PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF USING DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE LEBANON-ISRAELI WAR OF 2006

BY

VINCENT AMOAKO

(10274893)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEGREE

LEGON JULY 2015
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the product of an original research that I undertook under the supervision of Dr. Philip Attuquayefio. This work has never been submitted partially or wholly elsewhere for any award, that all sources used have been duly acknowledged.

…………………………                    ……………………………………

VINCENT AMOAKO                       DR. PHILIP ATTUQUAYEFIO
(STUDENT)                             (SUPERVISOR)

DATE........................................ DATE........................................
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Jehovah God, my loving Parents (Mr. Edward Mensah and Mrs. Evelyn Okyere Mensah), Dr. Philip Attuquayefio, Irene Osei-Agyeman, Ruth Afua Nsowaa, Mr. Lord Fifii Boadi, Vida Okyere, Steve Nartey, Freda Nana Yaa Awuah Gyamfua and Dina Okyere.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I give thanks to Jehovah Almighty God, for giving me the wisdom and strength to undertake this work. My sincere thanks and gratitude goes to my precious supervisor, Dr. Philip Attuquayefio, for his guidance, patience, advice and assistance in bringing this work to a successful finish. I also want to thank Dr. Yao Gebe, my lecturers at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) and the staff of LECIAD for their contribution towards my course and to this research.

My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Ambassador D.K Osei, Ambassador Nana Effah-Appenteng, Ambassador Leslie Christian, Hannah Sinnibah Tiigah, Mr. Smith Oduro-Marfo, Ebenezer Anderson, Peter Limford-Agyei, Charlotte Adottey and Dieu Donne Gameli for their priceless assistance at the input stages as well as for providing me with valuable materials to assist in completing this work.

Not forgetting the enormous contribution of my friends, Isaac Kwabena Prah, Sonia Agbevenu, Lawrencia Ashie, Hackman Akwasi Ababio, Akwasi Asamoah Tandoh, Calvin Ohene-Agyei, Enoch Boakye-Gyimah, Joshua Quartey Papafieo, Patrick Adorku, Seline, Andy Adasi, Barbara Asamoah, Zarau Sheriff, Jemima Ani-Agyei, and the 2015 LECIAD class for their encouragement, support, prayer’s and believing in my capabilities which encouraged me to study and complete the program successfully.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU………………………European Union
IDF……………………Israel Defence Force
IMTD……………………Institute of Multi-track Diplomacy
MTD……………………Multi-track Diplomacy
OIC……………………Organization of Islamic Cooperation
T1…………………..Track One Diplomacy
T1.5…………………..Track One and Half Diplomacy
T2…………………..Track Two Diplomacy
T3…………………..Track Three Diplomacy
T4…………………..Track Four Diplomacy
UN…………………….United Nations
UNIFIL………………….United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC………………….United Nations Security Council
Table of Contents

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF USING DIPLOMACY AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE LEBANON-ISRAELI WAR OF 2006.................................................. i
DECLARATION ................................................................................................. i
DEDICATION ................................................................................................ ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................ iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................ iv
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................... viii
CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................... 1
RESEARCH DESIGN ..................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Background to the Research Problem ......................................................... 1
  1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ............................................................... 2
  1.3 Research Questions .................................................................................... 2
  1.4 Objectives of the Study .............................................................................. 3
  1.5 Hypothesis ................................................................................................ 3
  1.6 Scope of the study ..................................................................................... 3
  1.7 Clarification of key concepts ..................................................................... 3
  1.8 Significance of the Study ......................................................................... 4
  1.9 Conceptual Framework ........................................................................... 4
  1.10 Literature Review .................................................................................. 7
  1.11 Sources of Data and Methodology ......................................................... 11
  1.12 Organisation of the Work ....................................................................... 11
ENDNOTES ................................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER TWO .............................................................................................. 13
AN OVERVIEW OF DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ................. 13
  2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 13
  2.2 The Concept of Diplomacy .................................................................... 13
    2.2.1 The Origins & Practice of Diplomacy ................................................ 14
    2.2.2 Diplomatic Approaches to Conflict Resolution & Management ........ 15
      2.2.2.1 Negotiations ............................................................................. 15
      2.2.2.2 Mediation ............................................................................... 18
      2.2.2.3 Arbitration ............................................................................. 19
4.4 Recommendations ................................................................................................................................. 53

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................... 55
ABSTRACT

Diplomacy is a peaceful alternative to conflict. This is a fact accepted by all United Nations (UN) member states who collectively account for 99 percent of the world’s population. This notwithstanding, conflicts continue to occur and escalate. Against this background, the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006 was used as a case study to determine the challenges and prospects of diplomacy in conflict resolution. The study found that the international community creates diplomatic instruments for conflict resolution through the United Nations and intergovernmental and regional bodies, using multilateral consultations and dialogue. On the diplomatic tools for conflict resolution, it was concluded that Mediation, Enquiry, Arbitration, Conciliation, Negotiation, Track I, Track II, Track 1.5, Multi-Track Diplomacy, Coercive Diplomacy, Gunboat Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy and Shuttle Diplomacy are the primary diplomatic tools. The study also found that the major obstacles to diplomacy as a tool for conflict resolution include lack of political will by belligerent parties to submit to negotiations, cultural and religious barriers, the belief of a military advantage by parties and lack of goodwill to the diplomatic process as reflected in the posture and the utterances of parties. Given the success of diplomacy in resolving the perilous and antagonistic Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, diplomacy is relevant in not only resolving classic military warfare, but also newer and emerging forms of conflict such as electoral disputes, religious extremism, territorial boundary disputes and terrorism.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Research Problem

The United Nations, the pre-eminent international organization in the world is one institution that has consistently applied diplomacy and made the case that diplomatic solution have greater and long-term impacts in the prevention or negotiation of conflict. However, despite the acceptance of diplomacy as the peaceful alternative to conflict by most nations, conflicts continue to occur and escalate. The associated human and economic impacts are devastating as revealed in the death, misery, suffering, hunger and economic loss. The Global Peace Index for instance, in its 2014 report estimated that, in 2013 the economic cost of dealing with conflict-related violence was US$9.8 trillion, which amounts to 11.3 per cent of the global Gross Domestic Product. Paradoxically, in conflict theatres such as the Middle East and Northern Ukraine, both diplomacy efforts and violent conflicts exist side by side. The failure of diplomacy in resolving many ongoing conflicts has thus been interpreted by many scholars as lack of commitment, political will or anti-diplomatic behaviour of actors in the diplomatic process.

A fundamental reason for this failure, according to Natalie Palmer, is the changing and unpredictable nature of violent conflicts. He notes in this regard that, while on the one hand, the frequency of violence between sovereign states has significantly diminished, on the other hand, they have been replaced by a surge in non-conventional conflicts, where one or more of the belligerents are non-state actors. Other notable reasons explaining the limitation of diplomacy can be found in an assertion by Simon Adams that diplomatic institutions are institutionally conservative; an elitist field shrouded in secrecy and governed by protocol and prestige. In spite of these criticisms, there is general acceptance that the practice of diplomacy is critical to managing and resolving conflicts. Stuart Murray surmises in this regard that the numerous problems that confront the international community can be effectively addressed through diplomacy. It is for this reason that international organizations consistently apply and advocate the application of diplomacy and the solution of practical problems of conflicts or contestations.
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Out of more than 200 sovereign states on the planet, 193 are members of the UN who subscribe to the UN Charter of fostering global peace and security and of which Chapter VI specifically enjoins members involved in disputes to settle it peacefully through diplomatic instruments. An often cited case where the UN has relied on diplomacy is the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006. The conflict erupted when Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim political party, largely considered as a terrorist group by the US crossed the UN Blue Line on 12th July 2006 in Southern Lebanon and abducted two Israeli soldiers and killed three in the process. Backed by the US, and following its strategy of “deterrence”, Israel launched a heavy military response, including aerial bombardment and the dispatch of ground troops into Lebanon to root out Hezbollah. Hezbollah, widely believed to be funded by Iran, was determined to survive the Israeli onslaught and force Israel into prisoner exchange. After four weeks of heavy fighting and amidst international condemnation, both parties finally agreed to UN resolution 1701 to cease all hostilities and work towards addressing the underlying causes of the conflict.

The use of negotiations in resolving the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006 has been hailed as a classic example of the effectiveness of diplomacy in resolving conflicts when given the chance. But this assertion has been countered on the premise that the Israeli-Hezbollah negotiations were a mere charade. The counter argument is that both Israel and Hezbollah softened their stance upon realizing that there could be no short-run winner and that each side strategically used the UN Resolution as a political cover for an exit. Against this background, the role played by diplomacy in the resolution of the conflict is still contestable.

1.3 Research Questions

In addressing the research problem, the study will seek answers to the following research questions.

1. What are the diplomatic tools used in resolving conflict?
2. How does the international community create diplomatic instruments for peaceful conflict resolution?
3. What are the obstacles to diplomacy in conflict resolution?
4. Was diplomacy used in the resolution of the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006?
5. What were the diplomatic tools used in the resolution of Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006?
6. What were the challenges and successes recorded in the application of diplomacy to the resolution of the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to examine the challenges and prospects of diplomacy in conflict resolution using the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006. Emanating from the main objective is the under listed specific objectives:

1. To identify diplomatic tools used in resolving conflicts and how those tools are created by the international community.
2. To identify obstacles to diplomacy in conflict resolution.
3. To determine whether diplomacy was used in the resolution of the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 and which diplomatic tools were used.
4. To examine the challenges and successes of the use of diplomacy towards the resolution of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006.

1.5 Hypothesis

Diplomacy played a critical role in the resolution of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.

1.6 Scope of the study

The scope of this study is limited to the resolution of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006.

1.7 Clarification of key concepts

The term diplomacy is broad and can be used to refer to foreign affairs as whole, the conduct of foreign policy, management of international relations by negotiations, the use of diplomats organized in a diplomatic service, the manner in which relations are conducted or the art/skill of professional diplomats. This study adopts the definition by Geoffrey R. Berridge which defines diplomacy as: “the
conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means which are either directly or indirectly designed to promote negotiation”.

The study defines Conflict Management as “controlling or deescalating conflict” and Conflict Resolution as ending conflict by terminating the underlying causes”. The study used conflict and war interchangeably likewise the Israel-Hezbollah war and the Israel-Lebanon war.

1.8 Significance of the Study

The findings originating from this study offers a deeper understanding of the role diplomacy plays as a bilateral and multilateral tool for conflict resolution while identifying its common challenges and prospects drawing heavily from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006. Secondly, the study offers a broader insight into the concept of diplomacy; its fundamental norms and practices with both academic and practitioner-oriented perspectives on how diplomacy can be used to manage and resolve conflicts. Thirdly, it is envisaged that the findings based on the study serves as a useful resource for organisations that employ diplomatic techniques in resolving organisational, community or regional conflicts.

1.9 Conceptual Framework

Multi-Track diplomacy refers to the combination of activities, processes and actors that are activated towards the resolution of conflict and development of peace. Developed by McDonald and Louise Diamond, the concept derives from an attempt to merge track one diplomacy that features official or governmental actors and track two diplomacy that features effort through unofficial approaches to conflict resolution.

Multi-track diplomacy in effect represents an expanded framework for understanding diplomatic activity. According to the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), the founding institution for multi-track Diplomacy (MTD), the nine track of MTD are; Track one, Track two, Track Three, Track Four, Track Five, Track Six, Track Seven, Track Eight and Track Nine. For ease of reference, the nine tracks of MTD have been explained below:

1. Official diplomats/government officials (Track one diplomacy): This is official diplomacy hence peace processes are activated through governmental processes.
2. Nongovernmental/ unofficial Professional Conflict Resolution (Track two diplomacy): This track consists of non-governmental conflict resolution professionals who make an effort to analyze, manage and resolve international conflicts.

3. Business (Track three diplomacy): This is a purely business field whereby business is used as a channel for conflict management and resolution. This is achieved through the provision of informal communication, support for conflict management and resolution activities, economic opportunities, international friendship and understanding.

4. Private Citizens (Track Four diplomacy): This involves private individuals and the various ways that citizens become involved in conflict management and resolution by means of citizen diplomacy, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, interest groups and exchange programs.

4. Research, training and education (Tracks five diplomacy): This track focuses on research since it is linked with think tanks, special interest research and university programs; training programs with the aim of providing training particularly negotiations, mediation, third party facilitation, conflict resolution and management.

5. Peace Activism (Track six diplomacy): This track captures areas such as disarmament, human rights, social and economic justice as well as interest groups advocacy on specific government policies in conflict management and resolution.

6. Religion/ Religious leaders (Track seven diplomacy): This is managing and resolving conflicts through faith. Religious leaders in the communities are involved in the peace making processes.

7. Funding (Track eight diplomacy): This relates to the funding communities that provide financial support for the activities of other tracks involved in conflict resolution.

8. Communications and Media (Track nine diplomacy): This involves the voice of the people, how public opinion channeled through the media shape the management and resolution of conflicts.

This study utilizes the multi-track diplomacy concept in analyzing the topic under study. Multi-track diplomacy is a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system. It consists of an interconnected web of communities, institutions, activities, individuals, and that operate together for a common goal: usually geared toward global or world peace. Multi-track diplomacy evolved in 1990s in an attempt to address the lapses and inefficiencies in Track One for engendering international cooperation aimed at resolving conflict. The major proponents of multi-track diplomacy are Dr. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald In 1991, Dr. Diamond and Ambassador McDonald
expanded the number of tracks to nine. They added four new tracks: religion, activism, research-training and education, and philanthropy. They established that, “Tracks Two through Nine help prepare an environment that will welcome positive change carried out by track-one or government”.¹¹ This ensures that government decisions are carried out and implemented properly. The fusion between officials and non-government sectors of the society allows change to happen, especially in terms of conflict resolution and peace building. Other scholars who have opined about the efficacy of multi track diplomacy include Yilmaz and Chigas.

Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz emphasizes the need for multi-track diplomacy and its components to building peace after conflict. Yilmaz argues that, “there should be a partnership between community leaders, business leaders, government representatives, nongovernmental organization leaders and leaders at the grassroots level to provide input on a variety of issues pertaining to designing and implementing precise projects”.¹²

Diana Chigas discusses the significance of the track relations of diplomacy between each group in a divided society and with track one leaders. According to her traditional mediations and negotiations within track one and between Track One levels of a divided society are not adequate as the only faction addressing an intractable conflict. Furthermore, track one diplomats cannot address the psychological needs of the citizens within the conflict. She argues that it is vital to incorporate “Track Three Diplomacy” for sustainable peace agreements: In “track three diplomacy,” unofficial third parties work with people from all walks of life and sectors of their society to find ways to promote peace in settings of violent conflict. This work is aimed at building or rebuilding broken relationships across the lines of division among ordinary citizens in communities, in a range of sectors.¹³

Notwithstanding the benefits of the multi track diplomacy established by the above scholars, there are some criticisms leveled against it. For instance, Kumar Rupesinghe with his Rationalistic Discourse establishes that, where parties in conflict share the same central values, it is possible to get the parties to the table and that, it will be possible through negotiations to find a "win-win" solution agreeable to both sides. In such a situation, he establishes that the conceptual environment within which these conflicts occur is generally supposed to contain a
strong ideological imperative of equality and recognition of the rule of law, and these wouldn’t require multi track diplomacy in resolving a conflict.\textsuperscript{14}

In spite of the above criticisms leveled against the multi track diplomacy, the study still considers the theory an ideal theoretical framework for the topic under study. This is because, it fits into the topic by helping to understand and appreciate the failure of track one diplomacy only in resolving the Lebanon-Israeli war of 2006. It also helps to expound which other diplomatic processes and mechanisms were employed and how effective they have helped in resolving peace to some extent between the conflicting parties.

\section*{1.10 Literature Review}

Several scholarly works have been written since 2006 on the role of diplomacy in resolving the Lebanon-Israel War. However, most of these works have ignored the challenges and prospects of diplomacy as a tool for conflict resolution and management. It is in this vein that some of these works will be reviewed to indicate how they contribute significantly to the topic under study, and also identify some gaps, which this study attempts to fill.

Karim Makdisi’s work on “Reconsidering the Struggle over UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon” contributes extensively to the topic under study. He reveals that, the Lebanon-Israel war (between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli-soldiers) is not a recent phenomenon, but dates back as far as 1978 (when it begun).\textsuperscript{15} He also points out that, to resolve the conflict during this time, the UNSC after going through series of diplomatic processes (notably negotiations) adopted and passed Resolution 425 (UNSCR 425) which led to the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to resolve peace in the region; and this force has been in the region since 1978. This was because, Resolution 425 re-affirmed Lebanon’s sovereignty and political independence and as such called upon Israel to “immediately cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forth with its forces from all Lebanese territory”\textsuperscript{16}
Makdisi explains that Resolution 425 failed to achieve its purpose since conflicts have ensued intermittently between the two parties in the region (including the Lebanon-Israel War Of 2006). He states that in order to resolve the war in 2006, the UNSC again engaged in several diplomatic processes (Multi-Track diplomacy) and adopted and passed Resolution 1701 which intensified the mandate of the UNIFIL in the region. To achieve this, Resolution 1701 endowed the new force with more active rules of engagement, authorizing it to employ all necessary measures within its capabilities, to ensure the region is free from any hostile activities. Makdisi concludes that, notwithstanding all diplomatic processes (Multi-Track diplomacy) employed since 2006 to resolve peace between the two conflicting parties (i.e. Hezbollah fighters and Israeli-soldiers), the different understanding of the concepts of resistance, sovereignty and security by the two groups has posed challenges for the realization of peace in the region. This has caused the conflict to persist even till today.

Makdisi’s work contributes extensively to the study by giving a brief overview of the conflict and also indicating some diplomatic processes employed towards achieving peace in the conflict situation. His work also indicates that the different understanding of concepts such as resistance, sovereignty and security by the two conflicting parties militates against the effective realization of peace in the conflict. The work, however, fails to identify the challenges associated with the diplomatic initiatives adopted in resolving peace between the parties and the prospects that diplomacy stands to gain in resolving the conflict if its challenges are surmounted. This is a gap in Makdisi’s work which this study attempts to fill.

Touching on the assessment of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, Prof. Shai Feldman argues along similar lines, surmising that after the war with Israel, Hezbollah was able to project itself as the victor with the understanding that the said war was asymmetric in nature since Israel obviously a state actor engaged Hezbollah, a non-state actor in a war. The article also featured an account of the leader of Hezbollah, Sheik Nasrallah, who is reported to have stated that inspite of the pride of achieving the feat, he regretted the brutal faced by the Lebanese which was occasioned by the war.

Feldman opines that the seeming erosion of Israeli deterrence was as a result of Hezbollah’s success in winning the “war of narratives” and the unachieved goals initially touted by Israel prior or during the war. The article also featured some factors that contributed to the erosion of Israeli deterrence. Israeli Defence Force (IDF) was sent to the battle front with wrong ammunition, without appropriate body amour, food, water and right vision devices. Feldman also pointed out that from the Syrian perspective, the result of the war in Lebanon further worsened the
negative strategic developments, it experienced and the aftermath of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Palestine was also faced by the brunt of the Israel-Hezbollah war. However, the study fails to identify the diplomatic tools used in resolving the conflict and how those tools were created by the international community. This gap in his work is what this study attempts to fill.

The work of Dov Waxman on “Between Victory and Defeat: Israel after the War with Hezbollah” is also of great relevance to this study. In his work, he reveals that, though Israel has engaged in several conflicts and wars with surrounding Arab states before the 2006 war with Lebanon, it has only engaged in one peace agreement (i.e. with Egypt) following the 1973 war.\(^{18}\) Waxman also points out that, in the case of the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel scored a diplomatic victory, though failed in its military objectives. This is because, Israel agreed through diplomatic processes to abide by a peace agreement following the passing of Resolution 1701. This, according to Waxman, led to the ending of the conflict.

Waxman however identifies that, Israel adhere to the diplomatic processes (which were intended to result in the peace agreement) because it favored it. He explains that the resolution blamed Hezbollah for the outbreak of the hostilities and called for it to cease “all attacks,” whereas Israel only had to cease “offensive military operations”. There was no clarification on what that meant for Israel; allowing Israel to justify its continued military atrocities in Lebanon as defensive in nature. The resolution also demanded the unconditional release of Israel’s kidnapped soldiers, whereas it made no call on Israel to free the three Lebanese prisoners in its custody. In addition, Israel was also not required to withdraw its troops immediately from southern Lebanon but allowed to stay until the Lebanese army and a strengthened UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) of up to 15,000 troops were deployed to the area. Waxman establishes that, the outcomes of the diplomatic processes employed in resolving the peace process between the conflicting parties contribute to the reasons why the conflict still persists in the area. This is because the Hezbollah fighters do not consider the conditions of the peace agreement unfavorable to them, and as such unwilling to adhere to them.

Waxman’s work contributes to this study by indicating how the outcomes of diplomatic processes employed have failed in resolving peace in the conflict situation between Israel and the Hezbollah fighters. However, the study fails to identify the diplomatic tools used in resolving conflicts and how those tools are created by the international community. This gap in his work is what this study attempts to fill.
More so, the work of Uzi Dayan on “Israel's National Security Considerations in Its Approach to the Peace Process” also contributes extensively to this study. In his work, he identifies the logic behind Israel’s need for defensible borders.\textsuperscript{19} The logic, according to Dayan, are based on four principal threats (which includes conventional attack; terrorism; mortar and rocket fires, as well as ballistic missiles; and unconventional attack); and these are partly responsible for the motivation of Israel’s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. He further opines that, following the 2006 war, Israel has engaged international presence through diplomatic means to resolve peace in southern Lebanon. This particularly has to focus primarily on the disarmament and prevention of rearmament of Hezbollah fighters in Southern Lebanon. However, Dayan concludes that, “the Israeli experience with an international presence has been poor”. This is because the UNIFIL in Lebanon has not lived up to Israeli expectations in preventing the rearmament of Hezbollah fighters since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. This goes a far way to prove that, the diplomatic processes employed in negotiations to resolve peace in the region has not yielded much result.

This work by Dayan also contributes to the study, by identifying some core factors that might have influenced the war between the Hezbollah fighters and Israeli soldiers. It also indicates the failure of diplomacy in achieving the set goal of resolving peace between the conflicting parties (that is Hezbollah fighters and Israeli soldiers) in Southern Lebanon. However, this work also fails to examine the challenges and successes of the use of diplomacy towards the resolution of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006. Rather, Dayan just points that the diplomatic processes have failed in resolving the conflict without examining the reasons for the failure.

Writing on the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, Yukin indicates that the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to clamp down on the advancement of Israel forces in Southern Lebanon fail which resulted in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Again, he stated that the forces were poorly equipped with troops watching in askance as Israel forces advanced further and further south. Another UNIFIL was established in 2006 after the Israel-Hezbollah war. The new mandate of the UNIFIL required it to carry out its previous mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 as well as enforcing the new mandate under resolution 1701. Thus, this time apart from ensuring the complete withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanese territories. It was to assist the Lebanese army to recapture the southern Lebanon. The author attributed the failure of UNIFIL to the ambiguities in peacekeeping mandates, lack of clarity and that fact that the force misunderstood the situation on the ground. Yukin indicated how the diplomatic process failed
which led to the outbreak of the 2006 War and the reasons for the failure, but never examined the challenges and prospects of the diplomatic tools used. From the above, literature on the Israel-Hezbollah war affirms the contestations over the role of Diplomacy in resolving the conflict. The study attempts to address this by reexamining the prospects and challenges of the use of Diplomacy in resolving the conflict.

1.11 Sources of Data and Methodology

The materials for this study were sourced from both primary and secondary data. Primary data were generated through semi-structured interviews with three diplomats namely; Ambassador D. K. Osei – (Diplomat-in-Residence) at the Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy (LECIAD); Ambassador Leslie Christian of Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Ghana’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Nana Effah-Ampenteng Former President of the UNSC and Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Secondary data was drawn from research papers, books, media reports and articles in both print and electronic formats. Data obtained from these sources were subjected to critical content analysis geared towards answering the research questions.

1.12 Organisation of the Work

This study is structured into four chapters. Chapter one is the Research Design and outlines the statement of the problem, research objectives, significance, scope of the study, conceptual framework and literature review. Chapter two gives an overview of diplomatic tools, practices and procedures and how they are employed in conflict resolution. Chapter three discusses the challenges and prospects for the use of diplomacy in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006. Chapter four completes the study with a summary of research findings, conclusions and recommendations.

ENDNOTES


3 ibid

4 UN Membership


7 Inbar, Efraim. "How Israel bungled the second Lebanon war." *Middle East Quarterly* (2007).


CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an insight into diplomacy and its approaches to conflict resolution. Accordingly, the chapter examines the concept of Diplomacy- its definitions, practices and approaches to conflict resolution.

2.2 The Concept of Diplomacy

Despite the abundance of theoretical and practitioner oriented literature on diplomacy, there is no one universally accepted definition of diplomacy. Nevertheless, there are discernible principles and elements that cuts across the definitions put forward by the various authors. According to Raymond Cohen, diplomacy is the master-mechanism of international affairs, a system of managing relations between states.\(^1\) Sir Ernest Satow defines diplomacy as the application of intelligence and tact to the official relations between the governments of independent states, relations with dependent territories and between governments and international institutions.\(^2\) Adam Watson on the other hand, believes that diplomatic dialogue is the statement of international sovereignty, a civilized process based on awareness and respect for other people’s point of view and a civilizing one also, because the continuous exchange of ideas and the attempt to find mutually acceptable solutions to conflicts of interest increase that awareness and respect.\(^3\)

Some scholars are of the view that diplomacy is the practice of international legal principles and norms of international relations. A proponent of this view, E.J.J Johnson describes diplomacy as a multifaceted and complex instrument that measures forces working in the international system of international relations; and
of which subtle measures of diplomacy can be used to arrest, ameliorate or reduce, discard misunderstandings which precipitate international crisis.\(^4\) Taken together, all the above definitions of diplomacy leads to the basic concept that it is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between states and non-state actors or the technique of handling affairs or relations devoid of arousing hostility.

### 2.2.1 The Origins & Practice of Diplomacy

Diplomacy has been in existence since the beginning of human civilization. According to one research study, the origins of diplomacy are in the strategic and competitive exchange of impressive gifts, which may be traced to the Bronze Age and recognized as an aspect of Homeric guest-friendship.\(^5\) In the modern age it becomes the strategic weapon of statecraft and considered as base of inter country relations.\(^6\) Diplomatic relation is, thus, the reflection of the strategic relation between two countries. The practice of diplomacy between states has changed considerably over the centuries. In the traditional sense of diplomacy, it has no place for non-state actors in the international system due to the secretive nature of diplomacy.\(^7\) The traditional sense also limited diplomacy between only two states or countries without the involvement of non-state actors.\(^8\) Conventionally, it was practiced by an appointed person or a group of persons representing states to conduct negotiations on their behalf mostly with the objective of finding out possible ways for both of the parties or states in their preference of interest.\(^9\)

The ever-changing nature of the international system has resulted in paradigm shifts in the practice of diplomacy. In the past, diplomacy was the major subject of state to state relations, however in contemporary practice; diplomacy involves different transnational actors and people to people interaction and peace-making.\(^10\) In spite of the continuous changes in human social-political set-up and consequent effect on how diplomacy is practiced, diplomacy is still vital to conflict resolution and management. Diplomatic approaches to conflict resolution and management include Mediation, Enquiry, Arbitration, Conciliation, Negotiation, Track I, Track II, Track 1.5, Multi-Track Diplomacy, Coercive Diplomacy, Gunboat Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy and Shuttle Diplomacy.
2.2.2 Diplomatic Approaches to Conflict Resolution & Management

Peaceful settlement of disputes between states is one of the greatest diplomatic challenges facing our current world. The UN Charter (Article VI - Pacific Settlement of Dispute) has established the most desirable methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes/conflicts while authorizing its members to choose the system that they feel comfortable with. The UN Charter offers two kinds of arrangements for resolving disputes - “diplomatic-political” and “legal”. The diplomatic-political methods are Negotiation, Mediation and Conciliation. Conversely, the Legal means are Arbitration and Judicial Settlement.

2.2.2.1 Negotiations

According to Don Carper, negotiation originates from two ancient Latin words: “nec” for not and “otium”. Negotiation therefore literally means “not ease”. In the present context, negotiation is the process whereby the parties to a conflict seek to settle or resolve their conflict. Negotiation by its nature connotes “movement” - a process which leads to the movement and change of people, their attitudes and their positions. According, to Stephen B. Goldberg and H.H Sander (1992), “it is the communication for the purpose of persuasion”. From this definition, parties do not only convince the opposite side that their position is right; rather they persuade the other side to cooperate which subsequently results in adoption of new position by both parties. For there to be cooperation among the belligerents, negotiators must understand the dynamics of the conflict and must not be a partisan.

Negotiation is different from the other diplomatic instruments for conflict resolution listed by Chapter VI of the UN Charter such as Mediation, Conciliation, Facilitation and Arbitration. However, negotiation is not mutually independent; it is an extent, dependent on the other diplomatic instruments. According to William Zartman, parties agree to negotiate when there is “a ripe moment”. This ripe moment occurs when the following three elements are explicitly clear and available:

A Mutual Hurting Stalemate: - That is, when both parties acknowledge that neither a party will out rightly win the war and if the war should continue it would cost them more without achieving a win. For instance; as in the case of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, both Israel and Hezbollah realized that there could be no short-run winner and if the war should continue the damages will out weight their
chances of winning the fight. Hence each party dropped their de-facto demands and agreed to ceasefire on the terms of UN Resolution 1701. When there is a formula for a way-out of the conflict without losing face: - Again, with respect to Israel and Hezbollah, there was a clear and direct formula backed by the UN and the international community and for that matter, contributed to their willingness to negotiate and ceasefire.

Valid or authoritative Spokesperson: - 16 The ripe moment gives the disputants the opportunity which they must take advantage of. The conflict determines the kind of negotiation and how it should proceed.

Considering that negotiation is not only an art, but also a science, Landes et al stresses that practically, before negotiators opt for negotiation, they must carry out conflict analysis which will help them understand the specificity of the conflict.17 These analyses, according to a handbook on conducting conflict assessment by DFID may include among others:

- Identifying the parties to the conflict;
- Profiling their leaders and spoilers and the extent of their threat on the peace process;
- Historical background of the conflict as well as the underlying issues of the conflict.
- The interest of the parties and stakeholders involved in the conflict.
- The scope of the conflict and any previous attempt at resolving the conflict.
- The relationship between the actors.

Regarding the caliber of would-be negotiators, Zartman argues that negotiators must have solid expertise in negotiation process, special influence that will give them edge over others and must not have vested interest in the conflict.18 Perhaps, more critical to the success of the main negotiation is the pre-negotiation process. According to Zartman, the main negotiation begins with pre-negotiation process, where parties to the conflict reach or agree on the basic rules and procedures, participation in the process of negotiation and the methods of representation.19 Other important considerations also include: agreement on preconditions for negotiation and barriers to dialogue, form of negotiation, venue and location as well as managing the proceedings.20 Many publications on the subject of pre-negotiation suggest that; due to the sensitive nature of stalemates and disputes, some time-honoured guidelines must be followed to ensure a relatively higher degree of success at pre-negotiation. Some of the major guidelines that are considered for pre-negotiation are highlighted below.
Participation: - Participation opens the mode of communication between the disputants which can be small or informal in an attempt to start contacting and communication.\textsuperscript{21} This also includes all parties and stakeholders who have an interest in the conflict. Build a sufficiently pre-negotiation coalition to open communication with some substantial hope of achieving an outcome and hope to co-opt or persuade parties who abstain to adopt the behaviour to fit the rules of entry. There must also be equal number of delegates per each party and different degree of status in the process.\textsuperscript{22}

Preconditions, Legitimacy & Recognition of Spokesperson: - The negotiator must use effective pre-negotiation process to work through preconditions and settle the questions of legitimacy and recognition of spokesperson which could lead to all parties agreeing to negotiate.\textsuperscript{23} This takes the form of unofficial discussions with the parties before the main negotiation.\textsuperscript{24}

Level Playing Field: - There must be a leveling playing field of accepting the negotiation context, procedures, time and venue and resources to permit all parties to come to the negotiating table prepared.\textsuperscript{25}

Funding: - The must be funding for the negotiation, either from each side of the parties or one party offers to fund part or the full negotiation process.\textsuperscript{26}

Neutral Venue: - There must be a neutral venue with equal accessibility to all parties involved in the dispute. Formal discussions can be supported by unofficial, off-the-record and denial method of communication around and outside the round table.\textsuperscript{27}

Progress Report: - At the close of negotiation sessions, there should be occasional or regular report on progress which must be agreed by all parties. There should be an agreed embargo among all participant of the negotiation process with enforcement mechanisms to be negotiated among all.\textsuperscript{28}

Fair & Efficient Process Management: - The negotiator should manage the process in such a way that no one benefits from his position either in general or one specific agenda.\textsuperscript{29} There should not be any time limit rather all parties must remain until the negotiation process come to an end. There must also be realistic limit on goal to be achieved within the time available.\textsuperscript{30}

A leading exponent of negotiations, Zartman observes that the negotiation process is a continuum and parties to conflict may exchange proposals, demands and continue the negotiation process until a resolution is finally reached.
2.2.2.2 Mediation

Mediation is a conflict resolution process in which a neutral third party helps the disputants to communicate better, analyze their conflicts and their options and to develop mutually satisfactory solution.\(^{31}\) The main work of the third party is to assist in resolving a dispute between two or more parties. Much emphasis has been placed on mediation as one of the most potent methods to settle conflict peacefully under the UN Charter. According to Berridge, “mediation is a special kind of negotiation designed to promote the settlement of a conflict.\(^{32}\) In this negotiation, a distinctive role is played by a third party; that is, one not directly involved in the dispute in question”. Bercovitch and Rubin define mediation as “a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance or accept an offer of help from an individual, group, state or an organization to change or influence their perceptions or behaviour without restoring to physical force or invoking the authority of law.\(^{33}\) Mediation is vital when direct negotiations fails and parties are unable to compromise, then they will propose mediation. It is usually needed when parties retain the most distrust of each other’s motive, especially where cultural differences present an additional barrier to communication.\(^{34}\) According to Goldberg “mediation is an assisted and facilitated negotiation carried out by a third party”.\(^{35}\)

The Role of the Mediator in Mediation

Zartman observes that a key distinguishing feature of mediation is that; while the mediator helps to manage the process, the third party does not have the power to render a decision. Regarding the role of the mediator, the warring parties have control over the outcome of the resolution and management process.\(^{36}\) In furtherance of this, the mediator helps the parties to think in new and innovative ways to avoid the tendencies of parties taking an entrench position.\(^{37}\) The mediator in order to be successful must be impartial or neutral third party who shows empathy and has his/her own agenda, status, interest and power which is sometimes used during a conflict resolution and management process. The mediator also provides the guidelines to avoid negative outcomes and breakdown of the mediation process. Most importantly, the mediator designs the process in a manner that will help the disputants to get to the root of their conflict.\(^{38}\)
Factors Affecting Successful Mediation
Kenneth Feinberg claims that; in order to achieve successful mediation, three essential factors must be considered. First, the motivation of the parties in the disputes to resolve the conflict. Second, the opportunity for the mediator to be involved and to act and thirdly, adequate knowledge of the dispute by the mediator which includes the motivation factors, interest, and cultural factors among others.39

Another key factor that affects the outcome of mediation is the ability of the mediator to determine the ripe time for mediation - the moment both antagonists arrive at the conclusion that they will be better off if they settle the issue. At this ripe moment; the mediator will decide which approach to adopt - whether to seek comprehensive solution to the dispute or approach it in step-by-step manner.40 When the conflict is not deep, the latter is usually used to resolve the conflict. At this crucial stage, the mediator may refer to the substance of the matter and proposes ways and means for a solution acceptable to both parties by establishing the facts based on laws and comparing conflicting aspirations by both parties in order to arrive at a compromise.41 The skillful use of communication tools by mediator such re-framing, active listening, open-ended questions and analytical skills for the identification and probing of issues also has a bearing on the success of the mediation.42

Obstacles to Mediation

There are several obstacles that obstruct the mediation of conflicts. A key obstacle is; when there is no demand and supply for mediation on the part of the belligerents and interested parties like the international community for intervention.43 In such a case, the mediator must get an international authority before mediation can commence.
Similarly, mediation cannot occur when belligerents have clear military advantage. In such situations, the one with such advantage would not want to compromise but would use deterrence and coercion to achieve their interest rather than seeking peaceful settlement.44

2.2.2.3 Arbitration

Arbitration is the classical method of interstate dispute settlement leaving the choice of judges, the time frame and the issue entirely to the parties involve.45 It is the prime interstate dispute settlement procedure. In arbitration the parties agree to
settle and remain in charge of the procedures on how to achieve conflict resolution and management. An arbitration ruling is thus based on law and is binding in nature. The resolution based on the arbitration ruling must be implemented by the warring parties in good faith. Arbitration is similar to the court system which is based on plaintiff and defendants model; the arbitrator decides who is “wrong” and who is “right” based on solely the facts and law. Parties are given specific deadline for filing of submissions and proof as well as hearing for the arbitrator to hear arguments of both parties. The arbitrator acts as neutral and impartial judge without political authority.

2.2.2.4 Conciliation

Gerard Cornu defines conciliation as “an intervention to resolve international disputes by a body without political authority that has the trust of the parties involved and is responsible for examining all aspects of the dispute and proposing a solution that is not binding on the parties involved”. Thus; an independent commission of enquiry or conciliation commission examines the dispute in depth and then offer its recommendation for settlement which is non-binding. Arbitration is the same as conciliation, the only difference being, the recommendation of arbitration is binding. Conciliation differs from mediation in the sense that there is no intermediary to listen to arguments and take decision for the disputants, a mediator assist the parties to develop a solution themselves. Conciliation takes into account rule of law and non-legal aspects of the conflict or disputes. Its outcome can base solely or partially on law. Notwithstanding, legal considerations are not paramount and is sometimes absent in the process and for that matter the parties are not bound to implement the body’s decision; they can reject the outcome or resolution. In some cases, conciliation is similar to mediation because it is not designed to determine who is right or wrong but have a full say in the process and procedure for conflict resolution. Malinverni advances the view that conciliation which includes an international organization like the UN will act according to the rules governing member states as much as it can. Conciliation can yield one or more realistic solutions which will motivate parties to participate in implementing the outcome of the organization.

On the strength of conciliation, Ivan Bernier and Nathalie Latulippe advance the view that it offers the opportunity to settle disputes through reciprocity without forcing parties to renounce their fundamental interest and positions. In this respect; conciliation in dispute resolution and management, therefore allows legal and
economic, political and social factors to be considered and its outcome is a forward thinking solution which does not declare a winner or loser.\textsuperscript{51}

\subsection*{2.2.2.5 Preventive Diplomacy}

Preventive diplomacy, by the general definition, is a diplomatic action taken at the earliest possible stage to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. According to the UN, “Preventive Diplomacy” is diplomatic, political, military, economic and humanitarian action undertaken by governments, multilateral organizations (such as the UN, EU, AU as well as other regional groups) and international agencies (including non-governmental actors) with the aim of preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between and within states and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation among disputants.\textsuperscript{52}

An important aspect of preventive diplomacy is that, it is part of the immediate response to a crisis or pre-crisis situation, initiating measures that might contribute to the eventual resolution of the dispute. Preventive diplomacy is generally categorized into peace-time and crisis-time responses which are succinctly described below:

\textit{Peace Time Response:} - The peace-time responses include: confidence building among disputants i.e., ensuring transparency, exchange of information, notifying disputants of military exercise in advance and monitoring of regional agreements. Peace-time response involves institutional building by way of formal and informal means of getting experts and resources in pursuit of achieving a common goal. Secondly, it induces rule-governed behaviour among the actors, which can be useful for such rules governed behaviour can be non-intervention and lead to pacific settlement of dispute. Thirdly, it engulfs early warning by monitoring of political, military, ecological, natural disaster developments that unless prevented may lead to outbreak of violence or humanitarian crisis. Lastly, it also involves preventive humanitarian action which is concerned with preventing and managing the humanitarian consequences of political conflicts and the negative impacts of natural disasters.

\textit{Crisis-Time Response:} - This includes fact-finding, good offices, crisis management and preventive development. Fact-finding is the collection and analysis of reliable and timely information on conflict situations. There is a nexus between fact-finding and early-warning which could be undertaken during “peace-
time” response; however it is best undertaken during crisis situations. Ambassador D.K advocates that fact-finding should be comprehensive, covering domestic, regional and global aspects of a conflict and investigating the social, economic, strategic and political underpinnings. Whereas the aim of Good Offices is to express the concern of the international community and to promote a climate of trust and establish agreement between the warring parties; crisis-management’s objective is to reduce the immediate possibility of violent action in a conflict situation and requires measures such as reconciliation, mediation and arbitration that would help in diffusing tensions.

2.2.2.6 Track One Diplomacy

Track one diplomacy is known as official diplomacy and De Magalhaes (1998) describes official diplomacy as, “[a]n instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of contacts between the governments of different states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties”. The most important feature that distinguishes track one diplomacy from all other forms of diplomacy is its formal application at the state-to-state level. It follows a certain protocol to which every state is a signatory. Track one diplomacy is often regarded as the principal peace-making tool of a state’s foreign policy and its players include diplomats, high-ranking government officials, the United Nations, the Vatican and heads of states as well as regional economic and political bodies such European Union and the African Union. The main motive of Track one diplomacy is to influence the political power structure of a state.

**Strengths of Track One Diplomacy**

Track one diplomacy is a foreign policy instrument to specifically improve relations among nations. Below are four widely acclaimed advantages of track one diplomacy. Firstly, track one diplomacy has the ability to use political power to influence the direction of negotiations and outcomes. This power might include using the threat of military force if a party decides to go against international treaties. Secondly, track one diplomacy has the ability to access material and financial resources that give high leverage and flexibility in negotiations. Thirdly, track one diplomacy can employ in-depth knowledge about the parties’ interests because of the use of various intelligence sources. Lastly, track one mediators have the competence to use broad knowledge of their states’ foreign policies, and also the foreign policies of the conflicting parties.
Weaknesses of Track One Diplomacy

In spite of track one’s strengths outlined above, it has several identifiable weaknesses. The first weakness is that; its conflict resolution approaches are often corrupted by power. State power can be a liability to durable peace, rather than a facilitative tool. Power can suppress underlying issues of weaker parties, thereby undermining the sustainability of a peace agreement.\(^{57}\) Secondly, diplomatic missions - an asset to track one diplomacy, are usually closed down at the height of conflicts between countries “thereby reducing communication when it is needed most”.\(^{58}\) Thirdly, officials cannot, of course, speak against their country and, as a result, may either be too rigid or delay negotiations through consultations with their leaders at home.\(^{59}\) Fourthly, track one diplomacy is dependent on the position and interest of the principal actor who may be less flexible because of the ties states have with one another.

2.2.2.7 Track Two Diplomacy (T2)

Track two diplomacy, often abbreviated as “T2” is mediation by private individuals and NGOs which was known in the United States as “Citizen Diplomacy”, until Joseph Montvile changed the name to track two diplomacy in 1981. Montvile defines track two diplomacy as “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resource in ways that might help resolve conflict”.\(^{60}\)

Strengths of Track Two Diplomacy

T2 complements official track one negotiations. Example of T2 is the West African Network for Peace building (WANEP). According to Montivile, T2 parties who seek to resolve conflict are not limited or restrain by political or constitutional power. They have the locus standing to speak on issues that directly affect their communities and families.\(^{61}\) Moreover, T2 authorizes the minority groups by giving them a platform on which they bring their opinions on board on how conflict in their society or country can be resolved.\(^{62}\) Similarly, T2 approach can convince and persuade actors by appealing to other common understanding and establish a peaceful resolution in private discussion rather than making it public.\(^{63}\) Given that, T2 provides a neutral, low–key, safe and non–judgmental environment such as in workshop or reconciliation programmed to facilitate interaction among warring functions; disputants get conducive environment to share their fears and seek ways for resolution which is free from government constraints.\(^{64}\) T2 helps to prevent pre–violence and promote post conflict peace building; hence, making it
the ideal tool for preventing conflict and peace building. Most importantly, it involves stakeholders from bottom to the top. 65

**Weaknesses of Track Two Diplomacy**

A key weakness of T2 is; it lacks the capacity to influence foreign policy and political power structures in the international system since they do not have political power. Likewise, T2 intervention lacks political power to coerce disputants, its intervention can take long time to yield a positive result. In same manner, T2 cannot be used under authoritarian regime because leaders are not ready to listen to the advice from other “lower people”. T2 provides main options for negotiation by generating creative ideas which might not be raised within the context of official negotiations. In times of poor decision making by the actors of T2, no account is rendered for their poor decision. 66

Notwithstanding the above challenges T2 allows disputants to make and get to know each other both within and outside of plenary session. It opens channels of communication and improves the quality of communication among parties in conflict. Similarly, T2 helps in relationship and trust building and the bond formed during the unofficial process often translates to the official processes. 67

**2.2.2.9 Track One & Half Diplomacy (T1.5)**

Dr. Susan Nan defines T1.5 as diplomatic initiative that is facilitated by unofficial bodies, but directly involves officials from the conflict; implying that official representatives are involved but facilitators are ordinary citizens. 68 According to Mapendere, T1.5 is hybrid diplomacy of T1 and T2 that gives the third party diplomatic conflict approaches from T1 and T2 conflict resolution technique in relations which can be conducted in various ways. These ways can be private (T2) and public (T1), and to operate in either two situations is determined by the conflict and the people involved. There is a general assumption that T1.5 interveners have reasonable resources to carry out peace initiative as the reputation of the interveners or the third parties gets them funding from private and public organizations. Mapendere notes that; there are three ways in which T1.5 third parties can gain entry to conflict resolution process. Firstly, they can be invited by one disputant or both disputants in the conflict. Secondly, they can intervene based on the request for intervention by interested parties outside. Lastly, parties can also take initiation to intervene in a conflict. 69
Relevance of Track One & Half Diplomacy

Track one & Half diplomacy substitute the lacuna between track T 1 and T2 due to the use of prominent members in the international system. It also influences the powerful structure directly even though it is not based on governmental political agenda. T1.5 official can get into conflict which their home governments may not have interest in. Sometimes it is deployed to supplement traditional diplomacy which is ongoing and also provide leaders who find themselves in difficulty to set out of their problem and thus; provides face saving service. Leaders are often given the opportunity to choose an honourable way which is opposite of embarrassment and war. This can also facilitate communication between leaders whose communication has been broken by conflict.

During international conflict among countries, the warring countries cease diplomatic relations to signal that formal communication is no more needed between the two countries. In such a situation, the relation between such states deteriorates the situation. Likewise during intrastate conflict, a party may refuse to talk which is an indication of power and pride.

2.2.2.10 Multi-Track Diplomacy

According to Ziegler (1984), conflict is a complex phenomenon which demands a multidimensional approach to effectively manage and resolve it; and because of the inherent limitations of each track of diplomacy, it is imperative to reduce these challenges to ensure effective ways of resolving conflict. Proponents of this view advocates multi-track diplomacy which combines all the tracks of diplomacy together, from track I to IX. The argument is that; by combining these tracks gives the non–official track the opportunity to influence T1 official in the peace negotiation process by bringing on board new ideas. McDonald (2005) posits that; the merger of different tracks is most likely to ensure effectiveness by one track augmenting the other tracks weakness which is done in an interactive manner.

Moaz et al (2006) also makes the case that, the interaction among the track actors is influenced and shaped by their common identity either by religion, cultural or social identity that enable actors bring all other individual resource and ideas on board to increase their effectiveness in multi-track diplomacy. A similar line of
argument is also put forward by Kaye (2001) who argues that since all tracks of diplomacy come together, there is effective communication and coordination among the actors which result in decrease in uncertainty of reaching a resolution.\textsuperscript{77}

However in spite of the general acknowledgement that, in a whole, multi-track diplomacy works more effectively than individual tracks. Walter (2002) cautions that, multi-track is not effective and efficient when there are large or so many parties involved in dispute since it increase uncertainty and makes it difficult for the belligerents to agree on mediation.\textsuperscript{78}

### 2.2.2.11 Gunboat Diplomacy

According to James Cable, gunboat diplomacy, also known as "big stick diplomacy" refers to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives with the aid of deliberately display of naval power to persuade party/parties to agree to the demands of a superior third party.\textsuperscript{79} The term is associated with the nineteenth-century period of imperialism, where European powers could intimidate other less powerful states into yielding their concessions to them through a demonstration of their superior naval power. A country negotiating with a European power would notice that a warship or fleet of ships had appeared off its coast. Cable observes that the mere sight of such power almost always had a considerable effect, and it was rarely necessary for such boats to use other measures, such as demonstrations of cannon fire.\textsuperscript{80} In an interview with Ambassador D.K Osei, he emphasized the use of gun boat diplomacy in this modern international system as a diplomatic tool for conflict resolution and management. In that case, a superior third party can send naval ships closer to the party/parties in the conflict and threat to attack them if they do not agree to ceasefire or accept a resolution.

### 2.2.2.12 Coercive Diplomacy

Alexander George and William Simons define Coercive Diplomacy as the attempt to use military force as a diplomatic tool to “persuade a party/parties to cease aggression or ceasefire rather than to strike a party/parties to agree to ceasefire”.\textsuperscript{81} In practice, coercive diplomacy combines threat of punishment or military intervention, persuasion and incentives which lead party/parties of a conflict agree to the demands of the coercing state or third party. For coercive diplomacy to be effective there must be limited and exemplary action from the coercing country to make its threat credible.\textsuperscript{82} When using military force it should be used reasonably
to show determination to give credibility to the use of force which will be used to achieve compliance from a party or both parties in conflict. There are four types of objectives which are connected to coercive diplomacy. First is deterrence, which is an effort to persuade party/parties of a conflict not to do something.

The second one is to persuade a party or parties to stop an already taken action which would not achieve its targeted purpose.

The third is an effort to persuade party/parties to not take an action such as giving up an already won territory or removing his weapons from a war prohibiting zone. Lastly, the most compelling objective is to persuade party/parties to effect some changes in their form of government.

These categories represent an ascending scale in terms of their difficulty and the amount of coercion required to achieve. When using coercive diplomacy in peace enforcement, it depends on military force not to act as a physical barrier but as a psychological barrier. The notion of coercive diplomacy raises some issues about the use of force. There is the need to control the use of force at all times. The main aim of coercive diplomacy is to attain a final resolution with minimal political criticism, cost and bloodshed, and less danger of escalation than the use of pure force. Because vital national interests are seldom at stake in peace operations, excessive use of force that results in collateral damage or excessive casualties is likely to infuriate public opinion and call the international legitimacy of the intervention into question. It can also harden the resistance of the belligerents against the intervening force and lead to further escalation of the conflict.

2.2.2.13 Shuttle Diplomacy

The term “Shuttle Diplomacy” was reportedly coined to describe then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s efforts to broker peace in the Middle East following the Yom Kippur War in 1973. He was “shuttling” back and forth between nations and leaders to produce cease fires and peace agreements. While the term shuttle diplomacy is most often used to describe situations in which the negotiator travels long distances to meet with the parties involved, the strategy of meeting with world leaders separately is often used even when they are in the same place, in so-called “proximity talks”. In some conflict situations, shuttle diplomacy is the only option because Leaders at war are often unwilling to meet face-to-face or even to acknowledge each other formally due to national pride.

The use of shuttle diplomacy to resolve international conflict also suggests that even when the parties are likely to have ongoing relationships; separate meetings
in mediation may be needed and indeed may be the only workable method of achieving a resolution. In some mediations, particularly high-conflict cases, one or more of the parties communicates so harshly that the other party cannot stand being in the same room. Accusations, recriminations, condescension, personal attacks, bickering, and incessant interruption are common in such cases. Meeting separately with the parties, at least for a portion of the time, gives the mediator an opportunity to translate and, if necessary, reframe the messages from the other side-messages that are sometimes easier to hear from the mediator than from the other party. Proponents of shuttle diplomacy say it helps to overcome both emotional and cultural barriers in mediation.

**Emotional Barriers**

According to Daniel Shapiro, mediations often arouse intense emotion, especially when the conflict is highly personal or one party believes that the other party is not bargaining in good faith. Under such circumstance the conflict can only be resolved by shuttle diplomacy. Psychologists have established that when people are under stress and overwhelmed by emotions, hormonal changes occur and their adrenaline increases which may result in a fight or negative reaction making it complex to have a fruitful discussion. Paula James is of the view that shuttle diplomacy gives disputants the opportunity to calm down even when their anger makes them not to think straight and properly. Caucuses also create a space where a disputant can safely voice out their anger and frustrations which will not negatively affect the main negotiation where parties meet to resolve their conflict.

**Cultural Barriers**

In some conflict situations, the underlying cause of the conflict can be cultural or religion which divides the parties and prevent them from negotiating face to face. Such difference such as racial, cultural, gender, class, and other differences often stand in the way of understanding. Firstly, when one party’s identity becomes a central element in the mediation and particularly when that party perceives a lack of respect from the other party because of that identity, meeting face-to-face with an unrepentant opposing party may feel like rubbing salt into the wound that brought the parties to mediation. Secondly, shuttle diplomacy gives a safer setting for the aggrieved party by saving the party from stereotype threat which can obstruct the participation of the stereotyped party in the resolution process. Thus; shuttle diplomacy becomes the best option when such differences are explicit and one of the parties resists joint session negotiation.
2.2.2.15 Public Diplomacy/Propaganda

Alan K. Henrikson defines Public diplomacy “as the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labour unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments”.93

Public diplomacy is about engaging with domestic and foreign audiences through the media by this means allowing for dialogue and resolution.94 Propaganda is a calculated attempt to convince people, groups, or individuals to accept a particular definition of a situation by manipulating selected non-rational factors in their personality or in their social environment the desired effect is to change and mold behaviour.95 Public diplomacy is about engaging the public both domestic and abroad. However propaganda uses a one-way approach which focuses on persuading both domestic and foreign audience. Messages directed at domestic audiences often reach foreign audiences,96 and vice versa. Public diplomacy campaigns become successful when they are positively received by the targeted audience both domestic and abroad and the vice versa.

2.3 Overview of Conflict Management & Resolution

According to Louis Kriesberg, Conflict Resolution is oriented towards conducting conflict constructively, even creatively, in a manner that violence is minimized, antagonism between adversaries is overcome, outcomes are mutually acceptable to all the opponents and settlements are enduring.97 Conflict Resolution engulfs actions of the disputants and the mediators, short and long term plans and tactics to resolve the conflict. Conflict Resolution is based on the work of nonofficial and official practitioners, and academic analysts.
2.3.1 Historical Perspectives on Conflict Resolution

During 1946-69, unofficial diplomacy became vital in international affairs, hence leading to a drastic change in Conflict Resolution. For instance, unofficial diplomacy led to the signing of Partial Test Ban. Well-connected people became involved in resolving conflict. It started in the 1950’s and 1960’s during the Cold war when conflict and nuclear weapons of the two super powers, USA and USSR was a threat to human survival. A group of scholars from different disciplines sought to use the approaches of conflict resolution in industrial relations and community mediation approach as to resolve civil and internal conflict. By 1980 conflict resolution ideas gained grounds and its impacts on conflicts were felt.

2.3.2 Post Cold War & Conflict Resolution Models/Methods

The end of Cold war witness the radical change in conflict resolution since the cold war was seen to be the backbone of various regional wars was ending. With the end of the Cold War, international statesmen established conflict resolution mechanism and Conflict Prevention Centers, e.g. Jimmy carter an active leader in a conflict Resolution NGO. Prior to the end of the Cold War, in the late 1960’s Johan Galtung published his model for resolving both Asymmetric and Symmetric conflicts. Galtung’s model theorized that conflict can be perceived as a triangle with its three sides representing attitude, contradictions and behaviour. The contradiction represents the mismatch of goals which can be social, value and religion. The contradiction in symmetric conflict, according to Galtung is defined by the disputants clash of interest and goals while the contradiction in asymmetric is defined by the disputants relationship and the conflict of interest generated in the relationship. Attitude involves the positive and negative perceptions and misperceptions of belligerents. The attitude of disputants in conflict is motivated by fear, anger and bitterness.

By Galtung’s model, violent conflict is characterized by threats, coercion and destructive attacks. Galtung postulates that conflict is influenced by the frequent changing and impacts of one another. Conflict thus develops through hostile attitudes, intensity and then spread to include other parties. Against this reason there must be a resolution.
A resolution involves de-escalating behaviour, attitude changes of belligerents and other transformation of mismatched interests. The conflict escalation involves Ceasefire, Agreement, Normalization and Reconciliation. The gatherings perspective of conflict and violence with escalation and de-escalation was used to produce the hourglass model of conflict resolution to meet the narrowing of the political space feature of conflict escalation and the widening of political space as a feature of conflict de-escalation (this model differentiates elite peacekeeping from cultural peacekeeping).  

2.3.3 Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Approaches to conflict resolution leads to win-lose when parties stick to their interest or compromise – split their differences both lose. The traditional objective of resolution is to help parties see the outcome as either both sides may gain or may lose (non-zero-sum). One classical idea of conflict resolution is to distinguish between positions, interest and needs of parties. Another feature of the classical idea is third party intervention. Third parties may change the behaviour of parties by using positive and negative inducement.  

The classic way of resolving conflict, according to Katz H. Neil and John W. Lawyer it involves five steps as follows:

1. Interveners must ascertain whether concern for one disputant and concern for the other is high or low;
2. There should be a degree of yielding; i.e., each party must have more concern for the interest of the other party;
3. A disputant must avoid conflict and withdraw. Such disputants have low concern for themselves and other party’s interest.
4. Disputants must balance their concern of interest of themselves and others. This will result in seeking for accommodation and compromise with each other.
5. Lastly, each party must have high regard for herself and others. Each party must strive to give equal awareness of each other’s aspirations and needs while looking for a creative problem-solving outcome.

There have been new developments in conflict resolution and management. During the 1990’s a new pattern of armed conflict emerged hence leading to new forms of resolution. There have been some improvements from peaceful social change, to
conflict formation, to violent conflict transformation and then back to social change.

John Paul Lederach’s conflict resolution and transformation levels have also been influential: this model emphasizes the bottom-up approach which suggests that the middle level can link the top leaders (elites) and the grass root leaders (society) in resolving a conflict.  

Encarnation et al formulated a model for third party intervention and emphasizes their key role in resolution. There has been a shift from seeing third-party intervention as the primary responsibility of external agencies to the role of internal third parties or local peacemakers. Hence multi-track has model of conflict resolution which has an important role in place of track one, two and three which played essential role in conflict resolution. Track one involves in negotiation, peace-making, arbitrations, peace support mediation with muscle exchange and threat power domination. Track two uses good offices, conciliation, pure mediation, problem-solving, and integration among others. Track three is the peace constituencies whether the conflict, building social cohesion, common ground. Integrative and exchange power dominate.  

In summary, Chapter Two made an overview of diplomacy and its approaches to conflict resolution. In this regard, the chapter elaborated the concepts of diplomacy—its definition and approaches to conflict resolution. These include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, conciliation, preventive diplomacy, track one, track one and half, multi-track diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy and public diplomacy/propaganda as well as an overview of conflict management and resolution.

Endnotes

6 ibid
7 http://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy

9 ibid

11 Cited in Legon Centre for international Affairs (LECIA), Techniques of negotiation for diplomats


14 Are, Who We, et al. "Ripeness: the importance of timing in negotiation and conflict resolution."

15 Ibid
16 Ibid

18 Are, Who We, et al. "Pre-Negotiations: A Necessary Pre-Requisite for Success in Diplomatic Negotiations."

19 Ibid
20 Ibid
21 ibd
22 ibd
23 http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0032e/a0032e0d.htm#TopOfPage
24 Ibid
25 Ibid
26 ibd
28 Ibid
29 Ibid
30 Ibid
31 Burton J.W (1969) conflict and communication: the use of controlled communication in international Relation, London: Macmillian


37 ibid

40 Are, Who We, et al. "Pre-Negotiations: A Necessary Pre-Requisite for Success in Diplomatic Negotiations."


44 ibid
45 ibid
46 ibid


53 ibid


www.copoj.ca


Ibid


Ibid


Ibid


Ibid


The Edward R. Murrow Center - The Fletcher School - Tufts University


CHAPTER THREE


This chapter discusses how diplomatic tools were used in the resolution of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2006. It presents an overview of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict and how the specific tools of diplomacy were utilized in the resolution of the conflict. Lastly, it highlights the challenges and successes of these diplomatic approaches.

3.1 Overview of the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict of 2006

Lebanon lies in the northern part of Israel and the Golan Heights. The 2006 conflict erupted when Hezbollah (the party of God) crossed the UN Blue Line on July 12, 2006 in Southern Lebanon and abducted two Israeli soldiers and killed three in the process.\(^1\) Hezbollah launched the attack across the Israeli border. Hezbollah’s leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah had calculated that the attack would result in a moderate retaliation attack from Israel, which would lead to the usual prisoner exchange between the two countries.\(^2\) However, he miscalculated, as the response from Israel was more massive than he had expected. Backed by the US and operating with its strategy of “deterrence”, Israel launched a heavy military response, including aerial bombardment and a dispatch of ground troops in Southern Lebanon to root out Hezbollah. According to Anthony Cordesman, the Israeli objectives included:

- Restoring the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005 thus countering that Israel was weak and was forced to leave;
- Forcing Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state and ending the status of Hezbollah as a state within a state and
Obtaining the release of two Israeli-soldiers that Hezbollah captured without an exchange of prisoners.\textsuperscript{3}

After four weeks of heavy fighting and amidst international condemnation, both Israel and Hezbollah finally agreed to UN Resolution 1701 to cease all hostilities and work towards addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. Initially, France proposed a ceasefire, but the United States, backed by Britain and other allies delayed the ceasefire resolution. John Bolton, US Ambassador to the UN affirmed this when he noted on the BBC that, the US deliberately resisted calls for an immediate ceasefire to allow Israel to eliminate Hezbolah.\textsuperscript{4} Later, the US supported France to formulate a resolution which was then sent to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for it to be passed in accordance with chapter VI of the UN Charter. On August 11, 2006 members of the UNSC unanimously approved the resolution. The resolution was accepted by both Lebanon and Israeli governments. Consequently, UNSC Resolution 1701 ended the war.\textsuperscript{5}

3.2 The use of Diplomacy in Resolving the Conflict

This sub-section discusses how various diplomatic tools were employed in the efforts by the international community to help resolve the Israeli-Hezbollah armed conflict in 2006. The approach will be to discuss some of the various tracks of diplomacy individually in terms of how they were utilized.

3.2.1 Track One Diplomacy

Track one diplomacy is the official government-to-government, diplomacy whereby negotiation and mediation is between government officials or diplomats. It is carried out by diplomats, high ranking government officials and heads of State and aims at influencing parties to cease fire or come to a resolution. This approach to conflict resolution is channeled through formal aspects of government processes. Track one diplomacy utilizes approaches like negotiations and mediations among others. During the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, there were numerous instances of track one negotiation and mediation to resolve the conflict. This sub-section details some of such instances.
In July, 2006, the Iraqi Foreign Minister held a closed door meeting in Cario with the Arab League Foreign Ministers to discuss a possible ceasefire or a resolution. This was a high ranking government official meeting to influence Hezbollah to cease fire. Similarly, on July 26, 2006, a high level meeting was convened in Rome by the Italian government to negotiate a ceasefire. The meeting involved officials from US, UK, the Arab League and Lebanon except Israel.

Another example of track one diplomacy was the meeting between the US Secretary of State Condiolaezza Rice, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert Ehud, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livini and the Defence Minister, Amir Peretz to negotiate a ceasefire on 24th July, 2006. From Israel, Rice met the Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora and other officials to also negotiate a ceasefire.

The French and Russian Foreign Ministers also held separate meetings with both Israeli government officials and Lebanese government officials. During the negotiation, Hezbollah as a main party to the conflict indirectly negotiated through the Lebanese government. Ambassadors Leslie Kwadwo Christian, D.K Osei and Nana Effah-Appenteng in interviews with the researcher unanimously agreed that it is allowed for the international community to engage Hezbollah through the Lebanese government. Nana Effah-Appenteng, former President of the UN Security Council and Ghana’s Permanent Representative to the UN explained this position further;

“Hezbollah has been condemned by some countries as a terrorist group, hence it was difficult to engage Hezbollah directly. It means that if the UN negotiated with them directly, it would be rewarding and recognizing a terrorist group. As such the UN decided to deal with Hezbollah through the Lebanese government, Arab League, Syria and Iran who were the sponsors of Hezbollah to pressure Hezbollah to cease fire”.

Ambassador Leslie Kwadwo Christian argues along similar lines stating that;

“When you deal with the Lebanese government, you are dealing with Hezbollah since Hezbollah has representation in the Lebanese cabinet and also exercise much influence in the cabinet hence there is no need dealing with them directly”

Touching on the issue of engaging Hezbollah indirectly, Ambassador D.K Osei opines that

“it depends on the relative powers of the parties involved in the conflict. Clearly, what the mediation team was implying was that the Hezbollah as an entity could
not have existed without the support of the military and financial backing of the Lebanese government. So it was better to talk to Lebanon who have the resources or call the tune. It was acceptable in practice since it ends up getting the rightful result. Yet the team was sensitive and careful about it and weighed the relative strength of the Israel and Hezbollah in the conflict in question. In the case of the Hezbollah it was accepted and understandable in practice”.

From the above, it can be concluded that negotiations were utilized in a bid to resolve the conflict.

Again, in July, 2006 a UN Security Council Meeting was held during which the Ambassador of Israel, Dan Gulliman and the Acting Lebanese Foreign Minister, Tarek Milri were invited to the security Council Secretary General. Similarly, according to Geir Pedersen, the UN representative in Southern Lebanon, a UN delegation met with Lebanese and Israeli Officials to broker peace. Again in the interview, Nana Effah-Appenteng said that; “We at the Security Council held several informal consultations whereby we exchanged views and the Security Council also invited officials from both Lebanon and Israel to negotiate peace”.

The exchanges at the governmental level represented an expansive use of track one diplomacy in the resolution of the conflict. The resolution of the conflict was also marked by several incidents of shuttle diplomacy involving diplomats, government officials and the UN Security Council. The Terje Rod-Larsen (then Norway’s ambassador to the UN) and UN envoy Alvaro De Soto and Vijay Nambiar (special political advisor to then Secretary General Kofi Annan.) team sent by the Secretary General from 14th to 19th July, for instance shuttled between the Israeli, Lebanese and the UN. They contacted the warring parties and reported back to the Secretary General. Similarly, the Arab league and the United States among other states shuttled between Lebanon and Israel and reported back to the UN. Most of the shuttle diplomacy activities were purely Track One activities involving the UN, government officials and diplomats.

Under Track One, mediation was also utilized. The UNSC was the main mediator of the conflict. The UNSC mediated indirectly between Lebanon and Israel. The Secretary General also mediated the conflict in the sense that he used his good offices in working together with the Security Council to mediate with Israel and Lebanon. The UN Security Council used the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation and individual countries like Qatar, US among others, to pressure the two countries involved to come to a resolution. It also used the fact
finding mission led by Nambiar and Larsen to find out the best way to defuse the crisis. The report of Nambiar and Larsen aided the UNSC’s attempts to broker peace. The UNSC mediation efforts largely utilized a multilateral approach. This meant that there were a number of actors basically seeming as mediators. These include the US and the Arab League among others. However some scholars have argued that the push for an end to the conflict did not necessarily warrant a multilateral approach to the mediation. The reasons for such a position include the following:

Substantial time, effort and logistics which are required to engage all actors/blocs, analyze their views and agree on common agendas and outcomes

Many of the stakeholders engaged in the multilateral efforts were already deeply involved in Middle East affairs with obvious geopolitical and economic interests – and have often been accused of being the very cause of instability and tension in the region.

Notwithstanding, Ambassadors D.K Osei and Nana Effah-Appenteng disagree with that assertion. Ambassador Nana Effah-Appenteng surmises that;

“There were not too many players involved. The Larsen team was serving as emissaries of the Secretary General. Larsen and Nambiar were people who had been engaged in the Middle East peace process for a long time, so they were familiar with Middle East issues. He further stated that, apart from the US, no country could bring pressure on Israel to cease fire. Consequently the US was involved to put pressure on Israel and also had the leverage over the Arab countries. The Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the other countries were brought in by the UN to pressure Lebanon to cease fire”.

Ambassador D.K argues along the same lines that;

“The most successful mediation process has always involved large scale multilateral or multi-party consultations. For a simple reason that third party influences in a conflict might be important as the parties involved in the conflict themselves. In the case of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, the influence of a third party involved, such as the US, Qatar, Arab League, OIC among others brought quicker results than engaging the Israel and Lebanon in the conflict directly. These third parties involved had the influence and the leverage that a third party must have. For example, if the US as the provider of armament to Israel pressurized Israel to cease fire, Israel would pay more attention. So from my experience and in the case of this war, the larger the consultation team and multi-
party consultation the likelihood of conflict resolution. This clearly was proven in the case of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict”.

3.2.2 Track 2 diplomacy (Unofficial diplomacy)

Track two diplomacy was also used in resolving the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006. In the course of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, key human rights and humanitarian aid Non Governmental Organizations issued many statements and reports. Amnesty International issued 27 statements and reports between July 12 and September 15, 2006.15 Similarly, Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) also issued one statement. These NGO’s issued the statements and reports pressurize Israel and Hezbollah to cease fire. The NGO’s also demanded the UN and other political leaders to pressurize Israel and Hezbollah to cease fire.

3.2.3 Track Four Diplomacy

This is the participation of private citizens in the peace process. This includes various ways for example through citizen as well as non-governmental and special interest groups. In the case of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, citizens from Israel and Lebanon were not directly involved in the negotiation and mediation process. However, they had an impact on the resolution process. The citizens exerted pressure on their governments to cease fire and also negotiate. This had a reasonable impact. On the part of Hezbollah, they realized that they are at a big disadvantage as because of them certain infrastructure in Lebanon had been destroyed. As such, if Hezbollah did not listen to the citizens agitations, chances were high that they would be unpopular within Lebanon. Hezbollah moreover feared the consequence of losing the two cabinet positions they held in government. On the part of Israel, the citizens accused their government of disproportionate attack, hence the government gave in not to be embarrassed. It can therefore be argued that both Parties ignored their initial entrenched positions and rather compromised for a ceasefire due to an extent the pressure from their citizenry.
In furtherance of the impact of public agitations, the UNSC also felt the pressure from the citizenry. Ambassador Nana Effah-Appenteng said “The public outcry from the citizenry pressurized the UNSC to live up to its obligation to act. There were frustrations, anger and condemnation during our informal consultations among the fifteen UNSC members for not exercising our mandate to maintain peace and security. Even though US and UK kept rejecting a call for ceasefire, finally they agreed and there was a ceasefire. Hence the public outcry had an indirect impact on the UNSC because we worked hard by having more informal consultations, where 95%-98% of the UNSC decision are made before they are voted on in the main chamber just to live up to our mandate of ensuring peace and security”.  

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that citizen diplomacy was essential resolving the conflict.

3.2.4 Track Nine Diplomacy (Communication and Media)

Track Nine refers to the use of the print, visual and electronic media to inform and engage the public on issues relating to peace and conflict resolution. Track Nine leads to the communication of truthful messages and signals about the adversary and through the elimination of the psychological burden, leads to conflict de-escalation. In this sense, T9 can be termed as public diplomacy. There were Public diplomacy activities during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict. Obvious examples were the public statements issued by the Arab League on 15th July, 2006 and the 17th July, 2006 public statement by the Great Eight Summit in Saint Petersburg, Russia. For instance, the use of public diplomacy was evident on the 15th July 2006; the Arab League issued a statement condemning both Israel and Hezbollah. On 17th July, 2006 Great Eight Summit was held in Saint Petersburg, Russia. The Great Eight issued a public statement condemning both Israel and Hezbollah.

3.3 Successes of the diplomatic tools used in the resolution of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war

Firstly, through negotiations with Israel and Hezbollah, the UN and the international community offered both Israel and Hezbollah a clear and direct formula for a way out of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict without any of the disputant losing face. Consequently, it contributed to their willingness to cease fire. Furthermore, negotiation provided an opportunity for both Israel and Lebanon to shift away from their entrenched position when they both realized their goals will
not be achieved through the conflict. Negotiation provided a win-win situation for both Israel and Hezbollah. The content of the UNSC resolution 1701 which ended the war, appreciably contributed to ensuring that the interests of the warring parties were met. Israel and Hezbollah eventful abandoned their entrenched position in order to negotiate confirms Goldberg and Sander (1992) definition of negotiation. They defined negotiation as “the communication for the purpose of persuasion”.\textsuperscript{18} The UN and the international community were able to persuade Israel and Hezbollah to abandon their initial violent posturing. According to D.K Osei, “The mediators were smart for looking for ways and means to ensure that the Israel and Hezbollah ended up with a solution that none of them perceived to have lost face”.\textsuperscript{19}

Secondly, the use of shuttle diplomacy positively helped with the pursuance of peace. Shuttle diplomacy was the only option used by the UNSC and the international community to negotiate between Israel and Hezbollah. The two parties were unwilling to negotiate each other or meet face to face or acknowledge each other formally due to national pride, emotional, cultural and religious background. As such, there were accusations and counter accusations between Israel and Hezbollah. The negotiators overcame these barriers through shuttle diplomacy. That is negotiating with the parties separately. This approach ensured that the concerns of both warring parties will be heard and most importantly be communicated to each other. Thus indirectly, the shuttle diplomacy ensured that the parties in conflict could still know about the demands of the party and make the necessary concessions where necessary.

Thirdly, Track One Diplomacy helped the UN and other negotiators such as the US to use their political power to influence the direction of negotiations and outcomes. This power included the threat of use of force as the last option if Israel or Hezbollah decides not to cease fire.

Fourth, through multi-track diplomacy, all the major actors including the UN, Arab League, OIC, Diplomats and High Ranking Officials influenced and shaped the resolution process. All the actors brought their resources and ideas on board as a result, it led to a ceasefire. For instance, the Arab League, OIC and Qatar brought their Islamic influence and pressurized Hezbollah to cease fire. The UN also
brought on board its expertise in conflict resolution including the fact finding mission, which gathered and analyzed reliable and timely information on the conflict situation. The US also brought on board its power to influence Israel and its capacity to implement UNSC decision. Due to the effectiveness of communication and coordination among the actors, a cease fire agreement was achieved and implemented.

Fifth, In the case of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, citizens from Israel and Lebanon were not directly involved in the negotiation and mediation process. However, they had an impact on the resolution process. The citizens exerted pressure on their governments to cease fire and also negotiate. This had a reasonable impact. On the part of Hezbollah, they realized that they are at a big disadvantage as certain infrastructure in Lebanon was destroyed because of them. As such, if Hezbollah did not listen to the citizens agitations, they would be unpopular within Lebanon. Hezbollah thus feared losing the two cabinet positions they held in government. On the part of Israel, the citizens accused their government of disproportionate attack, hence the government gave in not to be embarrassed. Both Parties ignored their initial entrenched positions and rather compromised for a ceasefire due to the pressure from their citizenry. On July 13, 2006, hundreds of protesters gathered in Tel Aviv to oppose the war.20

Lastly, the media during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war informed and engaged the publics of Israel and Lebanon on issues relating to the conflict. There was media coverage which exposed the disproportion of the Israeli attack which resulted in external and internal pressure on Israel to cease fire. For instance, on July 30, 2006 graphics showed on television screens revealed “disproportionality”, when the Israelis bombed the Qana in southern Lebanon. The report revealed 56 or 57 Lebanese civilians who were mostly women and children killed by Israel’s attack.21 Furthermore, track nine activities brought to the attention of other citizens the situation in Lebanon. A number of these citizens mobilized and mounted pressure through demonstration, rallies and appeals on the International Community and UNSC to resolve the conflict.
3.4 Challenges of the diplomatic tools used in resolving the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict

This subsection discusses some of the challenges faced by or posed by the various diplomatic tracks used in an attempt to resolve the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict.

To begin with, the use of track one diplomacy delayed the negotiation processes; this could be blamed on the many consultations among leaders, high ranking officials and diplomats all in the name of brokering peace.

Secondly, it is also more difficult when both parties of a conflict cannot be directly engaged in the resolution process. Hezbollah, which is a main party in the conflict, could not be engaged by the UNSC because it is considered a terrorist group. The UNSC had to go through proxy countries such as Iran, Syria and also the Lebanese government in order to negotiate with Hezbollah. This made negotiations and mediations difficult.

Thirdly, the military advantage of Israel hindered the negotiation process. Israel did not want to compromise, but rather wanted to use deterrence and coercion to achieve their aim of eliminating Hezbollah. Their military might became a barrier to negotiate the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. This lends credence to William Zartman’s assertion that parties to conflicts agree to negotiate when there is “a ripe moment. At that time, Israel thought the moment was not ripe for negotiations. In addition, there were no face to face negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah who were the principal disputants in the conflict. This could have added salt to an injury. Both Israel and Hezbollah lacked respect for one another because of how each conceives the identity of the other, as terrorists.

Fourth, Israel regards Hezbollah as a threat to its existence hence does not recognize Hezbollah. Hezbollah also considers the Israel as terrorists because they have firmly taken over Palestine lands by force which is not allowed under international law. Therefore, Hezbollah thinks it has the legitimate right to fight Israel. Hence, these two intractable positions held by Israel and Hezbollah make it difficult to negotiate with them. This is a major constraint for any diplomatic negotiation and mediation to be successful.
Lastly, during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict the posture, utterances and interest of US made diplomatic negotiations very difficult at the initial stage. The US after the 9/11 terrorist attack has sought every opportunity to eliminate terrorist groups. The US regards Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Hezbollah’s attack on Israel was regarded as a good opportunity by the former to eliminate Hezbollah. In the light of this, the US prevented every move to get a ceasefire with the aim of giving Israel the time to eliminate Hezbollah. Thus the interest of the US and Israel in terms of annihilating Hezbollah coincided and this impeded efforts aimed at resolving the conflict through multilateral mediation.

As Ambassador Nana Effah-Appenteng put it;

US will publicly appeal for peace, but deep down they were happy about the war because it provided an opportunity for Israel to eliminate Hezbollah. When the situation was bad, we talked about a cease fire in the UNSC but the US and UK because of the interest, never minded us.  

It can be deduced from the foregoing quote that the utterances and posture of a third party can stall negotiations when the third party has an entrenched interest in the conflict. During the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict the US posture and interest of the US at the initial stage of the war obstructed the attempts by the UNSC and International Community to get a ceasefire.

Notwithstanding, their impacts on the resolution process, citizens from both countries were not direct participants of negotiation processes. Consequently, their views and demands were not captured in the UNSC Resolution 1701. Rather the resolution solely captured the concerns of the government officials. Ambassador Nana Effah-Appenteng touching on the involvement of the citizens said; the UNSC only dealt with top officials of both the Israeli and Lebanese government, but we did not engage the citizens unlike other conflicts where we engaged the citizens in the resolution processes.

Such a conflict resolution approach does not conform to Lederach’s conflict resolution and transformation model which suggest that the middle should link the grassroots in resolving a conflict.  

Conclusively, Chapter Three discussed how diplomatic tools were used in the resolution of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2006. Paramount among issues examined in this Chapter included the Overview of Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict of 2006, the use of diplomacy in resolving conflict, Track One diplomacy, Track 2
diplomacy (Unofficial diplomacy), Track Four diplomacy, Track Nine diplomacy (Communication and Media), Successes of the diplomatic tools used in the resolution of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war and the challenges of the diplomatic tools used in resolving the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict

Endnotes


4 Maacher, Andre B. Lebanon: Strategic and political challenges and opportunities. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2008.


7 ibid
8 ibid
9 ibid

11 In an Interview with Nana Effah-Appenteng, he was the president of the Security Council under who leadership resolution 1701 was passed. August 1, 2015
12 In an Interview with Ambassador D.K Osei, July 20, 2006

13 http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=2170

14 ibid
15 http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/_overkill_ngo_responses_to_the_israel_lebanon_conflict_
16 Interview with Ambassador Nana Effah-Appenteng

19 Interview with Ambassador D.K Osei
20 Beinin, Joel (Fall 2006). "The 2006 Lebanon War and the Israeli Peace Forces"
22 Are, Who We, et al. "Ripeness': the importance of timing in negotiation and conflict resolution."
23 Interview with Ambassador Nana Effah-Appenteng
CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Introduction
In chapter one it was hypothesized that diplomacy played a critical role in the resolution of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. This chapter summarizes the findings of the study, states the conclusion and offers some recommendation towards the application of diplomacy as a tool for conflict resolution.

The overarching objective of this study was to determine the prospects and challenges of the use of diplomacy in conflict resolution with reference to the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006. The methodology involved a case study, employing semi-structured interviews as the main research instruments. In line with the objective, the study sought to address five central research questions. What are the diplomatic tools used in resolving conflict, how did the international community create diplomatic instruments for peaceful conflict resolution, how does the international community create diplomatic instruments for peaceful conflict resolution, what are the obstacles to diplomacy in conflict resolution, was diplomacy used in the resolution of the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 and what were the challenges and successes recorded in the application of diplomacy to the resolution of the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006? Altogether, four diplomats interviewed for the study. The concept of Multi-track diplomacy was utilized as an explanatory framework for this study.

4.2 Summary of Findings

This study observed that, the primary diplomatic tools for conflict resolution include mediation, enquiry, arbitration, conciliation, negotiation, track I, track II, track 1.5, multi-track diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy, public diplomacy and shuttle diplomacy.

It was evident in this study that track one diplomacy was used in a bid to resolve the conflict. For example, in July, 2006, the Iraqi Foreign Minister held a closed door meeting in Cairo with the Arab League Foreign Ministers to discuss a
possible ceasefire or a resolution. This was a high ranking government official meeting to influence Hezbollah to cease fire. Similarly, on July 26, 2006, a high level meeting was convened in Rome by the Italian government to negotiate a ceasefire. The meeting involved officials from US, UK, the Arab League and Lebanon except Israel.

It was clear that track four diplomacy was essential in resolving the conflict. For example, both Israel and Hezbollah ignored their initial entrenched positions and rather compromised for a ceasefire reasonably due to the pressure from their citizenry.

The study found that the international community created diplomatic instruments for conflict resolution through multilateral consultations and discussions primarily through the United Nations and other international and regionally-recognized intergovernmental bodies such as the Arab League and the European Union. With reference to the diplomatic tools used in resolving the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, the study indicated the extensive use of all aspects of multi-track diplomacy.

This research also found that the use of diplomacy to resolve the conflict faced a number of challenges. These include the following:

Conflict resolution is more difficult when both parties of a conflict cannot be directly engaged in the resolution process. Hezbollah, which is a main party in the conflict, could not be engaged by the UNSC because it is considered a terrorist group. The UNSC had to go through proxy countries in order to negotiate with Hezbollah.

Also, the military advantage of Israel hindered the negotiation process. Israel did not want to compromise, but rather wanted to use deterrence and coercion to achieve their aim of eliminating Hezbollah. This military strength became a barrier to the negotiations meant to resolve the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

The major obstacles to diplomacy in conflict resolution include lack of political will by belligerent parties to submit to negotiations, cultural and religious barriers, the belief that either party or both parties have military advantage and lack of goodwill towards the diplomatic process as reflected in the posture and utterances of parties.
The research also pointed out that the interest and posture of a third party can obstruct a resolution process. This was evident when the US and UK vetoed on several occasions to allow Israel an ample time to squash Hezbollah. Similarly the use of veto by the Permanent Five hinders the conflict resolution process.

The research also noted that UNSC resolution 1701 ended the conflict. However, there is no peace in the southern part of Lebanon and the Middle East as a whole. Resolution 1701 created a false peace since Hezbollah is still operating in the southern part of Lebanon.

The study also found that eventually diplomacy served as an effective tool for the resolution of the conflict. Some of the successes of the diplomatic approach included the following;

By utilizing shuttle diplomacy, the negotiators overcame national pride, emotional and religious barriers. The concerns of the warring parties were communicated to each other

Through track one diplomacy, the UN and other negotiators influenced the direction of the negotiations and outcomes by using their political power.

It was clearly shown that negotiation provided an opportunity for both Israel and Lebanon to shift away from their entrenched position when they both realized their goals will not be achieved through the conflict. Negotiation provided a win-win situation for both Israel and Hezbollah. The UN and the international community were able to persuade Israel and Hezbollah to abandon their initial violent posturing.

The research indicated that all the actors brought their resources and ideas on board as a result, it led to a ceasefire. For instance, the Arab League, OIC and Qatar brought their Islamic influence and pressurized Hezbollah to cease fire. The UN also brought on board its expertise in conflict resolution including the fact finding mission, which gathered and analyzed reliable and timely information on the conflict situation.
4.3 Conclusions

This study indicated that diplomacy can be applied to any conflict situation. While critics often associate diplomacy with lengthy back and forth processes and dialogues, in reality, there are hardly any other peaceful means to settle conflicts apart from diplomacy. While, admittedly, the Israeli-Hezbollah negotiation process took a period of four weeks to reach a peaceful settlement, failure to negotiate would have been more catastrophic beyond the loss of over one thousand lives and could possibly have led to another global war.

Another essential conclusion that can be drawn from this study is the usefulness of diplomacy in resolving conflicts in nascent democracies, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. As the mode of conflict on the continent is shifting from military coup d’états and civil wars to conflicts of asymmetrical nature, the range of multi-track diplomacy needs to be explored to the fullest. Particularly relevant in this regard is the usefulness of diplomacy in resolving conflicts such as electoral disputes, religious extremism, territorial boundary disputes and terrorism. This study has proven my hypothesis as positive. For instance, the UNSC and the Secretary General were the main mediators in this conflict.

In all, this study has shown that the hypothesis is positive. The research revealed that multi-track diplomacy proves to be an efficient tool for conflict resolution in that, the weakness of one track is covered and complemented by another track of diplomacy. Thus, the weakness of one track is the strength of another track of diplomacy and this ensures the provision of a wider repertoire of channels through which peace can be brokered at any point in time.

4.4 Recommendations

Diplomacy represents a key opportunity to address many of the conflicts that affect the social, political and economic well-being of society from both conflict management and conflict resolution perspective. Firstly, to this end, there is the need to strengthen the traditional diplomatic institutions to deal with conflicts before, during and after conflict eruption, escalation and resolution.
Secondly, the exploration of non-official approaches to conflict resolution must also be given a critical consideration not only by national governments, but also non-governmental and business sectors as well.

Again, in order to attain peace in the southern part of Lebanon and in the Middle East as a whole, the issue of land access and ownership must be addressed since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict is just a reflection of the structural underlying problem of land and ownership recognition issues in the region.

Also, the use of the veto by the Permanent Five members of the UNSC must be limited during certain situations to afford the United Nations the opportunity to intervene to save the situation. This will help ensure that the traditional rivalries amongst the P5 members and the associated national interest-based politicking do not interfere with the promotion of world peace.

To conclude, it is also important that states and intergovernmental organizations explore the possibilities of engaging, often-ostracized groups like terrorist organizations in dialogues to enable the brokering of peace. Even where such an engagement could signify recognition of the legal existence of such groups, it serves the greater purpose of resolving conflicts and promoting peace. Moreover, as was the case in the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006, such an engagement can be done indirectly.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Maachar, Andre B. *Lebanon: Strategic and political challenges and opportunities.* Army War Coll Carlisle Barracks PA, 2008.


McDonald, John W. "Further exploration of track two diplomacy." Timing the de-escalation of international conflicts (1991)


**B. Journal Articles**


Beinin, Joel (Fall 2006). "The 2006 Lebanon War and the Israeli Peace Forces"


Inbar, Efraim. "How Israel bungled the second Lebanon war." Middle East Quarterly (2007).


Steve Erlanger, “Turmoil in the Middle East: Casualty Figures: With Israeli Use of Force, Debate Over


C. Reports/Documents/Papers


D. Interviews

Interview with Ambassador Leslie Kwadwo Christain, Director of Foreign Affairs and Former Permanent Representative to the UN

Interview with Amb. D. K. Osei, Ambassador In-Residence, LEClAD and Aide to Ex-President J. A. Kufuor on 17th July, 2015

Interview with Ambassador Nana Effah-Appenteng, Former President of the UNSC on 1st August, 2015

University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
E. Internet Sources


