UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
CENTRE FOR MIGRATION STUDIES

PERCEPTION OF RESIDENTS OF ACCRA AND TEMA OF THE LINK BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TERRORISM

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JULY, 2016
DECLARATION

I, Fred Bongne, hereby declare that, except for references to other people’s work, which have been duly acknowledged, this thesis is the outcome of my independent research conducted at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, under the supervision of Dr. Leander Kandilige. I, therefore, declare that this thesis has neither in part nor in whole been presented to any other institution for an academic award.

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SUPERVISOR
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to God, my wife, children, parents and brother. Special thanks to You: Ivy, Bakhita and Nomu, for your immense support and understanding that have made this possible. God richly bless you.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My profound gratitude goes to my supervisor, Dr Leander Kandilige whose critique, advise and comments led to the successful completion of this work. Your kind encouragements and insightful comments enabled me to successfully complete this work. May God continue to enrich you with knowledge and wisdom for the benefit of all mankind.

I also want to thank Dr. (Mrs.) Delali Badasu, Director, Centre for Migration Studies for the motherly care, guidance and support she showed me throughout the period of this study. I say ‘ayekoo’ to you, Mum. Your efforts have not been in vain. May God continue to shower his blessings on you and your family.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANSARU</td>
<td>Jama Atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQAM</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATCSA</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>Ghana Statistical Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Immigration and Naturalisation Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSIS</td>
<td>National Security Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODCCP</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention</td>
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ABSTRACT

There is a global perception that international migration and terrorism are linked. This perception is due mainly to the fact that the 2001 attacks in the United States; 2004, 2007 and 2015 attacks in Madrid, London and Paris, respectively, all involved foreign migrants or their offspring. Though Africa is often classified as a hotbed of terrorism, little research has been conducted to establish the connection between international migration and terrorism. The activities of terrorist groups in West Africa have worsened the security landscape of the sub-region already plagued by bad governance, economic deprivation and conflict. Though, Ghana has not yet experienced any act of terrorism, its location within the sub-region and recent developments in the country make it at a risk of a potential terrorist attack. Ghana has a large immigrant population, mostly made up of West African nationals who are either residing in the country permanently or temporarily. These notwithstanding, there is a dearth of knowledge of any possible link between terrorism and international migration in the West African sub-region in general and Ghana, in particular. Not much work exists on international migration as a conduit for terrorism despite anecdotal evidence indicating some Ghanaian nationals migrated abroad to join terrorist groups.

The study, therefore, set out to explore the link between international migration and terrorism, if any, with particular reference to Ghana. To achieve this, the study adopted the mixed methods approach. Through a sample size of 100 respondents, it administered questionnaires and conducted in-depth interviews among the sampled population to extract their views and perceptions of the association between international migration and terrorism. It also adopted the securitization and psychometric paradigms as well as the integrated threat and cultural theories to explain how migration and terrorism are constructed as security threats and the attitudes of people towards these threats. The general outcome was that respondents felt there was no connection between terrorism and international migration. Recommendations such as improving border security, constructing a more security-conscious urban infrastructure to handle crisis situations and increased public awareness campaigns on terrorism and security were therefore made.
CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND OF STUDY

1.0 Introduction

International migration is an aged old global phenomenon dating back several centuries (Castles et al., 2014). Generally, people migrate due to poverty; unemployment; economic deprivation; non-availability of welfare systems; and for family reunification. Adverse political situations, wars and conflicts, environmental degradation and natural disasters may also compel people to migrate (Adepoju, 2011). In Africa, international migration is largely intra-regional with migrants moving within the sub-region and among states (Awumbila et al., 2015). Few travel to destinations in Europe and North America. Others head for the Middle East (Adepoju, 2011).

Though international migration is increasing (Castles et al., 2014), many immigrant receiving countries are not prepared to admit the huge numbers of international migrants often viewed as a security risk to host communities (Weiner, 1992). These negative perceptions have often led to xenophobia and violence (Weiner, 1992) perpetrated by host nationals against migrants. Attacks against black immigrants in South Africa are a case in point.

Securitization of migration was not a major issue until the end of the Cold War. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the United States, 2004 in Spain, 2005 and 2007 in the UK and 2015 in France created a general impression that international migration is linked to international security and terrorism (Castle et al., 2014).

The activities of terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansar
Al Sharia, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis and Al Murabitoun have led to the classification of Africa as a hot bed of terrorism (Davis, 2007). The enactment of terrorist attacks beyond the boundaries of countries in which terrorist groups are based (Zemi, 2013); the recruitment of members from diaspora communities by groups such as al Shabaab (Bushier, 2014 citing Shinn, 2011); the various international flows of financial resources that support and sustain these groups (Doukhan, 2013 and Vilkko, 2011 cited in Bushier 2014) not only bring into focus the devastating impact of terrorism but also the perceived links between transnational terrorism and international migration.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Africa is perceived as an incubator of terrorism due to the spate of attacks and the large presence of terrorist groups on the continent (Sosuh, 2011). According to Kehinde A Bolaji, between 1999 and 2006, Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 269 acts of international terrorism (Gordena and Botha, 2005:51 cited in Bolaji, 2010). The continent’s vast uninhabited land, particularly in the Sahel-Sahara area, serves as refuge and training grounds for these terrorist groups (Davis, 2007), while the prevailing abject poverty and deprivation, repressive governments, weak institutions, corruption, wars, religious and ethnic conflicts create a fertile ground for terrorism to flourish in Africa (Cilliers 2003; Dagne, 2004 cited in Davis, 2007).

The transnational nature of terrorist organisations, their activities, membership, mode of recruitment and sources of funding are a source of global concern (Davis, 2007). For instance, the ISIS group in Libya is composed of seventy per cent foreign fighters (BBC news, 2016), while membership of the Al Shabaab Islamic militant group includes Somali nationals and citizens of Kenya, Syria, the US, Canada, the UK, Russia, Finland, and
Sweden (Alexander, 2015).

It appears that West Africa is becoming the epicentre of terrorism in Africa where nearly all the terrorist groups on the continent and in the Middle East have established their presence. Recent incidents of terrorist attacks in Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Nigeria by groups such as AQIM and Boko Haram paint a bleak picture of the security situation in the West African sub-region.

Although there has not been any terrorist attack in Ghana, its location in a region characterised by the activities of insurgent and terrorist groups make the country at a potential risk of such an attack. In the year 2009, an incident involving a suspected Nigerian terrorist who transited through Ghana to the United States of America with the intention of blowing up an American airliner (Captain Brachie, 2014 cited in Anim, 2015) brought to the fore questions about Ghana’s readiness to fight terrorism. Later in 2014, disturbing reports of the activities of some groups allegedly linked to Boko Haram in certain parts of the country surfaced (Boker, 2014 cited in Anim, 2015). Though the Ghana Police Service refuted these allegations, they rekindled debates about Ghana’s security alertness in the event of a terrorist attack.

The departure of three Ghanaian nationals, Nazir Nortei Alema, Abubakr Mohammed and Shakira Mohammed, who left to join ISIS Islamist group in 2015 through the machinations of an alleged ISIS recruiter, Badhan Diallo (a Guinean national and former student of the University of Ghana) and the transfer of two ex-Guantanamo Bay terrorist prisoners, Mahmoud Omar Mohammed Bin Atef and Khalid Shayk Mohammed (BBC news, 2016) to Ghana provoked a public outcry and raised the scare of an imminent terrorist attack to a much higher pedestal. The security situation of the country was again
plunged into desperation when some ninety Syrian refugees who had fled from the ongoing civil war in Syria and the Middle East were admitted into the country. These developments appear to reinforce the perception that Ghana is an imminent danger of a terrorist attack, even though a survey on global terrorism trends between 1968-2006 ranked Ghana as a country without any incidence of terrorism (Sosuh, 2011).

Unfortunately, there is limited literature on terrorism and its links with international migration in Ghana despite growing concerns about transnational security threats such as environmental degradation, spread of infectious diseases, drug and human trafficking and terrorism, which are known to have the involvement of international migrants within the sub-region. Though there is a growing body of academic literature elsewhere on the potential threat foreign fighters or Islamists (jihadists) who travel abroad to engage in terrorist activities pose to their countries on their return, scholarship is almost silent on the subject matter in Africa despite glaring evidence that Africa has had a share of the destructive influence of religious fundamentalism on every part of the continent.

The paucity of literature in Africa and in Ghana on the potential threat return jihadist migrants could pose to their communities of origin has become a novel area for academic research. Little literature has explored the perceptions of residents of the potential threats activities of international migrants could have on home soil. Furthermore, Ghana’s National Migration policy (launched in April 2016) makes little or no mention of the security implications of international migration. The concern is whether Ghana has effective laws to handle the dynamics of international migration vis-a-vis international and transnational terrorism.
This research sought to explore the perceptions, knowledge and attitudes of residents in Accra and Tema of the linkages between international migration and terrorism and the implications of a potential attack. It was also to find out whether residents in Accra and Tema felt threatened by both immigrants in the country and Ghanaian migrants returning from jihadist war fronts. It further examined the current legislation and policies on migration and national security and established whether these legal instruments, if any, took into account issues bordering on migration and security.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study was to examine how residents in Accra and Tema, Ghana perceive of the link between migration and terrorism. This was achieved through the following specific objectives:

i) To find out how the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents define their perception of the link between terrorism and international migration.

ii) To explore their perceptions of the possible link between international migration and terrorism.

iii) To investigate stereotypes of certain communities or religions as more inclined to terrorism.

iv) To examine existing national security policies and legislations on preventing terrorist acts in Ghana.

v) To examine ways in which international migration could be managed to minimise the risk of terrorism in Ghana.
1.3 Relevance of the Study

The study is relevant for a number of reasons. To begin with, it was conducted at a time when international migration and transnational terrorism have both become major global issues of international security. Given the nature and trend of modern terrorism, Ghana’s geographical location and events in the country make it at risk of a possible terrorist attack hence the need to conduct the research. Also, the study could serve as a reference for security-migration analysis, and policy formulation. Finally, it is hoped that the study will add to the existing literature on migration-security nexus but with particular focus on Ghana.

1.4 Definition of Concepts

The following definitions of concepts have been adopted for the purpose of this study.

**Migration** is the movement of people from one geographical location to another for a period of time. The movement may be internal or international. **Internal migration** is defined as the movement of people from a part to another of a country while **International migration** is the movement from one country to another by individuals to take up temporary or permanent residence. An **international migrant** is therefore a person living in a country other than his or her country of birth for the period of at least six months according to the UN.

There are two main kinds of migration, namely voluntary migration and involuntary migration. **Voluntary migration** is the movement of people from one place to another at their own free will and these include **labour** or **economic migrants** who are people who migrate for economic reasons. **Involuntary** or **forced migration** on the other hand is the movement of people from a place to another without any choice or free will and this includes refugees and internally displaced persons. A **refugee** is a person who has been
forced to flee his or her own country due to fear of persecution, war or generalized violence whereas an **internally displaced person (IDP)**, is someone who has been forced to move from one location of a country due to violence, conflict, environmental or natural hazard to another place within the same country. An **asylum seeker** is that person who has left his or her country of birth for persecution or due to conflict and formally applied for protection in another country but whose application has not yet been decided.

International migrants living in foreign countries often maintain physical, cultural, political and emotional links with their countries of origin. **Diaspora** refers to people, who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet maintain effective and material ties to their countries of origin.

The ease in which foreign actors commit crimes across national borders has been often blamed on globalization. **Globalization** in this context refers to the upsurge in cross-border flows of all sorts-finance and trade; democracy and good governance; cultural and media products; environmental pollution and people.

Among some of the violent crimes that have attracted most states and governments in contemporary times is **terrorism**, which has been defined variously by scholars, states, institutions and other individuals. However, for the purpose of this dissertation, terrorism is defined as the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-nationals groups in order to obtain a political or social objective.

Terrorism is considered as a transnational security threat confronting nearly every country in contemporary history. **Transnational security threats** are cross-border challenges to the survival and wellbeing of people and states such as climate change, infectious diseases, natural disasters, environmental degradation, irregular migration and transnational organized crimes.
Perception of Risk refers to the process of collecting, selecting and interpreting signals about uncertain impacts of events, activities and technologies.

1.5 Organisation of the Study

The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter Two is a review of the relevant literature and the theoretical as well as conceptual framework of the study. Chapter Three presents the methodology used for the study. Chapter Four and Five deals with the analysis of data collected and discussion of results. Finally, Chapter Six presents the summary, conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews some relevant literature on issues of international migration, security and terrorism in Africa and the rest of the world. It also reviews the literature on violent crime and risk perceptions, attitudes as a result of these perceptions and some theoretical frameworks relating to international migration and perception of risk. The ensuing section will discuss in a sequential order why people migrate, factors contributing to the increase in international migration which include globalisation, feminization of migration and conflicts as well as the effects of international migration.

2.1 Overview and Implications of International Migration

The quest for new opportunities and the desire to escape poverty, conflict or environmental degradation have often led to the mass movement of people within and across national borders (Castle et al, 2014). In Africa, people migrated usually in search of security and fertile land for settlement and farming during the pre-colonial era (Adepoju, 2003).

Explaining why people migrate, the functionalist theories of migration identify push and pull factors operating at places of origin and destination as playing a key role in the decision-making process to migrate by individuals, households and communities (Haris and Todaro, 1970; Stark and Bloom, 1985). However, looking at the phenomenon from a different perspective, the historical-structuralist theory view migration as a ‘flight from the misery caused by capitalist expansion’ Hein de Haas (2010) citing Papademetriou (1985). In addition to factors cited above, Aderanti Adepoju (2011) assigns ethnoreligious
conflicts and rapidly growing population as some of the determinants of migration in Africa. Wars and terrorism have played a crucial role in the migration intentions of individuals.

Generally, international migration does not seem to show any sign of abating. According to estimates by the United Nations, the international migrants’ stock has been increasing steadily from 81.5 million in 1970 to 99.8 million in 1980 and 154 million in 1990. In 2010, the figure reached 232 million, representing 3.2 % of the world’s population (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs- UNDESA, 2010; 2013). Currently, the number of international migrants worldwide has reached 244 million according to the International Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) World Migration Report 2015.

The widening gap in inequalities between the global north and south often blamed on capitalists penetration of third world economies has been cited in the contemporary literature as driving the movement of migrants escaping the harsh economic conditions in their home countries (Castles et al., 2014). Also, the feminization of migration, which explains the increased female participation in migration also accounts for the upsurge in the number of international migrants in contemporary times. Currently, female international migrants constitute nearly half (49.6 percent) of the international migrant stock (Awumbila, 2015:134). Now women migrate independently in search of new opportunities rather than as an appendage to men as was the case in the past (Awumbila, 2015). Unfavourable political climate and armed conflicts arising from economic mismanagement and bad governance have contributed to an increase in the number of
people compelled to migrate as refugees and asylum seekers (Weiner, 1992; Castles, 2014).

However, globalization has been cited in the literature as a fundamental force driving up international migration. As Castles et al. (2014) note, globalization has created the modern technologies, cultural and social capitals that facilitate worldwide interconnectedness in terms of business and mobility of labour. Aside making air, land or sea travel faster, cheaper and readily available, technological advancement also makes it possible for images of first world prosperity as well as information about employment opportunities and migratory routes to be transmitted to the remotest parts of the world (ibid). Yet, globalization comes with both opportunities and challenges. Thus, while states are willing to take advantage of the phenomenon in order to remain competitive in a world of business and technology, they are also anxious about the kind of threats globalization brings in its trail (UNODC, 2010).

According to Myron Weiner (1992), fewer states are willing to admit migrants mainly as a result of perceptions that migrants put strains on the economy; destroy an ethnic balance of host communities; transmit diseases; weaken national identity; and threaten political upheaval. Weiner further observes that merely granting asylum to foreign populations in some cases creates tension and conflict among states. He goes on to note that armed foreign populations such as refugees can be a potential tool to effect regime change by host states. This assertion is supported by Fiona Adamson (2006) who argues that transnational diasporas in certain situations serve as a resource for violent conflicts. The Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora were reported to have created, funded and recruited fighters for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the conflict (Adamson, 2006). In Africa, the Rwandan and Somali refugee camps in Kenya became recruitment grounds for
the Kenyan government (HRW, 2009; Burns, 2010) and Al-Shabaab militant group. Both migrants and refugees are also known to be a resource for economic development and reconstruction. Ghana hosted over 50,000 Liberian refugees but never experienced any incidents of terrorism.

Economically, immigrants are blamed for driving down wages and for exacerbating the unemployment situation at destinations. They are accused of increasing the cost of housing and other goods at destinations. However, several studies have shown that skilled migrant workers provide real benefits to their host countries by filling employment gaps where there are genuine shortages (Borjas, 1995; 1998). Migrants arrive with skills and abilities that supplement the stock of human capital. In the United States, skilled immigrants contribute greatly scientific and industrial research, innovation and technological progress (Hunt, 2010).

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development- OECD (2014), statistics indicate that new immigrants represent 22 percent of entries into strongly growing occupations including healthcare, science, technology, engineering and mathematics in the US and 15 percent in Europe. Migrants contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in benefits (ibid). In Switzerland and Luxembourg, immigration provides an estimated net benefit of about 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to the public purse (ibid). Unskilled migrants are known to take up the three-D (dirty, difficult and dangerous) jobs often shun by the locals to the eventual benefit of the receiving country (Koser, 2007). Some countries affected by demographic deficits have adopted migration as a deliberate policy to filling large skill gaps due to falling birth rates and ageing populations (Adepoju, 2013).
Fiona Adamson (2006) contends that the strength or power of any sovereign state is often measured by its natural resources, territory, economy, military strength and size of its population, a major component of which is migration. As such countries formulate and adopt immigration policies in line with their national interests and security objectives. For example, many industrialized countries have designed various immigration schemes to harness the talents of international migrant workers (ibid). The US introduced the H-1B visa scheme with a clear objective of employing foreign workers temporarily in the information technology and communication sectors (ibid).

Literature further points out a direct correlation between migration and development. Remittances, including financial, human and social capital, have benefitted both sending and receiving states (Hein De Haas, 2010). Anecdotal evidence suggest that in 2000 remittances contributed more than 10 percent to the national economies of countries like El Salvador, Eritrea, Jamaica, and Jordan. As Fiona Adamson (2006) demonstrates, another benefit of migration is the harnessing of the skills of immigrants for a military, technological and diplomatic advantage that tend to enhance the power of sovereign states. According to her, personalities such as Albert Einstein and Edward Teller, who were both immigrants, helped the United States develop the first atomic bomb.

2.2 The Migration-Security Nexus

Currently, international migration is on the top of international security agenda with policy makers in the global North drawing links between migration policy and national security (Adamson, 2006). Much of the debates on the linkage between migration and security have focused on migration flows as a conduit for terrorism and transnational
organized crime. In this dissertation crime refers to a violent act committed in violation of the law.

A study by the International Social Survey Programme between 1995 and 2003 show the majority of the population of OECD countries believe that immigrants increase crime rates (Bianchi et al., 2008). Also, some argue that immigrants and natives may exhibit varied tendencies towards crime due to the fact that they face different legitimate earning opportunities, different probabilities of being arrested and convicted Becker (1968) and Ehrlick (1973) cited in Bianchi et al., 2008)

While Butcher and Piehl (2005) believe that current immigrants have lower imprisonment rates than natives, Borjas et al. (2006) contend that recent immigrants have contributed to the criminal activity of native black males by removing them from the labour market.

Without any empirical evidence to suggest that the surge in immigration contributes to the increase in crime, some western politicians and policy makers have often made sweeping statements that attempt to link immigration with high crime rates. One of such efforts was made by Donald Trump, the US Republican party’s presidential nominee, who said that “the senseless and totally preventable act of violence committed by an illegal immigrant is yet another example of why we must secure our border immediately” (CNN.com, 2015)

Yet, studies linking immigration with crime rates have shown that these arguments are often exaggerated (Faist, 2002). Stuart Anderson (2010) indeed asserts that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than natives. Citing a research by Tim Wardsworth published in June 2010 in the Social Science Quarterly in support of this claim, Anderson
observes that cities with the largest number of immigrants experience the largest decreases in homicide and robbery (Anderson, 2010). Situating these arguments in the African context, it is often argued that in certain jurisdictions, migrants have become a source of conflict and crime. In South Africa, foreign migrants are often blamed for the spread of diseases, crime, and soaring unemployment rates and this has led to violent xenophobia (Campbell, 2007; Ngomane, 2010). Ghana recently experienced some level of xenophobia against foreign nationals such as Chinese who were believed to taking up jobs (Inman, 2014). Fulani herdsmen were also accused of committing crimes such as armed robbery, rape, and murder (Baidoo, 2014). Yet, a cursory look at the general crime rates in Ghana shows that the rate of crimes involving migrants is lower than those involving natives.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States of America perpetrated by eighteen immigrants of Middle Eastern origin did a lot to raise global concerns about the connection between international migration and terrorism (IOM, 2010). Yet, even before the 11th September terrorist attacks on the US, the relationship between migration and security had always engaged policy makers and academics of international security studies (Boswell, 2006). Migration had, for the most part of the 1990s after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, been high on the security agenda of Europe (Parson and Smeeding, 2000). Incidents such as the 1995 Paris bombings that were linked to Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group and attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party across Europe had already raised apprehensions about the link between migration and security (Adamson, 2006).

However, the 2004 Madrid bombing and 2005 London attacks also involving immigrants or their offspring reinforced concerns over migration and security (Castles et al., 2014).
These events helped redefine international migration as a security issue in international relations and politics (Buzan et al., 1998). As William Walters (2010) explains migration came to be framed within popular and official discourses as a non-traditional existential threat confronting modern societies.

The idea of ‘securitizing’ migration in the field of international relations has since gained international prominence. Walter defines ‘securitization of migration’ as a ‘social and political construction of migration in which migration is represented as a threat, in which a whole series of dangers and fears come to find embodiment in the social figure of the immigrant, the refugee, the human trafficker, and smuggler’ (Walters, 2010). This concept, however, views migration from a narrow perspective and does not consider the fact that insecurity itself could lead to migration.

In this perspective, the international migrant is deemed as posting ‘new’ transnational security threats through the transmission and spread of diseases such as HIV/ AIDS, Ebola, Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) and by committing transnational organized crimes such as drug and human trafficking; and terrorism (Lutterbeck, 2006; Abubakari and Longi, 2014). As aptly described by Fiona Adamson (2006), immigrants or foreign populations including refugees, are accused of fuelling armed conflict and transnational criminal activities that seek to threaten the internal security and stability of states as well as international security and stability. Stereotyping of foreign migrants has often led to violent anti-immigrant sentiments and xenophobia in many contemporary societies (Schuller, 2013).
2.2.1 Overview of Terrorism in the Global World

Scholarship traces terrorism to the first BC when Jewish terrorists, known as the Zealots Sicari, murdered their victims in broad daylight in Jerusalem as a way of inciting a revolt against the roman rule in Judea (Cronin, 2002).

Presently, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism despite the apprehensions acts of terrorism pose to governments and institutions globally (Sorel, 2003). There have been several definitions of the concept but most agree that it is the use of politically or ideologically motivated violence or threat of it by a group with an intention of effecting a change in the political, religious or social direction of a targeted audience. Bruce Hoffman (2006) defines it as a politically motivated violence or threat of violence carried out by an organization or a subnational group or non-state entity designed to have great psychological effects beyond the immediate victim or target.

Anneli Botha (2007) distinguishes three main strands of terrorism: domestic, international and transnational terrorism. According to her, domestic terrorism occurs within the confines of national boundaries and does not include targets or agents from abroad. International terrorism, on the other hand, usually involves a third state with apparent international consequences. Terrorism becomes transnational in scope due to the nationality or ties of its perpetrators, victims, locations and ramifications that go beyond national borders. It is this kind of terrorism that the study seeks to focus attention on.

Africa has for years experienced transnational terrorism at different stages of its contemporary history (Forest and Giroux, 2011). Attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 that killed 291 and 10 people, respectively by Al Qaeda are two of the many instances of terrorism in Africa in contemporary history (Goita, 2011).
However, even before these incidents, activities of revolutionary and nationalist movements during the fight for independence and self-determination in the colonial era were often viewed as terrorism (Omotola, 2008).

Africa is now considered a hotbed of terrorism due to the high spate of terrorist activities on the continent (Aspen Security Forum, 2016). Many factors have been discussed in the literature as fuelling terrorism on the continent. In addition to threats posed by the activities of Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, ISIS which have as their main objective the spread of radical Islam; the political violence associated with authoritarian regimes; ethnic and religious rivalries; the presence of failed states characterized by endemic corruption and inability of states to govern or exert full control over their territories have helped create the necessary ‘internal’ conditions for terrorism to take root in Africa (Davis, 2007 citing Dagne, 2004). For Botha (2007), draconian or closed political systems, national or ethnic motivations for self-determination, conflict over natural resources, religious fanaticism and economic circumstances such as poverty, unemployment as well as the geographic location of the state, its alliances, and the issue of identity make states vulnerable to terrorism.

The importation of Islamic fundamentalism from North Africa and the Middle East into the rest of Africa did a lot to contribute to the emergence of transnational terrorism on the continent (Forest and Giroux, 2011). According to Botha (2007), transnational terrorism in Africa may be viewed through two lenses namely the involvement of African nationals in acts of terrorism outside and within the continent. She further observes that African nationals, notably those of North African descent, have often been implicated in a number of terrorist activities in Europe. North African immigrants from Morocco and Algeria
were implicated in the 2006 Madrid and 1995 Paris bombing campaigns, respectively. Also, the conviction of two Egyptian nationals by a court in Milan, Italy for the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid is a typical example of Africa’s connection with transnational terrorism in Europe. In July 2016, a French-Tunisian immigrant carried out a terrorist attack by driving through a crowd in Nice, France killing at least 84 people. Yet, there are other instances where natives themselves have perpetrated terrorism. Again, immigrants’ or later generations of immigrants’ inability to integrate into societies of recipient states due to prevailing hostile conditions in those societies often make them susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups.

Until the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the issue of West Africa’s vulnerability to transnational and domestic terrorism did not attract much importance in policy and academic debates (Onuoha and Ezirim, 2013). According to Obi (2006), as of 2006, the focus was whether terrorism was a real, emerging, or imagined threat in West Africa despite growing evidence of a potential threat posed by the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which had been forging ties with local Malian population as far back 2003.

The situation has, however, changed tremendously in recent times with increased militancy in nearly every part of the sub-region (Onuoha and Ezirim, 2013). With its vast Muslim population, West Africa has recently witnessed a rise in Islamic fundamentalism with groups such as AQIM, formerly the Salafist Group for the Preaching and Combat (GSPC), establishing a stronghold in the sub-region where its members continue to launch cross-border operations in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Algeria and Chad.
Terrorist groups such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and Jama Atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) have all also stepped up their game, made incursions with some impacts in their quest to spread terror and radical Islam in the sub-region. Ezirim (2010) notes that the activities of transnational organised criminal activities such as drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering; piracy; arms trafficking; and migrant smuggling and trafficking, which also serve as major sources of funding for the terrorist groups, have further complicated the situation. Levitt (2004) feels that the political, economic and social conditions in West Africa create the necessary conditions for terrorism to flourish. He further argues that though West Africa has not yet become a hub of terrorism, it is already providing the logistical base for international terrorist organizations and criminal syndicates such as Hezbollah to raise funds for their activities.

Adding to these threats is the gradual infiltration and expansion of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Hezbollah in the same region. West Africa’s large sparsely populated areas and the porous nature of its borders have made it possible for terrorist organizations to transport light arms and conduct military training for recruits. The arrest and prosecution of two Nigerian nationals, who allegedly accepted huge sums of money from AQAP with the objective of recruiting potential members from Nigeria show how intent the terrorist group is to establish its presence in the region (Onuoha and Ezirim, 2013). The illegal trade in diamond in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, served as an important source of funding for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah (Yev, 2015). The Lebanese diaspora in West Africa reportedly funded the operations of Al Qaeda and Hezbollah networks with proceeds from the purchase of ‘conflict’ diamond from the rebel groups like the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone (Levitt, 2004).
2.2.2 Perceived link between Migration and Terrorism

Contemporary Western literature has often sought to link international migration with terrorism. Proponents of this thought argue that all major terrorist attacks that occurred in the last decade in North America and Western Europe utilized migrants (Spencer, 2008) citing (Leiken, 2004:6). Emphasizing this connection, Steven Camarota (2002) observed that the 48 foreign-born terrorists who committed crimes in the United States between 1993 and 2001 actually entered the country either through temporary tourist, student or business visas or by crossing the border illegally and filing asylum applications (Camarota, 2002).

The attacks on the Madrid subway station, the London bombings, the Paris and Brussels attacks involved foreign migrants (Schmid, 2016). In Africa, the connection is hardly made probably due to the complexity of the historical link existing among states. The demarcations into political and geographical territories as a colonial legacy created a situation where people of particular ethnic groups sharing the same cultural heritage live and straddle national borders such as it is in the case of the Ewe ethnic groups in Togo and Ghana; and the Tutsi/Hutu ethnic groups in Rwanda and Congo. Thus the involvement of one group from a different geographical location in the affairs of another creates a definitional dilemma as to who a transnational or native is.

The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act bears testimony to the various efforts to link terrorism and migration. Section 411 to 418 of the Act entitled “Enhanced Immigration Provisions” gives the Attorney General exceptional powers to detain non-citizens without a hearing and proof they pose a threat to national security or a flight risk shows the
linkage between Migration and terrorism. The Act allows the deportation of foreigners for associational activity with an organization thought to have links to terrorism (Cole, 2002).

The introduction of the United Kingdom’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) in December 2001, which deals specifically with matters concerning immigration and terrorism, is another clear manifestation of an attempt to establish a nexus between international migration and terrorism. Aspects of the Act enable the UK Home Secretary to order the detention without trial of foreign nationals suspected of planning or intending to launch terrorist attacks in the UK or internationally (Payne, 2002).

Alexander Spencer (2008) goes on to further explain this noting that the idea and perception of foreign immigrants as potential terrorists following the events of September 11, 2001, galvanized Western governments to introduce anti-immigration policies as a response to the threat. Immigration now features prominently in political and academic discourses on terrorism in the West. The Foreign Minister of Spain, Josep Pique in 2006 argued: "the fight against illegal immigration is also the reinforcement of the fight against terrorism" (Adamson, 2006).

There is, however, a much more complex relationship between international migration and terrorism. In one sense migration can cause terrorism and in another migration can be a result of terrorism. Refugee camps are often associated with misery and deprivation and breeding grounds for terrorism. Slightly more of the world’s refugee population is younger than 18 years (Van der Velde, 2015). Under these conditions, the young people who are susceptible than older men find the lures of terrorism a better alternative to the
helplessness offered at the camp. An example of how refugee camps become recruitment grounds for terrorist activities is the fate of thousands of Palestinians who fled their homes when the State of Israel was being established in the 1940s and later during the 6day war between Israel and its Arab neighbours in the 1960s. Refugee camps in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries with Palestinian population became grounds for recruitment for militant groups who launch terrorist attacks on Israeli targets.

2.3 Risk Perceptions and Attitudes towards Migration and Crime/Terrorism

Prior to the terrorist attacks in the United States, the general perception of immigrants was positive. For instance, a Gallup poll conducted in June 2001 (Jones, 2001) found that majority (62 percent) of the respondents welcomed immigration as beneficial for the country at the time. However, the situation today is different due to the perceived link between immigration and terrorism. Studies found that people’s risk perception and attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants were badly affected following the terrorist attacks of 2001 in the US (Drakos and Muller, 2011; Huddy et al., 2005), although attitudes were quite favourable before the terrorist attacks.

A study by Aslund and Rooth (2005) showed an increase of negative perceptions of immigrants in Sweden as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Hanes and Machin (2014) observed significant increases in hate crimes against Asians and Arabs while in Spain, a study found that Spaniards expressed more anti-Arab and conservative attitudes after the 2004 Madrid attacks (Athina Economou et al) citing (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede, 2006)
The wave of anti-immigration sentiments has prevailed since 2001. Research has revealed that one of the most pervasive consequences of the September 11 attacks on the US was the intense feeling of threat of terrorism or potential harm to one’s group and to oneself as an individual. The attack evoked strong emotions of sadness, anxiety, anger and feelings of vulnerability (Spake & Szegedy-Maszak, 2001 cited in Esses et al., 2002). Studies showed that threat to one’s personal well-being often produces negative attitudes and actions directed at members of the threatening group (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001 cited in Esses et al., 2002).

Research has further shown that perceptions and feelings of threat to one’s group usually strengthen the sense of collective identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979 cited in Knud Larsen et al., 2009). As Mullen (1991; 2001) indicates under conditions of threat, people are more likely to see a threatening group in a more homogeneous but negative stereotypical ways. The September 11 attacks in the US, presented foreigners as posing a threat to the country. Thus, foreign populations were seen as having different interests to those of the national group (Langer, 2001).

Again, studies showed that people with certain demographic characteristics such as age, sex, education, social status, and ethnicity might perceive and react to crime differently (Sjoberg, 2005; Jasinski, 2005). It must be noted here that crime used in this context refers to violent acts committed in contravention of the law. Wealthy people or individuals of a higher social class tend to have less fear of crime than those of lower social status (Rountree, 1998 cited in Jennifer Truman, 2005). Women are thought to exhibit a higher degree of fear of crime than men (Haynie, 1998 cited in Jennifer Truman, 2005) whereas the fear of crime appears to be more pronounced with ethnic foreign
minority groups than indigenes. Some studies show older people are inclined to have less fear of crime than younger people (Chadee & Ditton, 2003; Ziegler & Mitchell, 2003 cited in Jennifer Truman, 2005), others indicate an opposite trend with older adults reporting a greater fear of crime than their younger counterparts (Weinrath & Gartell, cited in Jennifer Truman, 2005). Risk perceptions can also be influenced by media usage, politicians, a lack of knowledge, or strong attitudes and emotions (Woods et al., 2008) because of the diversity of views on risk prevalence or the groups that fear the risk of crime/terrorism the most. These perceptions may also vary from one geographical area to another. It is clear from these studies that there is no universal agreement on which groups are more susceptible to fears of a risk of crime.

There is also a general perception that foreign fighters who left Europe and North America to fight for Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq could return home more radicalized, trained and determined to carry on their violent campaigns and could pose a threat to the security of their home countries (Jenkins, 2014). Indeed Jenkins indicates that in 2009, three Islamist fundamentalists who left to fight for Islamist groups made a failed attempt on New York’s subways on their return. He further discloses that some of the suicide bombers involved in the bombings in London in 2005 reportedly received training in Pakistan (Jenkins, 2014). This has led to the formulation of anti-terrorism policies that seek to punish people known to have travelled and trained with terrorist groups abroad.

While the focus in Europe has been shifted to address the issues relating to return jihadists or nationals suspected of having fought alongside terrorist groups elsewhere, in Africa, literature makes little is mentioned of migrants who have returned home after their
military engagements with terrorist groups in the Middle East and elsewhere. No mention is made in the literature of the fact that while some of the African migrants directly left Africa to commit acts of terrorism elsewhere outside the continent, others formed part of foreign fighters who left Europe to fight elsewhere as militants. Such individuals for fear of being arrested and jailed or deported should they return to their adopted countries may by themselves return discretely to their motherland. Such a gap has not been addressed in the literature.

These perceptions and views further exacerbate negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration as indicated by Mullen et al. (2000). Anti-immigrant feelings and aggressive xenophobic tendencies have been evident; particularly towards those who are perceived to be Muslim (Kar, 2001) and this is widespread as a result of such stereotypes. This has made immigrants of middle-eastern origin express fear and anxiety about their safety (Rosin, 2001).

2.4 Counter-Terrorism Measures and Policies

The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, led to the formulation and implementation of anti-immigration measures across North America and Europe. Martin and Martin (2004) cited in Alexander Spencer (2008). Some of the measures implemented by the United States include the incorporation of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the passage of the USA Patriot Act with the objective of tackling the threat of transnational terrorism (Spencer, 2008). Also, the UK’s passage of Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA); establishment of joint border patrols between French, Italy, the UK and Belgium in the EU were measures taken by Western countries to fight terrorism.
These measures while legitimate to some extent alienated a sizeable portion of the population who largely felt marginalised.

There was a general perception within Muslim communities that policies aimed at fighting terrorism often focused on Arab or Muslim immigrants and foreigners. Alexander Spencer (2008) argues that isolating and alienating immigrants with nativity similar to Islamists could encourage the growth of genuinely harmful attitudes within the immigrant communities. Thus, targeting specific ethnic groups or religions risk undermining the legitimacy of the fight against terrorism by Western governments (Cole, 2003b: 183-210 cited in Spencer, 2008).

In Africa, most countries have tried to enact or develop legislative measures to combat and prevent terrorism. Kenya has an anti-terrorism police unit formed in 2003 and a task force on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism composed of representatives from the Ministries of Finance; Trade; and Foreign Affairs; the Central Bank: the Police; the Criminal Investigation Department (CID); and the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS). Tanzania has an anti-terrorism police unit while Uganda has a Joint Anti-terrorism task force made up of the department of military intelligence, the police criminal investigation department and special branch, the external security organization, and internal security organization. Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have all introduced counter-terrorism legislations (Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha, 2007).

The emergence of transnational terrorism has prompted many West African states to enact domestic anti-terrorism legislations. Currently, various West African states pursued national, bilateral and regional efforts to fight terrorism (Naila Salihu, 2015). In the case of Ghana, limited research has been conducted in areas bordering on transnational
security threats, radicalization, and violence. A study conducted on Islamic radicalization and violence in Ghana revealed that though Ghana experiences relative violence due to religious radicalization, such violence is limited to similar or different kinds of religious groups and not targeted at the state (Anim Emmanuel, 2015 citing Aning and Abdallah, 2013). Sosu (2011) in her research on the various cross-border and transnational organized crimes, identified Ghana as beset with a number of security challenges including transnational terrorism which all threaten the security and stability of the country.

There are a number of legal regimes and institutional arrangements that have been put in place to address transnational organized crimes including terrorism. Domestic legislative instruments and frameworks, which include the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2012 (Act 842); the Anti-Terrorism Act 2008 (Act 762); the Anti-Money Laundry Act 2008 (Act 749); the National Disaster Management Organization Act, 1996 (Act 517); the Criminal and other Offenses Act, 1960 (Act 29); the Economic and Organized Crime Act 2010 (Act 804); the Emergency Powers Act, 1994 Act 742); and the 1992 Constitution of Ghana are some of the legal instruments available in Ghana.

Terrorism was first made an offense in Ghana under the Criminal Offences Act of 1960 (Act 29). The Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundry Acts were passed in 2008 following growing concerns over threats posed by transnational organized crimes such as drug trafficking and terrorism (Bjorn and Sandler 2008; UNODCCP, 2012 cited in Norman et al., 2014). The Anti-Terrorism Act includes provisions for the confiscation and repatriation of terrorist funds and assets.
At the regional and international levels, Ghana has ratified a number of conventions and protocols on terrorism key among them are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Convention on Extradition, Convention on small Arms and Light Weapons as well as the Algiers protocol on Conflict Prevention (Anim, 2015). Again, Ghana is signatory to the 1999 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the prevention and combating terrorism and has been engaged in many sub-regional and international activities on security stability such as joint cooperation and collaboration with ECOWAS and African Union (AU) member states in combating terrorism (ibid). Ghana’s military is involved in international peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions globally notably in Mali, Somalia, Liberia, and Lebanon (ibid). There are also institutions of state such as the Ghana Police Service, the recently established Counter-Terrorism Unit at the Office of the President, the Military, Ghana Immigration Service, and the Customs Authority to ensure the rapid response to terrorist threats (ibid).

In spite of the many pieces of legislative instruments Ghana has, Norman et al. (2014) contend the country lacks the essential legislation that could strengthen its legal framework and improve the nation’s preparedness against security challenges posed by transnational threats. A study conducted on Ghana’s preparedness to combat terrorism by Norman et al. (2014) found some limitations in Ghana’s Anti-Terrorism Act. It described the definition of the term ‘terrorism’ as vague and too broad in scope, which in its view lent itself to certain human rights violations.
2.5 Theoretical Background of the Study

Several theories can be associated with the migration-security nexus with particular reference to terrorism. For the purpose of this study, however, the theory of securitization was adopted to help explore the linkages that exist between migration, security, and terrorism. The work was also conceived in the Integrated Threat Theory and Psychometric Paradigm, which explain how individuals or groups perceive and react to the threat, danger or risky situations.

The Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) as developed by Stephan and Stephan (2000) is a theoretical framework that provides researchers interested in intergroup relations a way of predicting the attitudes of in-groups towards out-groups (Osborne et al., 2008). A central assumption of ITT is that perception of realistic and symbolic threats as well as intergroup anxiety include the perception that members of an out-group pose a substantial hindrance to the in-group’s well-being.

Symbolic threats touch on the perception that members from one’s out-group have a distinct value system from one’s own group. Here, it is suggested that intergroup prejudices occur due to the belief that members of a group have different values that are potentially detrimental to the values and beliefs of another group (Stephan and Stephan, 2000 cited in Osborne et al., 2008). Intergroup anxiety arises when individuals feel nervous or anxious about interacting with members outside one’s immediate in-group (Stephan and Stephan, 2000 cited in Osborne et al., 2008). Explaining intergroup conflict, Stephan et al., (1994) point out that stereotypes of outgroup members are often correlated with emotional responses: the more negative a stereotype, the more negative the emotional response one has towards members of an outgroup.
Psychometric paradigm deals with the cognitive factors that influence individuals’ perception of risk. Essentially it is a cognitive map of social risk perception, which is broken down into two axes of dread risk factor and unknown risk factor. The former “reflects the degree to which a risk is understood and the degree to which it evokes a feeling of dread” (Slovic, 1992, p. 121), while the latter demonstrates that the general public perception of these activities or technologies that pose a higher degree of risk to their health and safety (Slovic, 1997, p. 235). Therefore, by combining dread and unfamiliar risk characteristics, the public’s risk perception of hazards may be mapped.

Securitization was first conceived as an analytical framework by Ole Waever (1995) to explain how security threats are perceived and managed by states. Buzan et al. (1998) argue that securitization occurs when an agent identifies and communicates an issue as an existential threat prompting the need for extraordinary measures. The process often begins with an oral statement or allusion to a specific actor as potentially threatening necessitating prompt measures (Themistocleous, 2013). The process enters the stage of the successful cultivation of fear and acceptance by the audience in the existence of the threat and the need for a response (ibid). A securitization actor can either be an individual, a group or elites such as governments, religious leaders, and political parties. The securitization subject may be a political, economic or social issue such as terrorism, immigration or a possible war (ibid).
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

3.0 Introduction

This section is on the methodology adopted in carrying out the study. Basically, methodology is a presentation of how the research was conducted. It is a set of rules and procedures adopted to investigate a phenomenon or situation (Kitchin and Tate, 2000:6). Schwandt (2001) defines it as a theory of how inquiry should proceed. This section describes the geographical location where the study was conducted, the sampling techniques and the respondents selected for the study. It also discusses the data collection procedures that were employed in gathering the required data for the study as well as the limitations encountered in the course of the study.

3.1 Research Design

Mixed methods research design, which is the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single research (Teye, 2010), was adopted for this study. While quantitative research allows for the discovery of patterns of behaviour, qualitative research methods aim at explaining people’s subjective behaviour (Bryman, 2001). Quantitative research is useful for generalisations and predictions and for establishing the correlations between different variables (Castro, Kellison, Boyd and Kodak, 2010 cited in Teye, 2010). This notwithstanding, the quantitative approach is not good for the explanation of behaviours and perception (Brannan, 1992). Qualitative, on the other hand, is useful for the generation of data on experiences, perceptions, emotions, beliefs and behaviours of respondents (Teye, 2010). Proponents argue that because humans behave and perceive things differently and are uniquely conscious of their own behaviour (Creswell et al., 2003), this research method permits the researcher to have access to the
respondent’s perspectives, experiences and psychological world through detailed, indepth and intensive interviewing, discussions and observation. It has been however criticised for being too subjective, inappropriate for generalisation and prediction.

As a result of the mixed outcomes from using quantitative and qualitative researches, mixed methods strategy has gained worldwide usage currently. Underpinning its broad usage are the assumptions that the combined use of quantitative and qualitative research data can cross-validate each other around a common reference point (Sharon, 2002), a point disputed by Meetoo and Temple (2003) who argue validation is not automatic; may be used to seek convergence and corroboration of results obtained from different methods; and for complementarity and initiation as well as expansion and development of methods. Though it has been criticised variously for being time-consuming, expensive, difficult for a single researcher and a complex venture, among others, it is regarded as the best (Teye, 2010).

3.2 The Area of Study- Accra and Tema

The areas of study were Accra and Tema in the Greater Accra Region (GAR), which is the smallest of the ten (10) administrative regions of Ghana occupying a land area of 3,245 sq km or 1.4 per cent of the total area of Ghana. It is situated in the Southern part of Ghana along the Gulf of Guinea and shares boundaries in the west and north with the Central and Eastern regions, respectively, and in the East with the Volta Lake. GAR has an estimated population of 4,010,054 (GSS, 2010) representing 15.4 per cent of Ghana’s total population making it the second most populated region in Ghana after the Ashanti Region. Figures from the 2010 national Population and Housing Census present the region as an ethnically diverse one with the distribution of the various ethnic groups as
follows: Akans (39.8%), Ga Adangme (29.7), Ewe (18%), among others. The metropolis has a youthful population with a high dependency ratio. About half of the population are internal migrants.

According to Jorge Ubaldo Colin Pescina (2013) Accra is among Africa’s largest cities in West Africa, which happens to be experiencing one of continent’s fastest rates of urbanisation. Accra’s economy has experienced some transformations owing largely to immigration and immigration from within and outside the country. As the business and economic hub of the country, Accra hosts a number of manufacturing industries, oil companies, financial institutions, telecommunication, tourism, education, health institutions and other important establishments which also provide employment opportunities to people. It is also the location for most regional and international institutions in Ghana.

Tema metropolis is situated about 30 km east of Accra Metropolitan Area and covers an area of about 87.8 square km. It shares boundaries in the Northeast with the Dangme West District, Southwest of Ledzokuku Krowor Municipal, Northwest by Adentan Municipal and Ga East Municipal, north by the Akuapim South District and the south by the Gulf of Guinea. With a population of 292,773 people, comprising 7.3 per cent of the region’s total population (GSS, 2010) the metropolis serves as the industrial hub of Ghana being home of over 500 industries and the Tema Harbour that contribute to the revenue generation of the country. A large track of land near the port has been designated as a free zone for the production of goods, 70 per cent of which are exported and 30 per cent for local consumption. Though Tema was first inhabited by the Ga-Dangmes, it is now
ethnically diverse with representations of several ethnic groups the dominant ones being the Akans, Ga-Dagme and Ewe. Others include the Mole-Dagbani and Guans.

3.3 Population of Study
The target population in this study were residents of Accra and Tema. Considering the purpose of the research as much as possible the researcher tried attaining an equal representation of individuals with key demographic characteristics relevant for the study including both men and women of various ages, different ethnic and religious backgrounds, foreigners, students, workers, market women and men and unemployed people. In this regard, the study targeted a total of 40 foreign nationals 20 from each study area (Tema and Accra) and 60 natives with 30 each from the study areas. A face-to-face interview method was employed to gather information from respondents identified in the questionnaire survey and from officials of the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, the Ghana Immigration Service as well as Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre.

3.4 Sampling Technique and Study Sample
A total sample size of 110 people was adopted in the study. Both purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to obtain responses from respondents who ranged between 19 and 70 years. According to Kumar and Phrommathed (2005), the main consideration in purposive sampling is the judgement of the researcher concerning who can provide the information needed to achieve the objectives of the study. This type of sampling is useful when a researcher intends to construct a historical reality, describe or discover a (new) phenomenon. In this particular study it was useful in identifying people of specific demographic features such as the aged and individuals belonging to the Islamic faith. Snowball sampling was adopted to identify foreign respondents.
3.5 Data Gathering- Procedure of Data Collection

The study used questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews for the collection of data. In-depth interviews were adopted as an appropriate approach to gain an insight into the respondents’ perspectives and psychological frame, while structured questionnaires were used to establish certain trends and patterns in the study.

3.6 Individual Interviews and Survey

An interview is basically a data gathering method in which there is an exchange of information (Dunn, 2000). Maccoby and Maccoby (1954) define it as the face-to-face verbal exchange between a researcher and participant with the former attempting to elicit information or expressions of opinions and/or belief and experiences from the latter. A total of 8 people were interviewed during the study. An interview guide was used to help the researcher ask questions relevant to the study. As observed by Kvale and Brinkmann (1996:129), the use of the interview guide assist in keeping interviewees on track where necessary to ensure important issues were covered.

3.7 Pre-Testing

As Kreuger and Neuman (2006) indicate a pre-test of the survey is done to ensure its reliability and congruence. I therefore pre-tested interviews with 8 respondents in the Adenta area in Accra to assess whether the questions could be comprehended by the respondents. This was to give the researcher some information regarding the ambiguous or redundant nature of questions asked. Adenta was selected for pre-texting due to its demographic composition. There are people including foreign nationals of diverse demographic characteristics who live or work in Adenta and it was felt that the area would be representative of the study population.
3.8 Data Handling and Analysis

Transcripts from the Interviews and field notes were collated and analysed through the use of the QSR NVivo, a software program for qualitative data analysis and the survey questionnaire were analysed using SPSS. Also, verbatim transcripts of some interviews from the tape recording were used. As noted by some scholars, this is a standard procedure during qualitative analysis. Pseudonyms were also used to ensure anonymity of respondents.

A thematic analysis was made of each interview. Editing at this stage involved pulling together broken pieces of the interviews and organizing them in order to follow the general chronology of the reviewed literature. This becomes useful to the reader because when events are presented in the order in which they occur, cause and effect becomes clearer.

3.9 Ethical Consideration

The researcher sought permission from all the respondents before administering the questionnaires. Again, the interviews were recorded only after the researcher had explained the overall purpose of the study and assured participants of anonymity and confidentiality. In some isolated cases, leaders of the target sample had to intervene after the initial reluctance of respondents to fill the questionnaire forms because they had feared the researcher was from the tax office. Pseudonyms were used for the participants in the analysis to ensure research anonymity.
CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND PERCEPTIONS OF RESPONDENTS

4.0 Introduction

Having established the theoretical background of the study, the purpose of this chapter is to use the data from the case study areas to test and investigate if the theoretical issues discussed in the preceding chapter concerning the linkage between international migration and terrorism can be extended to Ghana, specifically Accra and Tema.

4.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics

Socio-demographic characteristics such as age, sex, and level of education play a significant role in people’s perception and attitude of risk.

4.1.1 Age of respondents

According to the literature, people with certain demographic characteristics such as age perceive and react to violent crime or risk differently (Sjoberg, 2005). While some research has shown that older people are inclined to have less fear of crime than younger people (Ziegler and Mitchell, 2003), other studies indicate an opposite trend with adults showing greater fear of crime than younger ones (Robin Goodwin et al., 2005 citing Thomas, 2003). Table 4.1 shows that 39% of the respondents were between the ages of 20 and 29, while 4% were 19 years old and below. In the study, majority of the respondents, who are aged between 20 and 49, reported the fear of risk of crime.
4.1.2 Sex of respondents

A key determinant of risk perceptions is the sex of the individual and as has been found in most studies women tend to exhibit a higher degree of fear of crime or risk than men (Robin Goodwin et al., 2005 citing Norris et al., 2002). As shown in Table 4.1, 63% of the respondents are males while 37% are females. Generally, the respondents, the majority of whom are male, all exhibit a certain degree of fear of risk.

4.1.3 Level of education

Educational attainment is a key predictor of risk perception (Jasinski, 2005). Some studies have observed the higher the educational level attained, the greater the degree of risk perception and the vice versa (Essien, et al., 2007). In Table 4.1, 44% of the respondents have attained education up to the tertiary level while 2% have attained middle school. The level of education of the vast majority of the respondents demonstrates a higher risk perception of a terrorist attack amongst residents of Accra and Tema even though an in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon is lacking. As a result it does not have any impact on the country’s preparedness to confront the threat. Ghana may not have as yet experienced any recorded incidents of terrorism, but its literacy level has made the knowledge of terrorism widespread among a larger portion of the population.
Table 4.1: Summary of Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-demographic variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;19 years</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSS/JHS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS/SHS</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/vocational/commercial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2016)

4.1.4 Religious affiliation

According to the Cultural theory, individual’s social groups or affiliations play a role in the perception of risk by members of that group Douglas and Widavsky (1982). Again, studies have found religious belief to be a significant predictor of higher risk perception (Urban and Scasny, 2007 citing Sjoberg and Wahlberg, 2002). As Table 4.2 indicates, 43 % of the respondents are Charismatic, while 1 % is Anglican. This helps understand whether people’s religious beliefs influence their perception of risk or threat.
### Table 4.2: Religious affiliations of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliations</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charismatic</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecost</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Fieldwork (2016)

Though the result showing Christians as constituting the vast majority of respondents reflects the 2010 GSS National Population and Housing Census, it may have influenced the outcome on the views of category of people considered as terrorists in the ensuing chapter. However, it looks quite unlikely this played any crucial role in determining people’s perception of the potential threat of terrorism and its link with international migration in Ghana.

### 4.2 Perceptions of the Link between International Migration and Terrorism

States are now reluctant to admit and accommodate international migrants in their territories due to perceptions that migrants put strains on national economies; disrupt and destroy the cultural homogeneity of states; threaten the security and stability of states; spread contagious diseases; and commit crimes (Weiner, 1992). As part of its central objective, the study sought to explore the perception of the possible link between international migration and terrorism in Ghana.
4.2.1 Knowledge, Construction of Terrorism and Role of Media

As discussed in the preceding section, the knowledge of risk is key in determining an individual’s attitude and behaviour towards a perceived risk or danger. The more knowledgeable an individual is, the higher the degree of perception exhibited as found in some studies. In line with this objective, respondents were asked questions to determine their level of understanding of the subject matter. Table 4.3 shows that nearly all the respondents (99%) expressed some knowledge about the phenomenon.

Table 4.3: Knowledge of Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you ever heard of terrorism</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2016)

This result is further reinforced in Table 4.4 where 32% of the respondents described terrorism as a violent criminal act that causes the death of many people and 6% regarded it as a violent response to social and economic exclusion. This basic knowledge of terrorism expressed by residents explains why there is such a high degree of perception of the threat of terrorism in Ghana. It also supports the view that the perception of a risk is usually high among educated people. Yet this knowledge is easily forgotten as soon as the moment of threat passes or the possibility of its occurrence decreases. As some of the residents indicated people have short memories and tend to talk a lot more in the heat of the occurrence of an event but suddenly lose interest over time. Khalid, a 41-year-old public servant who works with one of the security agencies in Ghana during an interview with the researcher had this to say on the issue:

_I should say so until something comes up, either there is a terrorist attack in another part of the world or then the media and other social organization take it up in Ghana. They discuss it for a couple of days and the month fizzes out again._
So to a large extent we can say that there is not much sensitization about the people of Ghana on terrorism unless a terrorist act takes place somewhere, then the matter in discussed briefly and after that it is left to lie down again. (Khalid, June 2016)

Table 4.4: Description of terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If yes, which of the statements below best describes what terrorism is</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is a kind of religious movement</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a transnational criminal activity involving people of different nationality</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is the use of violence or intimidation to pursue an objective</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a criminal act that causes the death of many people</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a violent response to social and economic exclusion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2016)

On the issue on resident’s knowledge of terrorism, Elorm, a 27-year old participant interviewed, held a contrary view and believed Ghanaians are not sufficiently knowledgeable:

*I don’t think Ghanaians are sufficiently knowledgeable because we have never experienced any terrorism. Like I was telling you, it is only the literates who listen to news and it is like they are aware. And unfortunately, in Ghana the population of the illiterates out weights the literates. I don’t think enough Ghanaians have adequate information about terrorism* (Elorm, June 2016)

Modern technology and improvement in telecommunication have led to more people gaining access to information (Castles et al., 2014). The media plays a major role in influencing people’s knowledge and perception of risk (Woods et al., 2008). Currently, the media landscape in Ghana is large with about 200 authorized FM stations, 12 private television stations, and many hundreds of newspapers (Owusu, 2012).
In Table 4.5, 34% of the respondents said they heard about terrorism on television, while 4% heard about it through government officials. This shows the significant role the media plays in disseminating information on terrorism. It must be emphasized that media in this respect refers mainly to the many television and radio stations dotted all over the country through which people get their information on national issues. The use of the Internet and social media platforms to disseminate information appears to be more widespread among the technologically savvy individuals found in the urban areas. It has become a convenience and fast means of communication in the country now playing a key role in forming public opinion on issues.

**Table 4.5: Medium of Information on Terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How did you hear about terrorism?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On television</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the internet</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From government officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Fieldwork (2016)*

As shown in Figure 4.1, 48% of the respondents believed that the media sometimes play a major role in influencing people’s perception of terrorism while 4% did not think it influences the perception of terrorism. While the study found that the majority of the respondents have attained some level of education, in reality there are a sizeable number of illiterates in the country whose perceptions and views on national issues such as the threat of terrorism which are mainly influenced by radio and television broadcast, were not adequately captured in this research.
Using the securitization paradigm, the study explains how the threat of international migration as a perceived conduit of terrorism is constructed in Ghana. According to William Walter (2010), the securitization process begins when an issue is identified or alluded to as a security threat through an oral or verbal pronouncement, which gets successfully cultivated and accepted by a target audience as an existential threat requiring a prompt solution.

Table 4.6 shows that 38% of respondents felt pronouncements by politicians and journalists, play a crucial role in forming people’s views on terrorism in the country, while 6% believed other factors influence people’s opinion on the issue. This corroborates earlier studies on the role played by politicians and media practitioners in constructing ideas about events. According to Guasti and Mansfeldova (2013), the media plays a major role in political communication. He observed that not only does the media provide the platform for political discourse and facilitate the formation of public opinion, but also educate the public on specific national issues. In this context, the media play an important role in the construction of terrorism by politicians and other actors, which are
successfully inculcated in the citizens who are now calling for immediate action. In Ghana, for instance, the arrival of the ‘Gitmo two’ and departure of the three Ghanaian ISIS recruits revealed the major role the media and other actors played in constructing the perceived threat of terrorism in the country.

Though, the study showed that the vast majority of the respondents have attained both secondary and tertiary educational levels, the depth of knowledge on terrorism and its perceived link to international migration is limited making them depend almost entirely on the media and other electronic sources for information on the phenomena. It is this lack of in-depth knowledge that leads to the successful cultivation of international migration as a perceived security threat either by government officials or media practitioners who are ill-informed on the subject matter.

Table 4.6: Construction of opinion about terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Ghana, how do people form their opinion about the threat of terrorism</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political pronouncement</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious discourse</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public reaction</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2016)

4.2.2 Possible infiltration of terrorist into Ghana

The increase in violent transnational criminal activities in the West African sub-region; porous nature of the borders; poverty and economic deprivation; and the surge in the activities or attacks of Islamist groups such as Boko Haram, AQIM in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire and Mali have all led to the belief that Ghana is at a potential risk of terrorist attack (Ezirim, 2004; Levitt, 2004). The increased cross-border movements of
migrants within the sub-region serve as a conduit for terrorism (Adamson, 2006) that poses a threat to the region. Table 4.7 shows that 75 % of the respondents believed that terrorists could infiltrate into the country while 25 % said no.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think terrorists can infiltrate into the country?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.7: Respondents’ views on whether terrorists can infiltrate the country**

As indicated in Table 4.10, 44 % of the respondents merely agreed that Ghana is at a risk of possible attack while 7 % strongly disagreed. This confirms the general view of scholars that given the increased spate of terrorism in the sub-region and other contributing factors that make the sub-region a fertile ground for terrorism, Ghana is at a risk of an attack. All participants interviewed on the issue agreed that Ghana is at high risk of a potential terrorist attack. Indeed, James a 50-year old security expert, categorically stated that there will be a terrorist attack in Ghana and that it was only a matter of time for the event to occur:

*There will be a terrorist attack on Ghana. No... but do you know the number of attempted terrorist attacks in this country? Probably every year there are about 40 attempted terrorist attacks. We are the single country in the whole of Africa that imports the largest quantities of industrial explosives. We import about 3 million bullets every year, Ok. So there is an infrastructure for terror in this country. This is the only country in Africa where it is very easy to make an industrial bomb because every chemical shop sells it and you can buy them in small quantities so over time they can be able to do a bomb. However, it is only a matter of time (James, 16th June 2016)*

Khalid indicated that one of the terrorists who was arrested in connection with the terrorist attack on Grand Bassam in Cote d’Ivoire actually mentioned Ghana and Togo as the next targets of a terrorist attack:
Well to the extent that we received a media briefing that one of the terrorists who attacked the Grand Bassam Beach in Côte d’Ivoire did indicate that their group had planned to attack other countries including Ghana and Togo. So based on this, of course, we then know that Ghana is susceptible to terrorist attack (Khalid, 13th June 2016).

The ease with which migrants enter and exit the country plays a fundamental role in exposing Ghana to the risk of terrorism as there are no effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure a close watch on migrants who may have recourse to engaging in criminal acts.

4.2.3 Reasons for engaging in terrorism

The literature identifies poverty, socio-economic exclusion and ideological reasons as some of the factors driving people into terrorism. As shown in figure 4.2, the study showed that 40% of respondents believe ideological reasons play a key role in determining why people engage in terrorism, while 5% of the respondents felt people engage in acts of terrorism out of the desire for adventure. The findings confirm the assertion that ideology plays a pivotal role in the radicalisation process of would-be terrorists.

Figure 4.2: Reasons why people engage in terrorism

John Davis (2007) notes that ideology plays a significant part in the radicalisation of individuals but there are other equally important factors such as social exclusion and poverty that influence people’s decision to join terrorist groups. It appears in Ghana the
perceived radicalisation of individuals has more to do with poverty than the lack of economic opportunities. However, there are foreign minorities groups such as the Fulanis who feel socially excluded and marginalised and can engage in acts of terrorism if issues concerning them are not carefully handled.

4.2.4 Perception of the Link between terrorism and international migration

International migration is perceived to be a conduit for terrorism. Many studies have established a perceived linkage between international migration and terrorism, due to the involvement of foreign migrants or their offspring in terrorism (Spencer, 2008). This study, however, failed to establish this perceived link in Ghana, which has a sizeable population of migrants from West Africa and the rest of Europe. Currently, the population of migrants in Ghana stands at 2.5 million according to the 2010 Ghana Statistical Service survey. Table 4.8 reveals that 59% of respondents somewhat agreed there is a perceived link between international migration and terrorism, while 5% of the respondents strongly disagreed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your nationality?</th>
<th>There is a perceived link between terrorism and international migration</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I disagree</td>
<td>I agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanaian</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togolese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkinabe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivorian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabonese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beninese</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2016)
However, in-depth interviews conducted by this researcher produced varying views on the subject matter. Elorm who felt there was no perceived connection between terrorism and international migration said:

*Personally, I don’t think it is really linked. I don’t think there is any relationship between international migration and terrorism. Like in Nigeria, Boko Haram, for instance, are Nigerians, not foreigners. They are Nigerians worrying the Nigerians. So it is not like anybody migrated there and then formed the group Boko Haram so I don’t there is any relationship between migration and terrorism and moreover, we have lots of people in Ghana here who we come from various countries and yet we have never had any terrorist attack. We have a Liberian camp there in Bujumbura and there have never been terrorists, have they? (Elorm, June 2016)*

However, there were some who believed there is a link. Adebayor, a 38-year Nigerian held the opinion that there was a perceived connection between terrorism and international migration.

*To me, we know that what causes migration are the push and pull factors and some of the youths are experiencing a lot of economic hardship. Yeah, that contributes it is something that is going to pull them. Something is pushing them away from Ghana, which is the economic hardship but some people are offering them this benefit, so it is going to pull them to themselves. So I think in that sense international migration can play a role because of the push-pull factors. (Adebayo, June 2016)*

Khalid supported this claim from a different perspective:

*This is now where the migration issue comes directly at play with terrorist activities. Yes, I agree that the issue of migration, the accessibility that these people have to travel from Ghana to the Middle East and then to come back will definitely pose a security challenge to Ghana. (Khalid, June 2016)*

While there may be a weak association between international migration and terrorism, the fundamental question is why or how are many Ghanaian youth becoming radicalised to the point where they feel impelled to migrate abroad to join terrorist groups? The view of residents in Accra and Tema may not stand the test of time were the actual act of terrorism to occur in the country. This is because generally, Ghanaians are quite xenophobic as demonstrated in the manner they attribute the high levels of unemployment and violent crimes in the country or the destruction of the environment to foreign nationals such as the
Chinese, Fulanis and Nigerians. The recent formation of a militant group in Mali for the protection and promotion of the rights of Fulanis in the West African sub-region may act as a security threat to countries like Ghana which have a sizeable population of aggrieved and discontented Fulanis. Here international migration may play a significant role as a conduit for terrorism in a country.

### 4.2.5 Perception of Threat posed by Ghanaian foreign fighters

The literature has suggested that foreign fighters, who departed their countries of origin for the Middle East to fight for terrorist groups such as the ISIS and Al-Qaida, often pose a threat to their countries of origin upon their return (Jenkins, 2014). It has also been cited that part of the ISIS terrorist group’s strategy is to return some of its foreign fighters to their home countries to continue the jihadist crusade in the Middle East. Indeed studies have found some of the attacks in Europe and the US were orchestrated by individuals (both natives and migrants) with records of previous contacts with terrorist groups in the Middle East. Against this background, one of the objectives of the study was to find out whether the Ghanaian migrants who left to join the ISIS in Syria were perceived to be a security risk to Ghana when they return.

Table 4.9 shows 43% of the respondents somewhat agreed with the view that Ghanaian foreign fighters could pose a threat to Ghana’s security on their return, while 4% strongly disagreed. It was discovered that most residents in Accra and Tema perceive these returned Ghanaian migrants could carry out acts that would undermine the country’s security. This supports the general belief that foreign fighters threaten their countries of origin. A participant held that such individuals will return more frustrated and this could prove detrimental to the security of the country:
I think the person is still a threat. In as much he has not changed, the person is still motivated by what pushed or pulled him, the person is still vulnerable so except if the person is given close monitoring or something he still a threat to the community. *(Adebayor, June 2016)*

A similar sentiment was expressed by Khalid, who believed the jihadists could deploy the skills and techniques they acquired while abroad to perpetrate the acts in Ghana on their return:

*When these jihadists come back because they have acquired some training and skills in for example the manufacture or production of bombs and other explosive devices and also they would have probably learnt some techniques on how to recruit and when they come back they could pose a threat to our security.* *(Khalid, June 2016)*

Generally, however, people, have expressed doubts that these individuals will be allowed to return to their countries of origin while the jihadist group to which they swore allegiance are still in battle. Others also have expressed the fear such individuals may indeed be sent back as a strategy to continue the jihadist crusade in Ghana. Another concern is the social capital and network such individuals who have migrated will bring on their return. The contacts and connections these returned Ghanaian migrants have with foreign terrorist groups and individuals as well as the financial support they are likely to attract could prove inimical to Ghana’s security.

### 4.2.6 Perception of Nationality of Potential Terrorist in Ghana

Foreign immigrants are perceived to commit violent crimes, which have led to anti-immigration rhetoric and xenophobic sentiments from natives *(Faist, 2002)*. Several studies in the US and Europe have shown the 9/11 terrorist attacks created the perception that terrorism and immigration are intricately connected. The study was to find out whether residents in Accra and Tema perceive of foreign immigrants as potential
terrorists, particularly in the wake of recent attacks in Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire by AQIM.

Table 4.9 indicates that 40% of respondents somewhat agreed to the perception that foreign nationals are more likely to pose a terrorist threat to Ghana, while 10% disagreed strongly. Again, on who could most likely perpetrate acts of terrorism in Ghana, 28% of respondents said Ghanaians could be the most likely perpetrators of acts of terrorism in the country as opposed to 3% who indicated they did not know.

In support of this view, Khalid observed that in some countries natives have been known to engage in domestic terrorism:

*To that extent, I wouldn’t say the presence of large expatriates or a large number of immigrants pose a security threat. As it is now being revealed it is the case that in some countries terrorist activities are being carried out by native citizens so while migrants might have a role to play it is not in all cases. So we cannot say for certain that if terrorist activities are going to take place in Ghana it may be carried out either expatriates or by native Ghanaians. So it could be any group either citizens or non-citizens (Khalid, 13th June 2016)*

Similarly, James felt that migrants are not a security risk:

*I think my fundamental argument is that migrants are not the problem. Those who want to use terrorist acts against a recipient state or any other state might just exploit the dynamic of insecurity created by the migration flows either to slip into a country, hide, recuperate, get access to money and weapons and then strike. Now if we look at the specific of West Africa and east Africa, those who perpetrate these crimes are not migrants (James, 15th June 2016)*

However, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the activities of some foreign migrants if not checked could undermine the security of the country. The lack of effective border control and profiling of immigrants who may have come to security notice expose the country to a terrorist attack. The proverbial hospitality of Ghanaians and soft disposition towards foreign immigrants could spell doom as suggested in some literature.
Table 4.9: Perception of risk of attack from Ghanaians and Foreign nationals

Given the recent spate of terrorist attacks in West Africa, Ghana is at a risk of terrorist strike

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I disagree</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I strongly disagree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I strongly agree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ghanaians who left to join terrorist group in the middle East and elsewhere are likely to pose a threat to Ghana's security on their return

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I disagree</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I strongly disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I strongly agree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign nationals from Africa and Elsewhere are more likely to pose a terrorist threat to the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I disagree</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I strongly disagree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I strongly agree</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2016)

4.3 Summary of Findings

This chapter has presented the findings and discussions on the socio-demographic characteristics and perception of the residents of Accra and Tema of the link between international migration and terrorism. It analysed the factors that influence people’s perception of terrorism. It found that the perception of risk is generally high among residents due to the high levels of education of respondents and this corroborates a number of studies. This perception of risk (terrorism) is largely constructed by media practitioners and political agents who portray international migration as a security threat.
There is, however, no connection between international migration and terrorism, which refutes a general perception of a link. Foreign immigrants are also not perceived as posing a threat to the country, which again contradicts what other studies have found. Instead, Ghanaian nationals are said to be themselves the threat to security were terrorism to occur in Ghana.
CHAPTER FIVE

STEREOTYPES OF CERTAIN COMMUNITIES OR RELIGIONS AS MORE INCLINED TO TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES

5.0 Introduction

Generally, people’s attitudes and behaviour due to a threat or potential danger are mixed and varied. Until the September 11 terrorist attacks, Americans welcomed immigrants and appreciated the positive contributions they made to the country. However, since 9/11 a lot has changed with many natives expressing anti-immigration sentiments. The perception of the likelihood of a terrorist attack has changed the behaviour of people as they go along with their daily activities and attitudes towards foreigners.

5.1 Stereotypes of Communities or Religions

Studies have shown that immigrant or foreign populations including refugees are often viewed in a stereotypical way as being the source of epidemics, transnational crimes and conflicts (Adamson, 2006). Stereotyping often leads to violent ant-immigrants reactions from natives. Again, studies have found that risk perceptions and attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants were affected negatively following the attacks of 2001 in the US (Drakos and Muller, 2011 cited in Economou et al; date was not indicated).

The study sought to investigate stereotypes of certain communities or religions as more inclined to terrorism. Figure 5.1 showed that 37% of the respondents categorised Muslims as likely perpetrators of terrorism, while 2% saw Christians as likely suspects of the potential terrorist attack in Ghana.
Table 5.1: Perception of category of people termed as terrorists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which of these religions do you belong to?</th>
<th>When you hear about terrorism, who or what category of people come to your mind?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed Ghanaians Christians Muslims People of Middle Eastern descent Other foreign immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1 0 0 3 4 2 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>0 1 0 5 1 1 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>0 0 0 2 3 1 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charismatic</td>
<td>4 6 0 18 4 11 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>3 1 2 6 3 3 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalist</td>
<td>0 0 0 1 0 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecost</td>
<td>1 0 0 2 1 1 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 1 0 0 4 0 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11 9 2 37 20 21 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2016)

This again rejects the view that links terrorists with people of Islamic or Middle Eastern origin. Thus, while some studies have associated individuals belonging to the Islamic faith or of Middle Eastern origin with terrorism in Ghana, there is no causal link between terrorism and Islam.

This assertion was further buttressed by Kwame, an immigration expert:

No. No, I don’t want to encourage that (laughs) because you see if you remember when I started I said that... some people do it for fanaticism so they use religion, so it is not the religion itself but religious fanaticism. They hide behind the religion and then do that. So I don’t have any idea because anybody can (Kwame, June 2016).

However, looking at this from a different perspective, Adebayor believed that if a terrorist attack were to occur in Ghana it would most likely be perpetrated by Ghanaians themselves:

When we look at the history of countries that have experienced this thing, they have a plan so they start with the indigenes. So if there is no collaboration. And mostly they use the youth and now they are using females so you cannot say it is only male because vulnerable, they think are harmless so it is easy to...so they use all kinds of groups to (Adebayor, June 2016).
James disclosed that a number of Ghanaian nationals abroad have actually joined ISIS in Syria as foreign fighters. He is of the view such individuals would become a security risk on their return to Ghana:

\[\textit{Let me stop you there for a second…most of the time what we call foreign terrorist fighters in Europe who have gone to Islamic State and come back, quite a sizeable percentage are Ghanaians. So serious! They are Ghanaians born in European countries who feel disconnected, angry, want to strike a blow (James, June 2016)}\]

5.1.1 Situating the Integrated Threat Theory

According to the Integrated Threat Theory, intergroup anxiety increases when individuals feel nervous or anxious about interacting with members outside one’s immediate in-group (Stephen and Stephen, 2000). In other words, prejudices occur when there is a belief that members of an out-group have a different value that is potentially detrimental to the values and beliefs of an in-group. The study reflects this theory where the majority of the respondents, Christians, seen as members of the in-group, exhibit some prejudices against Muslim members of the out-group whose values are deemed potentially dangerous to those of the Christian majority.

5.1.2 Attitudes towards Terrorism and Psychometric Paradigm

As observed in the literature, people’s behaviour and attitudes towards risk of a terrorist attack are often shaped by fear of the unknown. The manner people cope with threats of terrorism may vary considerably (Robin Goodwin et al., 2005 citing Huddy et al., 2002). While some will limit their use of public transportation or visit to public places others will cancel their travel plans or delay a journey (Robin Goodwin et al., 2005). The psychometric paradigm, which deals with cognitive factors that influence an individual’s perception of risk, can be adopted to explain how the perception of a dread risk factor or unknown informs how residents of Accra and Tema react to the potential threat of terrorism in Ghana.
As seen in Table 5.1, 59% of the respondents indicated they feel safe in public places while 41% said they do not feel safe at such places. Table 5.1 indicates that 36% of the respondents are very worried about a terrorist attack in Ghana in the near future but 11% are not very worried. On whether residents have adjusted their behaviour due to the fear of terrorism, 58% of respondents reported yes, while 42% said no.

Table 5.2: Attitude towards perception of risk Do you feel safe when at public gatherings?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How worried are you about a terrorist attack on Ghana in the near future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not worried</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very worried</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worried</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very worried</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Have you adjusted your behaviour due to a fear of potential terrorist attack in Ghana?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork, 2016

Just as explained in the psychometric paradigm of risk perception, the dread factor or fear of the unknown has led many of residents in Accra and Tema to adjust their behaviour in order to avoid being caught up in any life threatening incidents. Some have even stopped visiting places of large public gatherings such as shopping malls and churches with large congregations, while others have become security alert and conscious of their immediate surroundings. Elorm aptly summed up this fear:
I am very concerned very, very concerned. Really, really very concerned because from what we have hear and see around us they are powerful people; the terrorists are powerful people. They are rich, they can get anywhere in the world today. They really penetrate powerful places, places you least expect them to get. We are a high-risk nation and considering the fact that they were in Burkina Faso and recently in Cote d’Ivoire. (Elorm, June 2016)

Adebayor also explained the threat had made him more security conscious and keenly interested in strangers who suddenly show up in his neighbourhood:

Well, to me personally I am security conscious, I am aware of what is going on. If I see someone new in the community I want to know who the person is so it helped to be alert because of where I came from if something is not right you want to find out what are you doing around here so that you can put measures in place. So it really made me to be alert, and to watch out and be observant in my community about the people around. (Adebayor, June 2016)

However, others like Khalid, did not see the need to be worried:

Well, it is always said in Ghana that God loves this country even though we know that we are susceptible to terrorist attacks. But it has not actually occurred to me or I have not very much been concerned about the possibility of either me or any of my friends or family members being a victim of terrorist attacks (Khalid, June 2016).

Whereas some did not feel threatened because nothing of that nature has ever occurred in the country, others put a religious slant to it trusting in God that such an incident will not occur in Ghana:

Well, to me I believe with this situation that is going on we saw what happened in Kenya when someone went to the mall and blasted the places. So it’s just trusting in God’s protection, really. That’s my own view because people just leave their houses to buy something at the mall and something happens you can’t explain that so it’s just trusting in God’s protection. (Adebayor, June 2016)

Generally, respondents interviewed felt the threat of potential terrorist attack had not changed their attitude towards foreign nationals nor made them intolerant of others. One
participant said that though the attitude of Ghanaians had not changed, some were quite intolerant of other views or religious beliefs:

No, I don’t think so. We have always been nice people and we have always been warm and welcoming…No, no, most Ghanaians will put their interest first before the interest of the nation. Ghanaians are not tolerant of other people’s beliefs (Elorm, June 2016).

Other participants felt even if there are xenophobic tendencies, it does not reflect in the way Ghanaians relate to foreigners:

I wouldn’t say that. In Ghana, we are lucky to have a multi-religious society where we respect one another’s religion and we have been living in peace with various religions some independence. Although people might have concerns or apprehension about certain religious groups in the country but I am not sure that it has reflected publicly about opened xenophobia against a particular religious group or foreign entity (Khalid, June 2016).

5.2 Policies and Measures

Literature notes that in view of the upsurge in terrorist activities globally, there has been a wave of counter-terrorism policies and measures adopted by states to address the phenomenon in their respective jurisdictions (Spencer, 2008). The US Patriot Act and the UK’s ATCSA are two common examples of policies adopted.

Ghana also has a number of legislations and instruments that are geared towards addressing terrorism and related threats. As a core objective, the study sought to examine the existing national policies and instruments in enhancing national security and addressing threats of terrorism. Recently in 2016, a National Migration Policy was launched in Accra to among other things manage migration in the country. This document, however, made little reference to threats posed terrorism in contemporary Ghanaian history. An objective of the study was therefore to examine ways in which international migration could be managed to minimize the risk of terrorism in Ghana. As shown in Figure 7.2, 67% of respondents believed not enough is being done to help
counter any threat of terrorism in the country, while 33% felt enough is being done to address the issue of terrorism in Ghana.

**Figure 5.1: Policies and Measures to minimize the risk of terrorism and maximize the benefits of international migration**

Respondents’ view on whether enough is being done to help prevent a terrorist attack in Ghana

![Pie chart showing 67% Yes and 33% No](source)

**Source: Fieldwork (2016)**

On measures to address the threat, 42% of the respondents called for public educational campaigns against terrorism, while 1% believed preventing Ghanaians from joining terrorist groups abroad would help. Please see Table 5.2
Table 5 3: Respondents’ view on what the Government should do to prevent a terrorist attack in Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do you think the Government should do to prevent a terrorist attack in Ghana?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enact more laws to fight terrorism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent Ghanaians from joining terrorism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest Ghanaians who return after joining terrorist groups abroad</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public education campaigns on terrorism</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check Irregular migration</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork (2016)

Those who believed not enough was being done felt the infrastructural provisions and institutional framework are not adequate to deal with any possible threat.

The security arrangements are weak but it is also about the response. Let’s say Accra Mall at Tetteh Quarshie Round About is blown up or some small explosion. Nobody gets hurt. It is just that physical structure that gets damaged but there’s a huge explosion. Within 5 minutes the whole of Accra will be in gridlock because nobody should be allowed to put up a construction over there. There will be gridlock. When we develop our towns, we don’t develop a security consciousness or a security lenses. No single bridge in this country can take a challenger armoured tank. Every bridge will collapse. There is no motorway in this country where in a crisis period they can within 5 minutes be turned into a landing place for a jet. So a lot of the people who are at the very top and ought to be designing these response and preventive structures don’t have that innovative thinking, it doesn’t come to them naturally because for them they went in there as this is what I need to get to eat (James, June 2016).

Some blamed it on the endemic corruption and lack of patriotism on the part of security officials.

I think we should strengthen our security checkpoints, our security system. Our public places, like the malls should have cameras so that they can record events. Then our security personnel should be put on their toes, such as the immigration police. They should put their nations first. They should put their nation’s interest above their personal interest so that they would not be engaged in bribery and corruption or develop lackadaisical attitudes toward work. There should be public educational campaigns on
issues of terrorism here and there. And they should be reinforced in the schools. The general populace should be well informed (Elorm, June 2016)

Yet others felt the lack of knowledge about terrorism compounded by ineffective and ‘useless’ laws is a fundamental problem in addressing the problem

JDM doesn’t know anything about terrorism, his deputy doesn’t know. The defence minister knows a lot. Only everyone knows he is goddamn academic so who the hell is he to tell us about terrorism? Now you remember... the police service...the IGP knows a lot about terrorism. He has a good counter-terrorism force. Our counter-terrorism legislation is totally useless, you know and those who are in the parliamentary defence and interior committee do not really know anything about terrorism. Terrorism is a vehicle and a mechanism through which people siphon money from this state. There’s very little knowledge about terrorism and how to fight it (James, June 2016)

5.3 Summary of Chapter

This chapter dealt further with the findings and discussions on the stereotypes of communities and religions as inclined to terrorism. It also presented the attitude and behaviour of residents of Accra and Tema in Ghana towards the threat of terrorism as well as the policies and measures in the country to address the issue of terrorism. It found that terrorism is mostly associated with individuals of Islamic background. It also found that many residents have adjusted their behaviour due to the threat of terrorism. Despite the many legislations Ghana has, residents feel Ghana is still not prepared to handle any terrorist attack. The lack effective policies, manpower, commitment and institutional inefficiency due to bribery and corruption have all contributed to the heightened fear of an imminent terrorist attack.
CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the summary of major findings, conclusions and recommendations for policy makers in the area of security and international migration. The study examined how residents of Accra and Tema, Ghana, perceive the link between international migration and terrorism. It also investigated stereotypes of some communities and religions perceived as more inclined to terrorism, examined existing national laws and policies on the prevention of terrorism and ways of minimising the risk of terrorism.

6.2 Summary of Findings

The study showed that the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents including their sex, age, and level of educational attainment, played a role in determining their perception of the link between terrorism and international migration.

Respecting the sex of the respondents, 63% were male and 37% female. An overwhelming total of 74% of the respondents fell within the ages of 20-39 years. On the educational level of respondents, a total of 75% had attained Senior Secondary School, Technical or commercial and tertiary level.

As regards the perception of the link between international migration and terrorism the study found that nearly all the respondents, i.e. 99%, had heard about terrorism, mainly through TV programmes. A number of the respondents (48%) felt the media played a significant role in influencing their general perceptions on terrorism, while 38 believed political pronouncements helped construct their perception about terrorism. On the
possible infiltration of terrorism into the Ghana, an overwhelming majority, i.e. 75% thought that terrorists could quite easily infiltrate. A total of 51% of the respondents also felt Ghana is at possible risk of a terrorist attack. Again, 40% of the respondents held that ideology was the main reason people engage themselves in terrorism. On the possible link between terrorism and international migration, a total of 64 agreed there was a link between the two phenomena. A total of 59% agreed that foreign immigrants pose a threat to Ghana, while a total of 77% agreed that Ghanaian nationals who left to join terrorist groups abroad will pose a security threat on their return.

With reference to the stereotypes of certain communities or religions as more inclined to terrorism, a total 57% of the respondents viewed individuals with Islamic background as more inclined to terrorism. Concerning the perception to risk, 59% of the respondents said they did not feel safe at public gatherings in the wake of threats of a potential attack, while 58 % held they have adjusted their behaviour due to the threat. A total majority of 68 % respondents felt worried about a potential terrorist strike in Ghana.

Relating to the national policies and measures on preventing terrorism in Ghana 67% of the respondents believed that not enough was being done to prevent and address issues of terrorism in the country. To effectively resolve this problem, 42% of the respondents advocated for a public campaign against terrorism as a way of addressing the threat in the country.

On managing migration to minimise the possibility of terrorism in the country, respondents called for a more effective control of our borders and increased checkpoints to ensure the right people are admitted. Those who return from jihadist war fronts should be monitored on arrival.
6.3 Conclusions

The study, therefore, concludes that basic knowledge of terrorism amongst residents of Accra and Tema, Ghana is high and this has been as a result of a large media landscape, notably the radio and television. However, the perception of terrorism is mostly shaped by political pronouncements and discourses, which are mainly transmitted through the media. This has, in turn, increased the perceptions residents have of the link between international migration and terrorism in Ghana. Not only do they believe that foreign immigrants could represent a threat to Ghana but also feel that returned Ghanaian migrants suspected to have joined terrorist groups abroad would be a threat to the country’s security on their return to Ghana. In spite of the many legislations Ghana has on its statute books, there is a pervasive fear that not enough is being done to address the issues of threat. This fear of terrorism has led many to the stereotyping of people with Islamic background as potential perpetrators of acts of terrorism. Also, the fear of the unknown has made many to adjust their daily lives and become more security conscious.

6.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study the following recommendations are made:

First of all, as a matter of national urgency issues of bribery and corruption in the public sector, particularly within security services, should be addressed if the country were to successfully combat the threat of terrorism. As part of measures to control issues of corruption within the security services, law enforcers should be well remunerated. Those found to be corrupt should be punished to serve as a deterrent to others. The general public should be encouraged through a mechanism to report corrupt officials to the appropriate authority.
Secondly, to ensure an effective control of national borders, the government could consider not only increasing the numerical strength of border security agencies but also equipping them with the relevant logistical, technological and technical support in order to enhance the performance of their duties, which includes border patrols and management. This will help minimise the risk of the infiltration of terrorists into the country.

Thirdly, public educational campaigns must be undertaken to inform the general public on issues relating to personal and public security. Public awareness campaigns should be undertaken at the national, regional and district levels; on the electronic and social media; and in educational institutions to sensitize the populace about transnational security threats such as terrorism.

Fourthly, a closer look at the current legislation on anti-terrorism should be undertaken to address all the grey areas in the legislation that lend themselves misinterpretation and abuse. Legislations should conform to internationally accepted standards and best practices. Those of the UK and US could be used as model for Ghana.

Finally, the infrastructural developers as well as town and country planners in the country need to adopt a security lens. The planning and construction of cities and towns should be done in a manner that will ensure easy evacuation in times of crisis.
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United Nations


**Websites**


[www.iom.int/world-migration-report](http://www.iom.int/world-migration-report).


APPENDICES
Appendix A: Questionnaire for Residents Of Accra and Tema, Ghana

My name is Fred Bongne, an MA student of the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, Legon. I am conducting a study on “Perception of Residents of Accra and Tema of the link between international migration and terrorism in Ghana” and I would be most grateful if you could make time of your busy schedule to answer the questions below. Be assured that the information given is for academic purposes and will be treated confidentially.

IDENTIFICATION

Number________________________________________Profession_____________________
Social Status_________________________________
Occupation____________________________________
Telephone number________________________________Email:_____________________

SECTION I : SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Firstly I would like to ask you a few questions to help me analyse the survey. To answer place a tick in the boxes that apply.

1. What age group do you fall into?
   a. Up to 19 years    
   b. 20 - 29 years
   c. 30 - 39 years
   d. 40 - 49 years
   e. 50 +

2. Sex
   □ Female    □ Male

3. What is your level of education?
   a. Primary
   b. JSS/JHS

University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
c. Middle School

d. SSS/SHS

e. Technical/ Vocational/Commercial

f. Tertiary

g. No formal education

4. Which of these religions do you belong to?

a. Catholic

b. Anglican

c. Presbyterian

d. Methodist

e. Charismatic

f. Islam

g. Other (Please specify)________________________

5. What is your nationality?

a. Ghanaian

b. Nigerian

c. Togolese

d. Burkinabe

e. Ivorian

f. Gabonese

g. Other (Please specify)________________________

6. What is your ethnic background?

a. Akan

b. Ga-Adangbe

c. Guan

d. Mole-Dagbani

e. Ewe

f. Other (Please specify)________________________
7. Which of these groups does your monthly income fall within?
   a. 1 – 100 cedis
   b. 200 – 300 cedis
   c. 400 – 500 cedis
   d. 600 – 700 cedis
   e. 800 - 900 cedis
   f. More than 1000 cedis

SECTION II : KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM
I am going to ask you questions to your knowledge and perceptions of terrorism and international migration.

8. Have you heard about terrorism?
   ☐ Yes ☐ No

9. If Yes, which of the statements below best describes what terrorism is?
   a. It is a kind of religious movement
   b. It is a transnational criminal activity involving people of different nationality
   c. It is the use of violence or intimidation to pursue an objective
   d. It is a criminal act that cause the deaths of of many people
   e. It is violent response to social and economic exclusion
   f. Other (please Specify)

10. If No, please go to Question 12

11. How did you hear about terrorism?
   a. On Radio
   b. On Television
   c. On the Internet
   d. From government officials
   e. Other (Please Specify)

12. In Ghana how do people form their opinion about the threat of terrorism?
   a. Political pronouncement
   b. Religious discourse

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c. Public reaction

d. Other (Please Specify)

13. Do you think the media influence people’s perception of terrorism?

a. Always do

b. Sometimes do

c. Rarely do

d. Never do

14. Why do you think people engage in terrorism?

a. Economic and social frustrations or hardship

b. Adventure

c. Ideological reasons

d. Ignorance

e. Other: (Please Specify)

15. When you hear about terrorism, who or what category of people come to your mind?

a. Foreign immigrants

b. Unemployed Ghanaians

c. Christians

d. Muslims

e. People of Middle Eastern descent

f. Other (please Specify)

16. Why do you associate the category of people you selected with terrorism?

_______________________________________________________________

17. Do you think terrorists can infiltrate into the country?

[ ] Yes  [ ] No

18. Give reasons for your answer

_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________
Questions 19 to 22 are about your perception of a link between terrorism and international migration. Please tick the box that best describes your perception.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>I disagree</th>
<th>I strongly disagree</th>
<th>I agree</th>
<th>I strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Given the recent spate of terrorist attacks in West Africa, Ghana is at a risk of a terrorist strike</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20 There is a link between terrorism and international migration</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Ghanaians who left to join terrorist groups in the Middle East and elsewhere are likely to pose a threat to Ghana’s security on their return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Foreign nationals from Africa and elsewhere are more likely to pose a terrorist threat to the country</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SECTION III: ATTITUDE TOWARDS TERRORISM
In this section I will be asking you questions on your attitude towards terrorism and international migration.

23. Do you feel safe when at public gatherings?
   □ Yes □ No

24. If yes, how? And if No, why not?

25. How worried are you about a terrorist attack on Ghana in the near future?
   a. Not worried □
   b. Not very worried □
   c. Worried □
   d. Very worried □

26. How concerned are you that either you or a relative of yours will be a victim of terrorist attack in Ghana in the near future?
   a. Not concerned □
   b. Not very concerned □
   c. Concerned □
   d. Very concerned □
Have you adjusted your behaviour due to a fear of potential terrorist attack in Ghana?
☐ Yes       ☐ No

27. If yes, how? And if No, why not?
____________________________________________________________________________________________

28. If there happens to be a terrorist attack on Ghana, who are likely to be the perpetrators?
   a. Ghanaians
   b. ECOWAS nationals
   c. Other African nationals
   d. Non-African nationals

30. Religious diversity in Ghana increases the country’s risk to terrorism.
   a. Agree
   b. Strongly agree
   c. Disagree
   d. Strongly disagree

31. Do you think enough is being done to help prevent a terrorist attack in Ghana?
   ☐ Yes       ☐ No

32. What do you think the Government should do to prevent a terrorist attack in Ghana?
   a. Enact more laws to fight terrorism
   b. Prevent Ghanaians from joining terrorism
   c. Arrest and jail Ghanaians who return after joining terrorist groups abroad
   d. Public educational campaigns on terrorism
   e. Check irregular migration
   f. Other (Please Specify)
Appendix B: Interview Guide

My name is Fred Bongne, an MA student of the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, Legon. I am conducting a study on “Perception of Residents of Accra and Tema of the link between international migration and terrorism in Ghana”. As part of my research towards the award of MA degree in Migration Studies, I humbly request you to grant me an interview lasting for about an hour. Your participation is very important for the success of this project. If at any point you do not understand our questions please let me know and I will be glad to clarify. Be assured that this interview is purely for academic purposes and will be treated confidentially. No information provided will be passed on to any third party. Participation in this interview is voluntary. Thank you for your cooperation.

IDENTIFICATION

Number: ...........................................................................................................

Profession: ........................................................ Position: ........................................

Telephone number: ...................................... Email: ..............................................

SECTION 1: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

1. Sex:

2. Age:

3. Highest level of Education: ...............................................................

4. Nationality: ........................................................................................

5. Ethnicity: ...........................................................................................

6. Religious affiliation: ..............................................................................
7. Briefly describe your current job and how long you have been in this job?

SECTION 2: KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM

8. Are you familiar with the issue of terrorism? Briefly tell me what you know about terrorism?

9. What in your opinion is / are the cause (s) of terrorism in Africa?

10. How is terrorism and its threats constructed in Ghana? (Probe for the role played by the media, political actors, civil society and religious groups as well as the general public).

11. How concerned are you personally about yourself, a friend or a relative being a victim of future terrorist attack in Ghana?

12. Are Ghanaians sufficiently knowledgeable about the issue of terrorism? How do Ghanaians react to issues concerning terrorism? Is this reaction any different from their attitude to other serious crimes such as armed robbery?

13. Given the recent spate of terrorist attacks in the West African sub-Region, to what extent is Ghana at risk of a possible terrorist attack?

14. In view of recent reports that some Ghanaians joined some terrorist groups abroad, how much of these perceptions of a possible terrorist attack on Ghana are linked to international migration?

15. How worried are you that these so-called Ghanaian jihadists on their return will pose a threat to Ghana’s security? (Probe for reasons).
16. What factors expose Ghana to a possible terrorist risk? (Probe for the nature of our borders, participation in UN peacekeeping etc.).

SECTION 3: ATTITUDE TOWARDS TERRORISM IN GHANA

17. In the wake of recent developments of a potential terrorist attack in the country, do you feel safe at public gatherings or places?

18. Do you think the general Ghanaian populace has a justified cause to feel unsafe at public places?

19. Do you think the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the country has changed the general attitude of Ghanaians towards foreign nationals? (Probe further whether Ghanaians are now more xenophobic, patriotic or intolerant of other religious beliefs and ideologies).

SECTION 4: LAWS AND POLICIES

20. How can international migration be managed in order to minimise the risk of terrorism in Ghana? (Probe for existing mechanisms in Ghana for maximising the benefits of international migration and minimising its negative dimensions).

21. What national laws and policies exist in Ghana to address the issue of threats posed by terrorists in the country? Are these instruments effective and adequate? (Probe for their implementation).

22. What are some of the challenges your institution faces in implementing these laws and policies on terrorism and similar crimes in Ghana?

23. Do have anything you will like to add or clarify?