THE PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES IN OPERATIONALIZING THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE IN 2015

BY
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THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DECLARATION

I, Stanley Samuel Famiah, hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own research work, conducted under the supervision of Dr Juliana Appiah. It has never been presented in part or in whole at any other university for a degree. Except for inadvertent omissions, all borrowed sources in the preparation of this work have been duly acknowledged.

STANLEY SAMUEL FAMIAH
(STUDENT)

DR. JULIANA APPIAH
(SUPERVISOR)

DATE:..............................

INTEGRI PROCEDAMUS
DEDICATION

Ebenezer! I owe this work to my God for this far He, the Lord, has brought me. I dedicate this study, wholly, to God Almighty for His benevolence that has seen me through this programme. I know I am His ‘Project’ and thank Him for His mercies, grace and favour upon me. My family—my wife, Grace, and my children, Priscilla, Samuel, Nhyira, Nyamedo and Nyamedea— I dedicate this work to you also for being my small but huge world of comfort and succour.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD  African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACP-EU  African Caribbean Pacific-European Union
AFDEM  African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations
AMIB    African Mission in Burundi
AMIS    African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM  African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA    African Peace and Security Architecture
APSTA   African Peace Support Trainers’ Association
ASF     African Standby Force
AU      African Union
AU SMLC  African Union Senior Mission Leaders Course
AUC     African Union Commission
C3IS    Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems
CADSP   Common African Defence and Security Policy
CB      Capacity Building
CEWS    Continental Early Warning System
CIMIC   Civil-Military Coordination
CMD     Conflict Management Division
COE     Contingent Owned Equipment
CPX     Command Post Exercise
DDR     Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPKO    Department of Peacekeeping Operations
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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASBRICOM</td>
<td>Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>East African Standby Force</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capability</td>
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<td>FPUs</td>
<td>Formed Police Units</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>IAPTC</td>
<td>International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IMPT</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Planning Team</td>
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<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Force</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operational Capability</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>Initial Planning Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPSCS</td>
<td>Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies</td>
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<td>IPOs</td>
<td>Individual Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<td>LECIAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mission Analysis Cell</td>
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<td>MAPEX</td>
<td>Map Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Mission Operations Centre</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPEC</td>
<td>Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>North African Regional Capability</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NUPI</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>PKF</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Force</td>
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<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Elements</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Partial Operational Capability</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
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<td>POLSTRAT</td>
<td>Political Strategic Seminar/Conference</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>Peace and Security Directorate</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<td>PST</td>
<td>Peace Support Team</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Capability</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RMss</td>
<td>Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>RoE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>RSF</td>
<td>Regional Standby Force</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRCC</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission</td>
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<td>SSF</td>
<td>SADC Standby Force</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>STR</td>
<td>Staffing, Training and Rostering</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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ABSTRACT

Post-independent Africa has seen many intra-state armed conflicts, civil wars and a few inter-state wars. These armed conflicts entailed carnage and infrastructural destruction that exacerbated the already under-developed continent. The continent has been buffeted by poverty and deprivation on one side and war and violence on the other. Ironically, these two evils are cyclical. The occurrence of one set automatically leads to the other. Socio-economic development is possible only in secured and peaceful environment. The AU set out to prevent, contain and douse armed conflicts, war crimes and associated human rights abuses from the midst of the peoples of the continent by establishing purpose-built structures. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was, therefore, set up in 2004 to serve as the vehicle to deliver the much-needed peace and security to Africa through the philosophy of “Africa Solutions to African Problem.” A vital organ under the APSA, with mandate to intervene to prevent or stop armed conflicts, is the African Standby Force (ASF), supposed to have been operationalized in 2010. The challenges of the lack of Logistics Bases; the lack of political commitment; an unpredictable and an unsustainable funding; the absence of strategic airlift capacity; vertical and horizontal coordination deficiencies; and Rostering challenges led to 2015 being set as the new deadline. AMANI AFRICA II and other corrective measures have been taken by the AU, in conjunction with its donor partners, to facilitate the declaration of Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the ASF by the Field Training Exercise (FTX) in December 2015 in South Africa. The declaration of FOC will operationalize the highly-anticipated ASF. This study sought to ascertain whether as at July 2015 there were prospects of operationalizing the ASF. This study found out that despite some successes chalked in the areas of Doctrine, Training Manuals and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) formulation and in the acquisition of enhanced competences in strategic and operational management, the prospects of operationalizing the ASF by the December 2015 deadline is bleak considering the existence of the pre-2015 deadline challenges of strategic airlift capacity, logistics and funding. The study therefore concluded that there are no prospects of the ASF being operationalized in 2015.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.0 Background

Post-independent Africa has seen many intra-state armed conflicts and civil wars and a few inter-state wars. Some of these civil wars spanned decades (the Angolan and Sudanese wars). These wars were associated with gross human rights abuses, and wastage of human, natural and material resources that slowed down the economic growth of the continent, poverty and deprivation. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was formed in 1963 with a state-centric outlook, could little to stop these wars and their debilitating effects because it placed emphasis on state sovereignty; regime and state security; and territorial integrity against human security.

The Articles 2(2f) and 3(e) of the OAU Charter emphasized more on protection from external sources than securing peaceful and secure conditions in their borders. Non-interference and non-intervention created room for human right abuses within national borders whilst the leaders continued with their annual political platitudes that earned them the nickname the ‘Dictators Club’ since they were more interested in protecting and prolonging their rule than anything else. This was against the background of their people perishing under conflicts, wars, draughts, authoritarian rule, human rights abuses and the rest. Conflict and insecurity reigned supreme across the continent even in countries which never went to war.

The resultant loss of hope and faith in the OAU led to incessant calls for a break from the past and the formation of a new political union that will steer the continent from the doldrums of conflict and provide the much-needed peace and security, which are sine qua non for development. The advent of democratic rule on the continent in the late 1980s provided the
opportunity for Africa to awake from its slumber and chart a new course: a new Africa that reflects good governance, respect for human rights and democracy for eventual development.

In a bid to avoid the past failures that resulted in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and others, the framers of the new Union created a more elaborative and robust structure with authority to achieve peace and security. This new thinking ushered in the Africa Union (AU) in May, 2001. The AU was thus launched in July 2002 with a Constitutive Act, as later amended, that was supposed to have the capability to stem or mitigate factors that cause civil wars, conflicts, and human rights abuses on the continent. In addition, its mandate is also to promote peace-making and building and economic development on the continent.

The 25th AU Summit in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, adopted a Protocol relating to the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This Protocol eventually set up, in 2004, a 15-member non-permanent Peace and Security Council (PSC) with powers modified to mirror that of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It should be noted that Articles 3(2) and 3(3) of the OAU Charter placed emphasized on non-interference. However, in direct opposite, the Article 4 (h) and 4(m) of the AU Charter grant the continental body the authority to intervene in member states to stop human rights abuses, genocides and crime against humanity. This aforementioned authority informed the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace Security Council of the African Union in 2004 to operationalize the APSA.

In pursuant to Article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act, the Peace and Security Council was established in 2004 to act as an umbrella, under which the other components of the APSA structure will operate. The PSC under its mandate is “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall be a
collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”\textsuperscript{10} Amongst other things, it is to “promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.”\textsuperscript{11} The implementing organs of the Solemn Declaration on a Common Defence and Security Policy of the AU are listed as the Assembly, the PSC, the AU Commission and the RECs/RMs in the Declaration.\textsuperscript{12}

Per article 7(h) of the PSC Protocol, the PSC has the power to “implement the Common Defense Policy of the Union”\textsuperscript{13}. This, incidentally, renders the PSC the pivot of the APSA around which the Panel of the Wise (PoW); the Continental Early Warning System (CESW); the Peace Fund (PF) and the African Standby Force (ASF) revolve as policy supporting or implementing units/organ. The PSC Protocol states that:

in order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.\textsuperscript{14}

In an attempt to implement the African Standby Force, the AU’s formulated a Policy Framework Document in May 2003 with 2010 as the effective year of operationalizing the ASF. The mechanism is to be made of a total of 15,000 strong highly-trained and equipped troops with common Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to intervene in conflict situations within a maximum of 30 days. Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union names the ASF as a standby arrangement under which five sub-regional RECs/RMs serve as the pillars.
The sub-regional groupings are: the Southern Africa Development Community (SADCBRIG); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOBRIG); East African States (EASBRIG); Northern African Regional Capability (NARC) of the Northern Africa States; and Central African States (ECCASBRIG). The document makes provision for Police and Civilian components to complement the Military within the ASF.

1.1 Problem Statement

In pursuant of the ASF 2003 implementation document, ASF ROADMAPS I & II were designed to actualize the APSA concept. In this context, a two-phased development was adopted. The first phase was from 2003 to June 2005. It aimed at establishing a strategic level management capacity for the management of Scenarios 1-2 missions by the AU and setting up the regional standby forces at a brigade level for up to Scenario 4 by the RECs/RMs. Also, it was to develop the capacity of the AU to manage complex peacekeeping operations.

More also, the RECs/RMs were supposed to continue to develop their capacity to deploy a Mission Headquarters (HQs) for Scenario 4, involving AU/Regional peacekeeping forces, in the second phase from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010, to pave way for the ASF to be operationalized in 2010.

After the botched attempt to operationalize the ASF in 2010, ROADMAP III was rolled out in December 2010 to achieve Full Operationalization Capability (FOC) for the ASF in 2015. Series of Training Exercises have been planned and executed to achieve this goal. However, an AU Panel of Experts Report in December 2013 concluded that the ASF is unlikely to be operationalized in 2015 if key actors do not commit substantial resources and political support.
The AU, as part of AMANI AFRICA II, scheduled a Field Training Exercise (FTX) in Lesotho in October 2014 to assess the readiness of the ASF for its operationalization in 2015. This exercise was postponed and moved to South Africa. The exercise will be carried out in October-November 2015 to assess the readiness of the ASF for operationalization in December 2015.

When the 2010 deadline was missed, certain parameters and indicators were put in place to enable the AU meet the next end date-2015 ASF operationalizing deadline. It is, therefore, imperative that an examination is done to ascertain whether these conditions have been met to help assess the prospects and challenges in operationalizing the ASF in 2015.

This study, therefore, seeks to situate the status quo of the African Standby Force within the 2003 ASF Policy Framework in establishing, through empirical analysis, the AU's preparedness as well as the capacity to operationalize ASF by the end of 2015.

1.2 Research Questions

The questions this study seeks to answer are:

- Are the RECs/RMs capable of deploying Mission Headquarters, as in the ROADMAP II, for the ASF to be operationalized by the end of 2015?
- Are the regional blocks (RECs/RMs) ready in terms of logistics?
- Have the AU and RECs/RMs acquired the strategic-level management and command and control capabilities to roll out the ASF at the end of 2015?
- Is there enough political-will by “African power-houses” to help operationalize the ASF in 2015 in terms of finance and others?
1.3 Objectives

The objectives of this study are to find out:

- The achievability of the December, 2015 ASF operationalizing deadline.
- The challenges in operationalizing the ASF and the future prospects, and
- Whether African leaders are truly committed to the ASF concept.

1.4 Scope

This research will focus on the achievability of the end of 2015 deadline in operationalizing the ASF: against the background of the lack of political-will and unpreparedness of African leaders to commit the needed resources necessary to make their troops ready for immediate deployment as well as ensuring the sustainability of the combat-readiness of committed troops when donor contributions dry up naturally against the paucity of ‘African funds’.

1.5 Rationale

The purpose of this is to add to the existing body of knowledge in peace and security issues in Africa; provide insights as to the potentials, challenges and long-term sustainability of the ASF concept with or without the support of Western Donors.

1.6 Hypothesis

The operationalization of the ASF will enable the AU to intervene effectively in conflict situations to restore peace and security in Africa.
1.7 Theoretical Framework

The theory that undergirds this study is the Neo-Liberal Institutionalism. The Theory postulates that states can overcome their fear of the chaotic and anarchic international system through international cooperation by the formation of international institutions of cooperation. The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists are optimistic of international institutions and advocates for their existence.

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism assumes that states are utilitarian and rationalistic: they make their decisions based on cost and benefit analysis. Also, states are rational unitary actors which are interested in absolute gains. The theory campaigns for cooperation among states in an anarchic international political environment that does not acknowledge hierarchy. It supports the existence of international institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) and further argues that these institutions facilitate international cooperation. The theory again states that international cooperation institutions enable states to achieve their quest for absolute gains instead of the relative gains they stand to accrue if they refused to cooperate.

The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists accept that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate. This notwithstanding, Neo-Liberal Institutionalists maintain that states could still work together especially under the auspices of international institutions. Also, in reality, the influence and reach of international institutions over states are overwhelming: institutions shape the behaviour of states and not their temporary interests alone; wield substantial leverage over their members; and engender international cooperation even when the reasons for their creation no longer exist.
To the Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, the continuous existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), despite the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and the Cold War, supports this assertion. According to the Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, since the end of World War II, cooperation among states has become the norm in international politics to the extent that there is the proliferation of many multilateral inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations like the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and its agencies, the AU and EU that dominate international relations and regulate inter-state relations.

The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists further advocate that states are unlikely to cheat because of the high cost of defection or being declared a rogue. This makes them better-positioned to cooperate. Therefore, institutions of cooperation enhance a state's capacity to predict the behaviour of other states resulting from the application of common rules and standards of these International Institutions. Some of the major proponents of this Theory are Robert Keohane, Robert Powell, and Joseph Nye.

On the other hand, the critics of the theory intimate that the concept of institutionalism wrongly assumes that states are indifferent and atomistic to what others may gain whereas, in fact, states worry about what states gain and are positional about the gains of others in international cooperation and may exit if they consider others to be gaining more advantage. In his critique, J. Grieco states that “indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory's optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.” On his part, E. H. Carr laments the failure of international institutions in averting the World War II despite their glorious ideals and describes them as utopian. Hans Morgenthau contends that institutions are obsolete.
1.8 Application of the Theory

The coming together of African states to form the African Union (AU), with a common agenda depicts international cooperation, which aims at enabling states to maximize absolute gains, while trying to attain a common goal. In this situation, the common agenda here is peace and security for Africa and the operationalization of the ASF to serve as a force for actualizing peace and security goals of the continental body. According to Kenneth Neal Waltz, “theories explain the laws of international politics or recurrent patterns of national behaviour”. The Neo-Liberal Institutionalism theory will thus explain the apparent indifferent posture of African states toward the operationalization of the ASF by the end of 2015 by exposing factors that account for how national interest is played in the international politics arena.

Waltz underscores the importance of situating a study within the framework of a Theory to in order to procure a sound analysis to underlie the research. The employment of Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, in this study, will bring out the relevance of the ASF concept in international relations and emphasize the capability of this international cooperation in achieving results for member states. It will justify the setting up and existence of the ASF as well as the attempts that are being made to operationalize it through international cooperation among African states for the purpose of achieving their collective goals, ideals and values.

According to Oran R. Young, Joseph Nye and Robert Powell, international institutions encourage compliance from states through the application of their mechanisms and states do attach great importance to the existence and the functioning of these institutions and preserve them regardless of cost. This re-enforces stability. States, per the account of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, as a matter of course, choose to part with part of their autonomy in exchange of the benefit that may inure to them from international cooperation in the face of the dilemmas of
common aversion instead of pursuing narrow national interests. In this context, the Neo-Liberal Institutionalism will be applied to justify the creation of the ASF mechanism, assess its chances of being operationalized and continuous existence.

1.9 Literature Review

The available literature on the ASF pre-dating the 2010 operationalizing deadline had a tone that was based on their observations. Much of these available data identified gaps in logistics, airlift capacity, vertical and horizontal coordination amongst various stakeholders (the AU, the RECs/RMs, and civil society organisations), funding, staffing inadequacies, and lack of political will. Based on their research, some predicted that the 2010 deadlines would not be met whilst others even suggested that the targets were too ambitious and needed to be scaled down based on the experiences of the much-experienced UN and much-resourced European Union (EU), which had to disband its Standby Forces (EU Battlegroup).

A few others advocated for a shift in doctrine from the current form of Standby Force to a Just-In-Time mechanism which is less expensive and easy to manage in resource terms. The review of some of these writings will provide insight into what informed their predictions and the recommendations they made as well as ascertain their relevance today as we approach another deadline in 2015.

Colin Robinson in the article “The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects” states that the African Standby Force (ASF) concept was mooted by the AU as an antidote (African solution to African problems) to the perennial lack of capacity by African states to rein in or stem conflicts on the continent. He posits that there are differences in the implementation of the ASF concept. Consequently, notwithstanding, the philosophy of the concept as a continent-
wide mechanism, the EASF appears to prefer military-style interventions on its own terms instead of the interlocking ASF model. He mentions outstanding resource constraints as the main hindrance to the achievement of the aims of EASF, though marginal successes have been chalked in the areas of rapid operational capacity whilst airlift and training capacities lag behind.

In the assessment of Robinson, several identified gaps in the operational capabilities of EASF could be identified- funding, maintenance support, availability of personnel, training, and airlift logistics. In view of these encountered difficulties, Robinson suggests the current model, a readily available multi-dimensional force with a rapid deployment capability should be scaled down, since it does not appear to be appropriately modified to suit African perspectives, to a simpler form that will be easily operable by Africans within their political and military contexts.

Robinson asserts that there is a regional hegemonic struggle between Kenya and Ethiopia that has seen the logistics and operational headquarters being split between the two regional power houses. Eritrea’s differences with Djibouti and Ethiopia have been affecting her participation in EASF activities, which tends to impact negatively on EASF’s fortunes. Also, communications between COMESA, EAC and IGAD forming the EASF are poor, or to an existent made impossible by constraints in AU resolutions.

By Robinson’s account, Malan’s comments in 2008 reflected in Burgess’ 2011 work, that persisting rivalries and duplications within the East African REC indicate political reluctance on the part of its political leaders to pursue the ASF agenda. It is the conviction of Robinson that the agenda of EASF is too ambitious to be achieved even in 25 years and therefore, argues that the Force should be modified and attention focused on utilizing and enhancing the current acquired capabilities of the Force at reduced cost and goals. The Civilian and Police components, Robinson says, should be developed in a feeder-system aside the military, Scenarios 5 and 6.
should be scrapped for a lead-nation model that will see regional hegemons leading rapid intervention.

Though, Nigeria and South Africa are not Eastern African countries and for that matter EASF members, their serous commitment to the operationalization of the ASF have the potential to cure any defect pose by the absence of a lead-nation in the region since power-blocks peddle their influence outside their regional spheres to accentuate their relevance to international issues as well as confirm their strengths. In that regard, Robinson’s non-consideration of the capacity and the willingness of these two African giants, Nigeria and South Africa, who by World Bank Data, 2013\(^2\), are the 1\(^{st}\) and 2\(^{nd}\) largest economies of Africa to carry the lead-nation load, especially when they are eyeing any future UN Security Council permanent seat(s) that may be allocated to Africa could be described as gap. This study will attempt to find how much these countries are involved financially and logistically in the operationalization of the ASF and also if they are willing or unwilling to shoulder this onerous lead-nation burden as regional hegemons.

Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan writing under the title, “The African Standby Force Progress and Prospects” maintain that Africa has decided to play a pivotal role in the maintenance of peace and security on its soil by establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) with a mandate to execute a common defence policy that spells out conditions under which the collective strength of Africa would be marshaled and harnessed, through the deployment of regionally-based brigades with the strength 25,000 multidimensional troops, and unleashed to solve its peace and security problems instead of relying on the outside world for interventions.

According to Kent and Malan, Brahimi in 2000 recommended that a proposed UN standby force, reasoned and considered by the UN to have a strength of 5,000 troops was capable
of concretely subduing “spoilers of a peace process”. It should be regionally-based, comprised of a set of countries with similar “doctrine, leadership and operational practices” and have shared common “training and equipment standards.” Kent and Malan state further that the UN “welcomes the creation and identification of peacekeeping forces through regional partnership arrangements and recognizes that coherent units that utilize common procedures will enhance the ability…to respond to crisis.”

By Kant and Malan’s account, the failure of 2008 G8 Gleneagles Summit to commit funds towards the ASF indicate that the ASF concept is “overly ambitious and expensive”, which calls for Africa to adopt a gradualists approach and build on recognized blocks to enhance the capabilities of its troops for peace-making and enforcement activities. The identified gaps, per the narrations of Kent and Malan, between the current troop capabilities and the future requirements are so huge that they demand a second look and bridging of the gap.

African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) in their May 2003 meeting in Addis Ababa proposed that the envisaged Force be built up in stages from a monitoring one to an interventionist one after it has been enhanced to have a rapid deployment capability to intercede in serious cases of genocides. Also, “[the] lack of central funding and re-imbursement for peacekeeping costs have severely inhibited the full participation of less endowed Member States. This situation has undermined multinational efforts of the region and engendered sub-regional polarization.”

According to Kant and Malan, the problem of funding is a dire challenge; The AU Peace Fund has a huge deficit, which portends danger for the future of peace operations on the continent if no sustainable solution is found soon since Nigeria and South Africa are not likely to carry the financial burden of Africa alone. Compounding the issue is the problem of African
states using UN rates to seek reimbursement from the cash-strapped AU, while paying little salaries to their soldiers since they tend to see their participation in missions as revenue generating venture. They further assert that for Africa to solicit and sustain the support and interests of its partners in its peace and security efforts, it must live up to its own tenets in the AU Constitutive Act. Again, Africa states should lay aside national interests and adopt, through the PSC, holistic and collective security paradigms that bind on all states.

Kant and Malan do not indicate how much load Nigeria and South Africa currently carry, regarding the operationalizing of the ASF at the regional or continental level and how inequitable the load is and the indications that the two African giants are unwilling or unable to carry such a load especially when they are eyeing any future UN Security Council permanent seat(s) for Africa. This study will attempt to find how much these countries are involved financially and logistically in the operationalization of the ASF and also if they are willing or unwilling to shoulder this onerous burden.

Jeffery E. Marshall argues in his article titled, “Building an Effective African Standby Force to promote African Stability, Conflict Resolution and Prosperity”, that Africa is at a threshold which obliges her to consider security as its priority if it wants to attract foreign investors and engender socio-economic development in the face of dwindling financial resources due to adverse economic occurrences in the developed countries. He, therefore, posits that Africa must brace itself up to foot its peace and security bill by launching its own missions if it wants to create room for its development. He continues that, though, the AU is aware of this sine qua non and has instituted the ASF as the vehicle to this end, inadequate command, control and support systems have made it impossible for the ASF to achieve this aim of intervening in conflict situations help to restore peace and security.
The AU, built from the ashes of the OAU, though has a robust mandate is incapacitated ab initio because it has “very few sovereign powers to achieve it” since “it still remains largely a coalition of the willing with limited ability to drive solutions throughout the continent. The ASF, requiring cooperation from both the AUC and the RECs, could be an important step toward achieving this vision if it is successful.”

Marshall states that since the RECs are not sovereign, they cannot compel nor stop individual country deployments as was in the case of Southern African Development Commission (SADC) in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2008 when SADC kicked against intervention but Angola did intervene in DRC. The RECs, he claims can prevent the deployment of regional forces but not a country’s deployment; this shows the dynamics of RECs politics where a country can prevent a group action.

Marshall concludes that there are gaps in the ASF planning that should be looked into and appropriate remedial measures taken. Special Operations Forces be set up as a force multiplier for training others and for crucial operations in dire circumstances. Since it is expensive and difficult to train and maintain the military and police, Special Forces and civilian communication experts, the AU may create a centralized operations support base with these critical competencies.

In the view of Marshall, logistics, command and control are the constraint areas which need to be tackled. He admits that command and control difficulties are due to the nature of troops call-up, which allow troop contributing countries to insert caveats that limit the deployment of troops. Thus, the Commander’s flexibility and ability to operate is severely encircled.
In view of the multiple sources of funding for AU’s peace support operations, Marshall suggests that the African Clearing House (ACH) should be enhanced to coordinate the affairs of training to avoid duplication and overlapping of programmes and help to direct efforts beyond the concentration on infantry battalion training and also, the ASF structure streamlined to make it more lean but highly capable for all scenarios.

Marshall continues that the current decentralized set-up of the ASF at the RECs with executive management at the AU, though, is good, needs to be re-engineered in the face of resource constraints and the stage of development of the ASF. More also, the AU with its present insufficient capabilities at the headquarters and RECs levels should rather have a centralized planning and support with decentralized execution at the RECs. He recommends that the planning capacity at the PSD to be strengthened.

Since, per Marshall’s account, unilateral interventions by certain countries were not sanctioned by their RECs, and the AU did not chastise nor place any form of sanctions on them, this study will endeavour to find out why and also if relevant provisions exist to straighten errant states in instances like this and whether these provisions have been used before and if not, what could account for the non-usage and the future implications.

In an article titled, “Enhancing the Efficiency of the African Standby Force: The Case for a Shift to a Just-in-Time Rapid Response Force”, Cedric De Coning argues for a paradigm shift from the rapid response capacity policy to a just-in-time policy. He believes that, though, a lot has been achieved in the implementation of the ASF, the identified gaps hindering the operationalization of the ASF coupled with experiences elsewhere suggest that the ASF concept, as it stands now, at worst, is not feasible or, at best, sustainable. He argues that the AU’s target of having a rapid deployment capacity of 14 days when the ASF is operationalized in 2015 is a
big challenge. He contends that there are a few countries in the world that possess the needed high levels of resource and efficacy to achieve the 14 days target. He, therefore, questions this set target and labels it unrealistic proposing a just-in-time rapid response model as an alternative.

According to Cederic, the standby concept is wrongly-hinged on the premise that with a pre-select well-trained and equipped soldier readily available, peace operation could be rapidly deployed, within an optimum time, to achieve set goals. This assumption disregards or pays little attention to the most important of all factors: political commitment and national interests of leaders and states respectively. To Cedric, these two factors are more important than the readiness of a well-trained and equipped contingent set aside for immediate deployment. He believes the ASF will suffer from these two vulnerabilities that plagued the UN Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIB) initiative and the EU Battle Group concept and demised them.

To him, “this is because each crisis is unique, and it is doubtful that a generic standby capacity can sufficiently match the needs – both in terms of the political coalition and the operational capabilities – posed by the specific challenge. Each crisis requires a context-specific solution, including the coming together of a unique set of countries that have a political interest in the resolution of the conflict, or have an interest in being part of that particular mission. Each crisis also requires a slightly different set of capacities, and the off-the-shelf generic standby brigade model does not meet such needs.”

By the analysis of Cedric, national interest subtly motivates states to participate in consensual peace operations.

He concedes that the ASF concept has led to capacity-building in Africa. This has reflected in the actual planning and execution of peace support operations involving the military, police and civilian experts. He, however, predicts that post-2015 ASF may see the concept modified.
He advocates that the pillars of his proposed Just-in-Time Concept should be:

- “the modalities necessary to put together context-specific coalitions consisting of the AU, regions, member states and partners;
- “the ability of member states to contribute military, police and civilian capabilities”; and
- “the ability of the AU and regions to plan, deploy, manage and support peace operations.”

Cedric further maintains that “a just-in-time model will require a leaner ASF investment, because less effort will be needed to manage the pledging and verification of specific units, and to manage the model of rotating the responsibility for being on standing readiness among regions. This shift will allow the AU and the regions to focus more on the preparation of just-in-time modalities and the planning for and management of actual missions. This would be a much more realistic use of limited resources.” Cedric ends on the note that recent successes chalked in the rapid deployment of troops to Somalia and CAR were mainly due to political interests and to a lesser extent, the readiness of the pre-select standby troops so AU should invest more in prevention, peacemaking and peace-building to render unnecessary the need to engage in frequent rapid deployment of intervening troops.

Cedric throughout his argument does not provide evidence of the viability of his proposed just-in-time model. At the end of this study, a modest attempt will be made to find out the viability of Cedric’s proposal and the activities of the Panel of the Wise and the Early Warning Mechanism if they are on the ground and their impact on the search for peace and security on the continent.
Olaf Bachmann, in “The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) – a Design without Builders”, dilates on the operationalization of ASF with some cynicism and ends with a “but” caveat that casts doubts on the achievability of operationalization deadlines. According to Bachmann, having missed two deadlines and scaled down a “five brigade-strong ASF envisioned for 2012” to five battalions to “constitute a provisional’ Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) whilst awaiting the operationalization of ASF, it is ironic that RRF “soft target” also appear to be a mirage as mirrored in AU/ECOWAS inability to deploy troops to Mali in 2012 to contains the situation until the French stepped in first to calm the storms.

He, therefore, states that these “buts” need to be critically examined for the real picture to be painted. To this end, he tries to examine these “buts” under themes of “Social, Technical and Financial Ownerships”. Under the aforementioned themes, he explains the factors that appear to affect the operationalization of ASF in 2015. According to Olaf, African countries and their donors agree that “ownership” of ASF, with the support of development partners, belongs to Africa as her response to the actions and inactions of the international community.

From Olaf’s further analysis, “political/ideological ownership” is the sense of commitment, control and possession of the ASF Concept, which African leaders have demonstrated beyond measure. However, he believes that when it comes to the actual political commitment to provide the troops as pledged for ASF, notwithstanding the laudable troops contributions Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have made in Somalia and Central African republic, African leaders are found wanting. It is the belief of Olaf that states nationals at the ASF Headquarters in Addis Ababa and at the RECs/RM regional headquarters do show a lot of emotional and personal (“sociological ownership”) attachment to the ASF concept despite their countries failure to put it
into operation. Also, all attention and resources have been focused on the military, making the ASF concept technically military.

According to Olaf, financial ownership of the ASF concept remains “a distant objective”, whose achievement is paramount for the sustainability of ASF. He further contends that funding gaps in the ASF is a draw-back now and portends a future danger since Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) appear to be lost in the woods, without much hope, as to where the funds to finance the concept will be coming from. Again, Olaf argues that there is no enforceable Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and the TCCs to enable the AU Peace and Security Council assumes its rightful place as the authority that deploys troops since countries still decide which mission they will participate in. This played out in the recent Malian crisis in 2012.  

Though, Bachmann rightly indicates that there are serious issues regarding financing, he does not go further to find out why this is so and how it could be resolved or is being resolved by the RECs/AU. This study will find out if there is a donor fatigue and how RECs/AU intends to solve it, if it exists.

Festus Aboagye in “A Stitch in Time Would Have Saved Nine” alleges that the end of the Cold War watered a belief that conflicts, supposedly, engineered by the Cold War will subside for Africa to reap the expected benefits of peace and stability for socio-economic development. These dividends did not materialize. Conflicts still plague the continent with the United Nations looking aside. To Aboagye, this nonchalance of the UNSC, the institution clothed with the power and authority to stop the Rwandan genocide in 1994, might have triggered the concept of an African Force to solve African problems.
To buttress his assertions, he quotes the UN’s Panel on UN Peace Operations’ comments on the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) that the UNAMIR ‘had not been planned, deployed or instructed in a way that would have enabled it to stop the genocide... ’ and that ‘UNAMIR was also the victim of a lack of political- will in the Security Council and by other member states, including Africans.’

According to Aboagye, in the aftermath of Rwandan genocide, efforts to operationalize the ASF, in 1995 and 1997, to provide an African common security and defence mechanism failed until 2003 when it was revived with 2010 as the operationalization deadline. He argues that had the critical mass been achieved by African leaders, “the ASF would have been the instrument of choice for the Peace and Security Council’s mission to hunt for Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), in the Great Lakes region. In addition, the mandate of the AU Mission in Somali (AMISOM, 2007) would also have been transferred to the ASF in 2007. The projected deployment of an AU force to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to deal with the pervasive civilian insecurity would also have been a job for the ASF.” He continues that since the operationalization has been delayed continuously, it is time for an in-depth analysis to be done to ascertain the successes, challenges, failures, causative factors and prospects.

Aboagye continues that the ASF was conceived as an implementation tool for the decisions of the PSC and wonders if it will ever meet its operationalization deadlines after missing 2005, 2008 and 2010 deadlines detailed in roadmaps. He adds that the 2015 deadline, apparently moved from 2013, appears to be an unachievable moving target with question marks against its operational-ability since there are no concrete indications of plans to close identified
gaps to enable the ASF to be operationalized. Aboagye therefore advocates that the doctrine of the ASF should be re-tuned to suit varying African circumstances to make it still relevant.

Aboagye speaks of the need to retune the ASF concept which he does not provide. Efforts will be made to find out what possible retuning could be done on the ASF if its current form makes it difficult to be achieved.

1.10 Sources of Data

This study utilized secondary data derived from existing academic research, the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of Ghana, the Resolutions/Declaration of the AU General Assembly of Heads of State and Government and AU PSC on operationalization of the ASF, the Constitutive Act of the AU and adopted protocols, academic publications and other useful web-based sources. In addition primary resource data was gathered from some Ghanaian and foreign Diplomats, Scholars and Experts who have had stints with the AU and UN various capacities and have extensively researched into peace and security matters on the continent were interviewed to obtain primary source data to help in the analysis of the available secondary data. In this direction, interviews were conducted from a carefully-selected field of twenty (20) renowned personalities with huge experiences in diplomacy, academia, peace operations and military affairs and soldering. The rationale was to obtain primary source academic, diplomatic and military data that will aid the research.

The interviewees were: Professor Henrietta Mensah-Bonsu, a former UN Deputy Special Representative in Liberia and the Director of the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) of the University of Ghana; Dr. Mary Chinery-Hesse, a former member of the AU Panel of the Wise (PoW), former UN Under-Secretary-General, former Deputy
Director-General of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and former Chief Advisor to President John Kufuor (Ghana); Mrs. Sena Siaw-Boateng, the Director, Africa, AU and ECOWAS Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of Ghana; Col. Charles Debrah, ASF Trainer and Security Expert, UN Mission in South Sudan; Col. Emmanuel Wekem Kotia, Chief Instructor, Academic Programmes Coordinator and Defence and Security Expert, Kofi Anan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC); Brigadier-General Adjetey Annan, Former Defence Attaché, Ghana Embassy and Mission to the AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Brigadier-General Asamoah Kweku Yeboah, Director General, International Peace Support Operations (IPSO), Ghana Armed Forces; Group Captain Seth Kwaku Fianya, Director for Project and Statistics, Personnel Administration, Ghana Armed Forces and former ASF Military Trainer, AU Headquarters; and Lt. Col. Adeleye Taofik Lawal, Deputy Defence Advisor, Nigerian High Commission, Accra, Ghana.

1.11 Methodology

This study applied the qualitative research method. The qualitative research is identified by its goals. It assesses certain segments of social life and applies its tools to produce words and ideas generally, instead of numbers as data for analysis. Qualitative research method is primarily fact-finding. Under this method, the subject matter of this research, Operationalizing ASF, was investigated and enquired into further. This made the qualitative method the most relevant for this study since it helped the research to bring out factors underpinning the ASF and assisted in the analysis of the relevant opinions on the subject matter and facilitated the understanding of the current situation.
Since this is a specialized area, the selection of interviewees was based on expertise, academic credentials and professional work experience. The interviews with these International Relations scholars, Diplomats and Security Experts dwelt on their research, academic work, expert knowledge in military warfare and experiences as career diplomats. The unstructured interview skill was used against structured interview to create space for follow-up questions needed to secure the right responses to make this study empirical. The adoption of in-depth one-one interview sessions enabled data to be collected for conclusions to be drawn for this research, based on the analysis derived from the collected data. Additionally, since a lot of data already exists on the subject matter, further research was conducted into existing academic and journalistic writings on the subject matter to supplement and complement the data gathered from the interviews to balance out and ensure an authoritative conclusion.

1.12 Organisation of Chapters

Chapter One : Research Design
Chapter Two : Overview of the ASF structures in relation to their mandates
Chapter Three : The challenges and prospects in operationalizing ASF by the 2015 deadline
Chapter Four : Summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations of the study.
Endnotes

6 African Union Constitutive Act, 2002 accessed on 15/02/15 At Http://Www.Au.Int/En/Sites/Default/Files/Constitutive_Act_En_0.Htm
9 The AU Constitutive Act, 2002, op. cit.
11 Ibid., Article 3(F)
14 The AU Constitutive Act, 2002, op. cit.
16 AMANI AFRICA II Field Training Exercise (FTX) accessed at www.Apsta-Africa.Org/Pdf/377 on 15/02/15
21 Ibid.
23 Ibid
CHAPTER TWO

THE STRUCTURE OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF) AS CONCEPTUALIZED BY THE PSC PROTOCOL AND AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION

2.0 Introduction

The African continent has witnessed many debilitating civil strife and armed conflict of varying proportions over the decades. Some of these wars, like the Angolan Civil War, were influenced and protracted by the strong cold winds of the Cold War. The panacea to the current generation of African leaders was the dramatic shift from the previous total reliance on outside-led military Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to African-led PSOs. The lack of this crucial African-led initiative in 1994 played out ghastly in Rwanda when over a million people were massacred, while Africa and the world at large looked on.¹

The re-awakening of the spirit of pan-Africanism in military dimensions was the precursor to the concept of “African solutions to African problems”² that culminated in the birth of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2003 in sync with Article (2) of the AU Constitutive Act. The AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the Africa Union was initialed by African states to concretize this new philosophy that seeks a critical shift from state-security consciousness in the OAU Charter to human security stipulated in the AU Constitutive Act adopted in 2001. The significant move from non-intervention to non-indifference underlies the new Peace and Security Architecture of the AU (APSA). The APSA is composed of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) at the apex overseeing the activities of the Panel of the Wise (PoW); the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the African Standby Force (ASF); and the Peace Fund (PF). The PSC collaborates with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanism
(RMes) in this vein. In fact, the RECs/RMs are the main instruments or pillars in the PSC’s efforts at securing peace and security for the African continent.

Per Article 7(2-4) of the AU Constitutive Act, the AU member states have extensively clothed the PSC with the power to take decisions on their behalf in line with the relevant provisions of the Constitutive Act and its own Protocol. Thus, when it comes to peace and security issues, the PSC wields the requisite authority to act to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The Protocol states that “the Peace and Security Council shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.” The ASF is the implementing arm of the PSC. It is expected to execute peace support operations and mount interventions as and when mandated.

The PSOs will be carried out within the context of Scenarios 1-5 under Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter, where the purpose is peace-making and/or enforcement, whereas interventions are opposed entry operations in respect of Scenario 6 where the focus is to halt genocide and crimes against humanity, amongst others under Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. The former seeks to separate opposing sides, save civilian lives and help find a negotiated settlement to the conflict, whilst the latter aims at stopping the perpetration of crimes against humanity and genocide by a regime against its citizens or sides in an armed conflict.

The complex nature of the mandate of the ASF demands a multi-structured set-up to achieve the required results. Consequently, the ASF has been configured as a multi-dimensional and multi-discipline creature capable of handling all conflict and post-conflict scenarios effectively through any of its sub-units: Military, Police and Civilian components. It is expected that the Military wing will mount peace support operations to restore some
semblance of order to create room for political and civil dialogue among combatants, opposing sides, and other stakeholders to achieve peaceful settlements. The Police Force will then come in to provide security to the civilian population to resume their normal daily activities, while creating the enabling environment for law and order to prevail. The ASF doctrine, largely inspired by the UN Peacekeeping doctrine, has conceived the Civilian aspect to be deployed on the ground even when the conflict is on-going to provide humanitarian services, peace-making moves, governance issues and counselling to the victims of the conflict and assist in reconstruction of both governance and physical infrastructures.  

Troops contributing countries, through their RECs, are required to keep for ready deployment, a well-trained and armed corps of police and military personnel, whilst the AU headquarters keeps, in conjunction with the RCs/RMs, a roster of qualified Civilian Specialists in various areas like trauma management, human rights, sexual abuse, counselling, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reconstruction (DDR) and humanitarian services who will be called to service as and when necessary.

2.1 The Structures of the African Standby Force (ASF)

The ASF is a 25,000-strong rapid reaction force made up of military, police and civilian components with specified roles within a mission deployed under the mandate of the AU. Per the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I) adopted by the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff, Addis Ababa, in May 2003, the Force should be multi-dimensional and multi-disciplined with the PSC as the legitimate mandating authority. The standby force shall be based in the five regions of Africa (the Southern, Eastern, Central, Western and Northern). The AU has selected
five RECs/RMs as the prongs for the APSA, which has the ASF as one of its key components.\textsuperscript{9} In this direction, the RECs/RMs act as the vehicles for mobilizing state-actors to actualize the lofty ideals of the AU. The ASF is a collaborative effort between the African Union (AU) and the five REC/RMs.

This manifested in the 2008 signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and the RECs/RMs on the deployment of the standby forces of the RECs/RMs under the ASF mechanism.\textsuperscript{10} “By the provisions of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, the ASF will be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.”\textsuperscript{11} Though, their roles may be different, they are symbiotic and complementary. Each component’s role feeds into the others making the mission a whole so incomplete without a component. Per 13(3-5) of the ASF Policy Framework, the ASF shall amongst others perform functions in the following areas:

a) Observation and monitoring missions.

b) Other types of peace support missions.

c) Intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CAAU).

d) Preventive deployment.

e) Peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation.

f) Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and

g) Any other functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly.\textsuperscript{12}
Table 1: ASF Mission Scenarios and Timelines for Deployment

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/Regional Military Advice to a Political Mission</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/Regional Observer Mission Co-Deployed with UN Mission</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-Alone AU/Regional Observer Mission</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU Regional Peacekeeping Force for Chapter VI and Preventive Deployment Missions</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU Peacekeeping Force for Complex Multidimensional Peacekeeping Mission – Low-Level Spoilers</td>
<td>30-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU Intervention in Cases of Grave Circumstances</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I) has phased the development of the ASF into three. It seeks to develop the regional logistical bases, strategic level management capacity at the AU Headquarters (PSOD), command and control capability at the RECs/RMs level, field readiness and capacity of the force. In addition, a cadre of trained support staff at the regional and continental headquarters-levels was to be made ready.

In consonance with the provisions of the PSC Protocol and the ASF Implementation Policy, as depicted by the ASF deployment Scenarios table above, the RECs/RMS are required to have the capability to mobilize already-identified purpose-trained men in their member-states to form Brigades to undertake humanitarian, peace-making, peace-enforcement and peace-building missions within specified time-frames. The ASF is expected to have the capability to carry out Scenarios 1-4 missions within 30 days; in Scenario 5, the ASF is expected to be able to carry out missions within 30-90 days.
supposed to deploy a multidimensional force involving the Police and Civilian components in about 90 days; and team up with lead-nations to undertake Scenario 6 missions until it attains full capability to undertake Scenario 6 missions (intervention) on its own. In the Scenario 6 deployment, lead-nations will undertake opposed-entry interventions in conflict situations, run the mission headquarters and modify it to accommodate others who will join the mission later to make the PSO a multi-national one. In this instance, the RECs/RMs are to provide a rapid deployment force within a 14-day time framework to intervene to halt genocides and war crimes and provide humanitarian assistances in disaster situation (Scenario 6) or take over from an earlier lead-nation intervention force.

In an incremental drive, the ASF was supposed to have acquired the capacity to carry out Scenarios 1-3 missions by the end of June 2005 in the Phase I of its development but was extended to June 2008 because of the late start. At the end of Phase I, the force was expected to acquire the capacity to deploy observer missions in Scenarios 1-3 missions. It was envisaged that the AU too would have established a Roster of 300 to 500 military observers and 240 police officers to be based in member states on 14 days' notice to move. In the Phase Two, the capacity to implement traditional peace-keeping and interventions missions under Scenarios 4-6 were to be achieved by the end of June 2010. The RECs/RMs were supposed to have developed their ability to undertake complex PSOs, established their standby forces, the AU be capable of setting up and managing small headquarter planning unit with a Planning Element (PLANELM) staff of 15. At the RECs/RMs levels, they were also expected to have acquired the capacity to manage the standby forces with PLANELM staff strength of 5.
2.1.1 The Military Component

Under the Military Component of the ASF, the Military Brigades are to be deployed at the first level of military command in which multiple arms and services are controlled under a single headquarters. By this arrangement, the Brigade should be self-sufficient with the capability to carry out and maintain their operations independently of external support. Their formations (manoeuvre units) should also be adjustable to cope with the operational demands on the ground.\textsuperscript{14} Such a Brigade must be able to successfully undertake “Scenario 4 AU/Regional Peacekeeping Force (PKF) for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions” and Scenario 5 AU PKF for complex multidimensional peace-keeping mission at low-level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts).”\textsuperscript{15} To back the Brigade should be a fully stocked logistics base and a standing well-staffed HQ capable of supporting the deployment for at least 60 days in terms of supplies and control and command. The Logistic Bases for the ASF are the strategic one in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the operational one in Douala, Cameroun. Each REC/RM is supposed to train, equip and maintain a standby force of 5,000 for ready deployment.\textsuperscript{16}

2.1.2 The Police Component

In view of the fact that the ASF Police Component will be composed of personnel from different countries with different policing cultures, a common Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) will be applied through a harmonized training curriculum to blend them for effective and cohesive team-work.\textsuperscript{17} Specialists and general police will make up the Police Component to manage situations from instability to stability in a PSO. Even in the most extreme circumstances, where military force is initially required to stabilize a failing state or to protect
the population from genocide or humanitarian disaster, among others, the Police will still be expected to advise the military, civilian components and humanitarian agencies on the contingency steps for the restoration of civil order.\textsuperscript{18}

According to Kasumba and Coning, the “Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have evolved into complex and multidimensional enterprises that require integration and cooperation amongst military, civilian and police elements”.\textsuperscript{19} The International Civilian Police role is to mentor, monitor, reform and restructure, build capacity, perform executive functions and offer advice to the Local Police. It prepares the grounds for the eventual take-over of security matters by the native Police after the International Police Force has trained and re-trained and sensitized them to carry out their policing duties in conformity with international standards. This is notwithstanding their peculiar environments of tension, violence, acrimony, chaos, suspicion and deficient infrastructure and lack of logistics. In some cases, a new Police Force is formed altogether, due to mistrust of the existing personnel or their near-complete wipe out.

The Police Component is an integral part of a multi-dimensional AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and it is, therefore, required to play its vital roles in a complementing manner. The senior Police personnel are to be drawn from a standby police database at the AU for Strategic Level Police Mission Leaders roles, whilst the RECs/RMs provide 240 Individual Police Officers (IPOs) and 2 Formed Police Units (FPUs) each.\textsuperscript{20} The FPUs, according to the ASF Policy Framework:

are groups of police officers who are selected and trained as members of specialised units in their home countries. FPUs enter the mission area as an integrated entity with their own equipment including vehicles, communications, weapons and other specialised equipment required for their role. FPUs are therefore expected to be self-sustaining for a minimum period after deployment. While the main body of a FPU is commonly constituted of public order police, there are also specialists attached to FPUs, (e.g. forensics, criminal analysis, anti-terrorist and experts).\textsuperscript{21}
Since the ASF Policy Framework document clearly states that the Civilian Police form an integral part of the AU PSOs, the AU Headquarters PLANELM is required to have, at least, a senior Police officer (an AU Commissioner of Police) appointed by AU Peace Support Operations Department (PSOD) and the necessary number of other Police officers. This is to ensure that the Police Component of the ASF is not relegated to the background in decision-making and implementation in the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) at the AU Headquarters. Every IMPT is supposed to have Police representation at the senior level provided the mission will have a Police Component.

At the mission level, the Police unit is headed by a Commissioner who reports to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) but could report indirectly to the AU Police Commissioner at the AU Headquarters. The Police Component has sub-units like the Mission Operations Centre (MOC), Mission Analysis Cell (MAC), Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC), Mission Logistic Centre (MLOC), and others. However, the mandate of a mission determines the kind of Police personnel and organisational structure at the mission headquarters. The deadline for establishing and operationalizing the Police Component was by 30th June 2005.22

2.1.3 The Civilian Component

The traditional PSOs have been hinged on military operations with some amount of Police participation and limited inclusion of civilian, who normally perform administrative support duties. Now, the emphasis is on Civilian Experts who perform specialists’ roles as part of the PSO. The exclusion of Civilian Experts from PSOs led to a situation where the unhealed scares of war (destroyed social and governance infrastructure; physical and emotional trauma and sexual abuse victims; and persons affected by dislocation and displacement) hindered
socio-economic development and social re-integration in the post-conflict society because of the lack of experts to rehabilitate these human and non-human victims of war. Thus, effective restoration of social cohesion is lost. This observation caused the UN to shift some of the attention from the restoration of peace and security and law and order to the restoration of the human dignity and self-worth during conflicts and after conflicts.23

Since the end of the Cold War, PSOs have made Civilian Experts integral part of missions. Their number increased from 3,000 in 1998 to 9,000 in 1999. This huge leap in numbers in a year confirms the current emphasize on the role of Civilian Experts in peace operations. The Brahimi Report called for the upgrading and expansion of the Civilian Police Unit in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the addition of judicial and penal experts to its staff, and far-reaching reform of UN administrative structures and financial procedures for peace operations.24

The PSC Protocol, in Articles 14 and 15, state that Civilian Experts in a mission will undertake human rights, reconstruction, demobilization, governance humanitarian issues amongst other. These aforementioned issues, incidentally, fall within the competence of civilians mostly. It is no wonder that premium is now placed on the Civilian Component of peace operations. The Civilian Experts in the AU PSO are private individuals identified, screened, trained and kept on a standby Roster to be called to duty at a short notice. Per paragraph 3.14 of the ASF Policy Framework, it is expected that such a pool of expertise will be kept and deployed as part of the ASF. Portions of the document reads that: “the AU should establish and centrally manage a roster of mission administration, plus a roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, humanitarian, governance, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and reconstruction component.”25
The Roster is supposed to have 300 Experts out of which a total of 60 will be deployed in a mission in three waves of 15, 30 and 60. In effect, 15 person will be deployed first, then increased to 30 and finally to 60. The Experts are deployed in order of importance with elaborate functions that cover every facet of a PSO. The Policy Framework provides for collaboration between the Civilian Experts and their Police and Military counterparts to allow for supplementarity and complementarity. The multi-dimensionality of AU PSOs requires that these functions: Political Affairs; Public Information; Planning & Coordination; Human Rights; Humanitarian Liaison; Legal Advice; Conduct and Discipline; Child Protection and Gender are performed to render the mission worthwhile.

The mandate of a mission outlines the number of personnel required, their levels and the structure of the Civilian aspect. Additional roles like the Rule of Law (RoL); Electoral Affairs; DDR; Civil Affairs and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are dependent on the mandate. PSOs are normally supported by a set of administrative staff who are also civilian in nature. In the AU ASF Policy Framework, these staff are described as ‘Mission Support’. The Head of Civilian Component is the SRCC supported by his two Deputies. The SRCC sits on the PLANELM. The AU has a group of recognized Training providers which are required to work closely with the AU and the RECs/RMs to apply the Civilian Rostering manuals scrupulously in their training. According to the AU Civilian Rostering Guidelines on training, recruitment, selection and deployment, the experts are to undergo the Civilian Peacekeepers Foundation Course and perform creditably in addition to their work experiences and qualifications before they could be engaged in field missions. Based on the AU minimum rostering and selection standards and criteria, the experts are screened and placed on AU and RECs/RMs Rosters for deployment as and when the need arises.
However, according to the Policy Framework, whilst the Police and Military two are seconded to the AU through the RECs/RMs for missions by their governments and still maintain their employment in their respective countries, the Civilian Experts are in their governments’ employment per se. The Policy intends to rely mostly on secondment and but will hire to fill in the gap when there is a shortfall as its recruitment policy. The RECs/RMs are supposed to have a leaner civil component. The deadline to establish and operationalize the Civilian component of the ASF was in 2006.29

2.1.4 The Military Staff Committee

In pursuance of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, a standing Military Staff Committee (MSC) is supposed to be established to advise the PSC on military matters. The MSC is constituted of senior military officers of the members of the PSC and headed by a military officer from the member-state chairing the PSC. It has the power to co-opt additional members to enhance its work without voting rights. In view of the fact that the ASF is made up of regional forces, the RECs/RMs have representations on the MSC to enhance coordination and collaboration between the SC and the RECs/Ms.

The membership of the MSC is co-terminous with membership on the PSC. PSC members without adequate military representation (senior military attaché) at the AU have the right to appoint or authorize another state which is not a PSC member to represent it on the MSC. The PSC is empowered to take both diplomatic initiatives and action it considers appropriate in situations of potential and actual conflicts. The MSC has no executive authority and performs these advisory functions stated below per paragraph 4.5 of Chapter 4 of the
Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I):

a) to advise and assist the PSC in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

b) Similarly, to keep the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CDS) of Member States serving on the PSC and MSC well informed of all decisions of the PSC, and their implications on peace and security in Africa, in order to facilitate their deliberations and decisions during MSC meetings at the level of ACDS.

c) To ensure that policies and actions in the fields of conflict prevention, management and resolution are consistent with sub-regional mechanisms.

d) To enhance co-operation in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding through consultations with the PSD (PSOD).

e) Prior to submission of plans to the Chairperson, co-ordinate with the PSOD.

f) Subject to the decision and authorization of the PSC, participate in or undertake visits to ASF missions, and other peacemaking and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of conflicts.

g) Carry out any other functions, which the PSC may entrust to it.30

2.2 The ASF ROADMAPS

These ROADMAPS were supposed to be the milestones that would guide efforts to attain Full Operationalization Capability (FOC) for the ASF. The Maputo Foundation Document outlined a series of activities under ROADMAP I aimed at preparing foundational documents that would translate the ASF concept from the abstract realm into an implementable group of activities with quantifiable goals and objectives. The ultimate goal was to operationalize the ASF in 2010. Some of the documents that were generated at the end of ROADMAP I were the ASF Doctrine, Command, Control, Information System, Standard Operation Procedures (SOP), Logistics and Training and Evaluation.31
2.2.1 The ROADMAP I

The ROADMAP I was adopted in March 2005 and covered the period June 2006 - March 2008. It was initially supposed to be executed from 2003 to June 2005 but was extended to 2008 due to implementational delays. ROADMAP I was initiated to enable the AU acquire a certain level of Multi-dimensional Strategic Level Management Capability, based on UN advice and instructive experiences of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, to manage operations at the Headquarters (HQ) level and to superintend over a whole mission strategically. The RECs/RMS on their part were supposed to attain Mission Headquarters Level Multidimensional Management Capability for effective command and control in field operations during missions. This would have resulted in the establishment of strategic level management capacity for the management of Scenarios 1-2 missions by the AU and the setting up of the regional standby forces at a brigade level for Scenarios 1-4 operations by the RECs/RMs.

2.2.2 ROADMAP II

Roadmap II was adopted at the May 2009 meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee Defense Safety and Security (STCDSS), Addis Ababa, and endorsed by the 15th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Addis Ababa from in June 2009. It covered the period April 2008 - December 2010. Under ROADMAP II, the AU was supposed to develop its capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while RECs/RMs continued to develop their capacity to deploy a Mission Headquarters (HQs) for Scenario 4 involving AU/Regional peacekeeping forces. The ROADMAP II was a sequel to ROADMAP I. It sought to formulate additional foundational documents, consolidate and build upon the
achievements of ROADMAP I and pave way for Exercise AMANI AFRICA designed to test the progress made by both ROADMAPS.

In October 2010, Continental Command Post Exercise (CPX) was undertaken under AMANI AFRICA to test the AU’s ability to deploy and manage a scenario 4 type mission. “The evaluation report on this exercise concluded that the ASF has achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC).”

2.2.3 Implementation of ROADMAPS I and II

The Phase 1 (up to 30th June 2008) of the ASF Framework Policy of 2004 states that “The AU should develop and maintain the full time capacity to manage Scenario 1 and 2 (military advice to political mission and co-deployed observer) missions, and establish a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 3 (stand-alone observer) missions.” The RECs/RMs on their part would have acquired the capacity to develop their standby brigades and have the ability to utilize “standby re-enforcement system to manage Scenario 4 (AU/Regional PKF) missions.”

In the report of the 2nd African Defence and Security Ministers on the operationalisation of the ASF, in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, 24th to 28th June 2008, the Ministers came to a decision that “significant progress has made in the development of the policy documents and efforts were undertaken by the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) in the establishment of their brigades”. Again, it acknowledged that the “pace has not been speedy” and “the regional brigades were not developing at the same pace due to lack of political will in some instances, as well as the cultural diversity and political-economic environment prevailing in the region.”
The Report, however, indicated that understaffing was contended with by the PSOD, whilst undertaking peace-keeping activities at the same time and this impacted on the pace of the development of the Brigades by the RECs/RMs and urged the Planning Elements (PLANELM) of the RECs/RMs to “recruit police personnel and civilians to enhance the development of those capacities.” In Phase I, the Report concluded that “a Training Directive and Training Plan has been produced that will enable the ASF components to train sufficiently and test or apply the working (policy) tools in the periods leading to the operationalization of the ASF by 2010.” From the Report, it is clear that the civilian and police components were not in place and the military were not properly constituted to conform to the standards of the ASF Doctrine.

In the Phase 2 of the Framework, (1 July 2005 - 30 June 2010), the AU was expected to have developed and maintained its acquired capacity in Phase 1 and gone ahead to develop further capacity in managing up to Scenario 5 (complex PKF) missions. On their part, the RECs/RMs were also expected to have built upon their capabilities in maintaining standby brigades to possessing increased rapid deployment abilities.

In their assessment of the Phase 2, though Yvonne Kasumba and Cedric de Coning concede that a lot of progress had been made in the areas of policy documents development; levels I, II and III decision-making exercises (AMANI AFRICA I & II) had been conducted for the AU and the RECs/RMs; management capabilities attained in the strategic and operational levels; and some achievements chalked in the Police and Civilian components. They maintained that:

too little, too late” incorporation of the civilian and police elements in both the pre-preparation and conduct of the various activities, thus compromising the aspect of multidimensionality. There was also a lack of clarity among the various decisionmakers and role players in terms of the procedures that are involved in mandating a mission.
They concluded that the absence of conceptual buy-in and political will by the main actors would likely derail the achievement of the 2010 operationalization deadline:

What is also clear is that, despite much progress towards establishing strategic level capabilities, the AU PSOD has yet to develop the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations and, for their part, the RECs/RMs have yet to develop full capacity to deploy a mission headquarters for Scenario 4 missions involving AU/regional forces. This deficiency creates a high degree of risk for the ASF concept.42

Subsequently, according to Kasumba and Coning, the AU planned the ROADMAP III to undertake the aspects of the two ROADMAPS left unimplemented and also to find antidotes to the identified gaps in the two guidelines to make it possible for the ASF to be operationalized in 2015.

In the 2010 Assessment Study, the study identified limited linkages between the AU and RECS/RMS and between the RECs/RMs; low levels of coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs; funding gaps that brings to the fore the issue of sustainability of ASF operations since the donors, the financial mainstay of the APSA, are unpredictable; poor staffing imposed by the ‘Maputo Structure’ which limits the engagement of staff on the AU’s regular budget. The thorny issue of subsidiarity was also raised in the Report in addition to logistics, leadership, air-lift capability and equipment compatibility gaps.
Table 2: The ASF Current Status of Implementation by RECs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmarks</th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>SADC</th>
<th>EASF</th>
<th>NARC</th>
<th>ECCAS</th>
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<td>7. Centres of Excellence</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Moving Africa Forward, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study”

Keys:
✓ - means successful implementation of the required task by the REC/RM under consideration.
x - means non-implementation of the required task by the REC/RM under consideration.
NA - means the non-applicability of the task in the instance under consideration.

2.2.4 ROADMAP III

The 5th Ordinary meeting of STCDSS in Addis Ababa, in October 2011, adopted ROADMAP III of the ASF. This was approved by the 20th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, held in Addis Ababa, January 2012. The ROADMAP III spans December 2010 to December 2015 and it is the last phase in the development of the ASF. Since all the RECs/RMs are not at the same level of development, the AU drew on the experiences gained
from ROADMAPS I & II and the results of the simulation and validation training exercises (AMANI AFRICA) to put together ROADMAP III. This phase is expected to consolidate the gains of the two previous ROADMAPS, bridge the identified gaps and prepare the ASF for operationalization in 2015. The specific aims of ROADMAP III are:

- finalize the pending actions under the Roadmap II, in the operational, legal, logistics and structural areas;
- review the ASF Vision to ensure its coherence with Africa’s needs, as determined in APSA
- highlight the new priorities and challenges: RDC, humanitarian action, management of the Police component and coordination of the civilian component.\(^{43}\)

2.3 AMANI AFRICA Cycle

AMANI AFRICA was to put into practice the doctrines for useful evaluations to be done and to enable the ASF concept to be endorsed.\(^{44}\) The European Union (EU)-African Union collaboration culminated in these military exercises from 2008 to 2010 aimed at achieving Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) that would have fed into an eventual full capacity at the AU level in 2015. In 2010 APSA Assessment Study, the AU stated that:

- “Phase 1 focused on individual training that was to be conducted in Member states level, PLANELM HQs level, Brigade Headquarters and LOG Base level.
- Phase 2, Individual Groups i.e. PLANELM, Brigade HQs, Logistic Base and units were supposed to train collectively.
- Phase 3 culmination of collective training conducted in the form of seminars, joint CPX and joint FTX (AMANI)."\(^{39}\)

2.3.1 AMANI AFRICA I

The AU adapted an EU training programme (EURORECAMP) to provide an adjustable framework suitable to its needs but capable of assessing and validating the ASF structure as having the capacity to achieve AU’s vision in the area of peace and security. The AMANI AFRICA Training Exercises are focused on realising “multidimensional peace operation integrated management”\(^{45}\) capacity relating to “structure, procedures and available means.”\(^{46}\)
The AMANI AFRICA Cycle is a series of activities carried out cyclically to enable the AU and
the RECs/RMs acquire the capacities necessary to operationalize the ASF. The programmed
activities were “the Strategic Decision Makers; a Level One Decision Making Exercise or Map
Exercise (MAPEX); a Political Strategic Seminar/Strategic Conference; a Level Two Decision
Making Exercise or Command Post Exercise (CPX).”

The Strategic Decision Makers was seminar in Addis Ababa in April 2009. The Peace
and Security Council (PSC) and the top echelon of the AU Commission (AUC) and the
RECs/RMs met to establish the steps to be implemented to allow for the deployment of the
ASF. The Draft Aide Memoire that came out of this seminar served as the platform and
provided guidelines for implementing the lined up programmes in the AMANI AFRICA Cycle.
The Map Exercise (MAPEX) was a practical session of studies, discussions and exercises from
31st August to 4th September 2009 in Addis Ababa. This saw the staff of the AU Commission
and the RECs/RMs being taken through the AU deployment procedures and the ASF Doctrine.
Again, in Addis Ababa from in November 2009, the Political Strategic Seminar/Conference
(POLSTRAT) was carried out to assess the competence level of the staff of the AU
Commission in using staff procedures at the commission in deployment and post-deployment
scenarios. Mandate and Mission Plan for deployment were developed for conducting the
Command Post Exercise (CPX) later. All these culminated in Continental CPX which was
undertaken in Addis Ababa in October 2010.47
2.3.2 AMANI AFRICA II

The AU in conjunction with the European Commission (EC) launched AMANI AFRICA II in Addis Ababa, in September 2011, with the aim of conducting a Field Training Exercise (FTX) in 2015. The purpose of AMANI II to “validate the capacity of the African Union to grant a mandate for the use of a Rapid Deployment Capability, as an initial operation for scenario six and lead in the process to a fully-fledged multidimensional peace operation (scenario 5)” by the end of 2012. Thus, declaring the ASF as having achieved Partial Operational Capability (POC).

In an AU press release of 3rd November, 2014 titled “Strategic Headquarters Training Session of the AMANI AFRICA II Field Training Exercise Opens in Harare”, the AU indicated that it was holding a training exercise in Harare “to provide participants with a better understanding of Peace Support Operations planning and management and prepare them for the Main Exercise” slated for April 2015 in South Africa. Specifically, AMANI II is targeting the building of capacity through field exercises for troops and command and control. In this direction, a Field Training Exercise (FTX) was planned to be held in Lesotho in October 2014. This Training exercise was moved to March 2015 and according to Kim Helfrich, the exercise rather took place in South Africa in March 2015 due to the unstable political situation in Lesotho. Also, he asserts that another field exercise under AMANI AFRICA II will be conducted in Northern Cape, South Africa, from October 19th to 7th November 2015 to assess the readiness of the ASF for operationalization in 2015.

Regarding the issue of progress, an AU Peace and Security Council secretary, Admore Kambudzi has commented that “significant progress has been made in ASF capacity building, including the development of the ASF Civilian Roster, training and exercises which will
culminate this year in the AMANI AFRICA II exercise. The issue of the African capacity for immediate response to crisis is a question that the AU and its Member States are determined to effectively address."

2.4 The Rapid Deployment Force

The Rapid Deployment Force is an integral part of the ASF. It has a medium-term objective of generating regional force of readily available 2,500 troops from each REC/RM with adequate capability to intervene in Scenario 6 situation cases of genocide, gross human rights abuses and crimes against humanity within 14 days. The Rapid Deployment Capability will be deployed at the entry-level to prepare the grounds for a larger mission to take over. According to the ROADMAP III, the RDC was scheduled to be tested, evaluated and operationalized by 2012. The level of readiness of the RDC was adjudged unsatisfactory at the end of 2013 by AU’s Panel of Experts. Thus, it missed its 2012 deployment deadline set out in the guidelines of the ROADMAP III.

Consequently, an Initial Planning Conference (IPC) was held in Addis Ababa in March, 2012 to prepare the modalities for a Field Training Exercise (FTX) in 2015 under AMANI AFRICA II. The exercise will "validate the capacity of the African Union to grant a mandate for the use of a Rapid Deployment Capability, as an initial operation (Scenario 6) and to lead, in the process, a fully-fledged multidimensional peace support operation (Scenario 5)".

2.5 Conclusion

Chapter Two assessed the structures of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Military, Civilian and Police Components of the ASF, the ROADMAPS and the AMANI
AFRICA Training Exercises as detailed in their various foundational documents prepared by the AU to guide the operationalization of the ASF.
Endnotes

4 Ibid, Article 2(1&2)
6 The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee
7 Cedric De Coning and Yvonne Kasumba, eds., The Civilian Dimension of The African Standby Force.
9 Cedric De Coning and Yvonne Kasumba, op. cit.
11 Protocol Establishing the PSC of the AU, July 2002
12 The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee
13 Ibid., Chapter 1
14 Ibid., Chapter 3
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
18 The Civilian Dimension of The African Standby Force edited by Cedric De Coning and Yvonne Kasumba
19 Ibid.
20 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
28 Cedric De Coning and Yvonne Kasumba, op. cit.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid., page 2 paragraph 6
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., page 2 paragraph 7
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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The Civilian Dimension of The African Standby Force edited by Cedric De Coning and Yvonne Kasumba
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The Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalisation…op. cit., p. 1 EW/rt . page 6 paragraph 24
CHAPTER THREE

THE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN OPERATIONALIZING THE ASF BY THE 2015 DEADLINE

3.0 Introduction

There was much euphoria when the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was established in 2004. This was because the adoption was a new milestone achieved by Africa since previous attempts by the Organisation of African Union (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU), to actualize its numerous Declarations, Decisions and Protocols on peace and security such as 1993 OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution into the African Union failed. The setting up of the APSA and the subsequent huge financial investment by AU’s partners in the operationalization of the structures of the architecture sent hopes high: Africa had, at long last, found a durable lasting solution to its nemesis - armed conflicts and violence- that result in insecurity, lack of peace, human rights abuse, genocide, crime against humanity, deprivation and under-development.

The hope of having a functional African Standby Force that will provide an African solution to African peace and security problems in peace keeping and making did not materialize when the 2010 deadline was missed despite all the political statements and financial support from the AU’s partners. The AU’s Panel of Experts in 2010 came out with a report that pinpointed a myriad of gaps to be filled and proffered some recommendations to make this ASF dream a reality. This study juxtaposes the identified gaps against the status quo in this Chapter to help draw a conclusion as to the prospects of operationalizing the ASF in 2015.
3.1 Challenges in Operationalizing the ASF

Since this research seeks to make modest attempts at answering some questions bordering on gaps identified in the works of some academicians and experts and establish if the deadline to operationalize ASF is achievable. The ensuing analysis in this study, based on the knowledge gathered from primary and secondary sources stated in Chapter One, will try to provide insights into the status quo of the ASF and consider how plausible the 2015 deadline is.

3.1.1 The Lack of Political-will to Own and Equip the ASF

The issue of Political-will is pervasive and so-encompassing that it affects almost every variable and facet of the ASF and thus each of these enabling factors can be discussed under it. The other factors that equally qualify under Political-will will be discussed elsewhere. This study asserts that every force enabler, capacity or multiplier has a political connotation since political decisions activate them or acquire them. Consequently, it is plausible, here, to limit the discussions to only the redemption of troop pledges and the physical inspection of troops and equipment that will facilitate the rapid deployment in emergencies

There is the lack of political-will on the part of African leaders, when it comes to the redemption of pledged troops and equipment. Many promises made by African Heads of States and Governments at their General Assembly meetings, in the provision of troops and equipment were never redeemed fully or sometimes never delivered. Other times too, the redemption came late affecting the rapidity of troop deployment since some pledges were so essential that, without them other contributions became ineffective or non-deployable. In an interview with Charles Debrah, an ASF Trainer and Security Expert at UN Mission in South Sudan, he stated that African leaders’ political-will is just rhetoric. Adeleye Taofik Lawal, the Deputy Defense
Advisor at the Nigerian High Commission in Accra, Ghana, corroborated Debrah’s assertion in an interview. He intimated that some countries fail to redeem their pledges at the eleventh hour forcing others to step in to fill the vacuum created.2

According to Debrah, Ghana pledged a Helicopter Squadron to the ECOWAS Standby Force but was unable to deliver because the same Squad had been deployed under a UN peace operation earlier on. Asamoah Kweku Yeboah, Director-General of the International Peace Support Operations (IPSO) of the Ghana Armed Forces, stated in an interview that though Ghana has pledged to provide an engineering unit to the ECOWAS Force, the same is currently deployed with the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) but gave the assurance that the Ghana Armed Forces still has the capability to constitute another engineering unit should the need arises because the German government has retooled the unit so they have the capacity. Assuming Germany had not recently equipped the engineering unit, which helped Ghana’s deployment into Mali, it is likely that Ghana might have defaulted in redeeming her pledged capacity.

The leadership of African states still lack the political ‘buy-in’ of the ASF concept and this manifests in the implementation of many of their decisions and declarations.3 According to Debrah, Africa lacks political focus, which is derailing the operationalization process. Mary Chinery-Hesse, political-will has been the bane of the AU and where there are no funds, policies are rendered useless and structures ineffective.4 The recent adoption of African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) underlies this innocuous assertion. Inadequate political-will to find realistic solutions to the deficits in logistics and strategic airlift capacity confronting the ASF resulted in the adoption of ACIRC by the AU instead of channeling these capacities being pledged under ACIRC to the RECs operationalize the standby forces.
Clearly, the ACIRC borrowed its tenets from the same ASF Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) module it is intended to compliment, with very little variation in the location of authority to deploy, and has also burrowed into the ASF’s traditional sources of funding. One wonders why ACIRC advocates could not make available to the ASF the capacities they are pledging under the ACIRC concept to save the faltering Rapid Deployment Capability aspect of the ASF rather than set up a new concept at another cost.

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) is definitely diverting attention and resources needed to attain the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) for the ASF. The United States (US)\(^5\) and the Chinese governments\(^6\) have all stated that, they will be assisting Africa to operationalize the ACIRC. This is a clear diversion of resources and attention. According to Seth Kwaku Fianya, the Director for Project and Statistics at the Personnel Administration of the Ghana Armed Forces and former ASF Military Trainer at the AU Headquarters, the ACIRC troop contributing states delegated liaison officers to the AU headquarters to work on the development of the concept at their own cost initially but later requested for their administrative cost and salaries to be absorbed by the AU after some few months though they stated severally that their countries will bear their own expenses.\(^7\)

This study finds it puzzling that the countries pledging under the ACIRC concept could not make their capacities available to their respective RECs/RMs to enable the rapid deployment capability of the African Standby Force (ASF) to be employed during the Malian crisis in a joint-RECs peace operation. It is well-documented that the ASF lacks logistics and airlift capacities which have delayed the attainment of RDC that would have enabled the ASF to be operationalized. This gives the impression that some states are not fully committed to AU’s standby force and lack the political-will to own the ASF and consequently commit the requisite
human and material resources needed to operationalize the ASF. According to Fianya, the British government airlifted Ghana’s Engineer Regiment to Mali during the ECOWAS/AU intervention. Why not Egypt or Angola reputed to have such a capability?

Due to national security fears that their defence weaknesses will be exposed, states are reluctant to allow ASF inspectors to assess the readiness and combat-worthiness of their pledged men and equipment. It is within this context that states are not ready to open their military installation for pre-deployment equipment inspection. Emmanuel Wekem Kotia, a Chief Instructor and Academic Programmes Coordinator at the Kofi Anan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), stated in an interview that pledged troops and equipment are hardly verified by the AU/RECs/RMs although the ASF doctrine require the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) and the Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) to allow inspection teams to confirm their readiness to deliver on demand. The failure of states to allow their pledged equipment to be inspected will affect mission planning and rapid troop deployment. 8

3.1.2 Financing the ASF and Donor Fatigue

The political leadership in Africa has conceptual ownership of the ASF concept as the originators but lack the critical political proprietorship of the concept needed to galvanize all the other enablers. The assumption of political responsibility for the implementation of the ASF is at the bottom of the financial problem the ASF faces and a critical mass if the concept is to be sustained since to own the concept financially is a political decision. So far the biggest concern of the AU and for that matter, the APSA, has been the funding of the ASF. Since the problem of economic constraint is so endemic in Africa and prevalent to the extent that almost every state’s budget has a huge component of multilateral donor support. It is, therefore, not surprising but
rather natural that almost every peace and security programme of the AU/PSC is funded 100% or almost 100% by development partners, mainly the European Union, the United States and to a lesser extent, Japan, Norway, India, Australia, and China amongst others. The EU alone funded PSOs and related Capacity Building (CB) to the tune of €2.7 billion in 2013 alone.9

Though, Africa can do far better than it is doing now, in terms of financing the ASF, the despicable and glaring spectacle of poverty and deprivation amidst its people makes it difficult for large chunks of its financial resources to be expended on peace missions. In an interview with Adjete Annan, a former Defense Attaché at the Ghana Embassy in Addis Ababa and Permanent Mission to the AU, Ethiopia he intimated that, African states do not manufacture implements of war and they have to import with their scarce foreign exchange from their traditional exports, which is meant for their developmental projects. African governments are thus, torn between spending scarce resources on development and securing peace and security.

This is an ironic situation because peace begets development, whilst violence and armed conflicts beget under-development, which leads to poverty and deprivation that beget violence and armed conflicts. In breaking this circle, which one of these precursors should be of priority? Africa is, therefore, in a dilemma. The peace and security-development nexus should inform peace support initiatives both on the part of donors and Africa. A fine and delicate balance must be found between the two since each is dependent on the other. This calls for a paradigm shift by donors and African states to reach a consensus that answers all questions on the peace-security-development nexus satisfactorily.

The maintenance of world peace and order is the primary duty of the United Nations (UN). The Preamble, Chapter I (Article 1) and Chapter V (Article 24) of the UN Charter collectively allocate the responsibility of maintaining world peace and security to the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). Chapters VI and VII further highlight this important function of the UN in eliminating threats to world peace, security and order under the principle of collective security. The principle of collective security demands that a threat to one is a threat to all and all resolve to respond to all threats collectively. Therefore, it behoves on the UNSC to play a leading role in the mounting of AU PSOs since they are geared toward obtaining global peace and security, which fall into the domain of the UN. Considering the fact that and African states provide about 70,000 uniformed personnel for UN operations globally, it is not out of place for the world (UN) to provide Africa with what it lacks most (funds and military hardware) in the running of its PSOs since the nature of conflicts in Africa deters the UN and Western countries from mounting the PSOs themselves on the continent.

It is noted that Africa has also become a major player in the search for global peace and security because of its weak economic base, it is forced to depend on donors, who determine the PSOs it should undertake and their nature in order to receive funding. Donor dependency can potentially create the problem of “donor-beneficiary relationship.” It is worrying that the peace and security programmes budget of the AU is funded to the tune of about 97% by donors.

Moreover, it costs far less in domestic political back-lash and finances to the UN and Western principals to train and equip African troops to run their own PSOs than for them to be on the ground themselves. The principle of shared responsibility should be the underpinning raison d’etre here. The UN, world powers and other nations, as part of their moral and legal responsibilities, should provide Africa with the funds and heavy military hardware it needs, while Africa on its part makes men, equipment and the political-will to take casualties available to maintain peace and security on the African terrain. For that matter global peace and security. This does not mean Africa has no financial responsibility towards its own peace but it, at least,
explains why the outside world should support the African peace efforts without much funfair or hullaballoo.

It must be admitted that the EU has between 2004 and 2014 contracted €1.45 billion with the AU and paid over €1.3 billion through the African Peace Facility (APF) towards African PSOs and other peace-related programmes on the continent. The APF was established at the request of the AU in 2003 in line with Article 11 of the Cotonou African Caribbean Pacific-European Union Agreement (ACP-EU). Funds from APF are used to finance AU and RECs/RMs PSOs, mediation and preventive diplomacy and Capacity Building (CB).\textsuperscript{13} Also, the United States (US) government has since 2009 expended about US$892 million in supporting African CB and PSOs by training and equipping about 250,000 troops and 1,100 Police personnel.\textsuperscript{14} Japan and China have also made financial contributions towards peace and security in Africa.

Despite the assistance of the donors, the threat of financial sustainability of the ASF has been on the table for some time without any resolution yet. According to Thierry Tardy, a Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Africa’s inability to take financial charge of its PSOs raises doubts about its willingness to effect AU’s ‘African solutions to African problems’ philosophy. He remarked that, though the EU is the largest funder of peace operations, it has little influence on how peace missions are run and this raises the issue of accountability. He concludes that “looking ahead, a strategic approach to peace operations will inevitably imply a closer linkage between financial engagement and political control.”\textsuperscript{15} This means Africa’s level of control on the running of its PSOs will be whittled down in the near future.
Though, the EU currently has committed itself to support PSOs in Africa up to 2020 under the APF, it is at the same time discussing with the AU how to broaden the funding spectrum by encouraging AU members to contribute financially towards its PSOs and incorporate other partners too.\textsuperscript{16} This is the strongest signal that short and medium term EU commitments are secured but not the long term commitments. This indicates fatigue. Donor fatigue occurs when the traditional donors, who previously supported a programme, gradually reduce the level of support or indicate their intentions to wind off their support for varied reasons. If there is no transitory funding arrangement, the reduction in funding, depending on the severity, will automatically stall the programme or bring it to a complete halt until replacement funding is found.

Debrah intimates that nothing can be achieved without an effort. African states cannot run away from their responsibility so they should try to generate their own funds because that is the surest way to make the ASF sustainable. Again, he states that the contribution of some countries are pitiable with some even smaller than his salary which should be rectified since it is ridiculous. Debrah further reiterated that donor fatigue can roll back the progress made so far or slow it down in the least. In spite of his caution, he staunchly maintains that the ASF will survive donor fatigue because it is a good project which Africa must try to generate funds within Africa to finance and sustain. He maintained that Africa cannot run away from its responsibility of sustaining the ASF. He wondered if a country can choose not to survive in the face of financial crisis because donors are not forthcoming.\textsuperscript{17}
3.1.3 Nigeria and South Africa and the Operationalization of the ASF

South Africa and Nigeria are Africa’s biggest countries in economic and military might, hence their relevance in any adopted African policy cannot be overemphasized. Their declared positions are so telepathic that clusters of states directly or indirectly are held sway by their stance on sub-regional and continental issues. Thus, their support is crucial to any policy directive adopted by a group they belong to. The two countries are currently the financial mainstay of the AU treasury after the demise of Col. Muammar Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader.

In the reviewed AU Scale of Assessment for the period 2016-2018, both Nigeria and South Africa are each expected to contribute 12% of the total assessed membership contributions. This clearly suggests that the two countries involvement in any project carry significant weight. The two states also appear to be, currently, the most reliable in the payment of contributions in terms of volume and timeliness. The AU’s 2016 Budget of US$ 247 million will be funded 41% by members’ assessed contributions, whilst the rest, 59%, will be borne by donors.

Nigeria paid about US$ 16.2 and US$16.96 million as assessed contributions to the AU in 2014 and 2015 respectively. South Africa is also reported to have contributed about US$ 33.23 million in 2014. Only about 67% of the expected assessed contributions were paid by members in 2014. In this light, Nigeria and South Africa’s reliable and huge payments are of significance to the survival and aspirations of the AU. The AU, according to Mmanaledi Mataboge, stated in parts that:

only programmes that have secured funds from partners should be included in the union’s budget and ….the commission should ensure compliance with the signed contribution agreements entered with the partners….and….despite high approved budgets, the funds released and the contracts/terms of engagement signed by the development partners were too insignificant. This low commitment from the partners left the AU with a huge budget deficit.
Since 1994, when black rule started in South Africa, it has been South Africa’s foreign policy to strategically use its huge financial resources to project itself as an influential global player to whittle away its bad apartheid image. South Africa is described as one of the best resourced armies in Africa with huge military capabilities. Moreover, until recently, it was the largest economy in Africa before Nigeria overtook it. Despite this, its huge industrial base and advanced economy and infrastructure make it a major player in Africa, and especially, in the SADC region. Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, the South African Defense Minister indicated in 2014 that her country, as a policy, has adopted a 400-page document that advocates for its military might to be boosted to enable it play a significant role as a national, regional and global player.

The South African government in its 2011-12 financial year spent US$ 22.7 million (R288 million) from its Renaissance Fund, under its Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRC), to promote its foreign policy aimed at positioning it as a peace-maker. Also, in 2011 and 2012, it paid 15% of the assessed contributions of the AU members and was expected to fund 20% (R70 million) of the SADC’s 2012 budget and contribute R138 million towards SADC’s 2013/14 budget. Though, it is by far the largest contributor to SADC’s budget, there is no indication that it has chosen to underwrite the deployment of the region’s component of the ASF by providing logistics and funds. In a concept gleaned from the RDC aspect of the ASF Scenario 6 mission deployment, South Africa, as the main proponent of the ACIRC, is still looking forward to receive donor support before the ACIRC will be deployed in Central Africa in October 2015. This is regardless of the fact that it gave serious commitments that the new concept will be equipped and financed by the participating states themselves. It is reported that in August 2014, President Jacob Zuma stated “that the SANDF would be sending soldiers back to the Central African Republic as early as October as part of ACIRC.” The report continued
that the US Africa Command will be providing equipment and transport since most African
states are in economic straits.

South Africa is regarded as having serious challenges in terms of its political ability to
sustain peacekeeping casualties since it left the Central African Republic (CAR) when 15 of its
soldiers were killed by the Saleka rebels in 2013. Institutional challenges like AIDS and funding
are regarded as impediments to the regional military role it wants to play. Currently, funds to
conduct the final AMANI AFRICA II exercise in South Africa in October-November, 2015 are
in doubts.\textsuperscript{22} Helmoed Römer Heitman stated in August 2014, about year after the ACIRC had
been promoted by South Africa and adopted by the 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the
Union held in May 2014, that the “immediate challenge is, however, the current shortfall in the
present defence budget, due to both legacy issues and new operational activities, such as
unfunded ACIRC preparations, sustainment of current missions and staff structure.\textsuperscript{23}

From all indications, South Africa is positioning itself as an African peace-broker with an
ostensible eye on the future Security Council seat for Africa. Despite this overture, one wonders
if South Africa is ready to dole out huge amounts of money as it pursues its peace and security
agenda as a leader as Nigeria did in West Africa and Africa before now. Though, it has the
military and financial wherewithal, the country’s open efforts to help SADC to operationalize its
RDC is yet to be seen in concrete terms when compared to its zealous efforts to operationalize its
own ‘baby’, the ACIRC. South Africa’s impact on the operationalization of SADC’s ASF likely
to be nominal because of its divided attention on the ACIRC.

Nigeria has been at the fore-front of African peacekeeping for decades. Nigeria was in
Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire in 1960) two days after its independence, and it did
cost Nigeria about US$ 40 million to spearhead the first AU/OAU mission deployed in Chad in
1982. The financial and material burden of the West African Economic Community’s (ECOWAS) ECOMOG interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and other ECOWAS peace missions in the West African zone were borne largely by Nigeria to the tune of about US$8 billion. It is estimated that Nigeria has spent about US$10 billion in OAU/AU and ECOWAS peace missions without re-imbursement.\textsuperscript{24}

In view of the huge cost its peace operations placed on its economy in the past, it appears that it is the Nigerian government’s policy to share the peacekeeping burden with other stakeholders (UN, AU and other states). Nigeria is currently employing about 20\% of its GDP to fight Boko Haram and other domestic security threats. However, Nigeria has obliged itself to provide majority of the men and equipment for the operationalized ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) come December 2015. Nigerian, however, lacks strategic airlift and sealift capacity.\textsuperscript{25}

Nigeria’s Army appears not to be adequately-tooled as exposed by Boko Haram insurgents, who have whittled down Nigeria’s traditional appetite for huge involvement in regional peacekeeping. In an off-the-record discussion with a diplomat at the Nigerian High Commission in Accra, Ghana, Nigeria’s financial and logistical contributions to the ECOWAS Standby Force, as a continental and sub-regional leader, in the operationalization of the ASF could not be ascertained. The officer rather stated that, “whatever Ghana does, Nigeria will support as a sister country.”\textsuperscript{26} This is non-committal.

There appears to be a consensus in Nigeria that, though it will not renege on its responsibility as a leader, it will be rather more cautious and wiser seeking equity in regional peace mission cost-sharing. This impression, though unofficial, are reflected in the views of Adeleye Taofik Lawal, the Deputy Military Advisor at the Nigerian High Commission in Accra, Ghana, expressed in an interview. Again, Adesoji Adeniyi corroborates Lawal’s opinion in his
This forebodes an ambivalent posture with ramifications, which will not take long to be noticed since Nigeria is a regional and continental power-house with a rich history in peacekeeping participation and financing. Therefore, any such policy shift will have negative repercussions on ECOWAS’ ASF if these views are well-founded because the sub-region’s budget is funded more than 50% by Nigeria and it has been the back-bone of the successes the ECOWAS has chalked in peace operations.

With the apparent reluctance of these two regional powers to lead their regional standby forces financially and logistically, it is no wonder that the operationalizing deadline of the ASF was shifted in 2010 and likely to be shifted again in 2015. South Africa has not made its huge military and logistics capability adequately available to SADC and Nigeria too has developed cold feet towards African peacekeeping because of its own security challenges and lack of readiness to foot disproportionate portions of the sub-regional peacekeeping burden. It could be concluded that operationalizing the ASF without the full commitment of funds, logistics and strategic airlift capacity from Nigeria and South Africa will have negative repercussions on their RECs ability to operationalize their ASF standby force.

3.1.4 Re-tuning of the Mission Deployment Scenarios

It has been mentioned that the undue delays in obtaining the required parliamentary approval by some states, defeats the concept of rapid deployment of troops since the tight timelines under the mission deployment scenarios in the ASF Policy Framework will not be easily met. When states have internal political and legal hurdles to clear at their parliaments before deploying their troops, optimistic timelines will not help the situation. As African societies and political space become more pluralistic, domestic politics influence the implementation of states
commitment to their signed obligations. This impacts on the rapidity of a state’s response since the domestic political mood will have to be measured and assuaged where necessary, and constitutional requirements met before national troops are deployed to form part of the regional force in a mission.

In an interview, Henrietta Mensah-Bonsu, a former UN Deputy Special Representative in Liberia and the Director of the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) of the University of Ghana, stated that the timelines of the mission deployment scenarios are ambitious and too optimistic judging from the fact that force generation is a hurdle in peace-making missions. This makes the scenario timelines unfeasible because even the UN, with all its resources, will find it difficult to go by such time-line. In the opinions of Fianya, Kotia and Debrah in separate interviews, the ASF concept is realistic but needs some tune-ups to make it more relevant to the situation on the ground.

Fianya wondered if the rotational nature of the standby arrangement will work considering the fact that the countries far from conflict centres tend to shy away from such intervention and also, conversely, those close to the conflict too tend to have vested interests, which make their engagements in such peace missions tricky and suspicious. Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia and Uganda and Rwanda in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are cases in point. The Rotational standby system will not enable full commitment to the deployment timelines since any discordance in the REC/RM on standby force will negatively affect force generation and occasion delays and inability to conform to the scenarios.

3.1.5 The Viability of the Just-In Time Model

Some Liberal Institutionalists assert that large institutions forged to ensure collective security of members tend to face resistance when serious issues crop up. This causes a smaller
number of members of the group to stand up to take up the mantle on their behalf.\textsuperscript{31} The Just-In-Time-Model is premised on the grounds that there are a willing group of states with excellent military competence and resources and possess the political-will to offer, on their own volition, to constitute a force to execute a peace mission on behalf of the larger group.\textsuperscript{32} The prongs of this concept sit on: the existence of a coalition of the willing; the ability of states to contribute their capabilities; and the capacity to deploy, manage and support operations, it will not be the answer to the lack of rapid deployment capacity of the ASF.

The reason for establishing the ASF was because the UN takes too long a time to respond to crisis in Africa and the absence of a strong political commitment by the states in the Just-In-Time coalition will let Africa down when the need arises since resource constraints and the national interest are variables that could hinder the smooth and fast deployment of a coalition-of-the-willing, of any constitution, expected under this Cedric proposal.

Debrah, opposed the Just-In-Time Model with the belief that it is not suitable for the African situation. He surmised that:

this kind of model will only work if the individual countries are capable and they have enough resources available that they pick on when called upon and Africa has not reached that level and I don’t think it is a good thing even for us to talk about in the first place because of the reasons for establishing the ASF.\textsuperscript{33}

The questions that need to be answered to determine the suitability and feasibility of this model are: will the coalitions-of-the-willing be faster in response than an already earmarked standby force like the ASF? Do we have to form a coalition when a conflict erupts or before it occurs in the face of resource and political constraints? Will a new coalition be formed for every conflict depending on the national interests of states? Can we have a coalition formed for a conflict fast enough when there is no binding MoU with any country? Will states sign MoUs committing themselves perpetually to coalitions-of-the-willing when others are non-committed?
Will the hurriedly-established operations headquarters be more efficiently run than the existing ASF headquarters?

Were African countries to be well resourced, it will not be too difficult for coalitions to be formed as and when a conflict develops but with the current general economic and military situation in Africa, it is not feasible for this concept to be relied upon since there is always the need to pull individual states resources together to form a collective strength to tackle conflicts in Africa. The continent is bedeviled with conflicts, which even the well-resourced UN shies away from.

3.1.6 AU Sanctions

J.M. Farral defines sanctions as an “action which seeks to either to coerce a target into behaving in a particular manner or by punish it for a behaviour considered unacceptable by the sender”. Also, D. Geldenhuys refers to sanctions as unilateral and international punitive measures in “the diplomatic, military and sociocultural fields against a state that violates international peace”. In principle, sanctions are tools in international diplomacy and politics adopted by state(s) to punish fellow state(s) for certain errant behavior or policies, with the aim of bringing supposed erring state (s) into line. Sanctions could be economic, political, and diplomatic. In all these, the supposed offending state is isolated from among the comity of nations and slapped with punitive measures meant to bring it to its knees. Other members of the international institution imposing the sanction are required to desist from dealing with the state under sanction in the stated areas.

The AU’s sanctions are against unconstitutional change in government and undemocratic acts that undermine growth of democracy on the continent. It is yet to be seen that AU has sanctioned a member for intervening militarily in another AU state without the blessings of the
AU or the member’s REC. The only reported attempt was in the case of Eritrea when the AU pushed for a UN Security Council to act against it for, allegedly, supporting Somali militants (al-Shahab). Although the AU has imposed sanctions against unconstitutional change in government in many states like Guinea Bissau, Egypt, Madagascar, and Niger amongst many others, it has not yet imposed sanctions on military interventions by member-states in other states.

In May 2009, the AU uncharacteristically requested the UN to impose sanctions on Eritrea for its role in the Somali war, which was causing the AU so many human lives. The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1907 (2009) on 23 December 2009 to place sanctions on Eritrea. In response, according to a BBC report, the recalcitrant and boastful Eritrean Information Minister stated that “we suspend our membership because of this irresponsible act of the African Union”.

The non-reconciliatory retort of the Eritrean Information Minister indicate intransigence and speaks of how member states regard the AU and particularly the lack of effectiveness in its sanctions since he knows the AU cannot bite.

Rwanda, like Uganda, got involved in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for various reasons, chiefly national interest. Rwanda has been documented by the UN and other reports as having broken the UN Resolution 1897, which bans the provision of military "assistance, advice or training" to any group in Congo. The AU has not been able to sanction Rwanda based on this resolution with the evidence that abound indicating Rwanda`s involvement in the war. Though, OAU/AU has a record of sanctioning unconstitutional changes in government, it is yet to sanction a state for militarily intervening in another country against the advice of the states REC/RM or the AU’s dictates.
3.1.7 Training Manuals for Peacekeeping Training Centres

The inadequacy of training manuals, especially, in the Civilian and Police Components are considered to be a draw-back to rapid deployment since their cohesive skills may not have been honed in enough before their deployment. Again, their interoperability may become an issue because they were not trained with the same harmonized training manuals and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). A collection of people with diverse demographic characteristics need to have a point of convergence engineered by harmonized training and operations guidelines. The re-orientation through the application of standardized guidelines is a requirement of modern PSO since the 2000 Brahimi Report and the Boutros-Boutros-Ghaly Agenda for Peace Report on peacekeeping espoused the critical roles of the Police and Civilian Experts in PSOs. These reports highlighted on their importance and revolutionalised PSOs.

Though, a harmonized training manual for Police and Civilian Expert training was adopted in Accra in 2013, Kotia, in an interview lamented that the AU, though, is supposed to liaise with the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre (KAIPTC) in the training of Civilian Experts, has failed to establish contact with the institute despite the Centre’s entreaties. As a result, the institute’s training manual is internally-generated without any input from the AU, though it is expected to be an AU-approved training centre for Civilian Experts in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). He reiterated that the UN and the ECOWAS have established MoUs with the Centre in the training of experts to suit their operations, but the AU has failed to do same.

If Kotia’s assertions are correct, then the AU appears to have paid lip service to the development of the Police and Civilian Components since the manuals on their training, unlike the Military side, took a long time to be developed and the few developed manuals were not sufficiently-detailed to fully equip these two sections to play their roles excellently in a deployed
mission. Kotia’s assertion regarding the AU’s attitude towards the civilian training could be extrapolated across all the training institutions if one considers the fact that the whole PSC Protocol does not contain the word ‘police’. Also, the ASF ROADMAP I did not have anything on the Police either and the AU Police Strategic Support Group (PSSG) was established in 2014 with the aim of helping to resolve issues concerning policy gaps, SOPs, doctrine and training to increase the capacity to deploy the Police rapidly.

In view of the important role Civilian Experts play in a peace operations mission, it is imperative that proper attention is paid to their training, re-training, engagement, and deployment. There are back-stage civilian administrative staff who run the offices and the Civilian Experts, who are deployed like their Police and Military counterparts into the field to perform specific goal-oriented functions in the war-ravaged country. They collaborate with the host, offer technical advice to them and engage in social re-engineering; re-building governance infrastructure; providing care to physical, emotional, trauma and sexual abuse victims; and assistance to persons affected by dislocation and displacement to re-integrate. They assist the economies of war-tone countries to resuscitate.

The Police on their part help the local civilian Police force to regain their capacity to perform their normal policing duties by establishing a new force, where the existing one has been wiped out by the conflict, helping the local Police to adopt modern policing methods, apply the rule of law and respect human rights in the performance of their duties. Also, the Police unit of the mission executes arrests and uses their unique expertise to restore peace, order and stabilize the chaotic war situation. The Police are required to have specialized skills and knowledge in the performance of their duties and these refresher courses run under the harmonized manuals bridge the knowledge gap and position them to work efficiently. Also, since the Police officers come
from different national forces with different policing doctrines, socio-political and religious-cultural backgrounds, it is important a common manual is used to harmonize their operations.

### 3.1.8 Inefficient Staff with Huge Self-interest

The EU, under APF, pays the salaries of the Civil Servants in the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission (AUC), yet staffing challenges are noted in the Police and Civilian PLANELMs at the AU headquarters and at the RECs/RMs level too. The reports indicated that the staffing levels at the AU headquarters and RECs were poor with the few staff over-stretched. This staffing challenge, attributed to the constraints imposed by the Maputo Structure in the 2010 APSA assessment, is reported ameliorated in recent AU reports. However, it still reported that Police component “remains understaffed and subordinated to the military component”.

However, in the personal assessments of diplomats, who once served at the AUC and do not want to be cited, the problem is more of ineptitude and self-service on the part of the Civil Servants of the AUC. In a private chat with a former Ghanaian Ambassador to the AU, who was later retained by the AU on contract, the level of inefficiency is too high. In another interview with a senior Ghanaian diplomat in Ghana`s Mission to the AU, waste and inefficiency were mentioned as the bane of the AUC. As if these are not enough, interviews with Annan, and Fianya revealed the same perception. They added that the staff serve their own interest of receiving travelling and per diem allowances. Also, they serve and promote the interests of some foreign masters by faxing documents to them in earnest whilst accredited diplomats struggle these same documents meant for them.
Kotia strongly intimated that the AUC cannot save Africa in its current state because its leadership is weak and is administratively paralyzed with the staff only interested in their personal benefits in a laissez faire atmosphere. This harsh assessment by Kotia is corroborated by a news item by Business Day Live, which indicated that, the then out-going US Ambassador to the AU, Mr. Michael Battle, had criticized Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the Chairperson of the AU, for surrounding herself with “a kitchen cabinet” of South Africa and SADC-minded people that seek only the interest of South Africa than Africa as a whole.44

The EU has initiated programmes to remove waste and ensure performance and obtain value for the disbursement of its funds. To secure accountability, the US government too indicates that about 90% of its assistance to the AU is in material support with only 10% in cash.45 The 2014 EU Annual APF stated that:

One of the major challenges faced by the APSA institutions is to strengthen the institutional capacities up to a level which is commensurate with their political ambitions. Therefore, financial ex-post audits are systematically conducted for all APF interventions, including AU-led PSOs. Several of these audits have identified weaknesses related to financial management and the European Commission has thus considerably increased its focus on improvements in this area46

These condemnatory assertions suggest that efficient performance might be the bigger problem than the inadequacy of numbers contained in the Maputo Structure AU reports complain of.

3.1.9 The Civilian Roster

The Civilian Roster has been noted as a challenge to the operationalization of the ASF because the ASF is supposed to be a tripod of Military, Police and Civilian Experts. In this vein, the ASF could not be said to have been operationalized when one leg is still in plaster. Currently, there are concerns that enough has not been done on the Civilian aspect of the ASF. According
to Kotia, the Roster as it stands now cannot be relied on since an individual’s private attendance at a Peace-keeping Training Centre earns him a place on the roll when the person has not personally applied. This means that, neither party owes the other any formal obligation. Also, there is no incentive to be short-listed on the Roster: No AU-sponsored further training; and compensation for making oneself available for an immediate call when juicier offers abound.

The spotting and recruitment of well-qualified Civilian Experts unto the AU and RECs/RMs Roster remains a challenge since the current AU ‘Roster’ is a data-base of Experts, which does not constitute a binding Roster between the AU and the Civilian Experts in specific terms.47 In recent AMISOM operations, those already trained and placed on Roster for rapid deployment were not called to duty as per the ASF Policy. Rather, those who had not gone through the AU training processes were sent on the missions.48 An inherent difficulty in the management of the AU Civilian Experts Roster is highlighted by a UN report that states that “international organisations often recruit qualified national professionals away from local institutions and organisations through financial and other incentives.”49

This suggests that the AU will find it difficult to keep names on the Roster for one reason or the other or because either those on the Rosters will not find AU’s engagements attractive to respond to or will be engaged elsewhere and unavailable because nothing keeps him bonded. The AU Civilian Experts Roster may then have a reliability problem since these Experts may not be available to be recruited for missions as and when the need arises unless an innovative solution is found in earnest like placing a cohort on rotation for a period and compensating them to keep them from getting themselves engaged elsewhere.
3.1.10 Force Generation

Though, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2008 between the AU and the RECs/RMs, it appears the RECs/RMs and their members have not signed any MoU to govern the Rules of Engagement (RoE) on the deployment of national troops as ASF troops. This may impede the operationalization of the ASF since the absence of a legally binding arrangement will hinder the rapid deployment of troops.

In the case of the ECOWAS, according to Kotia, existing protocol obligations, which require member-states to contribute troops for PSOs, cater for deployment in the absence of any ASF-specific MoU on deployment. This was corroborated by Debrah, who asserted that troop deployment and MoUs are two different things altogether. He stated that in an instance, Ghana pledged a Helicopter Squadron to ECOWAS for PSOs but could not redeem the pledge when it was called upon because it had earlier on deployed that same Squadron under a UN Peace Mission. Therefore, he stated, “signing a MoU is the means but the actual deployment is a political decision depending on political-will and determination.”

The presence of a strong political-will supersedes and circumvents hurdles that, ordinarily, may hinder the implementation of a decision of a state or the fulfillment of its statutory obligations. This pre-supposes that, where there is the will, there is a way. Again, the political buy-in of a project is adequate for its success no matter how hard the inherent difficulties are. The ASF is a project with set objectives and timelines demanding more purposeful political attention, decision-making and implementation to make it a success. Chinery-Hesse, in her an interview stated that political leaderships are buffeted by domestic imperatives that render them impotent to allocate scarce national resources to see through bigger continental and regional aspirations they very much believe in.
3.2 The Prospects of Operationalizing the ASF in 2015

Though Africa has acquired some enhanced capacity and competences have been accrued in Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems (C3IS), strategic and operational levels management. The continent currently has deployed about 70,000 troops globally and this indicates its capacity in trained men. The headquarters mission deployment management level has been enhanced through AMANI AFRICA. The Ebola mission to West Africa is an indication that that the ASF concept has made some progress. The capacity now exists for African to mount its own peace operations with little or no managerial assistance from outside the continent. Concepts of Operations can be easily formulated in Africa to suit its own circumstances through the implementations of the ASF. Political consciousness now exist about the need for Africa to take charge of its security and peace issues. The prospects of operationalizing the African Standby Force in 2015 pales out when considered against an extract from a PSC Report that stated that:

the main obstacles to the operationalization of the ASF are inadequate logistical capacities and funding. In this regard, Council requested that attention be focused on the acceleration of the operationalization of the ASF, which should become functional by 2015” and requested stakeholders “to accelerate the operationalization of their Standby Forces, including their rapid deployment capabilities and regional logistic depots, in order to speed up the operationalization of the ASF. Council encouraged all Member States to provide requisite financial, logistical and technical capacities towards the establishment of the Continental Logistic Base and its functioning.

This study came to a firm conclusion that the enormity of the prevailing challenges confronting the ASF’s operationalizing leaves no hope for the 2015 deadline to be met. As some, it is a work-progress so the goal post must be shifted to enable the outstanding challenges to be removed by the AU as soon as practicable.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This Chapter will provide the findings of this study as envisaged under the set objectives. The purpose of this study was to examine how realistic was the AU’s plan to operationalize the ASF by the end of 2015 taking into consideration the challenges militating against the operationalization of the ASF; the future prospects of the ASF; and the commitment of African leaders to the sustainability of the ASF concept.

4.1 Summary of Findings

Existing academic and journalistic works were examined under the Literature Review in Chapter One which enabled this research to have an in-depth knowledge of the existing data on the challenges of ASF. Documents from the AU’s Secretariat also brought into focus an insider’s view of the ASF and offered some clarity where some research works had ambiguity. Most of the writings on the ASF this study accessed recognized the relevance of the concept, its importance and the great benefits the continent stand to gain should it be activated. The appropriateness of the mission deployment scenarios under the ASF doctrine were analyzed and considered by some researchers as somewhat unachievable and too optimistic because of the inherent constraints in the African environment that were overlooked or simplified. This was because better resourced EU Standby Force (EU Battlegroup) and the UN Standby Force (SHIRBRIG) - with all their military; financial and managerial prowess; and political cohesion
and stability—had to be discontinued due to some of the challenges the ASF is confronting in its operationalization.

Chapter One also revealed that the AU’s objective of operationalizing the ASF has not been realized due to a malaise traceable to the lack of political-will to commit the required financial resources needed to procure the logistics required for kind of missions envisaged under the ASF doctrine. Though African leaders have the desire to operationalize the ASF, they have woefully failed to match this desire with the needed financial commitment required to secure peace and security for their peoples. The existing ‘conceptual ownership’ of the ASF has not been translated into ‘political-ownership’ that will eventually make them assume the financial control of the ASF mechanism to enable them attain their targets since donor preferences and conditions impact on implementations of plans and programmes.

Consequently, researchers aggressively harped on finance as the bane of the whole APSA and the ASF despite the huge investments made by donors. They argued that for Africa to own the APSA, it must provide the needed funds or at least, provide substantial counterpart funding to enable it be in the driving seat. They asserted that African funds are urgently needed if the future of the ASF is to be assured though the concept is generally considered. Some Decisions, Declarations and Communiques of the AU confirmed the claims of the independent assessors of the APSA/ASF. The study found that the AU is cash-strapped depending on donors to fund about 60-70% of its programmes and activities with the PSOs being almost 100% funded by donors. To arrest this situation of dependency and assume control of its programmes, the AU is considering the adoption of innovative means to raise funds to maintain its independence and protect its dignity.
Again, it came out from the research that Africa currently has acquired a huge capacity in trained men to mount peace operations on the continent and globally. Logistical and strategic airlift capacity challenges featured prominently as issues confronting the ASF. The underlining cause of these issues was stated as the lack of funds to procure these necessities. It was their strong belief that the ASF has the human and management capacity but lacks the logistics, strategic airlift capacity and heavy military hardware. Logistics and airlift are the real issues to be resolved if the 2015 deadline will be met and the ASF deployed afterwards since the troops are available but lack of air mobility and logistics make operationalizing the ASF this December 2015 not feasible considering the indispensability of logistics and airlift capacity in PSOs, especially Scenarios 5 and 6.

During the study, it was realized that a lot has been achieved in terms of doctrine development: the AU has been able to formulate many training manuals; Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); and guidelines which are somehow adequate to operationalize the ASF. However, the emphasis has been more on the Military with the Police and Civilian Expert Components which are far behind the Military Component. The basic documents on these two components were said to be inadequate.

The literature reviewed under Chapter One of this research described decision-making as tortuous, which needs to be reviewed to match the timelines of the mission deployment scenarios. Subsidiarity featured as one of the weaknesses the concept is still grappling with alongside coordination difficulties in the AU-RECs/RMs relationship. Some RECs/RMs still consider their roles in the ASF superior to that of the AU because they provide, train, equip and finance the standby force though the Article 17 of the PSC Protocol clearly obliges them. The PSC now has liaison offices for the RECs/RMs to help bridge the gap between the two bodies.
Chapter Two basically examined the structures of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the ASF, which forms an integral part of the APSA and the focus of this study. The ROADMAPS designed to implement the ASF mechanism were examined to give understanding to what was expected the doctrine and its implementation programmes. The Civilian, Military and Police Components were investigated to find out what has gone into their preparation so far. Again, the AMANI AFRICA Training Exercises geared towards enhancing the strategic and operational headquarters capacity were mentioned in Chapter Two.

In Chapter Three, the interviews conducted corroborated the major findings in Chapter One. Interviews with diplomats and military attachés who once served at the AU confirmed the reported inefficient performance by the staff of the AU Commission and their alleged collaboration with some Western countries to the detriment of accredited state representatives. Nigeria’s current posture towards peace funding too came out in this section as quite interesting. The thrust of all the interviewees was that the ASF is workable and its doctrine is being used in current peace operations but it needs to be refined and properly equipped to live up to expectation. They lamented the lack of political-will for the concept and African funding of the ASF. Also, the interviewees generally surmised that the delayed declaration of FOC should not dim the achievements of the ASF because enough competencies have been built in the deployment of troops at the strategic and operational levels by the numerous exercises conducted under AMANI AFRICA.

This research revealed that, although, some competencies and capacities exist on the ground, they are not in themselves sufficient enough to deploy the ASF rapidly without strategic airlift capacity that will ensure the effective execution of mission mandate. This is because the absence of a good logistics support base will render the presence of the rapidly-deployed
uniformed and civilian personnel and their Concept of Operations (CONOPS) useless. For these reasons, the prospect for the declaration of FOC by the end of 2015 is very dim even if there is a late attempt to fill these identified gaps by the AU and REC.

4.2 Conclusion

By the data obtained and analyzed, this study conclude that in spite of the economic constraints facing African countries, the ASF could have been operationalized if African leaders had shown a little more political commitment to the ASF project by making available the funds necessary to provide the logistics required to deploy, the airlift capacity which a few states possess and the funds to sustain an insertion until the UN and the donors step in to support.

Funding of missions is a major hindrance in the attempt to operationalize the ASF as mirrored in the inability of Africa to deploy troops rapidly into Mali during the 2012 crisis because it was looking up to donors to provide the needed funds. The capacity to deploy rapidly hinges on finance since Logistics Bases and strategic airlift capacity could be acquired if there are adequate African funds available to the ASF Project.

Africa leaders need to take bold decisions in adopting innovative funding methods recommended by the Obasanjo Committee if they really want to resolve this finance problem. It is apparent that the solution to Africa’s finance challenges lies in pragmatic proposals like the President Obasanjo Committee proposals and raising of membership dues to realistic levels to reflect the financial needs of the AU but not what the member-states find comfortable to pay, if financial independence of the AU could be obtained to permit programme independence.

The mission scenarios and the rotational deployment arrangement are unrealistic judging the prevailing economic, political and conflict dynamics of the African continent. They should...
be refined to make them easily implementable taking into consideration Africa`s peculiarities as shown by the experience from AU-led peace operations. This study asserts that AUC and the APSA are all work-in-progress so continuous assessments should be used to perfect the structures.

4.3 Recommendations

Since it is the responsibility of the UN to keep world peace and security, the AU should continue to dialogue with the world body, through the existing collaboration between its Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council, to secure a permanent financial regime based on any of the modules proposed by Africa. To ensure ownership and control of the ASF and to secure the continued support of its donors, this study do recommend that Africa should indicate, through the adoption of innovative funding mechanisms recommended by the Obasanjo Committee and others, to prove its capacity to match up the commitment of its partners. This is in addition to first pursuing and adopting a realist membership contribution formula that could foot substantial part of the cost of deploying the ASF.

African leaders should show ‘financial-will’ alongside their usual political proclamations since political-will is meaningless and useless without the required resources to effect them. In this direction, African leaders should muster the political courage to adopt the Obasanjo`s Committee`s recommendations, which appear to hold the key to the AU`s perennial financial woes.

In the interim, to attain Full Operational Capability (FOC) that will activate the ASF, the AU should arrange a pragmatic logistics and tooling provision pact with the UN, EU and other states that have the capacity to make these enablers available to AU peace operations under
flexible arrangements that could permit the rapid deployment of troops under Scenarios 5 & 6 missions. Again, the AU should formulate and sign a strategic airlift capacity agreement with the few African states that have the capacity, the North Atlantic Treaty Orgainsation (NATO), some European states, the United States (US) or other countries. Alternatively, AU members can be levied to purchase a strategic airlift capacity.
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