RESOURCE EXPLOITATION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION AND ITS EFFECT ON REGIONAL STABILITY

BY

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10114402

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LEGON                       JULY 2015
DECLARATION

I, Henrietta Baah, hereby declare that this Dissertation is the product of an original research conducted myself under the supervision of Dr. Emmanuel Ken Ahorsu. I also declare that I have not submitted this dissertation to any other institution for assessment, publication or for any other purpose and that all references have been duly acknowledged.

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(STUDENT)                              (SUPERVISOR)

DATE:...........................................  DATE:  ................................
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Almighty God who in His own way and grace made the completion of the work possible. I also dedicate the work to my husband, Anthony Baah and my precious children, Maame Asor Sika Baah, Nana Ama Kumah Baah and the unborn one.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a debt of gratitude to the many people who assisted in various ways in the course of my research towards this dissertation.

To begin with, I would like to express my greatest appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Ken Ahorsu, for his incisive, constructive and meticulous reviewing of this work.

Also, I would like to acknowledge the Minister Counsellor and staff of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and the friends who provided me with the necessary documents I needed for the completion of the work.

To my colleagues who took pain in reading the work and encouraging me where necessary.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Community for East and Southern Africa States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPMR</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East Africa Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (French: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lake Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoE</td>
<td>Group of Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Right Council Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Production-Sharing Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC Oil</td>
<td>South Africa Congo Oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Ugandan Presidential Defence Forces</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
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ABSTRACT

The abundance and exploitation of natural resources have increasingly become a source of conflict in most of the developing world since the end of the Cold War. Natural resource boundary conflict is an emerging issue in contemporary Africa wherever natural resources are found. The study examined the natural resource boundary conflict between DR Congo and Uganda that has occasioned their exploration and exploitation of oil in the Lake Albert. Data for the research was gathered through both primary and secondary sources. The study found that although an open warfare does not exist between the two countries, conflict exist all the same. The study have found out that the sources of the boundary conflict can be traced to the Belgium colonial policies of racial relation, economic development and migration as well as the social engineering that attended such policies. A number of wars have been fought between the two countries, as well as proxy wars by militia who were supported by the two countries at one time or the other. The discovery of oil in Lake Albert has heightened the distrust and perception of antagonism between the two governments. The work has equally found that the conflict communities along the lake’s social grievances and the machinations of MNC’s quest to maximize profit by playing stakeholders against each other have become part and parcel of the conflict. The work concludes that since both countries are landlocked and given the violability of the region: the two countries need to bury the hatchet, cooperate and collaborate to optimize the dividends of oil exploration.
CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Introduction
The abundance of natural resources for the most part has spurred development in the areas they are found. It is more so for highly valued and greatly needed and sort after natural resources such as gold, diamond, oil and gas and special earth, among others. Natural resources have been a catalyst for development in most countries. When Natural resources are transformed into tradable goods and services, it engenders economic development, which trickles down to all other aspects of a nation’s life. This leads to an increase in the quality and standard of living, which makes its citizens happy and proud of their country. Contrary to the glowing prospects of natural resources for any nation, the abundance, exploitation and management of natural resources in Africa shows a rather grim reality. From Sierra Leone to Liberia and from Nigeria to the Great Lakes region, natural resource endowment has led to conflict, strife and desolation. Natural resource exploitation has often been a source of controversy between governments and the communities in which the resources abound with regard to benefit-sharing. In the Post-Cold war era, (late 80s and early 90s), natural resource exploitation became largely associated with civil wars in which rebel movements seized resource-rich areas. Such rebels exploited especially, mineral resources to finance their rebellion. This led to the phenomenon of child soldiers, human rights abuses and loss of revenue to the state, among others. In some cases, where the problem with natural resources did not involve rebel movements, the exploitation of natural resources equally became an environmental problem. The exploitation of natural resources had adverse environmental effects on plant, animal and aquatic life. Recent developments around climate change make this phenomenon the more undesirable given the effects environmental degradation is having on generations of already poor African people.
The exploitation of natural resources has also resulted in security issues whereby exploiters of these natural resources have become unruly and violent towards local communities who question their inimical environmental exploitation. Glimpses of this situation have been seen in Ghana with regard to illegal Chinese miners in rural areas.

Owing to the unimpressive results African countries have had in their handling of natural resources (stunted economic growth, sectarian conflicts, massive corruption and growing inequality resulting from the management of these resources), it is not surprising that concepts like the ‘resource curse’, ‘Dutch disease’ and ‘natural resource conflicts’ have come to depict and become almost synonymous with natural resource management in Africa.

Again in Africa, the discovery and exploitation of natural resources has led to conflicts. These conflicts occur both within (intra-state) and in between states (inter-state). Intra state conflict issues range from communities that demand specific benefits from the resource that the government cannot grant them, to ethnic, tribal or religious minorities who see the resource in their areas as a basis to secede from the State. Inter-state conflicts have mainly been about boundary disputes—where to draw the line between two countries. These conflicts have led to bloodshed within and between states and others have threatened the security and stability of entire sub regions and undermined the development that these resources are supposed to engender in the first place. Examples of boundary conflicts in Africa include Nigeria-Cameroon over the Bakasi Peninsula, Nile basin, Malawi and Tanzania, Sudan soils struggles and recently, Ghana and Ivory Coast maritime dispute. This study will focus on the boundary conflict with particular attention to the discovery of oil in Lake Alberta and the connected boundary conflict involving the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda.
Uganda and the DR Congo share Lake Albert, which has become an important new frontier in the search for oil on the continent. Lake Albert, also Albert Nyanza and formerly Lake Mobutu Sese Seko, is one of the Great Lakes of Africa.\(^1\) It is Africa’s seventh largest Lake, and ranks as the world’s twenty-third largest lake by volume. It is located in the centre of the continent, on the border between the DR Congo and Uganda.\(^2\)

Oil exploration began in Uganda’s part of the Lake Albert basin in the late 1990s, increasing in 2003–4, and major finds were confirmed in 2006 and 2007, both offshore (under the Lake bed) and onshore. The Ugandan government has negotiated and re-negotiated Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with international oil companies for more than a decade. Among the first international exploration companies involved were Tullow and Heritage. Tullow is developing partnerships with larger international production companies like Total and CNOOC (China). Tower and Dominion are also present in Uganda. The government has allocated five of its current nine exploration blocks to Multinational companies.

On the DR Congo side, oil exploration is developing more slowly than in Uganda, although the DR Congo has been a minor oil producer from other parts of the country since the mid-1970s. The DR Congo government has opened up 16 exploration licences and has signed PSAs with at least two sets of companies: in 2006 with Tullow and Heritage, and in 2008 with Divine Inspiration Consortium, H-Oil, Sud, and Congo Petroleum & Gas. Oil exploration was expected to begin in 2010–11, but disputes and controversy have surrounded the PSAs, and plans are affected by Ituri’s instability.\(^3\) The conflict in Ituri was a significant conflict involving two ethnic groups; the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema both settled in the Ituri region of the DR Congo.\(^4\) Though the two groups have been wrangling since 1972, the main conflict itself was from 1999 to 2003.\(^5\)
1.2 Statement of the Problem

Just like most parts of the African continent, the Great Lakes region has had its fair share of conflicts. The nuances of the conflict continue to make the area a volatile zone in Africa. Some of the factors at play are identified by Anastase Shyaka as: the Colonial heritage of the countries in the sub region, chronic bad governance and leadership, inadequate political systems coupled with party cleavages, failure in managing critical transitions and international interference in the area. These factors are largely responsible for ethnic conflicts, political crises, boundary disputes and identity problems in the area. Shyaka maintains that foreign interest in the area reduce the possibility of stability in the sub region significantly.6

Against this background, this study aims at finding out the impacts of the discovery of oil on the security outlook of the sub region. Oil undoubtedly is an important resource, and as already discussed, its discovery in many countries bring about some degree of optimism that their socio-economic circumstances will be enhanced. In a volatile area such as the Great Lakes Region, it is particularly intriguing how these tendencies will play out.

The discovery presents an admixture of challenges; geo-political—the quest of both countries to dominate the sub region. Boundary controversy—a colonial legacy. Rebel movements that have encroached on national sovereignty and constantly undermining the governments in both DR Congo and Uganda. Inadequate political systems in both countries and the lingering foreign profit interests are still present in the GLR. The discovery appears to reinforce the volatility of the area. Oil exploration has also began on the DR Congo side though slowly as compared to activity on the Ugandan side. The fear is that since the two countries have recently fought each other in the region and are largely unstable, new violence may arise in the contestation of ownership of the natural resource. This work, therefore, seeks to examine the potential threats
that the exploration of oil in Lake Albert pose to Uganda and DR Congo and the sub region as a whole.

1.3 Research Questions

- What are the main issues involved in the exploitation of oil in the Lake Albert Region.
- Who are the main actors involved in the oil exploitation in Lake Albert and why the emerging conflict.
- What are the main principles, issues and challenges of border delimitation between Uganda and DR Congo.
- What are the dynamics of the conflict and what measures have since been taken to manage the crisis?

1.4 Objectives

The objectives of the study are to:

- Examine the claims of contestation of oil discovery and exploitation in Lake Albert.
- Provide an overview of the relations and exploitation of oil in the GLR.
- Ascertain the exploitation of oil and its implications for stability in the GLR especially in case of Uganda and DR Congo relations.
- Ascertain the measures so far taken nationally, regionally and internationally to manage the crisis.
- Offer suggestions and recommendations.

1.5 Hypothesis

The exploitation of oil in the Lake Albert Region holds potential threats for the stability of the GLR.
1.6 Scope of the Study

The focus of the study is on natural resource exploitation in the GLR with special emphasizes on the discovery of oil in Lake Albert and the resultant conflict between Uganda and DR Congo.

1.7 Significance of the Study

Natural resource border-conflict is an emerging issue in Africa presently. This study is an attempt to enhance understanding on the causes of the conflicts and how to manage them.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The theory that will guide this work is the rational actor model. The model suggests that individual actors will make the choice that will bring them optimal utility. Decision makers make decisions whose results and consequences are most favourable. It stems from the neoclassical economists. The rational actor model is the ‘political’ version of the rational choice theory. The latter is for economics and makes the argument of the economic man. The economic man simply meant that when a rational human being goes to the market to buy, he/she will seek to buy more with less, all things being equal. The foremost proponent of the rational actor model is Graham T. Allison. Allison used the Cuban Missiles Crisis as a case study to build the model. Other proponents are William Stanley Jevons and Daniel Kahneman.

The theory is particularly strong in explaining why individuals or states take the decisions that they do. It offers an almost natural explanation for these choices—that actors will choose the option that brings most benefits and the least set of consequences to them. It assumes that actors are rational and thus take into consideration possible decisions and their consequences in order to be able to choose the one with optimal benefit.
To summarize, the tenets or assumptions of the rational actor model posit purposeful behaviour. This means that political actors at the time they are to make a decision have a goal or an end, alternatives in terms of the means to reach that goal or end and the needed information to make the decision is available. Actors are able to relate means and ends and act consistently with their set goals. Thus actors are intelligent and will always make the optimal choice. The optimal choice refers to that decision that brings the most benefits after the pros and cons of alternative decisions have being weighed.

The state as a rational actor takes certain decisions which will be to her benefit. The states pursue goals that would enhance its states interest and at times the interest of the leaders. In the same instance, Companies are motivated by profit making motives. Therefore, as rational as they are, would enter into ventures that will yield more profit. With armed and other rebel groups located in resource centres though they may have different reasons why they participate in group formation, some of the reasons as rational actors may include desire to be part of governance structure, to enrich themselves, marginalisation issues, identity issues and others.

The rational actor model is not without criticism. It has been criticized and rightly some of the critique does try to water down the effectiveness of the model. Some of these limitations are explained hereafter. The first is the issue of bounded rationality. With this, an actor or actors’ choice is limited or determined by the amount of information available to them at the time the choice was being made. This suggests that the context in terms of the information available at the given time, may make a decision seem the most optimal. However, such given information may not be true or wholesome enough and this affects the supposed rationality of the decisions of political actors. Another limitation of the theory is that it assumes that all choices are made for material benefit some choices are made
for other reasons such as historical ties or emotions. Again the model is limited by the principal-agent problem. This is where a principal actor’s decision or choice is implemented by his agents. It is well and good if their goals are in line but where the agent’s goals are different from the principal’s goals, what starts out as a rational choice may be implemented in a way that might bring adverse results.

In addition, the model downplays the notions of sacrifice, volunteerism and altruism. This is because it holds firmly that actions are rational and calculated to bring optimal benefits with the least consequences as possible but does not take into consideration the fact that a political actor may make a decision which is not the most optimal out of sacrifice. The optimal choice is not necessarily the best decision, because, clearly, actors make mistakes, their decisions may have unintended consequences and they may at times take deliberate risks. Thus, it is not the same to say the rational choice is the best choice but it is the best choice as at the time the political actor is making the decision.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, the rational actor model is best suited for this study. The leaders of the governments of Uganda and DR Congo as well as leaders of rebel groups from the two countries operating in the two countries are political actors. By the model, these political actors will do whatever it takes to control Lake Albert and its resources as they see that as bringing the most benefits. Doing whatever it takes may include resorting to violence and risking instability in the Great Lakes Region. The model thus provides a clearer framework to properly appraise the actions of the political leaders of two countries in respect to Lake Albert.
1.9 Literature Review

The overall objective of this literature review is to draw attention to how natural resources have been a significant factor as a reason for the initiation and perpetuation of armed conflicts in Africa. To do this, the review first shows how natural resources have led to conflicts and instability within a number of African countries. Subsequently, the review shall move to focus on how natural resources have also led to inter-state conflicts and instability. Though this work focuses on inter-state conflict, it is important to begin by touching on intra-state conflicts as they in many circumstances have ramifications for inter-state conflicts as an instigating or sustaining factor. For example, the Ituri district in the DR Congo has been unstable prior to the discovery of oil in Lake Alberta. Ituri is also one of the closest DR Congo districts to Lake Alberta and as such, its instability has the potential of affecting Uganda-DR Congo relations regarding Lake Alberta. The review also discusses some general sources of conflicts in Uganda and the DR Congo as deduced from trends over the years.

In ‘The Reasons for Wars – an Updated Survey’, Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli pose a very insightful question; why do wars occur and recur, especially, in cases where the decisions involved are made by careful and rational actors? They concede that there are many answers to the question. In their estimation, there are two fundamental categorizations within which the causes of war between actors (rational) can be situated. Firstly, wars occur when the cost of war cannot be overwhelmingly high. As such, there must be some plausible situations in the eyes of the decision makers such that the anticipated gains from a war in terms of resources, power, glory, territory, and so forth exceed the expected costs of conflict, including expected damage to property and life. The second criterion espoused by Jackson and Morelli is that, for wars to occur there has to be a failure in bargaining, so that for some reason there is an inability to reach a mutually advantageous and enforceable agreement. On the issues of a
failing bargaining process, they provide a five-prong reason for it. They argue that bargaining processes may fail, and eventually actors may go to war when there is (a) asymmetric information about the potential costs and benefits of war (b) a lack of ability to enforce a bargaining agreement and/or a lack of the ability of one or both sides to credibly commit to abide by an agreement (c) indivisibility of resources that might change hands in a war, which makes all potential mutually beneficial agreements not feasible (d) agency problems, where the motives of leaders differ from those of the populations that they represent (e) multilateral interactions where every potential agreement is blocked by some coalition of states or constituencies who can derail it.\(^{12}\)

The biggest question that arises from the conception of rational wars is the burden of distinguishing them from irrational wars. On this, even though Jackson and Morelli make an effort to classify wars caused by religion, emotional revenge, ethnic cleansing and other ideological mass killing as irrational, they concede that there is a thin line between the two and in some cases, irrational wars so-called may be rational depending on the circumstance and the interpretation of it.

In ‘The Causes of Civil War’ Simeon Djankov and Marta Reynal-Querol questions; what causes civil war?\(^{13}\) In answering this difficult question, they explore the idea that strong institutions prevent conflicts as well as the role of institutions in development. They argue that the results on the relationship between democracy and civil wars parallel the literature on the relationship between democracy and growth. Their argument tends to challenge some previous studies that contend that poverty is perhaps the fundamental cause of civil wars. To them, when institutions are strong and there are secured property rights and laws are enforced, civil wars will be prevented.\(^{14}\) These scholars hence place prominence of strong institutions over other
factors such as per capita income inequalities, ethnicity, resources, religion and other potential causes of civil wars. They conclude that their findings undermine the emphasis on poverty as a determinant of civil war and indicate that research may concentrate more on institutions than on economic development if we wish to understand the causes of civil war. This explanation is quite simplistic and may not reflect the true underpinnings of civil wars, especially, in Africa. The challenge with this position is also that civil wars may be caused by multiple factors which may include both economic and non-economic factors.  

Fearon and Laitin introduce a new twist to the arguments and broaden the scope for analysis of the causes of civil wars. In their article ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’ they argue that “the main factors influencing which countries and groups have seen civil wars… are not cultural differences and ethnic grievances, but rather the conditions that favour insurgency”. Fearon and Laitin explain insurgency as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. Recounting the preconditions for favorable insurgency, they allude to financial, organizational, and politically weak central governments. These conditions, they argue, render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices, sometimes including a propensity for brutal and indiscriminate retaliation that helps drive locals into rebel forces. They also find a direct link between low income levels and insurgency or civil war. They argue that recruiting young men to the guerrilla units will be easier when the economic alternatives are worse. This position places the causes of civil war beyond the ethnic, religious or ideological; what have been collectively christened irrational causes of wars.

In ‘The Political Economy of Natural Resources’, Collier delves into the natural resources and civil wars arguments. He argues that many post-colonial states (African) have valuable natural resources and these compound the problem of insecurity. He observes that though the initial
explanation for the resource curse or Dutch disease was purely economic, it has gradually become evident that the key issues are political. This position locates the causes of resource conflict within the political enclave. Collier argues that democracy may be undermined by resource rent if government uses some of the money to maintain power by means of patronage. Rent-seeking, he posits, comes about when ownership is conferred by physical control of territory, people will divert their effort into violence. Since violence can be offset by counter violence, in equilibrium the value of rents from natural assets will be dissipated by the cost incurred by the violent.19 This lubricates intractable conflicts and wars.20

In his work ‘How Do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from Thirteen Cases’, Michael L. Ross sets to explore the causal link between natural resources and civil wars. He set out on the premise that identifying the mechanisms that link resources to civil war would make the theories that link resource to civil wars more complete and persuasive.21 Ross argues that even though various writers have used lagged data in their analysis of the resource-civil wars, their methods do not rule out reverse causality. He observes further that the natural resource-civil war correlation could also be spurious: both civil war and resource dependence might be independently caused by some unmeasured third variable such as weak rule of law.22 He notes that some writers attribute resource-civil wars to all primary commodities, others claim only oil matters. Yet other scholars contend that contraband commodities such as diamonds and drugs make wars last longer. Ross, therefore, set out to test some widely talked about hypothesis and conflict mechanisms. The first mechanism he considers is the “looting” mechanism. On this, he states that primary commodities increase the probability of civil war by enabling nascent rebel groups to raise money either by extracting and selling the commodities directly, or by extorting money from others who do. The second mechanism, Ross notes, is the “grievance” mechanism. It suggests that resource extraction creates grievances
among the local population, because of land expropriation, environmental hazards, insufficient job opportunities, and the social disruptions caused by labour migration; these grievances, in turn, lead to civil war. The above argument, he notes, suggest that resource wealth increases the probability of civil war by causing grievances over insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, in-adequate job opportunities, and labour migration. He argues that if resource exploitation leads to civil war through a grievance mechanism, one should observe the rebels criticizing resource firms or the resource sector in their propaganda; and one should see rebels make resource firms a target of their violence, apart from looting or extortion attempt.\textsuperscript{23}

A third possibility, Ross maintains, is that resource wealth, if it is located on a country's periphery or in an area populated by an ethnic minority will give local residents a financial incentive to establish a separate state, thus raising the risk of a civil war. He amplifies that if this mechanism is valid then it should be observed that the conflict is a separatist war, the conflict began after the separatist region was identified as having exploitable resource wealth and lastly the rebel group discusses the unfair distribution of resource wealth in its propaganda.\textsuperscript{24} On the duration of war caused by natural resource, he observes that, Natural Resource wealth may influence the duration of civil war, independent of its effects on the incidence of civil war. On this he identifies three mechanisms that could either lengthen or shorten a conflict, depending on how they occur. The first mechanism here again is looting. The other is the aeration that resource wealth discourages settlement. The last mechanism which he draws from Fearon bothers on commitment problem. It is important to note that when all these issues are evident resource conflicts are likely to prolong. The difficulty with the various mechanisms of conflict noted by Ross, which he concedes, is the issue of applicability.
Though there are no qualms about the fact that natural resource causes civil war, but different or combinations of factors may trigger and prolong civil wars.²⁵

Varisco argues that natural resources have a strong interrelation with armed conflicts only when they have particular natural and geographical characteristics of lootability, distance and diffusion.²⁶ He notes that pre-existing factors such as history, geography and ethnic diversity reinforce natural resource armed conflict. In his analysis he points out that some countries like Norway and Botswana are rich in Natural Resources yet they are peaceful, on the contrary Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are rich in Natural Resource and have experienced armed conflict. This creates a spurious link between natural resource and civil or armed conflict. He therefore concludes that the presence (or the absence) of natural resources per se has no clear consequences on armed conflicts. Therefore he argues that other elements need to be added to the research in order to understand this puzzling nexus.²⁷

The first set of elements refers to the natural and geographic characteristics of the natural resources: lootable, distant and diffuse natural resources have a strong inter-relation with armed conflicts. The second set of elements concerns the political, economic and social characteristics of a country.²⁸ To him, if natural resources are lootable, diffuse and the government has no absolute control over them, then it can be a potential factor for armed conflict. One other difficulty there is in accepting Varisco’s position is the issue of generalization. There are instances where natural resources such as oil are not lootable due to the high cost of exploration, yet it has been a cause of civil wars in some countries. Yet there are other countries and regions where natural resources are diffused, yet they have been no armed conflicts. Varisco therefore turns to other set of explanatory variables to explain resource conflicts. He maintains that political control of a government over its natural resources, the diversification of a country’s
economy, and the level of internal societal opposition in a state may also sustain resource conflict. The incidence of Natural Resources in a conflict therefore depends on their natural characteristics and on some other political, economic and societal elements that interact and reinforce or weaken this inter-relation.

The Great Lakes Region of Africa has witnessed most of the world’s deadliest civil and armed conflict since the end of the cold war period. Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda are among the notable countries within this region. These countries have been places of intractable conflicts since the end of the cold war era which has brought some of them to the brink of collapse and failing. Most of these conflicts have also eluded resolution. Daley in her work “Challenges to Peace: conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region of Africa”, observes that efforts to bring peace and reconstruction to the Central African region have been fashioned by contemporary conflict resolution models that have a standard formula of peace negotiations, with a trajectory of ceasefire agreements, transitional governments, demilitarization, constitutional reform and ending with democratic elections. She asserts that in this model local dynamics and the historical and multifaceted nature of the conflicts are rarely addressed.29

In a strategic conflict analysis on the Great Lakes Region published by Sida in 2004, analysis for both DR Congo and Uganda showed some deeply seated domestic tendencies in both countries which serve as a recipe for both intra-State conflict and inter State-conflict.

The analysis for DR Congo showed that by the end of colonialism traditional peasantry had been severely disrupted by the colonial government in order to create a stable labour force for the extractive sectors.30 This had two effects on the traditional economy, on the one hand labour
was redeployed from peasantry into the mines and other economic activities the colonial government was interested in, thereby leaving traditional peasantry struggling. On the other hand, many of the labourers that were transferred were not properly incorporated into the formal sector and post-independence these people have represented generations of errant labour in both the cities and rural areas.\textsuperscript{31}

The study also identifies economic and social decay as a key element in the conflict proneness of the DR Congo. This started in the 1980s when no reinvestment of incomes of the mining sector were made and thus no trickle-down effect was seen the economy. This led to widened inequality and a growing population of urban poor.\textsuperscript{32} These dynamics, among many, have made the DR Congo an unstable country in an already volatile sub region. Fortunately the peace agreement in 2003 still holds as the key parties of the conflict still abide by it. But clearly, the endurance of the peace agreement will be tested by how this new resource will be handled. Given the high poverty rate of the country and the grievance of people over the fact that they live in a country rich in resources and yet live in abject poverty the rise and persistence of rebel activity is highly predictable. In ‘Strategic Conflict Analysis of the Great Lakes Region’ Uganda shows quite similarly disturbing characteristics as DR Congo that makes it a volatile country.

Since independence Uganda has been characterized by conflict and insecurity.\textsuperscript{33} The Karamoja area in particular has been a place for conflict and human rights violations.\textsuperscript{34} Similar to DR Congo this is in large measure a legacy of colonialism. Colonial policies neglected this region for a long time, this neglect has led to a sense of exclusion among the people.\textsuperscript{35} The area is characterized by widespread poverty, low level of literacy and poor health generally.\textsuperscript{36} These
features just like those present in DR Congo also put Uganda in a state of intermittent skirmishes.

In a Strategic Analysis Paper on the conflict on the Nile, Jack Di Nunzio delves into the issues threatening the stability of Northern Africa and other countries along the Nile River. The issues that have the potential to lead states in that region into open confrontation are the issues of food and water security.\textsuperscript{37} The activities along the river are such that activities upstream have consequences for all other countries downstream hence the interest of a country like Egypt which is downstream to control activities along the river. For many years Egypt and Sudan have enjoyed a duopoly of the river with Egypt controlling three quarters of the river resources and Sudan controlling a quarter.\textsuperscript{38} This is provided for in the Nile Water Agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan in 1959. Prior to this agreement an earlier agreement between Egypt and the British Empire in 1929 gave Egypt absolute rights over the Nile and control of activities that might compromise its flow.\textsuperscript{39} Understandably, other countries along the river are not very happy about the duopoly of Egypt and Sudan since they had no input in such an agreement mainly because they were not independent sovereign nations at the time.\textsuperscript{40} The new nation, South Sudan changes the outlook of the region quite dramatically and it is already making claim for control of its part of the river. What has become clear is that countries along the river in view of the pressing needs at home can no longer stay away from exploiting the resources of the Nile and as such Egypt’s right and control of the river is seriously under challenge perhaps than ever before. Institutions like the Nile Basin Initiative have been put in place to manage the rivers resources relative to allocation in a way that will avoid conflict and its achieving some significant results. Currently there is tension between Egypt and Ethiopia over the latter’s Dam project for electricity on the Nile River.\textsuperscript{41} The project has attracted serious
criticism and even threats from Egypt. This was seen previously with Egypt and Sudan using their rights to curtail some development projects on the river by the government of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{42} In spite of the above the real potential for conflict lies perhaps ahead of us for as countries upstream experience growth, such growth will demand more use of water resources for both consumption and infrastructure development. \textsuperscript{43}

In a working paper, Where Politics Borders Law: Malawi and Tanzania border dispute Mahony et al delve into the issues of contention between Malawi and Tanzania. Specifically, the border line between the two countries in the eastern half of the northern part of the Lake separating the two countries.\textsuperscript{44} The dispute escalated when Malawi awarded oil exploration licenses to Surestream petroleum. Several concerns have been raised regarding the Malawi’s oil exploitation in the Lake Nyasa.\textsuperscript{45} Some of these concerns have bordered on the environmental impact on the communities living on the banks of the Lake, others have been on the impact it will have on the fish resources given that over 75\% of Malawi’s protein needs come from fish.\textsuperscript{46} The Lake has also serves as a tourist site and there is no gainsaying the effects oil exploration and subsequent production on the lake will be on tourism. The United Nations Economic and Social Council UNESCO has listed the Lake Nyasa as one of its heritage sites and is thus alarmed by the possibility of oil exploration on the Lake.\textsuperscript{47} The real concern lies however in the political ramifications of this border dispute between the two states. Already there is pressure within both countries on the governments not to concede to the other. Clearly, the potential billion dollars that oil will rake into the economy is enough incentive for both countries to go all out to secure that territory. But the economic and social costs of open confrontation will not augur well for both countries although between the two Tanzania looks more formidable due to the sturdy economic growth it has had and relative political stability it enjoys.\textsuperscript{48}
In a paper, Nigeria-Cameroun boundary dispute: The quest for the Bakasi peninsula, Babatola looks at the origins, causes of the interstate conflict between Nigeria and Cameroun and also the attempts and mechanisms put in place over the period to end the conflict. The Bakasi peninsula was seen as part of southern Cameroun even according to Nigerian survey documentation but when Cameroun made claims on the area in 1965, a disagreement led to the setting up of a joint commission to retrace the boundary and by 1971 there was a need to consider the lines drawn up by the 1913 Anglo-German treaty. Afterwards both governments entered into a peaceful engagement and set up a commission to proffer solutions to the issues. This culminated in the Maroua declaration in 1975 between the two countries purporting to delimit the maritime boundary between the two countries however the interpretation of some aspects which implied that Nigeria will lose the peninsula made the declaration unacceptable to the Nigerian government. The failure to peacefully settle this led to open clashes between the two countries, these skirmish have been intermittent over the decade spanning 1970 to the early 1980s. Examples include Cameroun’s invasion of the Adamawa province and the Bakasi peninsula. These attempts on Cameroun’s part have attracted some responses from the Nigerian state.

It is widely believed that the oil and gas deposits at the Bakasi peninsula is the motivating factor for both countries holding on to its rights to the area. Failed attempts to resolve it at the interstate level has made it necessary for the matter to be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Only recently did we see a proper resolution of the matter under the auspices of the ICJ in the form of the Green Tree Agreement that handed the Bakasi peninsula to Cameroun. But from some indications within Nigeria, there is quite a significant amount of dissatisfaction of some people including Nigerians living in the Bakasi area and many groups who feel that the ICJ ruling is injustice to the Nigerian state. Only recently a case was put
before an Abuja High Court to quash Nigeria’s commitment per the Green Tree Agreement.53

All this point to the extent to which states will go to win territorial disputes, against the background of several demands internally and externally, socially and economically.

Quite evidently a lot of debate has gone on about the causes of civil wars and interstate conflicts in the countries they have occurred. Prominent among the issues raised are structural, institutional, economic, political and even geo-political. The weak institutions in the States that the conflicts occur has been identified as a major cause of the conflict. Inequality in the economic structure of the economy has fuelled some insurgent activities, Sudan is an example on the African continent. Part of the structural issues identified in conflict countries are enduring ethnicity and tribal prejudice which creates a lot of fissures in the socio-political landscape. The allure of the money and power the control of resources has served as a motive for others. In addition to this is bad governance practices and legitimacy deficits in of political regimes in conflict countries. The very nature of the resources has also come up in the discourse as in their ability to be looted by rebel groups and or the way they enable extortions of those who exploit them by rebel groups. This has been posited as a key feature of resource inspired civil wars. At a glance it is not far from right to say that all these are characteristics of the GLR. In spite of the rich debate there is still no closure on a single theory of the causes of civil war or instability. Perhaps there is no single cause of civil wars and scholars will have to look at more than one perspective in explaining conflict. This is probably why the conflict resolution mechanisms are not yielding the desired results according to Daley.

What this study will do is to match theory with reality in explaining what the Lake Albert oil find means for stability in the Great Lakes Region. It will also attempt to draw conclusions and recommend solutions to the GLR in particular based on the findings.
1.10 Sources of Data

Primary and secondary sources of data collection will be used for the study. Primary sources include interviews with the Heads of Missions and or Representatives of the countries concerned (i.e. Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo), and the Africa Union (AU) desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. Secondary sources will cover books, journal articles, reports, newspaper publications as well as online literature.

1.11 Arrangement of Chapters

The study is organized in 4 main chapters;

Chapter One covers the Research Design.

Chapter Two will focus on an overview of natural resource boundary conflict in Africa.

Chapter Three concentrates on conflict between Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo on the oil discovery in Lake Albert

Chapter Four will sum up the study with main findings, conclusion and recommendations.
Endnotes

2 Ibid.
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5 Ibid.
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53 Ibid
CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF THE NATURAL RESOURCE BOUNDARY CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

Natural resources contribute to the economic development in most states around the globe. They are valuable and most often its right usage leads to the growth and development of the citizenry and the state in entirety. In the case of Africa, this is not usually the norm. Since the end of the Cold War, the African continent has experienced a lot of issues related to natural resource exploitation and its boundary conflict.

African territorial boundaries, both between and within states, are famously known to be created by the imperial powers, who, interestingly, drew fixed lines between and among societies of which they had very little knowledge. The persistence of these boundaries to the present day (with some notable exceptions) is, therefore, quite remarkable, especially in the context of rapidly changing political and economic dynamics across the continent.¹

During the 5th European Conference on African Studies, African dynamics in a multipolar world in Lisbon 2013, the convenors asserted that borders are usually not uncontested. Rival states across international boundaries and particular interest groups living within states will often seek to amend either external or internal boundaries, in order to gain access to resources valuable either to the state, local populations or both. The ambiguous history of boundary-making can, of course be manipulated and often remains highly contentious. These dynamics are present in many other African borderlands.²
This chapter focuses on natural resource boundary conflict in contemporary Africa, particularly those that were contested by neighbouring countries. The chapter further provides in-depth knowledge regarding countries in the Great Lakes Region that have experienced these boundary conflict due to their rich natural resources.

2.1 Natural Resource Boundary Conflict in Africa

Border disputes in Africa have been considered to be one of the prime reasons why disputes and violence remain prevalent in the region. Indeed, situations such as these brings about relentless strife, including refugee problems, environmental degradation, deforestation, small arms proliferation, organized crime, and other regional instabilities. Border disputes are very volatile and as the population of most countries, particularly those in Africa, keeps increasing steadily its resources are always a bone of contention for its neighbouring countries, which inevitably leads to hotbeds of conflicts.³

The political geography of Africa was derived from the Berlin Conference of 1884-85.⁴ This Conference prepared the grounds (laid down rules) and enabled the Europeans interfere in the affairs of states within the African continent. They went as far as creating colonial boundaries which have been sustained from the transition from colonies through to independence. There undoubtedly exists the argument that boundaries are arbitrary, yet the vast majority of them since their demarcation have remained virtually untouched since the late 1800s, particularly in Africa.

These boundaries collectively divide the continent into its many states, as well as its spatial patterns of economic development. ⁵ Scholars have argued that the present boundary system represents a rational response by both the colonialists and the present-day African leaders. This
leads to the constraints imposed by the demographic and ethnographic structure of the continent.\(^6\)

It has been predicted, among other things, that the political boundaries of Africa, by virtue of their presumed natural and artificial characteristics, harbour the seeds of many troubles within the region. Several references are made in the growing literature on nation-building and political modernization with respects to the natural and artificial qualities of these boundaries.\(^7\) The pervasive competition and conflict over customary systems of landholding and land use exclusion in Africa deepens social divisions and class formation.\(^8\)

2.1.1 The Nile Basin

Over the years, areas along the Nile Basin are one of Africa’s boundary dispute regions. The Nile River is noted for its several purposes such as irrigation, hydro-electric power production, water supply, fishing, tourism, hydro-power generation, flood control, water transportation and the protection of public health. The economy of countries along the Nile Basin is purely agricultural, hence, irrigation based agriculture has been one of the important uses of the Nile. The Nile Basin, has indeed gained a lot of economic importance which has resulted in series of conflicts within its tributary countries. Boutros Boutros-Ghali hypothesised in 1988 that Egypt’s next war was likely to be influenced by the Nile.\(^9\) Egypt, a desert agricultural country relies entirely on the Nile and is prepared to go to war with any country over the distribution of the Nile's water supply. For example the conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt is as a result of the usage of the Nile.\(^10\)

There has been the creation of legal regimes for the utilisation and management of the Nile Basin. The countries concerned have signed through bilateral treaties. In order to promote
regional peace and security, states along the Nile formed the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) to share essential socio-economic benefits. This treaty was initiated by officials of the countries that share the Nile- Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi with Eritrea as an observer country.

The purpose of the 1929 Nile Waters agreement was to guarantee and facilitate an increase in the volume of water reaching Egypt. This consensus was based on the outcome of political negotiations between Egypt and Great Britain and, in particular, the report of the 1925 Nile Waters Commission. For example, tensions have sparked between Egypt and Ethiopia as a result of Ethiopia’s intentions to construct the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa on the Nile.\textsuperscript{11} Tensions sparked between Egypt and Ethiopia as a result of Egypt’s control over the Nile.

2.1.2 Ghana-Côte D’Ivoire Maritime Boundary Dispute

The bilateral relationship between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire has, over the years, enjoyed warm and amicable relations. Since Ghana begun its oil exploration along its maritime border with Côte d’Ivoire, the relations between both countries has started to turn frosty. The dispute heightened when Côte d’Ivoire threatened oil companies located at West Cape Three Points to halt operations.

In order to help resolve the dispute, the two countries agreed to enter into negotiations through ECOWAS.\textsuperscript{12} After several failed attempts for both countries to reach an agreement / equalising grounds, Ghana went to the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in September 2014. She is, therefore, seeking a declaration that it has not encroached on Cote d’Ivoire’s territorial waters.
Following from this, the ITLOS special chamber has ordered a number of provisional acts to which both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are required to comply until its final verdict in 2017.

2.1.3 Malawi and Tanzania Conflict

Since 1964, Malawi and Tanzania have been in a border dispute over Lake Nyasa. This conflict poses a threat to peace and security of both two countries, as well as those of its neighbouring states. Border disputes largely leads to instability which slows the already inadequate socio-political and economic developments of both countries, and hinders sustainable development in the region as a whole.

The Malawi–Tanzania border case is linked to the spurious demarcation of the border around Lake Nyasa, which was created by the Anglo-Germany Treaty of July 1, 1890. The east of the valley lies Lake Malawi (also called Lake Nyasa), making up over three-quarters of Malawi’s eastern boundary. The basis of the conflict between Malawi and Tanzania is Malawi’s claim to the waters of a lake whose very name they dispute. Malawi calls it “Lake Malawi” as opposed to the more traditional name of “Lake Nyasa.”

Malawi makes the assertion that the boundary line need to pass along the Eastern border, whereas Tanzania insists it should pass along the median line which is similar to the international boundary between Malawi and Mozambique. According to Ewan Anderson, “the entire section of the boundary along the shoreline of Lake Nyasa is under dispute. Tanzania claims that from the mouth of River Songwe, the boundary should follow the lake’s median line to a tripoint with Mozambique which should be on the median line.”
Tanzania maintains/adheres to the fact that three states dwell on the bank of the river namely, Malawi, Mozambique and itself and should share the lake. On the other hand, Malawi claims the whole body of water, except a certain part of the lake falls to Mozambique. Lake Malawi is indeed rich in oil and gas deposits and this possibly explains why it is so much under conflict. According to Joe Mlenga, the tensions that have arisen, as a result of the ownership of the lake reached its peak following from Malawi’s desire to explore oil and gas from ‘Lake Malawi’ (a term only Malawi recognises but known as ‘Lake Nyasa’ to Mozambique and Tanzania).

Tanzania has urged Malawi to call off the search for oil and gas reserves, pending talks regarding the location of the borderline. While Malawi claims to own the whole water body, Tanzania argues that the line should be in the middle of the northern part of the lake. Each of these countries had different reasons for its claim. Tanzania backed its claim to half of the water mass as evidently suggested by international customary law, developed in the 1960s, on equitable sharing of water bodies Malawi, on the other hand, cited the 1890 Heligoland Treaty which handed sole ownership of the lake to Malawi, as well as the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty which came into effect around the same time.\textsuperscript{17}

Though consensus is been reached between the two countries via the leadership, it could be asserted that tensions have heightened ever since Malawi gave the nod to companies to start the explorations in the lake. This situation is not different from other boundary conflict in Africa.

2.2 Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes Region (GLR) is also one of the major zones on the African continent that faces problems of intense boundary conflicts. There has been high conflict around Lake Albert,
a zone that borders both the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda. According to the growing literature, over the years, the wars and instability surrounding the GLR are linked to its rich mineral deposits and the exploitation of minerals.

The Great Lakes Region (GLR) comprises a series of lakes constituting part of the Rift Valley lakes in and around the East African Rift. They include Lake Victoria, the second largest fresh water lake in the world, and Lake Tanganyika, the world's second largest in volume as well as the second deepest.\textsuperscript{18} Others include Lake Nyasa, Lake Turkana, Lake Albert, Lake Rukwa, Lake Mweru, Lake Kivu and Lake Edward.

More broadly, the term Great Lakes region is used to describe the countries that surround the lakes mentioned above. The countries that fall under this categorization are; DR Congo, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda.\textsuperscript{19} At times, the Great Lakes Region is conceived rather loosely to include Kenya and Tanzania “but not usually as far south as Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique nor as far north as Ethiopia, though these four countries border one of the Great Lakes.”\textsuperscript{20}

In terms of climate and topography, the region has relatively cool highlands and abundant rainfall. Forests dominate the lowlands of the Congo basin, whereas savannas and grasslands are more common in the eastern and southern highlands.\textsuperscript{21} The lakes are home to 1500 cichlid fish species, as well as other fish species. Amphibians such as crocodiles are common in this area.\textsuperscript{22} The area, as it is now, is largely a creation of the tectonic movements that created the rift valley; most of the lakes are located in the various depressions that the tectonic movements created.
Just like the rest of Africa, the GLR is resource endowed. Minerals deposits are scattered around the region. The high level of resource endowment has unmistakably shaped the relations of states in the region. Rather sad, is the fact that for the most part, it has led to conflict and insecurity, stalling development leading to desolation, poverty and squalor.

For example, based on International Monetary Fund Statistics as at April 2013, out of 184 countries ranked, the four main countries that make up the Great Lakes Region were listed as some of the poorest countries in the world. On the chart, Rwanda ranked 160th, Uganda ranked 164th, Burundi ranked 182nd while DR Congo ranked 184th.

2.2.1 DR Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or DR Congo) is located in Central Africa. DR Congo borders the Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan to the North, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania to the East, Zambia and Angola to the South and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. DRC is populated with about 75 million people. Over 200 ethnic groups populate the DR Congo; the majority of which are the Bantu people, Mongo, Luba and Kongo peoples. Although a wide range of dialects exist as a result of the vast number of ethnic groups, language gaps are bridged by the wide use of French, Swahili and Lingala languages, which are the most predominant. The country’s population is predominantly Christian interspersed with Islam and some indigenous religions.

DR Congo has, since independence in June 1960, gone through tumultuous decades of political and socio-economic disturbances. The political struggles that began in early post-independence, the Katanga secession and the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba still
cast its long shadow over the nation. There is no gainsaying that it has been the African epicenter of Cold War politics not least due to it resource endowment.

The country’s politics began to unravel just five years into independence Colonel Joseph Mobutu ceased power in 1965 and ruled the country for the next thirty two years. Mobutu maintained his regime through sham elections and the coercion, which, in tur turn, attracted activities of insurrection from the parties he isolated, many of whom were refugees from Rwanda and Uganda, who, among other things, were ethnically opposed to Mobutu. This culminated in the toppling of Mobutu’s regime in May 1997 and ushered in Laurent Kabila. Although Laurent Kabila’s reign was short lived, one significant thing he did was to rename the country Democratic Republic of Congo thus reversing Mobutu’s earlier decision to rename the country Zaire. In 2002, when Laurent Kabila was toppled, his son Joseph Kabila was made President of the DR Congo. That same year, Joseph Kabila succeeded in negotiating the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Eastern Congo. The Pretoria Agreement that was signed between the warring factions remained. This, however, did not end the cross border skirmishes in the country. Not long after that, in 2009, an attempt to integrate the Tutsi rebel group called the ‘National Congress for the Defense of the People’ into the Congolese military failed and that led to their defection and formation of another group, the M23; and renewed fighting soon followed.

Interestingly, DR Congo is one of the world’s richest countries in terms of natural resource endowment. The country has abundant copper, gold and crude oil to mention a few. This makes its present low level of development rather surprising.
2.2.2 Uganda

Uganda is a landlocked country located in East Africa. On the East, Uganda is bordered by Kenya, and to the North by South Sudan. It also shares borders on the West with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda to the Southwest and Tanzania to the South. Uganda had its independence on 9th October, 1962. Presently, Uganda has a population of about 34.9 million people with a median age of 15 and has the world’s fifth highest fertility rate. The country has several ethnic groups and none of those constitute a majority. Some of the notable ethnic groups include the Baganda, Banyankole and Basonga peoples.

With respects to the political terrain of the country, there was a compromise in the first regime to have the King of Buganda as head of state, and Milton Obote as Prime Minister. Five years on, Milton Obote made himself Executive President and Iddi Amin as commander of the Army. This act set the stage for political adventurism on the part of politicians and the military. This was seen in the use of the majority in parliament by Obote’s party to remove the ceremonial President and Vice President to make Obote the Executive President.

With the collapse of the Obote regime in 1971, Iddi Amin gained control of Uganda for the next eight years where he administered a brutal and tyrannical regime. Under Amin, a catastrophic death of 300,000 Ugandans was recorded. These were mainly northern Ugandans; people Amin believed were still loyal to Obote. The country basically continued on this political path until the rise of Yoweri Museveni in 1986. The Museveni regime has at least been able to restore calm and some level of economic stability since 1986.

Beyond the checkered political history, Uganda remains a country with great potential. It has a median age of 15 with about 45% of its population between 15 and 54 years old.
reflects a young population and a vibrant human resource for nation building. The country is endowed with a vast outlay of resources such as copper, cobalt, hydropower, limestone, salt, arable land, and gold.\textsuperscript{38}

2.2.3 Rwanda

Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1961. Rwanda has a peculiar political history, in a large measure, due to the policies of its former colonial masters Germany and Belgium. As far back as 1899, the white colonialists created a social hierarchy known as the ‘Hamitic Hypothesis’ which permitted the whites to enjoy top positions. This created a division between the local Hutu and Tutsi people by raising the ethnic Tutsis as directly under the white people and then the Hutu people being under the Tutsis, thus, being at the bottom of the food chain.\textsuperscript{39}

This led to almost a century of racial and ethnic subjugation in the country. Also, the colonial government pursued certain policies that caused serious grievance amongst the Hutu people. For example, Hutu chiefs were removed and replaced by Tutsis. Further a Tutsi monarch was created against the pre-colonial order that maintained a balance of power, where there was for example chief of men, chief of land and chief of pasture—a system that made sure both ethnic groups had adequate representation.\textsuperscript{40} Therefore the dismantling of this pre-colonial order and the replacement with a single chief was, for the Hutus, a serious act to undermine them.

In the run up to independence in 1961, the colonial government radically changed its policy in the country. In 1959, instead of handing power to the Tutsi minority elite; as was expected, they began to lay the foundation for power to be handed over to a majority led Hutu independent republic. This led to an uprising that culminated in the removal of the Tutsi
monarch, and the de-legitimization of the institutions by which the minority rule was perpetuated.\textsuperscript{41}

The defining feature of this development however is that it laid the foundation for revenge and persecution of Tutsis in Rwanda, which took place in April 1994. In an attempt to replace the Tutsi elite, the Hutu elite’s attempts at dismantling the preexisting repressive regime with their own kind were met with resistance resulting in the death of 2,500,000 people and about 22,000 internally displaced people and another 130,000 people fleeing the country into neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{42}

The country’s natural resource endowments include gold, cassiterite (tin ore), wolframite (tungsten ore), methane, hydropower, arable land.\textsuperscript{43} The country has a young population with a vast majority of the people between the ages of 15 and 54. The economic outlook of the country shows that a vast majority of the people are based in rural areas and engaged in mainly subsistence agriculture with a few agro processing and mineral extraction to add.\textsuperscript{44} Given the devastation of the 1994 genocide and the consequent loss of human resource, it is not out of place to suggest that the genocide and its legacy has taken a great toll on the country’s development. Rwanda, however, is, in recent times, making a lot of positive strides economically.

\textbf{2.2.4 Burundi}

Burundi is a landlocked country in the African Great Lakes region of East Africa, bordered by Rwanda to the north, Tanzania to the East and South, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the West. At times, Burundi is considered part of Central Africa. Although the country is landlocked, it has a Southwestern border adjacent to Lake Tanganyika.
For more than 200 years prior to colonialism, Burundi had an indigenous kingdom. It comprised both Rwanda and Burundi and was later known as Ruandi-Urundi when the Belgians took over from the Germans in the early 20th century. After independence, the country almost immediately went into political crises. This is once again mainly due to some of the policies and actions of the colonial government. For instance in the run up to independence, Burundi sought a separation of the then Ruandi-Urundi into Rwanda and Burundi mainly as a way of avoiding ethnic persecutions its people had suffered in Rwanda as a result of the colonial government handing over power to the Hutus. Right after independence, a constitutional monarchy was established and there was representation for all ethnic groups in the parliament.

An attempted coup led to clashes between the military and the Hutu dominated police force through which the Tutsi government was able to bring the police force under its control. This was followed in 1972 by what a group known as the Burundi Workers Party’s genocidal attempt at ethnic Tutsis. With the Tutsis in power, a reprisal was expectedly started by the government aiming at ethnic Hutus. In all, an estimated 100,000 people died and many other rendered refugees in other countries; whereas others became internally displaced. The story of Burundi did not change much for the period after this until in 1993, a real attempt at stabilizing the country was made through an attempt to democratize and the country had its first ever elected head of state that year. Events took a dramatic turn for the worse after newly elected President Ndadaye was assassinated four months into office. The war that broke out as a result saw another 300,000 deaths from clashes between Hutu and Tutsis. A series of peace talks ensued which in 2003 culminated in a signed agreement at an African Union Summit in Tanzania to end the conflict.
In 2015, fresh conflict and humanitarian crises have happened in Burundi again over the current president’s attempt to run for a third term. About a 100,000 people have fled the country as a result of the disturbances between the government and the opposition and the crackdown of some members of the military who failed at an attempted coup.

The case of Burundi is another African story of a country rich in natural resources such as “tantalum, gold, tin and tungsten” but wallowing in deprivation and squalor. Politics in Burundi has, since independence, allowed little room for the country to develop. It is therefore not surprising that it is among the world’s poorest countries.

2.3 Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

The East African Community (EAC) is the main economic bloc for the Great Lakes Region. The EAC was revived in 1999 after it had been dissolved in 1977. The dissolution was largely due to the political differences between Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya at the time. The EAC has its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania and its members are Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi. Conspicuously, DR Congo is not a member of the EAC. Rather, it is a member of the South African Development Community (SADC).

It must be said that both Uganda and DR Congo are members of the Community of East and Southern African States (COMESA) which was formed in 1994. Notwithstanding, there is also the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) which was founded in 1976 and DRC is a member. It is again significant to note that Uganda is not a member of this REC.
Positively, these RECs practically play a role in promoting peace and security in the GLR. For example, SADC has a Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, which basically seeks to ensure “close cooperation on matters of politics, defense and security shall at all times promote the peaceful settlement of disputes negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration”. EAC similarly has two major Instruments for Regional Peace and Security; Protocol on Peace and Security and the EAC Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) Mechanism. The CEPGL also adopted a protocol on peace and security in 2011. Despite the good intentions of such moves by the RECS in the GLR, the difficulty however is the fact that their memberships vary.

2.4 Migration in the Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes area, together with the whole of Central Africa and East Africa is an area that has seen a lot of migration. A study by the International Migration Organization cites discrimination, violence, money and the promise of opportunity especially in South Africa as the push factors fuelling migration in the entire region. For the countries at the center of this study— Rwanda, DR Congo, Burundi and Uganda much of the migration has been as a result of armed conflict. This is different for the migrants from other areas like Somalia, who migrate mainly due to the fear of being recruited by terrorist groups or the havoc that springs up due to their government’s inability or unwillingness to keep basic law and order.

Armed conflict in the GLR has led to a lot of forced migration issues in the region. Forced migration is defined as the movement of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), as well as people displaced by natural disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development projects. As indicated above, this section will deal with migration relative to armed conflict in the Great Lakes Region.

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To begin with, instability in Rwanda has particularly had major implications for migration in the Great Lakes Region. To better have a deeper understanding of the matter, it is important to elaborate the cases of instability in Rwanda in past years and the subsequent refugee crisis it brought about. Conflict in Rwanda has been mainly due to how ethnic identities have been activated over the years and used as a manipulative tool by various leaders in that country (colonial masters—Belgium and ethnic leaders fighting for power). In 1959, the colonial government made an abrupt shift from support to the Tutsi minority to support for a Hutu majority-led independent Rwandan state. The rioting that ensued led to the overthrow of the Tutsi monarch. In 1961, a Belgium-backed coup led to the displacement of several Tutsis who were entrenched in political positions.

A full blown conflict broke out this time which resulted in the first large scale displacement of about 120,000 Tutsis into neighboring countries. Although the refugees were expected to return to Rwanda in July 1962 when the nation had independence, it was after thirty years that a return for most of them could happen. The returnees of the first displacement returned at a time when the country was on the brink of the genocide in 1994. The genocide saw yet another mass exodus of Tutsis out of Rwanda. By the end of the genocide, some 150,000 refugees had taken refuge in neighboring countries; in Burundi there were about 40,000 Rwandan refugees, about 60,000 in Kivu in eastern DRC, 35,000 in Uganda and another 15,000 in Tanzania.

The Rwandan refugees scattered in the entire region had quite a significant impact on the political dynamics of the region. In Burundi, the refugees, mainly Tutsi, created a sense that the then Tutsi minority government in Burundi needed to get a firm grip of Burundi. With a firm hold of the Burundian army, the Rwandan Tutsi refugees seeking a return to Rwanda made
military incursions in Rwandan territory. This development hardened anti-Tutsi sentiment in Rwanda.65

This made the remaining Tutsis in Rwanda set targets of attacks leading to a next wave of migration of about 7,500 people to Uganda and another 10,000 to Burundi.66 Efforts by the Tutsis to take over the government of Rwanda succeeded in 1994 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were able to take down the Hutu government.67 This led to another wave of migration of Hutu people into Eastern Congo and the threat of these Hutu people returning to challenge the RPF.68

Moving on, in the case of Uganda, apart from the internal conflicts plaguing the country, it has been involved in a lot of the conflicts in neighboring countries.69 The political environment of this country has meandered through tumultuous path until the rise of Museveni in 1986. Although the regime of Museveni has been relatively stable, it is not without resistance within the borders of Uganda.70 The resistance the government has faced over the period from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has led to the displacement of about 1.8 million people at its peak.71 As of 2007, 916,000 people remained as IDPs in refugee camps especially in the Acholi region in northern Uganda.72

In DR Congo, constant armed conflicts have been devastating for migration and displacement of the local population.73 Some of such conflicts ongoing in DR Congo includes the conflict involving the Enyele rebels in the Equateur region of the country.74 The conflict has spanned over a decade and was mainly about fishing rights but has now assumed an ethnic dimension involving a tussle between opposing ethnic groups for economic and political power in the North West of DR Congo.75 Some 200,000 refugees have fled the area since 2009.76 The
presence of Hutu militias in Eastern Congo continues to pose a threat to the stability of the area. For example Rwandan Hutu forces clashed with Congolese government forces displacing further thousands of people in April 2010.

In Burundi, quite the opposite of the situation in Rwanda has been the case. Power was handed down from the colonial government to the minority Tutsis who strengthened their hold of power in order to persecute ethnic majority Hutus. After almost a decade of power struggles, Tutsi extremists ceased power in 1972 and organized a large scale massacre of Hutus. In all, 100,000 Hutus were killed and about 300,000 fled into Tanzania in 1972. Additionally, significant refugee outflows from Burundi were recorded in 1965, 1969, 1988 and 1991.

About 40,000 refugees accepted repatriation into Burundi following the country’s first attempt to demoratize. A larger number of about 240,000 decided to stay in Tanzania. By 1999 470,000 refugees were in Tanzania constituting about 7% of the Burundi’s national population. In 2015, an attempted coup by the military in Burundi has led to another outflow of about 100,000 refugees out of Burundi into neighboring countries. The movement of refugees and the displacement of people within the region has a net effect on the socio-economic development and environmental sustainability. Refugee movements have resulted in increased populations in some places like Eastern Congo. This development has an attendant pressure on the need and use of natural resources, the pressure then on the physical environment creates further issues of environmental sustainability. Further, the lack of resources to meet the needs of the growing population leads to frustration a tendency which allows mostly young men to be enlisted in rebel movements or form ragtag armies thereby creating a vicious cycle of perpetual conflict and destruction.
2.5 Instability in the Great Lakes Region

2.5.1 Colonial Period

The conflicts that have engulfed the Great Lakes region have been reasonably influenced by the colonial policies in the history of the countries in the region. A classic polarizing colonial policy in the Great Lakes Region was the use of the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ by Belgium and Germany in the Great Lakes Region during the colonial period.

The Hamitic Hypothesis posits that “everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race”. By this, indigenous African negroids and bushmen were conceived as inferior to African nomads. Ironically, the theory even posits that such African nomads and pastoralists like the Berbers, Beja and Somali were historically “‘Europeans'- arriving wave after wave-better armed as well as quicker witted than the dark agricultural Negroes”. This theory was popularized by Seligman.

The theory was utilized by Belgium in Ruanda-Urundi (now Rwanda and Burundi). Belgium as the colonizer used the theory as a basis to divide and polarize ethnic groups in its colonies. This practice eventually sowed the seeds of conflict amongst the Hutus and Tutsis mainly. The policy created a mythologized history of the ethnic groups in the area in order to divide and rule in line with the colonialists desire to deal with only the Tutsi minority ethnic group in the area. By this, Belgium ranked the Tutsi as (or close to) the ‘Hamites’ and as such made them superior in terms of social status to the Hutus despite the fact that the Hutus were in the majority numbers-wise.

According to Philip Gourevitch, Belgium pursued such discrimination and divisiveness as “the cornerstone of their colonial policy” in the 1920s. In the words of Mahmood Mamdani, the policy went as far as ensuring that the Hutus largely at a point “were not ruled by their own
chiefs but by Tutsi chiefs”. This policy led to a situation where the Hutus began to see the Tutsis as outsiders or strangers to their land. The policy led to several decades of political, social and economic exclusion of the Hutu and Twa ethnic groups who were considered the least in the social hierarchy.

The policy and its consequent polarization has been often cited as one of the main causes of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 as its largely seen as the main source of ethnicity-based tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis both in Rwanda and in Burundi. This context helps to bring better clarity to why Hutus would several years after independence inflict genocide on Tutsis and also why there will be constant power struggles in a transnational manner between Hutus and Tutsis (and even other ethnic groups) in the Great Lakes Region.

In the case of DR Congo, resource exploitation was backed by a colonial policy of brutal abuse of labour and exclusion of the indigenous people to the extent that they felt their existence was threatened. This caused a violent relationship between the indigenous people and the colonial government. Moreover, the Congolese population is said to have diminished by two thirds following repression and arbitrary killings on the part of the colonial government. Indeed, the brutal treatment of Congo under the Belgians is said to have been worse than in any other colony in Africa.

Further, the labourers that were used in the exploitation of the mineral resources were not incorporated in the industry leaving them as errant labour. From this arose a group called the evolues—a small group of people who were educated and who had a strong base among the labourers within the domestic population. Consequently, this group and its support base
formed the core of resistance against the colonial government in the quest to decolonize the country.\textsuperscript{102}

Also, the drawing of unnatural borders in the colonial era has contributed to the instability in the region. Although there were borders in the pre-colonial periods in African societies, the state borders as drawn by the colonial masters in Africa are at best alien.\textsuperscript{103} The borders at the time signified places where two distinct social environments met and demarcated kingdom frontiers.\textsuperscript{104} The colonial borders therefore were an interruption of this pre-colonial order, and the consequences thereof, is how the various ethnic groups have failed to peacefully coexist in Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda.\textsuperscript{105}

This is because in practical terms, the Great Lakes Region like the case of many other African sub-regions, have states that have people homogenous people living on either side of the border. In other words, related people by ethnicity have become unrelated by nationality. This has often incensed cross-border ethnic allegiances and intra-state ethnic collisions that have threatened stability in the Great lakes Region.

\subsection*{2.5.2 The Post-Independence and Cold War Era}

The fact that DR Congo, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda immediately plunged into political conflict after independence is illustrative of the deficiency in the management of the transition from colonial rule to self-rule in the Great Lakes Region. In Rwanda, for example, there was rioting in 1959 which ended with the murder of King Mutara III in 1959.\textsuperscript{106} Also, there was a subsequent social revolution in December 1963 to January 1964 which led to mass killings of Tutsi politicians and civil servants thereby, laying the foundation for the genocide in 1994.\textsuperscript{107}
In Uganda, ethnicity and personal ambition of the leaders also led to a long period of instability a few years after independence in 1965 well into the next two decades ending around 1986.108 In the span of two decades Uganda had seen recurrent political adventurism that led to prolonged civil war.

Some external actions of the countries in the region had profoundly shaped the regional stability of the region. An example of such was Uganda’s decision to be militarily active in Eastern DR Congo.109 Uganda and Rwanda fought on the side of Laurent Kabila to oust the Mobutu regime in the first Congo war.110 Soon after Laurent Kabila had assumed power, he turned against his allies who had helped him capture power. This led to the second Congo war and this time Kabila was fighting against Rwanda and Uganda-backed forces such as the ‘Rassemblement Conglais pour la Democraties’ (RCD) in DR Congo.111

Another event that had a profound impact on the stability of the Great Lakes region was the Cold War which led to the internationalization of the conflict in the region.112 In the DR Congo for example, an admixture of foreign armies, mercenaries and warlords created a long period of chaos that has been, for the most part, intractable as it undermined international mechanisms for conflict resolution.113 Western support for the Mobutu regime gave legitimacy to a regime that lacked it for the most part.114

This fits into the Cold War dichotomy at the time. The assassinated first Prime Minister of DR Congo, Patrice Lumumba was noted for his pro-communist ideology together with his follower Laurent Kabila.115 This ideological disposition pitched them against western interest and thus Mobutu was maintained in power even though his reign was brutal and did not bring development to the country.
2.5.3 Post-Cold War era

At the end of the Cold War, regimes such as Mobutu’s failed but however, it still continued to enjoy the support of the American government and the West, and therefore became wanting in efforts to maintain themselves. As a result, Mobutu’s regime collapsed in 1997. The shift from support for the Mobutu regime was described by the American government as a way of promoting a new face of leadership in Africa at the time which they found new allies in Rwanda’s Kagame and Uganda’s Museveni. In the post-Cold War period, the Great Lakes region continues to be plunged in armed conflicts.

The Rwandan Genocide in 1994 is such an example. Two other significant examples of such conflicts were the first Congo war and the second Congo war. The first Congo War from October 1996 to May 1997 was virtually an offshoot of the Rwandan Genocide. After the Rwandan Genocide, about two million Rwandans, mostly Hutus moved across Rwanda’s western border into DR Congo as refugees. This was at a time that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which was Tutsi-led had overthrown the Rwandan Hutu government.

The refugee camps in Eastern Congo were utilized by the exiled members of the Interhamwe and Army for the Liberation of Rwanda as their bases from where they persistently attacked the local population. The first Congo War was incited by efforts by Tutsi militias led by Laurent Kabila in DRC to expel the Rwanda Hutu militias from DR Congo. Kabila’s effort got the military backing of the governments in Rwanda and Uganda and later they joined hands to overthrow Mobutu as the DRC’s head of state.

The second Congo war is described as Africa’s deadliest war in modern history. It involved 9 African states and 20 separate armed groups and thus christened Africa’s world war. The
conflict was instigated by Kabila’s decision to turn on his allies, Uganda and Rwanda and allow Hutu militias to regroup in eastern DRC. This was met by an invasion of DRC by Uganda and Rwanda. Later DRC also gained military support from the likes of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

At the end of the war, 5.4 million people had lost their lives through disease and starvation making the war the most deadly since World War II. It also left millions as displaced people and refugees seeking asylum in neighboring countries. Recently the Human Security Report Project has challenged the 5.4 million figure and thus hold that the figure should be revised to 860,000 people. This region-wide armed conflict was managed through a number of agreements involving the various warring factions. These included the Lusaka Agreement, the Sun City Agreement, the Pretoria Accord and the Luanda Agreement, among others.

The Lusaka Agreement was signed in July 1999 by all parties in the protracted armed conflict in eastern DRC. This is an agreement resting on six elements. First, it agrees on the sovereignty of the DR Congo in its present frontiers and that of its neighbours. Second, an all-inclusive process will be taken by DR Congo in order to establish a new political order. Thirdly, the parties agree to collaborate in addressing the security challenges in each state. Fourthly, the agreement specially calls for the disarmament of militia groups in the DRC. It further calls for the disarmament of foreign forces in the DRC. Lastly, it calls on the UN chapter VII to see to the implementation of this.

The Sun City Agreement was formalized on 19th April, 2002. It was a framework to provide DR Congo with a multiparty government and democratic elections after years of protracted armed conflict. The agreement even though it was breached subsequently, at least was
successful in reducing the fighting. Inadvertently, its strength was weakened by the fact that it had no recommendations relative to the unification of the army.

The Pretoria Accord was signed on 30th July, 2002 after talks in Pretoria, South Africa. The aim of this Accord was to withdraw about 20,000 Rwandan soldiers in DR Congo. The other aim was to round up ex-Rwandan soldiers and to dismantle the Hutu militia known as Interahamwe which took part in the Rwandan genocide and continues to pose a threat in eastern Congo.

The Luanda Agreement was signed between Uganda and DR Congo on 6th September, 2002 and facilitated by the government of Angola. The agreement led to Uganda accepting to withdraw its troops from Gbadolite, Beni and their vicinities in DR Congo and to improve the overall bilateral relations between the two countries.

2.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, the boundary conflicts in Africa mainly are driven by the inherent resources found in the area. This chapter has presented an overview of the Natural Resources boundary conflicts in Africa with examples of some of the boundary conflict and then link it with the Great Lakes Region. Afterwards, a brief political economy profiling of DR Congo, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda was presented. Afterwards, the nature of migration in the region was discussed followed by a tracking of instability in the region from the colonial era to the post-Cold War era. The chapter has shown more concretely the conflict proneness and volatility of the GLR. The study in the next chapter will investigate what the discovery of oil in Lake Albert can mean for an already conflict-prone region like the GLR in terms of peace and security.
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CHAPTER THREE

CONFLICT BETWEEN UGANDA AND DR. CONGO ON THE OIL EXPLOITATION IN LAKE ALBERT

3.0 Introduction

The endowment of a country’s resources is meant for enriching its economy and those of other neighbouring states as well as improving upon the growth and development of the citizenry. This is, however, not the case in the Great Lakes Region as resources located in this area has always led to numerous cases of violence and misunderstanding among countries. This chapter seeks to analyse oil exploitation within the Lake Albert Region, with special focus on the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. It also seeks to discuss roles of other groups with connections to the region, which have an impact on oil exploration and drilling, and how the relations between these actors engender conflict or the likelihood of conflict. These other groups include the oil multinational companies with concessions in the region, the indigenous local communities living around the lake both in the DR Congo and Uganda, Rebel groups and local militias, private military companies and international bodies. The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the role the resource rich region of Lake Albert plays in the emergence of conflict in the region and also to understand how the actions and inactions of interested groups with regard to the region engender conflict or aid in its resolution. It finally analyses the future prospects for peace in the region and the way forward in maintaining stability in the region.

3.1 Lake Albert

The lake was named by British explorers after Prince Albert, a consort of Queen Victoria. It was used by the colonialists to operate shipping and open new routes to places of interest such as Egypt, East Africa and Southern Africa. Major oil findings were made in the lake in 2006
and 2007. The find is worth billions of United States dollars and has been described as the largest on shore oil discovery in sub Saharan Africa for more than 20 years.

Most of Africa’s boundaries, which were determined during the 1884/1885 partition of Africa by European colonial powers have remained constant following independence from colonial authority but have often been a bone of contention due to the lack of exactness and especially in recent times, a boom in oil discoveries across the continent. The lack of exact delimitation of boundaries have led to rising tensions as countries compete to lay claims to potential oil discoveries. In recent times, the likes of Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria, Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula, Ghana and La Cote D’Ivoire, and several others have all been involved in boundary disputes that center on oil finds in one or all countries involved in the dispute.

Lake Albert is part of a chain of lakes on the Albertine rift. It is about 160 km long and 30 km wide with a maximum depth of 51 m (168 ft.) and a surface elevation of 619 m (2,030 ft.) above sea level. Reports from current and former concessionaires suggest that there are over 2.5 billion barrels of oil in place underneath Lake Albert, located in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with a potential for double that amount which is yet to be confirmed. Notwithstanding these commercial hydrocarbons discoveries, there have been tendencies for critical border disputes that have not only resulted into conflicts and deaths, but also slowed down progress in exploitation of oil and gas resources.

3.2 Background to Conflict in Lake Albert Region

The two Congo Wars are widely considered the most deadly wars since the Second World War, totalling nearly four million deaths when the conflicts began in 1996. The root causes of the
armed conflict in Ituri are ‘the result of the exploitation, by local and regional actors, of a deeply rooted local conflict over access to land, economic opportunities and political power’. The control of over minerals plays a major role in these violent struggles for power and influence.

The Lake Albert region besides being one of the largest oil discoveries in Africa is also located in the notorious trouble spot that is the Great Lakes Region. Due to longstanding ethnic conflicts and the two Congo Wars (1996–97 and 1998–2003), both lakeshores are prone to insecurities from nearby conflicts, rebel insurgency, refugees and ethnic clashes. The (disputed) border between both countries lies within the lake itself. According to Benjamin Auge’, the borders were determined in 1915 by the British and Belgian colonialists who fixed it at the Semliki River, the lake’s southern source. He explains that the problem with this has been that erosion and other activities over the years have seen the border shift several times with the Semliki River now wholly within Congolese territory after moving 3.5km to the east since the boundary was marked in 1915. This means that currently there is no clear marker with which to determine the boundary accurately and the DR Congo’s insistence on sticking to the Semliki River is one major pillar of the current conflict.

In addition to this, the emergence of an island within the Lake and the opposing claims made by both countries due to its strategic importance to exploiting the oil resources in the lake and entrenching territorial claims to the Lake is another major pillar of the conflict. The Island known as Rukwanzi emerged following the 1915 delimitation and is described by Auge as the center of the boundary conflict between the two states in the Lake Albert region. He points out that both sides claim the island and from time to time their armies engage each other in skirmishes over it.
Underlying all of this, of course, is the bad blood that exist between the DR Congo and Uganda stretching from the two Congo Wars. In the second Congo War (1998-2003), Uganda invaded and occupied the region of Ituri which is essentially Congo’s side of Lake Albert. Uganda is known to have looted several of Congo’s resources during this period and has consistently been accused by Congo of actively promoting instability in the region even after its withdrawal in 2003. The residues of a war in the DR Congo includes dissident groups that are mostly still active, a region under extremely minimal government control, a population dependent on the Lake for its fortunes that is mistrustful of its own government and lives under UN protection. Multinational companies, under very little government supervision, seeking to exploit the Lakes oil resources and the spectral presence of the Ugandan government, altogether paints a picture of a volatile situation that could with a spark escalate to unmanageable levels. The lingering mistrust and enmity between the DRC and Uganda from the wars, merged with the discovery of billions of barrels of oil in Lake Albert and its attendant boundary disputes represent the murky circumstances under which exploration of oil is being undertaken in the region. All other possible causes of conflict around the oil exploration in Lake Albert are based in these circumstances, making them the starting point for discussion of the possibility of escalation and instability in the region.

3.3 Oil Exploration in Lake Albert-DRC’s Perspective

The DRC’s history with oil exploitation goes beyond just Lake Albert with significant oil production being undertaken in its province of Bas-Congo by French company Perenco, which produces over 30000 barrels of oil per day. International organisation, Platform, alleges that the operations in Bas-Congo are the blueprint for the DRC’s handling of oil related dealings which are shrouded in secrecy, plagued by massive environmental complications, corruption and lack of accountability and “heavy handed responses to legitimate community protests”.

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They do point out though that the Lake Albert region holds more than the five times the potential that the Bas-Congo has in terms of oil and is located in arguably the poorest and most unstable region of the DRC.¹¹

Comparatively then, the Lake Albert Region features, rather strongly, as a key interest of the DRC considering the high financial stakes at play here. Again the location of this discovery in a highly unstable zone crawling with rebel groups and a mistrusted neighbour that shares an interest in the exploitation of the resource, makes the region a key concern. As pointed out by Stratfor, the control and exploitation of resources has been at the root of every major conflict in the DR Congo with control of territory and power being strongly linked to the control and exploitation of key natural resources.¹² In view of this, the DRC government would be concerned about exercising maximum control over the exploration and drilling of oil on its side of the Lake. These concerns are already manifest in the murky nature of the Production Sharing Contracts that the government has agreed with a number of companies in major exploratory blocks on its side of the Lake.

### 3.3.1 Relations with Oil Exploratory and Production by Multi-National Companies

On June 2, 2002, Heritage Oil Company explored about 30,000 km² worth of oil around the lake. This agreement led Heritage and Tullow Oil Companies to sign a Production-Sharing Contract (PSC) with the previous administration, in July 2006, for Blocks 1 and 2. The emergence of Joseph Kabila as President with his newly appointed administration brought this process to a halt. The situation has not progressed any further due to the fact the tense relations between Vice President of African Business for Tullow, Tim O’Hanlon, and the former Congolese Minister of Hydrocarbons, Lambert Mende Omalanga, who sought to abrogate the agreements previously made. ¹³ Mende sought to cancel the Tullow/Heritage agreement,
accusing Heritage of being behind the resurgence in ethnic disturbances since 2003 in Ituri.\textsuperscript{14} He further argued that the contract was not signed at the time by a substantive Minister of the previous administration, consequently, rendering it invalid as the deputy Minister lacked the authorisation to agree such a deal. Moreover, he criticized both companies for not paying the signature bonus specified by the DRC. Tullow/Heritage paid only $250,000 per block, whereas Mende said that Congolese oil legislation imposes the amount of $500,000 per block.\textsuperscript{15}

Aside this, the killing of Heritage Oil Engineer, Carl Nefdt by FARDC (Congolese Forces) during an exploratory expedition on the Lake, is another cause of the friction between the DRC government and the Tullow/Heritage consortium. The incident involved an accusation of that Nefdt had breached the Congolese side of Lake Albert while engaging in exploratory activity for Uganda.\textsuperscript{16} It is believed this might be based in the Congolese allegation that Uganda has been drilling oil from the Congolese side with the connivance of Tullow and Heritage, with Heritage being accused further of deliberately fomenting conflict in the Ituri region by sponsoring rebel groups.\textsuperscript{17} In 2008, the Congolese government also accused Tullow and Heritage of acting in collusion with the Ugandan Army to encroach on its side of the Lake causing the death of 8 Congolese nationals. This state of affairs that has the potential to further compound issues leading to violence in the region especially when Heritage Oil is known for having a past history of sponsoring armed conflict in order to acquire unfettered access to oil producing areas.\textsuperscript{18}

Following from this, the year 2008 saw the DRC sign an agreement with the Divine Inspiration Consortium composed of the South African Company- South Africa Congo Oil (SAC Oil) and Petro SA (51%), the Franco- Spanish trading company H-Oil (37%), Sud Oil (2%), Congo Oil and Gas (3%) and COHYDRO (7%) for the exploration of Block 1, leading to two consortiums
in theory holding rights to the same exploration site. The agreement with Divine Inspiration was aimed at increasing the constraints under which the likes of Tullow and Heritage Oil were operating in view of Congolese perceptions of them as Ugandan companies. The likes of Sud Oil and Congo Oil and Gas are of unclear provenance and suspected of being shell companies owned by key power brokers in the government considering they are not required to front any contributions towards investment in exploration but are to share in future profits. Strafor reports that the likes of French Oil giant Total and a Congo based exploration company, Oil of DR Congo, owned by an associate of President Kabila known as Dan Gertler are the two main operators in its other blocks.

There are other major concerns regarding the need for these firms operating in what is a highly volatile environment to provide security for their operations through the use of Private Military Companies and in some cases troops from neighbouring countries. These private militia have been known in the past to get embroiled in disputes with the local community, rebel groups and government forces within the area. Their presence is thus perilous to the maintenance of peace and security in the region despite the crucial service they provide to the companies because of the relative lack of regulatory control of their activities and the area’s propensity for armed confrontations.

3.3.2 The Re-emergence of Militant Groups and their Activities

With respects to the tension in that area, there are doubts that the local dynamic will be conducive for production to begin. The reason being that, the three blocks are located in the same general area, where the Allied Democratic Forces, the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri and the Nationalist and Integrationist Front — all militant groups — have historically been
active. These groups are not as active as they once were, but have slowly begun to re-emerge given the recent developments with regard to oil resources in the area.\textsuperscript{22}

Given the unstable nature of the area, it is likely that with an active exploration of Oil and Gas, there is a high likelihood that this might lead to a ramping up of militant activity in the area. These fears and anxieties were echoed by the Minister Counsellor of the DR Congo embassy in Ghana suggesting that, “the presence of armed groups around the site of production is a fertile ground for conflict.”\textsuperscript{23} The possibility of these militant groups re-emerging again is high. This is because oil production is considered to be among the key world’s market products which determines economic development of a country. Again, taking the previously mentioned historical involvement of the DRC’s neighbours in conflicts surrounding resources, it is plausible that the re-emergence of these militant groups are linked to the machinations of its neighbours that might benefit from such instability.

For instance, in 2014, the Stratfor global intelligence report reveals that there were dozens of confrontations between remnants of the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri on one hand and MONUSCO, the U.N. peacekeeping force, and the Congolese army on the other. The Allied Democratic Forces, an exiled Ugandan Islamist militant group, has intensified its actions in the Rwenzori Mountains along the southern border of Total’s oil exploration block.\textsuperscript{24}

Frequent raids and attacks in key trading towns and villages have also attracted the attention of the United Nations’ Force Intervention Brigade, which conducted several operations against the Allied Democratic Forces in 2014. This environment complicates the security picture in the country. MONUSCO’s capabilities are already stretched thin, and although the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) provides some significant offensive capabilities, it does so in only
a limited area. A unit of MONUSCO, the FIB, has a special mandate to conduct offensive operations against certain groups, unlike MONUSCO). The force can move around but it cannot be everywhere at once.  

The relations between these militant groups and the Multinationals is another cause for concern. Heritage Oil confessed it signed several MOU’s with various rebel groups on the Congolese side of the Lake and the invading Ugandan Army in order to engage in exploratory activities in the area. This provides an example of the seeming willingness of these companies to cooperate with rebel groups insofar as it serves their interests. The possible handouts of financial largesse that would secure such cooperation go towards strengthening these rebel groups to enable them engage the state in costly wars that inevitably escalate into regional wars. Nearby conflicts such as the one between the M23 rebel group allegedly backed by Rwanda and Uganda in the Lake Kivu region to block Congolese interests in the harvesting of Methane gas from that Lake in favour of Rwandan interests, draw uncomfortable parallels with the developing situation in Lake Albert. Recent reports suggest the likelihood of this conflict spreading to the nearby Lake Albert region and effectively scuttling the DRC’s oil exploration efforts in the region. These suspicions of alleged support for rebel groups by its neighbours to cheat the DRC out of its natural resources build up the atmosphere of mistrust and might instigate actions that might fuel a resumption of the major wars that plagued the Great Lakes region.

3.3.3 The Local Congolese Community in Ituri

The dependence of the local community with regards to its economic dependence on Lake Albert cannot be understated. Economic activities ranging from logging and harvesting of timber, farming, raising livestock particularly cattle, and perhaps most importantly fishing are
all to varying degrees dependent on the Lake for their execution. Oil exploration and exploitation have been known to create environmental challenges for locals living in the area such as the loss of farmlands, destruction of marine life, and infiltration by foreign ethnic groups attracted by the economic opportunities presented by the resource. These conditions are already at play in Ituri with the local communities on both sides of the Lake often prevented from fishing in the Lake without any compensation because of alleged interference with seismic tests being conducted by the MNCs. Lay and Minio-Poluello contend that that oil exploration in the region pose direct threats to economic survival and food security in the region. They posit that, current contractual agreements that cover exploratory activity in the region do not provide any mechanisms to account for either economic deprivation caused by exploration or environmental damage for that matter. They further add that no enforceable rules or penalty regimes exist for environmental safety breaches that impact negatively on land and water resources with environmental management plans left entirely to the discretion of these oil MNCs with no government legislation providing oversight. Already large amounts of toxic waste and mud produced as a result of exploratory activity are not being properly disposed of and the lack of any mechanisms to check oil spillages puts the environment at great risk. The complete lack of protection and deprivation caused by oil exploration in the region is likely to increase hostility towards the oil MNCs in the region and the government. The local community have a deep mistrust for the government due to historical abuses perpetuated by Congolese armed forces in the region in past times. The state’s failure to protect their sources of livelihood and environment from being damaged could provide a new cause for indigenes and militant rebel groups to unite behind and could lead to major disturbances in the region that are unlikely to augur well for its security.
Besides the threats to livelihood and the environment, there are also issues with regard to the distribution of profits from the oil exploration and future drilling in the area. Current arrangements require Tullow and Heritage to spend $125,000 and $200,000 every year during the period of exploration and production respectively on the community for health, education and cultural projects. These projects are however not handled by the local administrators in Ituri but both funds and projects are placed in the hands of the Ministry of Energy in Kinshasa. Internships and scholarships for training demanded from the MNCs also do not include the local community but are meant exclusively for senior civil servants from the capital.

The experience of Nigeria’s Niger Delta region where indigenes were seemingly left out of profits from Oil activities that had taken their sources of livelihood from them and the consequences arising from the failure to take their grievances into account, are a good example of what could possibly develop in Ituri. The rise of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the level of unrest they sparked in what was a largely conflict free area previously is likely to be intensified several times over by a similar group(s) rising in an Ituri region already crawling with armed groups and having an unstable security situation.

While historically close ethnic links with their neighbours on the Ugandan side and several trade linkages have prevented violent exchanges, there is an increasing cross border community rivalry emerging over dwindling fish stock in the Lake. The community is also unlikely to benefit from jobs from the emerging oil industry as most of the key infrastructure such as pipelines and refineries are being sited on the relatively peaceful Ugandan side of the lake. These are all likely to lead to hostility within the local community as time goes on considering the Congolese government’s inability to effectively exercise state control of the region.
3.3.4 The DR Congo and Uganda

Most of the main issues in contention with regard to border delimitation and historical differences have been covered in earlier sections. It is however important to touch on how the DRC’s actions with regard to its exploration of Lake Albert worsen these relations and raise the possibility of escalations. It must be pointed out that since the end of the second Congo War, the two countries have not engaged in any major physical confrontations and have largely been openly civil with each other in recent times. In spite of this, a number of touchy issues clearly linger including Uganda’s outstanding reparation debts of $10 billion owed to the DRC for its invasion of its territory during the second Congo War, Congolese perceptions that Uganda sponsors and harbours militia and rebel groups in order to destabilise its Ituri region and prevent it from exploiting oil resources in Lake Albert, and the belief that with the connivance of Tullow and Heritage Oil, Uganda is drilling(stealing) oil that rightfully belongs to the DRC. 34

The outstanding border dispute regarding boundaries in the Lake and the status of Rukwanzi Island are perhaps the major issues, though some steps have been taken toward their resolution (which are covered in a section below). The DRC’s neighbours have a history of seeking to exploit resources in Congo by consistently sponsoring militias and even on occasion using their own armies to maintain a state of anarchy that serve these aims. These suspicions and mistrust seems to have spurred several minor related issues such as the bad relations between the DRC government and both Tullow and Heritage Oil, the constant skirmishes and attacks on the Lake even in cases when the circumstances are unclear like in the Carl Nefdt murder. 35 Should negotiations over the main boundary issues fail to yield a positive result for both sides, it is likely to result in a massive confrontation that could plunge the entire Great Lakes region into war again.
Congo’s development of its oil resources in the Lake Albert region is filled with danger and uncertainty despite the vast economic potential it holds for the country. Its relations with the oil Multinational Companies are ambivalent, and the presence of and re-emergence of militant groups might lead to the resurgence of pre-existing conflicts in the area. The possible hostility that might arise between the MNCs, government and local communities in the area due to the environmental effects of oil exploitation might also result in ethnic based conflict and hostility.\textsuperscript{36}

### 3.4 Oil Exploration in Lake Albert-Uganda’s Perspective
#### 3.4.1 Oil exploration in Uganda and Relations with MNCs

In Uganda, the first explorations of oil in the region were conducted by the major Anglo-Dutch Company Shell in 1938. Following from this, Uganda split the zone into several blocks, which were the subject of several aeromagnetic studies during the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{37} On January 15, 1997, the Canadian Company; Heritage Oil signed its first contract with the Ugandan government to explore Block 3A. In October 2001, the Australian Company; Hardman Resources (purchased by the British Company; Tullow Oil in 2006) signed a contract with Uganda for Block 2.

Oil exploration on the Ugandan side of Lake Albert begun as far back as 1980s with Anglo-Dutch Oil firm Shell. Following key aeromagnetic studies in the area, a number of exploratory blocks were marked out and given out initially to the likes of Heritage Oil and Tullow. Due to the low prices of oil on the world market at the time ($12), developments with regard to the exploratory fields were slow and were renegotiated several times by the Ugandan government.\textsuperscript{38}
A massive resurgence in the world prices of oil and a boom in oil shares around 2003 has since spurred significant developments in this area leading to active exploratory activities being carried out in 5 of the 9 Blocks currently open in Uganda. Currently, a coalition of Tullow, French Oil giant Total and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation hold the rights to three of the nine blocks currently owned by Uganda on its side of the lake specifically in Blocks 1, 2 and 3A. A British firm, Neptune (now owned by Tower resources since 2008) acquired exploratory rights to Block 5 located in the northern part of Lake Albert in 2005 while Dominion holds the rights to Block 4B signed in 2007 on the southern reaches of the lake. These are shown in the Map 1 below:

![Map 1, distribution of oil blocks on Lake Albert](http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh)

A cursory glance at the map above shows Uganda’s portion of the lake is attracting keen investor interest and development compared to the Congolese side which is yet to sink any exploratory wells as opposed to over 20 on the Ugandan side. Uganda’s leaders have placed the exploitation of petroleum from Albert at the top of their priorities since Yoweri Museveni
became its president in 1986. Concerned about their continued dependence on refined petroleum products from Kenya’s Mombasa refinery, they have been keen to wean themselves of its ill-effects by developing their own oil resources. For instance, during the disturbances following Kenya’s presidential elections in 2008, Uganda found its imports of refined oil products from Kenya restricted leading to extreme economic difficulties and the resurgence of an active black market in petroleum products.  

The oil exploration in Lake Albert is as a result extremely crucial to Uganda which currently boasts no other sources of oil beyond this region. As a result the Ugandan Presidential Defence Forces (UPDF) and in particular a battalion of the elite Presidential Guard Brigade have been deployed to provide security for the oil companies. This of course raises questions regarding the militarisation of the zone and if Uganda would not in similar fashion to its invasion of the DRC in the second Congo War repeat such an action if it feels events on the Congolese side pose security threats to oil exploration activities on its side of the lake. The DRC as previously stated has already had cause to complain about alleged breaches of its side of the lake by Ugandan security forces resulting in Congolese casualties. Their presence creates a security dilemma of sorts considering events in the past which could motivate the DRC to increase its military presence on its side of the Lake in fear of Uganda using its military to steal its oil.

Considering that the boundaries of the lake and its demarcations are not settled, the possibilities for misunderstanding that could lead to armed conflict are numerous and extremely likely. Uganda however claims these measures are ostensibly meant to protect against possible security threats posed by militias within Congo and the likes of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony. Uganda’s relations with the MNCs on its side of the Lake are largely without incident and better organised. Beyond the threat of contagion from the instability on
the Congolese side of the lake, Uganda’s oil exploration and drilling are without security encumbrances and this is highlighted by the willingness of investors to build major infrastructure such as a $3 billion refinery and a network of pipelines about 1300km long to Mombasa port which will cost just as much as the refinery.

### 3.4.2 The Local Community

Relations between the local communities on the Ugandan side of the lake, the Ugandan government and the Oil exploration companies are relatively peaceful and without incident. Officials of the Bunyoro Kingdom, the largest local community on the Ugandan side of the lake, have been known to often attempt to pressurise the government through the media into factoring it into the distribution of expected oil revenues. Their relative lack of influence compared to the larger Kingdom of Buganda, for instance, has led to such demands often being ignored despite the good relations they have with representatives of Tullow Oil.

Despite these good relations, similar concerns to those of the Ituri living on the Congo side of the lake are equally at play on the Ugandan side. Despite possessing a relatively better economy and living conditions compared to their compatriots on the other side of the lake, Westerkamp and Houdret report that the activities connected to oil exploration has already resulted in the loss of fertile farmland, which has forced Ugandan farmers to cross to the DRC side in order to find fertile land to farm. Competition of this sort is likely to eventually negatively impact the otherwise peaceful co-existence between local communities on both sides. According to Westerkamp and Houdret, ethnic tensions are also heating up due to large scale migration from other parts of Uganda to the Lake Albert region to take advantage of an expected boom in jobs in the area. They contend that competition over lands which are allegedly being bought up by foreigners in the hope that they could hold oil reserves and entitle them to future compensation
has led to the local community developing a deep suspicion of non-indigenes migrating to the region. Other issues they raise concern the lack of appropriate government legislation which leaves the MNCs to decide independently on the extent of corporate social responsibility they would engage in if any at all. In addition the Ugandan government has failed to establish any environmental legislative frameworks to oversee and minimize the impact of economic damage. For instance, the Murchison Falls National Park which attracts over 40000 tourists a year and the Kwaboka Wildlife Reserve have all been encroached on by the oil firms with drilling taking place in these protected places putting protected species at risk of extinction and destroying the benefits tourism brings to the locals in the area. The duo also touch on the issue of gas flaring and possible oil spillages within the area which has again been ignored by the Ugandan government and basically gives the oil firms carte blanche to engage in activities that cause environmental degradation, toxic rains, increased carbon emissions and have been identified as abuses of Human Rights.  

All these issues are each on their own likely to rapidly inflame tensions that are already quite high in the area and lead to violent protests and confrontations between local residents and with both the government and MNCs. The situation has not been helped by the governments increasing militarisation of the region replete with the establishment of a UPDF military base in the region. As discussed earlier, such actions do not augur well for the security of the region.

3.4.3 Activities of Militant Groups and Relations with the DRC

Uganda has in the past had to deal with Rebel groups such as the Joseph Kony led LRA and several others that have often posed significant threats to its peace and security around the Lake Albert Region. It has in the past not hesitated to pursue such groups into Congolese territory
though the motives for these encroachments could equally have been directed towards exploiting Congo’s resources. The Congolese seem to believe the latter position with several accusations directed at the Ugandan’s for their alleged support of rebel groups active within the DRC such as in the case of the M23 rebel group. The Minister Counsellor of the DR Congo in Ghana anchored this assertion by claiming that the declaration of Ugandan’s support for the rebel groups in DR Congo who were from Rwanda clearly indicates that they are against the peace in DR Congo.\(^{50}\)

While Uganda’s side of the border is largely secure from rebel activity, the mistrust and associative links continually drawn between it and the actions of rebel groups across the lake in the DRC is only likely to result in actions that would be detrimental to its more developed oil industry on Lake Albert. Any violent activity that takes place within the DRC around the Lake Albert region is likely to have a direct impact on Ugandan activities on the Lake leading to the involvement of the UPDF and a possible all-out war. The DRC’s continued mistrust of Uganda and its alleged links to rebel groups in the former’s territory is an undesirable situation and likely to prevent the needed cooperation necessary to peacefully exploit the resources of the Lake and also maintain a conducive atmosphere for oil related activities.

Uganda’s development of its oil resources in the Lake Albert region is largely peaceful and relatively better organised than in DR Congo. However, the tension and suspicion that exist between the two countries is likely to enlarge to engender conflicts within the Lake Albert region. There is therefore the need for cooperation between the two countries.
3.5 The Involvement of Other Agencies in the Conflict

This section touches lightly on the roles of other private parties to the conflict which have not been covered fully within the previous sections. Oil exploration in Lake Albert has both private and public parties’ which are actively involved for varied reasons deliberately or otherwise in the developments within the region. These actors are the Oil exploration and Production companies, armed groups and Rebels active in the area, and the local people living on both sides of the lake.

3.5.1 The Local Communities

The local people are the indigenous persons living in the areas where the resource are located. More often than not, the livelihoods of the local populations around Lake Albert are closely linked to the natural resources deposits and trade. The inhabitants rely on fishing, cattle breeding and agriculture. Trade in border towns such as Mahagi allow the locals to buy and sell goods such as timber, agriculture products and fish.\(^{51}\)

Additionally, Ugandans and Congolese cross borders in both directions for cattle breeding, logging or fishing to sustain their livelihoods.\(^{52}\) Lake Albert does not only provide income to the local population, it also contributes 15 percent to Uganda’s fishing activities.\(^{53}\) Again, it serves as a site for oil exploration, which implies that the living conditions of the local population are bound to be significantly transformed for better or worse.

Expectations of these communities of the oil find in Lake Albert are understandably high with most of them expecting a corresponding employment boom, increased incomes and major infrastructural development in their communities.\(^{54}\) However, when these expectations are not met, these local people are likely to agitate and increase tensions in the two countries. Oil
exploration could affect their transport system, cost of living, and also affect the very environment that has been their major source of livelihood in ages past. However with most of the contracts surrounding the exploitation of oil in Lake Albert shrouded in secrecy, the lack of accountability could lead to local unrest especially if they do not sense immediate positive changes to their conditions of living. As pointed out in previous sections, even ahead of full scale production, the current impact on local communities have been largely negative. The lack of oversight by both countries with regard to the practices of these MNCs is likely to become a bone of contention in the near future as they negatively affect the livelihood of locals. Already restrictions on fishing in the Lake are an issue and likely to get worse once onshore drilling operations take place on the Lake proper. While no violent incidents or major protests by local communities have been reported, it is likely to be a possibility in the near future if significant steps in the form of joint legislation by both countries to protect the interests of these communities. This is necessary in order to prevent what could be an even worse case of the Niger Delta syndrome in the region.

3.5.2 The Rebel Militias

The DRC government lacks total sovereignty/effective control over the Lake Albert area due to the presence of armed groups who are opposed to the Congolese government. This is revealed in an International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect report which indicates the Congolese government’s inability to control its territory which has allowed rebel armed like M23 forces to exploit its resources. This has largely fuelled the continuous conflict in Congo, especially in areas near Lake Albert.

While the exploitation of oil is not the main target of these rebel groups because of its clumsy nature which makes its transportation challenging, these groups still stand to benefit from
creating a state of instability in the region in order to exploit other minerals such as gold and diamonds which are also present in the area. The prospects of being able to obtain bribes and payments from MNCs in the region through kidnappings and disruption of operations cannot be ruled out either as a motivation. The government believe that it is the presence of the M23 rebels that has hindered its ability to effectively manage the Lake Albert region. Additionally, the Congolese government blamed Uganda for openly declaring their support for the M23 armed group that is constantly interrupting the peace in Eastern Congo where the Lake Albert Region is.

The risks posed by the involvement of armed groups stationed around oil sites to provide protection cannot be underestimated. According to Hall and Predergast, several pieces of evidence suggest that some of these armed groups are financed and supported by various governments in the Lake Albert region. For instance, in Eastern DR Congo it has been revealed that the M23 rebel group are supported by the governments of Rwanda and Uganda.

This is further supported by the U.N. Group of Experts (GoE) 2011 report, which reveals that the DR Congo is of the view that the governments of Rwanda and Uganda are providing military, economic and political support to the rebel group in the region. According to the reports, the M23 movement has now taken control of a large part of the DR Congo’s North Kivu Province especially in the north eastern part, hindering the oil exploration in that region and has begun to spread to the heavily militarized Lake Albert area.

The force and tensions raised by these groups reveal the inability of the government of DR Congo to bring an end the activities of these armed groups. DRC still believes that the situation can be dealt with by strengthening its military force in the east and building regional alliances
to counter the actions of Rwanda and Uganda. It envisages the possibility of oil production in Lake Albert and its environs, which is likely to remain muted and will not reach their fullest potential as the country continues to be challenged by its geographical constraints.\textsuperscript{61}

\subsection*{3.5.3 The Oil Exploration and Production Companies}

Multinational Corporations are organisations that invest in the exploration and production of oil and gas. These organisations are profit–motivated and they do all they can to make enough profit. Thus the lack of regulatory frameworks for the dangers their activities pose to the environment is a cause for concern and could lead to conflict with local residents. However, MNCs have largely been criticised for their major involvement in the tensions within the Lake Albert region. For instance, according to Benjamin Auge’, the main goal for both Tullow and Heritage Oil is to control the whole lake in order to access sufficient reserves for exploration.\textsuperscript{62} Furthermore, some MNCs are being blamed for lobbying leaders of countries so as to gain the necessary concession for operation. Tullow Oil Company has been urging Congolese ministers and deputies for approval of its two blocks. The company regularly invites influential Congolese figures (especially national and provincial deputies) to evaluate the progress of oil exploration in Uganda. On the other side, Tullow stresses that it has been actively investing in Uganda, having invested $250 million in 2008 alone.\textsuperscript{63} Uganda comes second only to Ghana in terms of the group’s exploration budget. Tullow has made assurances to the DRC to advance similar capital should its contract is approved. Meanwhile, Tullow endorses the view that only one company, or at least one joint venture, should be allowed to work on the lake in order to avoid conflicts.\textsuperscript{64}

The past records of some of these MNCs particularly with respect to their actions in conflict prone areas leave a lot to be desired. Heritage Oil owned by a former mercenary, Tony
Buckhingham, is known to have a reputation for being willing to work in unstable zones and has often been accused of deliberately fomenting instability in order to drive away other investors and grant it unfettered access to oil resources.\textsuperscript{65}

Deneault was of the view that, based on Angola’s experiences with Heritage Oil Company, during its civil war, conflicts were fuelled by the latter via its engagement of South African mercenaries to work for MPLA authorities in Angola against UNITA. Deneault further stresses that this heavy profile serves the owners of Heritage well in that it helps their company to easily win contracts in unstable zones.\textsuperscript{66}

Again, he believes that Heritage could have purposely created tension among the communities in Ituri so that DR Congo would be forced to hand the contract to the company which is willing to work under any circumstances, thereby, increasing their chances of oil exploration in the region.\textsuperscript{67} As pointed out in an earlier section, Heritage admitted colluding with invading Ugandan forces and Congolese rebel groups during the second Congo War in order to operate within Lake Albert. Moreover, Auge’ maintains that Tullow and Heritage Oil companies, having been the pioneers in the sector, heavily influenced the Ugandan government in defining its petroleum policies. These close relations have however been detrimental to their aims in the region as it has caused the Congolese government to view them with suspicion and caused the previously mentioned misunderstanding over agreement between the trio.\textsuperscript{68}

The MNCs play a crucial role in the developing conflict in the Lake Albert Region. The competing interests of these MNCs, their involvement in governmental disputes and use of armed military groups to safeguard their operations, the adverse effects of their activities on the livelihood of the local populace and the lack of obligatory frameworks for corporate social
responsibility are all sticking points that both contribute and are likely to exacerbate the conflicts within the region.

3.6 The Need for Cooperation Between the Two Countries

Full exploitation of the offshore oil will require cooperation between the DRC and Uganda in key areas (from the political, security and technical points of view), which when not done, could lead to conflicts. Nonetheless, with the level of suspicion and mistrust between the two governments, it is likely that tensions might arise especially when both countries start full exploration.

The very nature of the security situation in both countries especially on the side of the DRC can only be resolved through bilateral and to some extent multilateral action. The conflict is currently in stasis because most of the activity is largely exploratory but once actual production begins within the lake, the unresolved boundary and other simmering issues are likely to cause spark a massive conflict. Uganda is quite close to actual production but considering Congolese accusations that it is likely to ‘steal’ their oil, arriving at an amicable cooperative settlement quickly is crucial if its oil operations are to proceed peacefully.

With the successful drilling in Uganda, 85 percent of exploration wells have encountered hydrocarbons specifically in the Albertine Graben Basin. Infrastructural works in terms of the construction of pipelines within the area will eventually be built in Uganda to export some of this oil, and it is very likely that in the event where the oil and Gas are found in economical quantities in DR Congo, then that area would likely be tied into Uganda's pipeline infrastructure.
DR Congo will therefore have to cooperate with Uganda so as to benefit from the pipeline infrastructure. Again, the two countries need to cooperate with respects to upholding peace and security in the GLR. Security is indeed paramount for attracting investors in any business venture, largely because no investor would want to operate in conflict zones. In this regard, Uganda just as much as DRC would need to find an even platform where their differences can be sorted out, which would ultimately create a peaceful co-existence between both countries. Indeed, the absence of peace would lead to violence in both countries as well as neighbouring states such as Rwanda. Instilling peace and stability is therefore principal for the well-being of the citizenry of both countries as well as the entire region (GLR in this instance).\textsuperscript{71}

Finally, DRC and Uganda need to cooperate so as to control the activities of MNC’s in the Great Lakes Region. Most often than not, these MNCs undertake reckless activities which leads to conflict between the local populace and the government. In fact, their activities often impact negatively on the environment- issues of pollution of water bodies, release of harmful toxic waste and disruptions of key economic activities have often been the order of the day.

3.7 Management of Conflict

The Great Lakes region and in particular the DRC have been the site of major conflicts in the past that have required significant conflict management efforts to resolve. The most crucial of which was undertaken by then South African President Thabo Mbeki in 2002 in Sun city, South Africa, to bring an end to the Second Congo war in 2003. However agreements made under the settlement have largely been ignored as the presence of multiple rebel groups particularly in Ituri in the Lake Albert Region and the lingering enmity from the Wars continue to scuttle efforts towards full resolution of pre-existing conflicts.\textsuperscript{72}
Conflict management provides enabling environments for peace to prevail in conflicting areas like the Great Lakes Region. The various parties to the conflict as elaborated above need to be managed effectively to bring peace. If these disputes remain unresolved, the governments involved would have a difficult time attracting new investors to help exploit these resources. DR Congo, has been trying for a decade to entice international oil companies to develop its oil resources stranded in the Great Lakes region of Africa. This problem has lingered on because of the general perception that DR Congo is fairly unstable in the region.

The exploration of oil and gas around the border should provide an opportunity for bilateral negotiations that can promote cooperation and enable optimal exploitation of the natural resources in the Lake Albert. However it has rather introduced new conflicts and the possibility of sparking old grudges. The following sections explore the various efforts by both nations to resolve their differences, and the role of RECS and International bodies such as SADC and COMESA, the AU, the UN and other relevant agencies in resolving the conflict.

3.7.1 National/Bilateral Response

In 2007, the first efforts towards a bilateral resolution of the boundary dispute was spearheaded by then Tanzanian leader, Jikaya Kikwete who invited the presidents of Uganda and the DRC to a little village in Tanzania known as Ngurdoto to find an amicable solution to their differences. This was well received by the International community and led to Museveni and Kabila agreeing to the creation of a joint technical border commission to make a final determination of the borders of Lake Albert. In addition to this, Auge reports that a meeting was scheduled between the two countries’ ministers of hydrocarbons to establish a new agreement on unitization of Lake Albert’s resources. Other bilateral issues were also discussed at this meeting. The joint commission has since met twice both in 2007, once in the DRC and
in Uganda. In addition a delegation of Congolese officials were invited to Uganda to engage in joint fieldwork on the Ugandan side of the Lake with their Ugandan compatriots. Late that year both countries’ politicians and technicians jointly observed oil exploration work in the region in addition to discussions in Kampala. At a second meeting between the two leaders in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the Rukwanzizi Island was discussed though nothing was settled as both countries maintained their claims on the Island. They however decided to jointly administer the Island in the meantime.\textsuperscript{74}

Westerkamp and Houdret however suggest that most of the current bilateral cooperation is highly ‘superficial’ and ‘fragile’. They conclude based on interviews they conducted that the chances of success for joint bilateral institutional frameworks in the Lake Albert region are very minimal. They point out that the lack of government legitimacy and control on the part of the DRC in Ituri significantly hinders the possibility of fully resolving the conflict.\textsuperscript{75}

In the DRC’s view, its relations with the Uganda government is one of hypocrisy. As a matter of fact, their relations are not harmonious at all but rather frosty.\textsuperscript{76} The frosty relations stem from the fact that mistrust, suspicions, feelings of superiority, and a desire to control the entire oil exploration site continue to reign in Uganda and DR Congo. Therefore, it has rendered both Governments unable to do much as a matter of urgency to bring a lasting peace to the Region.

\textbf{3.7.2 Regional Response}

In order to secure the needed peace in the region, dialoguing on the critical issues such as the existing conflict between DRC and Uganda at the various regional bodies is necessary. Mr. Richard Awazi disclosed that although the two countries are members of SADC and COMESA, they join hands to negotiate on other pertinent issues other than oil exploration tensions.\textsuperscript{77}
Taking into account the nature of conflicts that start within the DRC, to quickly spread and engulf neighbouring states in the Great Lakes Region, it is in the interest of the regional bodies in the area to ensure there is peace in the Lake Albert Region and no risks of escalation. On the regional front, there have been several sub-bodies created towards managing the conflict within the zone. The efforts of these Unions and Organizations, for instance, help in the deployment of additional teams to ensure peace and stability. For instance the creation of the UN Intervention Brigade was initiated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and supported by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). In February 2013, a framework of agreement was drawn by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to address the mounting violence in around the eastern parts of the DRC.78

More recent militia attacks appear to be a response to joint operations between the Congolese and Ugandan armies within Congo. In early March 2009, Presidents Museveni of Uganda and Kabila of DRC signed an agreement to continue military co-operation and to work together in exploiting oil discovered in the Lake Albert region. This marks a change from 2008, when Congo revoked Tullow’s exploration rights, accusing the company of enlisting the Ugandan army to violate its borders. Despite the shifting alliances, attempts to control oil and natural resources continue to drive military conflict in Eastern Congo.79

Mr Richard Sadala Kanyela Awazi again affirms the fact that both countries, the DRC and Uganda are members of SADC and the Common Market for Eastern and South Africa (COMESA), and that there is a regional agreement that the DRC and Uganda are signatories to, regarding the nature of peace and security in the Great Lake region (GLR).80

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICLGR) has also been another platform for discussion and convened series of meetings that resulted in the Kampala peace
talks. On 24 February 2013, a UNSC-brokered peace agreement between the ICGLR Heads of State was signed by Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. This peace agreement was termed “Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region”. The agreement emphasized issues of sexual violence and displacement, among other human rights abuses, and noted that progress begins with the cessation of violence. Most importantly, the agreement recognized the distinct yet interdependent roles of actors from the DRC, within the region, and within the international community. At the country level, the DRC agreed to work towards decentralization and further structural reform. The regional players promised to respect one another’s sovereignty, but to also increase cooperation between states.\(^{81}\)

In a recent development on security issues, the Security Council in the region has raised a red flag on the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) made up of Rwanda Hutu extremists recruiting new fighters within the region. This has urged the joint military operation by the FARDC and MONUSCO to commence immediately. In January 29, 2015 the army of the DRC, supported by MONUSCO and the FIB, officially declared the start of operations and launched a military campaign against the FDLR. While this development is encouraging, it is still too early to determine the effectiveness of the initiative.\(^{82}\)

Regional arrangements so far seem limited to an extent in their effectiveness but are a major step towards easing tensions and building good relations between governments in the region. While security has been on the agenda, its links to the exploitation and distribution of shared resources should perhaps be at the centre of discussions. To a large extent then despite the best efforts of the likes of SADC and COMESA, a lot would depend on the willingness of the DRC
and Uganda to commit themselves to developing a suitable working arrangement under the auspices of the regional bodies to secure peace in the area.

3.7.3 International Response

On 24th February, 2013, the AU intervened in the rising tensions between DR Congo and Uganda by creating a platform for both countries to sign an agreement regarding Peace and security in the Region. This Agreement known as Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region was signed in Ethiopia at the AU headquarters.

The United Nations and the wider international community have been greatly involved in seeking a peaceful resolution to the DRC conflict, specifically in the past decade. For instance, in 2012, the Human Right Council Report (HRC Resolution 9/27) encouraged the establishment of an inter alia, human rights commission in the DRC, and asked the High Commissioner for Human Rights to submit a report in 2013 on the states of human rights work in the country.83 Also, there have been several reports by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on conflicts within the DRC region. The United Nations and the wider international community have been greatly involved in seeking a peaceful resolution to the DRC conflict, specifically in the past decade. For instance, in 2012 the Human Right Council Report (HRC Resolution 9/27) encouraged the establishment of an inter alia, human rights commission in the DRC, and asked the High Commissioner for Human Rights to submit a report in 2013 on the states of human rights work in the country.84 Also, there have been several reports by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on conflicts within the DRC region. In October 2010, the OHCHR released a report entitled ‘DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations 1993-2003.’ This report noted about 617 most serious incidents of human rights abuses, crimes against humanity and
war crimes. It also states apparent systematic and widespread attacks and, if proven before a competent court, could be characterised as crimes of genocide. In this report was also the allegation that Rwanda’s army was responsible for acts of genocide against ethnic Hutus living in the DRC. Similarly, the report also accused Ugandan troops of having committed war crimes in the DRC.

The UNSC involvement in the DRC has been its authorization of two missions in the country, namely, the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO). Although the mandate of the two missions to protect civilians and other issues was unsuccessful, the introduction of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) allows its personnel to use all necessary means, including the use of offensive tactics, against the M23 and other rebel groups in order to enforce civilian protection. Neutralization of armed groups, arms embargo implementation, and provision of judicial processes have been some of the efforts the United Nations has taken to ensure stability in the region. As such, MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians and promote stability in the region has over the years increased significantly.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has also been instrumental in the role of ensuring stability within the region. On June 23 2004 the ICC announced its decision to open the first ever investigation into the crimes in DRC. This has since seen notable persons facing trial, such as Thomas Lubanga, former leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and Bosco Ntaganda, a former M23 leader. It is hoped that these measures would serve as a deterrent to other likeminded persons seeking to engage in violent conflicts.
To ensure security and stability within the region both regional and international agencies employ the use of various sanctions. On July 2003, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed the resolution 1493 which sought to place sanctions on DRC. Here, an arms embargo was placed on militias in North and South Kivu, and Ituri.88 Later, in January 2013, the UN again initiated an arms embargo on both M23 and FDLR rebels, along with a travel ban and assets freeze on two specific M23 leaders: Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, and Lieutenant Colonel Eric Badege. Their checks revealed that neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda have continuously supported the M23 rebels in the fight against the FARDC and had violated terms of the arms embargo. Rwanda and Uganda again were also accused of providing the M23 rebels with weapons, ammunition, intelligence and political advice, as well as deploying army troops to fight alongside the M23.89

After continuous warnings to stop such activities fuelling instability, the United States, the Europeans Union and Britain withdrew their military aid to Rwanda in October, 2013 which served as a means of sanction to propagate peace and security. This condition is not so different, as the UN also threatens to pull their support should the Congolese government refuses to replace two military commanders accused of previous causing human rights violations.90 These efforts by the International bodies all help to create a suitable environment within which a peaceful resolution to the conflict can be achieved. While current efforts to stop rebel activity within the DRC haven’t helped much, the timely reactions to what is still an emerging situation is a sign of a growing commitment within the international community to take a strong stance against any resurgence of conflicts in the Great Lakes Region.
3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has delved into the background of Conflict in Lake Albert which shows clearly that the stability of the region is at risk following the recent oil exploration activities in the region. It undertook an investigation of the various roles played by the two governments, the oil exploration and production companies, the local communities, rebel groups in the area, and the international community in both engendering the conflict and helping towards its possible resolution. It has considered the consequences of the interrelationships between various key actors in the conflict and conflict management efforts undertaken by relevant bodies connected to the conflict.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.

4.1 Summary of Findings

The study examined the currency of natural resource boundaries conflict in Africa that have become a source of concern contemporarily. It specifically studied the oil-exploitation-boundary-conflict between the D. R. Congo and Uganda in Lake Albert that constitutes their common boundary. The work found that just as most of Africa’s boundaries, which were determined during the 1884/1885 partition of Africa by European powers, Uganda and Congo’s have remained a bone of contention due to the lack of exactness; and especially, in recent times because of the oil discovery in commercial quantities. There is no open warfare between the two countries, but given the recurring effects of former colonial policies, past wars, recurrent militia activism in the area, multinational corporations’ social engineering to create monopoly and maximize profit, and restive communities in the Lake Albert’s environs’ social grievances have created tendencies for critical border disputes that have not only resulted in conflicts and deaths but also slowed down progress in the exploitation of oil in DR Congo, by particular.

The study found out that for a better appreciation of the conflict between the two countries the German and Belgian policies of racial and ethnic relations, colonial migration policies and economic development policies are important in comprehending contemporary armed conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, especially, in the Lake Albert area. Over the years, these result of the exploitation by local and regional actors, have resulted in deep rooted local conflicts over access to land, economic opportunities and political power. The control of over minerals plays a major role in these violent struggles for survival, livelihood, power and influence.
As such, both lakeshores are prone to insecurities from nearby conflicts, rebel insurgency, refugees and ethnic clashes due to longstanding ethnic conflicts that resulted in the two Congo Wars (1996–97 and 1998–2003). In addition, is the emergence of an island within the Lake over which both countries have laid territorial claims of ownership due its strategic importance to exploiting the oil resources; and from time to time their armies engage each other in skirmishes over it.

Besides, bad blood, suspicion distrust between the two countries, ambitious and rapacious elites, dissident groups that are still active in the region under extremely minimal government control, populations dependent on the Lake for its livelihood that is mistrustful of their own government (and lives under UN protection in the case of D R Congo), Multinational companies under very little government supervision seeking to exploit the Lakes oil resources and the spectral presence of the Ugandan government, altogether paint a picture of a volatile situation that could with a spark escalate to unmanageable levels. All other possible causes of conflict around the oil exploration in Lake Albert are based in these circumstances.

The killing of Heritage Oil Engineer, Carl Nefdt by FARDC (Congolese Forces) during an exploratory expedition on the Lake, is another cause of the friction between the D R Congo government, and Uganda and the Tullow/Heritage consortium. The incident involved an accusation of that Nefdt had breached the Congolese side of Lake Albert while engaging in exploratory activity for Uganda. It is believed this might be based on the Congolese allegation that Uganda has been drilling oil from the Congolese side with the connivance of Tullow and Heritage, with Heritage being accused further of deliberately fomenting conflict in the Ituri region by sponsoring rebel groups. In 2008, the Congolese government also accused Tullow and Heritage of acting in collusion with the Ugandan Army to encroach on its side of the Lake.
causing the death of 8 Congolese nationals. This state of affairs that has the potential to further compound issues leading to violence in the region especially when MNCs are known for having a past history of sponsoring armed conflict in order to acquire unfettered access to oil producing areas.

The environment complicates the security picture in the sub-region, especially, given the fact that D R Congo is unable to secure the whole country. MONUSCO's capabilities are already stretched thin, and although the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) provides some significant offensive capabilities, it does so in only a limited area. A unit of MONUSCO, the FIB, has a special mandate to conduct offensive operations against certain groups, unlike MONUSCO. The force can move around but it cannot be everywhere at once. The work equally found out that oil exploration and exploitation have been known to create environmental challenges for locals living in the area such as the loss of farmlands, destruction of marine life, and infiltration by foreign ethnic groups attracted by the economic opportunities presented by the resource. And corporate social responsibility is weak without local components.

4.2 Conclusions

The study concludes that the oil discovery and exploitation in Lake Albert poses an imminent and serious threat to the peace and stability in the Great Lakes region. The explanation is found in the common colonial history of the countries found in the region. The exigencies of nation-state building in a region whose fate is intertwined with those of others in terms of the search of survival, livelihood, influence, and power, makes the untying of the Gordon not of instability difficult.
The study again concludes that, though the international community’s response to the disputes over the exploitation of oil in the Lake Albert basin may have been tardy and inadequate, the stability in the region would have been worse off but for the interventions of SADC, the AU and the UN. This proves the point that, though international regimes are confronted with some challenges, they are still relevant in contemporary international system. This is because, they help in addressing or tackling transnational threats (such as wars and conflicts associated with abundance of resource in a region); which are sometimes beyond the capabilities of a single state to tackle.

The study also concludes that with respects to the tension in that area, there are doubts that the local dynamic will be conducive for production to begin. Therefore there is the need to resolve the conflict in the region so that the two countries (i.e. Uganda and DRC) could benefit from the oil resource prospects of the Lake Albert basin region.

It is also concluded from the findings of the study that, there is still hope for resolving the conflict situation in the Lake Albert basin despite the growing tensions between Uganda and Congo to gain access to oil resources in the region. This will require proper management and accountability of the oil resources by governments of the two countries.

Based on the above findings of the study, it is concluded that, the hypothesis that “The disputes over the exploitation of oil in Lake Albert poses potential threats for the stability of the Great Lake Region (GLR)” has been proven. This is because the oil exploration activities have largely contributed to the tensions and conflicts between Uganda and DR Congo.
Given the circumstances, especially D. R. Congo proverbial weakness and the spectral presence of Uganda under the enigmatic Museveni, the study concludes that the international community, especially the African Union, should act to shore up Congo’s strength to navigate the challenges the region is faced with.

4.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings from the study and suggestions made by respondents during interviews, the following recommendations are made:

The exploration of oil and gas around the border should provide an opportunity for bilateral negotiations that can promote cooperation and enable optimal exploitation of the natural resources in the Lake Albert.

In addition to the above, infrastructural works in terms of the construction of pipelines within the area will eventually be built in Uganda to export some of this oil, and it is very likely that in the event where the oil and Gas are found in economical quantities in DR Congo, then that area would likely be tied into Uganda’s pipeline infrastructure. DR Congo will therefore have to cooperate with Uganda so as to benefit from the pipeline infrastructure. Again, the two countries need to cooperate with respects to upholding peace and security in the GLR. Security is indeed paramount for attracting investors in any business venture, largely because no investor would want to operate in conflict zones. In this regard, Uganda just as much as DR Congo would need to find an even platform where their differences can be sorted out, which would ultimately create a peaceful co-existence between both countries.
Also, there should be an establishment of a strong Regional Military Force through dialogues and negotiations for the two countries to agree for that force to oversee the exploratory activities of the two countries in the Lake Albert basin region.
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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The interview guide is divided into two sections; the broader context of the Great Lakes region and the narrow/specific context of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

**Broader Context**

1. What is the nature of the peace and security architecture of the East African Community (EAC)?
2. What have been the major sources of instability in the Great Lakes region?
3. How have these sources evolved over the years?
4. How has the EAC helped in regulating the ownership and extraction of natural resources in the Great Lakes region?
5. To what extent has the EAC succeeded and what have been the challenges?
6. How specifically has the EAC and/or the African Union intervened in the management of tensions between Uganda and the DRC over the extraction and ownership of natural resources?

**Narrow Context**

1. What has been the general nature of relations between Uganda and the DRC?
2. What are the main issues that have threatened the peace between the two countries?
3. Historically, are there examples of conflicts between Uganda and the DRC?
4. To what extent have these conflicts had something to do with the ownership and extraction of natural resources?
5. Are there any examples of conflicts between Uganda and the DRC over the years that were basically due to the ownership and extraction of natural resources?
6. What have been the contending positions of both countries regarding their tensions over the extraction and ownership of natural resources?
7. What have been the bilateral/mutual efforts by Uganda and DRC aimed at managing the ownership and extraction of natural resources?