the 2016 election. President Jammeh, one of the longest serving Presidents on the continent, initially conceded defeat after the results were announced. He reversed his decision a week later and petitioned the Supreme Court of Gambia to order a re-run of the polls citing voter fraud as reasons why he lost in the polls. After being in power for over twenty-two (22) years it was obvious Gambians wanted change and change they
voted for. His decision to cling to power meant stiff opposition from Mr. Barrow’s camp and generated pockets of violence.88

ECOWAS aware of this situation and learning from previous experience once again decided to act swiftly. ECOWAS sent a delegation comprising of President John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, President Buhari of Nigeria, Mohammad Ibn Chambas former President of ECOWAS Commission and President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf ECOWAS Chair to meet President Jammeh and persuade him to rescind power.89 The delegation failed to persuade the defiant Jammeh to rescind power.90

In January 2017, ECOWAS chiefs of staff met in Abuja to deliberate on preparations towards military intervention in the Gambia.91 On 19 January 2017, shortly after Adama Barrow inauguration as President of the Gambia in the Gambian embassy in Senegal, some Senegalese troops surrounded the country and prepared to march towards the capital Banjul. This was to demonstrate ECOWAS’ resolve to oust Jammeh militarily should he refuse to live the Presidential Palace and hand-over power to newly installed President Adama Barrow. Convinced about the imminent threat Jammeh eventually left the Gambia on 21 January 2017.92

ECOWAS combination of military and non-military strategies to effectively remove Yahya Jammeh from office and install Mr. Adama Barrow as the democratically elected President of Gambia is another feather in the cup of ECOWAS. A demonstration of the implementation of its protocols and in this case, the effectively applying the ECOWAS Mechanism, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance as well as the ECPF.
2.12 Conclusion

ECOWAS Protocols on Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance on Defense were designed primarily to address inter-state conflicts and security issues about external aggression. The PNA and PMAD are highly militarized in nature, and very little provisions were made for a non-military approach to conflict resolution. It could be understood as conflicts that occurred during the Cold War era in the sub-region were predominantly inter-state or were supported and funded by external actors for various reasons.

The ECOWAS Mechanism was drafted based on lessons drawn from the conflicts that erupted in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The reactions by member states to these conflicts and issues raised concerning the PNA and PMAD during the two conflicts were factored in drafting the Mechanism. The Mechanism sought to develop a comprehensive framework for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The all-encompassing nature of the Mechanism creates an implementation problem as the Protocol becomes “overburdened”.

The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance pre-empts some causes of conflicts in the sub-region and takes steps to address them. If the Protocol is properly implemented by member States, conflicts in the sub-region will be significantly reduced. Issues such as poverty, bad governance, dictatorship, corruption, ethnic and religious marginalization are re-current causes of conflicts in the sub-region. The protocol emphasizes addressing issues of governance and meeting the socio-economic aspirations of citizens. The implementation of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance will, therefore, serve as an antidote to conflicts triggered by these causes.
The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework is designed specifically as a conflict prevention manual. It addresses the ‘generality’ problem of the ECOWAS Mechanism and gives more specific solutions to preventing conflicts that occur in the sub-region.

Though ECOWAS has been forthcoming with excellent Protocols, implementation has largely been a challenge. Despite subsequent protocols adopted by ECOWAS emphasizing the use of the non-military approach to conflict resolution, ECOWAS attempts to resolve conflicts in the sub-region have largely been characterized by military interventions.
ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER THREE

ASSESSING GHANA’S PARTICIPATION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE ECOWAS SUB-REGION

3.0 Introduction

The chapter begins with a general introduction to Ghana’s participation in peacekeeping operations across the globe. The first part of this chapter examines a catalog of non-military conflict resolution strategies. This is followed by an assessment of Ghana’s application of these non-military conflict resolution strategies during the conflicts in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Togo and the Gambia and also highlights other contributions Ghana has made towards ECOWAS’ collective peace and security agenda. The second part of the chapter highlights the role of the military in the application of non-military strategies in resolving conflicts, achievements and challenges Ghana encountered during the resolution of the conflicts and finally concludes with a summary of findings under the chapter.

Ghana since the 1960s has contributed both military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations across the globe. Ghana over the past two decades has been ranked among the top ten contributors of troops to support UN missions across the globe.¹ In 2015 the country was ranked as the 8th highest contributor of troops to peacekeeping missions.² Ghana was the second highest contributor of troops to the first ECOMOG mission in Liberia and produced the first ECOMOG Force Commander, Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo.³ These contributions are indications of the country’s commitment to ensuring world peace in general and in West Africa in particular.⁴ According to Prof. Mensa-Bonsu, peace enforcement and peacekeeping (military) operations is just an aspect of ensuring peace and security.⁵ She further advances that, the use of military force
is not sufficient and cannot be relied upon always to resolve conflicts. Azumah noted that conflicts have their dynamics regarding causes, actors involved and the intensity. He, therefore, remarks that it is important to understand the dynamics of a conflict before attempting to resolve it. Ghana has thereby employed the use of military and non-military strategies in conjunction with its sub-regional body ECOWAS in resolving conflicts within the sub-region. The study, however, assesses Ghana’s use of non-military strategies in resolving conflicts in the sub-region.

3.1 Non-Military Conflict Resolution Strategies

According to Col. Atror, the use of non-military strategies in resolving conflicts has become more imperative in recent times due to some of the dastardly negative imprints left by military operation during peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. Non-military conflict resolution strategies are methods employed to resolve the conflict that does not require the use of military force. These strategies include mediation, negotiation, diplomacy, arbitration, reconciliation, and application or imposition of sanctions. Some of the non-military strategies are closely related and are concurrently applied in resolving conflicts.

3.1.1 Mediation

Moore defines mediation as “a voluntary conflict resolution process in which an individual or group helps people in conflict to negotiate tangible and mutually acceptable agreements that resolve their differences.” He further advances that, a good mediation process can restore peaceful relations and promote reconciliation between disputants. For mediation to be effective, there is the need for a facilitator who is referred to as a mediator. A mediator is an independent and impartial individual willingly accepted by parties to a conflict to help resolve their differences.
amicably. The UN identifies preparedness, consent, impartiality, inclusivity, ownership, international law and norms, coherence and quality of peace agreements as fundamental principles to be upheld by mediators in mediating both inter and intra-state conflicts. Additionally, mediators must have a guide for the mediation processes. This guide must ensure the safety of the conflicting parties, have behavioral guidelines, propose a process for the discussion of issues, building consensus, formalizing agreements and closure of process.

3.1.2 Negotiation

The process by which two or more people voluntarily agree to discuss their differences and endeavor to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements that satisfies their interest is known as negotiation. Negotiation is employed when parties to a dispute or conflict realize they cannot attain or realize their goals independently hence the need to cooperate with other parties to arrive at a mutually satisfying end. People resort to negotiation when they want to have greater control over the conflict resolution process. There are two main types of negotiation. These are Positional Negotiation and Interest-Based Negotiation. With Positional negotiation, one party makes a specific proposal that meets their needs to the other party. This is often met with some rejections, and the other party makes a counterproposal. This then initiates the negotiation process. Interest-Based negotiation involves the conflict parties identifying their needs and interest and jointly working to arrive at them.
3.1.3 Diplomacy

Diplomacy is an international relation tool used to advance peace and harmony within the international community. It enhances corporation and is utilized as an effective conflict resolution strategy. In this regard, diplomacy can be broadly defined as “the use of tact, common sense and intelligence to reach agreements, compromises, and settlements with other actors (usually nation-states) on the global stage.” Conflict resolution entails the use of different types of diplomacy.

The United Nations in its 1992 report “An Agenda for Peace” identified Preventive Diplomacy as a tool for conflict prevention and resolution. The report defined Preventive Diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when it occurs.” The goal of preventive diplomacy is to resolve disputes before they degenerate into violence. Shuttle diplomacy is also employed as a conflict resolution technique. As the name implies, diplomats move from one disputing party to the other during negotiations. The purpose is to reach some agreement with each party before mediation or negotiation begins. This facilitates the conflict resolution process.

3.1.4 Arbitration

Arbitration is an extra-judicial mechanism through which parties to a conflict resolve their differences. Arbitration is adversarial and is synonymous with court adjudication. Parties to a conflict present their case to a third party (an arbitrator) to examine all evidence presented by the parties and make a determination based on the evidence adduced by the parties. The disputing parties reserve the right to appoint the arbitrator. Multiple arbitrators are often used to enhance the decision-making process. Usually, when the conflict is between two parties, each party to the
conflict appoints an arbitrator, and an additional arbitrator is added by the arbitration council to make the number three (odd) to make the determination of the case simpler. This is because of arbitration, unlike mediation, gives a win-lose verdict in resolving a conflict. Though arbitration is not a court process, decisions by the arbitrator(s) are binding on the parties involved.\textsuperscript{27}

3.1.5 Conciliation

Conciliation is a conflict resolution strategy adopted by parties in a dispute to resolve their differences using a third party referred to as a conciliator.\textsuperscript{28} Conciliation is voluntary hence parties to the conflict must willingly opt for the process. The conciliator who acts as an intermediary between the disputants must be neutral. During the processes of conciliation, the disputants can direct the conciliator to draft a non-binding resolution proposal. The proposal may be adopted by the disputing parties in arriving at an amicable agreement. This, however, cannot be used during mediation as the mediator is barred from making any such proposals.\textsuperscript{29}

3.1.6 Reconciliation

Reconciliation is used as a long-term approach to turn temporary peace or peace agreements during conflicts into a permanent peace. This is to prevent relapse of conflict especially when the conflict has deep root historical underpinnings, and mass atrocities were committed.\textsuperscript{30} Reconciliation requires a third party acting as ‘Grace’, ‘Law’, and ‘Justice’ between the perpetrator and the victim. The process is to bring healing to the victims of the conflict through the apology and acts of remorse expressed by the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{31} The perpetrators in expressing remorse or apology also find inner peace when victims accept their plea. Victims may request retribution or be compensated either by the State or the victim.\textsuperscript{32} A good reconciliation process entails truth,
justice, mercy, and peace. The process is not intended to be directly punitive but to mend bridges and promote peace and unity.\(^{33}\)

3.1.7 **Imposition of Sanctions**

Sanctions are restrictive measures imposed on an actor(s) to limit their efforts in pursuing or achieving their objectives during conflict.\(^{34}\) During conflicts, different sanctions may be applied to reduce the capacity of the disputing parties from continuing the conflict. Economic sanctions are applied to reduce the resources available parties in a conflict. These types of sanctions are usually imposed on governments during conflicts.\(^{35}\) There is also the application of arms embargo to prevent the warring factions from accessing more ammunition to continue the conflict.\(^{36}\) Diplomatic sanctions can also be applied during conflicts. Countries can cut diplomatic ties with governments to mount pressure on them to end a conflict.\(^{37}\) The use of travel bans is another diplomatic means of persuading conflicting parties to resolve the conflict.\(^{38}\)

3.2 **Ghana’s Participation in Resolving the Liberian Conflicts (1989-2003)**

Ghana was a member of the Standing Mediation Committee established in 1990 by ECOWAS to help resolve the conflict in Liberia. The SMC’s responsibility of resolving the conflict in Liberia included the use of mediation.\(^{39}\) In July 1990 the SMC, held its first meeting with the warring factions in Freetown Liberia to agree to a cease-fire agreement. The SMC was unable to secure a cease-fire agreement as Tom Woewiyu a spokesperson for the NPFL reiterated the group's stance of not accepting any cease-fire agreement or any form of ECOWAS peacekeeping force which he described as an ‘invasion force’.\(^{40}\) Ghana continued to participate in the mediation process with the other members of the SMC to broker other peace agreement including the Bamako Accord of
November 1990, the Lome Peace Talks of February 1999 and the Monrovia Peace Talks of March 1991 which all proved futile.\textsuperscript{41}

In September 1994, Ghana hosted a Peace Talk for the warring factions in Akosombo. This led to the adoption of the Akosombo Peace Agreement which was a supplementary agreement to the Cotonou Agreement.\textsuperscript{42} In December 1994, another Peace Agreement was signed in Ghana commonly referred to as the Accra Peace Agreement. These two peace agreements were signed when former President Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana was Chairman of ECOWAS.\textsuperscript{43} Former President Rawlings continued to facilitate the peace process as Chair of ECOWAS until the end of his tenure in 1996. He, however, did not relent in his efforts to work towards the restoration of peace which came in 1997 after Charles Taylor won the presidential elections.\textsuperscript{44}

When Liberia relapsed into violent conflict from 1999 to 2003, Ghana again played a vital role in restoring peace to the country. According to Baah-Duodu, after several attempts by ECOWAS leaders to bring all the warring factions together had failed, Ghana succeeded.\textsuperscript{45} It was in Accra that the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed following a series of peace talks that span from early June to mid-August 2003. During the Accra Peace Talks hosted by Ghana on June 4, 2013, all actors in the conflict including representatives of the various political parties were present. In all, a total number of eighteen political parties, the Government of Liberia, two rebel groups (LURD and MODEL) and civil society organizations were represented at the talks. The agreement made provision for the establishment of a Transitional Government and for the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Re-integration of fighters and other victims of the conflict.\textsuperscript{46}
According to Prof. Mensa-Bonsu, Ghana adopted diplomacy and mediation as the main non-military conflict resolution strategies in resolving the first Liberian conflict that ended in 1997. She noted that, before the mediation process begun, separate meetings were held with the different warring factions to come to the roundtable to commence peace talks. The warring factions were given the opportunity to decide on the location where the meetings would be held and other arrangements to ensure their security. These processes according to her involved the use of negotiation. She further added that parties to the conflict were allowed to make inputs in drafting and concluding the peace agreements which also involves the use of negotiation. The presence of the Heads of State of ECOWAS and other prominent members of ECOWAS during the mediation and negotiation process constitutes diplomacy. Ghana stuck to its use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation as the non-military strategies when Liberia relapsed into conflict in 1999. After several negotiation and mediation efforts, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2003 which led to the restoration of peace in Liberia. The use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation thus proved successful in resolving the conflicts that erupted in Liberia in 1989 and 1999.

3.3 Ghana’s Role in Resolving the Ivorian Conflict (2002-2004)

On 19th of September 2002, violence erupted in Cote d’Ivoire after an attempted coup failed. This was least expected as the country had successfully gone through a National Reconciliation forum in October 2001. At the invitation of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Ghana accepted to host an Extraordinary ECOWAS summit to address the crisis that had beleaguered the country. The meeting was held in Accra on the 29th of September 2002. At the meeting, a High-Level Contact Group (HLCG) comprising of Ghana, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Nigeria and Togo was
formed by ECOWAS’ Heads of State and Government to establish contact with the insurgents, prevail upon them to cease all hostilities, and negotiate a general framework for the resolution of the crisis.  

Ghana’s influence on the work of the HLCG was tremendous, leading to the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement on 17th October 2002. This Agreement was reached before the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which was signed by all the Ivorian political actors in Paris on 24th January 2003. The Linas-Marcoussis Accord provided a basis for the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation in Cote d’Ivoire. Some challenges were encountered in the implementation of the Accord which threatened the peace process. The Government of Ghana in its attempt to salvage the situation invited representatives of all major political factions in Cote d’Ivoire to a Round Table meeting in Accra from 6th to 7th March 2003. The meeting in Accra managed to curtail the resumption of hostilities. The conflicting parties at the meeting accepted the proposal by John Agyekum Kufuor on the distribution of ministerial portfolios in a Government of National Reconciliation. The Accra Accord according to Baah-Duodu rejuvenated efforts to implement the Linas-Marcoussis Accord. 

During the latter part of 2003, the peace process was once again constrained and President Kufuor as ECOWAS Chairman had to immediately organize a mini-summit in Accra on 11th November 2003 to resolve the issue and restore the peace process. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo then Foreign Minister of Ghana, was subsequently sent to the UN Security Council in the same month to request for a possible ‘blue helmets’ of the ECOWAS forces in Cote d’Ivoire. The UN accepted
the request and a more robust UN force was deployed to Cote d’Ivoire. This reduced the financial burden on ECOWAS in funding the peacekeeping mission in the country.56

Majority of the signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement suspended their participation in the Government of National Reconciliation in March 2003 due to the dismissal of three Ministers.57 This adversely affected the peace process. President Kufuor attended the Abuja summit, in Nigeria on 20th June 2004 and also the 3rd Session of the Assembly of the AU in Addis Ababa, convened by the UN Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Anan. Both meetings were designed to discuss a roadmap for the Ivorian peace process.58 Based on the agreements reached on the 6th July 2004 meeting in Addis Ababa, Ghana agreed to host a High-Level Meeting with all actors involved in the Ivorian conflict, including President Gbagbo, in Accra from 29th to 30th July 2004.59 This was to help consolidate consensus over all the essential issues thwarting the peace process and to find amicable solutions to them. This led to the signing of the Accra III Agreement, in July 2004. Calm was restored to the country and this led to the re-activation of the peace process in Cote d’Ivoire. 60

Diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation were extensively used by Ghana in collaborating with ECOWAS to resolve the Cote d’Ivoire conflict. The High-Level Contact Group established by ECOWAS under the leadership of President Kufuor to dialogue with President Gbagbo and members of the insurgency to agree to peaceful means of settling the conflict constitutes the use of diplomacy. This paved the way for the commencement of the mediation process. Despite the fact that mediation process suffered several setbacks as both the government and rebel groups reneged on the peace agreements signed, Ghana kept faith in the use of diplomacy and mediation in resolving the conflict. The use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation once again proved

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successful with the signing of the Accra III Agreements in July 2004. This restored peace in Cote d’Ivoire.

3.4 Ghana’s Role in Resolving the Conflict in Guinea Bissau (2003-2005)

On 14th September 2003, a bloodless military coup d’état plunged Guinea Bissau into political crisis. The military action was widely condemned by the international community who called for an immediate return to constitutional rule. Prior to the military takeover, President Kufuor had invited Mr. Koumba Yala President of Guinea Bissau to hold talks on the governance situation in Guinea Bissau. The Ghanaian President during the Talks impressed upon Mr. Kuomba Yala to review the state of governance in the country and take remedial steps to avert any governance crisis.

President Kufuor who was the Chairman of ECOWAS at the time took proactive steps to prevent the situation from degenerating. He sent an ECOWAS delegation headed by Ghana’s Foreign Minister to meet the Armed forces, representatives of the various political parties and civil societies in Bissau to help resolve the issue. The group managed to reach an agreement with the military to return to the barracks, and a transitional government of national unity was formed headed by H.E. Mr. Henrique Rosa. The transitional government was formed and charged with the responsibility to conduct transparent free and fair elections. A transitional Charter was drafted and formally approved by the Military Committee for the Restoration of Constitutional and Democratic Order (MCRCDO) and other stakeholders on 28th September 2003. The Charter stipulated the time for the conduction of Presidential and Legislative elections.
Ghana did no relent in its effort to support in the democratization process in Guinea Bissau. The government of Ghana continued to appeal through ECOWAS to the UN, the AU, the EU, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the international community, in general, to lend financial support to Guinea Bissau to support the transition process and the socio-economic reconstruction of the country. The Legislative election held on 28 March 2004 was characterized by disputes and to prevent the situation from degenerating, President Kufuor dispatched a high-level ECOWAS Ministerial mission to Guinea Bissau to restore calm which the group successfully achieved.

The transition process suffered another setback when the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces was killed by a group of soldiers during a violent demonstrating in Bissau. The demonstrations were held in demand for unpaid wages, an improvement in their condition of service and a change in the leadership of the armed forces. To prevent tensions from further escalating, ECOWAS immediately embarked on a joint mediation process in Bissau, which led to the signing of an agreement between the Government and mutineers under the auspices of ECOWAS, the AU and the Community of Portuguese speaking countries. Ghana continued to work with ECOWAS to ensure that, the country returned to democratic rule. Presidential elections were held on June 19, 2005, and the run-off on 24 July 2005 after a transitional period of eighteen months.

President Kufuor adopted preventive diplomacy when he invited President Koumba Yala of Guinea Bissau to discuss the governance crisis in the country before the conflict in 2003. When the conflict erupted, the President of Ghana still employed the use of diplomacy as his first method to resolve the conflict when he delegated Ghana’s Foreign Minister to head ECOWAS mission to Guinea Bissau. The government of Ghana collaborated with ECOWAS through the use of
dialogue, negotiations, and mediation to restore peace in the country in 2004. Through negotiations, the government of Guinea Bissau and the dissident groups agreed to a transitional government and agreed to hold legislative and presidential elections months after.

3.5 Ghana’s Role in Resolving the Togo crisis (2005)

Togo was plunged into a brief period of unconstitutional rule from February 5, 2005, after the demise of the President Gnassingbe Eyadema. Faure Gnassingbe was hurriedly sworn in as president of Togo to complete the term of his father.\textsuperscript{70} This act was widely condemned by the international community and ECOWAS as unconstitutional. ECOWAS, therefore, refused to recognize the presidency of Faure Gnassingbe.\textsuperscript{71} ECOWAS being aware of the fragile nature of peace and security in the sub-region decided to employ preventive diplomacy rather than deploying ECOMOG.\textsuperscript{72}

Ibn Chambas a Ghanaian diplomat and then ECOWAS Executive Secretary together with Mrs. Aichatou Mindaodou from the Ministry of Foreign Office of Niger made a trip to Togo to dialogue with the Togolese authorities. Few days after, ECOWAS convened a summit in Niger to discuss the crisis and find a mechanism to restore constitutional rule in Togo by the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.\textsuperscript{73} Ghana and Burkina Faso during the meeting held the position that ECOWAS should engage in dialogue with Faure Gnassingbe and commanders of the Togolese Armed Forces. This proposal was made with the view that, both Faure and the Army commanders may be confronted with feelings of insecurity should they hand over power.\textsuperscript{74} They, therefore, proposed amnesty for the initiators of the crisis. They further proposed that the Togolese
Speaker of Parliament Mr. Fambare Ouattara be instated as interim President by the provisions of article 65 of the 1992 Constitution of Togo which was amended in 2002.\textsuperscript{75} 

President Kufuor’s decision to opt for preventive diplomacy was guided by Ghana’s national interest. Ghana shares borders with Togo to the east and Ghana has many of its citizen residing and doing business in Togo.\textsuperscript{76} Any decision which does not pursue the path of peace will be detrimental to our national security. The looming spill-over effects the crisis will have on Ghana were factors the government of Ghana considered in stating its position on the issue.\textsuperscript{77} After several meetings and negotiations, an agreement was finally reached with the Togolese authorities to organize transparent free and fair election involving all the political parties in Togo within sixty days. Togo’s Speaker of Parliament was sworn in as Interim President by the Togolese constitution.\textsuperscript{78} Faure Gnassingbe merged as the winner of the presidential election that was conducted on April 24, 2005, and assumed office as the President of Togo.\textsuperscript{79} 

During the Togo crisis, negotiation was largely employed to resolve the conflict and restore normalcy. The government of Ghana and ECOWAS through collective efforts pursued the path of peace using diplomacy and negotiations. The several high-level meetings held between government authorities, high ranking members of the Togolese Armed forces and the ECOWAS hastened the conflict resolution process. The use of diplomacy and negotiation were successfully employed in resolving the Togolese crisis.
3.6 Ghana’s role in the Gambian Conflict

The Gambia was threatened by political instability when President Yahya Jammeh rescinded his initial decision of accepting defeat in the December 2016 presidential polls. His call for a rerun of the polls citing voter fraud was met with stiff opposition and worldwide condemnation by the international community. ECOWAS, the sub-regional body of which the Gambia is a member, also expressed their displeasure about President Jammeh’s decision. In response to Yahya Jammeh’s call for new elections to be conducted, Mrs. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the President of Liberia and ECOWAS Chair, asserted that the decision if upheld, will be in contravention of the sovereign will of Gambians free expressed through the ballot.

The former President of Ghana John Dramani Mahama was part of an eminent ECOWAS Mediation team comprising of President of Liberia and ECOWAS Chair Ellen Jonson Sirleaf, Muhammadu Buhari, President of Nigeria and Ernest Bai Koroma, president of Sierra Leone that visited Banjul to dialogue with President Jammeh to peacefully hand over power. Ghana’s Mohammed Ibn Chambas (former President of ECOWAS Commission) was part of the delegation as the UN Special Representative for West Africa. President Mahama and President Buhari were co-mediators on the team. The team was initially unsuccessful in convincing President Jammeh to peaceful handover the administration of the country to President-elect Adama Barrow. Further negotiations by the team and subsequent efforts by President Alpha Conde of Guinea Conakry and President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania helped ECOWAS to resolve the power crisis as President Jammeh finally agreed to concede power to Adama Barrow. Ghana again settled for diplomacy and negotiation to resolve the Gambian crisis. The method proved effective as Mr.
Yahya Jammeh eventually handed-over the country’s administration to President Adama Barrow without any bloodshed.

3.7 Other contributions by Ghana towards Collective Peace and Security Agenda

Ghana aside directly assisting ECOWAS in resolving conflicts in the sub-region has also contributed through institutional and other means to enhance the use of non-military strategies in resolving conflicts in the sub-region. Some of these contributions include the development of a peace architecture, establishment of training centers, research centers, and experience sharing.

3.7.1 Peace Architecture

According to Azumah, Ghana is the first country in West Africa to have developed a structured peace architecture. Ghana’s National Peace Council (NPC) has become a model for many countries both within and outside of the sub-region. The National Peace Council of Ghana was designed as a policy framework in 2006. The NPC was institutionalized by the Government of Ghana by Act 818 of the Parliament of the Republic of Ghana in November 2011 to “facilitate and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution and to build sustainable peace in the country”. The institution has the additional responsibility of facilitating reconciliation should the need arise. The PNC structurally is made up of a board and a secretariat. The board is established at the national level, the regional level, and the district level. The regional and the district boards are supervised and coordinated by the national board. The NPC operates under the Ministry of Interior in Ghana. Christian bodies, Muslim bodies, African Traditional Religious bodies and Traditional authorities are to present representatives to constitute the board. The President of the Republic of Ghana nominates two people of which one must be
female and other identifiable groups also nominate two people to the board.\textsuperscript{87} The President of Ghana appoints members of the National Board on the recommendation of the Interior Minister. Meanwhile, the chairperson of the board is selected by the members of the group. The regional board is constituted following the same procedure but this time, the National Board in consultation with the Regional Coordinating Council set up the board. A similar approach is used in constituting the district board.\textsuperscript{88} There is mandatory resource allocation made by the law (Act 818) to facilitate the smooth operations of the boards and secretariat. The transparency and inclusiveness the board demonstrates are widely appreciated by Ghanaians and foreign observers. Initially, the board had many Christian representatives due to the different Christian organizations which all had nomination slots. During the conclusion of the draft, the different Muslim groups were also given slots to nominate representatives to the board. This increased the number of Muslims on the board and enhanced the balance of the board.\textsuperscript{89} The NPC during electioneering periods embarks on a national peace campaign aimed at promoting tolerance, peace, unity and ultimately reduce the tension that arises in the country. During presidential and parliamentary elections, the NPC holds several meetings with the various political parties to persuade them to adhere to the tenets of peace and fairness.\textsuperscript{90}

This and several other works by the NPC since its establishment has contributed to the general peace and stability the country is enjoying. The NPC has become a model for many countries in the sub-region including Liberia, Benin, and Cote d’Ivoire are learning from. This, in essence, contributes to ECOWAS collective peace and security agenda as the NPC helps to prevent, manage and resolve intra-state conflict in Ghana.\textsuperscript{91} As aptly noted by Azumah, when Ghana’s peace architecture becomes fully operational in all member states of ECOWAS, it will help reduce intra-
state conflicts and prevent the conflicts from degenerating into violence when they occur. This will promote general peace and stability within the sub-region.\textsuperscript{92}

3.7.2 Establishment of Peacemaking, Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping Training Centers

The Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC) was commissioned in 1999 by the government of Ghana. The Center was established to build on and share Ghana’s experience in peacekeeping operations since the 1960’s with other states in the international community especially those in Africa.\textsuperscript{93} The Center since 2003 has run over 400 courses for both individuals and organization from over 90 countries. The KAIPTC aside offering regular courses for individuals and organizations across the globe, also organizes training courses, seminars, conferences, and workshops. This is geared towards the development of professionals and personnel that are ready to meet the modern-day challenges of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{94} The Center also trains mediators to professionally handle issues of conflict which has saddled the continent. Many people both civilians and military officers have come from within the sub-region to study at KAIPTC. This also contributes to the ECOWAS peace and security agenda.\textsuperscript{95}

The West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) was founded in Ghana in December 2002 as a peacebuilding non-governmental organization. The organization focuses on collaborating with governments and other civil society organizations to prevent and manage conflicts as well as promote peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{96} WANEP also works to gather early warning signals about conflict and makes the necessary recommendations first to the government of the state and then to ECOWAS to find means of averting the conflicts and its subsequent implications.\textsuperscript{97} Ghana happens to be the
third country in which WANEP was established, and the organization currently operates in all the
ECOWAS states. Mr. Emmanuel Bombande a former Ghanaian Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister
is a co-founder of WANEP. WANEP has also facilitated the prevention of major conflicts by
providing useful and timely information to the government of Ghana on sensitive conflict issues.
A peaceful Ghana by extension contributes to the peace and security of ECOWAS.\textsuperscript{98}

The Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) was established in 1989 by
the University of Ghana at the request of Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Centre was
established to offer courses in international relations and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{99} LECIAD since 2002, has
collaborated with international organizations such as the United Nations, African Union, and
ECOWAS to provide training in areas such as diplomacy, mediation, negotiations and election
management.\textsuperscript{100} In 2002, the International Training Program on Peacebuilding and Good
Governance for African Civilian Personnel (ITPPGG) were established by LECIAD in
collaboration with the International Training Program for Conflict Management of the Scuola
Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy under the auspices of the UN Department of Economic and Social
Affairs (UNDESA).\textsuperscript{101}

The Centre has also organized training programs to build civilian capacity to handle peace support
operations. LECIAD through its training programs, workshops, seminars, and conferences has
developed and enhanced the skill and knowledge of diplomats, mediators and negotiators across
the continent and particularly from West Africa. The Centre through its publications such as the
“Conflict Watch” provides early warning signals to the government and guidance as to how to
manage the situation in order to avoid full-blown conflicts.\textsuperscript{102} The Centre, therefore, contributes
3.8 The Role of the Military in the Application of Non-military Strategies in conflict resolution

According to Brig Gen. Kotia, the military aside its traditional role of using force and aggression to enforce peace during violent conflicts plays other auxiliary roles during conflicts to facilitate resolution. He further intimates that military presence during conflicts can serve as a deterrent to disputants and when conflicts are not fully blown-out, it may lead to immediate cessation of hostilities as parties to the conflict may not be very well organized at that point and wield sophisticated ammunitions to confront the military. Elaborating on the role of the military, Brig. Gen Kotia advances that, the military also secures the grounds for peacemakers (diplomats and mediators) to move in to begin the mediation process. He added that, in the situation where diplomats and mediators may not have access to rebel factions to start negotiations, the military is relied upon to identify the various groups and assist mediators to gain access to them. Furthermore, during the mediation process, the military protects all parties involved especially the mediators and high-profile diplomats assisting in the mediation process. Information is key in resolving conflicts, intelligence gathered by the military may be shared with mediators to help in resolving the conflict. The military also provides general surveillance during conflicts. These auxiliary functions played by the military facilitates the process of conflict resolution.
3.9 Achievements and Challenges confronted by Ghana in resolving conflicts in the ECOWAS Sub-region

Ghana has achieved some successes in its effort to help resolve conflicts in the sub-region. The use of non-military strategies has helped in resolving some of the conflicts in the sub-region. Ghana’s efforts together with that of ECOWAS secured a final cease-fire and restored relative peace for elections to be conducted. When Liberia relapsed into conflict in 2002, Ghana through the use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation secured the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August 2003 which paved the way for the resolution of the conflict and marked the beginning of sustainable peace.

Ghana was again at the center of resolving the conflict that erupted in Cote d’Ivoire in 2002. After several unsuccessful attempts by ECOWAS to resolve the conflict, the meeting of President Gbagbo and all the other actors in the conflict in Accra proved to be the decisive turning point. This led to an agreement to cease hostilities and paved the way for the re-activation of the peace process. Ghana’s call for the use of preventive diplomacy during the 2005 Togo crisis helped to preserve the country’s peace and restore constitutional rule within six months. A radical approach could have blown the country into flames. Ghana’s involvement in the conflict resolution process in Guinea Bissau also helped ECOWAS in resolving the conflict and restoring peace. Though the presence of ECOWAS Standby Force served as deterrence and may have partly contributed to Mr. Yahya Jammeh’ decision to peacefully hand over power, the continuous use of diplomacy and negotiation helped prevent a military confrontation. This could have led to a bloodbath as we see during most military interventions in the sub-region. The human cost both military and civilian, as well as collateral damage which may lead to the destruction of some important state and civilian properties, were all averted through non-military approach.
Conflicts in the sub-region are complex, and the dynamics keep changing. It is therefore important for mediators, negotiators, and conciliators to keep abreast with the current development to be able to effectively respond to conflicts when they occur. The establishment of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding centers has helped train several hundreds of individuals across the sub-region (civilians and military). This in effect contributes to improving the quality of human resource available to ECOWAS to handle conflict-related issues. Ghana’s National Peace Council has contributed to Ghana’s relative peace by offering guidance to the government as well as publicly appealing for calm during internal conflicts. The national board constituted by high profile persons use their ‘authority figure’ and influence in society to call for calm and assist in mediating chieftaincy disputes, public agitations, and election-related disputes. The adoption of this peace architecture by some ECOWAS member states has assisted in curbing violent intra-state conflicts.

Ghana has encountered some challenges with the use of non-military strategies in resolving conflicts in the ECOWAS sub-region through both individual and collective efforts. Peace Accords concluded during mediation and negotiations have often and quickly been reneged upon by parties to the conflict. The Akosombo Accord and the First Accra Accord signed in 1994 in Ghana during the Liberian conflict were not honored by the warring factions. The impunity with which these Accords are broken exposes some weakness and failures of the diplomatic, mediation and negotiation process. According to Azumah, ECOWAS’ decision to use Heads of State as the lead mediators during the conflict resolution processes due to their influence and personality is a contributing factor to weaknesses of the process. He posits that some Heads of State may be influential but not possess the requisite skills to lead a mediation process. He further adds that the
rush with which peace accords are drafted and signed makes it a mere formality hence parties to
the agreement do not feel obliged to adhere to them.\textsuperscript{108} The relapse of Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire
into conflict is also a failure of the resolution process. Barely a year after the conflict in Liberia
was resolved, the country relapsed into another conflict. The 1997 elections which were won by
Mr. Charles Taylor was perceived to have ended the conflict and initiated the process of
peacebuilding and democratic rule. This was not the case as violence erupted not long after these
iconic ceremonies were held. Cote d’Ivoire was in a similar situation a few years after the country
got out of the ashes of the 2002 violent conflict. This was because post-conflict resolution measures
were not adequately put in place.\textsuperscript{109}

3.10 Conclusion

The chapter highlighted some significant contributions made by Ghana in assisting ECOWAS
resolve conflicts in the sub-region. The chapter also espoused Ghana’s use of non-military conflict
resolution strategies in helping ECOWAS resolve the conflicts in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea
Bissau, Togo, and Gambia.

The use of diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation by Ghana is in accordance with the 1999
ECOWAS Mechanism and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. This helped Ghana in
assisting ECOWAS to resolve some of the conflicts that erupted in the sub-region without
exacerbating tensions and violence which could have resulted in mass civilian and military
casualties. Ghana’s proposal to use preventive diplomacy which is enshrined in the Mechanism
(Article 3,G) and at the core of the ECPF helped ECOWAS to resolve the 2005 Togo crisis without
the use of military force. Former President Kufuor, employed the early warning system by the
ECOWAS Mechanism when he first invited Mr. Koumba Yala then President of Guinea Bissau to Accra to discuss Guinea’s governance crisis before the 2003 conflict.

Ghana’s National Peace Council is currently being studied by some ECOWAS states and has already been adopted by others. This aids the process of reducing intra-state conflicts in the sub-region. Furthermore, training offered in conflict prevention, management and resolution by Ghanaian institutions such as KAIPTC, WANEP, and LECIAD has also contributed to the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts in the sub-region. The study discovered that non-military conflict resolution strategies are effective instruments for the resolution of violent conflicts in the sub-region.

Despite the efficacy of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation in resolving conflicts, the methods have some challenges. The use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation sometimes span the duration of conflicts. This allows for the warring factions to unleash more violence and destruction on the population. The warring factions also use cease-fire periods to regroup, strategize and arm themselves to further advance the conflict. The impunity with which the numerous Peace Agreements signed during the processes of mediation and negotiations have been flouted was also identified as a challenge. The use of Heads of State as lead mediators during conflict resolution processes and the relapse of conflicts in the sub-region were identified as challenges encountered by Ghana in resolving some of the conflicts that erupted in the sub-region. The military has also been identified to play auxiliary roles using non-aggressive methods in assisting diplomats, mediators and negotiators resolve conflicts that occur in the sub-region.
Ghana’s participation in conflict resolution in the ECOWAS sub-region has been beneficial. The use of non-military conflict resolution strategies has proven to be an effective way of resolving conflicts in the sub-region without resort to aggression despite some of the challenges with the methods. Ghana’s use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation are consistent with ECOWAS’ peace and security protocols. Ghana’s participation in conflict resolution in the ECOWAS sub-region has contributed to sub-regional peace and security.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter gives a summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on the assessment of Ghana’s role in promoting conflict resolution in the ECOWAS sub-region.

4.1 Summary of Findings

The study showed that conflicts that erupted within the ECOWAS sub-region had shifted from inter-state to intra-state since the late 1980’s. Bad governance, political exclusion, human rights violations, poverty, corruption, mismanagement of natural resources, ethnicity, colonial legacies and Cold War politics were identified as sources of conflicts in the ECOWAS sub-region. It also revealed that ECOWAS originally established to promote economic integration among member-states had to expand its focus to include security in direct response to the instability created by the numerous conflicts.

To achieve this, ECOWAS developed its first security policy in 1978 under the Protocol of Non-Aggression. Since then, ECOWAS has developed several other peace and security-related protocols including the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (1981), the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999), Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008). ECOWAS adopted these protocols based on the concept of collective security. The Protocols on Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance on defense were
adopted based on the classical concept of collective security which states that an attack on a member State is an attack on all thereby calling on States to unite and fight against external threats or aggression but prohibits interference in the internal affairs of States. ECOWAS in 1999 adopted the Mechanism to expand the scope of collective security to allow the Community intervene during the internal crisis in member states.

An assessment of ECOWAS’ approach to the conflict in Liberia (1990) revealed that ECOWAS’ response to the conflict was based on both military intervention and the use non-military strategies. The non-interference clauses in the PNA and PMAD complicated the ECOWAS’ intervention. There was a divide between member states on intervening militarily in a sovereign state (Liberia). Despite the divide, ECOWAS still went ahead with a military intervention through ECOMOG based on humanitarian grounds. ECOWAS also employed non-military strategies such as diplomacy, mediation, and negotiations during the Liberian conflicts in addition to the military intervention. The military intervention in Liberia was regarded by some member states of ECOWAS as illegitimate and an attempt by Nigeria to assert itself as a sub-regional hegemon.

Member states of ECOWAS were more responsive to the Community’s response to the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire in 2002. ECOWAS was more open to diplomacy, mediation and negotiations despite the fact that it still deployed troops to Cote d’Ivoire. ECOWAS formed ECOMICI to spearhead the operations in Cote d’Ivoire and collaborated with the United Nations. ECOWAS received support from the United Nations and some Western countries including the U.S, United Kingdom, and France to facilitate its operations in Cote d’Ivoire. The inconsistency of support provided by the external donors partly affected the operations of ECOMICI in Cote d’Ivoire.
The study revealed that ECOWAS’ use of preventive diplomacy during the 2015 Burkina Faso crisis and the 2016 Gambia crisis were effective in preventing the escalation of violence and helped resolve the conflict amicably and within a reasonably short period. In the Gambia, ECOWAS used the gunboat diplomacy as a backup strategy to deter Mr. Yahya Jammeh who was initially adamant about relinquishing power.

The study identified the leadership role played by Ghana in resolving the conflicts in Liberia (1989 -1999 and 1999 – 2003). The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra in 2003 was at the apex of the conflict resolution and initiated the peace process. Ghana’s role in bringing all the warring factions together in Accra in 2004 during the Ivorian conflict in 2002 resulted in the cessation of hostilities and restored the peace process. Ghana also assisted ECOWAS in resolving the conflicts in Guinea Bissau, Togo, and Gambia.

The study established that the use diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation during conflicts in the sub-region reduce civilian and military casualties and also helps to deflate tensions. It also prevents the destruction of the state and individual properties through collateral damage that may occur during military interventions. The use of non-military conflict resolution strategies by Ghana and ECOWAS was seen to be cost-effective. Military operations involve mobilization of logistics, transportation of logistics and personnel, allowances for personnel, transportation from one location to the other during the military operations and a relatively sizeable contingent is needed as compared to negotiation and mediation teams that can be relatively small in number. The use of non-military conflict resolution strategies such as diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation prevents animosity between interveners and the general public. It also prevents
retaliatory actions by the warring factions against intervening states. The humanitarian crisis is contained, and spillover effects are reduced when non-military strategies are employed. The study also identified other auxiliary roles the military paly during conflicts to assist diplomats and mediators in resolving conflicts in the sub-region.

The study also established the fact that, Peace Agreements and Accords signed during conflicts within the ECOWAS sub-region were flouted with impunity by the warring factions and disputants. The haste and frequency with which these cease-fire agreements and Peace Accords were signed often reduced the process to iconic ceremonies.

Heads of States were often used as mediators during conflicts in the sub-region. Though they may be supported by technical aids, they still spearheaded the mediation processes. Heads of State may have the influence but may not have the required skills needed to facilitate the mediation process. This partly contributes to why mediation processes are prolonged and often peace agreements flouted. The study discovered that countries including Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea Bissau relapsed into conflicts few years after the conflicts were resolved. This was because Ghana and ECOWAS had not instituted efficient post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation processes geared towards ensuring sustainable peace after the resolution of some of the conflicts. Finally, Francophone and Anglophone wrangling within the community also affected the unity of purpose with regards to the amicable resolution of conflicts in the sub-region and the advancement of ECOWAS’ collective peace and security agenda.
4.2 Conclusion

Ghana’s collaboration with ECOWAS in resolving conflicts that have erupted within the ECOWAS sub-region has been beneficial. Ghana’s use of non-military conflict resolution strategies including diplomacy, mediation and negotiation have been consistent with ECOWAS’ peace and security protocols (The 1999 Mechanism and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework). This is justified by the peaceful settlement of the conflicts that erupted in Guinea Bissau, Togo and Gambia without the direct participation of the military. Despite the fact that, Ghana contributed troops to support ECOMOG’s operations in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana’s continuous use of diplomacy, mediation and negotiation played a significant role in the eventual resolution of the conflicts. These efforts helped to restore peace in the countries and further enhanced the peace and security of the sub-region.

The establishment of a peace model architecture (National Peace Council) by Ghana has contributed to enhancing the nation’s peace and security. The peace architecture which has been adopted by some member States of ECOWAS also serves as a bulwark against intra-state conflicts within those States. Ghana’s peace and security centers provide training in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking. Professionally trained mediators by these institutions will facilitate the mediation of future conflicts. The sharing of knowledge and experiences in resolving conflicts also builds the capacity of member states to better handle intra-state conflicts when they occur. Ghana’s role has not been in isolation as it has consistently participated and played a significant stakeholder role in conflict resolution through its collaboration with ECOWAS. In conclusion, the study asserts that Ghana’s participation in conflict resolution in the ECOWAS sub-region has contributed to sub-regional peace and security.
4.3 Recommendations

The study proposes the following recommendations based on its finding.

- Ghana should develop a comprehensive peace and security policy as part of the country’s foreign policy to serve as a guide for the State during conflicts. This security policy should take into consideration the various ECOWAS conflict resolution strategies.

- Ghana should invest more in establishing peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding institutions to produce more experts in conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

- ECOWAS should provide training in mediation, conciliation, and negotiation for Heads of State within the sub-region as the Community relies on them to mediate conflicts that occur in the sub-region. Additionally, ECOWAS should attach highly skilled mediators and conciliators to Heads of State during conflict resolution to provide technical assistance during the process.

- ECOWAS should persuade member states to incorporate peace studies into the academic curricular from the basic level as this will help develop peace conscious citizens and in effect reduce intra-state conflicts. This will enhance the peace and security of the sub-region.

- Ghana should continue to use non-military conflict resolution strategies in assisting ECOWAS resolve conflicts that erupt in the sub-region as this promotes the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

- The government of Ghana should organize periodic seminars and conferences to share Ghana’s experiences and challenges in conflict resolution with other ECOWAS members.
This will help other members learn from Ghana’s experiences and share theirs with Ghana. This will promote cooperation between the Member States.

- Ghana should collaborate with ECOWAS to establish an effective and efficient post-conflict reconstruction framework and institution. This will help promote sustainable peace and prevent member States from relapsing into conflicts after peaceful resolutions.
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APPENDIX

AN ASSESSMENT OF GHANA’S ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE ECOWAS SUB-REGION.

Emphasis on the use of non-military strategies in resolving conflicts.

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE.

Research Questions

1. What does conflict resolution entail?

2. What is ECOWAS’ approach to conflict resolution in the sub-region?

3. What were the non-military strategies used in the Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Gambia?

4. When do you use mediation and when do you use negotiation to resolve a conflict?

5. How useful was mediation and negotiation in resolving the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and Gambia?

6. Why should a non-military approach be used in resolving a conflict?

7. When should a non-military approach be used in resolving conflicts?

8. What goes into drafting Peace Accords and Agreements? Are there Agreements/Accords drafted by diplomats and given to the conflicting parties to sign or the conflicting parties draft the terms and conditions of the Peace Agreements?

9. What other role(s) does the military play in conflict resolution other than the traditional peacekeeping?

10. Does the military also use diplomacy/non-military methods in resolving conflicts? Examples required, please.

11. Has Ghana initiated any non-military conflict resolution processes in the sub-region?
12. What are some of the conflicts Ghana has assisted in resolving using non-military methods in the sub-region and how successful have they been?

13. What are the key challenges of using non-military conflict resolution mechanisms and how efficient are they in achieving results?

14. Has Ghana developed enough experts in the field of non-military conflict resolution?

15. To what extent have the non-military conflict resolution methods contributed to the ECOWAS collective peace and security agenda?