A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ECOWAS' INTERVENTIONS IN THE
LIBERIAN AND IVORIAN CONFLICTS OF 1989 AND 2002

BY
AUGUSTINE AWUKU-ANNIE
(ID: 10505013)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA,
LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DIPLOMACY

LEGON
NOVEMBER, 2016
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Dissertation is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of Dr Ken Ahorsu and that no part of it has been submitted anywhere else for any other purpose.

.................................................. ............................
AUGUSTINE AWUKU-ANNIE                             DR. KEN AHORSU
(STUDENT)                                             (SUPERVISOR)

..............................................2016  .............................................. 2016
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the Lord Almighty by whose Grace I had life to write and to

the Awuku-Annie Family.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My utmost thanks go to God Almighty whose mercy, protection and provision took me through the challenging times and enabled me to successfully complete both the course work and this dissertation. I am very grateful to Dr Ken Ahorsu, my supervisor for his guidance and advice. To my wife Ama; Children Fiifi and Maakua, I say am indebted for your sacrifices. I am also indebted to Mr Emmanuel Bombande, Brigadier General Kusi (Rtd) and all those who granted me audience for an interview. To Mr Francis Kwabena Atta, I say am appreciative of your invaluable support. Once again, thank you all and may God bless each of you.
# LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces of the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC-NPFL</td>
<td>NPFL Central Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNR</td>
<td>Government of National Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFMC</td>
<td>Inter-faith Mediation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGNU</td>
<td>Interim Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPFL</td>
<td>Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Lofa Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberian Peace Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>UN Mission in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJP</td>
<td>Movement for Justice and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCI</td>
<td>Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPIGO</td>
<td>Mouvement Populaire Ivorian du Grand Ouest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDFL</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of the Africa Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAE</td>
<td>Pacific Architects and Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAL</td>
<td>Progressive Alliance of Liberians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMAD</td>
<td>Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Protocol on Non-Aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRES</td>
<td>Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOC I</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG  United Nations Secretary General
WAFF  West African Frontier Force
WANEP  West African Network for Peace-building
WASU  West African Students Union
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION .............................................................. i
DEDICATION .............................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................. iii
LIST OF ACRONYMS ...................................................... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................... vi
ABSTRACT ................................................................. ix

CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Problem .......................................... 1
1.2 Problem Statement .................................................... 3
1.3 Objectives .................................................................... 4
1.4 Research Questions .................................................... 5
1.5 Rationale ..................................................................... 5
1.6 Conceptual Framework ................................................ 5
1.7 Review of Existing Literature ....................................... 7
1.8 Research Methodology and Sources of Data .................... 12
1.9 Scope of the Study ..................................................... 12
1.10 Arrangements of Chapters .......................................... 12
Endnotes .......................................................................... 14
CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF ECOWAS’ COLLECTIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS AND INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA AND COTE D’IVOIRE

2.1 Introduction ................................................................. 16
2.2 The Evolution of ECOWAS .............................................. 16
2.3 The Protocol on Non-Aggression ....................................... 18
2.4 The Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defence ....................... 19
2.5 The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security .............. 20
2.6 The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance ................ 23
2.7 The Conflict in Liberia .................................................. 24
2.8 The ECOWAS Intervention in the Liberian Conflicts ................. 26
2.9 The Conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire ......................................... 29
2.10 The ECOWAS Intervention in the Ivorian Conflict ................. 31
2.11 Conclusion .................................................................. 35

Endnotes ........................................................................... 36

CHAPTER THREE

COMPARISON OF THE INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA AND COTE D’IVOIRE

3.1 Introduction .................................................................. 40
3.2 Causes of the Conflicts ................................................... 40
3.3 Reaction of the International Community ........................... 42
3.4 ECOWAS Speed of the Intervention .................................. 44
3.5 Troop Contributing Countries and Command Structures ........ 46
3.6 The ECOWAS Peace Plans and Mandates .............................................48
3.7 Factional Support by Member States ...................................................50
3.8 The Legality and Justification for the Interventions ...............................51
3.9 The Nigeria and the French Supports ..................................................53
3.10 The Challenges Encountered .............................................................55
3.11 The UN takeover and re-hatting of ECOWAS Troops .........................57
3.12 The Achievements and Failures .........................................................59
3.13 Conclusion .......................................................................................61
Endnotes ...............................................................................................63

CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................67
4.2 Summary of Findings .........................................................................67
4.3 Conclusion .........................................................................................72
4.4 Recommendations ..............................................................................73
Bibliography ...........................................................................................75
ECOWAS was created on 28 May 1975 with the objective of promoting economic integration and development in West Africa. Threats to the peace and security within the sub-region compelled ECOWAS to engage in several interventions in member states including Liberia in 1990 and Cote d’Ivoire in 2002. This qualitative study attempts to identify the similarities and differences between these two interventions; ascertain the challenges that were encountered in Liberia and determine whether ECOWAS took measures to address these challenges before undertaking the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. The study finds that similar causes led to the two conflicts. These were political marginalisation, economic decline and ethnocentrism. ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia were confronted by several challenges including division among member states, lack of political will, support of factions by member states, poor force generation, poor preparation, lack of funding, difficulty in command and control, lack of logistics, weak institutional capacity, lack of impartiality, lack of neutrality and theft by troops. Through its Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security; ECOWAS addressed some of these challenges before the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. However, division among member states, poor preparation, lack of funding, difficulty in command and control, lack of logistics and weak institutional capacity persisted during the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. The UN had to once more take over in Cote d’Ivoire before the conflict could be brought to an end. The study concludes that ECOWAS is not yet positioned to unilaterally conduct an intervention in a member state and bring conflicts to an end. It is recommends that ECOWAS gives more consideration to the conflict prevention rather than the management aspect of the Mechanism. ECOWAS should promote the enduring tenets of democracy and good governance and sign a bilateral agreement with the UN to provide a guaranteed funding for possible future interventions. A meeting involving peace and security experts within West Africa should be organised to proffer solutions to the challenges so far encountered during these interventions.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Problem

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created on 28 May 1975 with the signing of the Lagos Treaty.¹ West Africa and the rest of the world were at the time going through severe economic crisis as a consequence of the oil price shock.² This was manifested in falling standards of living in developing countries; over-dependence of Africa on the economies of the former colonial powers; shortfalls in export demand and lower prices of exported commodities.³

The vision of the leaders was to create a single regional economic body with a single market and single currency through integration capable of generating accelerated socio-economic development.⁴ It was also to make the regional body more competitive in the global market. The ECOWAS agenda was thus to promote market integration through policy harmonization and coordination as well as to speed up the development of physical infrastructure.⁵

At the time of its formation, the pioneers of ECOWAS gave little attention to the connection between security and development. As a result, no provision was made to ensure peace and security within the sub region until three years after the formation of the Regional Economic Community (REC). In 1978, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA) followed in 1981 by the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence.⁶ These protocols were adopted to address Cold War era security threats which were mainly external and inter-state in nature.⁷ However, the easing of the Cold War tensions was accompanied by a dramatic increase in violent internal power struggles that threatened the security of states across Africa and particularly in West Africa.⁸
Barely a decade after the creation of ECOWAS, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched a rebellion against the government of President Samuel Doe on 24 December 1989. The rebellion quickly degenerated into a fierce conflict between the NPFL and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The conflict led to the loss of many lives and destruction of property. A lot of people became internally displaced with many refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. Mediation attempts at ending the conflict by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) of Liberia failed. An intervention by the international community in the conflict which was much anticipated never happened. As a result, ECOWAS intervened to end the conflicts which threatened peace and security in Liberia in particular and the sub-region in general.

ECOWAS constituted a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to determine how best to end the conflict in Liberia at its 13th Heads of State Summit in Banjul, Gambia. The Committee held two separate meetings with all the factions in Banjul in July and August 1990. At the end of the second meeting, the SMC made its recommendations to the Authority of Heads of State and Government which included a military intervention in Liberia. Drawing from the PMAD and based on humanitarian grounds, an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was composed to intervene in the Liberian conflict in August 1990. Although the intervention was turbulent and received a lot of criticism as a result of its legal justification, the regional body managed to stabilise the situation in Liberia before the United Nations took over the intervention in October 1993.

ECOWAS later adopted two additional protocols. The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security popularly referred to as the Mechanism of 1999; and the supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001. These protocols were aimed at assisting the regional body to ensure peace and security within the West African sub region.
On 19 September 2002, a little over a decade after the Liberian conflict, the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) attempted a coup against President Laurent Gbagbo’s government in Côte d’Ivoire. The failed coup resulted in a conflict between the MPCI rebels and the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) which divided the country into two with the rebels controlling the northern part and the government controlling the southern part. It took the intervention of the French Licorne Forces to establish a buffer zone between the forces and to prevent the conflicts from degenerating further. ECOWAS in this instance activated the provisions in the Mechanism and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to intervene in the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.

1.2 Problem Statement

The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia which was largely supported by Nigeria and conducted under difficult circumstances faced some challenges as well as criticisms. For instance, it was beset by lack of military equipment, logistics and problems with language differences. The troops initially landed without intelligence or military maps of Monrovia; some without their personal weapons, and with inadequate supplies of boots and uniforms. Additionally, there was the problem of division among the Anglophone and Francophone members of the Community regarding the intervention.

In 2002 the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) was composed by the regional body to intervene in the Ivorian conflicts based on the Mechanism. Nigeria’s keen involvement and support was absent this time and ECOWAS was largely supported by the French who deployed about 3000 LICORNE Forces ahead of ECOMICI’s deployment. France was very instrumental during ECOWAS’ operations in Côte d’Ivoire. Although donor countries such as the United States of America, Britain and Belgium supported ECOMICI,
this was beset with challenges such as insufficient funding, lack of integrated logistics support and insufficient troops.26

These two interventions, although by the same organisation were carried out within different contexts and under different circumstances. The intervention in Côte d'Ivoire was carried out over a decade after Liberia, and followed the coming into force of several additional ECOWAS protocols and conventions. However, although a lot of scholarly work has been done on the nuances of the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, not much analysis has been done on the Ivorian situation and the extent to which ECOWAS interventions have metamorphosed since Liberia. This research therefore seeks to carry out a comparative analysis of the two interventions to establish how these interventions differed from or were similar to each other and if any lessons were appropriated from the Liberian intervention to guide the Ivorian case.

1.3 Objectives

The objectives of the study are to:

Identify the challenges that ECOWAS encountered in Liberia and to find out if steps were taken to address them before the intervention in Côte d'Ivoire.

Find out whether ECOWAS could have conducted the interventions in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire alone.

Determine whether ECOWAS is ready to unilaterally conduct a military intervention.

Make recommendations regarding any possible future interventions.
1.4 Research Questions

The research will seek answers to the following questions:

What were the differences and similarities between the ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian conflict of 1989 and in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict of 2002?

How did the participation of Nigeria and France impact on the interventions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire respectively?

Is ECOWAS positioned to intervene and bring peace to a member state without the support of the UN?

1.5 Rationale

The dynamics of International Peace and Security is changing and the UN is gradually increasing the responsibility of regional groupings to ensure peace and security within their respective regions. It is therefore important that ECOWAS prepare itself adequately to accept this responsibility. The rationale for this study is to ascertain some of the recurring challenges regarding ECOWAS interventions within the West African sub-region. This will aid ECOWAS in the formulation of policies and adoption of treaties as well as conflict resolution mechanisms in the future. The study will also add to the body of knowledge on ECOWAS interventions as well as peace and security within the West African sub-region. Finally, it will provide the basis for future research on the subject of ECOWAS interventions.

1.6 Conceptual Framework

The study is underpinned by the evolving concept of communitarian security. Two proponents of the concept are Stevens Goldman and David Scheffer. The concept contests the Westphalian view that states are sovereign and have the inherent rights of
sovereignty. Implicitly, the right of sovereignty includes the right of a state to lay claim to absolute and exclusive rule over its territory. Thus, states were not answerable to any other authority regarding events in its geographical area. However, Goldman, a proponent of the concept argues against the exclusivity of the sovereign rights of states. In his paper titled “The Rights of Intervention based upon impaired sovereignty”, Goldman opines that some states are legitimate whereas others are illegitimate. He defined the illegitimate states as undemocratic states that trample upon the rights as well as the liberty of the citizens and whose activities threatens the peace and security of the international community. Legitimate states on the other hand are state that upholds the right of its citizens as well as their safety.

The concept therefore opposes the Westphalia ideology of exclusive sovereignty of all states devoid of whether such a state is legitimate or illegitimate. Rather the concept suggests that:

Where conditions of anarchy or international crimes or of genocide take place within the geographic confines of a political entity whose sovereignty may be described as impaired, or perhaps in suspension, the previously impenetrable wall of state sovereignty should not be allowed to present legal obstacle to outside intervention by legitimate states.

According to Scheffer, the interventions by such legitimate states are carried out for the following reasons:

1. Rescue or protect citizens abroad and other aliens whose lives are at risk
2. Protect religious or ethnic minorities from genocide or violent oppression
3. End internal aggression or human rights atrocities
4. Contain mass migration of people, to return large numbers of displaced people to their
rightful homes, to repatriate large numbers of refugees and other migrants or to protect refugees and migrants from life-threatening circumstances.

5. Respond to mass human suffering caused by man-made or natural disasters

6. Support anti-totalitarian rebellion or other movements of self–determination struggling for independence from oppressive regimes that violate human rights on a large scale\(^32\).

The concept emphasizes the need for the international community and regional bodies to undertake humanitarian interventions because domestic humanitarian crises can have consequences for international security. Refugee movements across borders destabilizes neighbouring countries as was evident during the Liberian conflicts of 1989. Additionally, governemental oppression can trigger more widespread conflicts as members of the same ethnic or religious group from other countries come to the victim’s aid. It was on such basis that ECOWAS broke new grounds and ventured into hitherto uncharted waters of intervention in domestic conflicts in Liberia and subsequently in Cote d’Ivoire.

1.7 Review of Existing Literature

The need for the establishment of regional integration schemes aimed at promoting cooperation and sustainable development existed across the globe long before the 1970s.\(^33\) According to Obi, several attempts were made in the 1960s by West African leaders to form a regional economic integration scheme.\(^34\) These leaders argued that if economic integration was long practiced by self-sufficient countries in Europe and North America, then there was an even stronger need for states in developing West Africa to form a regional economic scheme.\(^35\) Consequently, the aspirations of the leaders were realized by the signing of the Lagos Treaty which created ECOWAS. The Community began as a communal pursuit
for self-reliance, economic development and cooperation in West Africa. It was also to promote infrastructural development in the areas of transport, telecommunications, energy and agriculture among others.\textsuperscript{36}

Osadorlor opines that:

The issues of development and cooperation became so interrelated with the fundamental principle of maintaining regional peace, stability and security that they could not be dissociated from one another as a major challenge of ECOWAS. This thinking paved the way for the evolution of policies on collective security by the exploration of the possibilities and limitations of cooperative arrangements in security and defence matters in West Africa.\textsuperscript{37}

He adds that regional attempts at ensuring collective security began in 1978 by the adoption of the Protocol on Non-Aggression. This Protocol was later reinforced by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence in 1981. Nonetheless, ECOWAS did not operationalize these protocols until early 1990s.

Kaplan, states that West Africa became a symbol of societal stress in the 1990s characterised by scarcity of resources, the increasing erosion of nation-state and international borders, the empowerment of private military and security companies as well as erosion of nation-states and international borders.\textsuperscript{38} Dr Ibn Chambas, former President of the ECOWAS commission asserted that the easing of the Cold War exacerbated this precarious situation leading to a number of intra state conflicts in West Africa.\textsuperscript{39} One of such conflicts was the Liberian civil war that began in 1989. Several authors have stated that the Liberian civil war heightened the critical demand for an indigenous conflict resolution in West Africa.\textsuperscript{40} Additionally, the carnage that resulted from the conflicts and the unwillingness of the International Community to intervene demanded a regional intervention in an intra-state conflict.\textsuperscript{41} Subsequently, in August 1990, ECOWAS deployed an intervention force designated as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to Liberia. ECOWAS has since conducted three other conflict interventions in Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea Bissau in 1998
and Côte d’Ivoire in 2003. The community has also adopted two more protocols including the Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Security and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.

Obi attributed the reason for ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian Crisis to an appeal by the late President Doe to ECOWAS for assistance to deal with the NPFL insurgency. He states that in furtherance of the request, General Babangida, then military Head of State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria made a case for an intervention in the Liberian conflict during an ECOWAS meeting in Banjul in May 1990. However, some member states did not agree to an intervention since it violated the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries. According to Obi, Babaginda based his proposal on the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence specifically the provisions that allowed an intervention upon a request from the leader of a member state. Though, Babangida’s proposal may have been laudable at the time, Osadolor is of the opinion that it was borne out of his personal interest and that of Nigeria’s quest to assume a leadership role in the region. He further states that Nigeria and the other member states that advocating the intervention interpreted external support to the NPFL by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya as the basis to intervene.

Arthur outlines six reasons that according to him gave credence to the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. These were “Western disengagement” from the conflicts, “Western withdrawal from African affairs”, “perceived lack of interest by the UN Security Council”, “Humanitarian imperatives” and finally the “UN Charter provisions on collective self-defence” as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In spite of these seemingly cogent reasons, the arguments still rages on as to whether the intervention was legally justified as ECOWAS did not seek authorisation from the UN Security Council before the conduct of the intervention. The President of Liberia at the time was Samuel Doe. However, Charles Taylor
Leader of the NPFL controlled about half of the country. Taylor’s consent should have been sought prior to deployment of ECOMOG forces. Failure to seek Taylor’s consent led to opposition by the NPFL.  

Arthur, Obi, Osadorlor and Aboagye affirm that ECOWAS faced formidable challenges upon deployment. Arthur lists disagreements among member states, financial constraints, equipment and logistical problems as some of the challenges faced by ECOWAS. According to Sesay, troop contributing countries bore the cost of maintaining their respective contingents. Aboagye adds that inadequate maintenance of equipment, and problems relating to accommodation and cooking arrangements were some of the challenges that the ECOWAS force had to battle with. A report by an ECOWAS workshop stated that difficulties with command and control, the ad-hoc nature of the force, poor coordination and harmonization between the contributing countries, poor coordination between ECOMOG field commanders and ECOWAS, weak political will, and lack of agreement about the nature and role of ECOMOG among West Africa’s leaders were some of the difficulties that the intervention force were confronted with. Due to these challenges, some authors have labeled the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia as a “Heroic Failure”. However, regardless of this tag, the intervention by ECOWAS reduced the carnage in the streets of Liberia and ensured the security of Monrovia. The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is arguably the first peacekeeping operation by a regional economic scheme and as such served as a trail blazer.

The ECOWAS intervention in Côte d’Ivoire unlike that of Liberia began with several mediation efforts by the regional body. This was followed by the deployment of an ECOWAS fourth intervention force known as ECOMICI in January 2003. This was after France had deployed about 3000 LICORNE Forces. ECOMICI was made up of mainly Francophone West African countries including Senegal, Niger, Togo, Benin and Ghana as the only Anglophone country, operating alongside French forces (LICORNE). Nigeria’s role
during the intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was limited to mediation unlike the intervention in the Liberian crisis.

According to Bovcon, the ECOMICI operation was also bedeviled with certain challenges. 56 First of all the total strength of the troops pledged by member countries was not enough to execute the mission. This situation was further exacerbated by the fact that countries could not deploy as promised for various reasons. 57 Bovcon adds that ECOMICI also faced various challenges such as “the delayed setting up of the basic force headquarters, lack of coordination and organizational skills, a too small professional staff, and overall deficiencies of equipment, logistics support and funding”. 58 He however, acknowledges that ECOMICI operations in Côte d’Ivoire had a lot of progressive initiatives most especially in comparison to ECOMOG operations in Liberia. Some of these positives include the credibility of ECOMICI and the lack of apparent division among members states in the case of ECOMOG for an intervention. 59

Through the diplomatic role of France, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1479 authorizing the establishment of a UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) to support ECOWAS and LICORNE forces. 60 The UN Security Council once again adopted resolution 1528 which authorized the establishment of the United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire UNOCI in 2004 and also authorized the transfer of ECOMICI and MINUCI to UNOCI. 61

Several reasons might have accounted for the positives in the ECOMICI as compared to ECOMOG. The deployment of LICORNE forces in advance may have softened the ground for the ECOMICI forces. The Protocol on the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution and security as well as the Protocol on Good governance and democracy which were adopted in 1999 and 2001 respectively may have also contributed towards the success of ECOMICI. The experiences that ECOWAS had garnered in the
interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau could have contributed towards the success. Finally, it could be simply the different circumstances and eras at the time of the two interventions spanning over a decade.

1.8 Research Methodology and Sources of Data

Qualitative research methodology that sought to gather an in-depth understanding of the ECOWAS intervention was used in the study. Qualitative research is a broad methodological approach that encompasses many research methods. The aim of qualitative research may vary with the disciplinary background. It examines the why and how of decision making, not just what, where, when, or who. Qualitative methods are usually more flexible, allowing more naturalness and acclimatization for the interaction and collaboration between the researcher and the participant. Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Structured interviews were conducted with 10 soldiers from the Ghana Armed Forces who took part in both ECOMOG and ECOMICI interventions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire; Mr Emmanuel Bombade, Executive Director of the West African Network for Peace; Brigadier General Kusi (Rtd), Second-in-Command/Deputy Operations Officer ECOMOG GHANBATT 4. Secondary data were sourced from textbooks, journal articles and other publications.

1.9 Scope of the study

The research was limited to ECOWAS interventions in Liberia from 24 August 1990 to 10 October 1993 and in Côte d’Ivoire from 17 November 2002 to 4 April 2004.

1.10 Arrangement of Chapters

The study is organized into four chapters. Chapter One outlines the Research Design. Qualitative research methodology was used with data generated through structured interviews with some individuals who participated in these interventions. Chapter Two gives an overview of ECOWAS collective security mechanisms and interventions in Liberia and Côte...
d’Ivoire. Chapter Three constitutes a comparative assessment of the ECOWAS interventions in the two conflicts. Finally, Chapter Four provides a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
ENDNOTES

2 The oil crisis began in October 1973 when the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries proclaimed an oil embargo. By the end of the embargo in March 1974 the price of oil had risen from $3 per barrel to nearly $12.
3 Ditte, P, and P Roell. Past oil price shocks: Political background and economic impactEvidence from three cases. n.d.
5 ibid
7 Cold war security threats were mostly traditional state-centric, with conflicts being inter-state than intra-state. As such strategies to address these were skewed in that direction.
10 Ibid39
11 ibid 57
17 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY." Lome: ECOWAS, 1999. 4.
19 Ibid 10
20 Ibid 21
http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.html (accessed October 12, 2014).
24 Gberie and Addo, 2004. Op Cit. 21
25 Ibid 22
26 Ibid 25
30 Ibid 27.
31 Ibid 27.
42 Obi 2009, Op.Cit
57 Ibid
59 Ibid
CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF ECOWAS’ COLLECTIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS AND INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA AND COTE D’IVOIRE

2.1 Introduction

ECOWAS was originally created as a Regional Economic Community (REC) with the objective of promoting economic integration and development. The Lagos Treaty which established ECOWAS on 28 May 1975 had no provisions for ensuring peace and security within the sub region. However, external aggression from some member states towards others in the late 1970s threatened peace and security within the sub region as well as the attainment of the original objectives of ECOWAS. Member States then realized the nexus between peace, security and development.

This realization culminated into the adoption of the PNA of 1978. Later, two other protocols concerning peace and security were adopted by ECOWAS. These were the PMAD of 1981 and the Mechanism of December 1999. These Protocols provided for ECOWAS to intervene in the event of conflicts in member states. Subsequently, ECOWAS intervened following the outbreak of conflicts in Liberia in 1989. ECOWAS again intervened when conflicts broke out in Cote d’Ivoire in September 2002. This chapter seeks to examine the evolution of ECOWAS and an examination of these Protocols. The chapter then discusses the Liberian and Ivorian conflicts how ECOWAS intervened based on the Protocols.

2.2 The Evolution of ECOWAS

Attempts at integrating countries in West Africa for economic development began as early as 1925 by the formation of the West African Students Union (WASU). The Union comprised of students from West African States namely, then Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone who had gone to study in London. WASU was formed to for three main purposes; to
serve as a common front through which the students opposed racism; create an establishment that offered solidarity and protection and finally a platform that ushered the West African students into the world of anti-colonial politics. Members of the Union undertook a number of political crusades aimed at promoting economic development in West Africa. For instance in 1938, WASU campaigned in support of Gold Coast Cocoa hold up. The group also advocated the immediate independence for West African colonies.

During the pre-colonial era, the colonial masters’ form of governance in West Africa was modelled along the lines of economic integration influenced the formation of integration schemes after colonialism. The French united their colonies into forming the French West Africa confederacy comprising Benin, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Mali and Burkina Faso. The confederacy had a very close economic, political, and cultural tie with France. Similarly, the British formed the British West Africa comprising Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone. The West African Frontier Force (WAFF) was constituted out of the British West Africa was for battle during World War II.

After independence, there was a renewed cooperation both within the French-speaking states and in cooperation with the former British colonies. The nascent West African States began forming integration groups. Ghana and Guinea formed a political union in 1958 which was later joined by Mali in 1961. The three countries had the objectives of harmonizing their policies in the fields of defence, finance and external affairs. Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Togo also came together to form the Entente Council with the objective of promoting economic development and integration in the region. Several other integration groupings emerged including the Organization of the Senegal River states made up of Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal as well as the Manu River Union made up of Sierra Leone and Liberia.
In April 1972, Generals Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Eyadema of Togo drafted a treaty advocating the formation of a new integration scheme in West Africa. The draft treaty was examined and reviewed by interested member states in Lomé, Togo in December 1973; at a meeting of experts and jurist in Accra, Ghana, in January 1974 and at a meeting of ministers in Monrovia, Liberia in January 1975.\textsuperscript{17} Finally, on 28 May 1975, 15 West African countries met in Lagos, Nigeria where the treaty which became known as the Lagos Treaty was signed thereby creating the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).\textsuperscript{18}

The Treaty of Lagos was purely an economic treaty intended to promote cooperation among member states in the fields of agriculture, industry, transportation, telecommunications, energy, natural resources, commerce, and financial, social and cultural matters. It was also to promote free movement of persons, goods, and capital across national borders in West Africa.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{2.3 The Protocol on Non-Aggression}

The Treaty of Lagos had no provisions for ensuring peace and security within the sub-region. Acts of aggression that took place in West Africa in the late 1970s necessitated the need to adopt the PNA.\textsuperscript{20} On 16 January 1977, mercenaries led by Bob Denard with the backing from some leaders within the community invaded Benin and attempted a coup against Mathieu Kérékou.\textsuperscript{21} In response, the UNSC adopted Resolution 419 of 1977 which condemned the invasion and called on all states and international organisations to work together against such occurrence.\textsuperscript{22} The late 1970s also witnessed a number of coups within the West African sub-region.\textsuperscript{23} These events threatened the peace and security within the sub region. ECOWAS therefore adopted the PNA on 22\textsuperscript{nd} April 1978 upon the realisation that it cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Member States of the Community.\textsuperscript{24} The adoption of the protocol was also in
response to the UNSCR 419 which urged international organisations to ensure peace and security.

The PNA which is aimed at safeguarding security within the sub-region by ensuring peaceful coexistence among member states accentuate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which prohibits either a threat or use of force by states against each other. The Protocol obliges member states to refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against each other. It encourages member states to prevent foreigners’ resident and non-resident on its territory to respectively refrain from committing acts of subversion, hostility or aggression. In the event of disputes among member states, the treaty urges states engaged in the disputes to respond to all peaceful means in the settlement of the disputes. Any dispute, which cannot be settled peacefully among Member States are to be referred to a Committee of the Authority. The ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression is however criticised for being merely idealistic as it failed to outline ECOWAS’ response in the event of a breach of the Protocol.

2.4 The Protocol on Mutual Assistance of Defence

The Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD) is the second security related protocol adopted by ECOWAS. It was ratified in 1981 at an ECOWAS Summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, but became operational in September 1986. The PMAD was as a result of ECOWAS’ resolve to safeguard and consolidate the independence and the sovereignty of Member States against foreign invasion. It was borne out of the consciousness that external defence of member states depends entirely on each sovereign state but such a defence will be more effective with the coordination and pooling together of assistance from other member states. The PMAD therefore sought to seal the gap that existed in the PNA by outlining the regional response to a breach of the PNA.
The Protocol focuses mainly on aggression emanating from outside a member state. According to the Protocol, any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community.\textsuperscript{32} Mutual Assistance according to the Protocol then implies all military aid offered in the form of material, technical and personnel in combating such an aggression originating from outside a member state.\textsuperscript{33} In case of an internal armed conflict engineered and supported actively from outside a member state, the decision on the action to take is left with the Authority.\textsuperscript{34}

The Authority, the Defence Council, the Defence Commission and the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) are institutions that were to be established to facilitate the implementation of the protocol. Member States were also to end the presence of foreign military bases within their national territories. That too has not been achieved as Francophone countries within the community continue to play host to a strong France military presence in their countries.\textsuperscript{35}

Article 16 of the Protocol stipulates that intervention in the conflicts of a member state is contingent upon a written request for assistance from the Head of State of that member state. The Authority shall then take a decision to determine the expediency of military intervention based upon the request. However, the Community shall not intervene if the conflict is purely internal. Critics say the Protocol focused solely on external threats and failed to make provision for internal conflicts which rather threatened security among member states.\textsuperscript{36}

2.5 The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security

On 24 July 1993, ECOWAS members signed a revised ECOWAS Treaty aimed at accelerating the integration of economic policies and improving political cooperation among member states.\textsuperscript{37} As a way of improving political cooperation, the Revised Treaty conferred
the status of supranationality on ECOWAS and committed Member States to cooperate with
the Community for the purposes of reinforcing the appropriate mechanisms to ensure the
timely prevention and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts.\textsuperscript{38}

Following the commitment to ensure the timely prevention and resolution of conflicts,
ECOWAS adopted its Decision A/DEC.11/10/98 relating to the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security referred to as the
Mechanism in Abuja on 31 October 1998.\textsuperscript{39} Decision A/DEC.11/10/98 was signed into a
Protocol on 10 Dec 1999 in Lomé, Togo in order to establish an operational structure for its
implementation. The Mechanism constitutes the most comprehensive normative framework
for confronting the threats to peace and security in the ECOWAS sub-region. This is because
the Mechanism boosts the conflict prevention capabilities of ECOWAS in pre-empting
potential outbreak of violence, resolve conflicts when they occur and to engage more
effectively in post-conflict reconstruction. The Mechanism is also aimed at sealing the gaps
encountered in PNA and PMAD whilst undertaking interventions to prevent manage and
resolve internal and inter-State conflicts within the sub region.

The Mechanism sanctioned the establishment of the Authority, Mediation and
Security Council, Executive Secretariat as the institutions responsible for implementation.\textsuperscript{40}
Others include the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders and ECOMOG.
The Authority composed of Heads of State and Government of Member States has powers to
act on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and
security.\textsuperscript{41} Nine Member States of which seven are elected by the Authority constitute the
Mediation and Security Council. The functions of the Council include taking decisions on
issues of peace and security in the sub-region on behalf of the Authority and implementing all
the provisions of the Protocol.\textsuperscript{42}
The Defence and Security Commission is made up of Chiefs of Defence Staff or equivalent, Officers responsible for Internal Affairs and Security as well as Experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Member States. Heads of other security Agencies may be invited to join the Commission depending on the Agenda. The functions of the commission include formulating the mandate of the Peace-keeping Force, defining the terms of reference for the Force, appointing the Force Commander and determining the composition of the Contingents.

The Council of Elders comprise eminent persons from various segments of society be it political, traditional or religious leaders who can use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators. The mandate of the Council of Elders is defined by the Executive Secretary on the basis of the missions to be carried out. ECOMOG is composed of several Stand-by multi-purpose modules both civilian and military in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment. The functions of ECOMOG are observation and monitoring; Peacekeeping and restoration of peace; humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster and Enforcement of sanctions. Others include peace building; disarmament and demobilisation; Policing activities including the control of fraud and organised crime and any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council.

The Mechanism may be implemented in cases of aggression or conflict in any Member State or threat thereof. The Mechanism may also be implemented whenever conflicts arise between two or several Member States or in case of an internal conflict that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region. In the event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law or an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government, the Mechanism is implementable. Finally, the mechanism may be implemented in any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council.
The power to initiate the Mechanism is vested in the Authority as well as the Mediation and Security Council. The Mechanism may also be initiated at the request of a Member State, the Organisation of African Unity or the United Nations. Finally, the Mechanism may be initiated on the initiative of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.  

2.6 The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance

The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance is a supplementary Protocol to the Mechanism signed by 14 Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS in Dakar, Senegal on 21st December 2001. It has since been ratified by more than two-thirds of the member states. The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance complemented the Mechanism by incorporating issues such as prevention of internal crises and promotion of democracy and good governance, the rule of law, and human rights. This was necessitated by the realization that conflicts within the sub-region are caused by poverty, corruption and usurping of power by the armed forces. Others include non-adherence to the tenets of democracy, election fraud, interruption in the rule of law and gross abuse of human rights.

The Protocol obliges the armed forces to be apolitical and remain under the command of a legally constituted political authority. The Protocol forbids members of the armed forces to run for political elections whilst in the armed forces; it also forbids substantial modification to electoral laws in the last six 6 months before the elections except with the consent of majority of the political actors. Preparation and conduct of elections as well as announcement of election results are be done in a transparent manner.

In democratic governance, the security agencies are urged by the Protocol to be non-partisan but rather ensure their core role of maintaining law and order. They are also to be prepared to take part in any ECOMOG operations as and when ordered. Methods of ensuring poverty alleviation, the rule of law, human rights and good governance are also provided for.
in the Protocol. Member States who are found culpable of any of the provision are to be awarded various sanctions including suspension from all ECOWAS decision making bodies.

2.7 The Conflict in Liberia

On 24 December 1989, conflict erupted in Liberia which quickly degenerated into chaos causing thousands of deaths and numerous refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. Since it was declared a republic in 1847, politics in Liberia was dominated by the Freed Black American slaves also known as Americo-Liberians who were relocated to Liberia from the United States of America. The Americo-Liberian regimes held onto political power in Liberia to the exclusion of the indigenous Liberians. The regime also saw incessant monopolization of political, economic and social positions in favour of the Americo-Liberians. These form of governance by successive Americo-Liberian government continued at during President Tubman’s regime generating resentment among the indigenous Liberians towards the Americo Liberians. Between 1963 and 1970, there were frequent attempts by officers from the AFL to assassinate President Tubman. But all the attempts failed leaving Tubman to die in office in 1971 after 32 years of presidency. William Tolbert, also of the Americo-Liberian descent completed Tubman’s term before starting his own term in 1972.

Some decisions President Tolbert took during his regime enraged the already marginalised indigenous Liberians. For instance, he proposed an increment in the price of a 100-pound bag of rice from $22 to $26. The proposal was met with riots organised by the Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL). Tolbert was also accused of failing to take care of the poor housing condition of the AFL personnel and relieving about 20% of the AFL soldiers for political expediency. It was against this background that a group of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) led by Master Sergeant Doe of the AFL staged a successful
coup in which Tolbert was assassinated on 12 April 1980. Majority of the NCOs including Doe belonged to the indigenous Krahn ethnic group with the rest coming from three other indigenous ethnic groups. After usurping power, Doe ruled Liberia and retained a military regime that lasted for a period of 5 years.

The regime was characterized by marginalization and class status. The bureaucracy, army, security forces, and public services became permeated with members of Doe’s Krahn ethnic group. Civilians from the other ethnic groups especially Gios and Manos were brutalised, marginalized and suppressed. Although the Regime introduced some social reforms, there was no indication as to the political direction of the revolution. Added to these was a dramatic economic downturn that resulted in an increment of a bag of rice from $20 to $24. These economic hardships generated a lot of public outcry calling for an end to the regime. Doe did not step down as was demanded but rather contested and won the 1984 election on the ticket of the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDFL). However, many believed the election was flawed and the verdict stolen by Doe. A failed coup attempt by Thomas Qwiwonkpa an ethnic Gio in 1985 led to an increased persecution of ethnic Gios.

It was during this era of flawed elections, a failed coup attempt and an ever increasing dissatisfaction for the NDFL that Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an incursion into Liberia on 24 December 1989. The incursion which was aimed at ousting Doe’s Government had the support of Gio and Mano ethnic groups. Though the AFL fought back, the invasion was very swift and by May 1990, the NPFL was in control of majority of Liberia’s territory and very close to Monrovia. Carnage ensued as Taylor’s NPFL battled the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The situation worsened when several other factions including the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), the Liberian Peace
Council (LPC), Lofa Defence Force (LDF), and the NPFL Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC) emerged and became involved in the conflicts.  

Masked soldiers abducted and killed about forty refugees from a United Nations camp on 30 May 1990. This incident forced the UN to evacuate its employees from Liberia. On the night of 29 July 1990, about 600 people who had sought refuge at St. Peter’s Church in Monrovia were massacred by militants. Many of those massacred were women with children. The level of atrocities committed by the belligerents escalated to an alarming proportion by July 1990. Mutilated dead bodies could be found either dumped by the roadside or washed ashore. Acute shortages of basic supplies such as food and water coupled with lack of health care worsened the plight of the populace.

Mediation attempts made by the Liberian Christian and Muslim leaders under the Inter-Faith Mediation Commission (IFMC) failed. The expectation that the United Nations or the Organisation of the Africa Union (OAU) will intervene became a mirage when the conflict raged on without any sign of intervention by the international community.

2.8 The ECOWAS Intervention in the Liberian Conflicts

The devastating effects of the conflict in Liberia coupled with the failure of the International Community to intervene posed a security challenge to ECOWAS. However, it was not until 30th May 1990 that the regional body had a formal deliberation on the conflicts at its 13th Heads of State Summit in Banjul, Gambia. At the summit, General Babanginda of Nigeria referred to a request from President Doe to ECOWAS for assistance and argued that ECOWAS must intervene in the conflict based on the PMAD. A five-member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) comprising Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo was constituted to facilitate the mediation in the conflict in Liberia. The SMC held its first and second meetings with the factions in Banjul, Gambia in July and from 6-7 August 1990.
respectively. At the end of the second meeting, the SMC drafted a proposed ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia which recommended a military intervention using the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to monitor the Peace Plan.

The recommendation generated division between the Anglophone and Francophone member states. Except Guinea, all the Francophone countries led by Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso opposed the intervention whilst the Anglophone countries led by Nigeria advocated a military intervention. A decision on the recommendation was taken on 25 August 1990 when the Heads of States and Government approved military intervention based on the PMAD and on humanitarian grounds. Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia, and Sierra Leone contributed troops for the initial 3000 strong ECOMOG Force. Togo and Mali refused to contribute troops although they were members of the SMC.

ECOMOG was beset with several challenges during, its preparation, deployment and conduct of operations. The usual pre-deployment training for soldiers was absent as Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) were compelled to hurriedly form troops for ECOMOG. The Troops did not have topographical maps of the sub-region particularly Liberia to aid the conduct of the initial planning before embarkation. Whereas some countries managed to plan on tourist maps, others could not plan at all and this later reflected in the significant show of unfamiliarity with the geography of Liberia by the troops. Additionally, ECOWAS did not have a repertoire of logistics available for such interventions. TCC had to depend on their own resources which in most cases were not available for the embarkation. According to Brigadier General Kusi (Rtd) because the resources were lacking, Combat supplies were loaded as and when they became available. This affected the proper order of loading supplies causing some troops to arrive in the theatre without their arms and personal kits.
Nigeria was the kingpin during the intervention and in addition to contributing the bulk of the troops, there was also a heavy dependence on the West Africa’s most populous and largest economy for logistics support.\textsuperscript{84} To mitigate the logistics challenges confronting the ECOWAS and the other TCCs, Warrant Officer Class I Boadu, indicated in an interview that Nigeria provided arms, ammunitions, funds and airlift to launch troops from other member countries.\textsuperscript{85} ECOMOG troops concentrated at the Queen Elizabeth Quay in Freetown Sierra Leone for embarkation in the midst of these challenges. On 23 August 1990, ECOMOG embarked for Liberia arriving at the Freeport in Liberia on 24 August 1990 to commence the intervention without the authorisation from the UNSC.\textsuperscript{86} The intervention itself was fraught with challenges right from the onset. Charles Taylor’s NPFL attacked ECOMOG forces on berthing at the Freeport. However, with the support of the INPFL, ECOMOG Forces defeated the NPFL and secured the Freeport.\textsuperscript{87}

Operations support from INPFL later became ECOMOG’s Modus operandi compromising the needed neutrality and impartiality required as an intervention force. ECOMOG operation was also affected by the Anglo-Francophone division that ensued during the initial stages. Whilst Benin and Cote d’Ivoire called for UN troops to replace ECOMOG, Nigeria favoured continuation of the ECOMOG intervention with an aggressive stance against Charles Taylor and Ghana favoured political accommodation with Charles Taylor.\textsuperscript{88} In addition, ECOMOG troops were accused of stealing vehicles and other property belonging to Liberians.

By the end of August 1990, ECOWAS in furtherance of the Peace Plan had established the Interim Government of National Unity at a conference in Banjul, Gambia with Amos Sawyer as the leader. On the ground in Liberia, ECOMOG had pushed NPFL out of Monrovia and secured a buffer zone around central Monrovia by October 1990. This paved the way for the evacuation of about 30000 refugees and the swearing-in of the Interim
Government of National Unity on 22 November 1990. ECOWAS brokered several agreements\textsuperscript{89} from August 1990 aimed at ending the conflict but these agreements failed due to a number of reasons. The conflict had become complex with Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso blatantly supporting the NPFL whilst ECOMOG Forces were not seen as being neutral and impartial. Added to these were the frequent logistics and financial challenges that confronted ECOMOG thereby reducing its capacity to conclusively mitigate the conflict.

In November 1992, ECOWAS made a presentation to the UNSC requesting for assistance in resolving the conflict in Liberia. Following the presentation, the Council on 19 November 1992 adopted Resolution 788 which imposed a total embargo on the shipment of weapons and military equipment to Liberia. The Council later adopted resolution 813 of 26 March 1993 which reaffirmed belief in the Yamoussoukro I-IV accords and also declared support for ECOMOG. On 22 September 1993, the UNSC adopted Resolution 866 of which sanctioned the establishment of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) including an additional 4000 ECOWAS troops mainly from East Africa to monitor and verify the disarmament.\textsuperscript{90} Consequently, from October 1993, UN began deploying UNOMIL troops in Liberia.\textsuperscript{91}

2.9 The Conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire

The Government of the late President Houphouët-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire created the Country’s Armed Forces known as FANCI in May 1960. FANCI was created for the purposes of using the personnel for political and developmental activities including the administration of the civil service and serving in other capacities as Ministers, Ambassadors and Hospital Directors. It was also to engage in road construction and agriculture including fisheries. This venture saw economic prosperity of Cote d’Ivoire during the first decade of Houphouët-Boigny government. Although FANCI continued to perform these roles, there
was economic downturn in the country until the death of Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993.\textsuperscript{92}

Houphouët-Boigny’s death sent Cote d’Ivoire into a quagmire of protracted power struggle and challenges of succession between the political elites. Eventually, Former President Henri Konan Bédié the National Assembly Speaker succeeded Houphouët-Boigny’s through a constitutional revision that had been made by Boigny before his death. Upon assumption of office, Bédié declared a policy with an ethnocentric undertone known as Ivoirité. By the policy, Bédié excluded all significant political opponents from other ethnic groups thereby creating a system of power interplay which favoured the natives of Akan ethnic group more precisely, the Baoulé to the exclusion of all other ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{93} He also changed the original role of FANCI from that of developmental ventures into supressing political opponents. This fomented tension within the ranks of the armed forces leading to the release of the then armed forces commander General Gueï.\textsuperscript{94} Meanwhile, the dissatisfaction of the population increased as the economy of the country continued to decline and Bédié was accused of corruption, political repression and stripping some citizens of their political rights through the policy of Ivoirité. Eventually, a group of soldiers overthrew President Bédié in a coup.

Former army commander General Gueï was called from retirement to lead the revolution. Gueï announced the power take over as well as the dissolution of Parliament, the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court. Although the regime denounced the policy of Ivoirité, the status quo remained.\textsuperscript{95} The regime passed a law on 23 July 2000 permitting only individuals of Ivorian parentage to contest for presidential elections. As a result, the October 2000 elections which ushered President Gbagbo into power became a two-man contest between General Gueï and Laurent Gbagbo as all other opponents including Allasane Ouattara were barred from contesting.
On assumption of power, President Gbagbo strengthened the Ivoirité policy and further marginalised the natives of the impoverished north of the country. He also earmarked about 800 FANCI soldiers believed to be General Gueï’s loyalists for retrenchment. On 19 September 2002, these 800 soldiers revolted in coordinated attacks that took place in the cities of Abidjan, Korhogo and Bouake with the aim of overthrowing President Gbagbo. When the coup failed, the soldiers withdrew to the north, formed the Mouvement Patriotic de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) and established their headquarters in Bouake. About 400 people including former General Robert Guei and his entire family were killed within a few days of hostilities.

An attempt by FANCI to retake Bouake was repelled by the rebels and it took the intervention of about 600 French LICORNE forces already based in Cote d’Ivoire to rescue foreign nationals from the city. On 22 September 2002, just 3 days after the uprising, France began reinforcing its 600 Licorne forces to about 3000. This force stabilized the situation and created a buffer zone separating the rebel held north from the Government held south. However, there were difficulties in the movement of people, goods and services from the north to the south and vice-versa. Two other rebel movements, the Mouvement Populaire Ivorian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) later emerged in the western part of the country. These movements were noted for causing a lot of terror and vandalism in the western part of the country which made many Ivorians to flee the country.

2.10 The ECOWAS Intervention in the Ivorian Conflict

Nigeria, Ghana, and Togo dispatched a delegation to Côte d'Ivoire to first express their camaraderie to President Gbagbo and to pledge ECOWAS resolve to help end the conflict and bring democratic governance to Cote d’Ivoire. Following this assurance, Ghana hosted an Extraordinary ECOWAS Summit in Accra on 29 September 2002. The summit
dubbed Accra I meeting deliberated on the on-going conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire. A six-member Contact Group comprising Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo was established at the summit to make contact with the various factions, compel them to cease all hostilities and allow normalcy to prevail in the occupied towns after which a general framework for the resolution of the conflict will be negotiated.  

The Contact Group held discussions with President Gbagbo in Abidjan on 2 October 2002 and with the insurgents on 3 October 2002 in Bouake under the escort of the LICORNE Forces. The Group also sought and obtained French commitment to provide logistics support at a meeting with the French Ambassador in Cote d’Ivoire. The Contact Group later secured two important Agreements, the Abidjan and Lomé Agreements which were signed on 31 October 2002 and 1 November 2002 respectively. These two Agreements formed the basis for the military intervention. However, in line with the provisions of the Mechanism and to initiate its implementation, the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission submitted a proposal to the Mediation and Security Council suggesting the deployment of an intervention force in Cote d’Ivoire. The proposal was also against the background that the coup attempt contravened the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001. The Authority approved the Proposal on 26 October 2002 and authorised the formation of the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (ECOMICI). Benin, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo pledged to contribute troops to form the 2, 386 authorized strength of ECOMICI.

However, the deployment of ECOMICI faced some challenges as some countries could not honour their pledges. Mali did not deploy for the reason that the huge number of Malian immigrants in Côte d' Ivoire may jeopardize the neutrality of the Malian troops. Nigeria, which led the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, was not able to deploy due to its own internal security challenges. Guinea Bissau that pledged the largest number of troops
could not also deploy. At the end, the initial ECOMICI troops were drawn from Senegal, Ghana, Niger, Togo and Benin.  

The TCCs received logistics support from some donor countries during its preparation for deployment. The French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity Programme (RECAMP) supported Senegal, Niger and Togo whilst Britain provided support to Ghana and Belgium to Benin. The United States of America also supported the Mission through the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), a private company. In addition, individual TCC deployed with their Contingent Owned Equipment. However, there was no integrated logistics system making the logistics planning incoherent and the force build up very difficult. For instance, whilst ECOMICI was waiting for Benin to deploy, Benin was also waiting for the Belgians to provide the promised logistics support. To sort out the Logistics issue, an Advance team was dispatched to Cote d'Ivoire on 17 November 2002.  

France continued with its effort at ending the conflicts whilst ECOMICI prepared to deploy. The colonial master organised a round table talk involving all the factions in Linas-Marcoussis, France from 15-23 January 2003. At the end of the talks, France brokered what became known as the Linas-Marcoussis Accord. The Accord recommended the setting up of a monitoring committee made up of representatives of several organizations including the UN to guarantee its implementation. Subsequently on 4 February 2003, the UNSC passed Resolution 1464 which posteriorly legitimized the Linas-Marcoussis accords and the interventions by LICORNE and ECOMICI even before the full complement of ECOMICI troops could deploy in March 2003.  

Upon deployment, the ECOMICI troops were confronted with several challenges. First, it took about 100 days to set up the force headquarters and within that period, the FC had to rely on his own initiatives, knowledge of the country and acquaintances to operate.
The troops had no vehicles to facilitate movement as a result of the logistics difficulties. ECOMICI forces also lacked the necessary equipment to operate in places considered as being volatile and dominated by the rebel groups. These areas were left for LICORNE Forces who served as the main supporters for ECOMICI to handle.\textsuperscript{107}

Even though ECOMICI continued to receive financial and material support from France, the US, Belgium and the Netherlands; this support was erratic and the mission was challenged with chronic financial difficulties. The FC occasionally operated for about two months without any funds forcing the UNSG Kofi Annan and the FC General Khalil to appeal for funds in order to sustain ECOMICI Operations.\textsuperscript{108}

On 13 May 2003, the UNSC passed Resolution 1479 establishing the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) to monitor the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. Consequently, a group of 26 military liaison officers forming part of MINUCI arrived in Cote d’Ivoire on 23 June 2003 with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord but not to keep peace. The implementation was however fraught with challenges as bouts of sporadic violence initiated by the factions continued in Cote d’Ivoire in violation of the Accord.\textsuperscript{109} The situation compelled the UN to extend the mandate of MINUCI on three occasions by passing the UNSCR 1498 of 4 August 2003, UNSCR 1514 of 13 November 2003 and the UNSCR 1527 of 4 February 2004.

The difficulty in implementing the Linas-Marcoussis Accords compelled ECOWAS to officially request the UN to consider strengthening ECOMICI and transforming them into a United Nations Peacekeeping Force. The UNSC Based on the request adopted Resolution 1528 on 27 February 2004. The Resolution sanctioned the establishment the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the transfer of the authority of MINUCI and ECOMICI to UNOCI. This transfer was done on 4 April 2004 when UNOCI deployed in
Cote d’Ivoire. ECOMICI forces were also absorbed by UNOCI and re-hatted as a UN force.\textsuperscript{110}

2.11 Conclusion

ECOWAS adopted the PNA as a way of addressing the external aggression among member states that developed in the late 1970s. However, the protocol lacked the actions to be taken by ECOWAS in the events of its breach. This led to the adoption of the PMAD which sanctioned ECOWAS to intervene and assist in the event of external conflicts insecurity in a member state as a result of external aggression. The internal intervention may be conducted based upon a written request from the Head of State of the attacked state. It was upon this basis that ECOWAS intervene in the Liberian crisis after President Doe had submitted a written request to ECOWAS for assistance.

However, at the time of the request, President Doe was confined to the Presidential Palace whilst Charles Taylor controlled majority of Liberia’s territory. This made the intervention based on the request from Doe without the consent of Taylor contentious. The attempt to address this contention and other issues led to the adoption of the Mechanism. The Mechanism adequately provided for and justified ECOWAS intervention in Cote d’Ivoire without any contention.
END NOTES

8 Ibid
9 Ibid
16 Yansane, Op. Cit. 48
19 Ibid
21 Forsyth, Frederick. "Bob Denard, the Dogs of War." L’Humanite, May 4, 1999. The leaders were Gnassingbe Eyadema (Togo), Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast) and Omar Bongo (Gabon).
25 (ECOWAS, PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY 1999)
26 Ibid
27 Ibid
28 Kabia, Op.Cit
29 Ibid
31 Ibid
32 Ibid
33 Ibid
35 (ECOWAS, Mutual Assistance on Defence 1981) Op. Cit. 1
38 Ibid
40 (ECOWAS, PROTOCOL ON NON-AGGRESSION 1978) Op. Cit
41 (ECOWAS, PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY 1999) Op. Cit
42 Ibid article 10
43 Ibid Article 18
44 Ibid Article 19
45 IBID Article 20
46 Ibid
47 Ibid Article 21
48 Ibid article 22
49 Ibid article 25
50 Ibid article 26
56 Ibid article 2
57 Ibid article 6
58 Ibid art 19
59 Ibid section 5
60 Ibid article 45
63 (Mgbeoji 2003)
64 Aboagye, Op Cit. 13
65 Aboagye, Op Cit. 15
66 Ibid
69 Aboagye, Op. Cit 24
70 Outram, Op. Cit
71 Aboagye, Op. Cit 34


Aboagye, Op. Cit 57


Aboagye, Op. Cit 81


Aboagye Op.Cit


Aboagye Op.Cit 115

Ibid

Gberie and Addo, Op. Cit. 9

Addo, Op. Cit

Gberie and Addo, Op. Cit. 9

Addo, Op. Cit 49

(Gberie and Addo 2004) 9

Ibid 10

Addo, Op. Cit 49

(Gberie and Addo 2004)

Ibid 21


Gberie and Addo, Op. Cit 10


Gberie and Addo, Op. Cit

Obi, Op. Cit. 12
CHAPTER THREE

COMPARISON OF THE INTERVENTIONS IN LEBERIA AND COTE D’IVOIRE

3.1 Introduction

ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire were undertaken within different context and in different eras. The circumstances that pertained in Liberia were different from that which pertained in Cote d’Ivoire. ECOWAS faced some challenges during the intervention in Liberia in 1990. Later in the year 2002, ECOWAS again intervened in the conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire where the regional body once more encountered some challenges.

This chapter therefore seeks to compare the two interventions in order to ascertain the similarities or otherwise that pertained; challenges they encountered in Liberia and the steps that were taken to address them before the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. The comparison is done in the context of the causes of the conflicts, the reaction of the international community, ECOWAS speed of intervention, member states that contributed troops towards the interventions as well as ECOWAS Peace Plans and Mandates upon which the intervention were undertaken. Others include the support of factions by member states, the legality and justifications for the interventions, the Nigeria and the French supports, UN takeover and re-designating of ECOWAS troops, challenges and finally achievements.

3.2 Causes of the Conflicts

According to Bombande, there were some similarities in the causes of the two conflicts.¹ These similarities were political marginalisation, economic decline and ethnocentrism. The root causes of the Liberian conflict include the Americo-Liberian domination of political power; political marginalisation of the indigenous Liberians; economic downturn during President Tolbert’s and Doe’s regimes. The immediate cause of
the conflict however was President Doe’s continuation of the Political Marginalisation and his ethnocentric tendencies thereby maltreating the Gios and Manos tribes’ people. The penchant for the Gios and Manos to also fight back led to the conflicts.²

In Cote d’Ivoire, the late President Houphouet-Boigny held onto power for decades during which he succeeded in united the population for national development. He did not discriminate or exclude anyone but involved all devoid of ethnicity or nationality.³ However, Boigny’s amendment to the constitution of Cote d’Ivoire to favour the speaker of the National Assembly Konan Bédié as his successor triggered political agitations upon his death. The ethnic differences harboured over the years by the various ethnic groupings surfaced upon his death. This was worsened by Bédié’s introduction of the policy of Ivoirité, which politically marginalised and excluded those from the northern part of the country. The immediate cause of the conflict however was Gbagbo’s release of about 800 soldiers who were branded as General Gueï’s loyalist from FANCI.⁴

The initiative by ECOWAS to intervene in the Liberian conflict is commendable. However, it appeared the regional body rather endorsed the remote and immediate causes of the conflicts during its mediation attempts. The various rebel groups were formed on ethnic lines; therefore, any agreement or meeting held with the exclusion of others is considered as the continuation of the political marginalisation and ethnic exclusion.⁵ ECOWAS seemed to have taken sides from the onset of the intervention; ECOMOG enlisted the support of the INPFL to fight the NPFL. Although the Peace Plan required all parties to be present before the establishment of the Interim Government of National Unity, the establishment was done in the absence of the NPFL.⁶ In addition, whereas the INPFL were left out of the Yamoussoukro Accord, ULIMO were not included in both the Bamako and Yamoussoukro Accords.⁷ Thus, the mediation attempts in Liberia marginalized some ethnic groups by these exclusions.
The situation was different in Cote d’Ivoire. ECOWAS involved all the factions right from the beginning. According to Bombande, the Contact Group had negotiations with all the factions and ensured that their concerns were addressed. ECOWAS did not succumb to President Gbagbo’s opinion that signing the Abidjan Agreement will legitimise the rebel movement. Instead, the sub-regional body held further negotiations with him which finally led to the signing of the Agreement. The change in approach may be due to the lessons learnt from earlier interventions. It may also be attributable to the provisions of the mechanism and protocol on good governance.

3.3 Reaction of the International Community

The international community’s intervention in the Liberian Conflicts began on 3 June 1993 upon a request by the ECOWAS for assistance. Hitherto, no formal steps had been taken by the International Community to end the conflict. Reasons for such attitude were attributed to the turbulent global security situation during the early 1990s. The Cold War which had determined the nature of global security for over 3 decades was ending and states were making preparations. It was also a period that the first Gulf war which perhaps was considered more strategic was in full force. The attention of the international community was therefore in the Middle East at the time. On the African continent, the OAU was beset with lack of resources and political will to conduct any intervention.

The international community finally made efforts at ending the conflicts when ECOWAS requested assistance at the UN. Starting from Resolution 788 of November 1992, the UNSC passed two other resolutions aimed at ending the conflicts. The UNSCR 813 of March 1993 and the UNSCR 866 of September 1993 which sanctioned the establishment of UNOMIL. Personnel of UNOMIL subsequently started arriving in Liberia on 10 October 1993.
The response of the international community in the case of the Ivorian conflicts was different. The French Licorne Forces already deployed in Cote d’Ivoire quickly intervened in the conflict. This force which was later reinforced up to about 3000 created a buffer zone between the rebel held north and the government held south. France quickly organized a roundtable talks involving all the factions in Linas-Marcoussis, France from the 15-23 January 2003. The Linas-Marcoussis Accord was brokered at the end of the talks.\textsuperscript{13} To support the efforts by France, the UNSC passed six resolutions between February 2003 and February 2004. The first was UNSCR 1479 of May 2003 which established MINUCI to monitor the Linas-Marcoussis Accord and the last was the UNSCR 1528 of February 2004 which sanctioned the establishment of UNOCI with powers to keep the peace.

The quick response by the international community in the Ivorian conflict is largely due to the efforts, presence and interest of France. Côte d’Ivoire since its independence in 1960 had signed several defence accords with France. The Accords guaranteed Cote d’Ivoire assistance from France in times of national insurgency and attacks.\textsuperscript{14} Additionally, Cote d’Ivoire had been a major source of raw materials and one of the countries within Africa where French culture is actively promoted.\textsuperscript{15} In fulfilment of the pacts between the countries and to protect its interest, France used its resources to quickly intervene in the Conflict. Afterwards, the colonial master used its permanent membership at the UNSC and influence in the world politics to rally other members of the international community especially the UN in support of efforts at ending the conflict.

Such a support from a colonial master or an influential state was absent in the case of Liberia. Perhaps the reaction of the international community would have been different in spite of the security challenges at the time had the United States showed interest and demonstrated the kind of support that France gave in the case of Cote d’Ivoire.
3.4 ECOWAS Speed of the Intervention

The response of ECOWAS to the conflict in Liberia was slower as compared to that of Cote d’Ivoire. The first formal discussion on the conflict in Liberia was held on 30 May 1990 at an ECOWAS 13th summit of the Heads of States in Banjul, Gambia. This was about six months after NPFL’s incursion into Liberia. It was during the summit that the SMC was constituted to ascertain how to end the Liberian Conflict. It took an additional three months after constitution of the SMC before ECOWAS could finally deploy ECOMOG in Liberia.17

Contrary to the situation in Liberia, ECOWAS intervened quickly in Cote d’Ivoire. An Extra Ordinary Summit was organised on 29 September 2002; just 10 days after the onset of the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. The decision to intervene militarily was arrived at approximately a month after the start of hostilities, whereas in Liberia, the decision to intervene was taken at approximately 7 months after the start of the conflicts. Finally, while it took ECOWAS about 8 months to deploy troops on the ground in Liberia, the sub-regional body had ECOMICI troops in Cote d’Ivoire 2 months after the start of the conflict.

Reasons for the delay in the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia relative to that in Cote d’Ivoire are several. In Liberia, the sub-regional body felt that the international community will intervene but this never happened. The failure of the international community to intervene compelled ECOWAS to take steps and mitigate in the conflicts. Secondly, ECOWAS had hitherto not conducted any military intervention on its own. As a result, some of the member states were sceptical regarding the capacity of the sub-regional body to undertake a military intervention in terms of financing and logistics. Added to this, was the Francophone and Anglophone divide that ensued regarding the intervention. Whereas the Anglophone countries agreed to intervene, the Francophone countries opposed such an intervention and this protracted deliberations regarding the intervention.
The delay in the intervention was also due to the lack of a framework to guide the procedures for conducting the intervention. As a result, member states argued among themselves during discussions instead of just following procedures that would have been already outlined if there was a mechanism.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, the understanding of the member states at the time regarding the responsibility for ensuring regional peace and security was different. It was thought that the International Community had the responsibility for ensuring peace and security within the sub region and the entire world. This ideology affected the political will of member states to support the intervention.\textsuperscript{19}

The two conflicts took place during two different eras. At the time that the Conflict erupted in Cote d’Ivoire, ECOWAS had conducted interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea and had gained some intervention experiences. The initial scepticism regarding the capability of the sub-region to undertake a military intervention had been defeated following these interventions. In addition, the regional body had adopted the Mechanism of 1999 which had outlined the procedures to be adopted in the event of a conflict in a member state. Thus, member states only needed to activate the procedures indicated in the Mechanism at the onset of the conflicts in Liberia. The existence of the Protocol therefore made it easier and quicker to take the decision and to subsequently intervene.\textsuperscript{20}

There was a better understanding among member states regarding the responsibility to ensure sub-regional peace and security. Member states were therefore ready and willing to intervene and end the conflict.\textsuperscript{21} ECOWAS had become more assertive within the sub-region and in the scheme of world politics. This assertiveness gave ECOWAS the confidence to follow the procedures in the protocol and intervene. The issue of Francophone and Anglophone divide during the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire was non-existent so delays regarding the decision to intervene were absent. France, Britain and Belgium had pledged logistics support for the West African force even before ECOWAS decided to intervene.\textsuperscript{22} There was
therefore no need for member states to be overly concerned about mobilizing the needed logistics support required to conduct the operation. But in the case of Liberia, member states had to find means of getting the logistics for the operation which were non-existent at the time. This delayed the intervention.  

3.5 Troop Contributing Countries and Command Structures

Five member states contributed troops for the initial deployment of the intervention force in each of the conflicts. However, there were variations in the level of contributions made by each of the countries. The Anglophone and Francophone divide that ensued influenced the contribution of troops by member states in the case of Liberia. All the Francophone member states except Guinea refused to contribute troops for the intervention in Liberia.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Gambia</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>1 Company</td>
<td>1 Battalion</td>
<td>1 Battalion</td>
<td>3 Battalions</td>
<td>1 Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Troop</td>
<td>1 Troop</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Battery</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Detachment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Detachment</td>
<td>3 Patrol boats</td>
<td>2 Boats</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Detachment</td>
<td>Battery Air Defence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td>1 Squadron</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Regiment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Tank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 Company</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle ships</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 Ships</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4 Contribution of TCC in terms of troops and armament for ECOMOG}

Figure 3.4 shows the initial Troop Contributing Countries for the intervention in Liberia with the support they offered. In addition to the financial contribution made by Nigeria, it contributed the largest number of personnel and armament. Whereas the other TCC contributed an Infantry Battalion each of about 800 personnel, Nigeria contributed 3 battalions. The Tanks and Artillery pieces that offered ECOWAS superior Fire Power over the NPFL were from Nigeria. Nigeria also provided rounds of ammunitions for personal rifles to soldiers from other countries including Ghana. Nigeria was largely responsible for the transportation of the troops into Liberia. The country provided 6 out of the 8 battle ships that conveyed the troops from other countries to Sierra Leone and from Sierra Leone to Liberia.

All the Ghana Armed Forces soldiers interviewed acknowledged the invaluable support of Nigeria in terms of armament. These soldiers agreed that ECOMOG could not have operated in Liberia but for Nigeria’s support. For instance, Warrant Officer Class I Asare stated that the Nigerian Artillery pieces enabled ECOMOG to push back the NFPL forces from Monrovia. The respondents hinted the support offered by Nigeria had its own challenges. Although the first Force Commander Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo was a Ghanaian, ECOMOG Concept of Operation was dominated by Nigeria’s intent of curtailing the conflicts by any means possible. Nigerian troops who formed the bulk of ECOMOG were therefore very brutal towards the belligerents and even innocent civilians during the intervention.

ECOMOG operated with the Force Commander (FC) doubling as both the political and military head having no clearly defined command, control and communication structure. The ad hoc structure which was dominated by Nigeria was inconsistent with the composition of the force and this led to acrimony among the troop contributing countries. With the exception of the first Force Commander who was a Ghanaian, Nigeria held all the staff
appointments at the Command Headquarters. Nigeria’s dominance even at the headquarters affected decision making which was always geared towards the interest of the country but not the entire force.\textsuperscript{34} The situation worsened when barely two months into the intervention, Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo the first Force Commander from Ghana was replaced by Major General Dogonyaro a Nigerian.\textsuperscript{35}

In Cote d’Ivoire, a consensus existed among the Anglophone and Francophone member states during the intervention. The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger Nigeria, Senegal and Togo pledged to contribute troops. However, at the end only five member states including Ghana contributed the troops.\textsuperscript{36} An indication that although member states have attained the political will necessary to ensure peace and security within the sub region, the commitment that is required to enforce the responsibility of ensuring peace and security within the sub region is yet to be attained.

Command and Control in Cote d’Ivoire was better than in Liberia. Articles 32 and 33 of the Protocol on Mechanism which had been adopted in 2001 addressed the challenges with Command and control experienced in Liberia.\textsuperscript{37} The Articles stipulated the procedure for appointing the Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary (SRES) as well as his responsibilities. The Articles also outlined the procedures for appointing the FC and his roles including the chain of command.

\textbf{3.6 The ECOWAS Peace Plans and Mandates}

ECOWAS intervened in the Liberian conflicts based on its decision A/DEC.2/11/90 relating to the adoption of an ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia and the entire West African sub-region.\textsuperscript{38} Article I of the Decision states that the Peace Plan was to ensure the restoration of peace and security to Liberia and the entire sub region by setting up an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to keep the peace, restore law and order and ensure
respect for the ceasefire. A broad-based Interim Government by National Conference of Liberian political parties, warring parties and other interest groups was also to be set up. Finally, a free and fair election was to be held within 6 to 9 months to establish a democratically elected government in Liberia. Drawing from the Peace Plan, ECOMOG was given the mandate to maintain law and order in Liberia, Protect life and property, maintain essential services, provide security to the Interim Administration, observe elections and conduct normal police duties.\(^{39}\)

Similarly, ECOWAS intervened in the Ivorian conflict based on recommendations by the Contact Group in the Abidjan Cease-fire Agreement of 17 October 2002. The objectives of the intervention were to monitor the cessation of hostilities; facilitate the return of normal public administrative services and the free movement of goods and services; contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement; and guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers and humanitarian staff.\(^{40}\)

The mandate for the Liberia conflict which was geared towards peace enforcement was as a result of the carnage that pertained during the intervention.\(^{41}\) Law and order had broken down and there was ceaseless killing of innocent people and destruction of property. Essential services were not functioning and international employees were being evacuated. The government was not in control as the NPFL controlled majority of the territory. This precarious condition informed the formulation of such mandate.\(^{42}\)

In Cote d’Ivoire, the situation was different. Hence, the mandate was more of monitoring than enforcement of peace.\(^{43}\) The LICORNE Forces had deployed in advance to form the Buffer Zone separating the rebel held north from government held south. In addition France had already secured the Linas-Marcoussis Accord so all that ECOWAS only needed
to monitor the implementation of the Accord and to enable free movement of the population as it was difficult to commute between the north and the south.

3.7 **Factional Support by Member States**

There were varying degrees of support of the factions by member states in both conflicts. The NPFL trained and launched its incursion from Houphouet-Boigny’s Cote d’Ivoire. After the incursion, the country continued to support the NPFL by supplying it with arms. President Blaise Compaore’s Burkina Faso also provided a strategic preparation ground for the NPFL as well as provision of arms. To garner further support for the NPFL, Compaore introduced Charles Taylor to the late Colonel Gadhafi who offered Libya as a training ground for the NPFL. Burkina Faso made its support for the NPFL open when in September 1990; President Compaore publicly admitted that Burkina Faso was providing military support to the NPFL during a visit to President Eyadema of the Republic of Togo. The Presidents Houphouët Boigny and Compaore’s support for the NPFL was a way of avenging the execution of President William Tolbert and the arrest of his son Adolphus Tolbert by President Doe.

A family relationship had developed between the Tolbert’s and the Boigny’s as Adolphus was married to Boigny’s daughter. Boigny therefore requested Doe to spare the life of President Tolbert upon ousting him from power but Doe refused the request and executed President William Tolbert. Afterwards, he arrested Adolphus who was later killed in jail. It was within this context that Boigny supported the NPFL and solicited the assistance of Compaore who later married Adolphus widow to do same.

To counter this support, President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria was believed to have also supported Doe. Babangida was regarded as the God-father of President Doe who had named a Graduate School of International Relations and a major road in Liberia after
At the onset of the crisis, Doe visited Nigeria to solicit for support against the looming insurgency. The Babaginda-Doe relations may have influenced Nigeria’s strong advocacy for a military intervention. Two other significant events that may have influenced Nigeria’s support of the NPFL against Doe was the shooting at the Nigerian Embassy in Monrovia in July 1990 by the NPFL. The following month, the NPFL reportedly killed about 1000 Nigerian Citizens within the premises of the Nigerian Embassy.

Similarly, there were proportions of rebel support by member states in the Ivorian conflicts. The Government of Burkina Faso offered protection and support to the military personnel who initiated the coup d’état that failed in 2002. Meanwhile, Charles Taylor was alleged to have contributed towards the formation, armament and offering military training to the MJP and MPIGO.

The support by these member states to the belligerent had a strong influence on the conflict. Provision of arms to Charles Taylor enabled the NPFL to continue the killing of innocent civilians, destruction of property and waging deadly operations against ECOMOG forces. ECOWAS however failed to address the support provided to the belligerents in both cases. Had that been done, the conflict would not have lasted that long.

3.8 The Legality and Justification for the Interventions

The United Nations Charter and the ECOWAS Protocols are the two main criteria by which the legality of the two ECOWAS interventions may be assessed. According to Article 52 of the UN Charter, the activities of any sub-regional group such as ECOWAS must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter which among others include the prohibition of the use of force. In addition, the sub-regional group must also seek an authorization from the UNSC before any intervention which if granted, would overrule the prohibition on the use of force. Article 54 of the Charter also states that the UNSC shall at all
times be kept informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.  

Article 16 of the PMAD states that the Head of State of a member state under external armed threat or aggression may seek assistance from the community through a written request to the Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS, with copies to other Members. Similarly, Article 40 of the Protocol relating to the mechanism for states that ECOWAS shall intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster in a member state.

In Liberia, ECOWAS violated the purposes and principles of the UN Charter specifically Article 52 when it failed to secure authorization from the Security Council before the intervention making it illegal per the UN Charter. Additionally, ECOWAS also violated article 54 when it failed to inform the UN Security Council of its planned deployment in Liberia, only notifying the Security Council after troops had already been deployed.

The legality of the intervention judging from the PMAD is also contentious. In July 1991, President Doe addressed a letter to the Chairman of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee asking for assistance to curb the insurgency. However, at the time, Charles Taylor’s NPFL was controlling majority of the territory of Liberia. Given that territorial control was in the hands of the rebels, and the rebels did not authorize the peacekeeping operation makes ECOWAS the justification based on the request from President Doe controversial. This may justify the NPFL labelling of ECOMOG as an invasion force and subsequently attacked them at the Freeport. However, ECOWAS justification based on humanitarian grounds to stop the senseless killing of innocent Liberian nationals and to help
the Liberian people to restore their democratic institutions was credible considering the carnage that went on Liberia.\textsuperscript{61}

In Cote d’Ivoire, ECOWAS intervention had no legal contestations. This was because the sub regional body acted in line with the provisions made in the Mechanism. The Mediation and Security Council mandated to ensure peace and security within the sub region according to the Protocol initiated the intervention at the request of President Gbagbo.\textsuperscript{62} It appeared that by adopting the Protocol relating to the Mechanism, ECOWAS had addressed the challenges of legality and justification that were encountered during the intervention in Liberia.

3.9 The Nigeria and the French Supports

Nigeria provided an estimated 80\% of ECOMOG troops and about 90\% of the funding.\textsuperscript{63} It offered airlift assistance to the other countries and assisted in the provision of armament and logistics supply to the force during the intervention. Ghana for instance relied on Nigeria for the supply of ammunition.\textsuperscript{64} Though Nigeria’s attitude and leadership role has been largely attributed to the relationship that existed between General Babangida and the Liberian President Doe, it was also consistent with its foreign policy of dominance in West Africa and the desire to be a hegemon in the sub-region. It was also believed that the intervention was an attempt by the Nigeria to enhance the status of its army and to prove its worth as a national and sub-regional asset.\textsuperscript{65}

However, Nigeria’s aggressive stands and leadership role incurred the displeasure of other member states of the Community. It heightened the internal strife between Anglophone and Francophone countries. Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire interpreted Nigeria’s initiatives as a means to establish its powers and an attempt to further exercise sub-regional domination.\textsuperscript{66} In spite of this assertion, Nigeria’s leadership role and contribution towards
the intervention has been acclaimed by many. ECOWAS was not assertive at the time of the Liberian Conflicts, there was therefore the need for a member state having the assertiveness and capacity to lead the intervention; that member state was found in Nigeria hence without Nigeria, it would have been difficult for ECOWAS to undertake the intervention.

In Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria did not assume the same leadership role but remained at the background and contributed towards the diplomatic negotiations. The French took over the leadership role during the Ivorian intervention in the absence of Nigeria. The 600 LICORNE Forces already in Cote d’Ivoire were reinforced to about 3000 to serve as the buffer between the rebel held north and the government held south. The French organised the Linas-Marcoussis Accords which served as the foundation for the Ivorian Peace Process. In addition, France employed its influence at the Security Council in ensuring the passage of six Security Council Resolutions on Cote d’Ivoire within a period of one year. France contributed over 4.6 billion Francs and signed other agreements worth several millions of franc towards the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire.

France however, was only promoting its foreign policy objectives in the region and seeking its national interest whilst seemingly helping to end the conflict. The military and political intervention was in fulfilment of its defence accords with Cote d’Ivoire aimed at ensuring its involvement in the security of the former colony. That notwithstanding, the role of France in Cote d’Ivoire was very important to the operations of ECOMICI. The Mission’s financial challenges would have been worse without the French.

The leadership roles of Nigeria and France in the Liberian and Ivorian conflicts stemmed from the institutional weakness of ECOWAS and the lack of capacity of the regional body to unilaterally undertake such intervention. Since ECOWAS has such challenges, it will be necessary for the sub regional body to have an agreement with the
international community and donor countries involving a guaranteed financial and logistics support during intervention. The support must continue until such a time that ECOWAS will be able to support itself during interventions.

3.10 The Challenges Encountered

ECOWAS interventions in both Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire were confronted with several challenges. Figure 3.5 below shows some of the pertinent challenges faced during the two interventions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Cote d’Ivoire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Division Among Member States</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of Political will</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Support of factions by member states</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Poor Force Generation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Poor preparation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lack of Funding</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Difficulty in Command and Control</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Lack of Logistics</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Weak Institutional Capacity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lack of Impartiality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lack of Neutrality</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Theft by Troops</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3.5 Challenges faced by ECOWAS during the two Interventions

ECOWAS had a divided front right from onset when the decision was being taken to militarily intervene in the Liberian conflicts. The Anglophone member states supported the intervention whereas Francophone Member States opposed a military intervention. The division also reflected in the Poor Force Generation as the Francophone countries refused to
contribute troops for the intervention in Liberia. The division heightened the already weak political will of member states towards ensuring security within the sub-region. The Ghanaian Soldiers interviewed, agreed that preparations in the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia was poorer compared with that of ECOMICI in Cote d’Ivoire.⁷⁴

ECOMOG also faced serious financial challenges. The ECOWAS Special Fund that was to be set up for the Operation in Liberia was not set up. TCCs were made to maintain their troops as a result; some poorer countries often could not provide the necessary combat supplies to their troops.⁷⁵ Such countries also struggled to pay the salaries and per diem due their soldiers in the field. This situation often led to indiscipline and negatively affected the morale of the troops. It also contributed towards pilfering by the soldiers and encouraged poor command and control.⁷⁶

The over dependence on Nigeria had its own challenges. The country took advantage to put forth its national agenda and to dominate decision making processes.⁷⁷ In the conduct of operations, Nigeria used its numbers to project the intent of its leader which was to use any means possible to end the conflict.⁷⁸ Nigeria’s dominance was accentuated by the weak capacity of ECOWAS institutions to manage the intervention. There was lack of coordination between ECOWAS and ECOMOG Field Commanders.⁷⁹ In addition, ECOWAS was not able to provide the needed logistics and supplies were erratic.⁸⁰ ECOMOG could not stay neutral and impartial. Rather, it often cooperated with one faction against the other. Instead of protecting life and property, there were incidents of human rights abuses, theft and corruption on the part of some of the peace keepers.⁸¹

In Cote d’Ivoire, the division among member states was absent as all members agreed and cooperated towards the intervention. Member States were politically willing to support the intervention. But the political willingness was not backed by the necessary financial and
logistics commitments. ECOMICI consistently was confronted with financial difficulties to the extent that then UNSG Kofi Annan had to appeal for funds to sustain the operations of ECOMICI.\textsuperscript{82} There was a lack of integrated logistics system in spite of the support from donor countries.

In addition, force generation were incoherent in Cote d’Ivoire as countries that initially pledged to commit troops later failed to do so. Support of factions by member states also persisted in Cote d’Ivoire but was not as blatant as was the case in Liberia. Burkina Faso was accused of supporting General Gueï and his rebels whilst Charles Taylor was also accused of supporting the MJP and MPIGO.\textsuperscript{83} Preparation of ECOMICI troops for the intervention was better than ECOMOG in Liberia. There were some prior training of personnel in peace support training centres and other military schools, as well as joint exercises.\textsuperscript{84} The challenges with Command and Control were minimised in Cote d’Ivoire as Articles 32 and 33 of the Mechanism addressed the challenges that were earlier on encountered in Liberia.

The office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs responsible for assisting the Executive Secretary to implement the Mechanism had not been fully set up when the conflict erupted in 2002.\textsuperscript{85} The challenges with the lack of finance, difficulty in lack of logistics and weak institutional capacity recurred in Cote d’Ivoire though at a minimum.\textsuperscript{86} It appeared that though ECOWAS had taken the steps to address some of the challenges, these measures had not been fully implemented due to lack of funds.

\textbf{3.11 The UN takeover and re-hatting of ECOWAS Troops}

The change over from an ECOWAS intervention to that of a UN Peacekeeping Mission with the concomitant re-hatting of the ECOWAS forces into UN troops started in Liberia and was repeated in Cote d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{87} There were some similarities and differences in
the circumstances that led to the changeover. In Liberia, the competence of ECOMOG as an intervention force became doubtful when on several occasion ECOMOG combined with the INPFL, the AFL or ULIMO to attack NPFL.\textsuperscript{88} The sub-regional body therefore lacked the neutrality, impartiality and competence necessary to mediate and bring the conflict to an end. Secondly, the division that ensued among member states regarding the intervention continued during the intervention. Consequently, some member states pressed for the UN to take-over.\textsuperscript{89} Finally, the logistically challenged ECOWAS became cash strapped as the conflict raged thereby affecting ECOMOG operations and capacity to see the intervention through. The lack of funds to support the operations of ECOMOG also prolonged the conflict.

The over ambitious Yamoussoukro Agreements of 1991 which was believed to be the roadmap for ending the conflict involved an encampment and disarmament of all the warring factions which required substantial funds to undertake. Unfortunately, the Agreement could not be implemented effectively as ECOWAS lacked the finance to do so.\textsuperscript{90} The deplorable financial position of ECOWAS coupled with the intractable nature of the conflict compelled ECOWAS to make a representation to the UN Security Council in November 1992 for assistance to end the conflict.\textsuperscript{91}

In Cote d'Ivoire, the change over from an ECOWAS intervention to that of a United Nations intervention began with the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord of January 2003.\textsuperscript{92} France had recommended that the UN assists in the implementation of the Accord. Following the recommendation, the UN deployed MINUCI forces to assist. But when the implementation of the Accord became difficult, France used its influence at the UNSC to deploy a UN force with a peacekeeping mandate to continue with the intervention. This led to the creation of UNOCI to take over from ECOMICI and MINUCI. In addition, funds for ECOMICI operation were not forthcoming and the mission faced chronic lack of
funds which affected its operations. The lack of funds also informed the request for the UN to take over.

3.12 The Achievements and Failures

With the support of the INPFL, ECOMOG managed to secure Freeport amidst fears battle with the NPFL on 25 August 1990. Though this achievement was contentious since it compromised the neutrality of ECOMOG, it paved the way for the entire intervention. At the time of deployment in Liberia, majority of the Liberian territory was under the control of Charles Taylor with President Doe confined to the Presidential Palace and a few other areas within Monrovia. ECOMOG deployment stopped the carnage on the streets and pushed NPFL out of Monrovia.

Having received large supplies of weapons, ammunition and equipment the NPFL launched a counter attack codenamed Operation Octopus to take back Monrovia on 15 October 1992 to recapture Monrovia but the attack was successfully repelled by ECOMOG. ECOWAS decision and resolve to intervene in the conflicts in Liberia at the time when the UN, the OAU and the international community looked on is commendable. In spite of the challenges encountered, the novel sub regional conflict intervention by ECOWAS has been acclaimed by many. ECOWAS is now touted as the benchmark; a trail blazer and a role model to other sub regional groups in terms of conflict interventions.

In Liberia, there were some challenges in spite of these achievements. On 9 September 1990, Prince Johnsons INPFL killed over 60 of Doe’s body guards and forced the president to surrender at no other place than ECOMOG Headquarters. ECOWAS failed to prevent the President from being massacred the following day with his body parts dismembered. The failure became more regrettable when then ECOWAS Chairman, President Dawda Kairaba Jawara of The Gambia and the Executive Secretary Abbas Bundu welcomed the death of President Doe under that despicable circumstances.
In Cote d’Ivoire, ECOMICI had some achievements in Cote d’Ivoire. A Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) was successfully inaugurated on 13 March 2003. ECOMICI also succeeded in stabilizing the situation in the western part of the country by July 2003. The mission demonstrated the sub region’s capability to take care of its problems when equipped financially and with the necessary logistics. ECOMICI established a permanent liaison with the belligerents as well as quadripartite meetings and operations centre. The management of the operations centre helped in information sharing and prevented escalation of tension among the belligerents as liaison officers from all the factions were present at the operations centre.

The achievements of the interventions can better be assessed based on their respective mandates and objectives. ECOWAS did better in Cote d’Ivoire than in Liberia based on the individual mandates and objectives. In Liberia, ECOWAS was able to set up an Interim Government of National Unity but this had some challenges as the Government was set up in the absence of NPFL contrary to the Peace Plan. Elections to establish a democratically elected government could not be held within 6 to 9 months as stated in the Peace Plan. The setting of Special Emergency Fund for ECOWAS Operations in Liberia with an initial capital of US$ 50 million could also not be achieved. It was therefore not surprising that the regional body later faced serious financial challenges. ECOMOG’s mandate of protecting lives and property also became a fiasco when several incidents of pilfering and thefts were perpetrated by ECOMOG soldiers. Mercedes Benz vehicles meant for diplomatic use were stolen by the soldiers. Due to the extensive theft of vehicles, some people mimicked the acronym ECOMOG to mean “Every Car Or Moving Object Gone”. In one instance, a ship bound for Guinea Bissau run aground as a result of being over loaded with stolen goods.

Several factors accounted for ECOWAS relatively improved achievement in Cote d’Ivoire than in Liberia. The intervention in Liberia was the first for ECOWAS. There were
no earlier examples to have learnt from. The decision to intervene was fraught with serious divisions among Anglophone and Francophone Divide. This delayed the intervention and negatively affected the operations of ECOMOG. The personal interest of some leaders at the time severely frustrated the efforts of the regional body. Added to these was the lack of preparation on the part of the countries for such an intervention prior to the occurrence of the conflict in Liberia. The complexities of the conflict in Liberia as opposed to that of Cote d'Ivoire also contributed to the inability of ECOWAS to achieve more.

ECOWAS had garnered a wealth of experience from interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau prior to Cote d’Ivoire. Quite a number of lessons had been learnt and efforts had been made to correct some of the mistakes, challenges and failures encountered during the previous interventions. The efforts made at correcting the earlier mistakes yielded positive results in Cote d’Ivoire.

3.13 Conclusion

There were some similarities and differences in the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. Political marginalization, economic decline and ethnocentrism were common in the causes of the two conflicts. The international community responded promptly in the case of the conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire whereas in Liberia, the response came later at the request of ECOWAS. Nigeria largely supported the intervention in Liberia contributing the bulk of the troops and personnel as indicating in Figure 3.4. In Cote d’Ivoire, France was the main sponsor contributing about 4.6 billion franc and deploying about 3000 LICORNE forces.107

There were varying degrees of factional support in both interventions. In Liberia, President Houphouêt Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire and Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso overtly supported Charles Taylor’s NPFL and supplied arms to the rebel group. In Cote d’Ivoire,
Charles Taylor was accused of assisting in the formation of MPCI. There were contentions regarding the legality of ECOWAS intervention in Liberia whereas in Cote d’Ivoire, such contentions were absent. Challenges of funding, logistics, command and control, lack impartiality and neutrality were encountered in Liberia. However, ECOWAS took steps to address some of these challenges before conducting the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. Yet, the problem of lack of funds and logistics still persisted in Cote d’Ivoire. The UN had to take over in both interventions before the conflicts could be brought to an end. This indicates that ECOWAS need to improve upon its intervention capabilities in order to ensure peace and security within the sub region.
ENDNOTES

2 Ibid
3 Ibid
5 Mensah (Colonel), D, interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG in Liberia (October 12, 2014).
7 Aboagye, Op. Cit. 93
11 Ibid
15 Ibid
17 Owusu (Colonel), A, interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire (October 19, 2014).
19 Ibid
20 Ibid
21 Ibid
23 Ibid
25 Aboagye, Op. Cit. 144
26 Kusi, Op.Cit
27 Ibid
28 Ibid
29 Owusu(Colonel), Adjei (Lieutenant Colonel), Mensah(Lieutenant Colonel), Annan (Warrant Officer I), Asare (Warrant Officer Class I), and Armah (Warrant Officer Class I), interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG and ECOMICI interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire (October 20, 2014).
30 Asare, K, interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG and ECOMICI interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire (October 20, 2014).
31 (OwusuColonel), et al. 2014), Op. Cit
33 Aboagye, Op. Cit. 81
Mohammed (Warrant Officer Class I), interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG and ECOMICI interventions in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire (October 20, 2014).

Aboagye, Op. Cit. 89
Gberie and Addo. Op. Cit. 22


Aboagye Op. Cit. 62
Gberie and Addo. Op. Cit. 21
Aboagye Op. Cit. 62
Gberie Op. Cit. 38


Mohammed(Warrant Officer), Op.Cit.


Joleneh, Op. Cit


64 Kusi, Op Cit
67 Owusu (Colonel) Op. Cit
69 ibid
70 Bovcon, Op. Cit. 10
74 Owusu (Colonel) Op. Cit
75 Kusi, Op Cit
76 ibid
77 Obi, Op. Cit. 122
78 Mensah (Lieutenant Colonel), J, interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG and ECOMICI interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire (October 21, 2014).
79 ibid
80 Kusi, Op Cit
88 Mensah(Colonel) 2014, Op. Cit
90 Addo. Op. Cit 22
91 Aboagye, 1999 Op.Cit 115
92 Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi, Emma Birikorang, and Thomas Jaye. COMPRENDIUM OF ECOWAS PEACE & SECURITY DECISIONS: PROTOCOLS, DECLARATIONS AND PEACE AGREEMENTS. Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), 2010.332
94 Aboagye Op. Cit. 82
96 Aboagye Op. Cit 105
98 ibid
99 Aboagye Op. Cit 85
100 (Aboagye 1999) 87
Former 2IC and DCO of GHANBATT in ECOMOG, interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement, Challenges and Failures of ECOMOG in Liberia (October 10, 2014).


CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Introduction

Over a decade, ECOWAS undertook conflict interventions in four member states beginning with Liberia in the year 1990 and ending with Cote d’Ivoire in 2002. The Liberian intervention largely supported by Nigeria was fraught with challenges such as lack of funds, inadequate logistics and issues concerning justification for the intervention. The study therefore compared the two interventions to establish how they differed from or were similar to each other and if any lessons were appropriated from the Liberian intervention to guide the Ivorian case. It sought answers to how Nigeria and France’s participations impacted on the interventions.

The study was underpinned by the concept of communitarian security. This was because; the concept contests the Westphalia ideology of state sovereignty and its right to exclusive rule over its territory. It argues that when states fail to protect the citizens within their territory, the community must take the responsibility to protect the citizens and ensure their safety; the exact basis upon which ECOWAS intervened in the Liberian crisis and subsequently adopted several protocols to facilitate such interventions.

4.2 Summary of Findings

The Protocol on Non-Aggression of 1978 was the first Protocol adopted by the community towards ensuring peace and security within the sub-region. The Protocol encouraged member states to desist from any acts of aggression towards each other and to settle all disputes peacefully. However, the PNA was criticised for having no response mechanism in case of its breach by a member state. This led to the adoption of the PMAD in
1981 to craft a response mechanism in the event of an external aggression towards a member state. The PMAD may be implemented upon a request from the Head of State of a threatened member state to the Chairman of ECOWAS.

To accelerate the integration of economic policies and to improve upon political cooperation, ECOWAS revised its treaty on 24 July 1993. The revised treaty conferred the status of supra-nationality on ECOWAS and committed member states to ensure the prevention and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts. This led to the adoption of the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security popularly referred to as the Mechanism of 1999. The Mechanism is the most comprehensive protocol adopted by ECOWAS for ensuring peace and security. It established the Authority, Mediation and Security Council, the Executive Secretariat, the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders and ECOMOG as the structures responsible for implementing the Mechanism. To further strengthen the preventive aspect of the Mechanism, a supplementary protocol dubbed the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was adopted in the year 2001. The protocol provided guidelines for alleviating the common causes of conflicts within the sub region such as poverty, corruption, election fraud and usurp of power by the military.

In December 1989, Charles Taylor and his NPFL launched a rebellion in Liberia against Doe’s Government. The rebellion quickly degenerated into chaos leading to the loss of many lives and destruction of property as the NPFL battled the AFL. The situation worsened when other rebel groups later emerged. There were no attempt by the international community to end the conflict and this compelled ECOWAS to intervene. Then in 2002, the MPCI initiated a coup attempt against the government of Laurent Gbabgo in Cote d’Ivoire. The failed coup later turned into conflicts dividing the country into two. ECOWAS having intervened in other conflicts and adopted several protocols aimed at ensuring peace and
security within the sub region intervened in the conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire after the French Licorne Forces had deployed earlier.

There were some similarities in the causes of both the Liberian and Ivorian conflicts. These similarities were political marginalisation, economic decline and ethnocentrism. It appeared that in Liberia, ECOWAS mediation approaches accentuated these causes. There were instances that some of the groups were excluded from the peace process. However, this error in approach were addressed in Cote d’Ivoire by the setting up of the quadripartite operations centre where all the factions involved in the conflict were updated on events.

ECOWAS’ response towards the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire was quicker than the conflict in Liberia. The quick response was due to the presence, support and involvement of France in the conflict. France’s support stemmed from the pact between Cote d’Ivoire and France as well as the attempt by the colonial master to protect its national interest.

Similar to the international community, ECOWAS responded speedily in the Ivorian than in the Liberian conflict. Factors that caused the delay included the lack of consensus or division among member states. Anglophone countries led by Nigeria advocated an intervention whilst Francophone countries led by Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso opposed the intervention. This division extended the period spent on deliberations regarding the intervention. Because the PMAD which formed the legal basis for the intervention lacked the procedures to be followed, member states rather spent a lot of time arguing on what to do during sessions instead of just following the laid down procedure if there was one. This challenge was resolved by the adoption of the Mechanism of 1999 which established the structures responsible for initiating and implementing interventions as well as the procedure to be followed. Thus, at the onset of the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, members only initiated the Mechanism and followed the procedures. This facilitated a faster response. Again the
scepticism that member states had regarding the capacity of ECOWAS to undertake interventions had been dealt with through the regional body’s intervention in several conflicts prior to that of Cote d’Ivoire.

In Liberia, all the Francophone countries refused to contribute troops for the intervention except Guinea. The refusal stemmed from the division that ensued between Anglophone and Francophone member states. Among Guinea, the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone that initially contributed towards the intervention, Nigeria contributed the most, committing about 80% of the troops and 90% of the funding. The country also provided a chunk of the armaments including battle ships that conveyed the ECOMOG to Liberia as well as artillery pieces that gave ECOMOG firepower over the NPFL. Respondents interviewed agreed that without the support of Nigeria, ECOWAS could not have undertaken the intervention in Liberia.

In Cote d’Ivoire, eight member states comprising members from both the Anglophone and Francophone divide pledged to contribute troops. But at the end, only five member states contributed troops. This indicated that although member states had the political will to ensure peace and security within the sub region, the commitment that was required was yet to be attained. There were varying supports of factions by member states in both conflicts. The degree of support in Liberia was more overt and higher whilst that of Cote d’Ivoire was covet and lesser.

Nigeria largely supported the intervention in Liberia but remained at the background during the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. With the exit of Nigeria, the Contact Group had to solicit the commitment of France to provide logistics support prior to recommending the need to intervene to the Mediation and Security Council. France agreed and supported the intervention. France deployed the LICORNE force to establish a buffer zone between the
rebel held north and the Government held south. The Licorne forces operated in the areas that were regarded as volatile and difficult for ECOMICI to operate. The country held and brokered the Linas-Marcoussis Accord which formed the basis for the peace process. France also contributed over 4.6 billion Francs towards the intervention. Respondents interviewed agreed that, the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire could not have been possible without the support of France.

There were also some recurring challenges in both interventions. In Liberia, ECOWAS had challenges with funding as the Special Emergency Funds for operations in Liberia with an initial capital of $50 million could not set up. There were problems with logistics in spite of Nigeria’s immense support. Consensual political will was lacking as member states persistently supported factions in the conflicts. There was poor force generation in Liberia as Francophone countries refused to contribute troops and those who contributed troops lacked the necessary logistics to conduct operations. These challenges recurred during the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. There was chronic shortage of funds. This made the UNSG at the time and the FC to appeal for funds to enable ECOMICI conduct its operations. Although the political will of member states had improved during the Ivorian intervention, the commitment that was required was not there. Donor countries offered logistics support to countries that contributed troops yet, there were logistics challenges due to the lack of an integrated logistics system. It appeared ECOWAS has not done much to address the challenges with logistics.

In Liberia, there were challenges with the legality and justification for the intervention in the framework of Articles 53 and 54 of the UN Charter. ECOWAS violated these articles by failing to seek authorisation from the UNSC before the intervention. There was lack of coordination between ECOWAS and ECOMOG Field Commanders and this generated difficulty with command and control. Additionally, Nigeria dominated the Command and
Staff appointments at the Headquarters and this affected decision making. The challenge with command and control was addressed by ECOWAS in Articles 32 and 33 of the Mechanism. As a result, challenges with command and control were reduced in Cote d’Ivoire. The challenges with impartiality and lack of neutrality experienced in Liberia were addressed in Cote d’Ivoire by the establishment of the quadripartite operations centre.

ECOWAS did not have the capacity to continue with the intervention and bring the conflict to a peaceful conclusion as result of the challenges. The UN had to take over from ECOWAS in both cases, before the conflicts could be brought to an end.

4.3 Conclusion
Fundamental changes in circumstances and political dynamics made ECOWAS responded better to the conflicts in Liberia than that of Cote d’Ivoire. The international community failed to react promptly when the conflicts broke out in the case of Liberia, however in Cote d’Ivoire, the international community reacted promptly. During the conflicts in Liberia, ECOWAS had no Protocol with procedure that indicated the steps to take by the community at the outbreak of a conflict in a member state, but in Liberia, the Mechanism which provided for the steps to take had been adopted and this facilitated the prompt response from ECOWAS. Division existed between the Anglophone and Francophone member states regarding the intervention in the Liberian conflicts, this division was absent during the intervention in the Ivorian conflicts. ECOWAS was not assertive at time that conflict broke out in Liberia. The community also lacked intervention experience before its intervention in Liberia. However, ECOWAS had become assertive at the time of the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire and gained experiences from previous interventions before the Cote d’Ivoire case. The carnage was still on-going when ECOWAS landed in Monrovia with the Charles Taylor controlling majority of the territory. However, in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, the French Licorne forces had deployed earlier and stabilised the situation before ECOWAS deployed
ECOMICI. These fundamental changes in circumstances and political dynamics led to ECOWAS better response in Cote d’Ivoire than in Liberia.

ECOWAS is also not positioned to unilaterally intervene and bring to an end a conflict in a member state and without the support of the UN. Although there is the political will to do so and protocols to facilitate such interventions; the funds, logistics and structures required are not available. The smaller and weaker economies of member states are the cause of these states of affairs making it impossible for ECOWAS to raise funds for interventions.

The adoption of the Mechanism and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance addressed the challenges with lack of political will, Legality and justification, difficulties in command and control as well as delays in interventions encountered in Cote d’Ivoire. However, the challenges with funding and logistics still pertained in Cote d’Ivoire.

4.4 Recommendations

The challenges identified in the study necessitates that measures are adopted by ECOWAS to improve upon its conflict intervention capabilities within the West African sub-region. This will help promote peace and security within the sub region whilst facilitating the achievement of ECOWAS’ original objective of promoting economic integration for development in West Africa.

- ECOWAS should give more consideration to the conflict prevention rather than the management aspect of the Mechanism. This is because conflict management through intervention is too expensive for ECOWAS to sponsor unilaterally. To this end, ECOWAS should promote the enduring tenets of democracy and good governance. Acts such as corruption, election fraud and usurping of power by the military should be quickly condemned.
• ECOWAS should sign a bilateral agreement with the UN to provide a guaranteed funding for interventions should there be the need since ECOWAS has the political will and is better placed to conduct interventions within the sub-region but lack the wherewithal. This is against the background that, members of ECOWAS double as members of the UN and as such pay levies to the world body entrusted with the responsibility for ensuring world peace.

• A meeting involving various peace and security experts within West African should be convened by ECOWAS to review the interventions so far conducted in order proffer solutions to the outstanding intervention challenges so far encountered but not addressed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.html (accessed October 12, 2014).


—. "PROTOCOL ON NON-AGGRESSION." Lagos: ECOWAS, 1978. 3.


—. "PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY." Lome: ECOWAS, 1999. 4.

ECOWAS. *PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION, PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY.* TREATY, Lome: ECOWAS, 1999.


Mohammed( Warrant Officer Class I), interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. *Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG and ECOMICI interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire* (October 20, 2014).


Owusu (Colonel), A, interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire (October 19, 2014).

Owusu(Colonel), Adjei (Lieutenant Colonel), Mensah(Lieutenant Colonel), Annan (Warrant Officer I), Asare (Warrant Officer Class I), and Armah (Warrant Officer Class I), interview by Augustine Awuku-Annie. Achievement and Challenges of ECOMOG and ECOMICI interventions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire (October 20, 2014).


