ONLINE NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE “BRING BACK OUR GIRLS” CAMPAIGN IN NIGERIA

BY

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OCTOBER, 2015
DECLARATION

I declare that with the exception of works by other authors duly referenced, this dissertation, “Online Newspaper Coverage of 'Bring Back Our Girls’ Campaign in Nigeria” is original research undertaken by me under the supervision of Professor Audrey Gadzekpo.

I affirm that this study has not been submitted either in part or whole elsewhere for the award of any other degree, diploma or certificate.

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Professor Audrey Gadzekpo
(Supervisor)

Date                          Date
DEDICATION

To my sweetest mother, Hadiza Bala, my late brother, Isa Bala, my dearest wife, Hasiya Ismaila Agwaru and my little angel, Khadijah (Ismat) Abubakar who endured my absence when they needed me most. To all the victims of the stampede in Saudi Arabia.
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ABSTRACT

In this study, attempt has been made to determine the coverage of Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) campaign in Nigeria by online newspapers. Seventy-one editions of Daily Trust, the Punch, Sahara Reporters and Vanguard newspapers from April 2014-October 2014 were content analysed. The study examined how much coverage BBOG campaigns received in the sampled online newspapers, the nature of reporting BBOG campaigns and the dominant sources of stories and themes in the framing of stories on the campaign in the newspapers studied.

Making use of qualitative and quantitative content analysis and secondary sources of data, the study found that the newspapers provided mostly favourable coverage of the campaign with a total of 59 (83.1%) out of 71 total stories. The study also found that the campaigners and their sympathisers were the dominant sources of stories during the study period.

The study adopted framing theory as a theoretical basis of the study. The study concluded that the newspapers made concerted efforts to cover the campaign positively, unlike what usually obtains in Western media framing of social movements where status quo biases are often maintained. The study also found that the newspapers focused more on straight news than other story types in reporting the campaigns.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BBOG</td>
<td>Bring Back Our Girls</td>
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<td>BH</td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Computer Mediated Communication</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Company</td>
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<td>NOA</td>
<td>National Orientation Agency</td>
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<td>NPF</td>
<td>Nigeria Police Force</td>
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<td>NUT</td>
<td>Nigeria Union of Teachers</td>
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<td>SAAWG</td>
<td>South Africa Association of Women Graduate</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

This introductory section provides background information on the Bring Back Our Girls Campaign, the historical context of Boko Haram, the role of mass media in covering salient issues and social movements.

1.1.1 The “Bring Back Our Girls” Campaign

On the night of April 14, 2014, a terrorist group known as Boko Haram abducted about 276 secondary school girls from their dormitories at the Government Girls Secondary School in the remote town of Chibok, Borno State, in north-eastern Nigeria. Fifty-seven of the 276 girls escaped and Boko Haram threatened to sell the rest as slave brides if their captured members were not released from jail. On October 17, 2014, after six months of the girls’ capture and a month of negotiations mediated by the Chadian president Idriss Deby in Saudi Arabia, hopes were raised when the Nigerian Army announced that the remaining 219 might soon be released after a truce with the sect.

The girls’ initial weeks in captivity sparked a fury of media coverage and interest online, where the hash-tag #BringBackOurGirls trended on Twitter the world over. Nigeria Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) campaigners had a worldwide appeal and have since held regular marches in Nigerian cities and other places. The kidnap is considered as unfortunate, inhuman, and barbaric by the global community (Olutokunbo et al., 2015).
The incidence has become a big dent to Nigeria’s reputation and history as it led to the global outrage campaign for BBOG which attracted not only passionate individuals but also organisations, agencies, and governments of several nations.

Olutokunbo, et al. (2015) state that as part of the on-going global campaign for Bring Back Our Girls, Hazel (2014), the National President of South Africa Association of Women Graduate (SAAWG) and other international organisations called on the Nigerian government for the release of the abducted girls. Organisations that are championing the call for the BBOG global campaign include: Women Arise against Terror, African National Congress of Women’s League South Africa, The Global Partnership for Education (GPE), UNICEF, United Nations, Amnesty International, Nigeria’s National Orientation Agency, to mention but a few.

Aside from organisations, there are world renowned celebrities and important personalities that joined the campaign. Prominent among them is the US First Lady, Michelle Obama who held a placard sign, reading “Bring Back Our Girls;” as solidarity for the global campaign for the safe rescue of the kidnapped Chibok girls.

It is important to note that the implication of this global campaign break the barriers of gender, religion, cultural boundaries, and strengthen the culture of oneness, sense of belonging and togetherness among nations.

According to Chandler (2015), the social media campaign #BringBackOurGirls in April 2014 helped galvanize international outrage about the plight of 276 Nigerian schoolgirls who were kidnapped. More than one year later, 219 of them remain missing.

However, the problem is much bigger than Chibok girls. Young men and boys were also kidnapped, forced to join the sect or killed for rebelling. It is estimated that about fifteen
thousand people have died in violence related to the group's insurgency since 2009, including a reported massacre of thousands near the Nigerian border with Chad in January 2015. The civilian death toll since the start of 2014 alone has eclipsed 5,500 (Chandler, 2015). According to Chandler, UNICEF report released in April 2015 also revealed that 800,000 children have had to flee Boko Haram's campaign, a displacement that will have generational reverberations.

According to BBC, Amnesty International (2014) said, the group has abducted 2,000 girls and women since the beginning of 2014, forcing many into sexual slavery, fighters or cooks.

Boko Haram says the kidnapped girls have converted to Islam and been married off (BBC.com).

1.1.2 Boko Haram: Historical Context

In an attempt to historicise Boko Haram, an Islamic sect based largely in North-eastern Nigeria, Sani (2011), Mantsikos (2013), Adibe (2013), Onuoha (2013), and Ekwueme and Akpan, (2012) said security operatives in Nigeria traced its origin to 1995 in Maiduguri by Abubakar Lawan. However, the popular belief from most media, writers and commentators is that it was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf.

Madike (2011), contends that the sect was actually founded in 1995 by Lawan Abubakar and it was then called Sahaba. Yusuf was said to have taken over the leadership of the group after Abubakar left for studies in Saudi Arabia. And that the sect flourished as a nonviolent movement until Mohammed Yusuf assumed leadership of the group in 2002 and radicalised it.

According to Onuoha (2013) and Egwemi (2012), the group has metamorphosed overtime under various names like Nigerian Taliban (though there is no evidence that links them to the
real Taliban), Muhajirun, Yusufiyya, Khawaarij, and Boko Haram (BH). It is believed that the sect actually calls itself and prefers to be known by their Arabic name: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidd’a’wati Wal Jihad (People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad) (Adibe, 2013). It is not clear if the sect actually calls itself Boko Haram. The tag Boko Haram was coined by the public because of the sect’s perceived negative perceptions of Western education (Abubakar, 2011 and Adibe, 2013). As their leader said before his execution in police custody, the sect was essentially opposed to those Western values and products that contradict their perceived teachings of Islam (Daily Trust, 2009; Gorman, 2009). They were neither anti-modern technology nor anti-education in general, as their general portrayal by the media tends to stress (Abubakar, 2011).

The name Boko Haram is a combination of the Hausa word ‘boko’ meaning Western education and the Arabic word ‘haram’ which means sin or forbidden, hence the name Boko Haram is generally translated as ‘Western education is forbidden.’ But, some scholars argue that the deeper meaning is that they are mainly opposed to western civilisation and culture, which includes of course Western education, but is not limited to it (Abubakar 2011 and Adibe, 2013).

Many issues about the phenomenon of Boko Haram, though dominated policy debates among policy makers and academics interested in Nigerian and African politics (Mantzikos, 2013) and security discourse (Adibe, 2013), remain unclear and contested. The profiles of its members, the methods of recruitment, the reasons for its emergence and radicalisation and its affiliation with other terrorists such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Ansar Dine in Mali are still unclear (Mantzikos, 2013 and Adibe, 2013). Whether the sect is actually responsible for all the several attacks attributed to it is also a contestable debate.
However, one undisputed fact about the sect is that Yusuf was responsible for raising its profile. He was said to have established the sect’s religious complex that included a school and a mosque where “many poor families from Nigeria and the neighbouring countries enrolled their children” (Adibe, 2013).

Also, there is a general consensus that until 2009, the sect conducted its various activities more or less peacefully and that its radicalisation was as a result of government clampdown in 2009 in which about 800 people were killed. The leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was also killed in that attack while in lawful custody of the police (Adibe, 2013). However, contrary to this belief, Onuoha (2013) argues that resorting to violence by the members of the sect in pursuit of its objectives dates back to December 24, 2003 when it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geidam and Kanamma in Yobe State, Nigeria. And that, in 2004, it established a based called ‘Afghanistan’ in Kanamma in northern Yobe State, and on September 21st, 2004, they attacked police stations in Bama and Gwoza local governments in Borno State, killing several policemen and stealing arms and ammunitions. He added that it maintained intermittent hit-and-run attacks on security posts in some parts of Borno and Yobe states until July 2009, when it staged a major anti-government revolt, in revenge for the killing of its members by state security forces, and the “extrajudicial murder of its leader while in police custody, although police officials ‘claimed’ that he was killed while trying to escape” (Onuoha, 2013). This gave birth to the present day seemingly unending insurgency in the North.

Adibe (2013) notes that after assuming the leadership of the sect, Yusuf embarked on an intensive and hugely successful recruitment of members such that he had over 500,000 followers before his death. Madike also alleged that “Yusuf taxed each member one naira per day, meaning the group leader realised about ₦500,000 (roughly $2,510) per day” (Adibe, 2013).
Before he was killed, Yusuf had two deputies (Na’ib Amir ul- Aam I & II). For every state where they existed, it had its own Amir (Commander), and in each local government area they operated, it had an Amir as well. They, as well, organised themselves according to various roles: soldiers and police, among others (Adibe, 2013). Adibe stated also that in January, 2012, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Yusuf, who was also thought to have died during the 2009 clampdown, appeared in a video posted on YouTube and assumed the leadership of the sect.

In July 2009 series of clashes occurred in Northern Nigeria between security forces and members of the militant Boko Haram. The security forces initially appeared to have overpowered the group, captured and killed its leader Muhammad Yusuf and many of his followers (Daily Trust, 2009; Herskovits, 2009; Newstime Africa, 2009). An estimated 1,000 people, mostly sect members, were reportedly killed in the first main clashes that lasted for about a week (Bello-Barkindo, 2009). The government’s view about the group was that it was an anti-modernity sect [they oppose Western education and science (Boyle, 2009; Gorman, 2009)] that sought for a violent overthrow of the secular government in the country.

Opinions differ on the reasons for the 2009 clampdown, but one dominating version traced it to a motorcycle incident. That “some members of the sect were shot dead on June 11, 2009” following a clash with the police over the refusal of the members to wear helmets in Maiduguri. Three days after the incident, Yusuf vowed to avenge the death of his followers, and this led to arrest of some of the sect members by the Borno State police command. According to this version, the apparently coordinated attacks on the police in various states in the north after this incident were reprisal attacks for the police humiliation and arrest of their members (Adibe, 2013).
According to Ekwueme and Akpan (2012), the group killed many political and religious leaders particularly those who dared criticise them. After the government hurled a clampdown on the group, they regrouped in 2011 and responded with killing of government officials and police officers. According to them, in an effort to crush the sect, dozens of their members were shot by the security operatives and hundreds were detained. This action of the security operatives was the tonic the sect needed to unleash more mayhem on the city of Maiduguri. They hit Maiduguri and its environs with unprecedented violence and ruthlessness. The sect’s list of bombings, killings, and maiming forced the Federal Government to deploy the Joint Military Taskforce to restore order in the beleaguered state (Ekwueme and Akpan, 2012).

According to Abubakar (2011), the sect’s original version was different. He states that they wanted to establish an Islamic government in the country, they admitted; but insisted that they were neither opposed to modernity nor did they seek for a violent change of government. Media reports, however, showed that they did attack several police stations, government buildings mosques and churches (Boyle, 2009; Daily Trust, 2009). They initially insisted, though, that they were only retaliating to earlier attacks on them by the security forces (Herskovits, 2009; Gorman, 2009).

In what was apparently seen as retaliation for the extrajudicial killing of the leader and some other members, the group launched its first terrorist attack in January 2010 killing four people at Dala Alemderi Ward in Maiduguri, Borno State (Adibe, 2013). Since then, the sect has intensified its terrorist activities. Later, they came out openly to admit that they were now at war with the government after series of bomb attacks on police stations, bars and buildings.

Their most audacious operation was the suicide car bomb attack at the national headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in Abuja, not very far away from the presidential palace, killing several people (Campbell, 2011). It was considered to be the first case of using a suicide
bomber in Nigeria to carry out a terrorism act. Another suicide bomber, on August 26, 2011 blew up the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, leaving dead, 21 people and dozens more were injured (Adibe, 2013). Again, on January 20, 2012, it attacked Kano, leaving more than 185 people dead. A day hardly passes these days without news of attacks by the group.

According to Onuoha (2013), the sect’s attacks had focused on security establishment and personnel, religious and community leaders, worship centres, politicians and other civilian targets; and overtime, it added hospitals, media houses, tertiary institutions, public schools, markets and critical infrastructure of telecommunication to the list of its targets and attacks.

Indisputably, these crises have caused the deaths of tens of thousands people; led to the maiming and displacement of millions others; resulted in the damaging and poisoning of established relationships plus the destruction of property of incalculable costs (Abubakar, 2011).

The sect has intensified its attacks in 2014, where in February, it killed more than 100 Christian men in the villages of Doron Baga and Izghe, Borno State, killed 59 boys in the Federal Government College Buni Yadi, Yobe State (Dorell, 2014 and Nigerian Guardian, 2014). In March, they attacked Giwa Barracks and freed some captured militants (Dorell, 2014). This occurred on the same day as a bomb was detonated killing at least 88 people (Perkins, 2014). In 2014 alone, Boko Haram was blamed for the deaths of nearly 4,000 people. (Dorell, 2014 and Wikipedia.com, 2015).

1.1.3 Role of Newspaper in covering salient issues

The BBOG campaign received continual mass media attention. The mass media can furnish useful information to people because they reach the largest section of the society directly or
through secondary readership and viewship regularly (Onabajo, 2007). Mass media play important roles in determining what social issues receive the most attention of the mass audience, and which issues will be ignored or given little attention. To a great extent, news media control the social reality citizens see, when they see it, and how they see such a social reality. As Dimaggio (2009) explains, issues that the media choose to report and to ignore constitute a major factor in the formation of public opinions and conversations.

The media represent a key component in the machinery of any campaign to mobilise social awareness and action. It appeals to everybody in different perspectives and exerts great influence on the society (Akpoveta, 2007). Alexander (2005) argues that independent information carried by the mass media in every country has a huge role to play in generating awareness among citizens, and so creating the conditions for progress.

Itemising the areas in which mass media effects are mainly felt, McQuail (2005) believes that it includes campaign, definition of social reality and social norms, the immediate response or reaction, institutional change and changes in culture and society. Mass media according to Enahoro and Richard (2007) is the chief means through which the general public is educated and sensitised about important issues affecting the lives of the people.

The Nigerian press according to Pate (2006) is, without doubt, a vibrant social force that has been contributing positively in national development. In other words, the media is not only essential, but central in any movement campaign process and monitoring the progress and evaluating the success of that campaign at the local, state and national levels. As captured succinctly by Kofi Annan (2005), cited in Pate (2006), the media is not just an indispensable partner in delivering services to the poor at the scope required by public agitations, but it can also catalyse action within countries on pressing development concerns, mobilising broad-based movements and creating grass-roots pressure to hold leaders accountable for their commitments.”
Nigeria is richly endowed with variety of media outlets in every part of the country. Over the years, the media have continued to demonstrate their relevance as a vibrant social force that has much to offer in all facets of development in the country. With their advantage of diversity, reach, visibility and credibility, the media in different parts of Nigeria have the capacity and potential to actively popularise and monitor the progress of BBOG campaign and evaluating its success.

Although there is generally a dearth of relevant literature on the “Bring back our girls” campaign, a cursory look at other relevant social movements and campaigns reveal how media promote public discourse to a very important position.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Coming from the backdrop of its chequered political history, Nigeria’s democratic experience in the fourth republic has been characterised by a myriad of emotive mass mediated discourses. Volatile among such media controversies is the current “Bring back our girls” campaign, which has generated tension in the nation’s public sphere. The tension was principally caused by the abduction of 276 Chibok schoolgirls by the members of Boko Haram.

The BBOG global outrage campaign was launched to challenge the Nigerian government towards ensuring the safe return of the abductees. Consultations with the Nigerian government were initiated via a social media campaign and face-to-face by concerned citizens of Nigeria as well as world leaders and international organisations who expressed solidarity across continents for the abducted school girls. Countries such as the United States
of America, United Kingdom, and France intervened in the on-going BBOG global campaign (Hugo, 2015 in Olutokunbo, et al. 2015).

Mostly social movements or protests rely on the mass media to bring to public attention their objectives and objections. Media on the other hand are very selective about the stories they cover and the degree of coverage they give to such stories. The manner in which the media frames stories affects audience views, which can also determine subsequent supports and contributions from the public. Similar studies tried to examine the effect of media framing in social movement (Skonieczny and Morse (2013) as well as Tusa (2013) compared the effective use of the Internet by the Egyptians and Iranians to frame their cause. However, little empirical evidence exists on the nature of media coverage of social movements in Africa.

Different media outlets in Nigeria report the BBOG campaigns. Although there is continual coverage of the campaign by different media outlets, there has been no known systematic analysis on the nature of the media campaign to categorically evaluate the performance of the Nigerian media.

This study sought to find out how Nigerian online newspapers covered the campaign by bringing to public attention the desires and aspirations of protesters, and the manner in which they framed the BBOG movement. The insights this study provided may serve as vital tools for accessing the role of newspapers in social movements and also how they frame effective public campaign.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study seeks to investigate how the Nigerian online newspapers cover the Bring Back Our Girls campaign and their interpretations of the purposes of the protestors. Specifically, the study examines the dominant images and themes in framing the campaign and seeks to find out the nature of coverage of the campaign, as well as the dominant sources of stories on the campaign. The attempt to find out how the selected online newspapers frame the BBOG campaign was informed by the perceived impact the media have in shaping the behaviours of the society towards social movements and campaigns. Therefore, such understanding could help in predicting the influence of the media on BBOG.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Four research questions were constructed to guide the study. The research questions are:

1. How much coverage did Nigerian online newspapers give the “Bring Back Our Girls” campaign?
2. What is the nature of coverage of BBOG campaign?
3. What are the dominant images and themes in the framing of stories on the campaign?
4. Who are the dominant sources of stories on the “Bring Back Our Girls” campaign?

1.5 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

This study tried to investigate, with critical analysis, the pattern of media coverage of “Bring Back Our Girls,” a public campaign of global interest at a time when both the media landscape and Nigerians are faced with terrifying challenges from an up-and-coming old terrorist group.
To study the Nigerian online newspapers’ coverage of social movement, with specific reference to the BBOG campaign as this holds out potentials for epistemological and theoretical development in media effect studies.

Furthermore, the insights this study could provide may serve as vital tools for assessing the role of newspapers in social movements and also how they frame effective public campaign.

Finally, this research will also be helpful, and will serve as a reference point to students of Communication Studies and other relevant areas of study who are interested in media framing of social movements.

1.6 CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Boko Haram:** A terrorist group in Northern Nigeria that is well known for the abduction of students, indiscriminate killings of military personnel and civilians and bombing of religious, public and government buildings.

**Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) Campaign** – A campaign mounted as a result of the abduction of 276 secondary school girls in Chibok, Nigeria by members of the Boko Haram sect.

**Coverage** – reportorial activities related to the Bring Back Our Girls Campaign by some of selected Nigerian online newspapers.

**Online Newspapers** – this refers to some selected Nigerian ‘newspapers’ produced online for their online readers.
1.7 SUMMARY

This chapter has outlined the issues that are central to the public outcry over the abducted schoolgirls by Boko Haram. It has also discussed the historical origin of Boko Haram and set out the functions of newspaper in covering salient issues. The chapter also contains the statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, research questions, rationale of the study and operational definitions of key terms.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews some studies that are considered relevant to the issue under investigation. Issues relating to social movements and protests in relation to media coverage were identified and discussed.

This study adopted framing theory as it serves as relevant to this study.

2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theories according to Olise (2010) are important to any empirical study because they provide the latitude for analysis aimed at predicting phenomena of any research. They are empirically tested and confirmed statements and conclusions about a phenomena. This study is anchored on framing theory. The selection of this theory to underpin the study situated the study properly within the purview of news selection and framing.

2.1.1 Framing Theory

Framing assumes that how an issue is characterised in news reports can have an influence over how it is comprehended by audiences (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). It posits that media transfers the salience of specific attributes to issues or events (Dimitrova et al. 2005).

Benford and Snow (2000) define a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations,
events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.”

According to Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007), media frames can be seen as an organising mechanism for media content that provides immediate context to the recipient of such frame, through selection, emphasis or exclusion of some specific facts or ideas.

According to McQuail (2005), framing of stories entails giving specific interpretations using words in news representation such that audience do not just read about an issue but view it from a particular perspective. It consists of “using certain words or phrases, making certain contextual references, choosing certain pictures or films, giving examples as typical, referring to certain sources and so on.” It refers to how messages are coded with meaning so that they can be efficiently interpreted in relation to existing beliefs or ideas (Nwabueze and Edegoh, 2010).

According to Benford and Snow (2000), the concept of framing, within the sociology, can be traced back to Erving Goffman’s Frame analysis of (1974). According to Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), Goffman assumed that people cannot understand the world fully and always struggle to interpret their life experiences and make sense of the world around them. So, in order to efficiently process new information they apply “interpretive schemas” or “primary frameworks” to classify information and give it meaningful interpretation. The term framing, according to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), refers to modes of presentation that communicators and journalists use to present information in a manner that resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audience (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007).

Conceptualisation of framing as media effects model was developed by Entman in the early 1990s. Entman (1993) offered a more detailed explanation of how media provide audiences with schemas for interpreting events. According to him, framing essentially involves “selection and salience: to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make
Entman identified five traits of media texts that set a certain frame of reference: (a) importance judgements; (b) agency, or the answer to the question (e.g., who did it?); (c) identification with potential victims; (d) categorisation, or the choice of labels for the incidents; and (e) generalisations to a broader national context (Scheufelle, 1999).

However, according to Benford and Snow (2000), framing theory was popularised by Robert Benford and David Snow, whose three conceptual articles on framing between 1995 and 2000 have been cited over 500 times. They deduced from this that framing processes have “come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilisation and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements” (Benford and Snow, 2000).

The concept of framing according to Tilly (2003) cited by Tusa (2013) has much in common with the study of what some scholars describe as “political identity” (the experience of a social transaction coupled with public representation of that experience). Tilly claims that organisers or leaders of social movements construct political identities and mobilise people with these identities to engage in collective action. Invariably, a political identity relies on some sort of shared history, whether created, exaggerated, or real. When viewed in this light, “political identity” and “framing” are addressing the same phenomenon. In both cases, scholars examine the “politics of signification” (Hall, 2006) of how movement actors are engaged in the “production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Benford and Snow, 2000 and Tusa, 2013).
Some researchers have also studied news framing from three different perspectives: cognitive, constructivist, and critical (Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007), citing d’Angelo, (2002). According to Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007), one of the devices that influence news framing of events is the choice of sources. They cited Baden’s (2003) pre-war study that compares the Guardian of UK and the New York Times (US). According to Barden, even though the two newspapers belong to the two countries that were an integral part of the ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ the study found differences between them. While the Guardian framed its coverage through the use of more foreign official sources, the New York Times concentrated on official government sources. Another study comparing Al Ahram and The New York Times’ pre-war coverage, Ghanem (2005) found that The Times relied more heavily on U.S sources whereas Al Ahram used more Arabic sources (Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007).

Research evidence has shown that framing plays crucial role in media coverage of events. After a study of how British press covered diplomatic scandal in Nigeria, with the Umaru Dikko affair as a case study, Uche and Ngumoha (1996) found that British newspapers gave quite a good amount of coverage that presented a most negative image of Nigeria to its national and international readers, during the period the affair took place (Nwabueze and Edegoh, 2010).

It has also been established that news framing determines to a great extent, public opinion and decision making on an issue. This was particularly expressed in initial public support for the US led war on terror and subsequent invasion of Iraq. According to Entman (2005:254), “many US citizens supported the war on the grounds it made the USA safer from 9/11-style terrorism, based on dominant news framing that emphasised Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and active assistance to al-Qaida.”

1 A joined force of US and its allied countries in a military intervention in the Iraq War
In doing their work, journalists refer to certain knowledge or cultural maps that, in some way, influence the way they conceptualise events and issues (Oso, 2006:68). The journalists use these frames in treating news items thereby creating interpretations of the events being covered.

The process of framing in modern social movements is increasingly relevant in the age of the Internet and social media. The new dynamic these technologies bring to the study of social movements should not be underestimated (Tusa, 2013).

The process of organising and framing are of course intertwined. A frame can inspire people to go out and protest while organisation tells them how and when. Similarly, good organisation of a protest that physically brings people together can create a sense of unity that in turn can be the beginning of a frame. “Media framing infers that media has a powerful effect in giving certain issues legitimacy by altering public opinion” (Skonieczny and Morse, 2013). Protests and social movements are continually the subject of media framing research.

The above theoretical analysis of framing shows that news presentation is a function of certain knowledge structure and sociocultural maps of journalists covering protest movements. The analysis has been able to justify the theoretical basis as it provided the reason for the use of mass media in shaping public opinion towards social movements. This analysis, no doubt shows the relationship between the theory and the study under investigation.
2.2 REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES

Related literatures in the area of media framing and social movements or campaigns are reviewed in this section. Similar literatures are compared to bring out similarities and differences and their connection to this study.

2.2.1 Media Framing of Social Movement

Scholars reveal that media coverage has impact on how protests are represented to the public and on many occasions limits protesters’ ability to represent their own message as it has to be sieved through “already existing, dominant, ‘status quo’ frames” (Skonieczny and Morse, 2013).

Skonieczny and Morse (2013), said the Occupy Wall Street Protest Movement of September 2011 in response to the “global economic crisis and the rise of inequality and corporate influence on democracy” was initiated by a Canadian magazine, Adbusters. According to them, the protest dubbed “we are the 99 percent” had broad appeal based on the unequal distribution of wealth between the top ‘1’ percent and everyone else.

Skonieczny and Morse (2013) said although the movement attracted the attention of the wider public and raised popular awareness of the economic inequality alarms, stoking the moral outrage of ordinary citizens and transforming the national political conversation, some observers were confused by the protest’s lack of conventional “demands” or a single “message.”

Skonieczny and Morse (2013) state that despite the broad appeal of the initial Occupy movement, by the end of November, most of the US Occupy encampments had been shut down by police and city officials, and a movement that had a worldwide appeal suddenly shifted out of the global spotlight. Why did the movement rise and fall so quickly from public
view? While the issues that gave birth to the movement had not changed or improved, the overall US public image of the movement had shifted from supportive and sympathetic to inconvenienced, concerned about public safety and/or disinterested. They found out that the shift was as a result of the dominant portrayal of the protest by the conventional media sources such as CNN. They also found out that the media framing of the protests mirrored near-identical media framing of past economic protests of neoliberal globalisation.

To examine the effect of media framing of the movement, Skonieczny and Morse, (2013) conducted a study of CNN coverage of the eight weeks Occupy movement using videos from CNN.org, and examined the dominant, largely negative, frames CNN used to portray the movement to the public. To support their findings, the authors utilised an online programme “Statnews,” which analyses large newspaper databases for key words and co-occurring terms in order to include a larger sample of media coverage of the Occupy movement.

Skonieczny and Morse (2013) aver that, although social media played an important role in the movement, the influence of the mainstream media on the public was still significant and reflected CNN’s pattern of ‘status quo biases’ in its protest movements’ coverage. They added that the way CNN framed the Occupy Movement closely resembled conventional media framing of the WTO Seattle protests and the protests that followed it against the World Bank and IMF challenging aspects of neoliberal globalisation.

Their study inductively found four dominant frames characterising CNN’s coverage: “Police/Security,” “Illegitimate,” “Protest,” and “Socio-Economic Critique.” They further quantified how much coverage each frame was given on each given date to demonstrate not only the most dominant frames, but also how the frames changed over the two months period as utilised by the CNN.
Police/Security frame sees the protests as a matter of police confrontation and threat to security. “The frame stressed that the protest created violence and endangered stability and security” (Skonieczny and Morse, 2013).

The Illegitimate frame was used for footages that questioned the legitimacy of the movement, mostly those stating that the movement had no goal and portrayed the protesters as outcasts of society. The Protest frame framed the movement on a more neutral ground, by presenting clips that predominantly comprised of either logistical aspect of the dissenters discussion pieces. The Socio-Economic Critique frame looks at the coverage of the economic critique put forward by the Occupy protestors. It shows the amount of coverage that actually discussed the possible goals of, and the reason for the Occupy movement, yet it was the least occurring frame (Skonieczny and Morse, 2013).

Findings in Skonieczny and Morse (2013) research show consistent use of similar negative media frames between the Occupy Wall Street movement and the global justice protests of the late 1999s, early 2000s.

Comparatively, Skonieczny and Morse’s media framing of Occupy movement of economic and globalisation protests and Jules Boykoff’s (2006) media framing analysis of the Global Justice Movement depict similar results. Both show media framing of protest movements as predominantly “violent” and “illegitimate.” The similarity among media frames of the two different and varied movements, despite the different categorisations by distinct authors, reveal a recycling of framing by media to depict social movements. It also shows a notable consistency in media portrayal of protests in support of the status quo to the detriment of the various causes.

Findings in Boykoff’s (2006) study on media framing analysis of the protests by the Global Justice Movement in Seattle and Washington, D. C., reveal near-identical frames to that of

Boykoff (2006:211) identified five dominant frames as portrayed by the media: “violence frame,” “disruption frame,” “freak frame,” “ignorance frame,” and “Amalgam of Grievances frame.”

He defined “violence frame” as violent clashes, vandalism, potential for violence and even lack of or absence of violence in news reporting. This is because, according to him, even when protesters did not actually perpetuate violence, the frame remains there because journalists remarked on the lack of or the absence of violence, or the potential for violence. Violence frame constituted the predominant frame as 62.9% of news stories covering the WTO protests featured the violence frame, with more than half (51.4%) of all newspaper accounts and almost three quarters (74.5%) of every television segment focusing on violent protesters. But in the World Bank/IMF protests, the violence frame was less prevalent, although it still factored into more than half of all news segments (53.3%).

Disruption frame, which according to Boykoff, often dovetailed with the violence frame, appeared regularly in news stories leading up to and during both episodes of contention. It was even the most common frame in the Washington DC protests coverage. He states that
“penchant for dissident disruption operated at two levels: (1), the disruption of the WTO, World Bank and IMF scheduled meetings and (2), the general disruption of the lives of regular, ‘law abiding’ and non-protesting citizens.”

Freak frame, which is another recurrent frame, focuses on the non-mainstream beliefs, values and opinions of these protesters, as well as their age and appearance. Freak frame was employed frequently in coverage of the two protests, with more than one in three stories zeroing in on the non-mainstream aspects of protesters (36% for Seattle and 42% for Washington D.C) (Boykoff, 2006).

In Ignorance frame, the protesters were depicted as ignorant or uninformed. Overall, the media coverage of both the protests, nearly one in five (19%) news packages portrayed the protestors as ignorant or naïve. In Amalgam of Grievances frame, protesters were accused of fighting for too many disparate issues. Roughly one in four news stories feature this frame.

Boykoff concludes that because mass media play an important role in the construction of social issues and problems, its “discourse is not only vital in terms of framing social issues and problems for the attentive public, but it is also a place of ideological and ideational struggle for various social movements, state actors and institutions.” He avers that mass media attention is crucial to social movement development, though sometimes media coverage could do more harm than good to social movements.

Tusa (2013) in his attempt to explain how social media can shape a protest movement believes that technology allows people to share not only information on when and how to protest, but more importantly, to share videos and images that contribute to a different interpretation of events than that which authorities wish.
Trying to ascertain the extent to which the success or failure of protest movements can be attributed to the judicious use of online communication, Tusa (2013) comparatively content analysed Arab Spring protests online to find out the effective use of the internet by the Egyptians and the Iranians to frame their causes. He concluded that computer-mediated communication (CMC) played a crucial role in the revolution of 2011 that ousted President Hosni Mubarak. Computer-mediated communication was clearly perceived as enough of a threat to the government to push Mubarak to block certain blogs and phone networks, and later the internet entirely (Tusa, 2013).

In Iran, social media, particularly Twitter, quickly became the main tool for organising protests and avoiding the police and other government forces. This is because the government in Iran went to the extent of ensuring a “blackout” around the protesters in terms of internet access and media coverage (Tusa, 2013).

According to Tusa, the effect of social media, and generally the internet, in both Egypt and Iran protest movements is undeniable, yet also distracting. Like most notable events, these movements and revolutions were in part possible because of new technology.

Tusa concluded also that, computer-mediated communication played an important, if not conclusively decisive, role in the protest movements in Egypt in 2011 and Iran in 2009. It has further shown that the internet and social media were far more effective tools for framing a protest movement than they were for organising it.

In their study comparing how online news sites in Coalition Countries and the Arab World framed the 2003 Iraq War, Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern (2007) employed quantitative content analysis to examine the frames used in the home pages of selected online news media in the US, the UK, Egypt and Qatar.
According to them, audiences of American and British television were shown “a gripping made-for-TV show starring brave U.S and British troops putting their lives on the line to bring freedom to oppressed Iraqis” whereas viewers of Arabic news coverage were shown “wounded and screaming Iraqi women and children, captured or terrified Iraqi, and yes, U.S. and British soldiers.” Research indicates that such differences in media metaphors, or frames, can have consequences for viewers’ reasoning and beliefs about events (Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern, 2007).

Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahern’s (2007) finding revealed differences in the tone of coverage and use of sources by the four news media studied. They concluded that while the “tale of war” in the Egypt and Qatar media was one of violence and destruction, the tale of war in the US and the UK media was one of military conflict leading to rebuilding for the people of Iraq.

In a study by Oso, Odunlami, Adaja, Rufai, and Atewolara-Odulé (2009) on press coverage of the protests against former President Obasanjo’s Third Term Agenda, five national dailies, namely the Guardian, the Punch, Nigerian Tribune, the Sun and Vanguard were purposively selected and content analysed. The study, which was guided by Agenda Setting Theory, sought to find out the views of the social movement group that predominate in the media, how sources engage the media to get their views across, the specific means used to transmit views to the media during the Third Term protests and the words or concepts that provide the context for the views, as captured by the press and expressed by the various protagonists in the controversy. Findings revealed that the press was overwhelmingly against the attempt to prolong Obasanjo’s tenure as the President and more or less demonised the pro-Third Term as anti-democratic and compared them to other sit-tight African leaders. The debate was heightened by the vehement public disagreement of the initiative and the press criticism
among other things, which forced the National Assembly to reject it. One interesting aspect of the finding is that both pro and anti-Third Term employed the same words or concepts national unity, national interest, peace, rule of law, constitutionalism and democracy to justify their claims and positions.

The researchers concluded that the ambiguity in the meanings of these concepts made them quite useful as ideological tools to mobilise public sentiment and influence public opinion. The researchers’ position was that though both sides in the controversy mobilised the same “condensational symbols as ideological frames,” the prevailing public mood must have encouraged the National Assembly to reject the proposal.

While the studies above by Tusa (2013) and Oso et al. (2009) saw media in protest movements as a tool in the hands of protesters to achieve their goals, Skonieczny and Morse (2013) and Boykoff (2006) revealed consistent use of negative media frames, in support of the status quo, to depict protest movements as predominantly illegitimate and violent.

In another study conducted by Nwabueze and Edegoh (2010) to find out how the Nigerian press framed the strike embarked upon by Nigeria Union of Teachers (NUT) between June and July 2008, and the protest that followed, qualitative content analysis technique was adopted. In assessing the image frames of the federal government on one hand and the NUT on the other hand, as evident in the coverage of the strike and the protest by three national dailies – Vanguard, the Guardian and Daily Champion, the study found that NUT were the dominant sources of news items on the strike, as a result of which the NUT defined the course of media coverage.

Findings from the 161 items published by the newspapers reveal that the protesting teachers were mostly the sources of stories on the strike action and also reveal massive public support for the teachers. The researchers adopted framing as the theory underpinning the study, and
explained how framing creates an image of the parties involved in the issue. The researchers concluded that the press seemingly took more delight on the conflict frame which tends to sell more than other frames as it was manifested through the numerous spot news stories published by the newspapers.

Findings from this research also revealed a shift away from the usual ‘status quo bias’ negative frame, as captured in some of the reviewed literatures above, to support the teachers on strike by projecting the protest, in the eyes of the public, as legitimate and a right that requires their supports.

Corrigall-Brown and Wilkes (2012) studied the visual framing of First Nations’ protest in Canada. All stories about Oka and related protests from 1990-2008 were gathered and analysed from *Globe and Mail, Montreal Gazette*, and *Vancouver Sun* newspapers. Three hypotheses were coded as “Representation,” “Power,” and “Legitimacy” to guide the study.

The “Representation” hypothesis said government officials will be presented in more images often than challengers and findings confirmed so. The “Power” hypothesis stated that it will appear that people are looking up at officials more often than challengers and finding also revealed the same. Which means authorities are seen as powerful, while challengers as weak.

The third hypothesis termed “Legitimacy” said government officials will be shown as rational and challengers will be shown as emotional. Findings reveals like the two above that authorities were seen as rational, and challengers as irrational (emotional). This study also corresponds with majority of the literatures above that status quo biases are maintained and sustained.

Going by the various research techniques and theoretical frameworks adopted in the reviewed literatures, and the findings of the researches, the researcher finds the reviewed studies very relevant to guide and serve as a bridge to the current study.
2.3 SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed the theoretical perspective of the study within the specific context of media framing of social movements. The same chapter carried an extensive review of newspapers framing of social movements. The review was generally on social movements and more specifically on protests which emphasised negative portrayal of protestors. This section analysed the empirical data on social movements and the application of the theoretical frameworks to the empirical findings.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the procedure followed in the research and provides an understanding on how the research was conducted. It explains the method and instrument of data collection, the universe of the study, sample size and sampling technique adopted, units of analysis, content categories and the approach used for analysing data.

3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

This study adopted qualitative and quantitative content analysis as a research approach. The reason for this was that the subject matter required an analysis of the manifest content of newspapers. The researcher considered content analysis technique as the most appropriate. The content analysis method, according to Babbie (2008), is a prescribed system which is systematic, objective and usually quantitative in the extraction of data from any form of communication which could be written, verbal or otherwise. Rosenberry and Vicker (2009) see it as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding.

Keyton (2001) cited in Ekeanyanwu & Olaniyan, (2010) affirms that content analysis is the most basic method of analysing message content. It integrates both data collection method and the analytical technique to measure the occurrence of some identifiable elements in a complete text or set of messages.
Content analysis enables researchers to sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion (Kerlinger, 1986). Further, it is a useful technique for allowing us to discover and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional or social attention (Weber, 1990). And it provides an empirical basis for monitoring shifts in public opinion.

Content Analysis was used in this study to extract data (using coding sheets) on “Bring Back Our Girls” campaign from the content of Nigerian online newspapers. This was done by analysing the frequency, frames, dominant tones, and sources of stories on Bring Back Our Girls.

As stated above, this research adopted both qualitative and quantitative content analysis. The qualitative content analysis works inductively by summarising and classifying elements or parts of the text material and assigning labels or categories to them. It searches for coherent meaning structures in the text material; thus, it affords analysing text material without predefined coding units, dimensions, or categories. It is about how and why people act and communicate this and not that way, what they mean by certain concepts, and so on (Scheufele, 2008). The qualitative aspect of this study will look at the sampled stories and the stories will be qualitatively examined to read meanings behind texts and images and find out how the campaigns were talked about; using qualitative coding to develop the dominant themes/frames and the nature of the coverage.

Quantitative content analysis however works deductively and measures quantitatively by assigning numeric codes to be parts of the material to be coded - which is called coding in quantitative content analysis. Unlike the qualitative, the quantitative aspect of this research will be deductive. Here, was used to analyse the online stories of the four selected online newspapers on BBOG campaign by focusing on the frames, sources, and tone of coverage. To analyse the frames, the researcher made use of predefined frames used by various scholars
who wrote on media framing of social movement. These predefined frames, as generated from various studies, are: Violence frame (violent protesters or potential for violent), Prognostic frame (the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem), adversarial frame (aggressive campaigns from opposition), marginalisation frame (protesters viewed as being marginalised) and amalgam of grievances frame (combination of other existing grievances with the campaign). The predefined frames was compared and merged with the inductively generated frames.

3.2 POPULATION

Population, according to Wimmer and Dominick (2011), is a group or class of subjects, variables, concepts, or phenomena. Asika (2005) notes that a population comprises all conceivable elements, subjects or observations that relate to a particular phenomenon of interest to a research. In this research, the population consists of the four Nigerian online newspapers namely: Sahara Reporters, Vanguard, Daily Trust and the Punch published within the first six months of the abduction of the girls. The online newspapers were selected based on their wide readership, consistency in news coverage, strong online presence, editorial independence, and of course based on researcher’s discretion.

3.2.0 Profile of Selected Newspapers

Profiles of the online newspapers selected for the study is provided below.

3.2.1 Vanguard

Vanguard Newspapers is a Lagos-based private publication of Vanguard Media Limited established in 1984. Presently, Vanguard has in circulation the Daily Vanguard, Saturday
Vanguard and Sunday Vanguard; it has since added other titles taking care of specialised interests. These include: Financial Vanguard and Sports Vanguard. All the titles are captured in the online version of the newspaper (vanguardngr.com). According to the newspaper’s official website, Vanguard is one of the leading Newspapers in Nigeria today with a daily circulation rate of 20,000 copies in Lagos, 12,000 copies in Abuja, 15,000 copies in South-West, 25,000 copies in South-South, 15,000 copies in South-East, 18,000 copies in North Central, 7,500 copies in North-East and 7,500 copies in North-west. This totals it to 120,000 copies with a Print Run of 130,000 copies daily.

3.2.2 Daily Trust

This is a privately held Nigerian newspaper of Media Trust Publishing Company based in Abuja. Media Trust publishes the English-Language version of Daily Trust, Weekly Trust, Sunday Trust, and the Hausa-Language Aminiya newspapers, as well as a new pan-African magazine, Kilimanjaro (Wikipedia.org). Daily Trust was launched in January 2001 and is the largest circulating print newspaper in Northern Nigeria. It is ranked among the top seven in Nigeria in advertising revenue (nigeriandailynewspaper.com). The newspaper has a strong online presence, accessible through www.dailytrust.com.

3.2.3 The Punch

This is one of the most widely-read Nigerian daily newspapers, with a circulation of over 80,000 copies daily. It was founded in 1971 as weekly newspaper and it went daily in 1976 (Wikipedia.com). The Punch can be accessed online through www.punchng.com
3.2.4  *Sahara Reporters*

*Sahara Reporters* is an online news media organisation well known for its promotion of citizen journalism by encouraging everyday people to report stories about corruption, human rights abuses and other political misconduct in Nigeria. A frontier news source for advocacy journalism, *Sahara Reporters* has been referred to as the “Wikileaks of Africa” by *The Daily Beast* (Wikipedia.org). Based in New York City, *Sahara Reporters* was founded in 2006 by Nigerian political activist Omoyele Sowore. *Sahara Reporters* is supported by grants donated by the Ford Foundation and The Omidyar Foundation. It is an online community of international reporters and social advocates dedicated to bringing commentaries, features, news reports from a Nigerian-African perspective. (Wikipedia.com and SaharaReporters.com). *Sahara Reporters* has gained a significantly large following (the largest online followers) both in Nigeria and amongst Nigerians abroad. It can be accessed via www.saharareporters.com

3.3  **SAMPLING TECHNIQUE**

This research adopted systematic random sampling technique in which elements from the population or sample frame was methodically selected at a regular interval after starting at a random point. In accordance with the sampling technique, and in regard to the population of the study, sampling frame was obtained from the four selected online newspapers published within April 14 - October 14, 2014. A total of 713 editions of the four newspapers, 194 for *Daily Trust*, 128 for the *Punch*, 217 for *Sahara Reporters*, and 174 for *Vanguard* were obtained through keyword search of stories that have ‘bring back our girls’ in them. The researcher decided to study one-tenth (1/10) of the population, thus resulting to a sample of 71 editions.
A hypothetical example illustrates the point. The population is 713 in which one-tenth \(\frac{1}{10}\) were selected resulting to a sample of 71 editions, thus:

\[
713 \times \frac{1}{10} = 71.3
\]

The sampling interval was thus \(713/71.3 = 10\). Here, one sees that the sampling interval is the same as the denominator of the sample proportion (fraction), which is also 10.

To select the 71 respondents, therefore, the table of random numbers was used for each newspaper to pick the first number the researcher came across between 1 and 10. To select the subsequent element, the researcher just added 10 (the sampling interval) to the first element and so on until the last element was selected. This exercise resulted in selecting 19 stories for *Daily Trust*, 13 for the *Punch*, 22 for *Sahara Reporters*, and 17 for *Vanguard* respectively.

### 3.4 UNITS OF ANALYSIS

Parameters used to collect, process and analyse the data collected are referred to as units of analysis. The unit of analysis is described as the smallest element of a content analysis, but quite important (Wimmer and Dominick, 2011). In this context, news stories, editorials, features, and photographs, formed the units of analysis.

### 3.5 CONTENT CATEGORIES

Content categories are the divisions into which the units of analysis that was content analysed are grouped. Categories in any research must be relevant to the subject of the study and must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In other words, a given content item logically can be
placed in only one of the categories (which is mutually exclusive), and there is a wide enough range of choices that the coder should be able to choose from, for every item to go (Rosenberry and Vicker, 2009).

Content categories were analysed with regards to the frequency of occurrence, tones of stories, themes and sources. The frequency of coverage will be determined by counting the total number of stories published on the BBOG campaigns for each newspaper. Tone of coverage will be determined by the manner in which the newspapers presented the stories. The newspapers’ tone of coverage could either be considered favourable, unfavourable or neutral. The tone was considered favourable if the content of the reportage presents the campaign, the various reactions of the world, individually and collectively, or any other effort to make it salient in a positive light. It will also be considered favourable if it, in addition, offers suggestions for solution or improvement and over 50 percent of a story favour the campaign. Words and phrases such as commendable, wonderful, appreciable, wise decision, welcome development, kudos, praise worthy, well-done, well intentioned, etc. will be considered to have demonstrated support for the campaign.

The tone will be considered unfavourable where contents of the reportage present the campaign in a negative light before the newspaper reading public. So also, reportage that condemns or criticises the campaign or devotes over 50 percent of its total number of paragraphs to negative comments on the campaign is unfavourable. Words often associated with such negative comments may include unacceptable, insincere, unyielding, failure, culpable, regrettable, negligent, inefficient, injustice, unnecessary, unfair, etc. The tone will however, be considered neutral when there is no clear distinction as to whether the reportage is favourable or unfavourable. That is, when it maintains a middle-of-road position, it may condemn and commend in equal proportion it may be considered as neutral.
The researcher will also code for dominant sources of stories on BBOG. The sources will be
categorised into BBOG Campaigners, Government Official, Sympathisers, Security
Personnel, Boko Haram Member, and Victims/Parents.

3.5 THEME CATEGORIES

Six themes were used in this study. These are the protest frame, ineptitude frame, abduction
frame, prognostic frame, violence frame and marginalisation frame. Three dominant themes
were inductively generated from the contents of the stories, and three other predefined themes
were adopted from the reviewed studies on media framing of social movements.

3.6 CODING PROCEDURE

To establish reliability of the findings, a graduate of mass communication and the researcher,
using the same instructions, coded 10 percent of the total stories, using Holsti’s formula of
calculating co-efficient of reliability, to measure percent agreement. Inter-coder reliability
was established at +.86 across all categories. Holsti’s formula is \( \frac{2A}{Na+Nb} \), ‘2’ indicates
the number of coders; ‘A’ represents the number of agreements or decisions made on each
content category by coders while ‘Na’ and ‘Nb’ stand for the number of units (stories)
analysed by each coder.

The area of coverage was the home pages of each of the four online newspapers as follows:
Daily Trust (http://www.dailytrust.com.ng), the Punch (http://www.punchng.com), Sahara
Reporters (http://www.saharareporters.com), and Vanguard (www.vanguardngr.com). The
home pages were downloaded during the study period – April 14, 2014 to October 14, 2014.
A total of 71 out of the 713 stories (news, feature, editorial, opinion, and letter) pertaining to the Bring Back Our Girls campaigns were content analysed.

Several content categories were coded in the study. These included dominant sources of stories on BBOG; nature of coverage; dominant images; and dominant themes. Other variables of interest were the gender of actors and number of actors involved.

3.7 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive statistical tools such as pie chart, cross-tabulations as well as frequency distribution tables were used in analysing and presenting data. The computer software, Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) devised for analysing social science data was also used. The statistical tools were used to present the data for simple analysis and understanding of the data.

3.8 SUMMARY

This chapter outlined and discussed the methodology of the research which consists of research design, units of analysis, content categories, universe of the study, and profiles of the sampled online newspapers. The chapter also examined the sample size and technique for the study, coding procedure, and technique of data analysis.
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents and analyses data gathered from the study. Qualitative and quantitative data were organised and discussed under themes using tables, graphs and descriptive statements to illustrate the findings. To answer the research questions, cross tabulations were run for each of the related variables.

The study investigated the coverage of Bring Back Our Girls campaign in Nigerian online newspapers. Daily Trust, the Punch, Sahara Reporters and Vanguard were purposively selected for the study. News, features, opinions, editorials, letters and other forms of stories on the BBOG campaign were used as units of analysis.

4.1 RESULTS OF FINDINGS

Table I below gives a summary of the editions counted and sampled within the study period.

Table I: Newspapers Counted and Sampled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Total Stories Counted</th>
<th>No. of BBOG Stories Sampled</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in the table 1 above, a total of 713 stories on Bring Back Our Girls campaigns from the study population, which fall within the period of April 14, 2014 – October 14, 2014 were counted. Using systematic random sampling technique to select the one-tenth of the population, 71 stories were sampled, 19 for *Daily Trust*, 13 for *Punch*, 22 for *Sahara Reporters* and 17 for *Vanguard* newspapers respectively. To get the sample, total stories for each of the four newspapers were numbered and picked at a fixed interval of 10. The table reveals that while *Sahara Reporters* has the highest number of stories on BBOG campaigns (31%), *Punch* has the least stories (18.3%).

**Table 2: Newspapers by Story Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Straight News</th>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Editorial</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Daily Trust</em></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Punch</em></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sahara Reporters</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Vanguard</em></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent</strong></td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The finding from Table 2 shows that, of the total number of stories coded, 43 were treated as straight news stories, compared with 13, which were feature articles. Two were editorials, with nine opinions, and four from ‘other’ category. *Daily Trust* had the highest number of straight news stories (14), followed by *Sahara Reporters* (13), the *Punch* had 11 and *Vanguard* recorded five. Feature articles were the second highest story type with a little less than one in five stories (13) on the BBOG campaigns being coded as such. *Sahara Reporters*
had the most feature articles (5) followed by the *Daily Trust* (4), *Vanguard* (3) and the *Punch* (1). Of the total number of coded stories, nine were opinion stories, seven of which came from the *Vanguard*, while *Sahara Reporters* and the *Punch* had one each. There were only two editorials, one from *Daily Trust* and the other from *Sahara Reporters*. ‘Other’ category of the story type had four stories which *Vanguard* and *Sahara Reporters* had two each. All the stories that came from ‘other’ category of the story type were press statements.

**Table 3: Nature of Coverage of BBOG Campaigns by Newspapers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Nature of Coverage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Favourable</td>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59(83.1%)</td>
<td>7(9.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study compared the nature of coverage of bring back our girls campaigns between the four news sites. Table 3 reveals that, of the total stories (71), 59(83.1%) were coded as favourable, seven (9.9%) unfavourable, and five (7.0%) neutral. Majority of the stories for each news site was coded as favourable. *Sahara Reporters* had 18 of the favourable stories, followed by the *Daily Trust* with 17, and then the *Punch* and *Vanguard* had 12 each.

Out of the seven unfavourable stories, five were from the *Vanguard* while one each from the *Punch* and *Daily Trust*. Four stories from the *Sahara Reporters* and one from the *Daily Trust* maintained a neutral ground. None of the stories fall under the “mixed” category, where stories were expected to reflect a mixture of favourable and unfavourable content.
Table 4: Dominant Sources of Bring Back Our Girls Campaign Stories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Sources</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>Punch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protesters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Personnel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims/Parents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathisers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19(26.8%)</td>
<td>13(18.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study examined whether the newspapers differed in their use of sources of information for stories on BBOG campaigns. There were seven dominant categories of sources identified from the stories: protesters, government officials, security personnel, Boko Haram members, victims/parents, sympathisers (those who neither joined the BBOG campaigners nor were they parents of the abducted girls but voiced out their sympathies), and foreign officials. An additional category “others,” which could include experts like academics, security analysts, etc. was also identified.

From the findings, the most frequently used sources across all the newspapers put together were sympathisers, who were cited 25, protesters (23), Government officials and victims/parents were cited an equal number of times (5) as sources in the stories sampled. Security personnel were cited 3 times while others category had 2. Except for Sahara Reporters that cited Boko Haram once, none of the newspapers cited the sect members in
their coverage of the BBOG campaigns. While Sahara Reporters did not cite security personnel as sources in any BBOG campaigns story, the other three online newspapers cited security personnel once each.

The researcher also examined the gender of sources in the stories as shown in the above pie chart. The majority of sources coded in the study were male, representing 59 percent of all identified sources, while female sources represented 41 percent.
The researcher also coded for number of sources in the stories on the BBOG campaigns as revealed by the news sites. Findings show that more than one-third (46.5%) of the news sites cited a group of sources rather than an individual. A little less than two in six (43.7%) stories cited individual sources, and 9.8% cited two sources. Group of sources here is referring to where the views of more than two sources were cited in a story or views of a group of campaigners were quoted. Individual source here is referring to where a single person was cited in a story, and two sources are referring to a situation where two people were captured in one story.

**Dominant Themes of Bring back Our Girls Stories across the Four News Sites**

For this study, the researcher read and coded 71 stories from the four news sites. Three news frames were inductively found to have dominated the four news sites’ coverage of the BBOG campaigns: the protest frame, the ineptitude frame, and the abduction frame. However, three other predefined frames were deductively adopted from the reviewed literature on media framing of social movements. These are: the violence frame, the prognostic frame, and the marginalisation frame. These frames are not mutually exclusive, as they frequently appeared within the same stories, echoing and strengthening one another. The study identified the central themes that were adopted by the newspapers using a key word search for recurring concepts in the phrases and sentences throughout the 71 stories by going through, and writing down, the recurring concepts manually. At the end of which, the researcher grouped the identified concepts, phrases and words into six dominant themes based on what they mean in the stories.

The researcher then quantified how much coverage was dedicated to each frame on each given online newspaper to demonstrate the most dominant frame within the study period.
**Protest Frame**

Agitations by the BBOG protesters and other organised civic activism or campaigns on BBOG that provoked rage and action in both Nigeria and the international community, constituted the predominant theme through which stories on the Bring Back Our Girls campaigns were presented. Activities such as candle light vigils, special sit out ceremonies, advocacy campaigns, organised protests and rallies, including public outcries were captured under the protest frame. Also, words like “rally,” “agitation,” “dissent,” “protest,” “campaign,” etc. were identified as the protest themes. As table 5 below demonstrates, more than one-quarter of the stories on BBOG campaigns featured the protest frame, with almost one-third of the total themes from the *Sahara Reporters* focusing on the protesters’ agitations. More than one-quarter of the themes from *Vanguard* stories and almost one-third of *Daily Trust* stories featured the protest frame.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>No of coded themes for the Protest Frame</th>
<th>% of coded themes for the Protest Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>257</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Table 5 above reveals the protest frame as captured by the four newspapers. It shows that almost half (46.3%) of the coded themes across all the four news sites came from *Sahara Reporters*, while more than one-quarter (28%) of the protest frame was by *Daily Trust* and *Vanguard* covered slightly above one-fifth (20.6%) of it. The table also reveals that the *Punch* had the least number of stories (5.1%) indicating the protest frame.
**Ineptitude Frame**

The Ineptitude Frame, which demonstrates lack of commitment in the government's efforts to rescue the kidnapped Chibok girls, and the show of incompetency and other efforts by the government to suppress, mock and even ban the protesters from campaigning through detention of the campaign leaders, appeared regularly in the stories. In fact, it was the second highest frame through which stories on the BBOG campaigns were told.

A total of 187 coded concepts demonstrated ineptitude frame in the stories. Incompetence and display of lack of intelligence by the Nigerian security in their approaches to rescuing the kidnapped girls as covered by the newspapers, the use of police to dislodge the campaigners from where they mounted a permanent sit-in, also formed part of the Ineptitude Frame.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>No of coded themes for the Ineptitude Frame</th>
<th>% of coded themes for the Ineptitude Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 6 above, more than two in five (43.3%) stories indicating the ineptitude frame were found in *Sahara Reporters*, and a little less than one-third (31.0%) were found in *Daily Trust*. *Vanguard* covered slightly above one-fifth (20.3) of the ineptitude frame, and the *Punch* had least of the ineptitude frame with just 5.4% represented.
**Abduction Frame**

Another recurrent frame found in the online newspapers accounts of the BBOG campaigns focused on the abduction of the girls. This frame also appeared regularly in the online sites where in all the stories, issues about the kidnap, continued detainment of the abducted girls, how they were abducted and the condition that led to the abduction were coded for abduction. Phrases and words like “carted away,” “captivity,” “continued detention,” “abduction,” “kidnap,” and even “kidnappers,” “abductors,” and “captors” were coded for Abduction Frame. A little less than one-fifth of all coverage was coded under the Abduction Frame.

**Table 7: Abduction Frame**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>No of coded themes for the Abduction Frame</th>
<th>% of coded themes for the Abduction Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>159</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 indicates that regarding the abduction frame more than one-third (37.7%) of it was coded from *Sahara Reporters*, and more than one-quarter (26.4%) was from *Daily Trust*. Less than one-fifth each (18.9% and 17.0%) of the Abduction Frame came from *Vanguard* and the *Punch*.

**Prognostic Frame**

Prognostic Frame is a predefined frame often used by the media to frame stories on social movements and war and this frame was adopted for this research. It addresses the question of what is to be done and suggests remedies. Although the prognostic frame did not emerge as
the dominant frame in the stories coded, however, about one-sixth (16.3%) of all the coverage on the BBOG campaigns demonstrated the Prognostic Frame. All efforts to negotiate the release of the girls or other demands that focused on calling on the government to secure the return of the girls either by the protesters, sympathisers or victims’ parents or any other authority were coded under the Prognostic Frame.

### Table 8: Prognostic Frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>No of coded themes for the Prognostic Frame</th>
<th>% of coded themes for the Prognostic Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated in table 8 above, one-third (33.6%) of the stories coded for the prognostic frame were from Sahara Reporters. More than one-quarter each (28.9% and 28.3%) were coded from Daily Trust and Vanguard, and just 9.2% were coded from the Punch.

**Violence Frame**

This is another predefined frame identified from the reviewed studies on media framing of social movements and coded for in this study. But unlike in the reviewed studies where the protesters were seen and recorded as exhibiting violent tendencies, in this study, the protesters were viewed as the victims of violence from the government through the security personnel. Also, violence towards the kidnapped girls and the rest of the people in the region by the Boko Haram sects, as cited in the BBOG campaigns stories, were coded under the violence frame. Phrases and words like “bomb attack,” “blast,” “female bomber,” “horrendous massacre and destruction,” “residents killed,” etc. were considered and incorporated under
the Violence Frame. Out of the total coded stories, 14.6% appeared under the Violence Frame.

Table 9: Violence Frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>No of coded themes for the Violence Frame</th>
<th>% of coded themes for the Violence Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 shows that, of the total stories coded for the Violence Frame, less than one-third (30.7%) of it came from *Sahara Reporters* while more than one-quarter (27.7%) of it came from *Daily Trust* and *Vanguard* each, and only one in seven (13.9%) came from the *Punch*.

**Marginalisation Frame**

The Marginalisation Frame focused on the manner in which the protesters as well as the victims were thought to have been marginalised and ignored because of their gender by the government and the society in general. This was cited in the stories as making the campaigners unrepresentative of the general public; and making other issues perceived to be less important as more important than rescuing the girls.

4.2.10 Table 10: Marginalisation Frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>No. of coded themes for the Marginalisation Frame</th>
<th>% of coded themes for the Marginalisation Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punch</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Dominant Themes of BBOG Stories across the Four News Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Themes</th>
<th>Online Newspapers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Trust</td>
<td>Punch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineptitude</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prognostic</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>265(28.3%)</td>
<td>89(9.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As indicated in table 11 above, all the coded stories for the various themes across the four news sites were put together. The table shows that *Sahara Reporters* had the highest number of stories (39.8%) coded for dominant themes, followed by *Daily Trust* (28.3%), *Vanguard* (22.4%) and the *Punch* had the least (9.5%). Of the dominant themes, the Protest Frame featured highest with 27.5%. This is followed by the Ineptitude Frame (20%), the Abduction
Frame (17%), the Prognostic Frame (16.3%), the Violence Frame (14.6%) and the Marginalisation Frame with 4.6%).

4.2 SUMMARY

This chapter takes care of data presentation, analysis and interpretation. The data was analysed based on the research questions. And in so doing, tables and charts were used to graphically describe the results.

From the results obtained, the study revealed that the newspapers studied reported BBOG campaign positively by concentrating more on straight news rather than other genres. This finding is contrary to the usual media coverage of the social movements where protesters are portrayed negatively.
CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This study has presented information concerning the Bring Back Our Girls campaigns as reported by the Daily Trust, the Punch, Sahara Reporters and the Vanguard online newspapers. The findings will be discussed based on the research questions.

The results obtained from the study were helpful in answering the research questions. First the four newspapers: Daily Trust, the Punch, Sahara Reporters, and Vanguard differ in their coverage of the BBOG campaigns. From the total stories counted on the news sites of the four online newspapers within the same six months period, it can be deduced that Daily Trust, which is north-based and Sahara Reporters, which predominantly reports about the northern Nigeria, showed more commitment to the coverage of the activities of the Bring Back Our Girls campaigners as should be expected.

The Punch and Vanguard on the other hand operate from, and mostly report about, the southern Nigeria, paid a little less attention to the activities of the campaigners. This is evident in the frequency of their coverage of the BBOG campaigns as accessed from their archives. The reason may simply be because the girls were abducted in the north and the operations of the abductors are majorly in the north. Generally, the findings reveal that the BBOG campaigns received considerable amount of coverage during the period under study. Seven hundred and thirteen stories related to the campaigns were counted throughout the period of the study. Second, though there was a high level of consistency across the four news sites in the presentation of the story types where news predominated, Vanguard had more opinion stories than the rest and concentrated more on opinions rather than news. While
Daily Trust had more news than all the other three, Sahara Reporters had more features than the rest, and more news than features. This result shows that the newspapers presented the BBOG campaigns stories more from straight news angle paying less attention to the other forms, especially editorial which is supposed to project the position of the newspapers as regards to the BBOG campaigners and their activities and evaluating the degree of attention they received from government and the international community.

Third, sympathisers were cited more predominantly by the news sites and were closely followed by the protesters. While Sahara Reporters and Vanguard concentrated more on the protesters, Daily Trust and the Punch concentrated more on sympathisers. Boko Haram was cited only once as a source and government source was less cited compared to protestors and sympathisers. This result is contrary to that of Corrigall-Brown and Wilkes (2012), in whose study, the government officials were cited and quoted more than the protesters. Out of the 46 dominant images coded, 21(45.6%) were those of the protesters, victims/parents and sympathisers received nine (19.6%) and eight (17.4%) respectively. Here also, government image was less with only five (10.9%). This finding is contrary to the findings of Corrigall-Brown and Wilkes (2012) where government officials images were cited more than the images of the protesters with 77% to just 23%.

Looking at the gender and number of the actors, the result remarkably showed that even though the victims are women and the campaigns were mounted chiefly by women, there were slightly more male sources than the female sources and more group of actors than individual or two actors as captured succinctly by the newspapers. A pie chart and a bar chart descriptively explained the results obtained from the study in relation to the gender and number of actors within the stories analysed. It is important to note that the implication of this world-wide campaign break the barriers of religion, gender, cultural boundaries, and strengthen the spirit of oneness, sense of belonging and togetherness among countries.
However, in examining the nature of reporting, which sought to answer research question 2, finding reveals that all the newspapers favoured the campaigners in their reports on the BBOG campaign with a higher percentage of 83.1. This can be explained by the fact that it is their social responsibility to hold government accountable for its role in securing the release of the kidnapped girls, hence the need to project the campaign positively. The unfavourable coverage which came second has just 9.9% and the neutral received the least coverage with 7.0%. Deductions from this study strongly suggest that contrary to the early media research findings’ view that protesters were reported negatively (see Skonieczny and Morse, 2013, and Boykoff, 2006), the protesters were rather viewed positively.

A look at the implication of this study for theory and practice regarding the online newspaper coverage of BBOG campaigns is necessary. Framing theory assumes that the mass media give specific interpretations in news representation, using certain words or phrases, choosing certain films or pictures, making certain contextual references, referring to certain sources, giving examples as typical, and so on such that audience do not just read about an issue but view it from a particular perspective.

When viewed from the stand point of this theory, it will be safe to sum up from the result of the study that, between April 14 to October 14, 2014, which marked the first six months of the abduction of 276 secondary school girls, the newspapers studied gave prominence to the issue by projecting positively the various activities of the Bring Back Our Girls campaigners. Their reportage was in demonstration towards safe and fast rescue of the girls. Besides that, when considered against the background of the doctrine of the people’s right to know, these newspapers did more to give people their rights as they should. So the study confirms the assumptions of the theory.
Also, the findings reveal a shift in the framing trends over time, where news are presented through identified lenses called “protest paradigm” to frame campaign movement stories. The dominant and most frequent negative frames that present movements as disruptive, violent, illegitimate, freak, etc., as captured by various media have shifted to presenting them as victims of incompetent governance and violence.

For example, findings in Skonieczny and Morse (2013) show consistent use of similar negative media frames between the Occupy Wall Street movement and the global justice protests of the late 1990s, early 2000s. “In both cases, the “protest paradigm” affected the movements’ ability to reach a broader audience despite wide-spread economic concerns about the shifting global economy and rising inequality and poverty.”

Findings also reveal that there were no clear-cut differences in terms of use of sources among the four newspapers, except for the Sahara Reporters that relied much more on the protesters than the rest of the sources, where 10 of its total 22 sources were the protesters. While none of the newspapers relied on government official as its dominant source, Sahara Reporters did not cite government official, security personnel and foreign official at all. Except for Sahara Reporters that cited two expert sources, none of the other three newspapers had sources from the “other” category.

Three dominant frames emerged inductively from the data and were complemented by three predefined frames adopted by the researcher. Generally, the protest frame was the most predominant of the six, as it appeared in more than one-quarter (27.5%) of all the news sites stories. In other words, bring back our girls protest was vehemently supported by the online sites in more than one of every four. This frame was followed in frequency by the ineptitude frame, which appeared in one-fifth (20%) of all the BBOG campaigns stories. This statistic is more explicable given the fact that the agitations by the protesters was as a result of the
government’s inept attitude towards ensuring safe return of the abducted girls. The third most frequent frame overall was the Abduction Frame, which appeared in a little less than one-fifth (17%) of all the coded stories of the news sites. The fourth most frequent frame was the Prognostic Frame, which appeared in one-sixth (16.3%) of all the accounts. The fifth most frequent frame was the Violence Frame, which appeared in slightly more than one in every seven (14.6%) coded stories. Finally, nearly one in every 21 (4.6%) coded stories presented Bring Back Our Girls campaigners and the victims of the abduction as being marginalised via the Marginalisation Frame.

5.1.1 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This study broadly investigates the coverage of Bring Back Our Girls Campaign by Nigerian online newspapers. It focuses primarily on examining four Nigerian online newspapers namely Sahara Reporters, Vanguard, Daily Trust and the Punch. Three of the four newspapers have printed versions; the only one that doesn’t is Sahara Reporters.

The study is restricted to the investigation of issues related to the Bring Back Our Girls campaign that followed the abduction of 276 school girls in Chibok, Nigeria. It does not go into the entire coverage of Boko Haram activities. A period of six months from April to October 2014 will be used to conduct the study.

It was not feasible to study the entire period from the abduction day to date due to time constraint and considering the fact that there are no enough resources to contract research assistants to do a wider study.
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

A few recommendations emerge from the findings of this study. The findings of this study show that 60.6 percent of the stories were straight news, this researcher would therefore recommend that the coverage of Bring Back Our Girls campaigns should go beyond straight news. It is important to go beyond straight news and to do more feature articles because feature articles allow journalists to explain further the complexities of BBOG campaign.

Further research on media framing of protests would be useful. The trend of media concentration on officialdom and its impact on media diversity and freedom, though refuted by this research, needs further investigation to either retain or invalidate the trend. This can best be achieved by studying both print and other online newspapers different from the ones used in this study.

The newspapers need to do more objective reporting since they are considered as national newspapers not regional. While the campaign breaks the barriers of religion, gender, cultural or geographic boundaries, the newspapers’ level of coverage of the campaign demonstrated some levels of biasness, where newspapers from the Southern Nigeria paid less attention to the campaign when compared to their northern counterpart. This can be attributed to the fact that both Boko Haram and the abducted girls are from the northern Nigeria.

5.3 CONCLUSION

This study indicated that all the four newspapers paid serious attention to the coverage of Bring Back Our Girls campaigns and they considered the campaigns as important by bringing to the attention of the public the desires and aspirations of the protesters. It also
showed that, the nature of the news reports favoured the campaigners rather than officialdom such as government and other actors. Although officialdom was covered, they were not given much prominence as the general public and parents of the girls. It is also interesting to note that coverage of BBOG movement was favourable when such movements are often portrayed negatively. The findings of this study were contrary to other studies on social media movements which found that social movement protests and protesters were considered illegitimate, irrational and ignorant, while governments were seen as powerful, rational, and legitimate. Rather, the study established in Nigeria, the social media movement BBOG was found to be one with a legitimate course, which gained national recognition and acceptance through lots of coverage in online newspapers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


www.saharareporters.com accessed on 18/08/2015

www.vanguardngr.com accessed on 18/08/2015

www.wikipedia.com accessed on 18/08/2015
**APPENDIX 1**

**Sampled Editions of the Newspapers (2014)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
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<th>August</th>
<th>Septeme</th>
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<td>Daily Trust</td>
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<td>5, 15, 16, 26,</td>
<td>4, 7</td>
<td>5, 25</td>
<td>3, 5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>Punch</td>
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<td>6, 10, 12, 21, 13, 22,</td>
<td>3, 5, 13</td>
<td>9, 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>11, 15</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Sahara Reporters</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>11, 11, 25</td>
<td>1, 6, 10, 14, 14</td>
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<td>Vanguard</td>
<td>5, 7, 8, 15, 11, 27,30, 24</td>
<td>4, 6</td>
<td>22,24, 30</td>
<td>11, 17</td>
<td>12, 15</td>
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<td>17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>6</td>
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APPENDIX 2:

CODING SHEET

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<td>Violence</td>
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<td>Ineptitude</td>
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<td>Abduction</td>
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<td>Marginalisation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Researcher watched out for recurring terms used throughout the various stories and generated three frames (Protest Frame, Abduction Frame and Ineptitude Frame) and then added to three adopted predefined frames (Prognostic Frame, Violence Frame, and Marginalisation Frame).

**SOURCES & IMAGES**
- BBOG Campaigners
  - Government Officials
  - Security Personnel
  - Boko Haram Members
  - Victims/Parents
  - Sympathisers
  - Foreign Officials
  - Others

**TONES:**
Tones will be determined by the stand of the newspaper as reflected in the campaign’s coverage

Favourable  Any effort to present it in positive light, offers suggestion for solution.
Unfavourable  Presents the campaign in negative light, criticises the campaign.
Neutral  No clear distinction as to whether it is favourable or unfavourable, maintains a middle-of-the-road position.
Mixed  condemns and commends the campaigns on equal proportion