THE FUTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA

BY
ISSAHAKU AMINU
(10240883)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LEGON AUGUST 2015
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that with the exception of duly acknowledged references, this dissertation is an original research work by me under the supervision of Dr. Philip Attuquayefio. I also declare that this dissertation has not been submitted either in part or in whole for any degree elsewhere.

.................................................................
ISSAHAKU AMINU
(STUDENT)

.................................................................
DR. PHILIP ATTUQUAYEFIO
(SUPERVISOR)

DATE : 31/08/2015

University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
DEDICATION

This is dedicated to the almighty God and my mother, Salima Issahaku for their guidance and support.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Philip Attuquayefio, my supervisor for agreeing to supervise me.
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASBM</td>
<td>Anti Ship Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBG</td>
<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>Nautical Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>Radio Free Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCS</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State Owned Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans Pacific Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOA - Voice of America
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... i
DEDICATION ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... vi
ABSTRACT ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ix

CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Problem Statement ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1
1.2 Problem Statement ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 4
1.3 Research Questions ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 5
1.4 Objectives of the Study ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 5
1.5 Hypothesis ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 5
1.6 Rationale of the Study ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 6
1.7 Theoretical Framework ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 6
1.8 Literature Review ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 9
1.9 Methodology and Sources of Data ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 13
1.10 Arrangement of Chapters ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 14
Endnotes ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 15
CHAPTER TWO
THE STATE OF US-CHINA RELATIONS

2.0 Introduction ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 16
2.1 An Overview of the State of US China Relations ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 16
2.2 US and China Relations: Mutual Suspicion and Mistrust ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 18
2.3 Competition for Global Power and Ideological Rivalry Between the US and China ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 20
2.4 Security Dilemma ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 24
2.5 Propaganda Warfare ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 25
2.6 Elements of Cooperation in US China Relations ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 26
  2.6.1 Multilateral Engagement ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 26
2.7 Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 28
2.8 Climate Change ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 29
2.9 Economic Interdependence ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 30
2.10 Elements of Contestation in US China Relations ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 32
  2.10.1 Trade Conflicts ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 32
2.11 China’s territorial claims in the South China and East China Sea ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 32
2.12 US China relations over the issue of Taiwan’s Independence ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 36
2.13 Cyber Security ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 37
2.14 Cyber Activities Directed Against U.S. National Defense Programs ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 37
2.15 China’s Technological Development and Military Buildup ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 39
2.16 China’s Military Modernization ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 40
2.17 Joint Military Drills ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 42
2.18 International Law ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 46
2.19 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes … … … … … 47
Endnotes … … … … … … … … … 49

CHAPTER THREE
THE FUTURE OF US CHINA RELATIONS
3.0 Introduction … … … … … … … … … 52
3.1 Multilateralism … … … … … … … … … 52
3.2 Power of Deterrents … … … … … … … … … 53
3.3 Democratization … … … … … … … … … 55
3.4 China’s Extraordinary Demand on World Resources … … … 56
3.5 Securing Energy Resources … … … … … … … … … 57
3.6 US Strategic Shift to the Asia Pacific Region … … … … … 58
3.7 China’s Reaction to U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific … … 60
3.8 Regional Politics of the Asia Pacific … … … … … … … … … 61
  3.8.1 South China Sea … … … … … … … … … 61
  3.8.2 East China Sea … … … … … … … … … 62
Endnotes … … … … … … … … … 64

CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.0 Introduction … … … … … … … … … 65
4.1 Summary of Findings … … … … … … … … … 65
4.2 Conclusion … … … … … … … … … 68
4.3 Recommendations … … … … … … … … … 69
Endnotes … … … … … … … … … 74
Bibliography … … … … … … … … … 75
ABSTRACT

The most significant bilateral relations in the international system is that of the relations between the US and China. This is not only premised on the significant economic clout of both countries, but also on the enormous magnitude of arsenals accumulated by these two powers. The increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world have made it impossible for economic, security and humanitarian issues in one country to be contained within the borders of that country without it being felt elsewhere. The US strategic shift towards the Asia Pacific region which many experts view within the context of trying to contain the rising power of China and its resultant aggressive behavior and assertive territorial claims in the Asia Pacific region therefore raise serious global security concerns. As a result of the enormous capacities of both states, an improvement in relations between them could have enormous impacts on the whole wide world. On the other hand, should relations between them deteriorate it could have far reaching devastating consequences on the international system. This has made it very necessary for the relations between the two powers to be carefully studied. The future relations between the pair would likely be marked by conflict and cooperation. This is backed by the numerous territorial disputes in the region involving the US, China and her regional neighbors. Equally important is China’s demand on global resources and her widely perceived unfair trade practices. Nevertheless the likelihood that the pair would be united by common interests and likewise common dangers is incredibly high.
CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Problem Statement

There is no relationship that is as important to the international system today as the one between the US and China. In the words of Friedberg, whether for good or for ill, the most significant bilateral international relationship over the course of the next several decades is likely to be the relationship between US and China. ¹This is fundamentally based on several factors:

“The U.S. and Chinese economies are the first and second largest in the world respectively on both a nominal dollar basis and a purchasing power parity basis. In 2012, according to the World Bank, U.S. nominal GDP was nearly twice the size of China’s, at $15.68 trillion compared to China’s $8.227 trillion”²

The US defense budget is more than that of all the five permanent members of the UN Security Council combined. China on the other hand owns and controls about a third of the world’s population.

Both countries have an enormous magnitude of participation in international diplomatic institutions ranging from political, economic and social to the environmental. With diplomatic missions spread across the various regions of the world both countries arguably have the largest international presence in the world. US businesses and Chinese corporations are equally spread across the length and breadth of the world. With strong economies and cutting edge technology, China has also managed to build very powerful military forces equipped with the most advanced military hardware capable of reaching targets across the globe. As an emerging power:

“It is also engaged in an ambitious military modernization drive, including efforts to develop extended range power projection capabilities and such advanced weapons as a “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missile(ASBM).”³
Most importantly, the approach employed by each state to realizing its foreign policy objectives is equally important. Both appear to have global interests with highly noticeable differences in approaches employed to reaching their goals. In the case of the US an expansive approach to foreign policy is the strategy employed to consolidate her global dominance and thus maintain the status quo.

The emphasis of US Foreign Policy is on projecting US influence across the globe through diplomatic, cultural, economic and in some instances through the use of force. The consequence of such a behavior is that the US seems to meddle a lot in the internal affairs of other countries particularly those it considers to be of strategic interest to the her. The focus of attention of US foreign policy is gradually shifting from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific region. This many experts believe is a well calculated effort intended to encircle China. The United States has rolled out plans for a strategic shift towards the Asia Pacific region, nevertheless in a situation in which U.S.-China military-to-military ties are fragile, it has become exceedingly difficult for Washington to convince Beijing that the rebalancing is not intended to contain China.

China on the other hand strongly opposes any attempt by any entity to interfere in its domestic affairs. On the basis of this, China’s foreign policy until very recently emphasized on trade and economy with little or no attention being paid to the internal social, cultural and political dynamics of other countries.

“China’s foreign policies have for decades reflected the principles of biding time, pursuing a restrained foreign policy, and viewing the first decades of the twenty-first century as a period of strategic opportunity to focus primarily on internal development.”

According to Mozingo, China’s leaders have always prioritized their more immediate selfish, national interest at the expense of their goal of advancing communism outside China.
It is only very recently that China is beginning to pursue an aggressively expansive Foreign policy marked by its land-grabbing attitude in the Asia pacific region and its recent announcement of joint naval exercises with the Russian Federation in the Mediterranean Ocean. China’s recent aggressive behavior can be blame on her attempts to achieve regional hegemony. That is largely what is bringing her into conflict with her regional neighbors and the US.

According to an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, China’s Foreign Policy is focused on three broad objectives namely building cooperative relations with the United States while preventing the emergence of any coalition targeting China, maintaining a “zone of peace” around China to enable the country to pursue its domestic agenda, especially economic strengthening while expanding its regional influence and securing and diversifying access to natural resources (especially energy supplies) needed to fuel China’s economic engine.

The United States places human rights and democracy on the top of its priorities while viewing them as the guiding principles for its foreign policies. China, however, puts “order, stability and security” on the top.

Beyond the above, the following developments in the Asia Pacific region also constitute issues of critical concern to the relationship between the two world powers: China’s military modernization program which poses an increasing threat to her regional neighbors and the US, its unflinching desire to regulate U.S. military operations in the “Exclusive Economic Zone” off its coast, its assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as well as its continuing threat to use force to bring Taiwan under its control.
1.2 Problem Statement

The post-Cold War era has gradually transformed from unipolarity to a multipolar system. Nevertheless it still retains some of the essential features of the Cold War era: superpower struggle between the major powers and its resultant issues of competing interests, mutual suspicion and mistrust as well as ideological rivalries. These largely characterize the relationship between the existing global powers of which US, Russia and China stand out as the most powerful among the rest. This in a large part indicates that national interest is now at the forefront of global superpower struggle.

Owing to their size and importance in the global system, what China and the US do together as well as individually will profoundly affect the international community’s ability to engage in robust international cooperation in science and technology and to find solutions to the world’s most pressing problems.\(^\text{12}\)

A deepening US China relations could have significant global impacts because of the tremendous capacities of both states. On the other hand, should the relations between the two superpowers deteriorate the entire global community could experience serious systemic shocks which have the likelihood of transforming the global architecture forever. If tensions between the two pacific powers worsen, the whole of Eastern Eurasia could become divided in a new Cold War and the prospects for confrontation and conflict would seem certain to rise.\(^\text{13}\)

On the contrary a deepening US China détente could bring with it increased possibility for sustained worldwide economic growth, the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional disputes and the successful management of pressing global problems including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\(^\text{14}\)
Within this context, the future of US-China relations remains topical and constitute the research problem.

### 1.3 Research Questions

In examining the research problem, the study will seek to answer the following research questions:

- What is the character of the current relationship between US and China?
- What factors will determine the future of the relationship between US and China?
- What are the possible areas of conflict and cooperation between US and China?

### 1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are:

- To examine the current character of the relationship between the US and China.
- To assess the factors that would determine the future of the relationship between the US and China.
- To identify the possible areas of conflict and cooperation between the US and China.
- To make practical recommendations on the possible ways to enhance good bilateral ties between the US and China.

### 1.5 Hypothesis

\( H_0 \) - The future of US-China relations will be marked by conflict.

\( H_1 \) - The future of US-China relations will be marked by cooperation.
1.6 Rationale of the Study

A careful consideration of the size of the economies of both states and their impacts on the entire global economy has revealed that the international community has substantial interest in an enhanced bilateral cooperation between these two countries.

The interest of the International community in an improved bilateral relations between the US and China is not limited to economics but also in the area of international peace and security. In this case, the fundamental concern is the increasingly sophisticated measure of arsenals ie. Weapons of Mass Destruction that have been accumulated by both powers since the end of the Second World War. The development of military technology has enhanced the respective capacities of these two powers to kill and to cause destruction on a scale unprecedented in the history of the world.

More importantly there is the fear of contagion should a war breakout between the two powers. An escalation between these two states will most likely engulf the entire global community. The necessity to assess and make recommendations on how to improve bilateral ties between the two countries can therefore not be overemphasized and this constitute the rationale of the study.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The study is situated within the theory of structural realism. According to Mearsheimer, the basic structure of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. It is the ultimate goal of every great power to
maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this implies that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world while also ensuring that no rival great power dominates another area.

Measheimer, put forward five assumptions about the world. First of all, states are the key actors in international politics, and no higher authority stands above them. In his view therefore, there is no ultimate arbiter or leviathan in the system that states can turn to if they get into trouble and need help. The international system is an anarchical system, as opposed to a hierarchic one.

The next two assumptions deal with capabilities and intentions of states respectively. All states have offensive military capabilities, although some states capabilities far exceed others. Capabilities are reasonably easy to measure because they are largely composed of tangible material objects.

Intentions on the other hand are a different matter. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states, because intentions are usually hiding inside the heads of leaders and thus virtually impossible to see and difficult to measure. This means that states can never know with complete confidence whether another state might have its gun sights on them for one reason or another. The problem of discerning states’ intentions is especially acute when one ponders their future intentions. This is because it is almost impossible to know who the leaders of any country will be five or more years from now, much less what they will think about foreign policy.

In structural realism the assumption is that states rank survival as their most important goal. This does not in any way imply that survival is the only ambition of every state, for states invariably have numerous ambitions. Nevertheless, when push comes to shove, survival trumps
all other goals, basically because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals. Survival means more than simply maintaining a state’s territorial integrity, although that goal is fundamental; it also means preserving the autonomy of a state’s policymaking process. Last but not the least, states are assumed to be rational actors, which is to say they are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival.

The combined effects of these assumptions cause states to behave in particular ways. States tend to fear each other especially in a world where there is some possibility that other states might have malign intentions as well as formidable offensive military capabilities. That fear is compounded by what Mearsheimer, called the “9-1-1” problem. According to him, an anarchical system is like a world where there is no night watchman whom states can call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Accordingly, states recognize they must look out for their own survival, and the best way to do that is to be especially powerful.

The logic here is that the more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely its survival will be at risk. It is an established fact that no country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare attack the United States, because it is so much stronger than any of its neighbors. This reasoning drives great powers to look for opportunities to move the balance of power in their favor and well as to prevent other states from gaining power at their expense. The ultimate aim is to be the hegemon: that is, the only great power in the system.\textsuperscript{16}

The relevance of the theory to the work stems from the suggestion that both China and the US are in a battle to assume global hegemonic status and to maintain the status quo respectively. Consequently, their future relations is likely to be influenced by their respective quests. This clearly falls within the ambit of realism.
1.8 Literature Review

The end of the Second World War did not signal a return to normality; on the contrary, it resulted in a new conflict known as the Cold War. The major European powers that had been at the forefront of the international stage in the 1930s were left exhausted and ruined by the war. This led to the emergence of two new global superpowers. Two blocs developed around the United States and the Soviet Union, with other countries being forced to choose between the two camps. The Cold War was a lengthy power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union that began in the aftermath of the surrender of Hitler’s Germany. In 1941, as a result of Nazi aggression against the USSR, the Soviet regime became an ally of the Western democracies. But in the post-war world, increasingly divergent viewpoints created rifts between these allies.17

Projecting US power outside her region of origin appeared to be the main emphasis of US Foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War, The United States emerged as the great victor of the Second World War. Its human and material losses were relatively low, and even though the US Army was almost completely demobilized a few months after the end of hostilities, the United States remained the world’s leading military power. Its navy and air force were unmatched, and it remained the only country with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons until 1949. It also confirmed its status as the world’s leading economic power. This is true in terms of both the volume of trade and industrial and agricultural production.18

The USSR also came out of the war territorially enlarged and with an air of prestige from having fought Hitler’s Germany. A new life was ejected into the country by its heroic resistance
to the enemy, an excellent case in point was the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. The USSR also offered a particular ideological, economic and social system extending as never before to the rest of Europe. Unlike the US army, the Red Army was not demobilized at the end of the war. The Soviet Union consequently had a real numerical superiority in terms of men and heavy weapons.

As earlier on noted the pursuit of an expansive Foreign policy by the US has a long history dating back to the end of the Second World War when the US wrestled with the Soviet Union over global dominance in what became known as the Cold War. The Cold War unlike global power struggles of the previous eras was an ideological war fare between the US and the Soviet Union.

From 1947 onwards, the two enemies, employing all the resources at their disposal for intimidation and subversion, clashed in a lengthy strategic and ideological conflict marked by crises of varying intensities.

Just as any other international conflict (such as the First and Second World Wars) involving global powers in a much interconnected and interdependent world, the Cold War spread to engulf almost the entire global community. The Cold War was therefore not exclusively a struggle between the US and the USSR but a global conflict that affected many countries, especially the continent of Europe. The United States and the USSR gradually built up their own areas of influence, dividing the world into two opposing camps.

Capitalism was the dominant ideology of the US led Western camp whiles the main ideology of the Soviet led Eastern bloc was Communism. It was the end of the Cold war that Ushered in the US as the lone superpower in 1990.

“Shortly after the Cold War ended, George H. W. Bush’s administration boldly stated in its famous “Defense Guidance” of 1992, which was leaked to the press, that the United States was now the lone superpower in the world and planned to remain in that exalted position.
American policymakers, in other words, would not tolerate the emergence of a new peer competitor."²²

Wang Jisi, dean of Peking University’s School of International Studies and a leading expert on U.S-China relations, also adds that in recent years the view throughout China has “deepened” that:

“the ultimate goal of the United States in world affairs is to maintain its hegemony and dominance and, as a result, Washington will attempt to prevent the emerging powers, in particular China, from achieving their goals and enhancing their stature.”²³

The Cold War is significant in numerous ways prominent among them is that it has established in profound ways the standards for superpower conflicts. It has laid down the rules that will govern the nature of superpower conflicts in the international system for a long time to come.

Although the two Great Powers never fought directly, the Cold War pushed the world to the brink of a nuclear war on several occasions. Nuclear deterrence was the only effective means of preventing a military confrontation. Just like the Cold War Era, Great power politics is gradually coming into force particularly with the rising power of China. The US an already well established hegemon perceives an imminent threat in the rise of China. As China rises, there is the increasing tendency for her to define her interest more expansively and thus threaten the current status quo in which the US is a major beneficiary. As rightly pointed out by Friedberg¹, as a state’s capabilities grow, its leaders tend to define their interests more expansively and to seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them.

“This correlation between growing power and expanding interests has been summarized by Robert Gilpin: “A more wealthy and more powerful state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state.”²⁴

The risk of a serious Sino-American confrontation exists despite the absence of the zero-sum, life-and-death struggle between two archrivals that characterized Soviet-American relations.²⁵
As armed adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union expected that their opposed interests would generate crises. Over time, this recognition encouraged both sides to anticipate and avoid risky confrontations and to improve their ability to manage them when they did occur. This salutary trend was not just the result of intellectual enlightenment and prudence; it was also catalyzed by nerve-rattling experience. During the first fifteen years of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow had faced the danger of military escalation in three crises over the status of Berlin and one over the presence of Soviet nuclear forces in Cuba. Through these frightening experiences, each side reluctantly came to accept that it could not challenge what were clearly understood to be the other’s vital interests beyond its homeland without triggering a confrontation that could escalate into a catastrophic war.26

The growing US and Soviet recognition of the international status quo in areas where each country had vital interests reduced the probability of actions triggering major crises. No similarly shared understanding has yet been reached in the case of China and the United States. Most importantly, there is much less clarity about the delimitation of U.S. and Chinese vital interests beyond their homelands, especially in the Western Pacific. Ambiguity has been reflected in China’s varying statements about its “core interests” aside from the territorial and political integrity of its recognized borders on the mainland and its relatively clear claim to Taiwan.27

Ambiguity has also been reflected in the United States’ broadly construed position on the future of Taiwan as well as on the resolution of maritime-territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Vagueness or uncertainty about “red lines” that cannot be crossed without risking conflict increases the possibility that states may take steps that elicit an unexpectedly arm response. Such actions can trigger a crisis by clarifying previously vague interests that states then
become determined to ensure. Uncertainty about the issues for which each would dare run the risk of escalation to military conflict could lead China or the United States to act in ways that it believes merely solidify the status quo and are therefore safe. But because the red lines are unclear, the other side might instead view such steps as provocative, triggering a crisis.28

1.9 Methodology and Sources of Data

The research relied solely on qualitative methods of research.

The study collected data from secondary sources such as journal articles, policy briefs, news items and reports as well as sources from the internet.

To get an objective picture of the themes discussed, reports written and published by both state sponsored as well as internationally recognized independent think tanks were consulted by the researcher.

These reports included state sponsored reports by the US Congressional Report Service and a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and The Europe Council on Foreign Relations.

An equally unique feature of the process is that the researcher made use of data from a variety of reputed on-line data sources.

The study was conducted using qualitative approach. The data collected was analyzed using descriptive means.
1.10 Arrangement of Chapters

The study has been divided into four chapters. Chapter one is the research design.
Chapter two has been devoted to discussing current state of the relationship between the US and China.
Chapter three consist of an examination of the elements that will shape the possible future of the relationship between the US and China.
Chapter four summarizes the findings, states the conclusions and offer recommendations.
Endnotes

4 Lawrence, S. V., op. cit.
7 BBC Online,(2013)Russia and China engage in a joint naval exercise…..Accessed on 30th, April 2013
8 Friedberg, A. L., op. cit.
11 Lawrence, S. V., op. cit.
12 Kempe F. and Qu Xing(2013) China US cooperation key to global future. Atlantic Council,BrentScowcroft,Centre On International Security
13 Friedberg, A.L., op. cit.
14 Friedberg, A.L., op. cit.
16 Ibid.
17 The Cold War (1945-1989),www.cvce.eu 2014,
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Mearsheimer, J., op. cit.
23 Ratner, E., op. cit.
24 Friedberg, A. L., op. cit.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO

THE STATE OF US-CHINA RELATIONS

2.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the current state of US China relations. This is presented along significant themes such as Nuclear Non Proliferation Climate Change among others. This serves as a premise for the discussion of the future of US China relations in Chapter three.

2.1 An Overview of the State of US China Relations

The current relationship between China and the US is largely characterized by a power struggle particularly in the Asia Pacific region. It is an established fact that the US remains the lone superpower with hegemonic status not only in the Asia Pacific region but also in the international system since the break Up of the Soviet Union which marked the end of the Cold War. Today, the geopolitical terrain is shifting again, altered by the emergence of China as a major power in a world dominated by the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹

The Asia Pacific has become especially important to the world particularly the US because of its growing economic potential and increasing military capabilities of the states in the region particularly China. The Asia Pacific region is currently the world’s most populous area and the fastest growing economic zone. It is expected to become even more vital for the U.S. economy in the future. This expectation has led the Obama Administration to pursue the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to make Asian nations central to its National Export Initiative.²

Increasing population growth as well as economic might couple with intense military build-up in the region has made the region and its regional powers particularly China important to the future
of world politics as a whole and for that matter the relations between the US and China as the leading global players.

The magnitude of China’s military and economic might are indications of the fact that China has now entered the ranks of the super powers. Nevertheless the rising power of China can still not counter the already well established global hegemonic clout of the US.

“But even if one believes, as I do, that China and Russia are great powers, they are still far weaker than the United States and in no position to challenge it in any meaningful way.”

The rise of China is one thing and her decision to seek international hegemony is another. China’s intentions are still not very clear. China has not openly demonstrated her desire to pursue international hegemony. When it does it would have to challenge US hegemony. Aside trade related issues PRC has with Washington, the current relationship between the US and China and its associated issues are largely regional issues of the Asia Pacific region. China unlike current powers such as Germany and Russia has no modern history of external conquest and annexations of other countries.

Nevertheless, China’s rising power in the Asia Pacific region and the issues it brings in its train could still have significant global implications because of the increasing economic and military capacities of China as well as the rising globalization of the international System. Increasing economic and military might implies that the international community’s stake in China is becoming much more pronounced. In a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational. An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another.

The following developments in the Asia Pacific region constitute issues of critical concern to the relationship between the two world powers: China’s military modernization
program which poses an increasing threat to her regional neighbors and the US, its unwavering desire to regulate U.S. military operations in the “Exclusive Economic Zone” off its coast, its assertive territorial claims in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea China continue to threaten to use force to bring Taiwan under its control.⁵

China is beginning to define her interest more expansively as a result of her rising power. This is one of the significant features of rising powers.⁶ The critical concern in this case is whether China’s behavior in the Asia Pacific would bring it into conflict with a potential for escalation with the US, the current reigning hegemon in the region and the world at large? If it does it could have tremendous global ramifications because of the significant economic and military clouts both states have managed to develop over the past few decades.

If tensions between the US and China worsen, the whole of Eastern Eurasia could become divided in a new cold war. And when this happens, the prospects for confrontation and conflict would seem certain to rise. On the other hand, an improved relationship between the U.S and China could bring with it increased possibilities for sustained worldwide economic growth, the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional disputes. This could also lead to the successful management of pressing global problems, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁷

2.2 US and China Relations: Mutual Suspicion and Mistrust

One barrier to closer ties between US and China is the ”Strategic Mistrust” between the leaders. Neither governments at present time aim to harm the other but tensions invariably arise when any powerful states-especially these two with their vastly different histories, cultures and political systems-pursue policies that seek primarily to enhance their own security and welfare.⁸
Key among such policies on the part of the US in recent times is the strategic rebalancing towards the Asia Pacific region. In the words of Ratner:

“As President Obama enters his second term, continuing to shift U.S. attention and resources to the Asia—Pacific will be a leading U.S. foreign policy priority. While many in the region have welcomed this renewed commitment, the U.S. ‘pivot’ to Asia has created heightened concerns in China about U.S. intentions. U.S. efforts to expand its military force posture in Asia, to strengthen security ties with allies and partners, and to enhance the role of regional institutions are viewed by many in Beijing as directly aimed at constraining China’s rise and as the principal cause of regional instability as well as the deterioration of China’s strategic environment.”

Clearly these moves by Washington are Foreign policy options made in direct responds to China’s rising influence and its resultant aggressive behavior which China has adopted in the pursuit of her Foreign policy objectives in the region.

The Chinese view the strategic shift towards the Asia Pacific with suspicion especially in the wake of the rising Chinese power in the region and waning US influence in the same region. The Obama Administration has stated that the primary goal of the strategic shift is to devote more effort to influencing the development of the Asia-Pacific’s norms and rules, particularly at a time when China emerges as an ever-more influential regional power.

This mutual suspicion between the US and China in any case doesn’t come as a surprise at all simply because relations between liberal and non-liberal states are always conducted in an “atmosphere of suspicion”. This is largely because liberal states are of the view that non liberal states are involved in a permanent state of aggression against its own people.

There is no denying the fact that Beijing has direct stake in the international politics of the region. On the other hand the US interest in the region is largely strategic. Nevertheless, the increasing military might of Beijing and the approach employed by her in the pursuit of her interest in the region raises a specter of danger not only to Washington which is the major power
in the region but also to all regional players who’s interest appears incompatible with Beijing’s interest in the region.

Differences in ideology thus tend to heighten the mistrust and competitive impulses that are rooted in the dynamics of geopolitics particularly with respect to the US, Russia and China in the current international system.¹²

### 2.3 Competition for Global Power and Ideological Rivalry Between the US and China

The Veto power has become a geopolitical tool which offers an irresistible fascination for any aspiring global power. The UN Security Council rather than serving its true purpose of ensuring global peace and security, has become the centre of a geopolitical tug of war between the major powers of the world (P5). There are instances too numerous to mention in which the UNSC has failed to take major decisions to address key global security concerns because of ideological differences and competition for global power between the major powers of the world.

For instance the draft resolution on establishing a no-fly zone in Libya was put to vote on March 17, 2011 in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). China, Russia, Brazil, India and Germany abstained from voting, paving the way for the military intervention plan led by the United States, Britain and France to pass. However, on February 4 2012, the UNSC draft resolution condemning Syria was vetoed by China and Russia balking the West’s plan of intervening in Syria. Western countries desired to intervene in Libya and Syria on the excuse of avoiding a humanitarian disaster while stressing the concept of relative sovereignty featured by “human rights taking precedence over sovereignty”. China’s abstention from and veto of the UNSC resolutions are based on the principle that the absoluteness of sovereignty can never be violated.¹³
There are two distinct ideologies which characterized the foreign and domestic policies of both the US and China. Capitalism and individualism are central to American ideology as well as the foundations of American economic system. Each of them emphasizes on the market and individuals as the key economic actors. Compared to citizens of European countries, Americans are more fearful of and concerned about government intervention and thus demand less state interference in economic affairs.\textsuperscript{14}

China could demonstrate formidable strength in the international market on the bases of state’s intervention in the market, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), sovereignty wealth fund, state manipulation of exchange rates, government subsidy, low labor standards as well as ineffectiveness in intellectual property protection, etc.\textsuperscript{15}

The ideological principles underlying western foreign policies seem to place a lot of emphasis on Human rights to the detriments of state sovereignty. Western backed humanitarian interventions such as the intervention in Libya appeared to have been founded on this principle. In the view of the west, Human rights take precedence over sovereignty. According to the proposal of a few Western states, when humanitarian disaster happens within the border of a sovereign state, the international community could interfere or even overthrow its national government.\textsuperscript{16}

The United States places human rights and democracy on the top of its priorities while viewing them as the guiding principles of its foreign policies. China, on the other hand, puts order, stability and security.\textsuperscript{17}

As shown by the Libya and Syria cases, it appears that the theory of relative sovereignty has been increasingly endorsed by the international community. For instance voting on the Libya issue, 10 out of the 15 UNSC members voted for the draft resolution and 5 abstained from
voting. With the voting on the Syrian issue, 13 members approved while 2 vetoed the resolution. Nevertheless, results like these only show the surface of the issue. UNSC voting actually reflects international competitions at two levels, one for power and the other concerning ideological beliefs.¹⁸

As a hegemonic power, the basic ideological norms governing US diplomacy include four fundamental principles: hegemony, capitalism, democracy and Western culture. In the ideological perspectives of the United States of America hegemony is better than a balance of power, capitalism is better than socialism, democracy is better than dictatorship and Western culture is better than all the rest. According to Xinchun, these fundamentals are out of date and in conflict with the ideological beliefs of emerging powers like China.¹⁹

These values are purely western values and hence attempts by the west to universalize them has been a major source of inter and intra-state conflicts across the world. The conflict between North and South Korea and the Arab Spring are excellent cases in point.

The existing leadership of China may no longer be Marxists, but they are most certainly Leninists. They are of the view that the one party authoritarian regime they lead should continue in power and hence are determined to crush any opposition or dissent. The ultimate aim of all elements of Chinese policy, foreign as well as domestic is to preserve CCP rule.²⁰

This makes democracy extremely distasteful to the Chinese leadership and hence Beijing ideology is incredibly at variance with that of the US.

As seen from Beijing, the United States appears as a crusading liberal democratic hegemon, bent on undermining the authority of regimes of which it disapproves and ultimately of remaking the entire world in its own image. This fear shapes the Chinese government’s
understanding of every aspect of U.S. policy and shapes its assessment of America’s activities across Asia, which it believes are aimed at encircling it with pro-U.S. democracies.\textsuperscript{21}

Differences in ideology thus tend to heighten the mistrust and competitive impulses that are rooted in the dynamics of geopolitics particularly with respect to the US, Russia and China in the existing international system. Since Athens and Sparta, relations between dominant powers and fast-rising potential challengers have always been characterized by tension and have often resulted in conflict. Relations between the United States and China were never anticipated to be smooth but, for as long as it persists, the ideological gap that now separates them is going to make it much harder to achieve a stable \textit{modus vivendi}.\textsuperscript{22}

In the height of the Cold War in 1952, the Chinese leadership were opposed to any form of friendly bilateral relations with non-Communist Asia countries because of the supposed influence western imperialist countries have on them. Beijing did not shelve its opposition to them on ideological as well as political grounds. More importantly Beijing actively inspired these states to emulate its communist ideals.\textsuperscript{23}

Just as any other state in contemporar international system ,Beijings policy towards non-communist states changed during the Korean war when it realised that her interest is better served by her capacity to accommodate other states in the region irrespective of their ideological inclinations.\textsuperscript{24}

US global strategic interest is shaped by ideological predispositions to battle with all non-democratic states in the international system .Western experts are of the view that international peace and security can only be attained when western democratic ideals triumphs over the rest. This perception of the west is markedly informed by the fact that authoritarian regimes are inherently fragile and thus compelled to rally domestic support through nationalist and
expansionist policies. As Friedberg puts it, a democratic China will have little cause to fear its democratic counterparts, still less to use force against them. Therefore, “stripped of diplomatic niceties, the ultimate aim of the American strategy to hasten a revolution, albeit a peaceful one, that will sweep away China’s one-party authoritarian state and leave a liberal democracy in its place.25

2.4 Security Dilemma

Even if one rejects the notion that the goal of the PRC is to oust the US as the only hegemonic power in East Asia, it is still possible to reach fairly optimistic conclusions about the potential future character of US China relations by invoking the logic of security dilemma. This implies that even if the main political goals on each side are predominantly defensive, the approach employed by either side to secure its interest and positions could still largely attract attention from the other side. This has the tendency to elicit countermeasures from each side.26

The mechanism of security dilemma appears to be at work in several aspects of the existing US China relations. For instance with respect to Taiwan, China’s goal may be only to prevent that island from moving towards independence. This implies that, the Chinese leadership may be willing to live with the existing status-quo forever but they may be of the view that periodic threats are necessary to ward off Taiwan from breaking free. Nevertheless, China’s threats and ongoing military buildup may raise fears that Beijing will eventually feel capable of achieving its objectives through the use of force.27 “To ensure deterrence, Washington may then feel compelled to increase military assistance to Taipei. More importantly, the US would take further steps designed to make it appear more likely that the United States would intervene if Taiwan were attacked. But these steps will almost certainly make the PRC more fearful of a
Taiwanese bolt for independence, which will cause Beijing to further intensify its military efforts and heighten its rhetoric, and so on.”

2.5 Propaganda Warfare

The US Department of State operates multiple Chinese blogs and microblogs on Chinese platforms in an effort to counter frequently heavy-handed Chinese censorship of the traditional news and reach out directly to Chinese public with messages that has to do with US Foreign policy. The US Embassy’s top microblogs each have close to 700,000 registered followers. These means that the US government is able to reach millions of Chinese who may not have direct access to US government messages when these registered followers re-post US blogs for their own followers. China based microblogs accounts are still subject to Chinese government censorship. In July 2012, for instance a Chinese microblog Service disabled a microblog operated by the US Consulate General in Shanghai China, simply because the Chinese government censors were not comfortable with the material the Consular general was posting.

The State Department also operates Chinese-language accounts on Twitter. This is based in the US and for that matter does not censor content. The U.S. government posts on Twitter sensitive information that is often censored on Chinese social media, such as U.S. government speeches on human rights and Internet freedom. The Chinese government has a state policy of blocking access to Twitter from inside China. This reduces the service reach in the country. Nevertheless technologically, savvy Chinese are able to use virtual private networks to evade the blocking technologies.

“Of longer standing are U.S. government efforts to reach out to the Chinese public through programming produced by Radio Free Asia (RFA) and the Voice of America (VOA).
Both are overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), an independent entity responsible for all U.S. government and government-sponsored non-military international broadcasting. RFA’s stated mission is “to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments prohibit access to a free press.”31

2.6 Elements of Cooperation in US China Relations

Areas of co-operation in US China relations include multilateralism, Non Proliferation of Nuclear weapons, climate change among others.

2.6.1 Multilateral Engagement

As a way of getting China to live by acceptable international norms and assume responsibilities compatible with its increasing national capabilities and growing global impacts, the Obama administration has made a policy commitment to engage China in international multilateral settings. As members of the P5 Security Council, they have cooperated in passing sanctions targeting North Korea and Iran’s nuclear programs. China has however on numerous occasions blocked several proposed UN Security Council Resolutions sought by the US particularly a series of actions on Syria. The US hope to resolve trade disputes with China through the rules of the WTO.32

More importantly, the US has engaged China on climate change issues through meetings of parties to the UN framework convention on climate Change. The US has also urged China to adhere to norms of aid, export credit finance and overseas investment established by the OECD “To accept principles related to freedom of navigation contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), although the United States itself has not ratified the treaty.”33
The US has prioritized its own attendance at meetings of regional multilateral groups in Asia, including the East Asian Summit, which the US joined in 2011. All these diplomatic maneuvers were done partly to engage China in those settings. \(^{34}\)

Aside trade, liberal optimists are confident in the effectiveness of international institutions of various kinds. International institutions can aid in improving communication between states, help clarify intentions of states and more importantly enhanced the capacity of states to make credible binding commitments to one another. International Institutions could help ease the pernicious effects of international anarchy and pave the way for higher degrees of cooperation and trust among states. \(^{35}\)

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation of regional institutions in East Asia. China has also sought to enhance her diplomatic participation in international organizations. In fact China’s membership in governmental organizations has more than doubled between 1977 and 1997. On the other hand her membership in International Non-Governmental Organizations rose during the same period from 71 to 1163. The rise in the number of international institutions in Asia and the enhanced U.S. and Chinese participation in them are drawing the United States and the PRC together and improving bilateral ties between the two powers. \(^{36}\)

China’s increasing participation in international institutions should give it a growing, albeit more diffuse, stake in the stability and continuity of the existing global order. The desire of China’s leadership to continue to enjoy the benefits of membership in that order should make them less likely to take steps that would threaten the status quo. This should reduce the likelihood that the PRC will act in ways that could bring it into conflict with the United States, which is the principal architect, defender and beneficiary of the current international system. \(^{37}\)
This is however not always the case, developments at the UN Security Council has proved otherwise. The voting pattern at the Permanent Membership of the UNSC has shown that international institutions have become a new battle ground for superpower struggle. The reason being that sometimes the benefits accruing to a state as a result of her pursuit of her national interest, far outweighs that of the benefits of being a member of an international organization. This applies to the US and China.

2.7 Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The discovery of nuclear weapons and technology marks a significant turning point in world history. Nevertheless nuclear technology appears to be a double edged sword. It was indeed the terrifying consequences of the Atomic weapons that forced the Japanese to succumb to the western powers during the Second World War and eventually brought an end to the war. Nuclear weapons in principle are designed to have the same effect rather peacefully as deterrents. However the degree of effectiveness of nuclear weapons as deterrents would largely depend on the success of global efforts at nonproliferation.

Using nuclear weapons as deterrents whiles curtailing further efforts at the development of nuclear weapon technology and placing emphasizes on the peaceful and environmentally friendly use of nuclear technology, is a necessity if the global community is to maximize its use of nuclear technology. Cooperation in this area particularly between the current nuclear powers is of crucial importance to the future of the international community particularly in the area of International Peace and Security.

The future ratification of CTBT by both the US and China is one area of likely progress. There is a stalemate in which each side is saying to the other “go first please.” The concern of the
Chinese is that the US Senate would not support conjoint ratification even if they-the Chinese side and the US administration- give their consent to such an agreement. Notwithstanding this constrains, simultaneous ratification would signify a significant step towards closing the strategic trust gap existing between the two powers.\(^{38}\)

China has acceded to various arms control treaties and related nonproliferation organizations, and has ensured that its domestic regulations conform to their requirements. China has joined the nuclear nonproliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group; agreed to abide by the limits of the Missile Technology Control Regime; and signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.\(^{39}\)

Since 2006, China has been an important player in United States- and European-led multilateral efforts to rein in Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China has participated in negotiations with Iran over the nuclear program as part of the P5+1 grouping (permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany). It has also supported a series of U.N. resolutions imposing limited U.N. sanctions against Iran, although it has frequently urged the use of dialogue rather than sanctions to address the nuclear program and joined Russia in pushing for more narrowly targeted sanctions than the U.S. and European nations sought. In the case of U.N. Resolution 1929, passed in June 2010, for example, Russia and China successfully insisted that new sanctions not target Iran’s civilian economy or its population.\(^{40}\)

### 2.8 Climate Change

Another important issue on the international security agenda aside nuclear weapons proliferation, is the issue of climate change. Cooperation of the international community
particularly the world’s biggest emitters of greenhouse gases is a necessary ingredient for global climate security.

The US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping announced recently in a historic climate change deal between the two major powers to limit their greenhouse emissions over the next two decades.

Under the deal, the US has agreed to cut its 2005 level of carbon emissions by 26% to 28% before 2025. China on the other hand would peak its carbon emissions by 2030 and will also aim to get 20% of its energy from zero-carbon emission sources by the same year.

"As the world's two largest economies, energy consumers and emitters of greenhouse gases, we have a special responsibility to lead the global effort against climate change," Obama said Wednesday in a joint news conference with Xi.41

2.9 Economic Interdependence

Liberal optimists believe that bilateral economic exchange creates shared interests in good relations between states. The greater the volume of trade and investment growing between the US and China, the more groups on both sides will have a strong interest in avoiding conflict and preserving peace.42

From the start of reform in 1978 to the end of the twentieth century, the value of the trade between the US and China grew by more than two orders of magnitude, from $1 billion to almost $120 billion annually. This figure doubled to a reported total of $245 billion by 2004. Capital flows between the two powers have also risen. US investors has so far invested substantial amounts of money into the Chinese economy. Experts believe that in the absence of any major disruptions, economic forces would continue to draw the two powers together.43

This is particularly so because, there has been mutual dependence of these two countries on each other’s economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole for
some time now. This was clearly demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. There was the recognition on the part of the US and Chinese leadership that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis. This played a key role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is likely to increase as globalization and interdependence deepens.44

Global economic interdependence is another area worth considering, the world is increasingly becoming interconnected. Globalization of trade just as any aspect of life is on the rise. This is manifested by trade liberalization policies being implemented by regional economic groupings across the world and the increasing number of multinational corporations across the world. An increase in the economic stake of the global community in any economy makes it almost untouchable in this era. For instance an increased in the volume of Foreign Direct Investments in an economy and a comfortable monopoly in the production and export of a major international commodity such as oil make states almost unrestrained either by sanctions or through the use of force. This is because any major interruption in any of the economic power houses of the world could have devastating global economic ramifications because of the interconnectedness of the economies across the world.

A case in point is Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and its resultant annexation of Crimea. The west led by the US responded by imposing nail biting sanctions on the Russian economy. The effects of these sanctions were not only felt by the Russian economy but the entire global economy particularly the global prices of energy products. This is because Russia’s
economy contributes substantially to the global economy particularly with regards to the exports of global energy products.

As a result of the increasing global interconnectedness and interdependence the need for economic cooperation between the two leading global economic power houses is overwhelmingly significant to the future of the global economy. The bottom-line is that economic interdependence has a significant likelihood of drawing not only the US and China together but the entire global community.

2.10 Elements of Contestation in US China Relations
2.10.1 Trade conflicts

There has been a diplomatic standoff between the US and China over currency values and trade balances as well as over the impact of China’s demand on world resources and its implications on global prices of energy and other materials. 45 “The U.S. and Chinese economies are the first and second largest in the world respectively, and are heavily interdependent. The Obama Administration has sought to cooperate with China in rebalancing the global economy, while acknowledging that the two nations are engaged in what President Obama calls “healthy economic competition.” Bilateral economic issues include the issue of commercial cyber espionage allegedly originating from China; China’s currency and industrial policies; and China’s weak enforcement of intellectual property rights. Both countries have welcomed the growth of Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States, although China has complained about U.S. scrutiny of investments on national security grounds.” 46

2.11 China’s territorial claims in the South China and East China Sea

There is a historical dimension to China’s territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. According to Mozingo, 47 before the arrival of western powers in the Far East to dominate
the area in the 19th century, the supposed Chinese empire included areas such as Korea, Mongolia, Tibet, Annam and the Siberian Maritime provinces. With the coming of the western powers, China was forced to accept the breakaway of these territories.

“Mao Tse-Tung echoed the traditional Chinese view in 1937 when he expressed to Edgar Snow his belief that China’s historical relationship to these territories would be restored”

The Chinese leadership are of the view that for China’s rightful status to be restored in the region, all western powers especially the US must leave the far East. This is because, the influence exerted by the US and the Soviet Union on China’s neighbors who were initially part of the supposed China empire constrains China’s efforts to get these territories accept China inclined political order.

Six countries lay overlapping claims to the East and South China Seas. This area that is rich in hydrocarbons and natural gas and through which trillions of dollars of global trade flow. China has been met by growing assertiveness from regional claimants like Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines as it seeks to expand its maritime presence, China has been met by growing assertiveness from regional claimants like Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The increasingly frequent stalemates span from the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, on China’s eastern flank, to the long stretch of archipelagos in the South China Sea that comprise hundreds of islets. The U.S. pivot to Asia, involving renewed diplomatic activity and military redeployment, could signal Washington’s heightened role in the disputes. If the US pivot to Asia is not managed wisely, it has a significant likelihood to turn part of Asia’s maritime regions from thriving trade channels into arenas of conflict.

A substantial measure of Beijing’s anger with the US strategic shift to the Asia Pacific region has to do with issues relating to the South China Sea. Much of China’s ire with U.S.
rebalancing has been concentrated in the South China Sea, where six governments claim a variety of contested land features and surrounding waters in historical fishing grounds that are believed to be rich in hydrocarbons. China has repeatedly claimed “indisputable sovereignty” over the sea, demarcating its claims on official maps with a nine-dash line that stretches far from mainland China and snakes along the coasts of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{51}

China’s anger with the US is not limited to issues related to the South China Sea alone but the East China Sea as well. This has to do with competing claims to Senkaku Island by both China and Japan in the East China Sea. These Islands have been a constant source of tension between these two powers for decades. These Islands are particularly important to these two states simply because it offer access to key shipping lanes. It further constitutes fishing grounds and potential oil reserves. Tensions between Japan and China were aggravated when Tokyo Governor, Shintaro Ishahara declared his intention to purchase the island from a private Japanese citizen.\textsuperscript{52}

The Chinese became suspicious of an ill-conceived US policy to create an additional source of instability in the region through the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands. Chinese suspicions of US involvement was reinforced by two key events, first, the fact that the announcement by the Tokyo governor to purchase the Island was done in a speech at the Heritage Foundation a think Tank in Washington.\textsuperscript{53}

More importantly, as the crisis escalated into the fall of 2012, U.S. officials reiterated Secretary Clinton’s October 2010 statement that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which obliges the United States to defend Japan in case of hostilities covers the Senkaku Islands.\textsuperscript{54}
According to realist pessimist there is a direct link between Intentions of states and their capabilities. They are equally of the view that there is in existence of certain principles of international behavior which are universally applicable. Rising powers for instance turn to have expansive interest and are very much likely to display assertive or aggressive behavior. As a rising power China is no exception in this case.55

It must however be noted that not all realists share this view, not even those who accept the fact that China’s power is growing as well as believe that rising powers tend to be dissatisfied with existing status quo. There is indeed credible evidence to back this assertion; India is a rising power just as China. Nevertheless India is yet to demonstrate the kind of assertive and or aggressive tendencies China has exhibited so far.

“As Randall Schweller notes, rising powers can differ in the extent of their dissatisfaction with the status quo, and hence in the scope of their ambitions. Some rising powers have truly revolutionary objectives; they seek, in other words, to overthrow an entire system of international rules and institutions. But others may have more modest, limited aims; they may be revision-ists rather than revolutionaries, states that seek marginal adjustments to the status quo rather than fundamental change.”56

Washington has wrestled, however, with how to engage China on issues affecting stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Washington is concerned about the intentions behind China’s military modernization program, the use of paramilitary forces and military by China in disputes with its neighbors over territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and Beijing’s continuing threat to use force to bring Taiwan under its control.57 China’s assertive territorial claims in the Asia Pacific Region is a direct outcome of her rising power
status. The US as a status quo power can’t bear that against her interest and the interest of her allies in the region.

2.12 US China relations over the issue of Taiwan’s Independence

Taiwan remains a potential flash point in East Asia. It remains the only issue over which leaders of both China and the United States contemplate and conscientiously prepare for armed conflict. U.S. policy toward Taiwan is articulated in the “Three Communiques” with the PRC and the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA). The Three Communique’s establish U.S. support for a “one China” policy. This policy also calls for the gradual reduction of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan consistent with the reduction of tension across the strait. According to the TRA it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain an independent capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”

The TRA also places an obligation on the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

China views these U.S. commitments to Taiwan’s security, especially the provision of defense goods and services to Taiwan, as an unwelcome intrusion in China’s internal affairs since it considers Taiwan to some extent as being under its jurisdiction.

“The Task Force finds that U.S. commitments under the Three Communique´s and the Taiwan Relations Act contribute meaningfully to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Other states in the region also view Washington’s commitment to cross-strait peace and stability as an important symbol of America’s strategic interest in East Asia, and would view any diminution of that interest with concern. Nevertheless, claims by both Washington and Beijing of a right to resort to force to
prevent an unwanted outcome in the Taiwan Strait naturally put limits on U.S.-China bilateral military relations, even on issues and missions of common concern, and encourage each side to prepare for a worst-case scenario. Conflicting military objectives of this magnitude create their own powerful dynamic of mistrust and could even lead to a conflict neither intended nor desired by either side. Until some level of political accommodation is reached in cross-strait relations, even on an interim basis, Washington and Beijing have to continue to manage their differences on Taiwan rather than resolve them.\textsuperscript{50}

2.13 Cyber Security

But for HIV virus Cyber-attacks constitute the greatest threat facing contemporary Human society. This is because unlike any other threat facing humanity, it has the overwhelming tendency to develop the capacity to effectively counter any measure that is put in place to fix it.

One of the issues of critical concern in U.S.-China relations is commercial cyber espionage that the U.S. government says appears to be directly attributable to official Chinese actors.\textsuperscript{61}

2.14 Cyber Activities Directed Against U.S. National Defense Programs

The U.S. government has stated for the first time in its DOD’s 2013 annual report to Congress that some cyber-intrusions directed at U.S. government and other computer systems, appear to be linked directly to the Chinese government and military.\textsuperscript{62}

The report further accused the Chinese of using “computer network exploitation (CNE)” capabilities to collect intelligence from the US government and sectors of its economy that support U.S. national defense programs. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson in a response to the allegations in the report, stated that “We resolutely oppose hacking attacks of any form and stand ready to have calm and constructive dialogue with the U.S. on the cyber security issue.”\textsuperscript{63}
Stories about suspected “Chinese” attacks on U.S. and allied interests in both the public and private domain have become an almost daily occurrence in the media, and a source of regular discussion within the Washington, D.C. policy community. In 2011, this took on a new level of concern and publicity with several major reported intrusions into American and allied government, military, corporate, university, NGO, and think tank networks. The most notable perhaps was the disclosure of the “Shady RAT” attacks that successfully targeted some 72 governments, international institutions, corporations, and think tanks. Some claim that if the overall scale of the loss were measured in monetary terms, it would be the largest theft in history.64

In short, U.S. concern about cyber security has intensified to the level that China has been specifically cited by the U.S. government’s 2011 Office of the National Counter intelligence Executive report as the “most active and persistent” perpetrator of cyber intrusions into the United States.65

President Barack Obama’s 2011 Cyberspace Policy Review declared that “cyber security risks pose some of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century.66

Chinese officials and writers also assert that most attacks on Chinese computers originate in the United States, claiming that China has been the target of some 34,000 cyber-attacks from the US. While the numbers are arguable, it is undeniable that a large amount of malicious Internet activity emanates from or at least moves through the U.S. For example, security researchers at Host Exploit have found that 20 of the top 50 crime-spewing ISPs (Internet Service Providers—the companies that provide access to the Internet) in the world are American.67

38
Finally, Chinese actors often express a sense of unfairness. Many feel that the U.S. has a too highly privileged position in the global cyber communications world as a legacy of its seminal role in developing the Internet and many related cyber technologies. They note, for example, that of the 13 root servers that are essential to the function of the entire internet, 10 were originally located in the U.S. (and include U.S. government operators like the U.S. Army Research Lab and NASA), and the other 3 are in U.S. allies (Japan, Netherlands, Sweden). Similarly, ICANN, which essentially manages the protocol addresses which is very essential to preserving the stability and smooth operation of the global Internet, started out through a U.S. government mandate. 68

In sum, distrust of each other’s actions in the cyber realm is growing between the U.S. and China, and such suspicions easily spills over into broader assessments of the other country’s long term intentions. 69 Cyber-attacks from either country constitute a real threat to their respective industrial and military installations.

2.15 China’s Technological Development and Military Buildup

China’s economic growth has provided Beijing the capacity to modernize its military. In fact China has experienced two decades of defense budget growth, including an 18 percent increase for 2007. China has even develop a robust space program. Concerns has been raised in some quarters that China will soon emerge as a military “peer competitor” of the United States. This means that China if it ever does it would be able to contest U.S. primacy in East Asia and project power around the globe. 70

The terrific speed at which technological development is moving is likely to change the global operating environment for foreign policy and national security over the next two decades with uncertain consequences course of states, international relations, and the international system, as have the Internet,
mobile communications technology, and social media. These technologies range from new energy systems and manufacturing technologies such as 3D printing to bio- and nanotechnology breakthroughs affecting agricultural productivity, human enhancement, robotics, and information availability. On the negative side of the ledger, cyber hacking, cyber warfare, and genomics-enabled bioterrorism have the likelihood to be highly disruptive.71

Furthermore, the development of military technology is another area through which China poses an increasing military threat not only to its regional neighbors but also to a far greater power like the US. Industrialization and Economic development could translate not only into the ability to acquire sophisticated weapons but also to develop the capacity to produce internally far more advanced weapons. Sensational stories about china’s military buildup in the Asia pacific region abound in the international media.

2.16 China’s Military Modernization

As a result of China’s rising power, the tendency for her to define her interest more expansively is incredibly high. This China cannot achieve without a well-equipped military force. More importantly, the increasing US military presence in the Asia Pacific region as well as the numerous coalitions the US has entered into with some of China’s neighbors with whom China is involved in territorial and maritime disputes is a major source of security concern for China.

China’s military modernization has two main motives. The first has to do with Taiwan, the second is clearly strategic: to build a modern military because China will be a modern power. In Pentagon 2005 report to Congress on China’s military, it found that China emphasis is on preparations to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along China’s borders, particularly in the East and South China Seas, where long-standing territorial disputes hold the potential for conflict.72
Trade routes in this region are also of particular significance to these disputes. China’s military strategy in the long term will be shaped by its growing dependence on imported oil, the presence of unstable regimes on its western and northeastern borders, and constant concerns about a U.S.-led containment strategy. In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon concluded that: The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review reports that China’s space, air, and missile capabilities now pose a robust threat to potential adversaries in contested areas around China. The validity of this concern appears to have been demonstrated by China’s use of a missile to destroy one of its old weather satellites in low-earth polar orbit. This was the first time that China had successfully tested an anti-satellite system.

China’s anti-satellite test at a minimum enhanced the credibility of China’s military threat to Taiwan by illustrating a limited ability to blind the satellites that the United States would rely upon to conduct operations in the Taiwan Strait.

Whatever China’s true intentions, the test remains a clear example of how China’s emerging military strength will complicate the strategic environment confronting the U.S. forces for decades to come.

Before 1990, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) used relatively unsophisticated equipment and had little successful combat experience. The PRC relied on large ground forces and geographical features, backed by a missile mounted nuclear deterrent. In the 1980s, military modernization was the least of China’s four modernizations. A number of factors accounted for this: realization from the Gulf War of its own military backwardness, the overall advance of technology, increased wealth from its economic development, and fears of Taiwan’s moves toward independence China embarked in the mid-1990s on an across-the-board improvement
program. The PLA laid down more than a million men from its ranks and began to focus on preparing for a Taiwan contingency.\textsuperscript{76}

China’s drive to build a comprehensive national power involves military modernization. This among other things include the acquisition of advanced technologies from abroad. Since the early 1990s, China has relied on arms imports from Russia to enhance its military capabilities. China’s reliance on Russian made arms is attributable to US and EU arms embargoes during the early 1990s. Russian arms imports include Il-76 heavy airlift, Mi-17 and Ka-28 helicopters, Sukhoi fighter aircraft, SA-10 air defense systems, Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with advanced surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles, and Kilo-class diesel electric Submarines. In recent years, improvements in China’s defense industrial base have led to the development of high-quality indigenous weapons systems including the long-delayed F-10 fighter aircraft, similar to the U.S. F-16 and the Israeli Lavi. Globalization and its resultant effects of interconnectedness and interdependency have enhanced the diffusion of advanced technologies which have reduced the effectiveness of regimes designed to limit the export of sensitive dual-use technologies to China.\textsuperscript{77}

Whatever the intentions are, China’s military modernization has a significant likelihood to lead to an arms race between China and the US and hence increase the already intense security dilemma that exist between the US and China in the Asia Pacific region.

2.17 Joint Military Drills

Joint military drills between allies in the Asia Pacific which analyst have described as annual war games are designed to have robust tactical effects. The intention is to fend off-deter- security threats and keep the military on high alert at all times. This is less likely to promote a healthy
relationship between the US and China as well as China and her regional neighbors. The reason being that joint military drills makes a countries adversaries insecure and thereby inspire counter measures from them leading to security dilemma.\textsuperscript{78}

The most serious crisis in the South China Sea last year began in an April 2012 standoff between Beijing and Manila over Scarborough Reef. It started when the Philippines captured eight Chinese fishing vessels in disputed waters. China was furious that the Philippines had used a naval ship instead of a maritime law enforcement vessel to arrest the fishermen. They were further angered by the fact that the ship was the BRP Gregorio del Pilar which was a decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard frigate transferred by the United States in May 2011. As the crisis dragged on in the ensuing months, Chinese diplomats doggedly accused the United States of both maintaining a biased position and encouraging the Philippines to take additional actions that could provoke China.\textsuperscript{79}

A scattershot of events during the crisis confirmed China’s concerns; these included the US-Philippines Balikatan military exercise in April, a port visit to Subic Bay in May by the nuclear-powered submarine USS North Carolina, and a visit to Washington by President Benigno Aquino in June.\textsuperscript{80}

In addition to this, since 2006, the US and Vietnam have conducted at least nine joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin, and in August 2010 engaged in a bilateral non-combatant naval exercise in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{81}

To further strengthen these security ties, in June 2012, Secretary Panetta made what could be described as the first visit by a US defense secretary to the US navy base in Cam Rahn Bay. On board the USS Richard E. Byrd, Panetta declared that:

“access for United States naval ships into this facility is a key component of this relationship and we see a tremendous potential here for the future.”\textsuperscript{82}
He later spoke at a joint news conference about the tendency to take the U.S.-Vietnam military relationship “to a new level” in the areas of maritime security, naval visits, search-and-rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations. Similar stories could be told about deepening U.S. security relations with emerging powers in the region including India, Indonesia, and Singapore.83

If current trends continue, China will also have to deal with deepening engagement between the United States and Burma, which at some point will include discussions about the content and timing of military-to-military relations between the two countries. With respect to this, Burmese officials for the first time participated as observers in the annual US-Thailand Cobra Gold military exercise in February 2013. Apart from security activities, U.S. diplomatic and economic efforts in Asia will also likely contribute to Beijing’s sense of unease. These include the prospect of progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, growing U.S. collaboration with ASEAN, and enhanced U.S. development assistance in Southeast Asia. Beijing will not view these actions favorably.84

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are likely to rise as annual war games between the United States and South Korea take place over the next two months. Washington and Seoul are using the large mobilization of troops and weaponry involved in these military exercises to threaten and intimidate North Korea as well as China.85

The two exercises known as Foal Eagle and Key Resolve are held each spring. Foal Eagle officially starts today and involves 3,700 US and 200,000 Korean troops. It will be followed by Key Resolve in which 8,600 American and 10,000 South Korean soldiers will take part.86
The Foal Eagle naval drill will take place in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea just south of the Korean Peninsula and is slated to run through to mid-March. The South Korean Navy released a statement saying, “We expect to boost joint operational capabilities between Seoul and Washington and solidify a strong joint defense posture.”

Foal Eagle comprises a series of land, sea, and air drills. Friday’s exercise began in the waters south of Korea and involves live-fire drills. Ten South Korean vessels are taking part, including the Ganggamchan, a destroyer. The USS Michael Murphy, a destroyer, is participating along with attack helicopters and patrol planes.

Key Resolve is a computerized command post exercise focusing on crisis management and combat readiness between the two allies. Both exercises are aimed, in the first instance, against North Korea, but also underscore the US military presence close to the Chinese mainland.

Following Panetta’s eight-day Asia-Pacific trip to, in the words of the Defense Department’s press service, “promote President Barack Obama’s new ‘pivot to Asia’ in foreign policy,” the Pentagon’s website reported his two main themes to be that “Washington is putting a greater policy emphasis on Asia and the Pacific, as opposed to Europe and the Middle East” and “the United States intends to increase its military activities in that region, with more joint exercises involving more countries, including Australia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and with more equipment, including at least 40 new ships.”

On June 2 Singapore Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen assured Defense Secretary Panetta of his government’s willingness to host four American littoral combat ships as an obligation entailed by the Strategic Framework Agreement signed by Washington and Singapore in 2005. The two defense chiefs also pledged to further implement the agreement and increase the scope
of joint military exercises; for example, adding a naval to the existing air force component of annual Commando Sling exercises.\textsuperscript{91}

The United States has invited Myanmar to the world's largest multi-national military field exercise, a powerful symbolic gesture toward a military with a grim human rights record and a milestone in its rapprochement with the West.\textsuperscript{92}

Myanmar was invited to observe Cobra Gold, which brings together thousands of American and Thai military personnel and participants from other Asian countries for joint annual maneuvers, officials from countries participating in the exercises told Reuters on Friday.

“It's a significant and symbolic gesture that shows the rapprochement is gathering momentum,” said Christopher Roberts, a security expert at Australia National University.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{2.18 International Law}

Out of the numerous maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific region, conflicting sovereignty claims to islands, maritime boundaries, and resources are the most salient. Geographically, Northeast Asian countries are adjacent or opposite to each other in semi-enclosed seas, many of which are less than 400 nautical miles wide. This has resulted in overlapping claims to maritime zones. The unique geopolitical situation of the area coupled with disparities in the interpretation of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are largely responsible for the maritime disputes of The Asia Pacific region.\textsuperscript{94}

Most of these countries with which China now have maritime boundary disputes and conflicting sovereignty claims to islands as well as resources are either key US allies or the US is under a treaty obligation to protect them and all the territories under their jurisdiction . The US
will therefore eventually be drawn into a territorial and maritime dispute involving any of these states and China.

More importantly, the gradual reshaping of international relations marked by the rise of China to a global power, and its resultant aggressive approach to the territorial and maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific region adds to the intricacies of the territorial and maritime disputes of the area.

In the wake of the creation of the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), which codified coastal states’ rights and responsibilities with regard to claims of up to 200 nautical miles (nm) of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and a further extension—up to 350 nm—of their claims to the continental shelf from the baselines, Northeast Asian countries have pursued the extension of their maritime jurisdiction beyond their traditional 3 nm of territorial waters.95

2.19 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes

Disagreement over the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) constitute the greatest day to day threat to US China relations. This is a treaty to which China but not the United States is a party. It gives coastal states a right to regulate foreign military activities in their maritime exclusive economic zones. The Exclusive Economic Zone of a coastal state generally extends from the edge of its territorial sea (12 nautical miles from its coast) to a distance of 200 nautical miles from its coast. It is China’s view, it has the legal right under UNCLOS to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ. This view is shared by a small number of other countries.96

The U.S. thinks otherwise. The US view which is shared by most other nations, is that international law as reflected in UNCLOS does not give coastal states this right to regulate foreign military activities in their maritime exclusive economic zones.97
On the basis of this view, the United States, has made several moves including operating military ships and aircraft in China’s EEZ, carrying out surveillance missions to monitor China’s military deployments and capabilities, surveying the ocean floor to facilitate submarine navigation, and engaging in military exercises with allies such as South Korea and Japan.\textsuperscript{98}

As a result of China’s views on UNCLOS, it has long protested, and sometimes physically resisted, these operations. This issue appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace. There are significant cases in point including incidents in March 2001, March 2009, and May 2009 in which Chinese ships and aircraft confronted and harassed the U.S. naval ships as they were conducting survey and ocean surveillance operations in China’s EEZ, and an incident on April 1, 2001, in which a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft flying in international airspace about 65 miles southeast of China’s Hainan Island in the South China Sea was intercepted by Chinese fighters.\textsuperscript{99}
Endnotes

2 Congressional Research Service Report (2012) Pivot to The Asia Pacific:The Obama Administration Rebalancing Towards The Asia Pacific,
6 Friedberg, A.L., op. cit.
7 Ibid.
10 Congressional Research Service Report (2012) Pivot to The Asia Pacific:The Obama Administration Rebalancing Towards The Asia Pacific,
11 Friedberg, A. L., op. cit.
14 Ibid. p.66
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Mozingo, D.P., (1964) China’s Relations With Asian Neighbors, p.1
24 Ibid. p.1
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., pp. 22,26
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Lawrence S.V., op. cit.
41 CNN Online,(2014)……12,11
43 Ibid.
Friedberg, A. L., op. cit.
Lawrence S.V., op. cit.
Mozingo D.P., op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Ratner, E., op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Friedberg, A.L., op. cit.
Ibid.
Lawrence, S.V., op. cit.
Ibid.
P. Lawrence, S.V., op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Cyber Security and US China Relations (2012)
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Kempe, F., and Qu Xing, op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Ratner, E., op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Rozoff, R., (2012) Militarization of The Asia Pacific Region: America Revives and Expand Cold War Military Alliances Against China
Ibid.
Ibid.

p.215
99Ibid. P. 213-247,
p.215
98Lawrence S.V., op. cit.
97Ibid.
96Ibid.
95Ibid.
CHAPTER THREE
THE FUTURE OF US CHINA RELATIONS

3.0  Introduction

As noted in the preceding chapter, US China relations have been marked by cooperation and contestation in a number of significant areas. This chapter will examine the future of US China relations by analyzing some of the factors that will shape their relationship.

3.1  Multilateralism

In addition to their faith in trade as an instrument of peace, liberal optimists place great store in the role of international institutions of various kinds. These can help to improve communication between states, reducing uncertainty about intentions and increasing the capacity of governments to make credible, binding commitments to one another. By so doing, they can help to ease or counteract some of the pernicious effects of international anarchy, clearing the way for higher levels of cooperation and trust than would otherwise be attainable.¹

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a proliferation of regional institutions in East Asia. Among them are APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum); the ARF (the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Regional Forum) the East Asia Summit. There has also been an expanding network of bilateral military-to-military talks and an even wider array of quasi-official track-2 security dialogues involving scholars, analysts, and bureaucrats from countries in the region. Over the course of the last decade, China has also sought entry into several important global institutions, including the WTO (which it entered in 2001) and the nuclear nonproliferation regime which it joined in 1996).²
In addition, it has begun to play a more active and prominent role in the United Nations. By one count, the PRC’s membership in formal, international governmental organizations more than doubled between 1977 and 1997 (from 21 to 52), while its membership in international nongovernmental organizations appreciated during the same period from 71 to 1,163.17.3

The growth of international institutions in Asia and the expansion of both U.S. and Chinese participation in them are drawing the United States and the PRC into a thickening web of ties. This liberal optimists believe will promote contact, communication and, over time, greater mutual understanding and trust, as well as reduce the likelihood of gross misperception on both sides.4

Aside whatever direct effects it may have on bilateral relations with the United States, China’s increasing participation in international institutions should also give it a growing, albeit more diffuse, stake in the stability and continuity of the current global order. It is believed that the desire of China’s leaders to continue to enjoy the benefits of membership in that order should constitute a credible deterrent to China taking steps that would threaten the status quo. This should reduce the likelihood that the PRC will act in ways that could bring it into conflict with the United States, which is, the principal architect, defender, and beneficiary of the contemporary international system.5

3.2 Power of Deterrents

States constantly upgrade or modernize their strategic deterrence capabilities particularly military hardware in order that it could enhance its effectiveness in an increasingly dynamic international system with growing technological advancement and increasing security uncertainties. The US and China are no exceptions. As long as rogue states continue to exist and
continue to pose serious threats to global peace and security, the usefulness of WMD’s/Nuclear Weapons and or biological weapons as deterrents cannot not be underestimated. If Europe’s nuclear deterrents were to be effective enough, it could have stave off Russia’s aggressive tendencies in Ukraine. Aside from this, if the Japan’s leadership had prior knowledge about the damage to lives and the destruction of property the US atomic bomb could cause them they wouldn’t have dared to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941 drawing the US into the Second World War.

Deterrents take numerous forms: this may include increased stake of the international community in an economy, resources, key geographical features such as transportation routes, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and control of vital technology like the internet.

The last great change in the strategic nuclear balance of power occurred nearly half a century ago with the onset of nuclear stalemate between the superpowers. The stalemate was characterized by the condition of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which meant that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had the capability to destroy the other’s retaliatory force, even by launching a surprise attack.\(^6\)

Just like the Cold War era, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons by the two polar powers (The US and China) should serve as an extra source of limitation on their behavior. This factor has been emphasized, for example, by Avery Goldstein who argues that it provides “the strongest reasons to expect that the dangers associated with China’s arrival as a fully fledged great power will be limited.” Goldstein suggests that, as participants in what Robert Jervis has described as the “nuclear revolution,” the United States and China have already entered into an “easily established relationship of mutual deterrence that provides not only a robust buffer against general war, but also a strong limitation on both limited war and crisis behavior."\(^7\)
Furthermore, the US Defense Department announced during Secretary Panetta’s trip to Tokyo in August 2012 that the US would locate an additional X-Band missile-defense radar in southern Japan. The Chinese are of the view that this constitute an attempt at containment and could reduce the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent.  

### 3.3 Democratization

Liberal optimists are of the view that democracy is a force for peace. Democratic regimes are less likely to enter lightly into military adventures or engage in wars whose actual motive is to enrich, and satisfy the vainglory, of their leaders. Though democracies may sometimes behave aggressively toward non democracies, they have rarely, if ever, gone to war with one another. As the number of democracies in the world increases the likelihood of international conflict should reduce significantly.

Liberal optimists believe that, although it is still far from completion, the process of democratization is already under way in China. This process is being driven largely by economic development, which, in turn, is being accelerated by the fact that China is increasingly becoming open to trade. A growing Chinese middle class is being created as a result of rising per capita incomes in China. In Europe and North America, and more recently in Asia, those with rising incomes have been the prime movers behind progress toward democracy. The hope is that they will play a similar role in China.

Liberals also believe that, apart from inspiring the desire for political rights, economic development creates an objective and crucial need for political freedom. For economic progress to succeed there ought to be courts, contracts, and a reliable rule of law.
Moreover, in an era in which free flow of information largely determines sustained growth. This implies that regimes that seek to curtail freedom of speech and control communications will be at a serious disadvantage. Should China move towards democracy, the tendency towards conflict between the US and China will be significantly reduced because democracies rarely go to war with other democracies.

3.4 China’s Extraordinary Demand on World Resources

China’s quest for resources has, by many accounts, had a host of important consequences for the world. These range from impact on the global economy, to international security, to the environment.

China’s increasing demand for commodities has had a significant pull on global commodity markets. For instance, demand for oil is rising throughout Asia and the developing world, not just in China. Developing Asia accounts for 60 percent of the growth in world oil demand since 1990, China alone accounts for about half of that. Its demand for energy has actually grown at a slower rate than its overall economy. Two-thirds of China’s energy needs are met by coal, of which it is the world’s largest producer. On the basis of this, China accounts for only 6 percent of world oil imports, and 8 percent of consumption. If you are looking for somebody to blame for high global oil prices, China is far down the list of suspects.

China’s industrial growth has also driven up demand and prices for cotton, rubber, and wood. Since 2001, China has accounted for 90 percent of global consumption growth of cotton to feed its growing textile and apparel industries. China is now the world’s leading consumer of rubber, driven by 20 percent annual growth in tire production and booming automobile sales. China’s expanding furniture industry has turned China into the world’s top importer of timber.
The impact of China’s demand on world resources is truly felt in the area of the demand for metal commodities. China has reached a period in its development where its demand for metal commodities is especially intense. Its metal consumption as a share of world consumption has jumped in the past decade from 10% to 25% as a share of world consumption. Since 1999, China has consumed two-thirds of the world’s growth in base metals output.\textsuperscript{16}

Strong demand led by China has driven metals prices up. China is a large net importer of oil, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, and zinc, where prices have increased the most. China’s demand for metals is, of course, linked to its growth in industrial output, particularly stainless steel, electrical wire, cable and infrastructure. The one exception is aluminum, where China is a major producer and net exporter, and where prices have been flat compared to copper.\textsuperscript{17}

The impacts of China’s demand for resources could push global prices for these commodities up. This has the likelihood to affect businesses and firms across the world. The US being the largest economy in the world will be the most affected by such a development.

### 3.5 Securing Energy Resources

Energy Security is one of the principal goals of Chinese foreign policy. China intends to diversify its access to natural resources it requires to fuel its increasingly huge and diversified economy. China’s huge population and low energy efficiency implies that China is the biggest energy consumer in the world. Its dependence on imported fossil fuels is going to grow for the foreseeable future. China currently relies on the United States to provide the energy security corridor through which most of its oil and gas imports flow. It seeks to reduce this over reliance on the US by diversifying suppliers and establishing commercial and political relationships—sometimes with unsavory regimes—that can weather outside pressure. China is also increasing
its own blue-water naval capabilities. This raises the prospect that China may someday develop an independent capability to secure and defend vital sea lanes of communication.  

China’s search for raw materials, especially energy resources, now extends far beyond its borders. China’s outreach to Africa is motivated by the prospect of access to crude oil, copper, tin, timber, and other critical commodities. China’s global search for raw materials is multifaceted, with both economic and security dimensions.  

China’s increasing demand on global resources could threaten the US economy. As China grows and develops economically in particular its demand for world resources increases substantially. This is particularly true not only in the demand for raw materials but most importantly in the demand for energy resources to feed its industries. This has the tendency to hurt US interest and any other state that is benefitting from the existing status quo economically.

3.6 US Strategic Shift to the Asia Pacific Region

The motive behind the US strategic shift towards the Asia-Pacific is multifaceted: to form military alliances to balance China and to reshape regional balance of power there. As noted in the recently published American strategic guidance report, the maintenance of America’s core interests in this region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence. Both President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta have reiterated that the reduction in defense spending will not affect its investment in security in the Asia-Pacific. Washington’s military focus or its security concern will be re-shifted to the Asia-Pacific.

There are two schools of thoughts regarding American security policies towards the Asia-Pacific. One proposes that the US should cultivate a lasting compromise with China, accept its rise, reduce America’s security commitment in the Asia-Pacific while shifting more
responsibilities to China and also allow it to enjoy more power at the same time. The other, however, insists that the US should take firmer policy towards China and warn other countries in the region to be alert to China’s increasing power so that they can coordinate with the US to constrain China’s potential actions of changing the status quo.\(^{21}\)

In the fall of 2011, the Obama Administration issued a statement which indicated that, with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, the United States was, in President Obama’s words, “turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.” Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described economics as a major motivation for the rebalancing, according to her, “Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting edge technology.”\(^{22}\)

The US rebalancing strategy has a military dimension which was outlined in a January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance policy. The policy described plans to strengthen U.S. treaty alliances in the region. This include US treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand and to expand cooperation with “emerging partners” in order to “ensure collective capability and capacity for securing collective interests.” The policy specifically stated that the United States was “investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India.” “to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” China fought a war in 1962 with India and continue to have territorial disputes and a wary relationship with India.\(^{23}\)

The policy further pledged that the United States would work with its allies and partners “to promote a rules-based international order that ensures among other things that there is underlying stability, encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.”\(^{24}\)
The policy grouped China and Iran together as countries that “will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities...” Under the rebalancing policy, the Administration has announced a series of moves which included but not limited to, new troop rotations to Australia, naval deployments in Singapore, and military engagements with the Philippines; enhance its engagement with regional multilateral institutions; expanded relations with such “emerging powers” as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam; pursued a new relationship with Burma; and pushed to expand free trade with Asian nations through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).  

One criticism of the rebalancing policy is that it antagonizes China and leads US allies and partners such as the Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam to believe that they have more US support in their disputes with China than the United States is actually prepared to offer. Those who share this criticism believe that the rebalancing is over-focused on military elements. This may be eroding already limited U.S.-China strategic trust and feeding regional instability, rather than minimizing it.

3.7 China’s Reaction to U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific

Among the top of Beijing’s concerns is U.S. strategic rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Shortly after the rebalancing was officially launched President Xi Jinping, then China’s Vice President, in a trip to the US responded with the statement, that “China welcomes a constructive role by the United States in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia Pacific. At the same time, we hope the United States will respect the interests and concerns of China and other countries in this region.”
Since then, several Chinese officials have repeatedly raised concerns about whether the U.S. rebalancing is, in fact, contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity, and whether, despite U.S. assurances to the contrary, it is indeed intended to ‘contain’ China.\(^\text{27}\)

3.8 Regional Politics of the Asia Pacific

China has long placed a high priority on sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is reflected in its attempts to bring Taiwan under its control and the numerous maritime disputes it has with its neighbors in the Asia Pacific region.

3.8.1 South China Sea

A major U.S. security concern in the Asia Pacific has to do with the rival claimants to territory in the South China Sea (SCS). China has extensive, though imprecise, claims to large parts of the SCS. This area is believed to be rich in oil and gas deposits as well as fisheries, and through which a major portion of world’s trade passes. China controls the Paracel Islands and seven reefs among the Spratly Islands. Territory claimed by China is also claimed in part by the following countries, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and in entirety by Taiwan. The fiercest territorial disputes in this region are those between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines. The SCS is a key strategic waterway for the U.S. Navy, it is also bordered by a U.S. treaty ally, the Philippines.\(^\text{28}\)

The territorial disputes at the heart of the tensions are age long disputes, but observers have noted a sharp uptick in incidents at sea since 2005-2006, from claimants seeking to assert sovereignty or exploit offshore hydrocarbons and fishery resources. A major incident occurred involving a set of landmasses disputed between China and the Philippines. Chinese vessels
confronted a Philippine Naval vessel that had interdicted Chinese fishing boats. After a weeks-long standoff, China took control of the area and the Philippine vessels left the area.  

Should a dispute between China and the Philippines escalates into a full blown war the US will be drawn into it because the Philippines is one of the major US allies in the Asia Pacific region.

3.8.2 East China Sea

China is involved in a territorial dispute with Japan over the sovereignty of uninhabited islets known in Japan as the Senkakus and in China as the Diaoyu Dao in East China Sea. This islets are also claimed by Taiwan, which refers to them as the Diaoyutai. The United States does not take a position on the sovereignty dispute, but has a strong interest in the issue. This is because the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers areas under Japanese administration, and the United States government has repeatedly confirmed that such areas include the Senkakus/Diaoyu Islets.

Tensions between China and Japan over the islets have run high since September 11, 2012, when Japan’s government purchased three of the islands from their private Japanese owners, a move that angered China. This was because China felt that Japan’s action was equivalent to nationalizing the islands. Since then, China has maintained a nearly continuous presence near the islets. China has also repeatedly sent its vessels into the 12 nautical mile territorial waters around them. China has deployed vessels from the two civilian agencies: China Maritime Surveillance and the Bureau of Fisheries. It has also sent Navy vessels and military aircraft into the area near the islands. Japan on its part has responded by stepping-up coast guard patrols and missions by the Japanese Self Defense Force fighter planes. Chinese officials have
indicated that key among their immediate goals is to force Japan to acknowledge that sovereignty of the islets is in dispute, an acknowledgement that Japan has resisted.\textsuperscript{31} As a result of the lessons learned from the Second World War, Japan is only allowed by the international community to maintain international defense forces and not standing armies. Moreover, Japan is a key ally of the US and the US under a bilateral security agreement with is obliged to defend Japan from any attack by any state.

More importantly, China has adopted two distinct but rather broad policies towards her neighbors since 1959: Bandung line and political warfare. Bandung line is China’s policy in relations with states which do not join with either the US or USSR to suppress Chinese aims, such states seek political accommodation with the Chinese state in relations with states who choose to join with China’s enemies and seek to rival or contain China’s influence.\textsuperscript{32}
Endnotes

2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
7Friedberg, A. L., op. cit.
8Ratner, E.(2013) Rebalancing To Asia With An insecure China. Centre For Strategic and International Studies
10Ibid.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
21Ibid.
23Ibid.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
32Mozingo D.P.(1964) China’s Relations With Asian Neighbors
CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the research findings, states the conclusions and offer some recommendations.

4.1 Summary of Findings

The US has an expansive approach to foreign policy dating as far back as the Cold War era, China until very recently emphasized much on internal sovereignty and trade whiles paying little attention to matters outside its jurisdiction.

The focus of global attention is gradually shifting to the Asia Pacific region because of the increasing economic potential of the Asia Pacific region and the growing military strength of the states in the region as well as the enormous magnitude of population growth in the region particularly that of China.

There is a growing correlation between growing power and expanding interests. A more wealthy and more powerful state is more likely to select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state.

The literature has further revealed that the current relationship between the US and China is marked by deep seated competition for global power and ideological rivalry. There are remarkable traces of the ideological divide that marked the relationship between the US and USSR during the cold war in the current relationship between the US and China.
Multilateralism serves as a double edged sword in the relations between the two powers. This has been clearly demonstrated at the permanent membership of the UNSC. The veto power vested in the P5 is now a geopolitical tool in the hands of the world’s great powers which include the US and China. This is particularly so in a situation when the possible benefits accruing to a state as a result of the pursuit of her national interest far exceeds that of the benefits of advancing the course of an international organization of which the state in question is a member.

More importantly, mutual suspicion and mistrust largely characterized the relationship between the two powers. Each state views the others actions with suspicion. There is very little trust between the two powers. There is intense military build-up in the Asia Pacific region led by the US and China.

The US and China are engaged in the building of alliances and counter alliances in the Asia Pacific region. This is gradually drawing the entire Asia Pacific region into the strained relationship that exist between the two powers.

Competition for resources serve as a major basis for most of the territorial and maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific region. Disparities in the Interpretation of International law largely served as a major threat to the relationship that exist between the US and China. There is no effective globally recognized mechanism for resolving peacefully the territorial and maritime disputes not only in the Asia Pacific but the world at large. International law unlike domestic law is largely based on the consent of only the signatory states.

US strategic shift to the Asia Pacific region is a foreign policy response to the rising power of China and its resultant aggressive behavior in the Asia Pacific region. China’s aggressive territorial claims is a profound basis for tension in the region.
US and China’s regional neighbors perceives a growing threat in the rising power of China in the region. Apart from trade related issues most of the issues that threaten the current relationship between the US and China are regional issues of the Asia Pacific region.

The mechanism of security dilemma is at work in the current relationship that exist between the US and China. This is a situation in which each state attempts to build its military to secure itself has inspired counter measures from either side. This is gradually setting in motion an arms race between the two powers in the region.

The researcher has also discovered that a new Cold War is gradually taken shape between the two powers marked by arms race, an ideological tug of war at the UNSC, the building of alliances and counter alliances in the Asia Pacific region as well as propaganda warfare and global competition for resources.

The research has revealed that despite the numerous issues both states have with each other in the Asia Pacific region, there are still several areas and platforms for cooperation between the two powers. These include the following:

Multilateralism

Economic interdependence

Climate change

Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

The researcher has found that the following issues threaten good bilateral relations between the US and China:

- Trade related issues.
- Territorial and maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific region.
- The issue of Taiwan’s independence.
• Cyber Security Issues.
• Beijing’s Military build-up and US Strategic shift towards the Asia Pacific region.
• Joint Military drills.
• International law.

The research has revealed that the US and China are likely to be united by common dangers and increasingly by common values in the future.

4.2 Conclusion

As a result of the significant capacities of both the United States and China, an improvement in relations between the two states could have enormous impacts on the whole wide world. On the other hand, should relations between them deteriorates it could have far reaching devastating consequences on the international system.

History has shown that rising powers are much more prone to display aggressive tendencies. This was particularly true in the case of rising democratic United States of America and autocratic Germany. China is no exception in this case as can be seen from its assertive territorial claims and the aggressive approach employed by her in the pursuit of such claims.

The rise of the US and China appear to be built on strong and highly industrialized economies. As China’s capabilities grow, its leadership tends to pursue more expansive foreign policy. China is beginning to define her interest more expansively just like the US.

The US an already established power in the status-quo as well as the other regional powers perceive a growing threat in the rise of China .The Strategic shift towards the Asia pacific region is clearly a foreign policy response on the part of the US to China’s rising power.
The growing economic and military might of China is gradually translating into the capacity to acquire as well as produce internally, highly sophisticated weaponry and weapons technology. This raises a specter of danger not only to the US but also to all China’s regional neighbors particularly those whose interest are incompatible with that of China. This is what is bringing China into conflict with the US and other regional powers in the Asia Pacific region.

In an international system dominated by the US in an era of rising Chinese power, Mutual deterrence, US interference in the regional politics of the Asia Pacific as well as China’s assertive territorial claims in the region will largely shape the future of the US China relations for a long time to come. The effectiveness of multilateralism, economic interdependence and mutual deterrence as pacifying forces will reduce the tendency for conflict between the US and China. The future of US China relations will therefore be marked by cooperation. A deepening relation between the two leading superpowers implies that the international community is likely to unite around them to find solution to most of the world’s most pressing problems. Hypothesis two has therefore been endorsed based on the findings of the research.

4.3 Recommendations

The US and China ought to weigh their national interest against the possible repercussions of destabilizing the current international system. This implies that in as much as the US and China intend to pursue their foreign policies as sovereign entities they mustn’t ignore the regional and global repercussions of destabilizing the international system. Lessons must be drawn from western military interventions in several countries in various regions across the world and their repercussions on regional stability and international security.
The UN is the only body with a global mandate to deal with all issues relating to international peace and security. The UN system is gradually becoming outmoded, sooner or later the international community would have to face the reality-inevitability of reforms- or live with the consequences of an outmoded international regime. The UN system ought to consider employing the strategy of using balance of power as a means of neutralizing global peace and security threats. Alliance should be used as a pacifying force. The current structure of the UN SC was constructed at a particular point in history to respond to the challenges of a particular international system. Since then, the international system has undergone fundamental changes but the structure of the UNSC still remains the same.

The formation of continental and regional security arrangements should be encouraged by the UN. Such continental and regional security arrangements should replace the current structure of the permanent membership of the UNSC. This means the current membership of the UNSC would have to be disbanded. The veto power vested in it would then be transferred to such continental and regional security arrangements. The UNSC would then become a point of convergence and cooperation for continental and regional security arrangements. The new structure of the UNSC would then be used to fend off both state and non-state actors as well as security arrangements whose actions are likely to destabilize the international system. Continental and regional security arrangements and or alliances would then serve as a pacifying force rather than serve a destructive purpose.

In order for states not to repeat the mistakes they made that led to the First and Second World Wars, the Foreign policies of states including the US and China must be guided by three principles: first the national interest of the state in question. The second principle has to do with
feasibility—the policy must be realistic—and lastly every foreign policy should take into consideration the possible regional and global implications of the policy-outcome.

The two powers must consider putting an end to Joint military drills-war games—particularly in disputed territories in order to suppress unnecessary tensions in the Asia Pacific region.

For Maritime disputes involving states to be nipped in the bud completely, UNCLOS 1982, would have to be amended. It should be reconstructed in a way that the actual geographical features of a region would determine regulations governing the territorial sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf. Every region should have its own version of the UNCLOS which is unique to its geographical features.

The leadership of the two countries has the responsibility to step back from the current dynamic of US-China relations and begin an earnest search for a balance of interests that could underpin a long-term relationship that is largely cooperative.¹

The US and China ought to augment existing mechanisms by creating a joint Vision Group designed and empowered to focus exclusively on global challenges particularly global security challenges. The Vision Group would comprise non-government and former government experts with substantial magnitude of experience in the areas of politico-military affairs, economics, business, and essential academic disciplines who also possess a global, long-term vision of development in these specific areas and of the evolution of China-US relations.²

As stipulated in the LOSC, states could enter into provisional agreements for the exploitation of seabed resources in disputed areas during transitional periods pending delimitation of maritime boundaries. Joint development and unitization represent a collective way to develop disputed seabed resources in a collaborative manner between or among countries.
concerned pending maritime boundary delimitation. The states concerned first has to establish a Joint Development Zone and develop it together on an equal revenue and expense basis.³

In order to suppress tensions and prevent incidents from developing into armed conflict between the two powers and their allies in the region, two options can be considered: a cooperative maritime security framework and a reinforcement of coast guard agencies. Cooperative security is defined as a cooperative relationship on security issues between antagonists and not allies. This idea springs from the perception that although countries are antagonistic to each other, they share significant areas of common interest in terms of avoiding war, especially nuclear war, and of reducing the level of military expenditures to the minimum level. Cooperative Security is multi-faceted in scope, it places emphasizes on reassurance rather than deterrence, it is not restrictive in membership, and it stresses the value of creating a “habit of dialogue” on a multilateral basis. Cooperative security is viewed as security with rather than against the adversary.⁴

The use of Coast Guards should be encouraged among the states in the Asia Pacific region in line with acceptable international norms and practices. They are highly armed and they are distinguished from navies in the sense that their actions have fewer political implications.²

The US strategic shift towards the Asia Pacific region mustn’t emphasize so much on the military aspects since this raises concerns about US intentions in the region. It further fuels arms race between the two powers in the region.

More importantly, China should moderate her attitude towards the numerous maritime and territorial disputes in region. This is because these disputes constitute a significant source of tension not only between the US and China but also between China and her regional neighbors. The US and China as well as her regional neighbors should use existing multilateral institutions
and international regimes as platforms for resolving territorial and maritime disputes rather resorting to the use of force. The recommendations fully appreciate the relevance of the roles China’s regional neighbors play in the relations between the US and China.
Endnotes

1 Kempe, F., and Qu Xing, (2013) China US cooperation key to global future. Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft, Centre On International Security
2 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books


B. Journal Articles


C. Documents/Reports/Papers


D. Internet Sources
