THE PLACE OF MILITARY COUP D` ETAT IN AFRICAN POLITICS: THE CASE OF 2013 EGYPT MILITARY COUP D` ETAT

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LEGON
JULY 2015
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the content of the work is as a result of my own research under supervision of Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso. All sources of material used have been duly acknowledged. I also declare that this work has not been represented either in whole or in part for any academic degree in any institution.

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DATE
DEDICATION

I, first of all, dedicate this work to the Almighty God for granting me success despite all the challenges. I also dedicate the work to my daughter Jenele Gerherdine Buchmann. A special feeling of gratitude to Mr. Fred Kisseh and Seidu Anas Sandow, whose words of encouragement and push for tenacity, still ring in my ears. LECIAD Lecturers and the rest of my friends have never left my side and are very special. I thank them for being there for me throughout the entire program.
I wish to thank my supervisor Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso for his fatherly patience, care and personal interest in the work, which I will only say, was invaluable. I have the pleasure in rendering my unqualified gratitude to all LECIAD students of 2012 batch, for their immense contribution in making me realize my dream. My sincere thanks also go to all LECIAD lecturers. To all, I say God bless you. May the Almighty Allah also bless all those other persons who in various ways assisted to make this work a success.
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ABSTRACT

The study set out to investigate the place of military coup d’état in the conduct of world politics and the level of impression to which military coup d’état has had on the development of contemporary African politics, with special focus on the 2013 Egypt military coup that led to the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi. The study is on the context of the local, regional and international socio-political, economic, and psychological factors which appeared to have tremendously influenced the cause of military coups in Africa. It found out that after the Cold War, the military and politics seem to have been odd bed-fellows because liberal democratic governance and human rights and freedoms seemed to have characterized the international system. The military was viewed as a state actor that is tasked with the responsibility of protecting the country against external aggression. The resurgence of the military in the conduct of African politics in the aftermath of the Cold War seems to be a clear manifestation of the fact that the military is a powerful force to reckon with in the study and practice of world politics. The study also examined the causes of military coup d’ in the conduct of African politics. It found out that although, the influence of military coup d’ in African politics appears to have had to its credit both positive and negative effects in the international system, these effects whether good or bad seem to have impacted on one way or the other the relationship between and among states and non-state actors in the international system. The study also found out that the credibility of the military as a tangible determinant of state power may be questionable based on the way and manner it seizes and controls political power. Finally, the study also found out that as a result of the rational actor model of foreign policy decision making the Nations State, which appears to be the primary actor in world politics most often than not consider their foreign policy interest at the expense of good governance, rule of law and human rights. This becomes more manifest in the 2013 Egypt military coup d’état, which was subjected to varied standpoints by both states and non state actors, where states like the US, UK, France, Saudi Arabia, China, Western media failed to describe the ouster of a democratically elected president Mohammed Morsi as a military coup d’état. Whiles Turkey, Qatar, Iran, al-Shabab, Hamas and others also interpreted and condemned it as a military coup.
CHAPTER ONE

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background of the Research

By the constitutional posture of the military, they and politics seem to be odd bed-fellows. Armed forces are an arm of the executive branch of government. They are to protect the country against external aggression, defend the country’s territorial integrity, to assist the police where it is necessary to maintain internal peace and security and other duties assigned to them by the government.¹

In his broadcast about the January 1966 coup d’état in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (first president of Ghana) stated that “it was not the function of soldiers to rule and that if it became necessary for them to intervene in the government of a country they had to hand over power to civilians within the shortest possible time”.² This statement seems to show the constitutional role of the military in Government as far as the conduct African politics is concerned.

According to Charles D. Ghoodbane, “a coup d'état is the sudden deposition of a government, usually by a small group of the existing state establishment, typically the military, to depose the extant government and replace it with another body, civil or military. A coup d'état is considered successful when the usurpers establish their dominance. When the coup neither fails completely nor succeeds, a civil war is a likely consequence”.³
There are three kinds of coups. The first is a *breakthrough coup d’etat* that occurs when a revolutionary group overthrows a civilian government and creates a new elite. Examples of this type of coup include China (1911), Egypt (1952), Greece (1967), and Liberia (1980). A *guardian coup d’etat* takes place when a group comes to power to ostensibly improve public order, as occurred in Pakistan with Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s overthrow by Chief of Army Staff Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1979. Finally, a *veto coup d’etat* occurs when the army vetoes democracy. The most famous example took place in Chile in 1973 when the military overthrew the elected socialist President Salvador Allende Gossens.⁴

There is a focus whether attempted plots and failed coups should be included in the study of the causes and effects of coups. Failed coups may have as large an effect as a successful coup. For instance, if a group were to attempt a coup and fail like that Burundi in 2015, the response of the regime that survived the attempt would likely be political repression as an outcome. This, in turn, ferments resentful out-groups prone to violence that often lead to countercoups or civil war. By way of illustration, Patrick McGowan breaks down the analysis of coups in sub-Saharan Africa into two periods, from 1958 to 1979 and 1980 to 2001. The causes of these coups across both periods are clustered along four explanations: the characteristic of the military, the level of political development, social mobilization, and the national political economy.⁵

There is disagreement on how these various causes positively or negatively affect change. What creates more question than answer is: For instance, does pluralism abate or accelerate coup d’etats? In this case the centrality of the military is almost always a key cause, and related to this is the characteristic of the military, such as its ethnic composition. Countries with large
militaries, particularly where they have strong ethic affinities, are strong candidates for a coup d’etat.\textsuperscript{6} Meanwhile, there is also broad agreement that poor economic performance is a powerful catalyst. Coups, of course, in turn have a negative impact on gross domestic product, which creates a viscous circle. In both cases, the causes of coups can be associated with the hollowing out of the state that eventually cripples it – a process that always precedes state collapse. There is more debate on the association between pluralism and coups, and there are two important points here. First, whatever impact the level of pluralism has on coups, once a coup occurs, the possibility of a subsequent coup is high, and therefore the lack of political development and coups will have a high correlation.\textsuperscript{7}

Nonetheless, in Africa and elsewhere there is a geographic pattern to coups. Of the five major regions, West and Central Africa seem to have been most prone to coups, while southern Africa has been relatively free of coups.\textsuperscript{8} In almost every country or state, the existence of the military is always an important necessity. As the history of some countries testifies, the constitutional role of the military in protecting a country against external aggression, territorial integrity, maintenance of internal peace and security seem to be more important than any other element in any school. In Africa however, the role of the military has not only taken different dimensions but also impacted on the development of politics in the sub-region. This work therefore looks at the way and manner military coup d’ etat impacted on the political development in Africa with special reference to the 2013 Egypt military coup d`etat.
1.2 Statement of the Problem

In the conduct of African politics, it appears that the military and politics are odd bed-fellows. Armed forces like the civil service are an arm of the executive branch of government. The constitutional place of the military is to protect the country against external aggression, to complement the efforts of the police where it is necessary to maintain internal peace and security etc. Many have predicted the future that military coups would cease to play a major role in the conduct of African politics as a result of the development of liberal democratic governance, rule of law, fundamental human rights and administrative justice in the post Cold War era. The stark reality today, however, has shattered the constitutional role of the military in contemporary African politics.

In the post Cold War era, military coups have become widespread in Africa. In the case of the Arab Republic of Egypt for instance, the participation of the military in active politics since the 1950s continues to be one of the major influential and challenging features confronting the development of contemporary African politics. In the past decades, Military coups in Egypt which have contributed to unconstitutional regime changes and “constitutional crises” have gradually crept into the African political sphere once again, occurring in 2013 in the Arab Republic of Egypt that ousted the first democratically elected president Muhammed Morsi after one year in office.

Since military coups appear to have had a negative impression in the conduct of African politics, what then accounts for this recent surge in Egypt? This work seeks to identify and analyze the place of military coup d’ etat in African politics, with special reference to the 2013 Egypt
military coup, its impact on the development of Africa and world politics, identify the risks and causes, and provides some recommendations for policy makers.

1.3 Objectives of the Research

The research is conducted against the background of the following aims and objectives.

- To examine the origin and development of military coup d’etat in Africa.
- To assess the impact of military coup d’etat on Africa.
- To assess why the Egyptian military has become the corner stone characterizing both domestic and foreign politics of Egypt.

1.4 Hypothesis

Military coup d’etat is an immutable feature in African politics.

1.5 Rationale of the Study

The outcome of the research could be beneficial to the government, the military, political leaders, and stake-holders in determining the place of the military in politics. It could also help the military to assess the effects of their actions, and that of their members and other security agencies to acknowledge the effects of military coup d’etat on nations. The rational is also to empower the military to disengage in participating into politics.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

The Neo-Patrimonialism Theory
The research is based on the framework of neo-patrimonialism, within which individual institutions use state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population to overthrow a government. In view of the above, issues of multiplicity of actors in local, regional and international system, are accepted as players influencing certain activities including coups. Notable among these are the armed forces.

Christopher Clapham defines neo-patrimonialism as a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. This means neo-patrimonialism explains a system in which an office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of private and public spheres. The term originated from Max Weber, who described it as a rule based on administrative and military personnel.  

An example is the militarization of the Egyptian state and economy which began in 1952, where a military coup led by a group of young officers, ousted King Farouk, and kicked out the British. This coup installed the first military president, Gamal Abd al-Nasser (1954-1970). In his reign Nasser formed a system in which military officers occupied key administrative positions. Nasser`s successors; Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) appeared to have allowed the military leaders to create economic enterprises and occupy high-level administrative positions in the government as well.

Therefore, state actors are important in international relations. From the realists’ perspective, the state is a unitary actor in international relations, the state is a rational actor, and the agenda of
world politics is restricted. The main proponents of neo-patrimonialism in this regard include Max Weber, Christopher Clapham, Vanda Walle, Ulf Engel, Mathias Basedau among others. African Coups waged in the 1950s have also been conceptualized in terms of the theory of neo-patrimonialism. It is derived from the term patriarchal and is related to male chauvinism. It basically described the nature of the political system that existed in Africa after the end of the Cold War patronage system. This theory is derived from Weber’s patrimonial-charismatic-legal bureaucratic model of administration. According to Weber, it is a system that is based on a male dominant personal rule rather than institutional rule. It is on this basis that Arab system of leadership totally isolates the Female. The system works mainly through cliques and client-patron relationships characterized by the distribution of incentives and rewards with the aim of rewarding influential elites and groups in order to pre-empt, identify and suppress all possible opposition to the incumbent leader who is mostly portrayed as the father of the nation. A major feature of this system of government is corruption; wealth is not distributed according to needs and sound judgment but rather based on “spoils and cooptation.”

For instance, the pre war society of Liberia under presidents William Tubman and William Tolbert was based on the rule by the minority. The Americo-Liberians who constituted just between 2 and 5% of the total population controlled the resources and development of the country with the indigenous majority basically marginalized. It is on this basis that Sergeant Samuel Doe, an indigenous Liberian, seized political power through a military coup d’état promising a return to civilian rule which he never did. Initially, Doe, seen as an indigenous Liberian would ensure some amount of equal redistribution of wealth to take care of the long marginalized majority. However, he ended up reinforcing the already existing politics of
oppressing and marginalizing the majority. It is on the basis of corruption, marginalization and oppression that Charles Tailor mobilized support to start the coup in 1989.\textsuperscript{12}

In Sierra Leone, on the other hand, the pre war society was also no different from the Liberian society. Perhaps the only difference would be the colonial legacy which divided the society into the rich and the poor. In that case Bangura posits that:

> The history of Sierra Leone is a product of mixed grievances from its colonial period. A two-class society with a weak bureaucracy was established during British colonial rule, thereby sowing the seeds for the later popular discontents. Post-colonial mismanagement, particularly in the government of Siaka Stevens (1967-1984), even made the already weak state system completely collapse. As a consequence, the young population both in cities and rural areas became even more marginalized from their society, without access to proper education and employment. This fuelled political and economic grievances against the government and ruling classes.\textsuperscript{13}

Just as Riordan Roett stated, that patrimonialism and modernity do not really co-exist in harmony but in a state of tension, the patrimonial Sierra Leonean state created by colonialism and the Liberian system could not co-exist with the globalised and more interdependent and interconnected global system that emerged after the Cold War. This is a system which facilitated easy trans-border trade, communication and transportation of goods and services (including weapons) across borders. However, some pertinent questions that this theory raises are, to what extent can patrimonialism be attributed to Africa, how were the European states formed and how did they develop, was it not through an European form of patrimonialism? Can it really be said that neo-patrimonialism as a system of government adopted by post independent African states is responsible for those civil wars without looking back to how the African state was created and the colonial style of leadership bequeathed to the new African leaders?\textsuperscript{14}

Opponents of the theory of neo-patrimonialism have also subjected the theory to a series of criticisms. According to Thandika Mkandawire, neopatrimonialism is sometimes used as a way
of explaining why African states have "failed" to effect neoliberal market reforms. Others critics of neo patrimonialism like Erdmann and Hoffmann have asserted that the term is vague, and added that its use has failed to take into account the politics of non-African states. For example, in 1998 Thandika Mkandawire contended that, “Another problem of "neo-patrimonial" is that states in and outside Africa have pursued a wide range of policies including some that are squarely developmental. In other words, other than indicating the style of governance, neo-patrimonialism does not tell us much about what policies a state will pursue and with what success. In the African case "neo-patrimonialism" has been used to explain import substitution, export orientation, parastatals, privatization, the informal sector development, etc. The result is that, in seeking to explain everything, it explains nothing except perhaps that capitalist relations in their idealized form are not pervasive in Africa.

Relevance to the Work

The relevance of this framework to the study emanate from the following principles. First neo-patrimonialism recognizes the importance of the military, because it may have local, regional, and transnational character. A case in point is the Egyptian Armed Forces whose influences transcend Egypt to include the US, EU, Gulf states etc. Secondly, neopatrimonialism also identifies the military as a system of social hierarchy where armed forces use state resources to secure the loyalty of both foreign and domestic clients in order to consolidate their influence and legitimacy in power. For instance, the silence and lack of condemnation by both regional and continental powers against the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces(SCAF) led by General Abdul Fattah al Sisi in 2013,
which overthrew a democratically elected government seems to explain the approval of the coup and recognition of the Egyptian military.

In neo-patrimonialism, as indicated by Christopher Clapham\textsuperscript{17} relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade and dominate a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines.” It is a system in which an office of power is used for by the military for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of the private and public spheres.

The main proponents of neo-patrimonialism include Christopher Clapham, Robert H. Dahl, Seymour Martin, William E. Canolly and others. Like realism, neopatrimonialism acknowledges the fact that the state acts unitarily in matters of both national and international politics. According to Christopher Clapham “decision making whether domestic or foreign, ought not to be composed of competing individuals or state actors, etc. Thus neopatrimonialism also argues that national, regional and international policy decisions are made by state actors including the military. Therefore, the military act’s like an international pressure group publicizing problems and proposing solutions to them. From this perspective, world politics emerges from a lengthy process of interaction and consultation between state actors. The presence of a greater diversity of state actors, including the armed forces in democracies, has an impact on world politics.

Transnationalism is another key sub-concept in neopatrimonialism. In this concept, the assertiveness and the activities of state organizations including the armed forces that are international or belong to transnational groups or organizations are at times incorporated into decision-making processes. The growth of transnational military movements and organizations
that are concerned with global issues has become an important modern trend in world politics. These include armed forces and other state security organizations that spread across the world such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau and investigation (FBI), Mossad, Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGCS) or the Basij Militia, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt etc. Their influences transcend national and regional to include international politics. So, the inroads that some military have made and continue to make in influencing world politics sometimes derive strength from their transnational nature. Thus transnationalism as a sub-concept in neopatrimonialism is relevant to this work. It helps to carve out the overlapping effects and transnational consequences of military activities in individual countries.

The inroads that military have made and continue to make in influencing national, regional and international politics seem to have derived their strength from their patrimonial nature. Thus nationalism which seems to be a sub-concept in neopatrimonialism is relevant to this study.

1.7 Literature Review

Valery Basong in his *Coup d’états in Africa: The Emergence, Prevalence and Eradication* contends that in the late 20th century, coups occurred most commonly in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, Africa and Asia. According to Basong, military coups have often been seen as a means for powerful nations to assure favorable outcomes in smaller foreign states. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the Soviet KGB etc. developed a reputation for supporting coups in states such as in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, respectively. For instance, recently Pat Robertson, a US former presidential candidate is purported to have called for the US
to assassinate former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Mr. Robertson described Mr. Chavez as “a terrific danger” and accused the United States of failing to act when Mr. Chavez was briefly overthrown in 2002.¹⁸

If Basong’s argument is something to go by, it may be obvious that as a result of the rational actor model of decision making, powerful states like the US and Russia will always go for their interests irrespective of the outcome. This may lead to series of activities including regime change since alliance seems to be one of the attributes regulating the conduct of the international system.

However, Daniel Dee Ziankahn in *The Impact of Military Coup D’etat on West Africa’s Socio-Economic and Political Development*, disputed Basong’s assertion that military coups in Africa and developing nations may not be attributed to powerful nations. According to Ziankahn military coups in Africa is as a result of the negative impact of colonialism. Ziankahn contends that in the 1950s when African countries starting in Egypt broke loose from colonialism and became independent, the need for an integrated and classless society was one of paramount concern to most, because the educated class eventually dominated and controlled the political landscape of their respective countries, with inherent authority over the military. They rarely used the armed forces for the intended purpose for which they were created. As the result of the military being rendered redundant and used by politicians as an instrument of fear against their own citizens coupled with political misrule, the military soon began to seize and control state power through military coup d’états.¹⁹
There seem to be some deficiencies in the views of Basong and Ziakahn, going by the plethora of recent coups in Africa, nothing seems to suggest that colonialism or Western influence have been the causes of military coups from the outset. For example, in the case of Egypt, several factors like authoritarianism, sectarian discrimination, human rights abuses, corruption, dictatorial tendencies, economic challenges, Government’s alliance with foreign militant organizations, lack of integration of political stake holders in decision making, Arabian system of totalitarian rule etc compelled the millions of Egyptians to rebel against their governments. This led the Egyptian military to intervene and staged a military coup in Egypt in 2013. Therefore, Western intervention, Colonialism, may have been relative causes of military coups in the African Continent; in the case of the Arab Republic of Egypt none seem to be the case.

In line with Basong`s argument Tariq Ramadan in his “The Arab Awakening” highlights that the fundamental challenge that led to the 2013 military coup in Egypt had to do with the economy, the new actors of the region, the role of the US, Israel and Multinational Corporations. According to him, the US and her allies decided not to condemn the military coup in order to support the army`s overthrow of president Morsi. Moreover, the mobilization of cyber dissidents by Google was a deliberate tactic which was obviously known by Mubarak and the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). According to Tariq, Google had the same agenda as the US, NATO and their regional allies in the overthrow of Morsi. Tariq added that Google organized the first meeting in Budapest of cyber dissidents coming from the Middle East in 2010 two years prior to the emergence of the military coup. Thus, that all what happened in Egypt was arranged by the West. Tariq concludes that Morsi`s ambition to run for presidency was a trap orchestrated by the West through the Egyptian military. Thus Tariq has disputed
Basong’s contention but agreed with the arguments of Ziakahn that military coups in Africa have been orchestrated by Western powers for their foreign interests.

In a sharp rebuttal Yasmin Alibhai-Brown in “Political Islam” says both sides (the military and the Muslim Brotherhood) failed to allow democracy to work in Egypt. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown stressed that the Muslim Brotherhood itself knowingly failed and betrayed the Egyptian people.22 This argument in my view appears to be quite rational as a result of the lack of clear domestic and foreign policy direction, retrospective laws, sectarian discriminations, rights abuses and the lack of a consistent political ideology etc within a year. It presupposes that things may have become worst if the military had waited and allowed Morsi for another year. In June 2013 20, leading Egyptian rights groups wrote a letter to president Morsi in which he was accused of trying to establish a new authoritarian regime in place of the Mubarak regime, of entrenching both political and religious despotism, of paving the way for a theocracy similar to the Iranian model.23

Mahdi Hassan also disputed Tariq’s assertion on the naivety of the Muslim Brotherhood which I find convincing. According to Mahdi, the Muslim Brotherhood were not naïve because Amnesty International, 20 Egyptian rights groups, human rights watch accused Morsi of inciting more violence against Christians, women and other minority groups, and imposed unto himself with dictatorial powers etc. For instance, in November 2012, Muhammad el Baradei described Morsi as new Egypt’s pharoah.24
Within the framework of my personal understanding, although lack of all-inclusive participation in decision making, human rights violations, alliance with militants like the Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah and the seeming diplomatic spat with Israel, Ethiopia and the Syrian government etc were all challenges confronted by the Muslim Brotherhood government, but an assessment of the first democratically elected government after one year in office, take him into account and oust him in military coup was a big challenge that seem to question the credibility of democratic governance in Africa and the Arab Republic of Egypt which has been succeeded by military dictators since the 1950s.

Samuel P. Huntington in his *Patterns of Military Politics* contends that where the public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics is rare. Military coup d`etat takes place in societies with low political culture, where there are few widely accepted political values and where there is a division of opinion on the legitimacy of the regime or incumbents.25

I think the above arguments are not absolute but relative. Because in certain states like Egypt, Thailand, Mali etc there seem to be always civilian attachments to public institutions, but it sometimes depends on the political history, assertiveness and intrusion of the military to always be part of the decision making processes. The political history of Egypt, from independence, appeared to have been characterized by military dictatorship, coups and counter coups, as typically embedded in the political heritage of Arabs`. In the case of Egypt since 1950, the military overthrew the monarchy and consolidated its position and socio-political and economic influence till today. Most often than not the African politicians engage the military in sensitive or
critical political positions and roles, these make it easier for the military to engage in coups in order to establish and consolidate their position in power. The credibility of the civilian governments in terms of democracy, the rule of law, accountable governance and human rights are also variables that seem to sometimes draw the attention of the military to stage coups in Africa.

In his book *Democracy in Developing Countries*, Diamond Linz asserts that military coups have reduced in frequency at the end of the Cold War when many African states embraced democracy, organized elections and acceded to international human rights laws and other international norms and principles. Meanwhile, in the past decade, military coups have gradually crept into the African political sphere, occurring in Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Togo, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Egypt, as well as Mauritania and Mali. African regional and sub-regional organizations have been confounded by this renewed trend.

In his response to Linz’s assertion, Barracain *Military Coup in the Post-Cold War era*, asserts that one reason for the resurgence of military coups in Africa is the failure of democracy in Africa. Considering the 2013 Egypt military coup for instance, Linz asserts that democracy, particularly in the Arab world has been interpreted and applied in different ways according to the whims and caprices of Arab politicians and ruling elites, causing significant discontent among many people. In such states there is no political competition and freedom. In addition, civil and political liberties are so limited that some people are unable to organize and express themselves freely according to their political orientation and interests. Where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of
elections is so compromised, military coups are always bound to ensue. Barraca states “that while many African states including Egypt lay claim to having accepted democracy in theory, in reality, the majority of them are semi-democratic.”

One may also contest the above notion to some extent, because the 2012 election in Egypt that saw the Muslim Brotherhood emerge victorious in both presidential and parliamentary elections was described by local, regional and international election observers as free, fair and credible. This appeared to have made Egypt as an emerging model of democracy in the Arab world. Therefore, democracy has not failed in Egypt but the seeming betrayal of the Egyptian people perhaps by the Muslim Brotherhood and certainly by the seeming lack of patience from the military to allow democracy to work appears to have been the main causes of the military coup d`etat in Egypt and in most African states. So, a large chunk of the challenges emanated from the lack of political tolerance on the part of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

Some scholars have also contended that the concept and practice of democratic governance was not firmly established by the colonialists in Africa prior to independence, and that African leaders were ill-schooled before they took reins of government. Thus G. Y Amoah in *Ground Work of Government for West Africa* argued that the Western type of democracy which the colonialists introduced in West Africa was not firmly established before political power was handed over to the indigenes. Colonial rule, in Amoah`s view, was essentially considered to be authoritarian, repressive and coercive. Towards the end of their rule, the colonialists introduced the western type of democracy. This was done at the stage of responsible government in the constitutional development of the colonies. Ghana reached this stage in 1954, Nigeria in 1957,
Sierra Leone in 1958 and the Gambia in 1962. As a result, the political leaders created conditions which provided justification for and precipitated military takeovers. I dispute the assertion of Amoah in that, some of the African leaders both the civilian and military who took the reins of governance (constitutionally or militarily) after independence appeared to have schooled and had leadership orientation in the West. Such include Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana 1960s), Lieutenant-Colonel Gamel Abd-al Naser (Egypt, 1950s) General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (Mauritania, 2008) Colonel Salou Djibo (Niger, 1999), Captain Amadou Sanogo (Mali, 2012), etc. General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi (Egypt, 2012), etc. They were either high ranking elites or students with Western education who were expected to be custodians of the constitution. Instead they were civilian authoritarian or military rulers. These in my view could be attributed to greed and an endless quest for power by some African military and civilian leaders.

As a component of an executive arm of government, the military most often than not intervenes to safe democracy, human rights and the rule of law from being abused, or trampled upon. The problem is that instead of handing over power to civilians and to ensure security and stability, most military men establish themselves as political leaders. For example militarymen like Hosni Mubarak, Jerry John Rawlings, Abdul Fattah El-Sisi, Blaise Campore, Yahya Jammeh, Gnassingbe Eyadema etc appeared to have been soldiers who seized political power, assumed civilian uniform, organized elections and ruled their countries. This trend has now become normal excuse for military men whose ambitions are to rule.
I think the resurgence of military coups in Africa may be attributed to the challenges confronted by the contemporary international system, such as globalization, containments of conflicts within tolerable limits by the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations, promotion of decency, the emergence of new actors and the like. These appear to be one of the systemic forces confronting the international system.

Meanwhile, regional and sub-regional organizations have also been blamed for the emergence of military coups in Africa. According to McGowan, Patrick J., the inability of regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa to curtail the prevalence of military coup d’etat has been a contributive factor in the emergence of unconstitutional regime change by the military.

The reverse seems to be the case in the West African sub-region. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in its Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of 1999, and the Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy of 2001, reiterated its commitment to ensure that “every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections.” ECOWAS also asserted its “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means. ECOWAS has a number of options when confronted with unconstitutional changes of government. These include:

1. Imposition of sanctions, such as refusal to support the candidature presented by the member state for elective posts; and

2. Suspension of the member state from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies.
Sometimes, the development of military coups depends on the level of the spirit of togetherness and the collective political will of regional organizations. Member states and regional powers tend to have varied views whenever coups occur in other countries. For instance, members of the United Nations and some regional organizations appeared to have had divided opinions when Morsi was overthrown in Egypt. This and other coups might have informed other schools of thought to subject the concept of military coup d’état into varied interpretations:

Lack of condemnations from the United Nation, European Union, African Union etc normally seem to confirm the suspicion of critics that the international community and other regional establishments are in support of regime changes through coup d’états. Moreover, regional organizations and African leaders have also contributed in diverse ways to the occurrence of military coup d’états. In The Military and Politics in Africa, George Klay contends that it was the attitude of “senior members” of the Union which continually threatened to weaken the organization’s resolve. There have been similar unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, such as, in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar etc. It was, therefore, not surprising when the then Senegalese President was equally against the suspension of Guinea from the AU after the coup d’état in December 2008.31

This presupposes that some military coups appear to be in favor of the strategic, political or economic interests of other countries, regional organizations and individual stake holders.

The contradictions inherent in the application of the norm against military coups in government lie in the African regional organizations’ lack of coherence in applying standards, irrespective of the particular circumstances or regime in power. Most importantly, it is critical to underscore the fact that even though many ECOWAS/AU member states may not want to be suspended from
the Union, the consequences of suspension seem not to discourage contravention of the collective norms. In other words, AU/ECOWAS suspensions and sanctions do not “hurt” enough."

However, in my own personal observation high military spending seem to be a relative case in reducing the risk of military coups in the conduct of African politics. An example is the Egyptian military; in terms of high military spending, the Egyptian military appeared to be the second highest non-NATO member recipient of US military aid worth 1.3 billion dollars annually. This seems to be one of the fundamental causes which emboldened the Egyptian military as a major player in Egyptian politics. The idea that Africa looks more likely to be saved from the menace of military coups if it could achieve economic growth than by further political reform seems to be questionable, because the realization of a country’s economic development may not materialize without taking into account the rule of law, accountable governance, and fundamental human rights and freedoms etc. Military coups in Africa seem to be a fundamental product of a combination of political and socio-economic factors. Therefore the absence of democracy, human rights and administrative justice, the rule of law and good governance seem to be the primary political factors if harnessed efficiently, may lead to the reduction of military coups in the conduct of African politics.

These above cited literature have been reviewed because of their contributions to the concept of military coup d'état in the conduct of contemporary African politics. The relevance of the arguments therein indicate that the existence of military coups in Africa has been subjected to varied interpretations as a result of the causes, the way and manner military coups are been
conducted. Thus, some relevant literature have been cited like Groundwork of Government for West Africa, Coup d’états in Africa: The Emergence, Prevalence and Eradication, Daniel Dee Ziankahn in The Impact of Military Coup D’Etat on West Africa’s Socio-Economic and Political Development, The Arab Awakening, Political Islam, al-Ikhwaan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq, Samuel P. Huntington in his Patterns of Military Politics, Professionalization and Military Power etc.

1.8 Sources of Data and Methodology

In gathering material for this work, the research shall consult both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources based on the time limit would be collected from questionnaires, interviews and observations. The interviews will also base on the one-on-one method which will also cover the High ranking Military officers of the Ghana Armed Forces, scholars who have some knowledge about military politics. Also, the major sources of information were data collected from books, articles, books, journals and relevant internet materials. Other relevant secondary sources shall be consulted most of which have been highlighted in the literature review.

1.9 Arrangement of Chapters

The work has been divided into four chapters as follows: Chapter One deals with the Research Design, which includes the Introduction, Statement of the Problem, Objectives of the research, Hypothesis, Scope of the research, Rational, Theoretical framework, Literature Review, Source of Data Collection and Arrangements of Chapters. Chapter Two is the historical analysis on the origin and development of military coup d’état in Africa, the impact of military coup d’état and
how it can be prevented in Africa. The Third Chapter deals with the overview of the 2013 military coup d’état in Egypt and its effects on African politics. The Fourth Chapter is a summary of the findings discussed, conclusions and recommendations.

Endnotes

2 Ibid p. 276
5 Encyclopedia of Political Science , op. cit., p.1450
6 Ibid., p.350
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
12 https://www.google.com.gh/search?site=&source=hp&q=the+pre+war+society+of+Liberia+under+presidents+William+Tubman+and+William+&oq=the+pre+war+society+of+Liberia+under+presidents+William+Tubman+and+William+&gs_l=hp.12...1903814.1903814.0.1905726.1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0...0..1c..64.hp.1.0.0.PVeRc9JpwY retrieved 14/6/2015
19 Daniel Dee Ziankahn The Impact of Military Coup D’Etat on West Africa’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
20 http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/2014/03/political-islam-failed-20143814278619177.html
22 ibid
23 ibid


CHAPTER TWO

BRIEF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY COUP D’ETAT IN AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

This Chapter discusses the historical analysis on the origin and development of military coup d’etat in Africa and why military coups have become the order of the day in the conduct of African politics.

2.1 Historical Development of Military Coups in Africa

Some international relations scholars have described the period of the 1960s as the era of military decade in Africa because the continent was plagued by coups during this period. In West Africa, for instance Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone Mali and the like have all experienced one or more successful coups between 1960 and 1963 alone. In the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of African leaders were assassinated or forced from office by coup d’état. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, only five countries in Africa held competitive elections on a regular basis.¹ All the coups were as a result of divergent causes such as corruption, dictatorship and social, economic, political, religious and psychological challenges.

Beginning from 23rd July, 1952 in Egypt a group of army officers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Gamel Abd-al Naser seized power. The military coup ousted King Farouk, and installed the first military president, Gamal Abd al-Nasser (1954-1970) who formed an Arab socialist regime in which military officers occupied the most important administrative and economic positions.²
This seems to have contributed tremendously to the establishment and consolidation of the Egyptian military in politics. Moreover, Nasser’s method of inculcating the military into active politics was pursued by subsequent military leaders like Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. This might have informed General Abdul Fattah El-Sisi and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to seize power from the first democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi.

Moreover in my personal observation, the role of the Egyptian military in active politics may somewhat be attributed to the culture of Arabs from time immemorial. Military men in the Middle East seem to have enjoyed a largely inalienable right to rule through bloody coups. This could be traced from the ideology of Umayyad and the Abbasside Caliphates who believe in changing society through militarism. This makes it extremely difficult for the introduction of ‘proper’ civilian rule in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Because the military most often than not stage coup, assume a civilian status, manipulate elections, suppress the opposition, and assume the position of presidency. A clear cut example is the current development in the internal politics of Egypt where General Sisi assumed a civilian dimension and became a head of state overnight.

But in the observation of Robert Springborad, instead of making the army focus on defense, subsequent military leaders who seized power like Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and Mubarak brought back the military’s influence on Egyptian society allowing its leaders to create economic enterprises and occupy high-level administrative positions in the government. Thereafter, military coups have ensued and spread like a contagion in Africa.
In the view of Martin Meredith “the first military coup d’états of the independence era in sub-Saharan Africa occurred in Togo. In 1963, for instance, Togo’s autocratic president, Sylvanus Olympio, was shot dead by a group of ex-servicemen led by sergeant, Étienne Eyadéma, after he refused to employ them in the Togolese army. Olympio’s assassination, marking as black Africa’s first coup d’état, was vehemently denounced throughout Africa, though in Togo itself there was little mourning.”

This may be due to the ethnic conflict between the Ewe in the south who make up 32% of the Togolese population, and the Kabye people in the north who also make up 22%. Eyadema and his rebellion were predominantly Kabyes who rebelled against Olympio and accused his government of sidelining the Kabye whilst favoring ewes.

A spate of coups followed in other African states like Benin; Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Central African Republic etc. These military coups were beset by tribal divisions, huge debts, unemployment, frequent strikes and an unending struggle for power between and among rival political leaders. In the case of Benin the army commander, Colonel Christophe Soglo, stepped in to take control in 1965 in order to prevent civil war, restore calm and protect the peace and security of the country. As a responsible army officer, after establishing a recognized provisional government, he gave up power and allowed former premier Sourou-Migan Apithy to become president.

This seems to suggest the varied standpoints in military coup d’états in the continent. The military in Africa sometimes stage coups to inject sanity, prevent genocide human rights
violations and the rule of law. They sometimes relatively or completely keep aloof from politics once calm has been restored. Spirit of togetherness in the military structure is also a factor in military coups. For instance, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt, has always been successful in staging coups as a result of the high level of cohesion and collective interests in its leadership. The military in most African countries seem to be divided along ethnic, political or religious lines. Thus the military may be unable to fully participate in politics in the absence of unity and cohesion in the barracks. It may be on the basis of this reason that Soglo retired from politics, when the military ousted him in 1967.

This, in my view presupposes that most often than not, the military men stage coups in response to the will of the people, many African civilian democratically elected leaders appeared to have been ousted by the military by the people’s conscent. Cases in point are the coups waged by Soglo(Benin), Lamizana(Upper Volta), Jerry John Rawlings(Ghana), Leutenant Colonel Isaac Zida(Burkina Faso) etc. These aspects of coup d’ etat seem to be in line with democratic governance. In the Egyptian case, for instance, millions of demonstrators were said to have implored the military to intervene which led to the overthrow of Morsi. But the way and manner coupled with the timing seemed to have question the credibility of the moral background of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces(SCAF) led by General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.

The Cold War appears to have contributed to the development of coups in parts of African. The ideological conflict between Communist Russia and Western Capitalism played a tremendous role in the development of coups in some countries in the continent.
In East Africa (1964) for instance, armed African gangs in Zanzibar incited a coup d’etat against the Arab ruling elite, forcing the sultan to flee in his yacht. A revolutionary council, led by Abeid Karume, a former navy, appealed for assistance from China, the Soviet Union and East Germany. Hundreds of communist technicians duly arrived, prompting Western fears that the island might become an African “Cuba”.6

This seems to be justified by later coups in which the United Kingdom and its allies intervened in East Africa to stabilize the region. In his assertion, Martin adds that the military coup in Zanzibar was followed by a series of mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, precipitated by grievances over pay, promotions and the continuing presence of senior British officers rather than by political resentment of the three governments. In each case, British troops were required to bring the mutinies to an end. Whatever the cause, army coups and interventions in Africa became a familiar occurrence. Within a few years of independence, military coups spread across the continent striking down not only regimes that were inherently weak and unstable but afflicting even the giants of Africa.7 I think it is on the basis of these developments that some scholars like Bassong and Zikham argued that military coups in Africa are orchestrations of the West, which may be justified to some extent based on the above assertion. Nonetheless, the East African coups in the 1960s seem to have been affected by the activities of the Cold War in 1946-1989.

Economic challenges, which appear to be among the contributive factors to the prevalence of military coups in most African countries were evident in the Republic of Ghana as well. Under Nkrumah’s leadership, Ghana sank rapidly into a spiral of economic chaos and decline.
Nkrumah’s grand design for industrialization in many fields and the challenges that went with it burdened Ghana with a vast, unwieldy structure of loss-making state enterprises — factories, shipyards etc. beset by economic challenges, the overall result was calamitous. From being one of the most prosperous tropical countries in the world at the time of independence in 1957, Ghana by 1965 had become virtually bankrupt.⁸

In a sharp contrast to the above, Christopher and Basili contend that Nkrumah’s downfall in the end came not as a result of Ghana’s desperate economic plight, but because of his fatal decision to interfere with the military. His attempt to subordinate the military to his own purposes and to accord favorable treatment to the President’s Own Guard Regiment, an elite unit regarded as his private army, caused deep and dangerous resentments among the officer corps. In February 1966, while Nkrumah was abroad, Ghana’s generals struck.⁹ Coup d’etat in Ghana did not stop there, however. Over the next two decades, a succession of governments, both military and civilian, engendered further collapse. Encumbered by massive debts, falling output, endemic corruption and incompetent management, Ghana by the 1980s had been reduced to little more than a wasteland. This also led to the development of other bloody coups in Ghana by Jerry John Rawlings in 1979.¹⁰

Abubakar Atofarati, in his observation, asserts that civilian rule in Nigeria survived for less than six years after independence. From the outset, rival political parties from the country’s three regions such as the (Hausa-Fulani) North and the two southern regions (predominantly Igbo) engaged in a ferocious struggle for supremacy over the federal government and the spoils of office. In January 1966, spurred by corruption a group of soldiers mounted a revolution in which
the federal prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was murdered.\textsuperscript{11} Coups and counter-coups ensued thereafter, which led to the emergence of Biafra led by Ojukwu who rallied the Eastern population behind secession and proclaimed the independence of the new state of Biafra. The Nigerian coup lasted for two and a half years and cost nearly a million lives.\textsuperscript{12} Although corruption, economic stagnation were the cause that led to many coups within and across sub-Saharan Africa, but tribal superiority or etnnocentricism appeared to have played a dominant role in the development of military coups in the federal Republic of Nigeria.

Contrary to the above, imperialism, dictatorship, and totalitarian tendencies adopted by some African leaders were also factors in the prevalence of coups in the Continent. For instance. According to Oliver, Roland and Atmore, after ruling Ethiopia for sixteen years (1916 1930) as a monarch, Haile Selassie appeared to have depended on his decisions alone. Beset by the inability to maintain his empire and impose his son as his successor, in early 1974, discontent within the army over pay led to a series of mutinies. Simultaneously, a chaotic profusion of strikes and demonstrations broke out in Addis Ababa and other towns; protesting over pay, rising prices and a multitude of other grievances. A group of radical junior officers formed a military “committee” or “Derg” ousted and murdered Haile Selassie in August 1975.\textsuperscript{13} Ethiopia’s military coup, initially accomplished without bloodshed, turned increasingly violent. An ambitious ordnance officer, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, emerged in control and embarked on what he referred to as a campaign of “red terror” to root out all resistance.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Nzongola Georges, during the Congo Crisis, Belgian forces aided Mobutu in a coup against the nationalist government of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 to take control of the government. Lumumba was the first leader in the country to be democratically elected. He was
subsequently deposed in a coup d’état organized by Colonel Mobutu and executed by a Katangese firing squad led by Julien Gat, a Belgian mercenary. Mobutu then assumed the role of army chief of staff, before taking power directly in a second coup in 1965. In a bid to create a new national identity, he ordered the country to be known as “Zaire”, a name derived by the Portuguese from a Kikongo word, Nzadi, meaning “vast river” in 1971 and his own name to Mobutu SeseSeko in 1972.15

In the aftermath of his coup in 1965, Mobutu set out to create a “new Congo”. Acting ruthlessly to suppress disorder and dissent, he managed to impose some form of central control over most parts of the Congo within a few years. His economic strategy was equally effective. Inflation was halted, the currency was stabilized, and the giant copper mining industry was nationalized.16 As a military officer who was expected to instill sanity in the political affairs of Zaire Mobutu established a single national political party (Popular Movement of the Revolution PMR), set himself up as its sole guide and mentor, assumed grand titles and laid down an ideology to which everyone was instructed to adhere, ruled by decree, controlled all appointments and promotions and deciding on the allocation of government revenues.17 In the works of Tharoor Ishan Zaire plunged ever deeper into decline and decay. Corruption and embezzlement spread to every level of society. In 1997, military men and rebel forces led by Laurent Kabila expelled him from the country.18

Milton Obote and Iddi Amin were also two Ugandan dictators. Like so many other African states, Uganda’s initial prospects were promising. Uganda began independence in 1962 with federal constitution that allowed the kingdom of Buganda to exercise a measure of internal
autonomy, to retain its own parliament, the Lukiiko, and monarchic traditions, while the central government in Kampala remained in effective control nationally. In a spirit of compromise, the Baganda king, the Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa, was appointed head of state, while Milton Obote, a Langi from the north, headed a coalition government which included the Baganda royalist party, the KabakaYekka.¹⁹

From the outset, however, Obote strove to gain absolute control. When his plans for a one-party state met resistance, he staged what was in effect his own coup d’état. In 1966, he ordered the arrest of cabinet ministers, assuming all powers, abrogated the constitution, suspended the National Assembly and dismissed the Kabaka as president. He also appointed a new army commander, Idi Amin, a former sergeant in the colonial army.²⁰

Obote assumed that Amin would continue to serve him as a loyal and simple soldier. When Obote began to build up a personal following in the officer corps and to look for support among the large contingents of Langi and Acholi troops, Amin matched his maneuvers by enlisting groups from the West Nile. Amin struck first, ousting Obote in 1971 while he was on an overseas visit.²¹

In constant fear of possible attack by Obote’s loyalists, Uganda descended into a nightmare of massacres, murders and lawlessness under Iddi Amin’s rule. He is said to have ordered the mass suppression and killing of Langi and Acholi tribesmen and opponents. No one was immune. The chief justice, the vice-chancellor of Makerere University disappeared, the Anglican archbishop, etc, were all murdered after they spoke out against Amin’s tyranny. The civil service, was reduced to a mere shell, its senior members either purged or escaped to safety abroad.²²
As Uganda sank deeper into disarray, Amin turned vindictively on Uganda’s Asian community who controlled much of the country’s trade and industry expelled by 1972. Uganda as a result, lost a large proportion of its doctors, dentists, veterinarians, professors and technicians. The end of Amin’s regime came in 1979, when Tanzanian forces struck back across the border and then decided to oust Amin altogether.  

A critical look at the factors that led to the development of Amin’s ouster in Uganda suggest that he was pursuing the totalitarian rule similar to that of the Arabs. This may have informed some international relations analysts to attribute him as a Saudi Arabian puppet since he was accommodated and secured in the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until his death.

When oil was discovered and revenues began to flow in Libya, an army coup in 1969 brought to power a 27-year-old captain, Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi’s readiness to use proxy violence, assassination and bribery in foreign lands made him widely feared and detested there. In Africa, Gaddafi backed Eritrean guerrillas against Haile Selassie’s regime; Polisario guerrillas fighting to oust Morocco from the Western Sahara; opposition factions in Niger and Mali; and southern African liberation movements. When Amin’s army faced defeat in 1979, Gaddafi dispatched an expeditionary force to Uganda to try to prop him up. He sent troops to invade the Aozou Strip, a stretch of desert on the border with Chad, and then used it as a forward base from which to intervene in a civil war in Chad, hoping to make it part of a new empire. In Libya, meanwhile, the population endured decades of stifling dictatorship until Libyans backed by NATO rebelled against and brutally assassinated him in 2011.
In the West African sub-region for instance the military in each country such as the Ivory Coast, The Gambia (which successful quelled a military coup attempt in 1981), Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Sierra Leone etc have experienced military coups and several abortive ones.\textsuperscript{26} The Gambia and Senegal have overthrown their governments at one time or the other in each country. Ghana has had Coups three times; on February 1966, 13 January 1972, and 4 June 1981 and many unsuccessful coup attempts. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, also a West African state has had coups five times; on 15 January 1966, 29 July 1966, 29 July 1975, 31 December 1983 and 27 August 1985, 1993 etc.\textsuperscript{27}

In the light of recent developments, some African countries have also experienced coup d’état. These coups in question took place in Mauritania (2008) when, Perceived Islamist and jihadist threat, prompted General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz to stage a military coup in August 2008. In 2009, the junta oversaw presidential elections. Abdel Aziz ran as a civilian and won, who remains in power till today.\textsuperscript{28}

Moreover, in 2008, the junta in Guinea, led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara staged a coup. Camara promised that elections would take place and that he would not stand, but tensions rose as his promises came to appear hollow and his behavior became erratic. Then, in December 2009, one of Camara’s guards shot him in the head. The junta leader lived, but was flown to Morocco, later to Burkina Faso, and was not permitted to re-enter Guinea. Power passed to General Sekouba Konate, who oversaw a two-round election in June/November 2010. Opposition leader Alpha Conde, won and is still the current president.\textsuperscript{29}
The 2010 coup in Niger, led by Colonel Salou Djibo, shows continuities with the 1999 coup: Djibo’s junta, appearing to consider itself the referee of Nigerien democracy, seized power and quickly organized civilian elections. This two-round contest, held in January/March 2011, was won by opposition leader and current President Mahamadou Issoufou.

On 22 March 2012, a band of Malian mutineers - who call themselves the National Committee for the reestablishment of Democracy (CNRDR) – led by Captain Amadou Sanogo have ordered borders closed, after taking over key buildings in the capital Bamako, ousting President Amadou Toumani Toure, which sparked international concern and condemnation. Their move was prompted by the government's "inability" to put down a Tuareg-led insurrection in the north and many others.30

Currently, there are eight (8) African heads of state who appear to have assumed power through military coup d`etat:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Assumed power</th>
<th>Replaced/Ousted</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coup d`Etat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Teodoro Obiang NguemaMbasogo</td>
<td>3 August 1979</td>
<td>Francisco Macias Nguema</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1979 Equatoguinean coup détat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Yoweri Museveni</td>
<td>29 January 1986</td>
<td>Tito Okello</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Ugandan Bush War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Omar al-Bashir</td>
<td>01989-06-30-000030 June 1989</td>
<td>Sadiq al-Mahdi</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1989 Sudanese coup d'état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Idriss Deby</td>
<td>2 December 1990</td>
<td>Hissene Habre</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1990 Chadian Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Isaias Afwerki</td>
<td>01991-04-27-000027</td>
<td>Mengistu Haile Mariam</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Eritrean War for Independence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Almost all African countries that gained their independence in the 1960s started out with multiparty systems. However by the end of the 1960s, only a handful of African countries appeared to have maintained a multiparty system. Indeed by 1970, half of the independent countries in Africa had military governments. That is, the military took over control of the government. Instead of elected civilians, the government was controlled by the arm forces.

Some coup d’etats were quite violent. In the process of taking control, the soldiers involved killed members of the civilian government, including, at times, the president. Sometimes the coup d’etats were non-violent. In these cases, the military simply surrounded the presidential palace and the civilian government surrendered peacefully.\(^3\)

In view of the above, the origin and development of military coups in Africa has been subjected to varied interpretations and series of analysis based on the challenges of the time coupled with the way and manner the coups were executed. To some schools of thought, whereas foreign interventions appeared to have contributed to the emergence of coups, there are other causes too that share general commonality in the majority of the state’s coups: A protracted economic crisis has in most cases led to the failure of the political leadership. When faced with runaway...
inflation some of the more common measures have been price control, strict currency control, increased taxes and devaluation. Unfortunately these have not always been popular measures and have instead tended to generate countrywide dissatisfaction and national outrage. Military intervention has often occurred in these circumstances.”

This in my view depends on the political status quo or the level of cohesion that exists between and among political parties and stake holders in the country. Other countries seem to have been confronted by similar challenges, as a result of the spirit of togetherness, support and determination between the people and the government military coup seizes to exist. A clear cut example is the republic of Ghana under the first term of the leadership of John Dramani Mahama where inflation, fall of the Cedis, increase taxes, prices control, electricity, water, education and other challenges bedeviled the country yet the military still played its role as armed forces of the nation without any intervention despite series of agitations and protests and demonstrations against the government.

Moreover, it appears that a country with deep rooted democratic heritage, sense of civility and national apathy may stand and survive the test of internal socio-political and economic challenges once the civilian leaders and the opposition, and stake holders have been able to resolve their differences in the interest of the nation. The out-ward effect of such unity and solidarity may not lead the military and the masses into disappointment, disillusion and loss of faith in the government.
Therefore Political squabbling, corruption, mismanagement, maladministration within the ruling elite may have the out-ward effect of leading the military and the masses into disappointment, disillusion and loss of faith in the government. The inefficiency of the civilian government, in the face of corruption, maladministration and the like seem to have been a common factor in the emergence coup d’etat in Africa.

2.2 Why Military Coup d’Etat have become the Order of the Day in the Development of Contemporary African Politics

With reference to the factors that cause military coup d’ etat in Africa, Major Jimmi Wangome, states “looking at the entire continent, military intervention has not always been conducted to 'rescue' the nation from political ills. Coups have been linked directly or indirectly to personal ambitions and the craving for power by some specific key players. This was in fact the case in Dahomey in 1965. In other instances, officers have led coups to regain lost prestige or to preempt an impending purge like in Egypt 2013 coup d’etat against Muhammed Morsi. Coupled with this, interpersonal clashes have occurred between the civilian and military elites and thereby provoking takeovers. Cases in point have been Uganda in 1971, Togo in 1963, Congo in 1968, Dahomey in 1967, and several others. On the other hand some have also argued that Military coup d’ etat in Africa are a product of a combination of political and socio-economic factors which are follows:

2.2 Political

Sometimes conflicts among political leaders have also led to bloody coups in the African Continent. The military usually seize the opportunity to usurp power when political wrangling among political leaders threatens law and order and undermine the security of the state.33 For
instance, in 2013, some leading politicians in Egypt including Muhammad El-Baradei, Ahmed Shafiq etc joined the civilian protesters against the dictatorial leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood led by Morsi. This led to insecurity, violence, mass protests. It was a clear manifestation of the conflict of interests among the political leaders. This consequently led the military to intervene and ousted the government.

**Absence of deep-rooted military professional heritage:**

The standing armies as known today in West Africa were the creation of the colonial powers. In the English-speaking West Africa, for example, the military establishments were created in the 1890s as the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) and later in 1928 as the Royal West African Frontier Force RWAFF) with units in Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. They were created to support the colonial governments.\(^{34}\)

Until the 1950s there were few African officers in the military establishments. The officer corps was predominantly European. Even after the West African Forces Conference held in Lagos in April 1953 when the need to provide for African commissioned officers in the military establishments in the British West Africa was emphasized, the West African governments frowned on the Africanization of the officer corps. Consequently, on the eve of independence, many West African states had very few African officers in their military establishments. For example, Sierra Leone had only ten (10) officers of whom the most senior was a major; Ghana had twenty-seven (27) and Nigeria had about fifty (50).\(^{35}\)
Absence of Deep-rooted Western democratic Heritage in Africa:

The Western type of democracy which the colonialists introduced in Africa appears not to have been firmly established before political power was handed over to the indigenes. Colonial rule was essentially considered to be authoritarian. Towards the end of their rule, the colonialists introduced the western type of democracy. This was done at the stage of responsible government in the constitutional development of the colonies. Ghana reached this stage in 1954, Nigeria in 1957, Siera Leone in 1958 and the Gambia in 10962.¹³⁶

The time between the introduction of Western type of democratic rule and the eventual independence in most parts of Africa appeared to have been so short that it did not have ample time to develop. The political leaders were, therefore, ill-schooled in it before they took the reins of government. When independence was achieved, the political leaders and the top civil servants continued behaving in an authoritarian manner and resented the constitutional checks embodied in the independent constitutions and those constitutions were quickly replaced soon after independence. The new constitutions enabled them to behave autocratically. As a result, the political leaders created conditions which provided justification for and precipitated military takeovers.³⁷

In view of the above, some schools of thought have also contended that colonial states in Africa were not democratic and had little respect for human rights. In my view it is difficult, but not impossible, to develop democratic institutions and practices on a "political foundation" that is un-democratic. Moreover, African leaders faced opposition, partially because of their inability to meet the needs of their citizens; it was easy for them to fall back on the un-democratic examples
of the colonial states. Many post-colonial governments resorted to the same undemocratic practices as the colonial states used to control and deal with opposition. A case in point was Nkrumah’s government of Ghana in the 1960s, where he had to adopt a robust tactic as a result of intense domestic and foreign opposition pressure in order to implement his socio-economic and political policies devoid hindrance.

**Lack of Leadership Capacity**

Colonial states appear to be weak and lacked capacity. Thus, it seemed very difficult for the first independent governments in Africa to meet the huge social and economic needs of their countries. The inability of governments to meet the legitimate needs of their citizens is a key cause of political dissatisfaction and un-rest that led to military coup d’etats in Africa. Some African governments inherited a weak political system from the colonial era. Consequently, some of the first African governments seem not to have had the capacity to govern effectively. Military leaders, afraid that their countries would fall apart politically, decided that they could do a better job of governing.

**2.3 Ethnic/Tribal superiority**

Ethnic conflict is a major political problem in many African countries. Ethnic rivalry over scarce resources and political power to control resources has led to political conflicts, military takeovers and occasionally to serious violence. Ethnicity and ethnic rivalry are not new developments in Africa; they are often rooted in Colonialism. The colonial policies of divide and rule and indirect rule are clear examples. These practices helped to establish ethnic rivalries that have become a common part of politics in post-colonial Africa. Examples are the Rwandan ethnic conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis and the Biafra War between the Igbos and the
Housa-Fulanis in the federal Republic of Nigeria. All these tribal superiority and bloody ethnic conflicts appear to be the result and activities of the colonial authorities

2.4 Disregard for Individual Liberties:
Beginning from Ghana in 1957 African countries south of the Sahara achieved in rapid succession after the colonial powers. After their independence constitutional amendments also followed in rapid succession. More power was concentrated in the hands of the rulers. Thus dictatorship ensued and civil liberties progressively were eroded away. Freedom of speech and the press are among the liberties which were often attacked. Criticism of a government was often restricted by charges of treason and by detention laws. Election were also manipulated in favor of ruling parties, democratic ways of changing governments were blocked. These deprivations provide justification for soldiers to seize power.41

Tendency to Clinch to Power:
Some African leaders consider themselves indispensable. They therefore hang on to power for life by declaring one party state, an example is Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokasa, who seized power in Central African Republic in 1965 established a monarchy, crowned himself as emperor Bokasa I, his wife as empress and his son as the crown prince on December 4, 1977. A coup d`etat is often the only means to end their rule.42 Almost all past Egyptian military leaders and the like appear to have been indispensable. Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muamar Gadhafi of Libya, Zain al Abideen Bin Ali of Tunisia etc hanged on to power with dictatorial powers until he Arab Spring in 2010 which led to their decades of rule.
Political Ambition of Military men:

Some military men nurse political ambition. They compete for power but they dislike elections. Fortunately for them, they control the instrument of violence (i.e. the gun) as means of taking power. This, in my view could sometimes be attributed to the Exposure of Military men to Political Positions: When the military seize power, some top political positions go to military men. Apart from the ruling council, some military men become governors, ministers, commissioners, managing directors, executive chairmen of public corporations and boards etc. An example is the Egypt were military officers have held top ranking government positions since 1950. They find it difficult to readjust to military life in the barracks when the hand over power to a civilian government. Some of them may plan to come back to power at all cost thereby taking arms. Besides, the new life -styles of and the wealth of those military men occupying political positions excite envy in some of those in the barracks. This makes them attempt to or capture power so that they may also live similar life-styles.

The duplication of the above scenario appears to have been witnessed in Egypt as General Abdul Fatah El-Sisi staged a coup, ousted a democratically elected president, stood for elections and now the president of Egypt, with top military official in government positions.

This, according to George Klay, undermines discipline in the armed forces. It sometimes leads to modification of the hierarchical structure in the armed forces. For instance, at official ceremonies military seniority often gives way to political positions. At national or regional functions a military regional commissioner who may be a lower rank military officer is at the center stage. On both his arrival and departure the national anthem is played. His superiors at command
positions on the other hand are brushed aside. Thus political appointments with all their paraphernalia become more lucrative and attractive than command posts. This breeds discord, jealousy and ambition for political power.  

2.5 Economic and Social Factors

Rosemary O’Kane argues that the underlying causes of coups in the conduct of African politics is economic rather than political. O’Kane views coups as the consequence of the lack of political control which results from the domestic uncertainties produced by world market trade. Specifically, it is argued that the underlying causes of coups are specialization in and dependency on primary goods for export, exacerbated by poverty. Such preconditions render even the most responsible governments open to accusations of incompetence and corruption, so inviting coups d'état.

Another major cause of military takeover in the development of contemporary African politics is economic mismanagement and corruption. The economies of most African states appear to be one product economies. This means that the countries depend on only one main crop or product for their exports and consequently for their foreign exchange earnings. If there is a drop in either the price of that single commodity or the demand for it, the countries find themselves in economic difficulties. For many years after their independence, some African countries like Ghana, Ethiopia, Guinea and the like have experienced continuous drop in their foreign exchange earnings due to perennial draught and the world economic situation. Moreover some African states mismanage their economies. This leads to waste in the economy. Other African governments also engage in prestigious and wasteful projects and ambitious foreign policies which bring hardship to their citizens.
The world economic situation, economic mismanagement, corruption and drought produce sad and humiliating situations in most African countries. As a result, the economy becomes stagnant; people suffer from acute shortages of drugs, spare parts, and other essential commodities, employment strike many people, prices of imported good and local food stuffs rise astronomically and many homes are drifted onto the verge of famine and starvation.⁴⁷

Given the under-developed economic systems they inherited from colonialism, many African governments were unable to meet the social and economic needs of their countries. This situation often led to a crisis of legitimacy. That is, the citizens became disillusioned --fed-up-- with governments that could not provide basic social and economic services, such as jobs, education, and adequate health-care. Military coup leaders in Africa often justified their taking power on the grounds that the prior civilian government had been unable to meet these basic needs.⁴⁸

2.6 Corruption

One of the most serious social evils that have plagued many African states and often lead to military coups is corruption. Corruption has permeated African states. Most African political leaders, government functionaries and top public servants regard public office as a means to enrich themselves, their families and friends, e.g Mobutu Sesseseko (Zaire), Blaise Compaore (Burkina Faso), Muammar Gadhafi (Libya) General Sani Abacha (Nigeria), Charles Tailor (Liberia) etc are said to have acquire extensive financial assets including overseas property by using their official positions to divert public funds.
Political leaders also create political funds with which they buy electoral supports from the electorate. Into these funds are paid kickbacks on governments’ contracts and import licenses. For instance, it was alleged during the mini-trial of President Sheiuh Shagari of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and his Vice-President, Alex Ekweme, in January 1986 that on one Federal government contract a sum of 21.8 million Naira was paid as a kickback to the defunct National Party of Nigeria (NPN), of which they were leaders, and some of its chieftains. Businessmen collude with government officials to bleed their countries white by over-invoicing imports, under-invoicing imports and transferring money to pay for goods which are never received. In the scandal which followed the collapse of a British Bank called Johnson Matthay Bankers Limited in 1985 and which has come to be known in banking circles as JMB Affairs. It was revealed that Nigeria lost about 6.2 billion dollars within a short time through such trade malpractices.49

The strains on the political system in the early years of independence provided an environment in which corruption became widely practiced in some African countries. Military leaders often used the pretext of widespread corruption to justify their taking power. Corruption and waste rob the state of the much needed capital—both local and foreign for development. They contribute heavily to the economic difficulties into which many African countries find themselves and which serve as a cause for military interventions.50

2.7 Psychological Factors.

Military men also follow the “Jone”. When soldiers in one country successfully capture political power there is a strong tendency among their counterparts across the borders to follow suit. An
example is the coup in Niger on 18th February 2010, Guinea Bissau on April 1st 2010, Madagascar on 17-18 November, 2010, and Democratic Republic of the Congo on 27 February 2010, Mali 21 March 2012, etc.  

2. 8 External Factors

Many military coup d’etat in Africa have been planned and executed from outside the country. The US and the Soviet Union were well-known for recruiting, financing, training and equipping military men to topple governments which they do not like. Some African countries also aid coups in other neighbouring countries to remove governments which they consider conservative or obstacles to their foreign policies.  

This phenomenon in the post-independence phase was blamed on outside intervention during the Cold War. According to Valeri Basong in March 2004, authorities in Zimbabwe impounded a plane which flew in from South Africa with 64 alleged mercenaries on board. The mercenaries were on their way to Equatorial Guinea to oust the government of President Obiang Nguema and had stopped in Zimbabwe to pick up ammunition. Simon Mann, a British ex-SAS officer, was leading the group and appeared to have been the main instigator of the coup attempt. An additional 17 mercenaries were arrested in Equatorial Guinea, when the coup attempt was thwarted. Their leader, Nick Du Toit, was sentenced to 34 years in prison, Du Toit was the only mercenary to admit he was taking part in an attempted coup.  

Basong adds that it was also found that Mark Thatcher, the son of the former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, had engineered and financed the coup. Mr. Thatcher, who was arrested at his home in South Africa, pleaded guilty to helping finance the coup plot. An increasing amount of
evidence had strengthened the case against Mr. Thatcher as South African police were able to prove that Mr. Thatcher had transferred about USD 285,000 to the mercenaries that were to execute the operation and had met and talked frequently to them prior to the coup attempt. Under the threat of being extradited to Equatorial Guinea or being condemned to a prison sentence in South Africa, Mr. Thatcher reportedly negotiated a deal with the prosecutor. In exchange for his confession and further cooperation with the court, the British businessman was to avoid prison and extradition. When Mr. Thatcher entered his guilty plea he claimed he thought the helicopter, which he had bought for the alleged coup plotters, would be used for humanitarian works. After pleading guilty, he was immediately handed down a five-year suspended prison sentence and a fine of about USD 560,000.

Conclusion

The constitutional role of the military, in most parts of Africa, has been redefined. Military coup d`etat have assumed a political dimension, which constitutes a significant setback to the survival and progress of multi-party politics and democratic governance.

Military regimes are not democratic; indeed, one of the first things that military governments do is dissolve the legislative branch of government, suspend the constitution etc. Moreover, military governments in Africa were no more successful than civilian governments in addressing the political, social, and economic issues, which provided the environment in which the coup d`etats took place.
In spite of popular opposition to military rule, between 1960 and 1985 there were 131 attempted coups in Africa, of which 60 were successful. Indeed, out of 54 independent African countries, only six countries have not experienced an attempted or successful coup since they became independent.

Therefore, the struggles inherent in the pursuit of a stable, free and fair electoral democracy far outweigh the long-term democratic and developmental setbacks that coups engender. The recent coups in Egypt, Mali, Guinea-Bissau etc should not be seen as stand-alone exceptions within the broader democratic development of Africa.
Endnotes


2 Ibid.


4Eastern Africa, part of sub-Saharan Africa comprising two traditionally recognized regions: East Africa, made up of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; and the Horn of Africa, made up of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.

5 Ibid


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.


14 Ibid


16Nzongola-Ntalaja Georges (17 January 2011), op. cit.

17 Ibid


27 Ibid., p.279

28The Sahel Blog, Posted by Alex Thurston (March 27, 2012). Three Recent Coups in West Africa and How They Played Out

29 Ibid.
31http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/students/curriculum/m10/activity4.php
33Ibid
34Hirsch, Afua (22 March 2012), op. cit.
38Ibid.
39Ibid
41Amoah, G. Y., (1988), op. cit., p. 278
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
44Ibid.
46Rosemary H. T. O'Kanehttp://jpr.sagepub.com/content/30/3/251.
48Ibid p.280
51Ibid.
53Ibid p.281
55Ibid.
56Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia etc.
CHAPTER THREE

OVERVIEW OF THE 2013 EGYPTIAN MILITARY COUP D’ETAT AND ITS EFFECTS ON CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

3.0 Introduction

This Chapter discusses the brief profile of the Egyptian military, its role in Egyptian politics and the overview of the 2013 Egyptian Military Coup d’état, Causes of the military coup d’état, its impacts, and how military coup d’état can be prevented in contemporary African politics.

3.1 Profile of the Egyptian Military

According to Kuodus Sharif, the Egyptian military which represents the Egyptian Armed Forces is led by the President, who is also the supreme commander of the armed forces. The president relies on the advice of the expertise of the National Defense Council. Beneath the president is the minister of defense, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the minister of military production. Reporting to him is the chief of staff of the armed forces and commander in chief of the army.¹

The other branches like the navy, air force and air defense forces have a commander in chief who reports to the chief of staff of the armed forces. Within each service there is chief of staff who reports to his respective commander-in-chief. The Egyptian army is divided into Central (Cairo), Eastern (Ismalyiya), Western (Mersa Matrum) and Northern (Aswan) zones. The central zone controls the reserves and the Republican Guard, while the Eastern zone controls the second and third Field Armies. The size of the Egyptian Army is 310,000 which include four armored divisions, seven mechanized divisions and one infantry divisions. The military is experienced in
a wide range of operations, including multinational peace operations that include UNOSOM II, MINURSO, ONUMOZ, UNPROFOR AND UNAMIR. As of March 2005, Egypt was contributing a total of 122 peacekeepers as part of UN missions.²

3.2 The Role of the Egyptian Military in Politics

S.E. Finer contends that the Egyptian military is a purposive instrument, rationally conceived to fulfill certain objective. Although its central purpose is defense of the state, the military's structure facilitates rapid decision making and efficient execution of these decisions. These institutional characteristics provide the Egyptian military with the potential to undertake socio-political action well beyond the defense function. The military also comes to serve as the corporate representation of and defender of a state's nationalism.³ Therefore, besides the responsibility conferred to it by the constitution, the Egyptian military play an influential role in the conduct of Egyptian politics:

According Karl DeReouen JR, since independence, the Military has dominated the political landscape of Egypt, because the country has been on one way or the other ruled by military personnel. This has been due to several factors including good governance, authoritarianism etc; For instance, the Egyptian people according to the US Department of State report 2004 do not have direct influence on the government due to the high level of political control by the military from time immemorial. As a result, internal pressures for change continue to grow in strength and violence. The military’s role in domestic politics is thus said to be secretive, yet strong.⁴
In view of the above, the Egyptian army seems to be a powerful force in Egypt since the 1952. Because it overthrew both military and civilian rulers like Gamel Abdel Nasr, Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak and Muhammad Morsi.

Change in my own assessment may therefore be difficult since the military is considered by experts to have an organizational structure sufficiently capable to conduct the affairs of the state, manage national projects, and resolve political chaos. Moreover, upon assuming power, senior military officers serve and dominate sensitive governmental positions including the cabinet.\(^5\)

DeReouen JR and Mark Cooper compared the role of the Egyptian military in domestic society to that of Latin America but limited the role of the Egyptian military to the 1970s. According to Mark, the military was the strongest institution within the Egyptian polity because the Middle East has a long history of military rule and that modern Egypt evolved from the 1952 military coup until the mid-1970s. Nominally, as Egypt has democratized, the military's involvement in matters of national politics has somewhat declined but still maintained its hold in Egypt's national life and economy.\(^6\)

In Cooper's observation, as the role of Egyptian military in domestic society is considered, one cannot help but reflect on the possibilities that the military could once again become a dominant player in Egyptian politics -- through circumstance or intent.\(^7\) Cooper's analysis seem quite debatable, considering the fact that the military since 1952 seem to have never lost its influence as the most powerful force in the body politic of Egypt, and there seem to be no instance where Egypt has democratized until the election in 2012 which brought the first democratically elected president (Mohamed Morsi) who was eventually ousted by the military.
Arguably, no other institution in Egypt could provide as effective a socialization instrument as the military in terms of work ethic, egalitarianism, social mobility, exposure to technology, civic responsibility and nation building. It may be on the basis of the above that some analysts contend that the military's role in Egypt's economy is represented in four primary sectors: military industries, civilian industries, agriculture, and national infrastructure. These are clear manifestations of the influential role of the Egyptian military in local, regional and continental politics.

So, the role of the Egyptian military in politics has been solely attributed to the regime of Nasser who is said to have introduced the military into key political positions to implement the social revolution. As a result of the military's poor showing in the 1967 war with Israel, the number of senior military officers in government positions began to decline. This decline accelerated under President Sadat who removed most of the senior officers likely to challenge his policies and appointed fewer senior or retired officers to cabinet and senior government positions.

There seemed to be lack of consistency in the introduction of the military into domestic politics since independence. Unlike Sadat, President Mubarak embraced the Egyptian military as a partner in the economic development of the country. However, while expanding the military's national mission into the economic realm, Mubarak maintained firm control to restrict the influence of the officer corps from political decisions.

Having accepted its declining role in the political process. It turned its attention to modernizing the Egyptian military and its economic activities which seem to have effectively offset its diminished political role. Senior military officers removed from political positions established
parallel domiciles in the military sectors. Likewise, upon retirement, many senior officers find important niches in the military-related commercial sectors. One recent example: in 1995, Lieutenant General Saleh Haliby, Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces retired and was immediately appointed as the Director of the Arab Organization for Industrialization.\textsuperscript{12} But I think the economic empowerment of the military appeared to have rather emboldened them to further participate in future domestic politics instead weakening it. The 2013 coup against a one year old democratically elected president seem to be a clear example.

Therefore, there are three central myths regarding the Egyptian military and politics in Egypt: the army is Egypt's kingmaker and ultimate guarantor of regime security. Concerning the regime, in two instances, the military has been called into the streets to respond to a domestic threat which could have endangered the government. The first occasion was the 1977 food riots when the Sadat government proposed to eliminate various subsidies which would have raised the price of many common food items. Perhaps reflecting a corporate concern for Egypt's citizens, the Army reputedly refused to intervene in the riots unless the subsidies were reestablished. Sadat restored the subsidies.\textsuperscript{13}

The second was the violent uprising of Central Security Force (CSF) conscripts in 1986. The conscripts rioted, when their mandatory term of service was to be extended from three years to four. Such an extension would have been a significant hardship considering that CSF conscripts were paid much less than the Army's conscripts. In both instances, the Army responded in a professional and efficient manner and returned to their barracks immediately upon conclusion of the crisis. The military's performance in these crises led to the not unrealistic public perception
that the army was the ultimate safeguard against threats to the regime despite the effectiveness of
the military in these crises.\footnote{14}

The third was the development of the Arab Spring in 2010 where the military seemed to have
played a tremendous role in the maintenance of internal peace, security and credible presidential
and parliamentary elections. Therefore the Egyptian military will maintain a monopoly in
superior firepower to respond to future threats to the domestic order if needed.

3.3 Overview of the 2013 Egyptian Military Coup d`Etat

The Egyptian military coup d`etat in 2013 cannot be discussed in isolation without taking into
account the historical antecedent of its body politic. With the impression of forming an Islamic
government in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood joined Gamal Abdel Nasser six decades ago in
the run-up to the 1952 revolution, but in practice, Nasser showed his inclination to an Arab
nationalist and socialist government and the Brotherhood broke ranks with Nasser who
responded with suppression instead of interaction\footnote{15}

Egypt saw the harshest crackdown by Nasser in 1962, when the Islamic theorist and leading
member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, was executed and some other
Brotherhood leaders were forced into exile. Nasser’s wave of repression not only failed to push
the Brotherhood towards moderation, but it made them more radical.\footnote{16} Nasser’s successor Anwar
Sadat, who ruled Egypt for ten years, also stood against the Brotherhood and other Islamists.
Sadat was dubbed by his opponents as the “New Pharaoh of Egypt”.\footnote{17} The deep-rooted Islamic
radicalism was revived and Khalid Islambouli, a member of Islamist-leaning Tanzim al-Jihad,
shot and killed President Sadat on October 3, 1981 during a military parade. Egypt’s contemporary history repeated itself once more.\textsuperscript{18}

The third phase started when Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1981. Mubarak sought to counter the repetition of history in his country, but it repeated itself even more violently and more deadly in the late 1980s. In his harsh crackdown on Islamists, Mubarak – unlike his predecessors – did not differentiate between radicals and moderates.\textsuperscript{19} Mubarak seemed to have failed to undermine political Islamists in Egypt and his policies even persuaded secular thinkers such as Mohamed Ammara, Tariq Bushra, Adel Hussein, Anwar Abdul-Mubarak and Khalid Mohamed Khalid to join the camp of political Islamists. Tendency to political Islam gathered steam in Egypt to the extent that even Egyptian women showed off the Islamic veil as the best fashion of the day. This process continued up to 2011 and it did not back down from its demand for the overthrow of the Western-backed secular government of Mubarak. The Tahrir movement managed to topple Mubarak and laid the groundwork for Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi to come into power.\textsuperscript{20}

A sense of optimism spread among political observers regarding an end to the era of confrontation between a secular government (the military rulers) and political Islamists. This wishful thinking lasted less than a year. This time, the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi’s government, due to their dismal economic record and failure to interact with rivals, dictatorial powers, foreign interventions, alliance with foreign militants like Hezbollah and Hamas etc, gave cause to General Abdul Fatta al-Sissi to repeat the history. As a result, the Egyptian Army unseated Morsi.\textsuperscript{21} Since the government in power (Abdel Fatta al-Sissi) is threatening and
stifling the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists who may plan to destabilize Egypt through insurgency like the Syrian and Iraqi scenarios. This presupposes that Egypt, which has always been a spring nation for the Arab world and Muslim nations, is in dire need of dialogue, interaction and compromise in order to avoid repetition of history.\textsuperscript{22}

Furthermore, neither side takes into account the fact that this failed experience has reoccurred in Egypt at least three times over the past six decades, and the only outcome has been the institutionalization of suppression, confrontation and violence in Egypt.

The first democratic round of a presidential election was held in Egypt on 23 and 24 May 2012 without a decisive winner. A second round was held on 16 and 17 June. On 24 June 2012, the election commission announced that Mohamed Morsi had won the election with 51.7 votes, making him the first democratically elected president of Egypt while Ahmed Shafik, prime minister under deposed leader Hosni Mubarak received 48.3 percent.\textsuperscript{23}

On 8 July 2012, Egypt's new president Mohamed Morsi overruled the military and the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt edict that dissolved the country's elected parliament and called lawmakers back into session.\textsuperscript{24} On 2 August 2012, Egypt's Prime Minister Hisham Qandil announced his 35 member cabinet comprising 28 newcomers including four from the influential Muslim Brotherhood, six others and the former military ruler Mohamed Hussein Tantawi as the Defence Minister from the previous Government.\textsuperscript{25} On 22 November 2012, Morsi issued a declaration immunizing his decrees from challenge, protection of the revolution and work of the
constituent assembly drafting the new constitution, a retrial of those accused in the Mubarak-era killings of protesters, who had been acquitted.

These were quite challenging that confronted Liberal and secular groups who previously walked out of the constitutional constituent assembly because they believed that it would impose strict Islamic practices, while Muslim Brotherhood backers threw their support behind Morsi.

The move was criticized by Mohamed ElBaradei, the leader of Egypt's Constitution Party, who accused Morsi of having usurped all state powers & appointed himself Egypt's new pharaoh" on his Twitter feed. The move led to massive protests and violent action throughout Egypt. On 5 December 2012, Tens of thousands of supporters and opponents of Egypt's president clashed, in what was described as the largest violent battle between Islamists and their foes since the country's revolution. Six senior advisors and three other officials resigned from the government and the country's leading Islamic institution called on Morsi to stem his powers. Morsi offered a "national dialogue" with opposition leaders but refused to cancel a 15 December vote on a draft constitution written by an Islamist-dominated assembly that has ignited two weeks of political unrest.

A constitutional referendum was held in two rounds on 15 and 22 December 2012, with majority (64%) endorsement which was signed into law by a presidential decree issued by Morsi on 26 December 2012. The constitution was suspended by order of the Egyptian army. On 30 June 2013, on the first anniversary of the election of Morsi, millions of protesters across Egypt took to the streets and demanded the immediate resignation of the president. The presidency rejected
the Army's 48-hour ultimatum to step down, on 3 July, General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, head of the Egyptian Armed Forces, removed Morsi from power, suspended the constitution, called for fresh presidential and Shura Council (parliamentary) elections and named Supreme Constitutional Court's leader, Adly Mansour as acting president.\(^{30}\)

### 3.4 Causes of the Military Coup d`etat

There are both internal and external factors that contributed to the development of the Military coup d`etat in Egypt 2013, that overthrew the administration of the Muslim Brotherhood Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) led by Former President Mohammad Morsi.

**Internal Factors**

**Stability**
The coup was justified by the military with an assumed public support. It was described as an event that had 80 percent support in the population. The coup against Morsi was aimed at removing an autocratic ruler from government and restore stability in a country that was on the brink of collapse. According to this line of argument, the Morsi government did not fulfill its promises of an inclusive democracy; the government leaned towards autocracy, exempted presidential decrees from review, favored Islamist groups, and oppressed secular opposition and activists. The deteriorating situation was evident in street protests against the Morsi government, decreasing popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and divisions within the Islamists bloc.\(^{31}\)
**Egyptian Army economic interests.**

The Economic interests of the military were one of the key components in the coup against Morsi. These include local civil industry, army foreign partnerships related to maritime and air transport, oil and gas and industrial-scale environmental projects such as wastewater treatment and energy generation. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces SCAF, felt that contemporary global economic challenges were already confronting the economic structure of the military, and that the policies of Morsi also had the potential to worsen its socio-political reputation and threatened the military economic position the more.\(^{32}\)

**The Salafi Dilemma**

The role played by the Salafi also contributed to the emergence of the coup in 2013. Salafis are the second most powerful Islamic group after the Muslim Brotherhood, which had a high number of representations in the Egyptian Parliament following the Brotherhood. They supported Morsi in exchange for making a constitution sensitive to Islamic rules but later supported the coup against Morsi for pragmatic reasons of retaining legal status in Egyptian politics. The Salafi Nur Party made it clear that they favor the parliamentary system and are against a powerful president who may dominate the political spectrum. The presidency of General Abdul Fattah El-Sissi is a blow to their Islamic concerns, which was wiped out from the changed constitution and their worries about a dominant president. Their pragmatic decision to side with Sisi makes them suspicious partners in politics at best.\(^{33}\) The Salafis may have played their roles in consonance with their regional puppets like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar in collaboration with the US who were their financial backers. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait pledged US$17 billion to the Egyptian government under the Military government of Sissi.
External Factors

The position of Egypt in both regional and international geo-politics also contributed tremendously to the military coup d’état in 2013. Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood was seen as a threat to the security of Israel and a danger to the peace treaty between the two states. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood government a supporter of the Palestinian militant organization called Hamas which is also designated as a terrorist group.

Diplomatic Challenges

Several diplomatic problems including construction of Ethiopian dam along the Nile river, affecting Egypt's share of water was a sensitive challenge confronted by the Brotherhood government. Regional geo-politics and the main role of Egypt in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Hamas, Israel) seemed to have also caused the coup and placed this instability in a regional perspective with a growing concern of interested international actors, mainly the U.S. The US would be supportive of any move that would place Egypt on a corrective course to eliminate potential harm to their interests (security of Israel which was threatened by the Morsi). The domestically, the military was seen to be in bed with Israel and the US, and from the regional perspective also Saudi, Qatar interests made it ripe for a coup in Egypt.

3.5 Impacts of the Military Coup on the Conduct of African Politics

The 2013 Egyptian Military Coup d’état has both external and internal impacts:

Internal Impacts

a) Brotherhood Banned from election.
The Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) were proscribed indefinitely in Egypt. In its move at dismantling the sprawling organization, banned by a sweeping court order, the military revoked the permit of the association the Brotherhood founded earlier in 2011 to give itself a legal face. On Wednesday 31 December 2014, al-Ahram News quoted Sisi saying “Egypt will not permit members of the Muslim brotherhood to participate in the country’s parliamentary elections. And that, members of the group may not even take part in the polls as independent candidates.”

b) Brutal crackdown, arrest, on officials and protestors

The ouster of Morsi led to nationwide crackdown and arrests on protesters. In December 2013, Morsi as well as high-echelon Muslim Brotherhood leaders were charged with murder, terrorism and officially classified as terrorists and plotting with foreign militants like Hamas and the Lebanese Shiite based Hezbollah against Egypt. According Greg Carlstrom, a travel ban was also put on Morsi, the head of his Muslim Brotherhood Mohammed Badie, Badie's deputy Khairat El-Shater, the Muslim Brotherhood's former leader Mahdi Akef, Mohamed Beltagy, Salafi preacher Safwat Hegazi and leader of the al-Wasat Party Abou Elela Mady and his deputy Essam Sultan. By May 2014, approximately 16,000 people (and as high as more than 40,000 by one independent count), mostly Brotherhood members and supporters, have been imprisoned since the coup with Morsi himself given a death sentence by the Egyptian court.

Collapse of the Tourism Industry

Egypt’s tourism industry has been seriously harmed and the scarcity of job opportunities becomes the main challenge during the military overthrow. Unstable and changing policies by
the government impacted on the routine life of people. General laborers, physicians, nurses and drivers could not work properly, and therefore they took part in demonstrations.\textsuperscript{41}

c) Violence Against Christians

Christianity forms an influential number of people in the Egyptian population. After Morsi was ousted - mobs rampaged through the Christian village of Nagaa Hassan, burning dozens of homes, ransacking stores and stabbing to death at least four people. This included, pro-military Christian activist Emile Naseem, who was hacked and beaten to death. Dozens of Christian families sought protection in local churches.\textsuperscript{42}

In Port Said's al-Manakh for instance, gunmen opened fire at the Mar Mina Church. Since 30 June, mobs carried out attacks on Christians in six out of Egypt's twenty-seven provinces. Churches across Egypt cancelled their evening Mass and social activities. Other incidents include Coptic Christian priest Mina Abboud Sharobeen being killed in an outdoor market.\textsuperscript{43}

d) Insurgency

Insurgency seems to get upper hand in destabilizing situations. After the coup, Islamist staged multiple attacks on security forces in Sinai and Suez. Security officials were killed while police stations and military headquarters were also attacked by rocket fire. Attackers also fired rocket-propelled grenades at army checkpoints guarding El Arish airport. A protest by hundreds of people occurred in Al-Arish the day after the ouster with calls to form a war council to combat the army. Ten areas in north Sinai were witness to clashes, including the Central Security Force
camp and a number of checkpoints. The airport was also closed after being targeted by unidentified militants. In late July 2013 the Egyptian military reportedly launched "Operation Sinai" in an effort to quash the militants.

**e) It has negated the bright prospect of the Arab Spring**

The military have ousted a popularly and constitutionally elected president. The peaceful overthrow of Hosni Mubarak's rule in Egypt was considered a successful turn of the Arab Spring with an optimistic outlook. Free and fair elections brought Muhammad Morsi to power in 2011; a high voter turnout further fed this positive account of the future of the Arab Spring. However, positive prospects waned after a military coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi put an end to Morsi rule and suspended the Egyptian Parliament.

**f) Restriction of Freedom**

The victory of the new president, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in June 2014 is seen by some scholars as an administration that is built on a transition rule of systematic oppression and restriction of fundamental human rights and the press. The restriction, crackdown and incarceration of journalists including the three famous Jazeera journalists Baher Muhammad, Peter Gretse, and Muhammad Fahmy and the looting of media establishments seem to questioned the integrity of Egypt's adherence to the principles of democracy, Human Rights and Freedoms. Pressure on activists continues under the transition government; the oppression on Islamists, crackdown on journalists, media houses and silencing of the liberals limit the role and involvement of young people in the political process like the rest of Egyptian society. The only
way to get involved is to side with the Sisi establishment, which is already overcrowded by old guards.47

External Impacts

a. Political landscape in the region

The Military coup appeared to have somewhat changed the political landscape of the Middle East. According Yasir Yakis, Turkey and Egypt severed of diplomatic ties and declared each other's ambassadors “personae non grata,” and were only represented by a chargé d'affaires in the other's country. The issue of Hamas` tunnels closure including the Rafa border crossing among others are as a result of the military coup.48

b. Mixed Reaction abroad

There has been mixed international reaction following the coup. After the military coup, the Gulf countries politically and economically backed Sisi to prevent a return of the Muslim Brotherhood which may in return spark a similar hope of change in their own countries. Therefore, the coup was welcomed by the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and the UAE. These states consider Sisi as a representation of a "new hope" for the Arab World. Sisi grants a blank check to strengthen political and economic ties with the Gulf countries as well. Qatar faced difficulties with other Gulf countries as it opposed the military coup in Egypt and had a critical attitude towards the transition rule in Egypt.49
c. Supranational Bodies

Suspension of Egypt from the African Union (AU)

According to Perry Nick, the African Union (AU) under the Peace and Security Council (PSC) imposed sanctions against Egypt following the military coup d’état in the North African nation until the restoration of constitutional order. The AU Commission Chairperson, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, on the sidelines of the Afro-Arab Summit in Kuwait City, Kuwait suspended Egypt from all its activities after the Egyptian military overthrew the country's first democratically-elected President Mohamed Morsi. However, the suspension was aimed at preventing Egypt from joining the contest for a permanent seat for Africa at the UN Security Council.  

The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU)

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former European Union (EU), Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton, have all appealed for calm, non-violence, dialogue, restrain, preservation of democracy, fundamental rights, and an all inclusive approach to addressing the needs and concerns of all Egyptians.

Arab League (AL)

As a result of the military coup, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Dr. Nabil El Araby, appeared to have embarked on an international tour and drummed up support for the military coup in Egypt. He tried to convince the foreign leaders that it was a "popular revolution". According to Al-Ahram newspaper, Dr. Nabil El Araby states, "I have started contacting a number of officials from international organizations, as well as other figures," and will
continue this during my visit to Austria where I will present the truth about what happened in Egypt." He said that this has been the first popular revolution with the largest gathering of people in history. "Everyone," he insisted, "must understand the exceptional circumstances Egypt is going through."52

States and Regional Impact

The United States

The intervention of the US on the military coup in Egypt had been subjected to varied standpoints:

The US seemed to have failed to describe the event as a military coup. US Secretary of State John Kerry has defended the Egyptian military for ousting the democratically-elected government of Mohamed Morsi. In an interview with Pakistani private television channel “Geo” Kerry states, "The military was asked to intervene by millions and millions of people, all of whom were afraid of descendence into chaos." President Barack Obama is quoted to have said he was "deeply concerned" by the actions of Egypt's military and urged a return to democratic governance.53 The White House has declined to call the ousting of Morsi by the military as a coup for the reason that labeling Morsi’s ouster a coup would require the administration of President Barack Obama to shelve its annual $1.5 billion military aid package for the country. Thus Egyptian protesters accuse the White House of putting its weight behind a coup which was meant to suppress country’s Islamic Political Party.54 The State Department also ordered the mandatory evacuation of its embassy in Cairo, while it issued a travel advisory ordering the departure of non-emergency US government personnel and family members from Egypt due to the ongoing political and social unrest."55
However, Republican Senator, John McCain, who is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however said: "We have to suspend aid to Egyptian military because the military has overturned the vote of the people. We cannot repeat the same mistakes that we made in other times of our history by supporting removal of freely elected governments." He added that once a timetable was arranged for a new election and a new constitution "the US should evaluate whether to continue with aid or not." He was the first U.S. politician to refer to the events as a coup.\textsuperscript{56} What the Brotherhood neglected to understand is that democracy means more than simply holding elections. Real democracy requires inclusiveness, compromise, respect for human and minority rights, and a commitment to the rule of law. Morsi and his inner circle did not embrace any of these principles and instead chose to consolidate power and rule by fiat.\textsuperscript{57}

Peter Weber has cited the Former US Ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner who said:

"It wasn’t the military that plotted the seizure of the government and grabbed it. It was a massive public uprising that, left unchecked, would have produced great violence. It would have left the military in the miserable position of having to control those demonstrations by force. The cry from the crowd was they wanted new elections … to help decide the country’s future, which has been so troubled. The military was faced with, genuinely overheated situation … It isn’t a coup in any classic sense. Egypt is the largest and most influential country in the Middle East. Egypt is central to peace with Israel. Egypt’s fate will influence the course of politics elsewhere in the region. So we want to be very, very careful before we go out and condemn an event that has, by the most recent polling of Egypt’s best pollsters, 80 percent support in the population. What is clear is the wave of anger against the government that drove Morsi from power, enjoyed massive, massive public support in the many, many millions of Egyptians. The U.S. is to go ahead with the delivery of F-16 jets to Egypt."\textsuperscript{58}

The foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, Germany- have issued statements cautioning the military to exercise restraint, to consider the broad national interests of their actions, and to prove that they strive to solve the brewing political and socio-economic problems in a democratic framework, without violence, and accounting for the interests of all social groups and religious confessions, respects the choice of the Egyptian people, and
expressed hope that all parties concerned in Egypt can avoid using violence and properly solve their disputes through dialogue and consultation and realize reconciliation and social stability."\textsuperscript{59}

**Regional**

Considering the geo-political incoherence in the Middle East, with the exception of the state of Israel – who did not release public statements or grant interviews,\textsuperscript{60} Regional States have also viewed the Egyptian military coup d`etat with varied interpretations: where as some viewed it as a defeat for the Islamic Awakening, others seem to have also welcomed the overthrow of the radical Muslim Brotherhood party, who may have intended to export their radical Islamic system of governance to neighbouring countries like the Iranian model.

Saudi Arabia`s former King Abdullah, was the first international head of state to send a message of congratulations to Interim President Adly Mansour and strongly hailed the Egyptian military, represented by General Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, who tunneled the coup d`etat.\textsuperscript{61}

Thereafter, the Kingdom of Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Arab Republic of Syria appeared to have welcomed the overthrow of Mori. Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, for instance, told the newspaper Thawra that "whoever brings religion to use in politics or in favor of one group at the expense of another will fall anywhere in the world. The summary of what is happening in Egypt is the fall of what is called political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood's performance has helped Egyptians to see the lies the [movement] used at the start of the popular
revolution in Egypt." In show of solidarity, Kuwait government then also gave US$4 billion in aid following Morsi's removal.

In Palestine - The Fatah-President Mahmoud Abbas called on Palestinians “not to interfere in internal issues of Arab countries," which was read by the media as supportive of the ouster. PLO executive committee member Hanan Ashrawi said: "I don't see this as a coup d'état. We see this as recognizing the will of the people there for the armed forces serving and protecting the people as they should."

Elsewhere in the Gaza Strip - Hamas Member of Parliament, Yahia Moussa said: "We do not fear the fall of President Mohamed Morsi. We fear the dramatic changes that could cause things to go out of hand and lead to bloodshed. We only care about stability in Egypt regardless of who is in charge. Egypt is a lifeline to us; it's a major factor in the stability of the internal Palestinian situation -- it is our backbone."

Qatar and Tunisia Qatar were reported to be unhappy over the military coup, after Qatar spent about US$10 billion in financial aid towards the Morsi government; while they were said to also be unhappy about the closure of Al Jazeera's offices in Cairo. Yet the new emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, sent "a cable of congratulations" to the new interim President. The Tunisian government condemned the "flagrant coup," with Ennahda party leader Rachid Ghannouchi expressing his astonishment and stated that “the removal of Morsi would undermine democracy and feed radicalism."
Whereas Somalia’s al-Shabab expressed regret over what it described as ‘negligence’ by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Republic of Iran seem to have had quite an obscure posture over the military coup: The Islamic Republic of Iran appears to have criticized the military coup but at the same time motivated the Islamists to continue their struggle for the establishment and consolidation of Islamic Republic like the Iranian model. In a statement published by the Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi asked the military government to hold a new election soon. He later said: "We do not consider proper the intervention by military forces in politics to replace a democratically elected administration. Islamists and revolutionaries should not be frustrated. We do not see the recent events in Egypt as a defeat for Islamic awakening."  

**Political NGO**

Al-Qaeda - Al-Qaeda's Egyptian leader Ayman al-Zawahiri commented in a video released on the internet criticizing the Islamists for losing power and not uniting to implement Sharia. He said: "The battle isn’t over, it has just started...the Islamic nation should offer victims and sacrifices to achieve what it wants and restore power from the corrupt authority governing Egypt."  

**The Closure of the Rafah Border Crossing in Gaza**

As a Result of the military coup, Egyptian authorities closed the main crossing to the besieged Gaza Strip following the worsening security situation across the North African country. The crossing was shut down in both directions for several days after the military overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi in early July 2013, because of deteriorating security in Egypt. Thus, the Egyptian military increased its crackdown on supply tunnels leading into Gaza. As a result,
impoverished Palestinians were forced to use underground tunnels to bring in essential supplies including food, fuel and medicine. Hundreds of Palestinians were stranded on the Egyptian side of the border. Some 800 people normally leave for Egypt and beyond through the Rafah crossing, the only passageway leading to the rest of the world for most Gazans. The siege by both Egypt and Israel has had a disastrous impact on the humanitarian and economic situation in the impoverished enclave, having turned the territory into the world’s largest open-air prison.71

Collapse in Relations between Cairo and Ankara

Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) served as a role model for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood as it engaged in electoral politics.

Jamie Dettmer has assertes that “the latest problem for Turkey’s ruling Islamist party is the collapse in relations between Cairo and Ankara since the fall of president Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first elected Muslim Brotherhood president and a key ideological ally of the Turkish prime minister Reccep Tayib Erdogan. According to former senior Arab League official Nassif Hitti, the military ouster of Morsi on July 3 has undermined what was emerging as one of the strongest partnerships of the post-Arab Spring period. “Egypt, a core Arab country, was considered a main pillar in Turkey’s regional strategy to project both its Islamist ideology and its political influence.”72

On July 30, for the second time Egypt’s Foreign Ministry summoned Turkey’s ambassador to complain about Turkish interference in Egypt’s domestic affairs. The immediate cause of Egyptian wrath, experts believe, is the harsh non-stop criticism by Turkish leaders condemning
Morsi’s ouster, which they insist was a coup and not the expression of the popular will of the people. Erdogan has delivered more than a dozen speeches slamming the military overthrow of Morsi and has demanded the ousted Egyptian president’s release from captivity. Hitti believes Erdogan’s ferocity is more an expression of his frustration with the problems besieging Turkey and at the upending of a strategy that was bearing fruit and allowing Ankara’s regional clout to increase. Hitti argues further that “The ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt resulted in both a strategic and an ideological blow to Turkey”.

3.6 Prospects of the Military Coup

Good days ahead for Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda seems to have gotten a fresh batch of new recruits, slogans, narrative, and material. According to Robin Richards all that material will point an accusatory finger toward the U.S and accuse the U.S (and by extension Israel) and the military for its coup d’etat—i.e., the U.S loves democracy only when it doesn’t involve Islamist Parties—and for being anti-Islam. Al-Qaeda as well as its ideology never believed and/or supported democracy and have always undermined moderate and not so moderate Islamist political parties. Probably, the biggest blow to Al-Qaeda as an ideology was the Arab Spring and the electoral victories of moderate Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt. However, Al-Qaeda’s biggest victory so far was seem to be handed to it by the Egyptian military overthrow of Mohammed Morsi.

3.7 Effects of Military Coup d’ Etat in Africa

Military rule has had varying effects on the political, social and economic development of the countries in Africa which are as follows:
Chilling effect on new democracies in the Arab World and Sub-Saharan Africa

G. Y. Amoah has attributed Africa as a cockpit for military adventurism. The overthrow of Morsi may have a chilling effect on all new and fledgling democratization processes in Tunisia and Libya. The military in Africa may feel emboldened by the Egyptian example. They may feel that they can intervene at any time in the political process to shape politics in the manner they see fit. Effectively, the military has become in the Arab World a very powerful veto player in civilian democratic governance. This can lead to the death of democracy, and the rise of electoral authoritarianism.76

Political

Coup d’etat sometimes sweeps away the dictatorial or authoritarian regime and restores people’s liberties to them. It also sometimes terminates a rule by mediocrities. Military interventions in government have, however, dwarfed political development of many African countries. Africans have not been given time by their soldiers to develop enduring political systems that suit their cultural environment. Coup d’etat in Africa have led to political instability in the sub-region. Governments in the sub-region are changed in rapid succession by soldiers. This hardly makes for continuity of policies and policy implementation.77

Military rule in Africa appear to have led to politicization of soldiers. The military think more of political power than their professional duties. With each coup d’etat some number of soldiers of all ranks are either discharged or appointed to certain positions because of their political leaning. Thus factionalism in military establishments poses serious threats to military discipline which in turn serves as threat to political stability in Africa. Military regimes usually suspend the parts or
the whole of the constitutions of their countries. If it happens this way a country is ruled with little or no checks, they pass laws which allow them to detain people without trial and violate the rights and freedoms of the people. Military coups have legitimized the use of violence as an instrument for changing a government. Thus military rule breeds authoritarian political culture.\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{Economic}

Some military regimes imbue their countries with economic nationalism through their policies on nationalization and indigenization decrees, military regimes have systematically sought to transfer the control of the economy from aliens into the hands of citizens.\textsuperscript{79}

Many military rulers in Africa, such as Blaise Compaore (Burkina Faso), Gnassingbe Eyadema (Togo), Hosni Muarak (Egypt) seem not to have been able to move the economies of their countries from neo-colonial status; a type of economy which is dominated by the former colonial power or its agents. It is characterized by dependence on one main exportable crop or product and the domination of the major sectors of the economy such as commerce, banking, mining, timber, key manufacturing and service industries by foreigners. Military regimes thwart investments in Africa and consequently hinder economic development. Coups and Coup attempts do not create favorable conditions for investments. They, instead, drive away investors from the continent. It also makes governments in the sub-region to devote a disproportionate attention and resources to state security measures to the general neglect of welfare services in the countries.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{Social}

Military regimes, in the short run, promote discipline and orderliness in the society. Such facets of discipline as the queue culture, work ethics and environmental sanitation are promoted.
Checks at offices, and severe sanctioning make public officers report at their offices and places of work punctually and regularly. Unfortunately, some of the methods used to instill discipline are too harsh. Soldiers, by their training, believe that everything can be achieved by the use of force. They, therefore, use force instead of education.\textsuperscript{81}

Military rule, unfortunately, has not been able to minimize corruption in many African countries. One of the major social evils that allegedly invite soldiers to overthrow civilian regimes is corruption. Military regimes try to inculcate some values like probity and official accountability into the public life of our countries. Combinations of such punishments such as death by firing squads, imprisonment for decades, forfeiture of assets, and disqualification from holding public office and dismissals from office are meted out to erring individuals. All this notwithstanding corruption is on the increase in Africa. Formally, corruption was a social disease confined to a small section of civilians comprising of politicians, top civil servants, top business executives, and a few top police officers. Now it has spread its tentacles vertically and horizontally to and it permeates through all social class including the military. For example the probe instituted in 1975 into the General Gowon military administration in Nigeria found all the military Governors corrupt except two.\textsuperscript{82}

Military coups have undermined security of jobs in the public services, especially, the civil service bureaucracy; have their own inbuilt mechanism for eliminating inefficiency, redundancy, undesirable and aged employees from the system and making it efficient.\textsuperscript{83} Military rule in West Africa has dehumanized the people. In Africa it is only when the military are in power that men are condemned to the stake; men and women flogged almost naked in public, or drilled, molested, humiliated or short dead before their subordinates, spouses and children often for
minor infractions. These forms of punishment have rapidly eroded the regard for human life and respect for human beings in many African countries.\textsuperscript{84}

3.8 How Military Coup d’Etat can be Prevented in the conduct of African Politics.

Diarchy

In the search for solutions many suggestions have been offered by practitioners in international relations. Prominent among them is what exponents call Diarchy or Union Government (in Ghana). Exponents of diarchy or union governments argue that a political system should be involved in which civilians, soldiers and the police share power in government. Thus, governments would be formed by soldiers, policemen and civilians. The exponents further argued that the participation of soldiers in the diarchy or the union government would restrain soldiers from overthrowing the governments.\textsuperscript{85} This is due to the fact that the African experience seems to show that most coups are planned and executed in the military headquarters, by either ambitious individual officers who command specific units or by a class of soldiers as in Sierra Leone in April 1968, or the 12 April 1980 coup in Liberia led by General Samuel Doe, Togo on 13 January 1963 when President Sylvanus Olympio was overthrown and assassinated by a group of demobilized soldiers from the French army. All these show that in Africa any group of military men can arm itself and mount a coup.\textsuperscript{86}

Civil Education

African societies are said to be characterized by illiteracy and ignorance. Two most intractable political problems facing African societies are the politicization of soldier and the weakness of the political systems due mainly to the apathy among the people. The programme of civic
education should aim at disengaging soldiers from politics and getting the greatest number of the people interested in the political affairs of their countries. This can be achieved if the programme creates an informed, analytical and involve citizenry which believes in democracy as a way of life. For this purpose civic education should be incorporated in the curricula of military training schools, adult education programmes, primary, secondary and tertiary. In this way a democratic culture may be built in Africa. It may make forcible seizure of power uncomfortable for the military.\textsuperscript{87}

**Defence Agreements**

Soldiers have been able to take over power in Africa because of non-existence of defense agreements between most individual countries and others. An example is the coup attempt in The Gambia in July 1981 was quelled by Senegalese troops in pursuance of a defense agreement between The Gambia and Senegal, in 1961 British and Nigerian troops quelled mutinies by Kenyan and Tanzanian soldiers. French troops saved President Leon Mba of the Central African Republic from being overthrown by his armed forces in February 1964. Thus the military may be deterred from attempting a coup if the country has a defense agreement with another country.\textsuperscript{88}

**Conclusion**

In any country or state, the existence of the military is an important necessity in preserving the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and the maintenance of internal security. In the conduct of African politics, the role of the military has been subjected to varied ways and manners. Based on its structure, influence, historical purpose and objectives, the Egyptian army since the 1950s has consolidated itself as a powerful force in local, regional and international
politics in regarding Egypt politics. The military's robust structure makes it easier for quick
decision making and well organized execution of these decisions. These institutional
characteristics provide the Egyptian military with the potential to undertake socio-political and
economic action well beyond the defense function. It is on the basis of the above mentioned
factors that made the Egyptian armed forces to overthrow previous heads of state including the
first democratically elected president Mohammad Morsi in 2013.

Despite the resurgence of influential political stake holders like the Muslim Brotherhood,
Tamaroud, Tajarroud, Al-Nour, Al-Azhar, the Coptic Church etc the military seem to be an all-
time domestic and foreign decision maker in the conduct of Egyptian politics.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Summary

Although the constitutional role of the military has to its credit a good many solid and impressive impacts on the development of contemporary African politics. However, the stark reality today has shattered the constitutional role of the military. The Military have assumed a political dimension which constitutes a significant setback to the survival and progress of multi-party politics, good governance, democracy, rule of law, accountability and fundamental human rights and administrative justice in the African continent.

The research intended to verify the argument that military coup d’état in Africa from time immemorial plays an influential role in the conduct of African politics and contemporary world politics in general. It examined the way and manner in which the military has influenced the conduct of contemporary African politics, and how the military has been used to achieve national, regional and continental objectives of the interests states, individuals and organizations.

The major sources of information were data collected from books, articles including informal interview with security experts, military officials and scholars. Attempts were made to search for documents that had something to do with the military and world politics.

4.2 Findings

The research found out that some soldiers target the areas of national and international relations that will serve the best interest of the people. A case in point is the Egyptian military. Since the
life of the Egyptian populace is highly permeated by Islam, they conduct both religiously friendly and secular policies in order to benefit from all the advantages that may emanate from her relations with other states and non-states actors. Examples of such republics are Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, etc. It also found out that other Islamic political parties, due to extreme level of adherence to Islam want to pursue local, regional world politics with strict Islamic rules irrespective of whether those policies will inure to the benefit of their citizens or not. An example of such states includes the Islamic Republic of Iran, who is seen to be bent on pursuing its nuclear ambition despite the rounds of intense sanctions from the United Nations Security Council, European Union, Canada and the United States, that has continued to exact a heavy toll on the lives of its citizens.

The research also found out that certain activities like corruption, economic mismanagement, interests conflict, human rights violations and freedoms are some of the issues which often lead to the development of military coup d´etat in the conduct of African politics.

The research found out that the place of the military in the conduct of world politics is at times manifested in the historical relationship between and among individual military men and foreign governments. In the case of the Arab Republic of Egypt, there seem to be a peace treaty as a result of the Camp David Accord witnessed by the United States in September 17, 1978 between Egypt and Israel. The Egyptian military appears to be the custodian to guarantee the security and maintenance of the peace accord. Thus the Egyptian military is the second non-NATO member recipient of US military aid worth 1.5 billion dollars annually.
The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood Freedom and Justice Party was not only seen as a threat to the survival of the peace accord between Israel and Egypt, but a significant set-back to the foreign policy of Egypt and its allies in the region, hence the military coup which ousted the first democratically elected president of Egypt, Dr. Mohammed Morsi.

The research was set in a frame work of Neo-patrimonialism, which posits that, individual state institutions including the military use state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population to overthrow a government. Issues of multiplicity of actors in the international system, which includes the military, are accepted as players influencing world politics. Notable among these are the armed forces and other belligerent or rebellious groups.

The findings of the research justify the theoretical framework, Neo-patrimonialism. The theory of neo-patrimonialism posits that, a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. It is a system in which an office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of private and public spheres. The term originated from Max Weber, who described it as a rule based on administrative and military personnel.

It found out that the military has ambivalently influence the character of African politics. In the conduct of contemporary Western politics, the military appear to have played a consistent role in providing security, defending sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states, its contributions in the political affairs in Africa has been quite ambivalent. The influence of the military in the development of contemporary African politics has had to its credit both good and bad effects on
contemporary international relations. Its effect whether good or bad, on contemporary international politics can be looked at from the perspective of both domestic and foreign interests.

4.2 Conclusions

The existence of the military in any state is always an important necessity. The role of the military in defending a state against external aggression and territorial integrity appears to have been more important than any other element in world politics. The military is considered by international relations scholars as one of the tangible determinants of state power and capability. Since the 1950s the military has played a major role and contributed to the development of African politics as a result of serious social evils that has plagued the continent such as corruption, economic mismanagement, bad governance, human rights violations, and dictatorial tendencies from civilian governments, politicians, religious leaders, government functionaries and top public servants.

Individuals seem to regard public office as a means to enrich themselves, their families and friends. Corruption, economic mismanagement, bad governance, violations of human rights and freedoms, dictatorship, etc lead to waste in the economy, produce sad and humiliating situations and always seem to rob the state of the much needed capital, both local and foreign, for development. Then right to health, education, food, shelter are undermined whenever there is corruption, economic mismanagement, abuse of power etc. These contribute heavily to the economic difficulties into which many African countries find themselves. These served as a cause for military interventions in the conduct of African politics.
4.3 Recommendations

It is recommended that Egypt, which has always been a spring nation for the Arab world and also attracts the attention of Muslim nations, should engage in dialogue and compromise with moderate stakeholders who can also complement the efforts of the military in nation building. The parties involved in the ongoing conflict in Egypt such as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al Muslimeen), Salafis, Tajarrud, Tamaroud, the Coptic Church, al-Azhar and all stakeholders have to lessen their demands to a minimum to create hope for a future settlement by establishing democracy, good and accountable governance, fundamental human rights and freedoms, empowering state institutions otherwise, Egypt will see a darker future which may bring to power to a dictator much worse than before and perhaps lead to the inflow of terrorists by Islamic extremists.

The UN, ECOWAS, the Arab League (AL), the African Union (AU) etc should unanimously condemn and reject unconstitutional changes of government, and be consistent in their application of sanctions so as to avoid deliberately or otherwise supporting unconstitutional regime changes. Flawed elections, when passed as free, fair and credible, leaves citizens with little choice than to agitate for regime change. Regional and international organizations that monitor elections should ensure that when elections are passed as free, fair and credible, that they are indeed so. Unconstitutional regime change is not a thing of the past – it is a clear, persistent and present danger.

The AU and other sub-regional organizations also need to be consistent in their reaction to member states’ behavior and most importantly, consistent in their responses and actions so as to
elicit compliance and shape behavior especially a situation where the military engages itself in active politics like that of Egypt.

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