POST-CIVIL WAR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN LIBERIA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

BY

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DECLARATION
I, Garmondeh Mokoboy Yebleh, author of this thesis, “Post-Civil War Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Prospects and Challenges”, hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, and all help relative to other people’s work have been duly acknowledged. Furthermore, I affirm that it has never been presented either in whole or in part for any other degree in this university or elsewhere.

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ABSTRACT

This study sought to examine the security progress and challenges in post-civil war Liberia from 2003 to 2013. Specifically, this objective was imperative to undertake in order to investigate how well the UN has reformed Liberia’s security sector. The objective was also relevant in order to ascertain how well the UN has prepared the security sector of the country to manage conflicts, as well as to investigate the peace building process of Liberia and its challenges. Methodologically, a historical approach was employed for the research. This paradigm attempted a systematic collection and objective assessment of data related to past occurrences in the civil war of Liberia, in order to test hypotheses concerning causes, effects, or trends of events that may help to explain present and anticipated events. Findings from the study revealed that there has been significant progress in the restitution, building and sustenance of peace and liberal democracy in Liberia with the aid of the UNMIL. However, there are still unresolved challenges, which if they are not prudently tackled may spur a resurgence of conflict even after the withdrawal of the peace keeping force. Some of these challenges are: anti-corruption efforts, unemployment, economic growth, the legal system capacity building, insufficient financial supports from international donors, the exclusion of some of the anti-terrorist groups in the security forces, the lack of political zeal to prosecute perpetrators of sexual and gender based-violence.
DEDICATION

I would humbly like to dedicate this dissertation to the Almighty God, the arbiter of my faith.

Also, to my beloved parents Mr. & Mrs. Moses K. Yebleh Sr. for their unflinching support to me.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AFL - Armed Forces of Liberia

ATU - Anti-terrorism Unit

AU - African Union

CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DAC - Development Assistance Committee

DDRR - Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

DEA - Drug Enforcement Agency

DPA - Department of Political Affairs

DPKO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States

EU - European Union

GRC - Governance Reform Commission

ICG - International Crisis Group

IPRS - Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy

JMAC - Joint Mission Analysis Cell

JSAT - Joint Security Assessment Team

LBF - Liberian Frontier Force
LNP - Liberian National Police

LURD - Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MCP - Monrovia City Police

MINUCI - United Nations Missions in Côte d’Ivoire

MINURCAT - UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

MNS - Ministry of National Security

MOD - Ministry of Defence

MODEL - Movement for Democracy in Liberia

MOJ - Ministry of Justice

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBI - National Bureau of Investigation

NFS - National Fire Service

NPFL - National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NPTA - National Police Training Academy

NSA - National Security Agency

NSC - National Security Council

NTGL - National Transition Government of Liberia
OECD -

ONUC - UN Operations in the Congo

PAE - Pacific Architects and Engineers

PSU - Police Support Unit

QRU - Quick-Reaction Unit

RSLAF - Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces

RUF - Revolutionary United Front

SLP - Sierra Leonean Police

SPLM - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary General

SSR - Security Sector Reform

SSS - Special Security Service

UN - United Nations

UNAMSIL - UN Mission in Sierra Leone

UNDP - UN Development Program

UNICEF - UN Children’s Fund

UNIFEM - UN Development Fund for Women
UNMIL-United Nations Missions in Liberia

UNOCI - United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire

UNPOL - United Nation Police

UNSC - UN Security Council

US - United States

USA - United States of America
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CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background of the Study

Even though there has been a significant attempt and progress in many African countries, the issue of developing a more democratic security sector governance is something that is difficult to achieve. The interaction of the different tribes or ethnic groups coupled with dynamic socio-economic environment within each country contributes to this challenge. The political history and the interaction with colonial masters both during and after colonisation have also impacted the governance of the security sector. A common feature that dominates the security sector in many West African countries has been the imposing instinct that is always displayed by the security forces. Thus, the security sector has become susceptible to looting of national resources, and the causing fear and panic among the public. With such experiences, improving the security sector of these countries would demand not only tackling the technical reform, recruitment and training but also looking at a complete overhaul of the thinking within the sector taking into account the people they must serve. In view of the economic hardship and the injustices within societies, many groups resort fighting for survival which results in the conflict or civil wars that is experienced.

The issue of SSR gained prominence in the later part of the 1990s when international developmental organizations especially spearheaded by the European development agencies, sought to address the impact of dysfunctional security sector management and its repercussions on their host nations and the world as a whole. The SSR has now evolved to become a benchmark in conflict prevention, peace building, and reconstruction for organizations such as
the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, ECOWAS, and many others. The local people for the SSR is implemented have often seen the reform to lack local content and generally regard it as an imposition. The solution to this view is to present a strong national leadership will and an active interest of the stakeholders in the process of SSR. The SSR take into account almost all the various institutions that are involved in the security matters of the state and try to reform them. The key principle of the SSR is to promote effectiveness and accountability.

For a successful peace building process, there is the need for a Security Sector Reform (SSR). A security sector that operates according to the tenets of the rule of law promotes peace and stability and international security. The idea of international developmental organisation to completely transform the security sector in a post-war situation provided the avenue develop good democratic security governance and avert any new conflict. After the ceasefire of warring factions in Liberia, the international community intervene to radically transform the security sector of Liberia which had been used as instrument to perpetrate various crime against the people.

An expedient approach identified by the UN in handling the post conflict situation in Liberia was the institution of the SSR. The SSR in Liberia which commenced its operations in 2004 started with the recruitment of personnel for the Liberian National Police (LNP) to assist in the 2005 elections which was spearheaded by the United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL). The SSR programme was initiated to reform the security sector and build peace in order to avoid another destabilization in the country. The police, army, and other security agencies were on the agenda of the reform.
The Liberian National Police (LNP) got the first share of the reform in 2004 which was led by the United Nation Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The United States was concerned with reforming the army even though a private company (DynCorp International) was contracted to do the actual work. In 2008, the UN force begun their preparation to drawdown in Liberia to form the SSR program which began in 2004.

1.2 Problem Statement

The intervention of the international community is expected to secure peace in the immediate post-conflict stage which is a very delicate part of transition from war to peace. However, in Liberia, the perception of insecurity in the communities remains, regardless of how long external peace builders exist in the country. There is a lack of willingness, agreement and resources from member states to operations organised by the UN. The general absence of transparency, accountability and local participation has led to a disregard of the process by the beneficiaries of the reform. The SSR program is faced with a lot of issues that need to be addressed.

There is a dearth of literature on SSR in Africa especially among the nations that are involved. There are relatively few contributions on SSR in Africa that have been authored by experts from the region or nations concerned. Looking at the specific challenge and prospects that are encountered in the SSR process in Liberia would help in making policies for future work of stakeholders.
1.3 Objectives of the Study

The objective of the study is to review the security progress and challenges in post civil war Liberia from 2003 to 2013. Specifically, the study would:

i. Examine the prospects gained in the SSR programme in Liberia;
ii. Identify the key challenges encountered during the SSR program; and
iii. Enumerate how efficient the UN has reformed the security sector of Liberia.

1.4 Research Question

In order for the study to address the main in the objectives, the following questions would need to be answered:

i. What are some of the prospects gained in the SSR programme in Liberia?
ii. What are the challenges that the SSR programme encountered in Liberia?
iii. How was the UN able to reform the security sector of Liberia to meet democratic standards?

1.5 Hypotheses

In view of the above objectives and the literature review, the researcher hypothesizes that:

HA: UNMIL has adequately reformed Liberia‘s security sector.

HO: UNMIL has not adequately reformed Liberia's security sector.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The scope of this research is to look at the post-conflict situation in Liberia, with respect to the operations of the SSR, by critically looking at the Armed Forces of Liberia, and Liberia
National Police from 2003 to 2013. The year 2003 marked the end of the civil war in Liberia when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by the warring factions and the Government of Liberia in Accra, Ghana. The study would look at the process of SSR in Liberia and more specifically concentrate on the capital, Monrovia. Analysis of various research works into the prospects and challenges of SSR in Liberia would be done.

1.7 Rationale of the study

The study would be of immense significance to policy makers, academia and researchers, and the nation as a whole. The research would contribute to existing literature on the SSR program in Liberia. Thus, it would fill the gap on studies on the prospects and challenges of SSR in Liberia.

1.8 Literature Review

1.8.1 Historical Context

Liberia was formed in 1822 by freed slaves from North America. In 1847, Liberia was declared an independent state. There was a problem of cohabitation between the settlers and the indigenous ethnic groups. The relationship between these two groups was very poor. The settlers relegated the ideas of the original inhabitants of the land, in matters that concerns politics and the economy.¹⁴ The founders who were the minority felt insecure and hence formed an army with the motive of defending themselves against any potential threat by the majority group who are the indigenous people.
There was another threat in 1908 from the British and French over the eligibility of the settlers to rule the indigenous people. This necessitated the formation of the Liberian Frontier Force to patrol in the remote areas. The Liberian Frontier Force (LBF) was initially colonial militias which got transformed in 1908 due to the threat from the British and the French. This force became the only security institution till the sixties. The LBF was functioning concurrently as a military and a police institution, operating at the dictates of the interest of the Liberian elites. People were compelled to join the as the settlers widened their territories into the hinterlands. Thus, the main motive of creating the security institution was to reinforce the supremacy of the settlers over the indigenous people, and fight any foreign interruption. During the reign of President William V.S. Tubman Sr., the civilian management of the armed forces had shifted to the office of the president. The security sector thus was controlled by the head of the state and not the people. The president used the security agencies as a shield to protect his political ambitions to the detriment of the people. In order to solidify his control, Tubman established the Executive Action Bureau, the Special Security Service (SSS), the National Intelligence and Security Service, and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). This thinking of the security that is centred on regime protection at the expense of the people became the practice of the day. The security sector over the years became fragmented in a divide-and-rule state.

The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was created in 1962 to replace the LBF. However, the member of the LBF were all recruited into the AFL. In 1980, Sergeant Samuel Doe who was a member of the Krahn tribe through a coup d’état overthrew the government of the day. His rule was characterised by strictness and expulsion of the elite group from public office. During his administration, the AFL underwent a transformation with the support of the US. Doe administration was faced with a rebel group led by Charles Taylor in 1989. This occurred amidst
chaos and violence that had broken out in the country. Doe was killed by Charles Taylor in 1990. A civil war broke out and the security sector was factionalised. The civil war which lasted between 1989 to 1996 created all kinds of warlords and renegade combatants who traumatised the Liberian population with all kinds of atrocities.19 This civil war in Liberia that lasted over a decade and factionalised the country’s security forces bred lawlessness.

In 1997, Taylor got elected the president after a ceasefire. However the election of Taylor was met with opposition and the chaos went on. The Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) were part of the opposition. Another civil war erupted in 1999. During the period of these civil wars, the AFL had disintegrated to be regarded as a legitimate security institution. The civil war which ended in 2003 resulted in the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in August that year. As part of this agreement was the recommendation to reform the security sector.

1.8.2 The Security Sector of Liberia

To fully understand the challenges of reforming the security sector, it would not be out of place to deliberate and examine the security structure of Liberia. The security sector of Liberia could be grouped into the state and private security agencies, and the institutions that provide oversight functions.

The state security apparatus includes the following agencies: the AFL made up of the coast guard, the Liberia National Police, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Ministry of National Security (MNS), the NBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the SSS, the Executive Mansion Guard, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), the Liberia
National Fire Service (NFS), the Bureau of Customs and Excise, and the Monrovia City Police (MCP).

1.8.3 The Transitional Period

A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Accra in the year 2003 to signify the end of civil war in Liberia. The CPA provided the framework for reform during the transition period of 2003 and 2005. Part of the reform in the CPA is the SSR. In 2005, the United Nations Mission in Liberia in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice organized a consultative forum on Security Sector Reform in Liberia. This was well represented by a wide variety of groups and persons that had interest in the process. This forum offered the opportunity for the local people to familiarize themselves and participate in the SSR process. The onus lied on the Liberian people to make the SSR a success whilst other external actors play their part.20

1.8.4 The Concept of Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform is a popular word that was originally introduced by developments donors.21 Development donors, international organizations, and consultants working in international affairs began to recognize the need for a holistic approach to the security sector. To ensure the success of development programs, there is the need to have a security force that is legitimate and accountable to the people.

The security of a state is mostly influenced by the economy, politics, security forces, and the social environment. When people become free from any kind of impediment in executing their normal every day activities without violating the right of others, then those people can be said to have security.
Security sector is seen as the agencies that are mandated by the state to be responsible for protecting the state and its citizens.\textsuperscript{22} It could also be seen as the sector that is constitutionally mandated to ensure the security of lives and properties in a given state. A stable security force provides a good avenue to ensure good governance and promote democracy.\textsuperscript{23} Security predicament are often exacerbated by poorly regulated security forces, instead of controlling it.\textsuperscript{24} As a result, it is very necessary to reform security forces that are disorganized or show signs of indiscipline.

In the era of democracy, good governance really dictates the path for economic transformation.\textsuperscript{25} The fundamental areas of any good governance would include transparency, accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, inclusiveness, equality, and the rule of law. What SSR seeks to accomplish is to instill these fundamental into the security sector.\textsuperscript{26} In other words, the SSR ensures that people enjoy the needed security within the boundaries of the law without infringing upon the right of the people.

The tenets of SSR has been adopted by several organizations all over the world as a medium to promote peace and development.\textsuperscript{27} The SSR in general has these objectives:

**Security:** this entails the protection from and the prevention of political violence by state or non-state elements such as criminal and militant opposition groups, which pose a major threat to most post-conflict situations. In relation to the provision of physical security, which primarily involves the police and the military, is the efficient functioning of the courts and the prison system as well as small arms control.

**Governance and Rule of Law:** this is concerned with ensuring the popularity of certain norms in the delivery of security, with reference to governance and rule of law. The necessary norms
of security sector governance are transparency, accountability, and professionalism. As an element of accountability, security institutions are subject to the rule of law.

**Performance**: there is the need for security sector institutions to perform effectively and efficiently. In most post-war situations there is the need to de-militarize, in order to reduce the number and size of armed forces and match military expenditures with economic means.

The measures to attain these objectives of security sector reconstruction and reform can be grouped into three clusters:

1. The disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and transformation of all kinds of armed forces or militia groups, as well as the prosecution of illegally armed groups in order to re-establish a state monopoly on the use of justifiable force;

2. The creation of new security sector institutions where none exist, reforming existing security institution, or preventing the re-emergence of repressive state security institutions from intervening into politics, economy, and society;

3. The long-term goals of building and sustaining accountable, efficient and effective security forces.\(^{28}\)

The cohesion between the freed slaves from the US and the indigenous people of Liberia contributed to the political exclusion and socio-economic subordination that was experienced prior to the military coup led by Sergeant Samuel Doe in 1980. Contrary to the expectation of the indigenous people, the rule of Samuel Doe was an epitome of contempt of the rule of law coupled with human rights abuses.\(^{29}\) This form of impunity was challenged by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which resulted in pockets of wars in the 1990s. During these wars, an estimated 200,000 people got killed, and about 700,000 became refugees, while about 1.5 million had to relocate elsewhere.
The United States has had a long relation with the security sector of Liberia ever since the era of the Liberian Frontier Force. It was no surprise that the United States agreed to assist to transform the AFL after a protracted period of civil war. The United States however contracted two private companies to undertake the reform the AFL on its behalf. The companies were DynCorp, and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE).

The UNMIL was involved in the transformation of the Liberian National Police to equip them to ensure law and order in the communities. The UNMIL was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) to assist in strengthening the rule of law and security in the country. Key security and legal institutions of the state were being manipulated by the political party in power. Some of these institutions included the AFL, LNP, the Prisons Service and other similar institutions. The people had lost confidence in the security which had disregarded human rights. In order to ensure a smooth democratic governance, there was the need to reform the security sector to boost the confidence of the people.

Effective security sector which operates by the tenets of democracy is a necessary condition for development. The Liberian Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) of 2007 accede to this notion. As a result it has prioritised some key areas and challenges in four categories:

- Improving national security
- Improving economic growth
- Enhancing governance and the rule of law
- Rehabilitation of infrastructure and basic services

Of utmost priority is the overhauling the national security. Even though any comprehensive SSR agenda is supposed to cover all aspect of a country’s security, the case in Liberia did not cover all the various sectors as has been the practice in most post-conflict situations. The SSR
only target the training and provision of resources for the armed forces and the police, while other sectors of national security were given an insignificant attention. Some of these neglected sectors include the judiciary and the penitentiaries which demands a complete overhaul.

The CPA of 2003, paved way for the UN to put in place a consolidated mission to Liberia. From the CPA (Article VII), some major stakeholders such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the United States of America (USA), the United Nations (UN), and the International Crisis Group (ICG) were invited to assist in the reformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The United States spearheaded the reconstruction of the army.

Article VIII of the CPA suggested that training of the Liberian National Police (LNP) be done by the United Nation Police (UNPOL). The UNPOL was tasked to recruit and train the LNP and the government appointed the officers.

1.8.5 Elements and Actors of the Reform

The actors that are involved in the SSR process are all the stakeholders who may be state or non-state. These actors may be those who recruit and train security personnel, and those who may benefit from the process. Key areas that form the focus of the SSR include the police, military, intelligence, and justice. The SSR seeks to achieve equality between in terms of accountability and effectiveness.

SSR programme even though was not designed solely for Africans, it has played a significant role in Africa especially in West Africa. It has helped countries especially Cote d’ Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Liberia, to recover from civil war. In other West African
countries such as Ghana, Benin, Mali and Nigeria, SSR has helped in smooth democratic transition.\textsuperscript{36}

1.8.6 Post-conflict Situations: Objectives and Assumptions

The decision to reform the security sector may emanate from diverse key stakeholders which may include peacekeepers, international organizations, political commentators and many others. These stakeholders offer recommendations that aid in policy direction. One predominant issue that arises out of these recommendations is related to security protection for the people. This is expected to be in the form of physically providing the security and proper management of these forces to promote a free atmosphere for the citizens.\textsuperscript{37}

1.8.7 The Call for SSR in Liberia

It was conspicuously clear that the security sector of Liberia needed a complete after it had allowed itself to be manipulated by the government of the day. In the 1980s the army was manipulated by President Doe to torment other ethnic groups apart from the Krahn tribe. During that era, recruits into the army were people from the Krahn tribe. When Charles Taylor became president, he also operated the security agencies of the country for his private gains. Taylor went contrary the Abuja Accord of September 1995 which directed him reform the army, police and other state security agencies to portray an unbiased governance.\textsuperscript{38} He attempted to do the reform in his own style by marginalizing the AFL which he doubted their allegiance because they were dominated by the Krahn. Taylor instead formed a nexus of opposing militias who were being led by his former comrades when he was the rebel leader. His son headed the Anti-terrorism Unit (ATU), his cousin was the National Police Chief.\textsuperscript{39} The
security resorted to looting and extortion from the people, due to poor remuneration. Thus, human rights abuse by the security forces was very common.\textsuperscript{40} When the comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2003, the citizens had lost trust in the security sector and rather saw them as agents of atrocities. It became very necessary that the government of the day ensure that the security sector is reformed to function effectively and efficient in order to win the confidence of the citizens.

At the time of the ceasefire, the security sector was characterized by redundancy, and overlapping of functions. There were a number of agencies that was a cause for concern since their roles overlapped with one another. There was the need to develop a national security strategy which was supposed to be vested in the National Security Council (NSC) that was created in 1999. The security strategy is necessary for a complete reform to occur.

Peace keepers were deployed into Liberia by the UNMIL in 2003 as authorized by the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{41} Following the signing of the CPA, the UNMIL quickly went to work by assisting in the immediate reconstruction efforts, and supported in organizing a credible election in Liberia.\textsuperscript{42} The UNMIL absorbed the ECOMIL its peace keeping operations which included civilian policing, and other support for the transition process.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, the country was offered the chance to return back to normalcy again.\textsuperscript{44} The National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL) was sworn into office after two weeks of peace keeping operation by the UNMIL. The UNMIL embarked on a comprehensive program of Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) to collect all weapons from war factions and individuals.\textsuperscript{45} With the successful retrieval of weapons from the streets, the way was paved for the democratic election in 2005, which saw Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as the first female president.
in Africa. The UNMIL was also tackling the recruitment and training of a new LNP to provide stability and security in the country.46

1.8.8 The Institutional Framework for SSR in Liberia

The SSR was established and implemented within the combined framework of the 1986 Constitution of Liberia, the CPA of 2003, and the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1509 (2003).47 These legal frameworks provided the directions as to what must be done in the reform process. The CPA mandated that soldiers are recruited from both the civilian which meet the laid down requirements and from the GOL, LURD, and the MODEL. As part of the agreement, other security and paramilitary units were required to be disbanded and disarmed. Some of these agencies included the Anti-Terrorist Unit, Special Operations Division, and other paramilitary groups.48 The role of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was spelt out in the UNSC Resolution 1509 (2003).49 The task of the UNMIL was to Provide assistance to the transitional government of Liberia to:

- Reform the Liberian police to operate in a democratic manner, in collaboration with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested states;
- Rehabilitate the Liberian military in collaboration with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested states.50

1.8.9 Rebuilding the Armed Forces of Liberia

The United States led in the restructuring of the Liberian armed forces. The United States assisted in the demobilising of the military, recruiting and vetting of recruits for the new military. This is then followed by training, equipping, and maintaining the force to make it fully
operational. The size of the military being formed was a priority since a military that is not well catered for is seen as a precursor for civil war. The United States however, subcontracted two private security companies to execute the military reform. DynCorp International was contracted to handle the basic training of the AFL, and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) handled forming and structuring of the AFL and providing specialised training for the officers. As part of the SSR program, old soldiers of the AFL were demobilized and compensated.

1.8.10 The Liberia National Police (LNP)

The UNMIL together with the transition government cooperated to reform the Liberian police force to operate in a democratic manner. Other organisations such as ECOWAS, international organizations and interested states also cooperated in the reform process. A special unit, the Police Support Unit (PSU) that would augment the normal police in situations of riots was established. The UN Police (UNPOL) in 2004, commenced the overall reform of the LNP. The UNPOL helped to restructure, retrain, and resourced the LNP. The UNPOL at the same time had to work few of the police recruited in order to maintain law and order in the country. The police during that time was faced with a lot of challenges as some had no uniform and faced poor remuneration. The budget from the UNMIL to support the LNP was inadequate and officers of the UNPOL had to support out of their own pockets. Thus, the financial contributions was used to buy black T-shirt which was used as police uniforms in the interim. The UNPOL and the interim police was on patrols together to ensure public security. Once the UNPOL started full recruitment of personnel, the United States donated some funds to support whilst the UNMIL provided accommodation for the trainees at the Liberian National Police Academy. Donations from other countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway,
also came to support. The goal of training 3,500 LNP personnel was achieved by the interim
government of Liberia. There was a rigorous selection and vetting procedure for the recruits.
These recruits were required to serve on probation for two years before they were confirmed.
About 2,700 people who used to be part of the former LNP could not meet the selection criteria
into the new LNP. Due to budgetary constraints, these individuals were allowed to operate
with the new force until monies were released to compensate them to be out of the force. The
new LNP was given several trainings including specialised ones for some of the members.
Some of the training included firearm training, riot control, general performance improvement
and many more. Despite these successes, the LNP was faces with logistics problems. There
were inadequate trucks for patrol, administrative equipment was inadequate and many others.
The UNPOL established the National Police Training Academy (NPTA) to give basic training
for law enforcement personnel. The teaching method emphasises more on human rights, and
policing techniques that is modern and based on the rule of law.

1.8.11 Dilemmas of SSR

Because in a post-conflict situation, most of the human capacity needed to govern or manage
key institutions have fled the country to seek refuge elsewhere, it creates a shortfall in the
implementation of programmes that are laid down by the SSR process. Key government
institution may lack the qualified personnel to manage it. This is a similar situation that is
faced in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
The SSR program is influenced by a multitude of factors ranging from economic dynamics,
politics, development cultures, ideologies, geographical locations, histories, and cultural
heritage. There are the risk of opposing groups and individuals who would see the reform
process as a threat to their dominance. These groups could be described as rebels, bandits, or terrorists who have the potential to disrupt the stabilization process, and can attack the interveners leading to loss of public trust and violence.

Collapsed institutions of the state could be collaborators of a network of saboteurs. These institutions could give weapons of the state to these bad people or assist in illicit trade of arms, drugs, and human trafficking, which worsen the stability process.

As has been characterized with most post conflict security sector reforms, the case of Liberian is no exception. It is characterized by inadequate resources and limited human resource capacity needed to develop and maintain the integrity of the program as well as the effectiveness of the security sector. Constraint related to logistics is also seen to be predominant. As observed by Aboagye and Rupiya, Liberia is faced with the problem of constitutional reform, decentralization, reconciliation and achieving of economic development goals.

1.8.12 Challenges of Liberia’s post-civil war security

With all the efforts of the elected president to better the lot of the people of Liberia, there existed some problem within certain areas of governance and the economic growth. The specific areas included the security sector reform, anti-corruption campaigns, unemployment, economic growth, and the judicial capacity building.

In the area of the security sector reform, the challenge was convincing the public that the new LNP was not formed to brutalize and extort from them as has been seen previously. The public had grown so much mistrust in the security service that they saw them as entities to be feared. Thus, the legitimacy of the security force had eroded in the eyes of the public. Besides the cost
involved in rebuilding a new security force, there was also the challenge of determining their new roles.

With respect to anti-corruption, there was a breakdown in the institutions that existed to fight this canker. The gap between the government and civil society had widened which made it difficult to address the problem of corruption. Most business and factories had been destroyed as a result of the war. This has heightened the unemployment situation in the country. A lot of the youth were unskilled and the funds to build their capacity was unavailable.\textsuperscript{69} The economic growth of the country was very slow due to the government’s reliance on donor agencies for budgetary support. The intermittent energy supply and the lack of infrastructure contributed immensely to the unemployment rate.\textsuperscript{70} The judicial system in the country is not functioning well. The legal expertise was insufficient and there was inadequate infrastructure. The efficiency with which the courts system is able to deal with cases, the better it would be for the public to have confidence in the system.

1.8.13 Local Ownership of SSR
The concept of SSR could be viewed from two perspectives.\textsuperscript{71} These are the institutions equipped well to provide security for the state, and the development of the rule of law. The partnership of governance that exists between the Liberian government and the foreign actors has been an uneven partnership.\textsuperscript{72} According to them, the international community approach to SSR has been highly technical, whilst the governance and political aspects are left in the hands of government. The international communities are coming out with definitions with regard to the state, which should have been done by the state itself.\textsuperscript{73} This has created a confusion in the
minds of the local actors as to who is actually governing what element in the reform process. The government is being blamed for a program that has not been very inclusive. This could be as a result of the lack of knowledge of the whole structure of the SSR, as a result of the lack of transparency in the reform process, which goes to tell that the partnership between the government and the international community is practically a lip service. The local content is missing in the SSR program. Building the capacity of local actor would promote a process that is more political in nature, and could have extended the commitment of the international community, which would not facilitate the expected drawdown of UNMIL in 2010. It has been a key approach of the UN to ensure ownership to allow the international community to complete their mission and withdraw. In the implementation of the SSR however, the requirement of owner changes, since the approach is purely technical leaving the political aspect to the local actors.

The approach of the SSR program in Liberia is one of intrusiveness as it does not take into account the political reality of the country. The local capacity to take up responsibility when the international community withdraws, is lacking. The lack of capacity building among the various arms of government, and community leaders and civil society groups has deepen the dependence on external actors. Rebuilding something that never existed is problematic, particularly when the context for the rebuilding is not appreciated. Building the local capacity would ensure that the reform could be left in safe hands since that would address the polarise nature of the society.
1.9 Theoretical Framework

Looking at the role played by security institution in the civil war of Liberia that lasted over a decade, the effectiveness and sustainability of rebuilding Liberia, would depend to a large extent on how well the security sector is transformed to function efficiently and effectively according to the rule of law. As a result, the national, regional, and international communities should not only focus on the restructuring the military and police force of Liberia, but must also define their new mandate in the post-conflict situation and ensure effective oversight and management.

Another area of which is a crucial component in the SSR programme is the legislature. The Liberian legislature at this point is faced with inadequacies, which include lack of parliamentary support, corruption, lack of integrity and many others. According to the IPRS, the medium-term approach of government is to develop a national security strategy that would direct the SSR programme and strengthen the control of national security to ensure peace and security, and also national security capabilities. The process is to be spearheaded by the Governance Reform Commission (GRC), the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The government is to develop a long-term operational and institutional reform programme that would be utilized by the security forces. The reform programme would enhance the change in culture of the security force, define clear goals, and avoid overlapping of responsibilities between the security agencies. The government thus set a date to come out with a national security framework that would take into consideration the Liberian territorial protection of land, sea and air. The development of the national security policy is to be led by the GRC in conjunction with the MOD and MOJ. The GRC is tasked with the overall agenda of governance reform. The SSR which is seen as the foundation for all other reforms, is also the most
problematic. The GRC has some reservations about the individual legislators, and, the capacity to perform its oversight responsibilities. The legislature needed a serious capacity building assistance concerning the legal framework for the SSR, and its interpretation and application. For instance, though the CPA provided that United States play a lead role in the defense transformation, the GRC stated that the United States process has disregarded the regional context and security realities in the country. The restructuring is done without involving the ECOWAS security architecture, and does not appear to be based on a comprehensive analysis of the security dynamics of the Mano River Basin. The President, Johnson-Sirleaf has withdrawn the controversial Defence Act that formed part of the Liberian defence policy. The MOD with support from the United States helped to draft a new Liberian National Defence Act (NDA). In 2006, the draft Act was completed and sent to the legislature to be debated and vetted. The draft Act stipulates the responsibilities and missions of the Liberian Defence sector, and hence presents a solid bedrock for civilian control and oversight of the Armed Forces of Liberia. The RAND report which is basically based on a generic international best practices, has been the guiding principles for pursuing SSR in Liberia, especially when there is no authoritative and comprehensive National Security Strategy. The report does not take into account the peculiarities of Liberia in the context of West Africa.

However, the transformation of the police and the military had to continue whilst the other administrative lapses are being addressed. The UNMIL and the United States, who have been key actors in the reform process, would not be present permanently in Liberia. This calls for a
consensus on the way forward to address the challenges facing the reform process. Despite foreign assistance, the Liberian economy would find it difficult to support a large security force, and hence the way for cost-effectiveness for Liberia security forces is to have complementary capabilities that cover the forces’ core security functions, possess the right qualities, and can be utilized flexibly. In addition to the transformation of the police and the military, RAND suggested the need for a mobile unit for the LNP that would perform the duties of fighting organized armed threats that did not warrant falling on the army, in addition to law enforcement. Thus, establishment of the police Quick-Reaction Unit (QRU) was suggested, to complement the regular police.

1.10 Conceptual Definition

Conflict: It is a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns.

Post-Civil War is a period that occurs immediately after war has happened. That is the period immediately following the end of a war and enduring as long as war does not resume.

Security: It refers to the state been free from state territorial intensity. In addition, it means protecting states from military threats by fighting and winning wars.

1.11 Research Methodology

The study is based on the qualitative analysis of secondary data from agency reports, newspaper stories and scholarly articles. This would involve a historical approach in studying Liberia’s
security reform and the implications of UNMIL’s withdrawal. According to Yuniya Kawamura, historical research or historiography attempts to systematically recapture the complex nuances, the people, meanings, events, and even ideas of the past that have influenced and shaped the present.\textsuperscript{86} N. K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln explained that the historical approach involves the systematic collection and objective assessment of data related to past occurrences in order to test hypotheses concerning causes, effects, or trends of these events that may help to explain present events and anticipate future event.\textsuperscript{87}

The researcher also use questionnaires to gather data from key personalities in the security sector, in Liberia. The questionnaire contains both opened and closed ended questions. The open-ended questions would enable respondents the liberty to express their views in their own words, and also provide facts and insights that is not apparent to the researcher.

A convenience sampling approach was adopted in order to target respondents who could give the right feedback that the study sought to get. Convenient sampling is less expensive and requires less time as compared to interviewing almost everybody who has a link with the post-conflict Liberian situation.

1.12 Sources of Data

This study utilized both primary and secondary data. Secondary sources included written, oral, journal articles, newspapers, biographies and other media sources such as films or tape recordings. Relevant literature from books, databases, and internet sources further complemented secondary data. Thereafter, the data was critically analyzed to identify and extract key concepts and themes which then forms the building blocks on which the descriptive
narrative are to be written. Doing this pulls out the essential themes which help to create a good story of what the data reveals based on the objectives of the study. The primary source of data is derived from administering the questionnaire. The researcher interviewed five respondents including some officials in the security sector.

1.13 Organization of Chapters

The research is organized into four chapters. Chapter one covers the research design, while chapter two talks about the UN and its role in the Security Sector Reform in post-conflict states. A brief background of the Liberian Civil War and the progress and challenges of Liberia’s post-civil war security is the centre piece of chapter three. Chapter four consists of the summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the study.
Endnote


8Ibid


17 Liebenow, 108


21 Ibid


29See Amnesty International Report, AI Index: AFR 34/005/1997, 1 October 1997


39Ibid


Ibid


UNMIL factsheet A

Ibid


Malan 2008

Article VIII, s. 2, of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 2003, 16.

Malan 2008


Article VIII, s. 1 of CPA, 2003, p. 16. UNMIL concluded the registration of statutory security agencies in April 2005—including the Liberia National Police, SSS, DEA, MNS, NBI, FDA, BIN, LPRC, MCP, RIA, LTC, LSP, and NSA.


Malan 2008

Ibid

Ibid

Ibid

Ibid


Ibid


Ibid


77 Ibid

78 Ibid


83 RAND Report, pp. 26-28


CHAPTER TWO

THE UN AND ITS ROLE IN SSR OF POST-CONFLICT STATES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a brief background of the United Nations and its role in the Security Sector Reform in post-conflict states. It further elaborates on their resulting security challenges, successes, and failures.

2.2 The UN and SSR Activities

The involvement of the UN in SSR business has been a piecemeal one. The role of the UN has basically been to provide support in the reform of national security institutions, democratic control, oversight and governance of the security sector in post conflict nations.¹ SSR issues were expressed in UN Security Council resolutions depending on the specific needs of countries. One of such mandates was the United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) which helped in reforming the security sector of Liberia.

2.3 SSR Implementation Around the World

A significant reform that has occurred beside that in Sierra Leone and South Africa is the post-communist transition of Eastern Europe in the 1990s.² The program of SSR was first championed within the framework of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and EU enlargements in the 1990s and serves as a case for the potential of SSR. SSR implementation
in various part of the world has had some challenges or difficulties along the way. The SSR
failed in promoting community policing in procedures in Georgia, and also difficulty in
reforming the police in Bosnia.\(^3\) Some are of the view that reforms had been basically efficient
in regions such as Kosovo despite the failure to fully develop democratic forces.\(^4\) In Africa, the
results have not been constant which is mixed with successes and challenges. There were
conspicuous successes in South Africa\(^5\) and Sierra Leone,\(^6\) and that of Liberia, Sudan and Congo was marked with mixed results. A clear case of a failed SSR program is that
of Haiti where the police and military were politicized and completely uncountable to the
people.\(^7\) This development has posed a lot of doubts in the ability of external actors to bring
positive change.

Most of the SSR activities have been carried in three different contexts which are: conflict and
post-conflict environments, developing countries and countries in transition, and democratic
and developed countries. Predominantly, SSR have been implemented in conflict, post-conflict,
frozen conflict, post-communist and post authoritarian periods, and also in the context of EU
enlargement. Iraq is a perfect case of the difficulty of SSR in conflict and post conflict
situation.\(^8\) That of Georgia represent SSR in a frozen conflict situation. The NATO and EU
enlargements have been a success during the 1990s transition of the Eastern European. The
same outcome was achieved in South Africa when the local people assisted in reforming the
country during the transition period. Despite the successes chalked by SSR with countries in
transition, countries such as Morocco and Algeria which received SSR program from the EU,
did not achieved reforms that developed more democratic institutions.\(^9\) Due to the diverse
dimensions to SSR program which include the military, police, prisons, rule of law, justice and
many more, the implementation in different sectors and regions have led to different results.
However, in general, reforms to the military and the security institutions have been generally successful, due to the universal quality of norms regarding civil-military relations. It would be fair to look at some of the key actors in SSR around the world to access the progress and challenges faced.

2.4 Challenges of Security Sector Reform

The prime challenge is how to ensure the development of good governance and democracy in the security sector. This could be seen from two perspectives. The first is the difficult task of establishing effective and efficient, equitable and accountable security institutions. This would provide the platform for sustainable peace, democracy and development, and, actions must be directed at addressing critical relics of the post-conflict situations. A vital action would among others include the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants. The next task is how to establish an effective civilian control of the security institutions. Thus, there should be a mutual and stable civil-military relationship.

2.5 UNMIL and SSR Programme in Liberia

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) which was established by the Security Council Resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003 deployed approximately 15,000 troops on 1 October 2003 to Liberia to ensure security and smooth operation. This could be seen as one of the biggest UN missions to Africa and the world as we speak. The UNMIL should be seen a major security provider and a key partner in the SSR program. By the year 2005, the number
of authorised uniformed personnel stood at 15974, and these were contributed by 59 countries out of which 16 came from Africa.

Despite the extensive experience in providing security especially in post-conflict situations, the approach adopted by the UN had been basically *ad hoc*. However, the UN had come up with principles and standards that would guide its operations in this sensitive area. These were contained in the first-ever report of the Secretary General concerning security sector reform. By virtue of the universality and legitimacy of the UN, the report and its related instruments had fast become a global benchmark for developing and implementing SSR agenda.¹² These UN values and principles are implemented with other frameworks such as the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the EU. In addition, they are linked with SSR frameworks of regional economic communities such as the AU or ECOWAS. The UN SSR approach has placed more emphasis on providing security to the individuals of the state. This has necessitated the issues of rule of law, democratization, social justice, and environmental protection.¹³

The experience of the UN SSR in Africa had been preceded by years of poor governance, tribal conflict and structural inequalities, regime control of security institutions, and protest of citizens against social and economic exclusion.¹⁴ Such was the case in Liberia that resulted in over a decade of conflict in the country. In many of these situations, the security sector as an entity has been the major source of conflict and serve as an instrument for manipulated by autocrats for dominance and protection of regime. It is therefore in the right order for the UN to highlight security governance as an integral part of SSR.¹⁵ The inability to address the security sector in a structured way in Liberia in the 1990s reignited the conflict. The SSR presents the platform for a positive transformation of the relationship between the citizens and the state. The role of
the UN in SSR in Africa is dynamic depending on the context, by providing training and infrastructure development, capacity building and oversight of security institutions, support in developing national security policy, and many more.\textsuperscript{16} There are a number of UN bodies that are involved in matters related to SSR. These include the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and many others. The UN having acknowledged the need for a multidimensional approach to SSR has instituted a UN inter-agency Task Force made up of agencies, departments, offices, funds and programmes. This task force in being chaired by the DPKO as the lead department for SSR. The UN has also not lost sight of the fact that SSR need to be approach from a regional perspective. It is for this reason that regional organizations are given a slot for collaboration. The involvement of these regional bodies ensures the elaboration of SSR policies and guidelines, together with the planning and execution of SSR agenda. Africa has contributed a significant number of security personnel to support in UN peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{17}

The UN has reviewed its approach to peacebuilding in post-conflict situations form solely peacekeeping operations to incorporate peacebuilding. This new approach has been the guide for the various UN missions in Africa in promoting peace since the end of the cold war. Even though some the UN has chalked some success in recent peacekeeping operations which placed peacebuilding at the centre, there are a number of challenges that need to be addressed to ensure gains are uncompromised. The presence of UN in peacebuilding operations have been overwhelming especially between 1960 to 2007. One of such operations started with the UN Operations in the Congo (ONUC) and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).\textsuperscript{18} From 1948 to 2009, the UN has had about 63 UN missions around the
world and out of this, Africa has had at least 25 UN Missions in Africa beginning 1960 to 2007. In recent times, the peacekeeping operations of the UN does not focus on only separating warring factions, monitoring ceasefires, and reporting violations to the Security Council, but has streamlined its operations to respond to emerging conflict paradigm that has evolved since the end of the Cold War.

The majority of recent conflicts are reported to be civil wars which are difficult to control and hence it has necessitated a convoluted intervention strategy to address them. The UN Security Council in 2001, appreciated the interrelation between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the necessity for a holistic and synergistic strategy to protect the gains made during peacekeeping and avoid resurgence of war. The UN Mission in Liberia was guided by set of principles and priorities for peacebuilding that were based on that used by the UN in conflict prevention and mitigation. These principles include: promoting an atmosphere of inclusion and tolerance; ensuring an environment of transparency and accountability; promoting equal justice, and championing the rule of law.

UNMIL with its multidimensional mandate as outlined in Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), joined immediate security functions with longer-term programmes that are linked to peacebuilding. The UNMIL recruited and trained the personnel for the newly formed LNP. The UNMIL was mandated to implement the ceasefire agreement by liaising with the warring factions; implement disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) agenda; secure key government installations, the public, foreign diplomats and many other things; ensure the protection of human rights; and support the transitional government in its activities.
As part of the longer-term programmes are the collaborative effort to protect and promote human rights; security sector reform which encapsulated the recruitment and training of civilian police, and the reformation of a structured military; and support for the implementation of the peace process. When the security situation in the country was a little stabilised after the signing of the peace agreement, more than 340 000 refugees who had gone for refuge in neighbouring West African countries returned with the support of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Others numbering more than 300 000 who have been internally displaced were also supported to return to their communities. As part of the mandate of the UNMIL, there was the need to factor gender in the post-conflict peacebuilding process by addressing violence against women and girls.

The mandate of the UNMIL was gradually shifted to incorporate more peacebuilding especially after the 2006 elections. The task was accomplished by a multidimensional team from various sections of the UNMIL. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) led the UNMIL to synchronize peace at the strategic level. The weaknesses in the political system was analyzed by the Political section of the UNMIL, and recommendations made on how to strengthen the political institutions democratically. Support to re-establish the administration of reform was done by the Rule of Law section, and the Human Rights section focused on building on the capacity of the government and civil society organizations to ensure advocacy for human rights. The UN Human Rights and Protection section also developed comprehensive plans to protect and promote the human rights of women who are sexually exploited and children who are economically exploited. This section was instrument in drafting legislature for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Independent National
Commission on Human Rights. The UNMIL Gender section saw to the protection of women and girls in its operations.

Other sections included: the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) responsible for threat assessments; the Joint Security Assessment Team (JSAT) responsible for assessment of security situation in each county; the Civil Affairs section responsible for the restoration and consolidation of state authority; and Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery section focused on the stabilization of the war-affected population. Other sections included the UN County Support Team which was responsible for capacity building at the county level.

2.6 The United States and the Armed Forces Of Liberia

The national security concerns of the United States among other things include the strong interest in the stability and security of people of the world and more especially those in Africa. Liberia which is a country in West Africa is one that has had a strong partnership with the United States in matters involving security. The United States supported heavily the reform of the Liberian army, in line with the CPA. The US-led approach to the army reform in Liberia was done by sub-contracting an American private security cooperation, DynCorp International. However, in 2010, that contract was replaced, and the US military train and equipped the new Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The work of the US military was complemented by the Economic Community of West African States countries, Ghana and Nigeria, which supported the AFL’s general staff. The efforts of these actors resulted in nearly two thousand rigorously vetted and trained military personnel, with only five percent made
up of former AFL personnel. The newly formed army participated in their first peacekeeping mission in Mali, in 2003.

2.7 SSR in Sierra Leone

Out of the 33 countries that contributed troops to support the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 11 were from Africa. The efforts of the UNAMSIL contributed in stabilizing the internal security of the country which had previously been torn apart in instability. The UNAMSIL helped in stabilizing the border dispute between Sierra Leone and Guinea; and promoted democracy in the country. As part of the draw down programmes of the UNAMSIL; the country is to assumed full responsibility of the security structure; the physical assets of the mission would be handed to the Sierra Leonean government; and charity projects were left in the care of the communities. Thus, the security responsibilities were transferred to the Sierra Leonean Police (SLP) and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). The UNAMSIL also conducted a year-long training programmes to develop the professional conduct of personnel of the SLP and RSLAF. The programme covered a variety of areas ranging from riot and insurgency control, forensic development, human rights, and community policing and training of trainers. This training made the security institutions to be proactive to face the challenges of the time. The UNAMSIL also constructed police barracks in various parts of the country, police training centres; and undertook an expansion work of the Police Training School in Hastings. In addition, facilities such as schools, hospitals, community centres, and many more were handed over to authorities. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established the UN Security Council Resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999, to develop the capacity of security institutions in the country. The UNAMSIL worked in close cooperation
with the UNMIL and United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to address the problem of ex-combatants who have sought refuge in those countries. Thus, those people needed to be demobilized and reintegrated into their communities.30

2.7.1 Prospects of UNAMSIL

The UNAMSIL by the end of 2005 had accomplished several key components of its mandate: the mission had successfully disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated more than 72,000 former combatants; assisted in restoring legitimate government authority in the country; organized both national and local elections; rebuilding of the security forces; and repatriated 300,000 refugees.31 The UNAMSIL has been touted as one of the successes of the UN, not least in terms of its remarkable recovery from a near collapse in 2000 after the kidnapping of 500 peacekeepers by rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).32

The UNAMSIL has also been credited with breaking new grounds in a number of areas. It was the first UN mission to employ the integrated mission concept.33 In an unprecedented move, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conducted an opinion poll in Sierra Leone to determine the level of social legitimacy of UNAMSIL. The findings indicated that majority of the population were satisfied with the performance of the UNAMSIL and hoped the gains would be sustained.34

2.8 SSR in Côte d’Ivoire

The United Nations Security Resolution 1479 established the United Nations Missions in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) on 13 May 2003. The Mission was deployed together with the ECOWAS
forces (ECOMICI) and Licorne force. These three forces operated with different mandates, with none assuming any leading role in the peace operation. The situation came along with some challenges. The Licorne force was pestered with questions about its accountability; and ECOMICI faced with shortages in manpower, equipment and logistical support. Looking at the situation and its potential ramification on the peace and stability in the region, and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 established UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Thus, the UN Security Council Resolution 1528 of February 2004 established the UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) for an initial duration of two years beginning from April 2004. The move was necessitated by the collapsed political instability which presented a serious threat to regional and international peace and security. The UN Security Council Resolution 1528 which empowered the UNOCI to carry out its mandate using all the means available, was further updated by the UN Security Council Resolution 1609 of June 2005. By this resolution, the UNOCI was empowered to coordinate with the French forces in implementing its mandate. The mandate included: monitoring the cessation of hostilities especially in terms of curtailing the movement of warring factions, and weapons in the country; implementing a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDRR) program for ex-combatants; protecting vital installations, UN personnel, disarmament, cantonments, and demobilization sites; destroying weapons surrendered by ex-combatants and militias; ensuring easy flow of humanitarian aid. Of the 50 countries that supported the UNOCI operations, 20 were from Africa. As has been noted, the UNOCI is working together with the UNAMSIL especially in areas relating to movement of weapons and combatants across the shared borders and the implementation of disarmament and demobilization programmes.
2.8.1 Failures and Challenges of UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire

The political environment presents unfavourable conditions for sustainable reform programme. These conditions include the risk of a emphasizing more on reforming the military at the expense of other key components; such as protecting, United Nations staff, key installations, and equipment, and protection of civilians who made be under threat or in danger within its capabilities and its area of deployment.

2.9 SSR in Sudan

The UN Security Council Resolution 1769 established the United Nations-African Mission in Darfur which sent out 26 000 peacekeepers to ensure peace and security in the country. The Sudanese state had become a source of insecurity to its citizens, and the institutional framework for security had become fragile. It is reported that more than 300 000 people have been killed, and more than 2.5 million have been displaced from their homes, as a result of conflict in the country. In addition there was a gross abuse of human rights such as raping of women, abduction of women and children and looting of peoples properties. These developments have been attributed to the lack of political will on the part of government to protect its citizens, and political manoeuvres. Other regions have continually pressed on the Sudanese government for renegotiation, this has resulted in the demands for increased control of natural resources, agitation for autonomy and self-determination, and religious and ethnic tensions. The country remains vulnerable due to the proliferation of weapons, presence of militia groups, and the weakness of institutions of government, although a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has been signed between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The establishment of government institutions through reform in the
security sector, electoral and judicial systems is key for SSR and access to justice in Sudan. DynCorp International\textsuperscript{44} is a private security firm subcontracted by the United States to assist in the reform. The US-based private security firm was awarded a contract by the US government in 2004 to conduct SSR in Sudan.

The success of the DDRR programme of Sudan and the achievement of sustainable peace could be attributed to the effective reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants who have been disarmed and demobilised.\textsuperscript{45} There is the need to include civil society, elected representatives and other institution of the state, in drawing up an agenda for SSR in Sudan.

2.9.1 Failures and Challenges

A major challenge for a successful SSR programme is the slow implementation and lack of commitment to the CPA by the government and the SPLM. The activities of DynCorp International are hindered due to the fact that they are accountable to only the United States.\textsuperscript{46} Hence, the cooperation and coordination from the host government is not forthcoming. The autocratic government of Omar al-Bashir, a militarised polity, extreme poverty, the use of child soldiers, youth employment, proliferation of small arms among others have made the implementation of the SSR very difficult.\textsuperscript{47}
Endnotes


14 Adedeji Ebo, The United Nations and Security Sector Transformation in Africa

15 Ibid

16 Ibid

17 Ibid


22 Ibid

24Ibid


30Ibid

31Ibid


37 Ibid

38 Ibid

39 Ibid


CHAPTER THREE

PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES OF SSR IN POST-CONFLICT LIBERIA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter highlights some of the progress and challenges of the SSR programme in Liberia.

3.2 Challenges of Liberia’s Post Civil War Security

Even though the UN mission in Liberia has chalked a lot of success in the SSR process, the approaches together with other factors have been characterized by a lack of strategy, and coordination among the various actors.

3.2.1 Coherence

The overall approach by the UNMIL is seen a piecemeal one, with various SSR activities undertaken by various sections which makes it unclear how these activities fit into the overall objectives of the UNMIL. With these various actors, it not clear how it could lead to a unified Mission strategy with defined objectives, processes and results. The incoherence is predicated on the fact that what constitute peacebuilding by the UNMIL is not fully integrated, even though the Joint Security Team (JSAT), UNMIL Consolidated Drawdown and Withdrawal (CDW) plan, and Integrated Mission Priorities and Implementation Plan (IMPIP) do provide some hint of that. In effect it was not clear how the activities of UNMIL has completely tackled the SSR challenges in the context of Liberia. From experience, when security issues are approached in a piecemeal fashion, there is no significant improvement in the sector.¹
3.2.2 Limited Capacity

Even though the staff of UNMIL have some knowledge on SSR, the capacity for the analysis of SSR activities and educating other actors was limited. It is very necessary for one to understand the societal dynamics, politics, processes of change and dynamics of conflicts and peace in full to be able to undertake a successful peacebuilding exercise. This gap in knowledge in the context of the operational environment has implications on the approach, appreciation and evaluation of various activities linked with the SSR. The donor-led approaches seem to focus more on the technical than the political aspects of the reform, and lacks the inputs of the communities.²

3.2.3 Problematic Assumptions

The approach of the UNMIL in the SSR programme rests on shaking assumptions. The UNMIL has approach the peacebuilding exercising, focusing primarily on activities and projects, with the notion that the solution to the war-torn country lies in only resources and programmes. The operations of UNMIL in Liberia have undertaken a number of activities that are assumed to lead to peace, without a full recourse to the structures, institutions, dynamics and attitudes that contribute to a peaceful society. The SSR efforts tend to be oblivious of the multi-layered security provision of the state.³

3.2.4 Conceptual Confusion

A major reason for the misunderstanding in the society, political community and political institutions emanates from the concept of the state, government and society on the one hand as
against that of conflict on the other. The SSR programme often fails to consider local political incentives which serve as obstacles to progressive change in the security sector, more especially at the executive level.\textsuperscript{4} There should be a clear understanding that the state and government are slightly different. Hence, the SSR should consider the peculiarities of the state and the history of ethnic diversity and division which, mostly affects conflicts significantly, and should be factored in the SSR process.

3.2.5 Overlooked Factors

One of the consequences of such analytical confusion is that certain aspects of building peace in post-conflict countries are being overlooked. The structural causes of the war in Liberia, for example, are well understood – in particular the deep-rooted structural cleavages established by the very creation of the state, which institutionalized social division, marginalisation impact on consolidating peace, they are not necessarily sufficient for overcoming the structural divisions that created the conditions for violent conflicts in the first place. The second assumption is that there are specific technical skills and mechanisms for conflict resolution, conflict management and peacebuilding, which build peace. The conflict-sensitive peacebuilding workshops, and some of the material produced by UNMIL in 2007, were very useful for introducing some of the analytical elements for conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, but they also promoted a technical approach focusing on special conflict resolution skills, peace education, dialogue, early warning mechanisms and conflict management structure outside of normal state and societal structures. This presupposes that 14 years of civil war occurred in Liberia because of an absence of such skills alone, and that the presence of such skills and exclusion, perpetuated by those who controlled the state. However,
UNMIL’s peacebuilding efforts did not seem to be addressing these structural issues related to the state and its control sufficiently. The focus on state capacity and on consolidating the authority of the state, as well as the focus on the grassroots and rural areas, while important, should not detract from the critical need to address the basic foundation of the Liberian State, which involves substantially more than capacity.

3.2.6 Operational Dilemmas
For a lasting peace to return to Liberia, the SSR process must take into account local ownership. Commitment of government, civil society, and the local communities is instrumental in achieving the goals of the SSR. The UNMIL is assuming too much leadership in peacebuilding and may hijack some responsibility of the state, instead of complementing the state.

3.3 Nonstate Actors Challenging SSR in Liberia
The delicate security situation that Liberia is faced with could be attributed to a number of reasons that have heightened the risk of nonstate actors becoming spoilers. Economic constraint and high unemployment could be some of the reasons. An unemployment rate of about 80 percent makes the youth amenable to take up guns, and makes it difficult to reintegrate ex-combatants into sustainable livelihoods. These groups are susceptible to the influence of domestic or foreign militia that would do anything to undermine the authority of, and work in opposition to, the Liberian government. Women have also had a fair share of the operations of ex-combatants. About 30 to 40 percent of former combatants were women. It is not out of
place to involve women in this discussion since they are more vulnerable to become potential combatants.

### 3.3.1 Ex-Combatants

Militia groups that played various roles in the conflict of Liberia, have the potential to disrupt the ongoing security situation in the country. Some of these militia groups are the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) which played various roles in ousting Taylor in 2003. Illegitimate government which came into power with support from militia groups, had to protect their regime and control the exploitation of the natural resources of the country, using such groups. With the struggle for power, these groups are disintegrated into warring militias. These militia group resorted to, human rights abuses, rape, pillaging, and looting as weapons of warfare. These groups continue to pose a threat to stability and transformation of Liberia. It was revealed in the 2007 RAND report that, the continued existence of militia group command structures pose a security threat. According to the International Crisis Group, the disarmament numbers raises a lot of questions, due to the fact that the DDR process had no mechanism to investigate alleged ex-combatants that have no weapon to present. It has been alleged that former rebel commanders had provided the required weapons to their business contacts in order to receive the disarmament payments. Assuming the disarmament and demobilization has been successful, there is still issues with reintegration of former combatants. These issues have been aggravated by the fact that the new army was formed with largely new youth that did not necessarily belong to any rebel group. These ex-combatants are faced with the high unemployment rate and frustration. In some instances, outstanding disarmament and pension
payments have resulted in pockets of violence.\textsuperscript{10} It has been argued that payments for disarmament and demobilization has contributed to reinforce the condition that violence, or the threat thereof, is rewarded and viewed as a key means to achieve whatever the desired end.\textsuperscript{11} The patterns of corruption undermine the reform of the security sector in Liberia because ex-combatants were not fully disarmed, demobilized, or reintegrated into the society, and hence pose a threat to the rule of law and peace of the country.

3.3.2 Youth

Assuming the ex-combatants pose less threat to the security of the country, same cannot be said about the frustrated youth who are unemployed. These unemployed youth may direct their anger and frustration towards the political and economic systems of Liberia. The youth could be a threat to effective and sustainable SSR. Due the history of the country, Liberian youth had been marginalized and exploited.\textsuperscript{12} The youth that form the largest proportion of the population that was affected by the conflict, as many of them were internally displaced and became refugees or combatants, could be a source for instability, if not proper managed.\textsuperscript{13} It is very important that the youth are adequately considered recognized in the SSR process in order to maintain the stability of the process. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has stated that it is important to include and empower the youth in the economy, politics, and also in conflict prevention and management, to reduce poverty and ensure stability.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, with the easy access to weapons and the glaring poverty, the youth unemployment could undermine the rule of law, and be a great opposition to the SSR process.
3.3.3 Women

The conflict affected the women in Liberia, because many lack basic education and livelihood skills. During the conflict, over 25 000 Liberian women took up weapons for a number of reasons, which included self-protection, desire to avenge the death of family members, peer pressure, material gains and survival. Women who were part of the combatants, when returned home after the conflict, majority were faced with hostilities and others continue to face stigmatization from families and the society. Women have been instrumental in post-conflict transformation in many countries and could do same in Liberia. A lot needs to be done to empower the women in reforming the security sector. Some achievements have been made in that regard, with the graduation of the female class of police officers from the Liberian Police Academy in 2008. However, the number of female police officers is very small. Notwithstanding this, efforts are being made to support and empower women in the SSR process. This could be seen by the introduction of the gender units in the police department, and also the development of a legal framework that encapsulates laws that protect against sexual and gender-based violence. Women generally do not pose a threat to SSR, beside the unemployed and alienated female ex-combatants. However, female ex-combatants need to be reintegrated, and women in general must be empowered to ensure stability.
Endnotes


14Ibid


CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter gives a summary of all findings, draw logical conclusions, and proposes recommendations for further studies as well as recommendations for the security sector in Liberia.

4.2 Summary of Findings

Liberia has over the past decade has experienced relative peace, after going through nearly 14 years of devastating civil war. The civil war started in the year 1989, and the war claimed over 200 000 people. There was a total collapse of law and order, and many were displaced both internally and externally. Several Liberians became refugees in neighbouring West African countries as a result of the conflict. The UN Security Council Resolution 1509 was adopted, on September 2003, mandating the UNMIL to begin the SSR programme in Liberia. The UN’s SSR programme in collaboration with the government of Liberia, worked to achieve gains in the SSR agenda, and prevent any resurgence of conflict. The UN Security Council resolution specifically looked at the transformation of the Liberian police and military. From the available literature as seen in chapters two and three of this study, it could be seen that the Liberian security situation has improved significantly. The study has revealed that since UNMIL was mandated to assume security and reformation operations in Liberia there has been no record of any kind of conflicts.
Because of that UNMIL is in a progressive preparation for smooth and effective security transition to the Liberia security apparatus. Currently, UNMIL’s troop strength since 2006 has reduced from 15250 to 7952 military personnel, the police officers stands at 1375 (a slight increment from 1115 in 2003). This is a sign of mission accomplishment. The points highlighted above assisted the researcher to achieve the main objective and the second specific objective that, UN has adequately prepared the security sector of Liberia to prevent resurgence of conflict as well as withstanding security issues within Liberia. It was observed that more than 140000 Liberians have returned home. Moreover, in 2013, Liberia for the first time became a contributory nation to the UN peacekeeping force, sending 50 security personnel to accomplish peace and security mission in Mali.

Furthermore, the findings of the study revealed that UN and SSR issues in Liberia correlated with other post-conflict countries like Kosovo and La Côte d’Ivoire as all their security issues intertwined. This enabled the researcher accomplished the objectives of the study to the extent of justifying and retaining the null hypothesis (HA: UNMIL’s reform of the security sector has decreased the likelihood that Liberia will fall into conflict upon its withdrawal). In addition, the study has been able to satisfy the specific objective (that is the extent to which Liberia will not experience resurgence of conflict when UNMIL pulls out). Although the role of UNMIL in Liberia is highly laudable and needs much recommendation, however, there are some challenges (as explained in chapter two and three) that can trigger chaotic activities in Liberia. As a post-conflict state, it is inevitable that there will be challenges. In the case of Liberia some of the challenges discovered are a lack of financial supports from international donors, exclusion of some of the antiterrorist forces (that is finding the appropriate means to integrate all ex-combatants into the civilian personnel and the armed forces), prosecution of perpetrators
of sexual and gender based-violence by both government and rebel forces. Other challenges include constitutional reform, government decentralization policy, complete disarmament and attainment of economic development.

4.2.1 Interview of Liberian Citizens

The researcher further interviewed some citizens of Liberia living in the capital Monrovia, to get their views on the SSR programme. The common theme that emanated from the responses included the following:

Police: The general response was that the UNMIL has done very well in reforming the police force and providing them with equipment needed to operate. However, some of the interviewees were quick to reveal that the number of police personnel trained is not adequate to ensure citizens abide by the laws of the country. The presence of the police in areas outside Monrovia is very low, and hence make residents in those areas vulnerable to threats of insecurity and violence. Citizens feared that as the UNMIL embark on its drawdown plans, the security situation could worsen due to the inadequate number of the police and the low institutional capacity.

Military: Most of the interviewees expressed hope in the programme to transform the security, however, there were still fears that the military could be used once again to protect a certain regime. Interviewees expressed worry over the presence of ex-combatants in the communities, fearing they could do anything silly at any time.
Local ownership: Some of the interviewees intimated that the involvement of civil society organization in the whole process of SSR has been a piecemeal one. The ordinary citizens feel they were left out in the whole exercise, and their views were sought in the process.

Unprofessional Behaviour: Still, some of the personnel of newly formed LNP who are deployed in the field, engage in some kind of bribery and corruption. It was revealed that despite being given a transformational change, poorly remunerated security personnel would resort to some of these unethical behaviours.

Collaboration: The collaboration between the police and the judicial system leaves much to be desired. Interviewees accounted occasions when criminals are acquitted due to lack of concrete evidence to prosecute and the unavailability of prosecutors to pursue the case.

4.3 Conclusion

It is extremely important that the security sector of a country be reformed once a conflict has ended. It is extremely relevant for sustainable peace and development to make population feel safe and secure, and to have confidence in their State. Liberia has experienced 14 years chaotic conflict in which the security sector, politicians, and the citizens were part of the problem. It was a period of lack of accountability on the side of the troops; lack of oversight bodies and authorities that should have given direction to the armed forces (combatants). From the study, it can be concluded that the struggle for political power, ethnic division, entrenched elites (who abused power), corrupt political system and economic disparities led Liberia to the war. It is shown in the study again that a well-equipped and well-trained security force is necessary but not sufficient. However, Liberia’s current security system evidently due to the presence of
UNMIL is a considerable improvement over the pre-war untrained and highly politicized security institutions that were used to intimidate citizens and maximize the power of the security forces. Significant gains have been made through the training and/or retraining of officers for the AFL, LNP, Immigration, Correction and other security institutions. As the training of security institution personnel – particularly in the armed forces and the police – grows in terms of numbers, donors are gradually leaving the process to the Liberian government. As for the AFL, the U.S. government has already turned it over to the Liberian government. It is now time for the country to protect its citizens by maintaining trained and equipped security institutions. The need to train and deploy more police officers around the country is critical to sustaining the integrity of the SSR program and promoting internal security. The need to open educational and training opportunities for personnel of the security institutions to advance themselves cannot be overemphasized, since there is a yearning for a literate security regime with civic and democratic values. Thus from the study the researcher despite the existence of some challenges, agrees to the alternative hypotheses (HA) that the UNMIL has adequately reformed Liberia’s security sector but more needs to be done.

4.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings from the study, the following recommendations are made:

1. From the study, it was discovered that a major cause of conflicts (civil wars) especially in Africa is tribalism and the struggle for power. Based on this, the study recommends that UN SSR Unit should have holistic policies that will incorporate ethnic groups (factions)
and ex-combatants in peacebuilding and SSR processes in order to prevent isolationism and discrimination, which mostly trigger conflict or resurgence of conflict.

2. In post-conflict settings like Liberia, the people themselves are never comfortable, they are afraid, they are completely traumatized; armed men continue to use weapons anytime because nobody puts them in check, nobody controls them, nobody directs them and they do not have respect for citizens they seek to protect. Therefore, it is of high importance for rules and laws to be put in place in Liberia so that both civilians and military personnel will understand that when you break the laws there are consequences.

3. There is the need for the UN to constantly liaise with the Liberian National Police and Military Forces in order to identify their challenges and to organize refresher courses to develop their technical expertise. The UN member states especially the developed ones should see it as an obligation to assist the Liberian security forces with logistical support.

4. Every effort should be made by the international business community to invest in strategic areas such as health, banking, education, among others in Liberia. This would bring about jobs and infrastructure in the country. Also this same business community should train Liberian citizens that are willing to enter into private business ventures and after the training provide them with some start-up capital, so that the citizens themselves can own businesses in the country. This will make the citizens more responsible and supportive of the reform process. This will result in widening of the revenue generation source which will aid government to effectively cater for the needs of the security sector.

5. More investment should be channeled into technical and vocational training to keep the teeming energetic youth that are unskilled and have lost hope in the country to regain some confidence and hope and as well build some skill for their personal and community
development. Donor partners and agencies, neighbouring states, multinationals, etc. should all join this worthy course.

6. The role of the media comes in handy at this stage of Liberia’s post-conflict development. Television stations, radio networks, newspapers, etc., should institute programmes that will inculcate values of fellow feeling, forgiveness, reconciliation, etc. to reorient the mind-set and attitude of the citizens.

7. There is the need for the government to have a clearer vision of the country’s security priorities especially concerning the establishment of the new AFL. There is, for example, a need to clarify explicitly the AFL’s primary aim of safeguarding the country’s peace process and its citizenry. A clear description of the respective fields of responsibility of the AFL and the LNP is very necessary for security sector reforms.

8. There is the need to improve the relationship between the police and the judiciary. Public prosecutors must work cordially with the personnel of the judiciary in order to efficiently prosecute law breakers.

9. The civil society organization must be offered the opportunity to provide a unified voice in support of the SSR programme. This would allow for greater accountability of the management of the LNP.
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